

Paralipomena zum Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda II:  
On the Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda and its Relation  
to the Vṛkṣāyurveda

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1. In my contributions to the Commemoration Volume for Ludwig Alsdorf I have at some length dealt with the so-called *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*<sup>1</sup>. The material drawn upon in this article was mainly from the Dvādaśāranayacakra of the Jain philosopher Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri's commentary on it, viz. the Nyāyāgamaṇusāriṇī. When I examined this material and put the results of my analysis down in writing, I was already aware of the fact that with this *vāda* I had not only discovered a very promising vein of gold, but that it would certainly not be possible to unearth all of the precious metal at once. In fact, it was only shortly afterwards that I came to realize that in Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya this *vāda* is also clearly attested. I have discussed the relevant passage in another article of mine, published in the WZKS.<sup>2</sup>

As I cannot take it for granted that the readers of the present article are familiar with my two earlier studies or that they remember my argument in them, I deem it to the point to summarize in brief<sup>3</sup> their main results before turning to what forms the actual subject of this second supplement.

2. However, before acquainting the reader with this *vāda* as regards its essential philosophical content and the relation it has with other central tenets of the Sāṃkhya school of thought, the following has to be emphasized: both the passages in which this *vāda* is mentioned, and some of the terms used, are not sufficiently explicit to allow to draw a distinct and complete picture, when taken by them-

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<sup>1</sup> "Studien zum Dvādaśāranayacakra des Śvetāmbara Mallavādin. I. Der *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*" in: *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf*, hrsg. von K. BRUHN und A. WEZLER, Wiesbaden 1981, 359-408 (= WEZLER 1981).

<sup>2</sup> "Paralipomena zum Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda (I): Mahābhāṣya zu Pāṇ. 4.3.155 und seine einheimischen Erklärer" in: WZKS XXVI (1982), 149-166 (= WEZLER 1982).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. my article "Remarks on the Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda" in: *Philosophical Essays. Professor Ananthai Thakur Felicitation Volume*, Calcutta 1987, 166-181, on which the present summary is partially based.

selves; therefore, the exegete is thrown back upon his own understanding and his own endeavours to think along the lines of Sāṃkhya. Thus, the result cannot but be in part hypothetical.

Starting from the observation that the sentence *sarvaṃ sarvātmakam* is paraphrased in the texts by the sentences *sarvam ekam ekaṃ ca sarvam* and *sarvaṃ sarvatra [vidyate/asti]*, this ontological statement can be shown to mean that every phenomenon, and all phenomena are material by necessity, contains in itself at least one representative of each and every species of individual things. Yet it cannot be overlooked that this *vāda* is always exemplified or proved by explicitly referring to what nowadays would be called the 'alimentary chain'. The fact, easily to be observed, that animal and vegetal life are mutually dependant, has obviously been interpreted by Sāṃkhya philosophers on the assumption that e.g. a particular animal contains in itself the matter of all those animals and/or plants it consumes. The peculiarity of this conception consists, however, in that the upholders of Sāṃkhya philosophy evidently supposed that all the individuals who have been consumed are nevertheless still existent as such, — a point which will become still clearer in the light of the evidence found in the Mahābhāṣya. On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that the statement *sarvaṃ sarvātmakam* does not imply that every phenomenon consists only of all the others; i.e. every phenomenon at the same is an entity in its own right. Obviously the validity of the *vāda* extends to the inanimate evolutes of *prakṛti*, too.

In connection with this latter question one would also have to take into account a fragment, assigned to the Vārṣagānāḥ, "the followers of Vārṣaganya",<sup>4</sup> by the author of the Yuktidīpikā which O. STRAUSS has dealt with;<sup>5</sup> it clearly states that the exponents of Sāṃkhya do not accept any annihilation, but only a disappearing out of being manifest (*vyakter apa-i*); this holds good for the 23 *tattvas* (at the end of a *kalpa*) as well as for all the other minor evolutes of them (after a more or less limited time of manifestation). In passing it may be noted that the rejoining of a phenomenon with its cause(s) after having been manifest for some time is denoted by the technical term *saṃsarga*, whereas the opposite process is called *visarga* in Sāṃkhya-Yoga terminology. The next important point we have to consider is the additional element *jātyanucchedena*, frequently met with the sentence *sarvaṃ sarvātmakam* occurs; for this expression is clearly intended to

<sup>4</sup> In passing, I should like to state here that I disagree with FRAUWALLNER (and others) as regards the reconstruction of the name of the famous Sāṃkhya philosopher: I think the evidence is clearly in favour of 'Vārṣaganya' and not 'Vṛṣagana'. I do not, of course, want to dispute that the proper name Vārṣaganya denotes its bearer as a descendent of a certain Vṛṣagana.

<sup>5</sup> "Eine alte Formel der Sāṃkhya-Yoga-Philosophie bei Vātsyāyana" in: *Festgabe H. Jacobi*, Bonn 1926, 358-368 = *Kleine Schriften*, hrsg. v. F. WILHELM, Wiesbaden 1983, 207-217.

preclude the possible misunderstanding of the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* as implying that by being *sarvātmaka* the individual phenomenon does not at the same time represent its own species. This *vāda* has predictably been attacked quite early, and the argument, of course, was that if it were true, everything would then be visible everywhere and in everything else. As to the answer of the exponents of Sāṃkhya, some of the relevant passages say that they took recourse to their specific concept of *abhivyakti*, i.e. they accounted for the empirical fact that a particular thing is perceived as this and only as this by referring to place, time, shape, etc., as conditioning its manifestation.

But there are still more fundamental problems connected with this *vāda* which have to be taken up for discussion. FRAUWALLNER<sup>6</sup> has made the interesting and important observation that the origin of a given doctrine lies elsewhere than in the reasoning adduced for it and that reasons are, on the contrary, adduced only at a later stage, in order to prove the doctrine, the origin of which lied in immediate observation and perception of things.

From this it would follow that the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* is posterior in relation to the doctrine of *prakṛti*, which, together with other reasons, it serves to justify. However, since it cannot have been solely deduced from empirical facts, since furthermore it cannot have itself been derived from the concept of primary matter, it might be the easier assumption that it is later merely in the sense that it was later used as one of the proofs for the existence of *prakṛti*. In quest of the origin of this *vāda* one has, therefore, to take into account the fact that it is closely related to the *satkāryavāda*, i.e. that it forms an integral constituent part of the special theory of causation the Sāṃkhyas adhere to and propound: according to the latter *vāda*, a product already exists before it becomes manifest, and according to the former, i.e. the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*, the fact of its existence is not affected by its disappearance. And both these *vādas* cannot be divorced from the specific Sāṃkhya concept of being which was formulated by Vārṣaganya, as is clear from a fragment thus preserved by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*:<sup>7</sup> *yad asti asty eva tad / yan nāsti nāsty eva tad / asato nāsti saṃbhavaḥ / sato nāsti vināśaḥ /*.

Now, regarding the *satkāryavāda* FRAUWALLNER<sup>8</sup> seems to have taken the view that it was developed secondarily only, viz. in order to meet adverse criticism directed against reasons brought forward by Sāṃkhya authors who wanted to prove the existence of primary matter. Thus, if FRAUWALLNER were right, it would

<sup>6</sup> *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, 285.

<sup>7</sup> Ed. P. PRADHAN, Patna 1967, 301.2.

<sup>8</sup> O.c., I.c.

mean that the specific concept of being, too, is of later origin — a consequence altogether improbable. Against FRAUWALLNER, as also against the implications of his ideas about this part of the historical development of the Sāṃkhya school of thought, I would hold that the whole problem stands in need of a thorough and critical reconsideration which may well lead to quite different results, and this is, of course, also due to new material which has become available in the meantime. The resulting new picture would, to be sure, likewise have the character of a hypothesis. Yet, I think it would be a stronger one. It has, of course, yet to be drawn in full detail; my own attempt is but a rough sketch, and this also because I did not yet find time to examine all the additional relevant material which I have only recently discovered. My attempt starts from the assumption that the Sāṃkhya concept of being has arisen, among other *śruti* passages, out of Ch.Up. 6.2.1.f., where — though still in terms rather of cosmological than of ontological thinking — it is stated that a *sat* can only have originated out of a *sat*. But Rāmānuja,<sup>9</sup> too, when he comes to speak of different theories of error refers to one which is evidently based on the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*; and it is in this very connection also that he actually refers to this Upaniṣadic teaching of Uddālaka Āruṇi; therefore one has to reckon with the possibility that the specific concept of being which has developed out of it was not confined to the early and classical Sāṃkhya school of thought, but was likewise shared by the forerunners of the specific theistic school which later used it in its singular theory of error, i.e. long before Rāmānuja; and its actual existence at a still earlier point of time is clearly attested by Mallavādin. Both schools, Sāṃkhya as well as the theistic one, should have had this concept of being in common, though their respective "Weltanschauung" would in all probability have differed considerably, a dualistic and non-theistic one in the case of the Sāṃkhya and a theistic and perhaps also monistic one in the case of the other.

