Paralipomena zum Sarvasarvātmatkatavāda II:
On the Sarvasarvātmatkatavāda and its Relation
to the Vṛksāyurveda

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1. In my contributions to the Commemoration Volume for Ludwig Alsdorf I have at some length dealt with the so-called sarvasarvātmatkatavāda. The material drawn upon in this article was mainly from the Dvādaśārṇayacakra of the Jain philosopher Mallavādin and Simhasūri's commentary on it, viz. the Nyāyāga-
mānusārini. When I examined this material and put the results of my analysis down in writing, I was already aware of the fact that with this vāda I had not only discovered a very promising vein of gold, but that it would certainly not be possible to unearth all of the precious metal at once. In fact, it was only shortly afterwards that I came to realize that in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya this vāda is also clearly attested. I have discussed the relevant passage in another article of mine, published in the WZKS.

As I cannot take it for granted that the readers of the present article are familiar with my two earlier studies or that they remember my argument in them, I deem it to the point to summarize in brief their main results before turning to what forms the actual subject of this second supplement.

2. However, before acquainting the reader with this vāda as regards its essential philosophical content and the relation it has with other central tenets of the Sāṅkhya school of thought, the following has to be emphasized: both the passages in which this vāda is mentioned, and some of the terms used, are not sufficiently explicit to allow to draw a distinct and complete picture, when taken by them-

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1 "Studien zum Dvādaśārṇayacakra des Śvetāmbara Mallavādin. I. Der sarvasarvātmat-


3 Cf. my article "Remarks on the Sarvasarvātmatkatavāda" in: Philosophical Essays. Professor Anandhal Thakur Felicitation Volume, Calcutta 1987, 166-181, on which the present summary is partially based.

selves; therefore, the exegete is thrown back upon his own understanding and his own endeavours to think along the lines of Sāṃkhya. Thus, the result cannot but be in part hypothetical.

Starting from the observation that the sentence saraṇaḥ sarvātmakam is paraphrased in the texts by the sentences sarvaṃ ekam ekam ca sarvam and sarvanaṃ sarvatā [vidyate/lasta], this ontological statement can be shown to mean that every phenomenon, and all phenomena are material by necessity, contains in itself at least one representative of each and every species of individual things. Yet it cannot be overlooked that this vāda is always exemplified or proved by explicitly referring to what nowadays would be called the ‘alimentary chain’. The fact, easily to be observed, that animal and vegetal life are mutually dependant, has obviously been interpreted by Sāṃkhya philosophers on the assumption that e.g. a particular animal contains in itself the matter of all those animals and/or plants it consumes. The peculiarity of this conception consists, however, in that the upholders of Sāṃkhya philosophy evidently supposed that all the individuals who have been consumed are nevertheless still existent as such,—a point which will become still clearer in the light of the evidence found in the Mahābhāṣya. On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that the statement saraṇaḥ sarvātmakam does not imply that every phenomenon consists only of all the others; i.e. every phenomenon at the same is an entity in its own right. Obviously the validity of the vāda extends to the inanimate evolves of prakṛti, too.

In connection with this latter question one would also have to take into account a fragment, assigned to the Vāraṇaśa, "the followers of Vāraṇaśa",⁴ by the author of the Yuktīdīpikā which O. STRAUSS has dealt with;⁵ it clearly states that the exponents of Sāṃkhya do not accept any annihilation, but only a disappearing out of being manifest (vyakti apā-t); this holds good for the 23 tattvas (at the end of a kalpa) as well as for all the other minor evolves of them (after a more or less limited time of manifestation). In passing it may be noted that the rejoining of a phenomenon with its cause(s) after having been manifest for some time is denoted by the technical term saṃsarga, whereas the opposite process is called viṣarga in Sāṃkhya-Yoga terminology. The next important point we have to consider is the additional element jātīyavuccchedena, frequently met with the sentence saraṇaḥ sarvātmakam occurs; for this expression is clearly intended to

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⁴ In passing, I should like to state here that I disagree with FRAUWALLNER (and others) as regards the reconstruction of the name of the famous Sāṃkhya philosopher: I think the evidence is clearly in favour of ‘Vāraṇaśa’ and not ‘Vṛṣṇaṇa’. I do not, of course, want to dispute that the proper name Vṛṣṇaṇa denotes its bearer as a descendent of a certain Vṛṣṇaṇa.


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preclude the possible misunderstanding of the sarvasarvātmakatvavādā as implying that by being sarvātmakā the individual phenomenon does not at the same time represent its own species. This vāda has predictably been attacked quite early, and the argument, of course, was that if it were true, everything would then be visible everywhere and in everything else. As to the answer of the exponents of Sāṃkhya, some of the relevant passages say that they took recourse to their specific concept of abhivyakti, i.e. they accounted for the empirical fact that a particular thing is perceived as this and only as this by referring to place, time, shape, etc., as conditioning its manifestation.

But there are still more fundamental problems connected with this vāda which have to be taken up for discussion. FRAUWALLNER⁶ has made the interesting and important observation that the origin of a given doctrine lies elsewhere than in the reasoning adduced for it and that reasons are, on the contrary, adduced only at a later stage, in order to prove the doctrine, the origin of which lies in immediate observation and perception of things.

From this it would follow that the sarvasarvātmakatvavādā is posterior in relation to the doctrine of prakṛti, which, together with other reasons, it serves to justify. However, since it cannot have been solely deduced from empirical facts, since furthermore it cannot have itself been derived from the concept of primary matter, it might be the easier assumption that it is later merely in the sense that it was later used as one of the proofs for the existence of prakṛti. In quest of the origin of this vāda one has, therefore, to take into account the fact that it is closely related to the satkāravāda, i.e. that it forms an integral constituent part of the special theory of causation the Sāṃkhya adheres to and propound: according to the latter vāda, a product already exists before it becomes manifest, and according to the former, i.e. the sarvasarvātmakatvavādā, the fact of its existence is not affected by its disappearance. And both these vādas cannot be divorced from the specific Sāṃkhya concept of being which was formulated by Vāraṇaśa, as is clear from a fragment thus preserved by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharma-kosā-bhāṣya:⁷ yad asti asty eva tad / yan nāsti nāsti eva tad / asato nāsti sanbhāvaḥ / sato nāsti vināśaḥ /.

Now, regarding the satkāravāda FRAUWALLNER⁸ seems to have taken the view that it was developed secondarily only, viz. in order to meet adverse criticism directed against reasons brought forward by Sāṃkhya authors who wanted to prove the existence of primary matter. Thus, if FRAUWALLNER were right, it would

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⁷ Ed. P. PRADHAN, Patna 1967, 301.2.