As for the passage from the Mahābhāṣya, it is the final sentence of the discussion on Paṇ. 4.3.155 which proves extraordinarily instructive for the 'protohistory' of the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*. It reads thus:<sup>10</sup> *atha matam etat prakṛty-anvayā vikārā bhavanti tīhāpi na doṣo bhavati*. This is meant to answer the question preceding: *atha yo 'sāv ādyaḥ kapotaḥ salomakaḥ sapakṣo na ca samprati prāṇīti katham tatra prāṇīśabdo vartata iti* /, "the feathered, winged pigeon that was at the beginning, now (i.e. after having been killed) does not breathe any more. How is it that with reference to it (i.e. the dead, plucked bird) a word is, nevertheless, used that [primarily] denotes a breathing being (i.e. a living pigeon)?"

<sup>9</sup> Śrībhāṣya on BS 1.1.1, ed. by SRI U. T. VIRARAGHAVACHARYA, Pt. 1, Madras 1963, 132f.

<sup>10</sup> Ed. F. KIELHORN, revised ... by K. V. ABHYANKAR, II 325, 15ff.

Although Kaiyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa apparently understood Patañjali's answer as referring to words denoting the product of a process of transformation, one cannot fail to observe that Patañjali, on the contrary, aims at explaining a linguistic fact by taking recourse to a philosophical view he knew and considered apt to solve the question under discussion. It was simply their unawareness of this philosophical view that led Kaiyaṭa and Nāgojibhaṭṭa to misunderstand this passage which doubtless refers to extralinguistic facts in order to explain a particular linguistic one. In reality what Patañjali says is this: "If one takes the view that the original [which undergoes a process of change] is existent in its transformation(s), there is no room for any objection in this case, too, (i.e., as regards the use e.g. of the word *kapota* to denote a dead pigeon as it is a *vikāra* of the original living bird which does not cease to exist)."

What Patañjali refers to here, is clearly a teaching that is intended to meet the question as to what happens to the *prakṛti* when a *vikāra* has manifested itself. And this teaching cannot but be the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*, according to which everything that represents a *prakṛti*, whatever the position it occupies in a given causal chain,<sup>11</sup> does not cease to exist as such when it passes out of visibility: The individual pigeon as a living being does, indeed, still exist when it has been killed; and it is precisely this ontological "fact" that accounts for the linguistic observation that a *prāṇīśabdo* can also be used to denote that very animal even when deprived of breath!

Thus the substance of the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* can be traced back to the 2nd century B.C.,<sup>12</sup> which would corroborate my hypothesis that the particular notion of 'being' underlying this *vāda* was originally conceived by certain Upaniṣadic thinkers. Yet, at the same time what we owe to Patañjali is a

<sup>11</sup> As is well known, the term *prakṛti* is used by the adherents of Sāṃkhya themselves not only to denote their peculiar concept of "primary matter", but also relativistically, i.e. to denote a phenomenon which forms an 'original' only with reference to its transformation(s). It should, however, be noted, that the process of transformation, though taken to be permanent and incessant, involving change every moment, is largely viewed as leading from one "state" (*avasthā*) to another, i.e. from a cause to its product; and in their notion of what constitutes a particular cause — and of which product — Sāṃkhya thinkers seem to have followed the *loka* (unless the example adduced by them are only meant to explain their philosophical ideas to ordinary people by taking recourse to concepts familiar to everybody).

<sup>12</sup> This is, of course, true only on condition that the date assigned to Patañjali viz: 2nd century B.C., is correct. As to this, I basically agree with CARDONA (*Pāṇini, A Survey of Research*, The Hague-Paris 1976, 266) who in concluding his report and discussion states that "the evidence is ... not absolutely probative but sufficient to warrant considering seriously that Patañjali lived" at this time; but I should like to add that recently I started to have doubts because I do not yet know exactly how to bring into accord such an early date with the stage of development of Sāṃkhya as attested to in the Mahābhāṣya.

particularly clear example of what the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* is ultimately about: it is meant to answer the following question one cannot but ask when confronted with the doctrine of *satkārya*: If each and every thing exists even before it is manifested, what becomes of it when it disappears out of being manifest? In the light of this observation one cannot, I think, feel the least doubt but that the two *vādas*, the *satkārya*- and the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*, are not only closely related to each other; in fact they are nothing but two logically necessary and mutually supplementary aspects of one and the same concept of 'being'. Accordingly to this concept, peculiar to Sāṃkhya, although probably not confined to it, there is only the dichotomy between things which exist (*sat*) and things which do not (*asat*); the view that things are produced and destroyed is unconditionally rejected; all that is admitted and in fact had to be conceded in order to account for the phenomenal world, is that the beginningless and endless being of each and every things is, as it were, interrupted by a shorter or longer period of being manifest, but remains ultimately unaltered. That is to say, this notion of being ("Sein") is remarkably rigorous, and besides it all that can be conceded is a limited period of being manifest, i.e. an almost ephemeral "Dasein".<sup>13</sup>

3. Almost right at the beginning of my brief survey of the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* attention was drawn to the fact "that this *vāda* is always exemplified or proved by explicitly referring to what nowadays would be called the 'alimentary chain'". It is in this connection that in one of the passages examined by me in my first article on this highly interesting doctrine reference is made to the *Vṛkṣāyurveda*, "the science of horticulture or botany",<sup>14</sup> in which as the name itself seems

<sup>13</sup> The distinction between the two modes of being has most probably been overlooked, or deliberately ignored, by the unknown author of the famous satirical verse quoted by Kamalaśīla (*Tattvasaṃgraha* pañjikā 29.10-11) *yad eva dadhī tat kṣīraṃ yat kṣīraṃ tad dadhīti ca / vadatā rūdrilenaiva khyāpitā vindhyavāsītā*.

M. HONDA's "Dharmapālas' report on Sāṃkhya", in: *JIBS* Vol. XVII (33) (1968), 446 (= [2]) cannot be claimed as containing evidence for the thesis ascribed to Rūdrila (Vindhyavāsini); for what is recorded by Dharmapāla is nothing else but the well-known Sāṃkhya idea that a cause like sweet milk becomes by transformation the product and that cause and product cannot reasonably be said to be distinct; not to mention a passage from the *Abhidharmadīpavṛtti* (*Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti, critically edited ...* by PADMANABH S. JAINI, Patna 1959), viz. 273.29f. — for in the wording there (*vidyamānam eva jāyate / tadyathā kṣīre vidyamānaṃ dadhī*) the locative is used as in Sāṃkhya sources themselves: It should also be noted that the Sāṃkhya distinction between the two modes of being is virtually explicitly refuted in the *Abhidharmadīpa* (274.1).

<sup>14</sup> Literally "Science of the duration of the life of trees": R. P. DAS review of G. U. THITE. "Medicine. Its Magico-Religious Aspects according to the Vedic and Later Literature", 1982, in: *IJ 27* (1984), 237. Cf. among others, A. ROŠU, *JA* CCLXXIV (1986), 258, R. P. DAS, "Some Notes on *Vṛkṣāyurveda*", in: *Ancient Science of Life*, VI,1 (1986), 6 and now R. P.

to indicate particular stress is laid on the treatment of diseases of trees, etc. The passage is from the *Pātañjalayogaśāstravivaraṇa* ascribed to Śaṅkara, the Advaitin, on the *Bhāṣya* on *YS* 3.14. In explaining the *sūtra* the *Bhāṣya* among other things quotes from a source which for various reasons cannot but have been a lost text of Classical Sāṃkhya, most probably of *Vārṣaganya* or one of his disciples, and this quotation<sup>15</sup> is in its turn explained by the author of the *Vivaraṇa*.<sup>16</sup> It is the following two sentences in his commentary which are of particular importance for the problem I want to deal with now (257.23-25).

DAS, *Das Wissen von der Lebensspanne der Bäume. Surapālas Vṛkṣāyurveda, kritisch ediert, übersetzt und kommentiert ...*, Stuttgart 1988 (= DAS 1988), 1.