⁸ O.c., i.e.
mean that the specific concept of being, too, is of later origin — a consequence altogether improbable. Against FRAUWALLNER, as also against the implications of his ideas about this part of the historical development of the Sāṃkhya school of thought, I would hold that the whole problem stands in need of a thorough and critical reconsideration which may well lead to quite different results, and this is, of course, also due to new material which has become available in the meantime. The resulting picture would, to be sure, likewise have the character of a hypothesis. Yet, I think it would be a stronger one. It has, of course, yet to be drawn in full detail; my own attempt is but a rough sketch, and this also because I did not yet find time to examine all the additional relevant material which I have only recently discovered. My attempt starts from the assumption that the Sāṃkhya concept of being has arisen, among other śrutis passages, out of Ch.Up. 6.2.1.f., where — though still in terms rather of cosmological than of ontological thinking — it is stated that a sat can only have originated out a sat. But Rāmānuja,9 too, when he comes to speak of different theories of error refers to one which is evidently based on the sarvasvarāvatmātavāda; and it is in this very connection also that he actually refers to this Upaniṣadic teaching of Uddālaka Ārūji; therefore one has to reckon with the possibility that the specific concept of being which has developed out of it was not confined to the early and classical Sāṃkhya school of thought, but was likewise shared by the forerunners of the specific theistic school which later used it in its singular theory of error, i.e. long before Rāmānuja; and its actual existence at a still earlier point of time is clearly attested by Mallāvādī. Both schools, Sāṃkhya as well as the theistic one, should have had this concept of being in common, though their respective "Weltanschauung" would in all probability have differed considerably, a dualistic and non-theistic one in the case of the Sāṃkhya and a theistic and perhaps also monistic one in the case of the other.

As for the passage from the Mahābhāṣya, it is the final sentence of the discussion on Pan. 4.3.155 which proves extraordinarily instructive for the 'protology' of the sarvasvarāvatmātavāda. It reads thus:10 atha matam etat prakṛty-anvayā víkarā bhavanāthāpi na doṣo bhavati. This is meant to answer the question preceding: atha yo 'sāv ādyāṅ kāpoṭāḥ salonakāḥ sapaṭkāḥ na ca saṃpratī prāṇitī kathāṃ tatra prāṇaśabdo vartata iti /, "the feathered, winged pigeon that was at the beginning, now (i.e. after having been killed) does not breathe anymore. How is it that with reference to it (i.e. the dead, plucked bird) a word is, nevertheless, used that [primarily] denotes a breathing being (i.e. a living pigeon)?"

9 Śrībhāṣya on BS 1.1.1, ed. by SRI U. T. VIRARAGHAVACHARYA, Pt. 1, Madras 1963, 132f.

10 Ed. F. KIELHORN, revised ... by K. V. ABHYANKAR, II 325,15ff.

Although Kaiyāṭa and Nāgojibhāṭṭa apparently understood Patañjali's answer as referring to words denoting the product of a process of transformation, one cannot fail to observe that Patañjali, on the contrary, aims at explaining a linguistic fact by taking recourse to a philosophical view he knew and considered apt to solve the question under discussion. It was simply their unawareness of this philosophical view that led Kaiyāṭa and Nāgojibhāṭṭa to misunderstand this passage which doubtless refers to extralinguistic facts in order to explain a particular linguistic one. In reality what Patañjali says is this: "If one takes the view that the original [which undergoes a process of change] is existent in its transformation(s), there is no room for any objection in this case, too, (i.e., as regards the use e.g. of the word kapota to denote a dead pigeon as it is a víkāra of the original living bird which does not cease to exist)."

What Patañjali refers to here, is clearly a teaching that is intended to meet the question as to what happens to the prakṛti when a víkāra has manifested itself. And this teaching cannot but be the sarvasvarāvatmātavāda, according to which everything that represents a prakṛti, whatever the position it occupies in a given causal chain,11 does not cease to exist as such when it passes out of visibility: The individual pigeon as a living being does, indeed, still exists when it has been killed; and it is precisely this ontological "fact" that accounts for the linguistic observation that a prāṇaśabda can also be used to denote that very animal even when deprived of breath!

Thus the substance of the sarvasvarāvatmātavāda can be traced back to the 2nd century B.C.,12 which would corroborate my hypothesis that the particular notion of 'being' underlying this vāda was originally conceived by certain Upaniṣadic thinkers. Yet, at the same time what we owe to Patañjali is a
particularly clear example of what the sarvasarvātmanakatavāda is ultimately about: it is meant to answer the following question one cannot but ask when confronted with the doctrine of satkārya: If each and every thing exists even before it is manifested, what becomes of it when it disappears out of being manifest? In the light of this observation one cannot, I think, feel the least doubt but that the two viññās, the satkārya- and the sarvasarvātmanakatavāda, are not only closely related to each other; in fact they are nothing but two logically necessary and mutually supplementary aspects of one and the same concept of 'being'. Accordingly to this concept, peculiar to Śāṅkhyā, although probably not confined to it, there is only the dichotomy between things which exist (sat) and things which do not (asat); the view that things are produced and destroyed is unconditionally rejected; all that is admitted and in fact had to be conceded in order to account for the phenomenal world, is that the beginningless and endless being of each and every things, as it were, interrupted by a shorter or longer period of being manifest, but remains ultimately unaltered. That is to say, this notion of being ('Sein') is remarkably rigorous, and besides it all that can be conceded is a limited period of being manifest, i.e. an almost ephemeral "Dasein".13

3. Almost right at the beginning of my brief survey of the sarvasarvātmana-
vādāda attention was drawn to the fact "that this viññā is always exemplified or proved by explicitly referring to what nowadays would be called the 'alimentary chain'." It is in this connection that in one of the passages examined by me in my first article on this highly interesting doctrine reference is made to the Viṣṇyūrveda, "the science of horticulture or botany",14 in which as the name itself seems to indicate particular stress is laid on the treatment of diseases of trees, etc. The passage is from the Pātañjalamāyāsūravārana ascribed to Śāṅkara, the Advaitin, on the Bhāṣya on YS 3.14. In explaining the sūtra the Bhāṣya among other things quotes from a source which for various reasons cannot but have been a lost text of Classical Śāṅkhyā, most probably of Vārāṇi or one of his disciples, and this quotation15 is in its turn explained by the author of the Vivaraṇa.16 It is the following two sentences in his commentary which are of particular importance for the problem I want to deal with now (257.23-25).