<sup>15</sup> The first part (cf. WEZLER 1981: 376f.) of this quotation, viz. *jalabhūmyoḥ pāriṇāmikāṃ rasādivaiśvarūpyaṃ sthāvaraṣu dṛṣṭaṃ tathā sthāvarāṇāṃ jaṅgameṣu jaṅgamānāṃ sthāvaraṣu*, has been included in a collection of fragments entitled "The Sāṃkhya-Sūtras of Pāṇicālika (and the Sāṃkhyatattvāloka)", Delhi-Varanasi-Patna 1977, 67f.) and compiled by SVĀMĪ HARIHARĀNANDA ĀRĀṆYA, a modern Sāṃkhya-Yogin (1869-1947) (cf. *Sāṃkhya. A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy* ed. by G. J. LARSON and RAM SHANKAR BHATTACHARYA, Princeton 1987, 581). The purely imaginary ascription apart (rectified by Mr. JAJNESWAR GHOSH's note that "this *sūtra* is quoted in Vyāsa's Sāṃkhya-Pravacana-Bhāṣya (sic!) III 14 but its authorship seems to have been unknown"), the Svāmī's commentary deserves attention, though primarily in terms of the reception of Sāṃkhya in modern India; for what he says is that: *sarvaṃ sarvātmakam iti / kasmāt? mūla-kāraṇasya ekavāt / trayo guṇāḥ sarveṣāṃ vikārāṇāṃ mūlam / tasmād nāsti atyantabhedo vikārāṇāṃ / pañcānāṃ bhūtānāṃ sthāvaraprāṇidehaparīṇāmo bhavati sthāvarāṇāṃ jaṅgamadehaparīṇāmo bhavati jaṅgamānāṃ ca punaḥ sthāvaraparīṇāmaḥ evaṃ sarvasmāt sarvaṃ saṃbhavātīti raddhāntaḥ / bhūrāni punaḥ tanmātraparīṇāmanī / tanmātrāni ca asmitāparīṇāmanīti vyavasāya-bhāvasya vyavasyatvaparīṇāmaḥ / maulikaikavāc ca sarve vikārāḥ sarvarūpā bhavanīti siddhāntaḥ //*. To complete the picture I should like to add the *tippana* of BĀLARĀMA UDĀSĪNA (*Yogadarśanam Bhagavanmahāmūnīpatañjalipraṇītam ...*, Calcutta 1891 [i.e. the edition used by J. H. WOODS from his translation], 213): *sarvaṃ vastu sarvātmakam = sarvaśaktimad ity arthaḥ, evaṃ ca nikhila- parīṇāmini vastuni avasthīrāḥ sukṣmarūpeṇa yā sarvavikārajananaśaktayas tā evāvyaṇyadeṣyā ity ucyante iti samādhanārtho bodhyaḥ / keṣu vastuṣu ke bhaviṣyanto dharmā iti samikṣārthaṃ prcchāmaḥ // — sthāvaraṣu ity asyārtham āha (viz. Vācāspatimīśra) — 'vanaspati' ityādinā, vanaspatīlatādiṣu yat phalapuṣpādīgataraḡandhādivai-citryaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tad rasādīguṇavato jalasya gandhādīguṇavatyāś ca bhūmeḥ pāriṇāmikāṃ = parīṇāmanimittakam ity anvayaḥ / jalabhūmyor vidyamānā yā rasādivikārajananaśaktiḥ sā 'vyāṇyadeṣyety ucyata iti bhāvah //*.

<sup>16</sup> *Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇam* of Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda ed. by P. SRI RAMA SASTRI and S. L. KRISHNAMURTHI SĀSTRĪ (Madras Gov. O. S. No. XCIV), Madras 1952. — On the passage in the *Bhāṣya* itself cf. also PULINBIHARI CHAKRAVARTI, *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, Delhi 1975<sup>2</sup>, p. 202ff. fn.1.

*sthāvarāṇām upayuktānām jaṅgameṣu rasalohitādiviśvabhedaḥ /  
tathā jaṅgamānām sthāvareṣu upayuktānām vṛkṣāyurvedapra-  
siddhaṃ rasādivaiśvarīpyam /*

"[Similarly it is an empirical fact that the manifoldness of fluids, etc., in animals is brought about by processes of transformation of plants, i.e.] that plants having been consumed by animals, in them become [fluids] of different kinds like organic juice, blood, etc. Similarly it is [a fact] well-known from the Vṛkṣāyurveda. that the manifoldness of saps, etc., in plants is brought about [by processes of transformation] of animals which have been consumed [by them]."

When I was grappling with this statement for the first time, I was far from understanding its full significance though I added a rather lengthy foot-note on the Vṛkṣāyurveda.<sup>17</sup> It was only in the light of references to the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* which I happened to discover later in other texts that I came to realize that there is much more to it: the very fact that the Vṛkṣāyurveda is mentioned in this particular context calls for a more thorough study than I was then able to undertake for lack of parallel material. But now I think I can at least partially repair this omission; in order to do so I shall discuss passages from Cakradhara's gloss on Jayantabhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī, i.e. from the NM-Granthibhaṅga, from Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, and, last but not least, from a Vṛkṣāyurveda text itself to which my attention was kindly drawn by a former student of ours who has published a critical edition of it.<sup>18</sup>

3.1 The passage in the NM-Granthibhaṅga<sup>19</sup> I have in mind raises some difficulties; for it is found at the top of folio 26' of the MS. and the folio immediately preceding has been lost. Thus the passage not only starts in the middle of a sentence, but it is also not clear to which phrase or expression of the *mūla* text it refers. But since the last *prāṭika* on folio 24' is NM (KSS No. 109) p. 61 l. 19 and that following immediately upon our passage corresponds to NM p. 63 l. 21, the phrase or expression Cakradhara elaborates on must belong to the text in between, i.e. practically the whole subsection given the apt heading *Sāṃkhyamatanirākaraṇam* by the editor. In order to try to identify it, i.e. to make up for what the editor (of the NM-Granthibhaṅga) failed to do, it is, however, necessary to first take a look at the passage which reads thus (206.5-10):

... *ghṛtādinām sambhavaḥ, ghṛtādiṣu ca puṣṭer ghṛtādyupayoge hi*

<sup>17</sup> CF. WEZLER 1981: 379.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. fn. 14.

<sup>19</sup> Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga (= NMGBh) ed. by NAGIN J. SHAH (LD Series 35), Ahmedabad 1972.

*puṣṭeḥ sambhavāt / puṣṭau ca satyām retaādayaḥ retasi ca  
putrādayaḥ / teṣāṃ ca prāptakāle maraṇāc charīrasya kvāṭhaḥ,  
kvāṭhitasya ca kṛmibhāvena pariṇāmaḥ, tad eva ca kvāṭhitam /  
Vṛkṣāyurvede vṛkṣānām vṛddhaye śrūyate: 'tathā ca sati vṛkṣa-  
syāpi tatra sambhavaḥ, vṛkṣāc ca phalam, phalād rasaḥ, rasād  
balam iti sarvaṃ kṛīre 'sti, deśakālākārāpabandhād na samāna-  
kālam abhivyajyante' iti /*

Already at the first glance it is clear that what this passage is obviously about is a chain of transformation the starting point of which must be milk. There is but one sentence in the subsection of the NM to be considered here to which these statements of Cakradhara's can refer, viz. the remark by which Jayanta concludes his refutation of the *buddhi* as conceived by the Sāṃkhyas. It reads thus (NM 63.10ff.):

*api ca satkāryavādamūla eṣa tapasvinām vibhramah, sarvaṃ  
sarvatrāstīti tato 'nvayasiddhiṃ buddhyamānās te pradhāna-  
siddhāv adhyavasitāḥ, satkāryavādaś ca vicaryamāṇo na samasty  
eveti kutastya hetusiddhiḥ /*

"and moreover, this error of the ascetics (i.e. the erroneous conception of the *buddhi* the Sāṃkhyas have) has its roots in the *satkāryavāda*; starting from [the belief] that each and every thing exists in each and every other they [are led] to assume that the material connection [of things] is an established fact and [hence] they are led to decide that primary matter is [something the existence of which they have proved]; yet, as the *satkāryavāda* does not stand a critical examination, it is out of the question that the reason [adduced by the Sāṃkhyas for the existence of primary matter] could be valid."

Most probably the passage of the NMGBh under discussion is meant to explain the words *sarvaṃ sarvatrāstīti tato 'nvayasiddhiṃ buddhyamānās* of the NM and there cannot be the least doubt that the particular doctrine Jayanta's words refer to, is the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*.<sup>20</sup> This *vāda* is, then, explained by

<sup>20</sup> After all this *vāda* is quite clearly attested to in (secondary) sources which are considerably older than the NM as has been shown elsewhere (WEZLER 1981 and 1982); and it is connected in them, too, with the statement '*sarvaṃ sarvatrāsti*' (and similar ones). On the other hand, there is no denying that in the present case the emphasis lies not on the aspect of disappearing-out-of-being-manifest, but, on the contrary, on the aspect of the amazing manifoldness of products-of-transformation appearing one after the other out of a particular original matter like milk. Therefore, if the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* were indeed, as argued by me elsewhere (WEZLER 1981: 397f.), meant only to explain, in a peculiar manner, the disappearing of phenomena — whereas the *satkāryavāda* give the reason for their appearing —, it would seem more appropriate to regard this latter *vāda* as the one which is intended in the passage quoted from the NMGBh. However, in the meantime I have arrived at the conclusion that my previous

Cakradhara thus:

"[By a process of transformation milk] is turned into ghee and other dairy products, and ghee, etc., is the source of growth in physical strength; for, when ghee and similar products are consumed, one grows in physical strength; and when one is in a well-nourished condition sperm, etc.,<sup>21</sup> [are produced in one's body] and when there is sperm, one [is able to beget] sons and other children. Because they die when time has come, their body is boiled<sup>22</sup>" (i.e. rots in the course of time), and the decomposed [corpse] by way of transformation turns into worms, and these, too, [finally] get putrefied. In the Vṛkṣāyurveda [the following] is authoritatively taught in order [to ensure] a [proper] growth if trees: 'This being so, even a tree can originate from it (i.e. milk) and from a tree [one gets] fruit, from fruit organic juice, from organic juice physical strength; hence each and everything is [contained] in milk; [yet the different products] do not become manifest simultaneously due to [the fact that their manifestation] is conditioned by place, time and shape.'"