13 The first part (cf. WEZLER 1981: 376f.) of this quotation, viz. jalabhadnyaṃ pārlaṁdikēdā raśāvimānaṇāṣanāḥ samadāvāṃ dēṣṭām tahā samvāradām thājagāmeṣu thājagāmānām samvāreṣaḥ, has been included in a collection of fragments entitled "The Śāṅkhyā-Sūtras of Pañcatikha (and the Śāṅkhyatattvāvalokā), Delhi-Varanasi-Patna 1977, 67f." and compiled by SVAMI HARIHARĀNANDA ARANYA, a modern Śāṅkhyā-Yogin (1869-1947) (cf. Śāṅkhyā. A Dualistic Tradition in Indian Philosophy ed. by G. J. LARSON and RAM SHANKAR BHATTACHARYA, Princeton 1987, 581). The purely imaginary ascription apart (rectified by Mr. JAINESWAR GHOSH’s note that "this sūtra is quoted in Viṣṇya’s Śāṅkhyā-Pravacana-Bhāṣya (sic!) li 14 but its authorship seems to have been unknown"), the Śāṅvīl’s commentary deserves attention, though primarily in terms of the reception of Śāṅkhyā in modern India; for what he says is that sarvam sarvākānma iti / kasmad? nāma- kāryaṇaṃ ekaraḥ / trayo guṇaḥ sarvesāṃ vikārāṇāṃ nālaṃ / tasmad nādi ayaṃtabheda vyikāraṇāḥ / patacāṇāṃ bhūyaṇāṃ sthāvaṇaparidhekaṇāṃ bhavati sthāvāradāṃ jñānamadhekaṇāṃ bhavati jñānamadān ca punaḥ sthāvāraparidhekaṇāṃ evam sarvasāṃ sarvam sambhavati rāddhānāḥ / bhūtaḥ punaḥ tattvāraparidhekaṇāḥ / tattvātnāi ca asmadparidhekaṇām vayasya- bhāvyaḥ vayasyavatparidhekaṇāḥ / mātikākaivāc sarve vikārāḥ sarvaśrāvād bhavanti siddhānanāḥ // To complete the picture I should like to add the śiplapa of BĀLARĀMA UPADHIVA (Yogadarśanam Bhavaganmanumipatana)/paprastāta vimuktam (1898) [i.e. the edition used by J. H. WOODS from his translation], 213]: sarvam vaca sarvavārmanam = sarvasthānaṃ ity arthe, evam ca nikhila- partikāṇi vastumi avartīdāḥ suksmatapāṇaḥ yā sarvadvāraparanātmanāt tā evadviṣadadyāt ity ucyante iti samādāndhiruḥ bodhāḥ / keṣu vāṣyaḥ ke bhavasyata dharmān iti samākāryam prychchānaḥ // - sthāvāreṣu ity aṣṭāhāṃ abā (viz. Viṣṇyūrveda) - vanaspatiyya ity āhān, vanaspatilatasya ity phalopudāgadgadgadvākirtiyaṃ dēṣṭām tad rāddhāṅvanāt jalaṣya gandhārjunavatvāt ca bhūmē pārlaṃdikēdā yā sarvādviṣadojanaṇātakāḥ ity vyapadeket ucyate iti bhūhāḥ //.

When I was grappling with this statement for the first time, I was far from understanding its full significance though I added a rather lengthy foot-note on the Vṛksāyurveda. It was only in the light of references to the sarvasarvātmaka-vāda which I happened to discover later in other texts that I came to realize that there is much more to it: the very fact that the Vṛksāyurveda is mentioned in this particular context calls for a more thorough study than I was then able to undertake for lack of parallel material. But now I think I can at least partially repair this omission; in order to do so I shall discuss passages from Cakrādharā's gloss on Jayantabhaṭṭa's Nyāyamāṇījarī, i.e. from the NM-Granthibhaṅga, from Bhāsarvājīa's Nyāyābhūṭa, and, last but not least, from a Vṛksāyurveda text itself to which my attention was kindly drawn by a former student of ours who has published a critical edition of it.  

3.1 The passage in the NM-Granthibhaṅga I have in mind raises some difficulties; for it is found at the top of folio 26 of the MS. and the folio immediately preceding has been lost. Thus the passage not only starts in the middle of a sentence, but it is also not clear to which phrase or expression of the mūla text it refers. But since the last pratiḍha on folio 24 is NM (KSS No. 109) p. 61 l. 19 and that following immediately upon our passage corresponds to NM p. 63 l. 21, the phrase or expression Cakrādharā elaborates on must belong to the text in between, i.e. practically the whole subsection given the apt heading Sāṃkhya-matanirākaṇam by the editor. In order to try to identify it, i.e. to make up for what the editor (of the NM-Granthibhaṅga) failed to do, it is, however, necessary to first take a look at the passage which reads thus (206.5-10):

\[\text{...ṛtādīnāṁ sambhāvaḥ, ṛtādīṣu ca puṣṭer ṛtādīyupayoge hi}\]

\[\text{17 CF. WEZLER 1981: 379.}\]
\[\text{18 Cf. fn. 14.}\]
\[\text{19 Cakrādharā's Nyāyamāṇījarigranthibhaṅga (= NMGBh) ed. by NAGIN J. SHAH (LD Series 35), Ahmedabad 1972.}\]
Cakradhara thus:

"[By a process of transformation milk] is turned into ghee and other dairy products, and ghee, etc., is the source of growth in physical strength; and, when ghee and similar products are consumed, one grows in physical strength; and when one is in a well-nourished condition sperm, etc. [are produced in one's body] and when there is sperm, one [is able to beget] sons and other children. Because they die when time has come, their body is boiled (i.e. rots in the course of time), and the decomposed [corpses] by way of transformation turns into worms, and these, too, [finally] get putrefied. In the Vṛkṣāyuveda [the following] is authoritatively taught in order [to ensure] a [proper] growth if trees: 'This being so, even a tree can originate from it (i.e. milk) and from a tree [one gets] fruit, from fruit organic juice, from organic juice physical strength; hence each and everything is [contained] in milk; [yet the different products] do not become manifest simultaneously due to [the fact that their manifestation] is conditioned by place, time and shape."

Now this passage allows to make the following observations:

[1] In order to explain the Sāṃkhya contention that sarvan sarvatrāsti — which is but an alternative expression for sarvan ekam ekam ca sarvan or sarvan sarvatmakam — Cakradhara gives an example, viz. milk and its various products-of-transformation. Since it is precisely this example which is frequently found in Sāṃkhya texts themselves, or fragments of such texts, there is no question about his having borrowed it in its substance from a Sāṃkhya source, though its identity cannot be determined.

21 The "ādi" is most probably added here in view of the widespread idea, met with in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts also, that in addition to sperm blood (sonita etc.) (from the side of a future mother) is necessary for conception.