Now this passage allows to make the following observations:

[1] In order to explain the Sāṃkhya contention that *sarvaṃ sarvatrāsti* — which is but an alternative expression for *sarvaṃ ekaṃ ekaṃ ca sarvaṃ* or *sarvaṃ sarvātmakam* — Cakradhara gives an example, viz. milk and its various products-of-transformation. Since it is precisely this example which is frequently found in Sāṃkhya texts themselves, or fragments of such texts, there is no question about his having borrowed it in its substance from a Sāṃkhya source, though its identity cannot be determined.

attempt at determining the relation between these two *vādas* was not entirely satisfactory, i.e. that the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* has rather to be taken as the more comprehensive doctrine, covering both aspects, that of appearing as well as that of disappearing: That every phenomenon contains in itself at least one representation of each and every species of individual things can be recognized, and shown not only (e.g.) by the end of an 'alimentary chain', but also by the various products-of-transformation appearing out of a *prakṛti*.

<sup>21</sup> The *ādī* is most probably added here in view of the widespread idea, met with in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts also, that in addition to sperm blood (*śoṇita* etc.) (from the side of a future mother) is necessary for conception.

<sup>22</sup> As *kvātha-* cannot but be derived from the root *kvath* and quite clearly means "rotting, decomposition" here, TURNER's assumption ("A Comparative Dictionary of Indo-Aryan Languages", 169, s.v. *KUTI*) that a root *kuh* "rot" should be separated from *kvath* "boil", accepted also by v. HINÜBER, "Pāli kaṭṭhi: Ein Beitrag zur Überlieferungsgeschichte des Theravāda-Kanons" in: *IJJ* 21 (1979), 21-26), becomes implausible. It seems more likely that originally there was one root *kvath* only denoting the (various) changes caused in liquids (cf. e.g. Manus. 11.159) or animal/vegetal matter by warmth or heat.

[2] . Subsequently he seems to quote from a Vṛkṣāyurveda text; this would, of course, be in order to vindicate his preceding explanation. However, the assumption of the editor of the NMGBh that the last sentence forms a quotation is highly questionable, nay demonstrably wrong: The expressions *tathā ca sati* as well as *tatra* at the beginning of the alleged quotation lack that which is referred to; of course, it is, at least as regards the latter expression, possible to make the guess that what is actually referred to is 'milk'; but, as to the initial *tathā ca sati*, one is left only with the conclusion that it cannot but resume what has been said in the preceding portion of the NMGBh itself or similar statements to that effect. Regarding this latter possibility one might feel tempted to ask whether Cakradhara has in this case made an unfortunate choice and given a rather incomplete and imperfect quotation. But this alternative can be safely ruled out, because the alleged quotation is problematic in other respects, too. It is clearly in prose while all Vṛkṣāyurveda texts (except for commentaries) which have been preserved or of which we know by secondary transmission are written in verse; in addition, the concluding sentence (*deśakālākārāpabandhā* etc.) makes one prick up one's ear. At least, this is what happened to me when I read it for the first time, since I was immediately reminded of many a passage I had examined in my first article on the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*.<sup>23</sup> In fact, what is given in this sentence is nothing but the usual refutation of the objection frequently raised against this *vāda*, viz. if every material phenomenon contains in itself at least one representative of each and every species in individual things, one would expect all of them to be manifest, or visible, at a time; and, to be sure, the counterargument that this is not the case due to *deśakālākārāpabandha* can only be adduced by an upholder of Sāṃkhya like in the other less ambiguous instances, too. Hence it is much more likely that what we have to do with here is not a quotation, but simply a constituent part of Cakradhara's own text. The final doubts are resolved as soon as it is realized that the final *iti* does by no means indicate a quotation, but has to be supplemented, as also in many other cases in the NMGBh, by a following *arthaḥ*, and that the words *Vṛkṣāyurveda vṛkṣāṇāṃ vṛddhaye śrīyate* have to be construed with the preceding one, i.e. *tad eva ca kvathitam*. This assumption is further corroborated by the observation that the alleged quotation if it were indeed introduced by *Vṛkṣāyurveda vṛkṣāṇāṃ vṛddhaye śrīyate* would stand in sharp contrast to this statement; for, in the subsequent sentence a means of making trees grow is not even alluded to!

The translation of this passage I gave earlier has, therefore, to be amended, but only as regards the sentence *tad eva ca kvathitam Vṛkṣāyurvede vṛkṣāṇāṃ vṛddhaye śrīyate* which rather means: "and of this (i.e. the corpse) when decomposed it is stated authoritatively in the Vṛkṣāyurveda that [it is a proper

<sup>23</sup> Cf. WEZLER 1981: 371, 375f., 378, 381.

means] of [making] trees grow (i.e. that it represents an excellent natural manure)." This re-interpretation of the passage under discussion — and I think it is the only correct interpretation — implies, of course, that the expression *tatra* in the subsequent sentence has to be taken as referring to *śarīraṃ kvāṭhitam* so that what results is the interesting statement that "since this is so, i.e. since a decomposed corpse serves among other things as manure of trees, it is not only worms that can be produced by it, but similarly a tree, too."

We are, therefore, in a position to add the following additional observations:

[3] The chain of transformation adduced by Cakradhara by way of illustration contains the following links: *kṣīra* — *ghṛta* etc. — *puṣṭi* — *retas* etc. — *putra* etc. — *marāṇa* — *śarīrasya kvāṭhaḥ* — *kṛmi* or alternatively *vrkṣa*<sup>24</sup> — *phala* — *rasa* — and finally *bala*. Since it is clearly meant to justify the statement obviously at issue, viz. that *sarvaṃ kṣīre 'sti*, it is no wonder at all that the process of transformation does not culminate in the manifestation of the original *prakṛti*, i.e. milk. As from other relevant sources, too, one gathers the impression that the Sāṃkhya never insisted on what we would call the cycle of matter in nature. For, one cannot fail to note in the present case that the chain could have easily been continued after *śarīrasya kvāṭhaḥ* by *īṣa* which in its turn could, when fed to a cow, to be said to become milk by transformation.

On the other hand, it seems noteworthy, or even significant, that such a continuation is absent and that the chain would seem to break off with *bala*, "strength", a concept similar to *puṣṭi*, but denoting an effect brought about by a vegetal and not an animal product; and there is no likelihood at all that the author who quotes here from a Sāṃkhya source is responsible for the break, i.e. that he has left out any links that may have followed upon *bala* in the original.

[4] Further, one should take note of the fact that Cakradhara's example is not really the 'alimentary chain'. Of course, it contains elements of such a chain: the ghee is consumed by man, the fruit eaten, etc., but taken together, it is of a distinctly different character, for it can rather be styled a causal chain; yet the different individual links of this chain are conceived each as forming a product-of-transformation of the immediately preceding one in the accordance with the Sāṃkhya *pariṇāma*-vāda.

[5] Of particular importance, however, is the context in which the Vṛkṣāyurveda is referred to; for, an element of its teaching is taken recourse to only in connection with the statement that there exists a *pariṇāma* relation also between

<sup>24</sup> It is perhaps better, and more in accord with what the text actually says, not to assume an alternative development, but a temporal sequence here too, i.e. to take *tad* (*eva*) to mean *kṛmibhāvena pariṇatam śarīram*; this interpretation is also confirmed by the parallel from the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, cf. below p. 299.

a decaying corpse and a tree, i.e. to use Sāṃkhya terminology, between a *jaṅgama* and a *sthāvara*. Now, it was precisely this idea which, as you will remember, made the author of the Vivaraṇa refer to the Vṛkṣāyurveda! This correspondence, striking as it is, can, to be sure, not by any means be convincingly accounted for by assuming a mere accidental coincidence. On the contrary, it warrants the assumption that the reference to the Vṛkṣāyurveda in both these texts was taken over by the authors from their respective sources which may well have been even a common one and which must necessarily have been a Sāṃkhya text.

It is hence perfectly legitimate to make the further assumption that it were Sāṃkhya authors themselves who thought it useful or even necessary to refer to the relevant *śāstra* when expressing the view that animals, nay even the foremost of animals, man himself, after death do not only, as could easily be observed, turn into worms, but also form a nutriment of plants, whereas the opposite process, i.e. the transformation of plants into animals, was evidently considered by them common empirical knowledge which did not in any way call for a *śāstra* justifying it.

3.2 Much of what has been said just now in analysing the NMGBh passage is strikingly corroborated by Bhāsarvajña who comes in as a most welcome additional witness. For, in examining the last of the famous five *vīta* proofs adduced by Classical Sāṃkhya authors, among them also Īśvarakṛṣṇa (cf. Sāṃkhyakārika 15),<sup>25</sup> for the existence of primary matter (*pradhāna*) it is thus that he renders the Sāṃkhya argument (Nyāyabhūṣaṇa 564.2-11):

*itaś cāsti pradhānam vaiśvarūpyopalabdheḥ kṣīrādivat / tad yathā kṣīrād dadhi, dhadhnas takraṃ ghṛtaṃ ca, tad upayogāt puṣṭis tato 'pi putrādayaḥ / kadācin mṛtasya śarīrasya kvāṭhaḥ / kuthitasya (read: kvāṭhitasya ?) kṛmibhāvena pariṇāmaḥ kuthitam (read: kvāṭhitam ?) śarīraṃ vrkṣāyurvede vrkṣāṇāṃ vṛddhyartham iti śrūyate / tena ca vrkṣāṇāṃ api tatkāryatvam, vrkṣāc ca phalam, phalād rasas tad upayogāt puṣṭibalam ity etat sarvaṃ kṣīre 'sti kāryakāraṇayor abhedād / evaṃ sthāvarāṇāṃ jaṅgameṣu sadbhāvo jaṅgamānāṃ ca sthāvareṣu ity evaṃ jātyanucchedena sarvaṃ sarvātmakam deśakālākāranimittapratibandhān na samānakālabhivyaktis, tad etat sthāvarajaṅgamavaiśarūpyam jalabhūmyoḥ pariṇāmikam / jalādipariṇāmo 'py anyasya kasyacit so 'py anyasya so 'py anyasya so 'py anyasya tāvad yāvad avi-*

<sup>25</sup> Apart from the passage quoted from the Sāṃkhya-Saptati-Vṛtti (Va) in WEZLER 1981: 380f. what should have been mentioned also is the Mātharavṛtti on this kārikā; for it concludes its comment with the words: *yathā jalabhūmyor etad rasagandhādivaiśvarūpyam avibhaktam asy eva sthāvarāṇāṃ jaṅgameṣu jaṅgamānāṃ sthāvareṣu / evaṃ jātyanucchedena sarvaṃ sarvātmakam iti //*.

*bhāgaḥ kvacid abhūt / yatra cāvibhāgas tat pradhānam iti //*

The correspondence of the first half of this passage with what we found stated in the NMGBh is almost a complete one; it also clearly confirms the re-interpretation of the latter text proposed by me, and this to such an extent that I think I need not translate it. Similarly I withstand the temptation to examine the relation in which the whole passage evidently stands not only to the Vivaraṇa, but also to quite a number of other relevant passages discussed in my first article on the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*; suffice it to state that this relation is so close that there cannot be the least doubt that Bhāsarvajña has borrowed from one of the other texts or — and this is more likely — is even indebted to the same common Sāṃkhya source.

In view of the parallel from the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa it can be regarded an established fact that it is only with regard to a particular element of the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*, viz. the transformation of a being of the *jaigama* class into a *sthāvara*, that Sāṃkhya authors felt prompted to call Vṛkṣāyurvedins into evidence and to support their view by the deposition of these unbiased witnesses. It is most natural to assume that corresponding statements can actually be found in texts of botany, and, indeed, I was able to point out some already in the article mentioned just now. They have, however, the common feature of referring to animals only, or constituent elements of the organism of animals,<sup>26</sup> while the transformation spoken of by Cakradhara and Bhāsarvajña is clearly that of a human corpse. One has, therefore, still to search for passages in Vṛkṣāyurveda texts that would agree with what both these authors assert them to say; for, to be sure, neither Cakradhara nor Bhāsarvajña seems to harbour the least doubt that the reference to the Vṛkṣāyurveda is fully justified.

In fact, in Surapāla's Vṛkṣāyurveda<sup>27</sup> we find also the following verses:

*aṅkolha-taila-narātaila-su-bhāvitam yat  
[bijam sva]bhāva-paripakva-phalād dhi nītam /  
sañjāyate jhaṭiti tat karakāmbu-sikta-  
mṛtsnā-cayopetam idam atra na citram asti //* 277 //

"A [grain of seed] which has been properly steeped in the oil of the *aṅkolha* plant as well as in oil [prepared from] human [fat], if it has been taken from a fruit [naturally] ripened, no doubt, sprouts at once, if it is furnished with a heap of fertile soil which has been [thoroughly] moistened

<sup>26</sup> This evidence, in fact it is an ample one, is now easily accessible in R. P. DAS' edition of Surapāla's Vṛkṣāyurveda (cf. fn. 14) and it need not hence be discussed here.

<sup>27</sup> For parallels in other Vṛkṣāyurveda texts and additional explanations see R. P. DAS, o.c., p. 366f.

with water from a vessel/hail-stone water; there is nothing amazing in this".

*anekadhā kurkuṭa-rakta-siktaṃ  
dāḍimba-bijaṃ ravi-śuṣkam uptam /  
nṛ-māṃsa-medah-paridhūpa-sekāt  
prajāyate tat phalati kṣaṇena //* 280 //

"A grain of seed of a pomegranate tree which is sown after it has been dried in the sun and repeatedly moistened with chicken/cock blood sprouts on account of having been [steeped in a decoct of] human flesh and fat, of having been fumed and on account of being watered; it bears fruits in no time."

*aṅkolha-matsya-śiśumāra-nṛ-kola-nakra-  
tailābhibhāvita-viśoṣita-bijaṃ uptam /  
sekād varāvani-tale karakāmbu-sikte  
sūte sa-puṣpa-phalitaṃ jhaṭiti drumam hi //* 281 //

"For, a grain of seed which has been steeped in oil prepared from the *aṅkolha* plant<sup>28</sup> and from fish, dolphins, men, hogs and/or alligators and which has been carefully dried, produces an account of being watered at once a tree full of blossoms and fruits, if it is sown in a piece of excellent soil, moistened with water from a pot/hail-stone water."

Similar verses are attested in the Upavanavinoda section of the Śārṅgadharapaddhati and other texts in which issues of the Vṛkṣāyurveda are dealt with. Yet, I think those I have noted just now render sufficient evidence to prove my point, viz. that Vṛkṣāyurveda texts in fact strongly recommend the use of certain products prepared from human corpses, in particular of 'human oil', and, indeed, as has been stated by Cakradhara and Bhāsarvajña, "in order to ensure a [rapid] growth of trees" and other plants. But this extraordinarily interesting material calls for a more detailed discussion which will be attempted in what follows, although I am also bound by limitations of space — and time.

[1] As regards chronology, no real difficulties arise. Although Surapāla can certainly not be assigned to a period prior to Classical Sāṃkhya,<sup>29</sup> there is no doubt that his work is, for the greatest part, based on older works and thus ultimately on a tradition which can be traced back to the time of the Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra where the Vṛkṣāyurveda is referred to for the first time.<sup>30</sup> It has, of course, to be admitted that there is no direct evidence for the assumption that the

<sup>28</sup> The preparation of this oil is described in Śivatattvaratnākara 7.2.18ff. (Vol. II p. 265f.).

<sup>29</sup> On Surapāla's date see R. P. DAS, o.c., p. 17.

<sup>30</sup> Viz. 2.24.1.



Śāstra known to Kauṭilya already contained such instructions; nevertheless I am pretty sure that this assumption is perfectly justified. For,

[2] one cannot help wondering why Sāṃkhya authors should have thought it necessary to refer their readers to the corresponding śāstra, had the use of 'human oil', in gardening been a well-known element of common everyday practice in their times, too. One is rather given the impression that this reference is, at least partially, caused by the fact, that this use of *nara-taila*, etc., was not easily observed or even common knowledge.

[3] In any case, I see no reason to suspect these Vṛkṣāyurveda instructions to be a mere fabrication. On the contrary, there is every likelihood that they have been derived from a real, not necessarily accidental experience<sup>31</sup> which clearly demonstrated that the dead body of a man is very much something that can be regarded as suitable for use in gardening. After all in India we have to do with a society which not only, down to the present day, could not bring itself to ignore the phenomenon of death — although the corpse is heavily tabooed — but which has also frequently been stricken by all sorts of natural disasters and epidemic diseases. But it is equally possible, may even probable that the usefulness of the dead body of man was not discovered separately and independently; rather its use may have been the result of a simple consideration to the effect that what holds good for certain animal products<sup>32</sup> should be true of human products, too; or perhaps (in view of the higher rank of man) even more true, viz. that it represents an excellent manure.

Yet, whatever may have induced the Indians to use human fat, etc., in gardening, a question which suggests itself with similar urgency is that of how they could have

<sup>31</sup> H.-G. TÜRSTIG (*Jyotiṣa. Das System der indischen Astrologie*, Wiesbaden 1980, p. XV) maintains that "the knowledge of medicine herbs ... can certainly ... not be acquired through experience and by trial and error" and refers in this connection to LÉVI-STRAUSS' famous work *La pensée sauvage*. However, it seems that he has fallen a prey to a misunderstanding; for the French anthropologist clearly even emphasizes that such knowledge presupposes active and methodical observations and he consequently distinguishes between two different types of scientific thinking. It would have been correct to say that such knowledge can not have been derived exclusively from experience based on perception. Apart from this, it appears to me necessary to take into account in the whole discussion that certain species of higher animals, e.g. dogs, 'take' particular plants when they do not feel well. Cf. also "DER SPIEGEL", Nr. 10 / 46. Jahrgang, 2. März 1992, 279 ("Heilkunde der Schimpansen").