22 As kvāti- cannot but be derived from the root kvāth and quite clearly means "rotting, decomposition" here, TURNER's assumption "A Comparative Dictionary of Indo-Aryan Languages", 169, s.v. KVÚTH) that a root kvāth "rot" should be separated from Vrksavat "boil", accepted also by v. HINÜBER, "Pāli kañhī: Ein Beitrag zur Überlieferungsgeschichte des Thervāda-Kanons" in: II 21 [1979],21-26), becomes implausible. It seems more likely that originally there was one root kvāth only denoting the [various] changes caused in liquids (cf. e.g. Manus. 11.159) or animal/vegetal matter by warmth or heat.

means] of [making] trees grow (i.e. that it represents an excellent natural manure)." This re-interpretation of the passage under discussion — and I think it is the only correct interpretation — implies, of course, that the expression tatra in the subsequent sentence has to be taken as referring to śārīraṃ kvaṭhāṁ so that what results is the interesting statement that "since this is so, i.e. since a decomposed corpse serves among other things as manure to trees, it is not only worms that can be produced by it, but similarly a tree, too."

We are, therefore, in a position to add the following additional observations:

[3] The chain of transformation adduced by Cakradhara by way of illustration contains the following links: kṣīra — ghṛta etc. — puṭṣī — retas etc. — putra etc. — māraṇa — śārīrasa kvaṭhāḥ — kṛṇi or alternatively vyṣṭa — phala — rasa— and finally bala. Since it is clearly meant to justify the statement obviously at issue, viz. that sarvaṃ kṣīre 'sti, it is no wonder at all that the process of transformation does not culminate in the manifestation of the original prakṛti, i.e. milk. As from other relevant sources, too, one gathers the impression that the Śaṅkhyas never insisted on what we would call the cycle of matter in nature. For, one cannot fail to note in the present case that the chain could have easily been continued after śārīrasa kvaṭhāḥ by tṛṇa which in its turn could, when fed to a cow, to be said to become milk by transformation.

On the other hand, it seems noteworthy, or even significant, that such a continuation is absent and that the chain would seem to break off with bala, "strength", a concept similar to puṭṣī, but denoting an effect brought about by a vegetal and not an animal product; and there is no likelihood at all that the author who quotes here from a Śaṅkhya source is responsible for the break, i.e. that he has left out any links that may have followed upon bala in the original.

[4] Further, one should take note of the fact that Cakradhara's example is not really the 'alimentary chain'. Of course, it contains elements of such a chain: the ghee is consumed by man, the fruit eaten, etc., but taken together, it is of a distinctly different character, for it can rather be styled a causal chain; yet the different individual links of this chain are conceived each as forming a product-of-transformation of the immediately preceding one in the accordance with the Śaṅkhya pariṇāmavāda.

[5] Of particular importance, however, is the context in which the Vyākhyāveda is referred to; for, an element of its teaching is taken recourse to only in connection with the statement that there exists a pariṇāma relation also between

a decaying corpse and a tree, i.e. to use Śāṅkhya terminology, between a jaṅgama and a sthāvara. Now, it was precisely this idea which, as you will remember, made the author of the Vivaraṇa refer to the Vyākhyāveda! This correspondence, striking as it is, can, to be sure, not by any means be convincingly accounted for by assuming a mere accidental coincidence. On the contrary, it warrants the assumption that the reference to the Vyākhyāveda in both these texts was taken over by the authors from their respective sources which may well have been even a common one and which must necessarily have been a Śaṅkhya text.

It is hence perfectly legitimate to make the further assumption that it were Śaṅkhyas authors themselves who thought it useful or even necessary to refer to the relevant sāstra when expressing the view that animals, nay even the foremost of animals, man himself, after death do not only, as could easily be observed, turn into worms, but also form a nutriment of plants, whereas the opposite process, i.e. the transformation of plants into animals, was evidently considered by them common empirical knowledge which did not in any way call for a sāstra justifying it.

3.2 Much of what has been said just now in analysing the NMGbh passage is strikingly corroborated by Bhāsarvajña who comes in as a most welcome additional witness. For, in examining the last of the famous viś products adduced by Classical Śaṅkhyas authors, among them also Īṣvaraśraṇa (cf. Śaṅkhyakārikā 15), for the existence of primary matter (pradhāna) it is thus that he renders the Śaṅkhya argument (Nyāyabhāṣya 564.2-11):

\[\text{itāḥ cāsti pradhānaṃ vaiśvarūpyopalabdheḥ kṣīrādivat / tadvāhā kṣīrād dadhī, dhadhinās takraṃ ghṛtaṃ ca, tadāpi yogat puṭṣī tato 'pi putrādyah / kadācin māryasa śārīrasa kvaṭhāḥ / kvaṭhāsya (read: kvaṭhāsya ?) kṣīrāvata pariṇāmaṃ kutilām (read: kutilām ?) śārīrāṃ vyākhyāvede vyṣṭāṇāṃ vṛddhyartham iti śūnaye / tena ca vyṣṭānām api tatkāryatam, vyṣṭa ca phalaṃ, putralā rasas tadāpi yogat puṭṣībham iti etat sarvaṃ kṣīre 'sti kārayakāraya itah ādā / evam sthāvarāṃjaṅgamaṃ sadbhāva jaṅgamaṃ ca sthāvarasya eti evam jñayucchedena sarvaṃ sātvāmakaṃ desakālākāramittaprabhādhānāṃ na samānā-kālabhibhīyaktaḥ, tad etat sthāvarajajñamavaisāśāryayam jaḷa-bhāmyoh pariṇāmitam / jala-dariṇiḥ taryasya kasyacit so \text{`py anyasya sa} \text{`py anyasya sa} \text{op'py anyasya tāvad yāvad avīn} \text{`py anyasya so} \text{`py anyasya so} \text{`py anyasya tāvad yāvad avīn}\]

\text{24} It is perhaps better, and more in accord with what the text actually says, not to assume an alternative development, but a temporal sequence here too, i.e. to take \text{tad (evo) to mean kṣīrāvata pariṇāmaṃ śārīram}; this interpretation is also confirmed by the parallel from the Nyāyabhāṣya, cf. below p. 299.

\text{25} Apart from the passage quoted from the Śaṅkhyā-Saptati-Vṛtti (Va) in WEZLER 1981: 380f. what should have been mentioned also is the Māthāharṣṭī on this kārikā; for it concludes its comment with the words: yahā jālabhāmyoh etad rastagandhādivaśāryāyam avabhākham anusa eva sthāvarāṇāṃ jaṅgamaṃ jaṅgamaṇāṃ sthāvareṣu / evam jñayucchedena sarvaṃ sātvāmakaṃ iti it.
bhāgah kvacic abhūt / yatra cāvībhāgas tat pradhānam iti //.