<sup>32</sup> Dried blood of animals slaughtered is still used as manure, and available in every market-garden. — The use of the blood of sacrificial animals as fertilizer is also referred to by H. ZIMMER, *Die indische Weltmutter*, Frankfurt 1980, p. 21; for the use of flesh in this capacity see also Śukranīti 4.4.45 as quoted in Dharmkośa, Rājānītikāṇḍa p. 1431. — Note that the idea that blood makes the earth fertile is attested already in the RV (e.g. 1.32.5) (cf. K. HOFFMANN, *Der Injunktiv im Veda*, Heidelberg 1967, 244).

procured such fertilizers. For, quite clearly we cannot go so far as to assume that human flesh and 'oil' have in India at any time been a merchandise easily available in the nearest market. On the other hand, the possibility that human flesh was nevertheless occasionally sold cannot be entirely excluded, not so much because of testimonies like e.g. that of act V of the *Mālatīmādhava*<sup>33</sup> or that of the *Harṣacarita*<sup>34</sup> (which might well derive from the arsenal of poetic imagination or the depths of popular horror stories), but rather in view of the fact that in the *Arthaśāstra* (4.10.14: punishment in the form of cutting off individual limbs and selling *vimāṃsa*<sup>35</sup>, 4.10.15: *mānuṣamāṃsavikraye vadhaḥ*) penalty of death is prescribed "in the case of the sale of human flesh"; for the inclusion of this paragraph in the 'Ancient Indian Penal Code' cannot plausibly be explained by assuming that it is based exclusively on considerations of a merely theoretical nature: something real must have been the reason for it, whatever it may have been.<sup>36</sup> But even so it cannot be disputed that the central question remains how

<sup>33</sup> Cf. also WEZLER, *Die wahren "Speiseresteesser"* (*Sk. vighasāṣin*), Wiesbaden 1978, p. 18ff.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *The Harṣacarita of Bāṇabhaṭṭa with Exhaustive Notes ...* by P. V. KANE, Delhi-Patna-Varanasi 1965, ucchvāsa 5, p. 21 (text) and p. 72 (note) as well as ucchvāsa 7, p. 65 and p. 204 (note); cf. also D. N. LORENZEN, *The Kāpālikas and Kālāmukhas*, New Delhi 1972, p. 1f. and 21 as well as p. 28, 56f. and 94 (on other sources about the sale of human flesh). Cf. also M. HARA, "A Note on the Sanskrit Phrase *devānām priya*", IL 30 (1969) [Katre Felicitation Vol. II], p. 23f.

<sup>35</sup> Regarding this term, R. P. KANGLE (*The Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra*, Pt. II, p. 327) rightly refers to AŚ 2.26.12 (*pariśūnam aśirahpādāsthi viṅgandham svayaṇmṛtam ca na vikrīṇiran*, "they shall not sell (meat that is) swollen, without head, feet and bones, foul-smelling and (of a) naturally dead (animal)"). He renders it, in his translation of 4.10.15, by "unclean"; but one should bear in mind that the passage 2.26.12 clearly shows that the "uncleaness" is twofold viz. caused by decay having already set in (cf. also Gaut.Dh.S. 17 (= 2.8)38) or uncertainty about the cause of death, on the one hand, on the other by the difficulty of determining its true nature in case when no characteristic limbs are left, i.e. by the danger that meat of animals that are not eaten by the Indians is sold and in the end also unknowingly eaten. The practice e.g. of Nepalese butchers to lay out the severed head of goats and not to cut off the animals legs, rather a repulsive sight to the Western visitor, is hence not only due to the fact these parts are also purchased, but most probably also by a legally motivated tradition which can be traced back to Kauṭilya. Cf. in this connection also Yājñ.S. 2.297 and Viṣṇu S. 5.49.

<sup>36</sup> The eating of human flesh or, to be precise, an atonement for it, is mentioned in the *abhakṣyabhakṣaṇapṛāyaścittaprakaraṇa* of the *Mitākṣara*, subsequent to the explanation of Yājñ.S. 3.289 (on p. 488 l. 11ff. of the NSP-edition). On cannibalism and necrophagia in ancient India, and Iran, cf. H. FALK, *Bruderschaft und Würfelspiel ...*, Freiburg 1986, p. 37f., 39ff.; FALK himself also refers to E. ARBMANN, *Rudra ...*, Uppsala 1922, p. 266f. and G. WIDENGREN, *Hochgonglaube im alten Iran ...*, Uppsala 1938, p. 335. — For an *arka*, i.e. a special type of medicinal preparation, from human flesh see G. J. MEULEN-

human flesh and 'oil' could have been procured in ancient or early mediaeval India.

Not, to be sure, from killing of old people<sup>37</sup> or from places where anatomy lectures were held, so to say;<sup>38</sup> a possible source for procuring usable products of the human body could, however, have been human sacrifice the existence of which even in the 'Great Tradition' cannot reasonably be doubted.<sup>39</sup> But apart

BELD, "Observations on the Arkaprakāṣa, a medical Sanskrit text ascribed to Rāvaṇa" in: *Les medecines traditionnelles de l'Asie. Actes du Colloque de Paris 11-12 Juin 1979*, ed. G. MAZARS, Strasbourg 1981, p. 120.

<sup>37</sup> On this costum cf. F. J. SPROCKHOFF, "Die Alten im alten Indien. Ein Versuch nach brahmanischen Quellen", in: *Saeculum* XXX Hft. 4 (1979), 374-433. But cf. also KLAUS E. MÜLLER, "Zur Frage der Altentötung im westeurasiatischen Raum", in: *Paideuma* XIV (1986), 17-44 and J. JETTMAR, "Altentötung in Dardistan", in: *Paideuma* XV (1969), 162-166.

<sup>38</sup> Regarding the question whether there were dissections of human corpses in India cf. K. G. ZYSK, "Some Observations on the Dissection of Cadavers in Ancient India" in: *Ancient Science of Life* 2, III (1983), 187-189; R. P. DAS, "More on the Dissection of Cadavers in Ancient India" in: *Ancient Science of Life* 3, I (1983), 48, I. FIŠER and O. FIŠEROVA, "Dissection in Ancient India. History and Culture of Ancient India" (*For the XXVI International Congress of Orientalists*), ed. By W. RUBEN, W. STRUVE, G. BONGARD-LEVIN, Moscow 1963, 306-328 and, finally K. G. ZYSK, "The Evolution of Anatomical Knowledge in Ancient India, with Special Reference to Cross-cultural Influences" in: *JAOS* 106.4 (1986), 687-705. Something like an autopsy is perhaps intended by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in the Ślokavārttika (Ātmavāda, verse 99f.); cf. C. OETKE, "Ich" und das Ich. *Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Ātmankontroverse*, Stuttgart 1988, p. 441).

<sup>39</sup> Some of the titles subsequently listed contain information about further relevant literature on human sacrifice in India; I therefore deem it justified to confine myself to presenting what is the result rather of an accidental discovery than of a systematic search.

A. WEBER: "Über Menschenopfer bei den Indern der Vedischen Zeit", *ZDMG* 18 (1864) 262-287.

J. CAMPBELL: *A Personal Narrative of 13 years amongst the wild tribes of Khondistan. Human Sacrifices in India*. With a prefatory new introduction by Prof. Birwal S. Das, Delhi 1986.

A. BARTH: *Les Religions de l'Inde*. Paris 1879, p. 38. *The Religion of India*, trans. into English by Rev. J. Wood, repr. Delhi 1969, 57-59.

S. A. WEBER: *Über die Königweihe, den Rājāsūya*, Berlin 1893, 8, 47, 52, 64, 108.

E. THURSTON: *Castes & Tribes of Southern India*, Vol. I, Madras 1909, p. XV.

R. VON HEINE-GELDERN: "Kopfjagd und Menschenopfer in Assam und Birma und ihre Ausstrahlungen nach Vorderindien", in: *Mitteilungen der Anthropologischen*

*Gesellschaft in Wien*, XXXXVII (1917), 1-65.

BAHADUR HIRA LAL RAI: "Human Sacrifice in Central India", in: *Man in India*, 1 (1921), 8-66.

H. WHITEHEAD: *The Village Gods of South India*, Madras 1921, repr. Delhi 1983, p. 59ff., 82, 86 ff.

SARAT CHANDRA ROY: "Ethnography in Old Official Records", in: *Man in India*, Vol. 2 (1922), 78-96.

J. G. FRAZER: *The Golden Bough* ..., London 1924, p. 433ff.

H. ZIMMER: "Die indische Weltmutter". Aufsätze hrsg. u. eingeleitet v. F. Wilhelm, Frankfurt 1980, p. 23 (originally published in: *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 1938, Zürich 1939).

K. K. HANDIQUI: *Yasastilaka and Indian Culture* (Jivarāja Jaina Granthamālā No. 2), Sholapur 1949, p. 22ff. (for further references see General Index s.v. Caṇḍamāri).

DHAIRYABALA P. VORA: *Evolution of Morals in the Epics (Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa)*, Bombay 1959, p. 230ff.

J. GONDA: *Die Religionen Indiens I* Stuttgart 1960, 1978<sup>2</sup>, p. 173, 325.; *II* Stuttgart 1963, 5, 50, 97, 211 and 218 (containing also further references).