The correspondence of the first half of this passage with what we found stated in the NMGBh is almost a complete one; it also clearly confirms the re-interpretation of the latter text proposed by me, and this to such an extent that I think I need not translate it. Similarly I withstand the temptation to examine the relation in which the whole passage evidently stands not only to the Vivaraṇa, but also to quite a number of other relevant passages discussed in my first article on the sarvasvarātmakatvavāda; suffice it to state that this relation is so close that there cannot be the least doubt that Bhāsarvajña has borrowed from one of the other texts or — and this is more likely — is even indebted to the same common Sāmkhya source.

In view of the parallel from the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa it can be regarded an established fact that it is only with regard to a particular element of the sarvasvarātmakatvavāda, viz. the transformation of a being of the jaṅgama class into a sthāvara, that Sāmkhya authors felt prompted to call Vṛkṣāyurvedas into evidence and to support their view by the deposition of these unbiassed witnesses. It is most natural to assume that corresponding statements can actually be found in texts of botany, and, indeed, I was able to point out some already in the article mentioned just now. They have, however, the common feature of referring to animals only, or constituent elements of the organism of animals,26 while the transformation spoken of by Cakradhara and Bhāsarvajña is clearly that of a human corpse. One has, therefore, still to search for passages in Vṛkṣāyurveda texts that would agree with what both these authors assert them to say; for, to be sure, neither Cakradhara nor Bhāsarvajña seems to harbour the least doubt that the reference to the Vṛkṣāyurveda is fully justified.

In fact, in Surapāla's Vṛkṣāyurveda27 we find also the following verses:

aiṅkolha-taila-narattaila-su-bhāvitaṃ yat
bijam svabhāva-paripakva-phalād dhi nītam /
sājīyate jhapītat tat karaṅkūbhi-sīka-  
nyātsnā-cayopetam idam atra na citrama asti // 277 //

"A [grain of seed] which has been properly steeped in the oil of the aiṅkolha plant as well as in oil [prepared from] human [fat]; if it has been taken from a fruit [naturally] ripened, no doubt, sprouts at once, if it is furnished with a heap of fertile soil which has been [thoroughly] moistened with water from a vessel/hail-stone water; there is nothing amazing in this".

aiṅkolha-matsya-sīnānār-yo-kola-nakra-  
tailābhīhāvā-viśoṣita-bijam upītam /
sekād varāvani-tale karakambu-sīke  
sūre sa-puṣpa-phalītaṃ jhapītīt drūmaṃ ha // 281 //

"For, a grain of seed which has been steeped in oil prepared from the aiṅkolha plant28 and from fish, dolphins, men, hogs and/or alligators and which has been carefully dried, produces an account of being watered at once a tree full of blossoms and fruits, if it is sown in a piece of excellent soil, moistened with water from a pot/hail-stone water."

Similar verses are attested in the Upavannavindha section of the Sārīgadharapaddhati and other texts in which issues of the Vṛkṣāyurveda are dealt with. Yet, I think those I have noted just now render sufficient evidence to prove my point, viz. that Vṛkṣāyurveda texts in fact strongly recommend the use of certain products prepared from human corpses, in particular of 'human oil', and, indeed, as has been stated by Cakradhara and Bhāsarvajña, "in order to ensure a [rapid] growth of trees" and other plants. But this extraordinarily interesting material calls for a more detailed discussion which will be attempted in what follows, although I am also bound by limitations of space — and time.

[1] As regards chronology, no real difficulties arise. Although Surapāla can certainly not be assigned to a period prior to Classical Sāmkhya,29 there is no doubt that his work is, for the greatest part, based on older works and thus ultimately on a tradition which can be traced back to the time of the Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra where the Vṛkṣāyurveda is referred to for the first time.30 It has, of course, to be admitted that there is no direct evidence for the assumption that the

26 This evidence, in fact it is an ample one, is now easily accessible in R. P. DAS' edition of Surapāla's Vṛkṣāyurveda (cf. fn. 14) and it need not hence be discussed here.

27 For parallels in other Vṛkṣāyurveda texts and additional explanations see R. P. DAS, o.c., p. 366f.

28 The preparation of this oil is described in Śivatattvavorānīka 7.2.18ff. (Vol. II p. 265ff.).

29 On Surapāla's date see R. P. DAS, o.c., p. 17.

30 Viz. 2.24.1.
procured such fertilizers. For, quite clearly we cannot go so far as to assume that human flesh and 'oil' have in India at any time be a merchandise easily available in the nearest market. On the other hand, the possibility that human flesh was nevertheless occasionally sold cannot be entirely excluded, not so much because of testimonies like e.g. that of act V of the Mālatimādhava33 or that of the Hārṣacarita34 (which might well derive from the arsenal of poetic imagination or the depths of popular horror stories), but rather in view of the fact that in the Arthaśāstra (4.10.14: punishment in the form of cutting off individual limbs and selling vīmāna35; 4.10.15: mānaṃśaṃśavikraye vadhah) penalty of death is prescribed "in the case of the sale of human flesh"; for the inclusion of this paragraph in the 'Ancient Indian Penal Code' cannot plausibly be explained by assuming that it is based exclusively on considerations of a merely theoretical nature; something real must have been the reason for it, whatever it may have been. But even so it cannot be disputed that the central question remains how

31 Cf. also WEZLER, Die wahren "Speiserestesser" (Skr. vighāsāin), Wiesbaden 1978, p. 18ff.

32 Dried blood of animals slaughtered is still used as manure, and it is used in every market-garden. The use of the blood of sacrificial animals as fertilizer is also referred to by H. ZIMMER, Die indische Weltmutter, Frankfurt 1980, p. 21; for the use of flesh in this capacity see also Śukraniti 4.4.45 as quoted in Dharmakośa, Rājanikīkāda p. 1431. Note that the idea that blood makes the earth fertile is attested already in the RV (e.g. 1.32.5) (cf. K. HOFFMANN, Der Inkunktiv im Veda, Heidelberg 1967, 244).
human flesh and 'oil' could have been procured in ancient or early mediaeval India.

Not, to be sure, from killing of old people? or from places where anatomy lectures were held, so to say, a possible source for procuring usable products of the human body could, however, have been human sacrifice the existence of which even in the 'Great Tradition' cannot reasonably be doubted. But apart


39 Some of the titles subsequently listed contain information about further relevant literature on human sacrifice in India; I therefore deem it justified to confine myself to presenting what is the result rather of an accidental discovery than of a systematic search.


S. A. Weber: Über die Königswelt, den Rajāsīhaya, Berlin 1893, 8, 47, 52, 64, 108.

E. Thurstorn: Castes & Tribes of Southern India, Vol. 1, Madras 1909, p.XV.

R. von Heine-Geldern: "Kopfjagd und Menschenopfer in Assam und Birma und ihre Ausstrahlungen nach Vorderindien", in: Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen

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PARALIPOMENA ZUM SARVASARVÂMAKATVAŚVÂDA II 305

Gesellschaft in Wien, XXXVII (1917), 1-65.

BAHADUR HIRLA RAI: "Human Sacrifice in Central India", in: Man in India, 1 (1921), 8-66.


K. K. Handiqui: Yajñatilaka and Indian Culture (Jivaraj Jaina Granthamâla No. 2), Sholapur 1949, p. 22ff. (for further references see General Index s.v. Caṇḍamāri).


D. N. Lorenzen: The Kâpâlikas and Kâlîmukhas. Two Lost Śâvâte Sects, New Delhi 1972, p. 86.


M. Witzel: "The Case of the Shattered Head" in: Sîrî 13/14 = Festschrift Wilhelm Rau . . ., 1987, 363-415 (especially §§ 8 and 9 as well as notes 49, 55ff., 66, 74, 95 and 103). — Sacrifices of animals and men to tree deities are referred to in Jātaka no. 50 and 353.

Note that even today one finds once in a while in the media news about, real or alleged, human sacrifices in the Indian subcontinent (e.g. "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" of 6th July 1991: "Zehn Jahre altert MÖdchen einer Göttin geopfert") It is, however, necessary to distinguish not only, as rightly pointed out by A. W. Macdonald (see above), between various stages in the cultural development of mankind in the framework of which such sacrifices become understandable, e.g. that of hunters in contradistinction to that of
from the problem of the diffusion and frequency of human sacrifice, it is the secrecy (that must have surrounded it), the fear of arousing the suspicion of a general public or the organs of state (that must have dominated the sacrifices and the participants) which makes one hesitate to regard such sacrifice to have been a probable, or at least the most probable, source of supply of human flesh, etc.

Now in the commentary on an unknown Vṛksāyurveda text, the Vṛksāropana-prakāravākyāya of Sādāsvīvāya — the edition of which we also owe to R. P. DAS, there is a passage in which it is clearly stated that the bones, marrow and flesh needed should be taken from śāstrāghātena yo mṛto 'thavā śālaprotena yo mṛtas tādāśramaṇasya ..., i.e. "from a man who has been slain with a weapon or impaled on the stake". One cannot, however, be sure that this forms an original piece of information, based on the author's own observation; it might likewise be merely part of Sādāsvīvāya's erudition; precisely for the same expression, and in identical sequence at that, are repeatedly met with in the Arthaśāstra. Significantly enough all references are to the last but one adhikārā, i.e. the fourteenth, "Concerning secret practices" (aupaniṣada), viz. 14.2.28, 14.3.4, 64 and 79 (śastraḥataṣṭa śālaprotena vā puruṣasya pumāsah). The evidence of the AŚ — in which the Vṛksāyurveda is mentioned for the first time in Indian literature (see above p. 301) — is particularly welcome as it definitely proves that the use of parts or products of human corpses was known at least in a certain kind of ancient Indian magic and sorcery. On the other hand, it is this magical context that creates a problem regarding the qualifications of the man whose flesh etc., can or should be used, viz. śastraḥata and śālaprota: Are they to be taken as a specific condition indispensable for the magical cure to be effective or are they a general quality inevitably to be present in the qualified, in that only flesh, etc., of such a person can at all be thought of being available? The implication this alternative has is clear: Only in the latter case would it seem possible to regard, without further ado, the statements found in the Vṛksāropana-prakāravākyāya and especially in the Arthaśāstra as pieces of evidence giving information about the source(s) of procurement of human corpses or parts of them for practical or magical purposes.

In order to answer this question we have first to determine the meanings of the decisive expressions śastraḥata and śālaprota in the AŚ. The latter does not pose any problem as it quite clearly denotes a man who has been sentenced to death and has been executed by a method apparently widely used in ancient and mediaeval India, viz. by impaling. In view of the juxtaposition of the two attributes it is legitimate to examine first whether śastraḥata might likewise refer to a person on whom a death sentence has been carried out, but then, of course, with the sword. Although this method was also known in India, it can't be what is intended by this expression here; for this attribute is found applied, in the same section of the AŚ, viz. 14.3.69, to a cow which is thus qualified as "killed with a weapon" (MEYER and KANGLE) or "a sword/knife". Following the dictionaries (PW, MONIER-WILLIAMS, etc.) one may, of course, consider also the possibility that śastraḥata means "fallen [warrior]"; and there is, no doubt, some likelihood that not all corpses of warriors or soldiers fallen in battle were always ritually cremated. But this seems to be too narrow a meaning especially as in AŚ 14.3.14 the expression svayaṃprāpta is met with (said of a Brahmin) and it suggests itself to take it as standing in direct opposition to śastraḥata; for MEYER's assumption that what is meant is a man who has committed suicide, is far from convincing, not only because of general semantic considerations (the root mṛ means "to die") but also, as rightly pointed out by KANGLE, because of the parallel at AŚ 2.2.9 (where svayaṃprāpta [scil. hastin] stands in opposition to a hastigāhīna). "Dies naturally", the correct meaning of svayaṃprāpta at 14.3.14 (and other places), then points, for śastraḥata, in the direction of "one who has met with death by violence (except for those who have been executed by impaling),"

agriculturists, but also between the killing of human beings as part of or essential element of a ritual act, on the one hand, and outside any sacrificial contexts, on the other. This point apart, one wonders that C. VON FÜRER-HEIMENDORF did not deem human sacrifice even worth mentioning (according to the "Index") in his book on Tribal Populations and Cultures of the Indian Subcontinent, (HDI II.7), Leiden-Köln 1985.


41 The suspicion is aroused by the fact that the sequence of the two qualifications is the same as in the Arthaśāstra, but first of all by the expression śālaprotena in the place of which one would rather expect śālapromana.

42 At 14.3.70 śālaprotena alone occurs; should we emend the text here and read also śastraḥataṣṭa śālaprotena vā? As for 14.3.58 see below, n. 48.


44 Note that at 14.3.15 a masculine go is referred to that is slaughtered "in the funeral rites of a Brahmin" (brahmānapasya pṛetakārya yao gaur mārya...). Regarding vegetarianism in the AŚ see H. SCHARFE: Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtstehe des Kañāya, Wiesbaden 1968, p. 291ff.

45 J. J. MEYER, Das altindische Buch vom Welt- und Staatsleben ..., Leipzig 1926, p. 652, n. 2.


47 Another parallel, not less significant than that mentioned by KANGLE, is AŚ 2.26.12 (cf. note 35, above).
veda texts in certain cases was most probably gained from the corpses of people who had either been impaled on the stake or met with death by some other form of violence.