J. C. HEESTERMANN: "The Case of the Severed Head" in: *WZKS XI*, 1967, 22-43.

D. SCHLINGLOFF: "Menschenopfer in Kauśāmbī" in: *IJ* 11 (1969), 175-189.

SUDHAKAR CHATTOPADHYAYA: *Evolution of Hindu Sects up to the time of Śaṅkara*, Delhi 1970, p. 123, 127.

D. N. LORENZEN: *The Kāpālikas and Kālāmukhas. Two Lost Śaivite Sects*, New Delhi 1972, p. 86.

A. W. MACDONALD: *Essays on the Ethnology of Nepal and South Asia*, Kathmandu 1983, p. 1ff. ("On Prajāpati").

H. FALK: "Die Legende von Śunahṣepa auf ihrem rituellen Hintergrund", *ZDMG* 134 (1984) 115-135, especially 134 + note 53.

K. G. ZYSK: "The Evolution of Anatomical Knowledge in Ancient India ..." in: *JAOS* 106.4 (1986), 689f.

M. WITZEL: "The Case of the Shattered Head" in: *Sill* 13/14 = *Festschrift Wilhelm Rau* ..., 1987, 363-415 (especially § 8 and 9 as well as notes 49, 55f., 66, 74, 95 and 103).

— Sacrifices of animals and men to tree deities are referred to in Jātaka no. 50 and 353. —

Note that even today one finds once in a while in the media news about, real or alleged, human sacrifices in the Indian subcontinent (e.g. "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" of 6th July 1991: "Zehn Jahre altes Mädchen einer Göttin geopfert"). It is, however, necessary to distinguish not only, as rightly pointed out by A. W. MACDONALD (see above), between various stages in the cultural development of mankind in the framework of which such sacrifices become understandable, e.g. that of hunters in contradistinction to that of

from the problem of the diffusion and frequency of human sacrifice, it is the secrecy (that must have surrounded it), the fear of arousing the suspicion of a general public or the organs of state (that must have dominated the sacrifices and the participants) which makes one hesitate to regard such sacrifice to have been a probable, or at least the most probable, source of supply of human flesh, etc.

Now in the commentary on an unknown Vṛkṣāyurveda text, the Vṛkṣāropana-prakāravākyā of Sadāśivavyāsa — the edition of which we also owe to R. P. DAS<sup>40</sup> —, there is a passage in which it is clearly stated that the bones, marrow and flesh needed should be taken from *śastrāghātena yo mṛto 'thavā śūlaprotena yo mṛtas tādrśamanuṣasya* ..., i.e. "from a man who has been slain with a weapon or impaled on the stake". One cannot, however, be sure that this forms an original piece of information, based on the author's own observation; it might likewise be merely part of Sadāśivavyāsa's erudition;<sup>41</sup> for precisely the same expressions, and in identical sequence at that, are repeatedly met with in the Arthaśāstra. Significantly enough all references are to the last but one *adhikaraṇa*, i.e. the fourteenth, "Concerning secret practices" (*aupaniṣada*), viz. 14.2.28, 14.3.4, 64 and 79 (*śastrahatasya śūlaprotasya vā puruṣasya/puṇṣaḥ*).<sup>42</sup>

The evidence of the AŚ — in which the Vṛkṣāyurveda is mentioned for the first time in Indian literature (see above p. 301) — is particularly welcome as it definitely proves that the use of parts or products of human corpses was known at least in a certain kind of ancient Indian magic and sorcery. On the other hand, it is this magical context that creates a problem regarding the qualifications of the man whose flesh etc., can or should be used, viz. *śastrahata* and *śūlaprota*: Are they to be taken as a specific condition indispensable for the magical cure to be effective or are they a general quality inevitably to be present in the qualified, in that only flesh, etc., of such a person can at all be thought of being available? The implication this alternative has is clear: Only in the latter case would it seem

agriculturists, but also between the killing of human beings as part of or essential element of a ritual act, on the one hand, and outside any sacrificial contexts, on the other. This point apart, one wonders that C. VON FÜRER-HEIMENDORF did not deem human sacrifice even worth mentioning (according to the "Index") in his book on *Tribal Populations and Cultures of the Indian Subcontinent*, (HdO II.7), Leiden-Köln 1985.

<sup>40</sup> See his dissertation (cf. fn. 14), p. 485 (beginning of § 23).

<sup>41</sup> The suspicion is aroused by the fact that the sequence of the two qualifications is the same as in the Arthaśāstra, but first of all by the expression *śūlaprotena* in the place of which one would rather expect *śūlāropāṇena*.

<sup>42</sup> At 14.3.70 *śūlaprotasya* alone occurs; should we emend the text here and read also *śastrahatasya śūlaprotasya vā*? As for 14.3.58 see below, n. 48.

possible to regard, without further ado, the statements found in the Vṛkṣāropana-prakāravākyā and especially in the Arthaśāstra as pieces of evidence giving information about the source(s) of procurement of human corpses or parts of them for practical or magical purposes.

In order to answer this question we have first to determine the meanings of the decisive expressions *śastrahata* and *śūlaprota* in the AŚ. The latter does not pose any problem as it quite clearly denotes a man who has been sentenced to death and has been executed by a method apparently widely used in ancient and mediaeval India, viz. by impaling. In view of the juxtaposition of the two attributes it is legitimate to examine first whether *śastrahata* might likewise refer to a person on whom a death sentence has been carried out, but then, of course, with the sword. Although this method was also known in India,<sup>43</sup> it can't be what is intended by this expression here; for this attribute is found applied, in the same section of the AŚ, viz. 14.3.69, to a cow which is thus qualified as "killed with a weapon" (MEYER and KANGLE)<sup>44</sup> or "a sword/knife". Following the dictionaries (PW, MONIER-WILLIAMS, etc.) one may, of course, consider also the possibility that *śastrahata* means "fallen [warrior]"; and there is, no doubt, some likelihood that not all corpses of warriors or soldiers fallen in battle were always ritually cremated. But this seems to be too narrow a meaning especially as in AŚ 14.3.14 the expression *svayaṇmṛta* is met with (said of a Brahmin) and it suggests itself to take it as standing in direct opposition to *śastrahata*; for MEYER's assumption<sup>45</sup> that what is meant is a man who has committed suicide, is far from convincing, not only because of general semantic considerations (the root *mṛ* means "to die") but also, as rightly pointed out by KANGLE,<sup>46</sup> because of the parallel at AŚ 2.2.9 (where *svayaṇmṛta* [scil. *hastin*] stands in opposition to a *hastighātin*).<sup>47</sup> "Dies naturally", the correct meaning of *svayaṇmṛta* at 14.3.14 (and other places), then points, for *śastrahata*, in the direction of "one who has met with death by violence (except for those who have been executed by impaling)",

<sup>43</sup> Cf. P. V. KANE, *History of the Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. III, Poona 1973, p. 400.

<sup>44</sup> Note that at 14.3.15 a masculine *go* is referred to that is slaughtered "in the funeral rites of a Brahmin" (*brahmaṇasya pretakārya yo gaur māryate* ...). Regarding vegetarianism in the AŚ see H. SCHARFE: *Untersuchungen zur Staatsrechtslehre des Kauṭilya*, Wiesbaden 1968, p. 291ff.

<sup>45</sup> J. J. MEYER, *Das altindische Buch vom Welt- und Staatsleben* ..., Leipzig 1926, p. 652, n. 2.

<sup>46</sup> R. P. KANGLE, *The Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra*, Pt. II, Bombay 1963, p. 584 n.

<sup>47</sup> Another parallel, not less significant than that mentioned by KANGLE, is AŚ 2.26.12 (cf. note 35, above).

or perhaps "executed" and this necessarily means "put to death by impaling", or "executed (by impaling or another method)".

The meaning of at least one of the two qualifications given in the AŚ, viz. *sastrahata*, is hence such that the possibility of its relating to a magical requirement only can be ruled out with very high a degree of probability: It is simply not special enough. On the other hand, it has to be taken into account that *sūlaprota* and *sastrahata* are not at all the only qualifications occurring in such contexts in the 14th *adhikaraṇa* of the AŚ. At 14.3.16, e.g. "The ashes of one bitten by a serpent" are mentioned, and according to 14.3.58 "one should make a bull out of the bone of a broken<sup>48</sup> man". Evidently the particular way of suffering the end of physical life is itself of (some) importance here, and this conclusion does not depend on the Western philologist's ability, or inability, to fully understand the relation obtaining between the type of death and the magical rite in which the ashes or bones, etc., are used. It is hence more than probable that the mode of death is relevant in the case of the other two qualifications also, viz. *sūlaprota* and *sastrahata* so that the alternative noted above (p. 307) seems to have to be decided in favour of the first possibility.