One cannot help asking oneself further questions at this point, e.g. how an Indian gardener could get hold of such corpses, etc. But the material at disposal does not, as far as I can see, permit us to answer such questions, not even the particularly momentous one regarding the quantity of corpses available on an average within a given period of time; meticulous book-keeping about killing, etc., is evidently a more recent 'achievement' in the history of mankind.

5. Yet apart from such concrete questions there is another problem, and one of much greater significance at that, which is raised by the text material presented above, viz. that of the relation(s) between philosophy and natural sciences in India in general. If I am not mistaken, all that can be said at present is that this problem has hardly ever been touched upon. Nobody seems to have addressed himself to it until now in a systematic, comprehensive and serious manner; and I for one cannot, and dare not to venture so far in the present essay. But the reference to the Vṛṣṇīṣyurveda in (an) early Sāmkhya text(s) with which I am dealing here is a particularly instructive instance of this relation so that at least a few remarks are certainly called for; indeed such individual observations form the most reliable basis for the comprehensive study of the general problem which we still lack.

It is true that this reference to the Vṛṣṇīṣyurveda is not the only one that can be found in philosophical texts, or tracts. To give but a few more examples: The argument vyāhāpraśākṣyātā, brought forward in Mahābhārata 12.177.15, is explained by the commentator Vidyāśāgara by adducing as witnesses unknown vṛṣṇīṣyurvedavidhā whom he quotes or states as making the prescription aṁlaṁ madhu māṃṣaṁ ca samyāvēśādīcchdugḍhodakaṁ in order to cure diseases of trees caused by people urinating at their roots. Similarly Sinhasūri refers to what is taught in the Vṛṣṇīṣyurveda on the occasion of Mallavādi’s assertion that fruits are also found not to be ripe at the time of their natural ripening.

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44 MEYER (o. c. p. 656, n.) changes dhānagṛya of the MSS into mānagṛya “drowned”; but KANGLE (o. c. p. 588 n.) seems reluctant to accept this conjecture and remarks that “dhānagṛya evidently refers to a murdered man”, however without adducing any parallel. Perhaps G. v. MITTERWALLNER’s observation that in Kusana art the Devī is depicted as overcoming the buffalo “by breaking his spine and strangling him with her main hand” (cf. her article in: German Scholars on India II, Bombay 1976, p. 196-213) is of importance here, too, in that it draws our attention to the possibility that killing without bloodshed could be denoted by the root bhatē.


51 Cf. Dvādāitäraṇ Nayacakrama of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamātrāmaṇa ...
finally, Siddhasena does not fail to point out that at least some of the facts which he adduces in order to prove the thesis of the trees’ cetanāvata "are stated in the Vṛksāyurveda." And it is equally true that the latter references, too, deserve a more detailed analysis than can be undertaken here.

Nevertheless, the reference in the unidentified Sāṃkhya source demands scholarly attention to a much higher degree. The reference, or quotation, has already been shown above (p. 297 and p. 299) to run thus: tadd eva ca kvākhyāṃ vṛksāyurvedesi vṛksāyāṃ śṛiṣyate or kathāṃśa vṛksāyurvedesā vṛksāyāṃ vṛddhyarthaṃ iti śṛiṣyate. Quite clearly the predicate śṛiṣyate cannot be taken literally, i.e. to mean "is heard," if this is equivalent to "is known from hearsay."

The reason for taking at all this possibility into consideration is, of course, that the well-known technical meaning would imply that the Vṛksāyurveda is regarded as forming part of the Śruti, a conception which the Western philologist can not by any means accept. However, the 'science' at issue here is, after all, called -veda, or rather -āyurveda, and in any case in India the latter has ultimately come to be regarded as a constituent, though subordinate part of the Vedic lore (whether solely because it is a 'Veda' or for other reasons, too). This is shown most conspicuously by the inclusion of the Āyurveda in the lists of the so-called Upavedas. Moreover, the Vṛksāyurveda as such is apparently not mentioned in these lists, not even in the course of explanations of the 'Science of the Span of Life' or as a science subordinate to it, the assumption is fully warranted that the final member of the compound Vṛksāyurveda could be taken as indicating a close connection with human medicine, one of the 4 Upavedas, and in such a manner that the notion could be extended to include the Vṛksāyurveda.

I have the impression that the Sāṃkhya author referring to this science, or even quoting from one of the works dealing with it, deliberately chose the expression śṛiṣyate in order to ensure that the authority of the source he adduces is established beyond any doubt: Understandably enough his way of arguing is influenced to some extent by his aim.

This is obvious in what forms the actual contents of the reference. For, literally, what it means is nothing but that a decomposed human body according to the Vṛksāyurveda furthers the growth of trees; but this statement is injected in such a context and in such a manner that the reader or reader is almost automatically given the impression that what the Vṛksāyurveda has in view is a process like the Sāṃkhya parināma at the beginning of which stands a human corpse and at the end of which a particular part of a vegetal body. The concept of parināma, however, is not only not even alluded to in the Vṛksāyurveda passage, but there is also no reason whatsoever for assuming that the concept was taken over by Vṛksāyurvedins on their part and applied to their field of learning.

Quite the reverse is evidently true: It is the Sāṃkhya philosopher who projects his idea of (ubiquitous) transformation upon the fact observed and made use of by the Vṛksāyurvedins; it is he who has, or claims to have, a thorough, clear and full understanding of the phenomenon observed and of the reason by which it is ultimately caused: Sāṃkhya philosophy is qua theory of the world in a sense also the basis of the 'natural science'; the philosophical 'laws' recognized by it are universally valid — whether the scientists were aware of them or not. And as regards the Vṛksāyurveda, there can be hardly any doubt, at least judging by Surapāḷa's work of the same name, that the representatives of this science kept (apart from certain rather fantastic or poetical (traditional) ideas) almost entirely to empirical facts and their description, i.e. that they did not take any notable interest in looking behind phenomena and discovering their causes: The Vṛksāyurvedins show a conspicuous lack of inquisitiveness and readiness to address themselves to theoretical questions; but this has clearly not detracted from the high reputation this Śāstra enjoyed from of old.

"Whether it is due to its predominantly

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32 Sarmanaitarka-Prakaranaṃ ... Pān. Sukhalālasaṃghāvind ... Pān. Becara-dāsadasatāna ca ... sansodhitam, Ahmedabad Sanvat 1980-85, p. 652f.

33 In the Śabdakalpadrumpa and Vācaspatty apavada is paraphrased by upamito vedena and thereafter explained as pradhanavedānātikāh in the former lexicon and by vedāndaye āyurvedāsau in the latter. Note also the term upāhīga likewise applied to the Āyurveda etc., cf. J. Filliozat, The Classical Doctrine of Indian Medicine, Delhi 1964, p. 1 n. and S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Cambridge 1965, p. 274.

34 L. Renou (The Destiny of the Veda in India. Delhi-Patna-Varanasi 1965, p. 14) is rather evasive in the little he has to say on this question.

35 Cf. e.g. Saunaka’s Caranāvyāhasūtra 4.1, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Prasthānābhedī (ed. A. Weber, Ind. St. 1, 1849, p. 9f. and p. 20f.) and Śivatastavaśāstakam 1.2.15f.

36 The fact that Surapāḷa refers only to parts or products of a human corpse, and not to the dead body as a whole does not lie least detract from the appropriateness of this statement.

37 That Āyurvedins themselves should have developed quite independently a concept identical or similar to that of Sāṃkhya parināma can safely be ruled out.

38 A particularly clear piece of evidence in this regard is Manusmṛti 1.46-48 (with which one should compare, in spite of the time gap, Surapāḷa’s Vṛksāyurveda (cf. fn. 14 p. 130f.); P. Hacker’s remark on Manu 1.43-48 ("Two Accounts of Cosmography", in: Jānaṭakāvya, Commemoration Volume in Honour of Joh. Nobel, Delhi 1963, 86 = Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 1978, 398), viz. "Divisions of living beings and plants. Not in TG 1" (= a particular
practical outlook that the Vṛksāyurveda does not show any vestiges of an influence exercised on it by the Śāmkhya system, is a problem that cannot be solved at the moment: The alluring, but obviously very vast and dense jungle of the reception of Śāmkhya (as also its scope and its limits) still awaits its courageous explorer.

Appendix

When I gave a talk on the subject of the present article in Vienna in 1987 my attention was kindly drawn in the ensuing discussion by my friend Gerhard Oberhammer to a painting of Edvard Munch's that practically illustrates the relation between a human corpse and a tree the unknown Śāmkhya author has in view. I finally succeeded in identifying the painting: It is given the title "Metabolism or Assimilation of Nutritive Material or Two Living Beings" and was, according to R. STANG, painted around 1898, but later changed by the artist, viz. around 1918. The painting forms part of the marvellous collection of the Oslo Kommunes Kunstsamlinger, Munch-Museet and is catalogued there as "Metabolism 1989 (OKK M 419)". Its size is 175 x 143 cm. As it does not belong to the better known pieces and hence is not generally included in illustrated books on Munch, I deem it advisable to add to the present article at least a black-and-white reproduction of it. I am most grateful to the Oslo Kommunes Kunstsamlinger for granting me the permission to do so (see the plate on p. 315).

Important additional information on the painting is given by A. EGGUM in the exhibition catalogue "Edvard Munch. Symbols and Images": 59 "In its original form, the picture had another iconographic content. Up from the roots in the frame grew a small bush or a large flower with a small embryo inside. The woman's hand pointed toward the embryo and almost touched it... A photograph from 1903 shows how centrally the motif was placed in the "Life Frieze", and we see that the upper part of the frame which depicts Christiania, was not yet completed. In his pamphlet The Life Frieze, Munch later expressed that he found the picture as necessary for the frieze as a buckle from the belt, even though it deviated somewhat from the general context. The picture was probably once repainted in connection with Munch's plans for a monumental execution of the "Life Frieze" motifs. A tree trunk between the man and the woman was added, which covers the

59 National Gallery of Art, Washington 1978, on cat. no. 46. My attention was kindly drawn to this article by Mrs. K. E. Lerheim, Secretary of the "Oslo Kommunes Kunstsamlinger".

bush or flower with the embryo... The picture was originally part of an eschatology of metabolism, but this aspect is almost gone in the final version..."

However, the final version not only almost perfectly matches the particular pariṇāma at issue in the present essay, but obviously also expresses much more clearly an idea that is met with, and more than once, in writings of Munch's, too. E.g. in his booklet "Livsfrienen" — which most probably dates from 1918 — he says (p. 2) 51 "The motif of the largest pictures, man and woman in the woods, ... is a picture of life as well as of death, and of the town which rises behind the trees." Or in a paper left by him he says: 59 "I rejoiced feeling myself die, united with — or transformed into this earth that always lived, always fermented, always was warmed by the sun ... I ought to be united with her. Out of my decomposing body plants and trees should grow... I ought to be "in" them. Nothing will pass away. ... That is eternity."

But the elementary parallels to the Śāmkhya-Vṛksāyurveda idea are not limited to Western art only; they can be found also in literary works and other written documents. I have not searched for them systematically, but I think that there should be material enough for a comparative study, a contribution to cultural anthropology which could perhaps even counteract to some extent our present alienation from nature. The few examples I have chanced upon during the last years will, I hope, at least demonstrate that this assumption is not entirely unjustified, or perhaps even inspire others to follow this path further.

A poem of Felix Pollak's entitled 'A Matter of History' begins thus: 62

"It all has passed and is gone, the cries silenced, the blood / concealed in the earth. The cries dissolved in air, the blood / sucked up by grass, transformed into the sap of young trees. / "

In A. Watt's booklet "Nature, Man and Woman" 63 there is a footnote which runs thus:

"It is curious to speculate upon the consequences of civilized man's refusal to be eaten by other forms of life, to return his body for the fertilization of the soil from which he took it. This is a significant symptom of his alienation from nature, and may be a by no means negligible deprivation of the earth's resources." A similar idea is found expressed already in G. Th Fechner's "Nanna oder Über das Seelen-

51 Cf. R. STANG, o.c. (fn. 59), pp. 123 and 301.


leben der Pflanzen", 64 viz. on p. 154: "Mit demselben Rechte, wie man sagt, daß die Menschen und Thiere die Früchte des Feldes essen und fressen, kann man in der That sagen, daß die Früchte des Feldes die Menschen und Thiere fressen; denn alles, was von Menschen und Thieren abgeht, geht wieder in die Pflanzen über, und muß in sie übergehen, damit sie wachsen und gedeihen. Sie zerreißen den Menschen nur nicht so bei lebendigem Leibe, wie wir es mit ihnen tun. Sie warten auf das, was von uns abgeht, bis es zu ihnen kommt, erwarten unseren Tod, ehe sie sich ganz unserer bemächtigen."

And finally the text of an inscription I happened to discover in September 1989 near the top of a mountain in Austria called "Stoderzinken": "Hier irgendwo ruht die Asche von Emil Ritter von Horstig, gestorben am 30. Oktober 1931 im 87. Lebensjahr. Er wollte 'ein Blümlein am Stoder werden": Cremation does not seem to stand in the way of the fulfillment of this modest wish.

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64 Reference is to the 3rd edition. Hamburg und Leipzig 1903.