There is, however, more that has to be taken into consideration. None of the qualifications is by itself fantastic, i.e. refers to something clearly unreal. It is therefore legitimate to assume that the question of the availability of the special type of corpse needed is not totally ignored in the AŚ 'recipes', but is on the contrary likewise simultaneously paid attention to. And thus what finally turns out is that the alternative at issue is at best only a theoretical question, if not even a pseudo-problem: Whether magically relevant or not, in any case the qualification in the AŚ give also information about the availability of human flesh, etc.; and the question whether a particular type of corpse was more easily available than another, can, if at all, be answered of the corresponding AŚ passages themselves. Considerations of this kind lead also to the assumption that e.g. the corpse of a person killed by snakebite — though this may have been not too rare a cause of death in ancient India — was most probably not considered as suitable for purposes of gardening or horticulture. The result is this that Sadāśivavyāsa's explanation, whatever its origin(s) may have been, can nevertheless be regarded as trustworthy in substance: The human 'oil', etc., the use of which is recommended in Vṛkṣāyur-

<sup>48</sup> MEYER (o.c. p. 656, n.) changes *bhagnasya* of the MSS into *magnasya* "drowned"; but KANGLE (o.c., p. 588 n.) seems reluctant to accept this conjecture and remarks that "*bhagnasya* evidently refers to a murdered man", however without adducing any parallel. Perhaps G. v. MITTERWALLNER's observation that in Kuṣāṇa art the Devī is depicted as overcoming the buffalo "by breaking his spine and strangulating him with her main hand" (cf. her article in: *German Scholars on India II*, Bombay 1976, p. 196-213) is of importance here, too, in that it draws our attention to the possibility that killing without bloodshed could be denoted by the root *bhañj*.

veda texts in certain cases was most probably gained from the corpses of people who had either been impaled on the stake or met with death by some other form of violence.

One cannot help asking oneself further questions at this point, e.g. how an Indian gardener could get hold of such corpses, etc. But the material at disposal does not, as far as I can see, permit us to answer such questions, not even the particularly momentous one regarding the quantity of corpses available on an average within a given period of time; meticulous book-keeping about killing, etc., is evidently a more recent 'achievement' in the history of mankind.

5. Yet apart from such concrete questions there is another problem, and one of much greater significance at that, which is raised by the text material presented above, viz. that of the relation(s) between philosophy and natural sciences in India in general. If I am not mistaken, all that can be said at present is that this problem has hardly ever been touched upon.<sup>49</sup> Nobody seems to have addressed himself to it until now in a systematic, comprehensive and serious manner; and I for one cannot, and dare not to venture so far in the present essay. But the reference to the Vṛkṣāyurveda in (an) early Sāṃkhya text(s) with which I am dealing here is a particularly instructive instance of this relation so that at least a few remarks are certainly called for; indeed such individual observations form the most reliable basis for the comprehensive study of the general problem which we still lack.

It is true that this reference to the Vṛkṣāyurveda is not the only one that can be found in philosophical texts, or tracts. To give but a few more examples: The argument *vyādhipratikriyatvāt*, brought forward in Mahābhārata 12.177.15, is explained by the commentator Vidyāsāgara by adducing as witnesses unknown *vṛkṣāyurvedavidāḥ* whom he quotes or states as making the prescription *amlaṃ madhu māṃsaṃ ca saṃviśyāsiñced dugdhodakaṃ* in order to cure diseases of trees caused by people urinating at their roots.<sup>50</sup> Similarly Sīṃhasūri refers to what is taught in the Vṛkṣāyurveda on the occasion of Mallavādin's assertion that fruits are also found not to be ripe at the time of their natural ripening.<sup>51</sup> And,

<sup>49</sup> See e.g. K. S. ARJUNWARKAR, "The Rasa Theory and the Darśanas" in: *ABORI LXV* (1984), 81-100. On theory versus practice see S. POLLOCK, "The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory in Indian Intellectual History" in: *JAOS* 105 (1985), 499-519; cf. his contributions "The idea of Śāstra in traditional India" and "Playing by the rules: Śāstra and Sanskrit Literature" to volume I of *Shastric Traditions in Indian Arts*, ed. by A. L. DALLAPICCOLA, Stuttgart 1989, 17-26 and 301-312 (respectively); cf. also PH. B. ZARILLI's article "Between text and embodied practice: Writing and reading in a South Indian martial tradition", in the same volume, p. 415-424.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. the critical edition of the Mbh., Vol. 15, p. 1009, App.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakraṇa* of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa ...

finally, Siddhasena does not fail to point out that at least some of the facts which he adduces in order to prove the thesis of the trees' *cetanatva* "are stated in the *Vṛkṣāyurveda*".<sup>52</sup> And it is equally true that the latter references, too, deserve a more detailed analysis than can be undertaken here.

Nevertheless, the reference in the unidentified Sāṃkhya source demands scholarly attention to a much higher degree. The reference, or quotation, has already been shown above (p. 297 and p. 299) to run thus: *tad eva ca kvathitaṃ vṛkṣāyurvede vṛkṣāṇāṃ śrūyate* or *kuthitaṃ śarīraṃ vṛkṣāyurvede vṛkṣāṇāṃ vṛddhyartham iti śrūyate*. Quite clearly the predicate *śrūyate* cannot be taken literally, i.e. to mean "is heard", if this is equivalent to "is known from hearsay". The reason for taking at all this possibility into consideration is, of course, that the well-known technical meaning would imply that the *Vṛkṣāyurveda* is regarded as forming part of the Śruti, a conception which the Western philologist can not by any means accept. However, the 'science' at issue here is, after all, called *-veda*, or rather *-āyurveda*, and in any case in India the latter has ultimately come to be regarded as a constituent, though subordinate<sup>53</sup> part of the Vedic lore (whether solely because it is a 'Veda'<sup>54</sup> or for other reasons, too). This is shown most conspicuously by the inclusion of the *Āyurveda* in the lists of the so-called *Upavedas*. Although the *Vṛkṣāyurveda* as such is apparently not mentioned in these lists,<sup>55</sup> not even in the course of explanations of the 'Science of the Span of Life' or as a science subordinate to it, the assumption is fully warranted that the final member of the compound *Vṛkṣāyurveda* could be taken as indicating a close connection with human medicine, one of the 4 *Upavedas*, and this in such a manner that the notion could be extended to include the *Vṛkṣāyurveda*, too. Nevertheless,

edited with critical notes by MUNI JAMBŪVJAYAJĪ, Pt. I, Bhavnagar 1966, p. 202 l. 3 and 14ff. (cf. also p. 367 l. 12ff.); as for methods meant to prevent ripening or postpone the period of ripening etc., see Surapāla's *Vṛkṣāyurveda* (cf. fn. 14), p. 356ff. and 313 (verse 225).

<sup>52</sup> *Sammatitarka-Prakaraṇam ... Paṇ. Sukhlalālasaṃghavinā ... Paṇ. Becara-dāsadoṣinā ca ... saṃsodhitam*, Ahmedabād Saṃvat 1980-85, p. 652f.

<sup>53</sup> In the *Śabdakalpadrūma* and *Vācaspatya upaveda* is paraphrased by *upamito vedena* and thereafter explained as *pradhanavedātīrikṭah* in the former lexicon and by *vedasadrṣe āyurvedādau* in the latter. Note also the term *upāṅga* likewise applied to the *Āyurveda* etc., cf. J. FILLIOZAT, *The Classical Doctrine of Indian Medicine*, Delhi 1964, p. 1 n. and S. DASGUPTA, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, Cambridge 1965, p. 274.

<sup>54</sup> L. RENOU (*The Destiny of the Veda in India*, Delhi-Patna-Varanasi 1965, p. 14) is rather evasive in the little he has to say on this question.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. e.g. Śaunaka's *Caraṇavyūhasūtra* 4.1, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Prasthānabheda* (ed. A. WEBER, Ind. St. 1, 1849, p. 9f. and p. 20f.) and Śivatattvaratnākara 1.2.15f.

I have the impression that the Sāṃkhya author referring to this science, or even quoting from one of the works dealing with it, deliberately chose the expression *śrūyate* in order to ensure that the authority of the source he adduces is established beyond any doubt: Understandably enough his way of arguing is influenced to some extent by his aim.

This is obvious also in what forms the actual contents of the reference. For, literally, what it means is nothing but that a decomposed human body according to the *Vṛkṣāyurveda* furthers the growth of trees; but this statement is injected in such a context and in such a manner that the hearer or reader is almost automatically given the impression that what the *Vṛkṣāyurveda* has in view is a process like the Sāṃkhya *pariṇāma* at the beginning of which stands a human corpse and at the end of which a particular part of a vegetal body!<sup>56</sup> The concept of *pariṇāma*, however, is not only not even alluded to in the *Vṛkṣāyurveda* passage, but there is also no reason whatsoever for assuming that the concept was taken over<sup>57</sup> by *Vṛkṣāyurvedins* on their part and applied to their field of learning.

Quite the reverse is evidently true: It is the Sāṃkhya philosopher who projects his idea of (ubiquitous) transformation upon the fact observed and made use of by the *Vṛkṣāyurvedins*; it is he who has, or claims to have, a thorough, clear and full understanding of the phenomenon observed and of the reason by which it is ultimately caused: Sāṃkhya philosophy is *qua* theory of the world in a sense also the basis of the 'natural science'; the philosophical 'laws' recognized by it are universally valid — whether the scientists were aware of them or not. And as regards the *Vṛkṣāyurveda*, there can be hardly any doubt, at least judging by Surapāla's work of the same name, that the representatives of this science kept (apart from certain rather fantastic or poetical (traditional) ideas) almost entirely to empirical facts and their description, i.e. that they did not take any notable interest in looking behind phenomena and discovering their causes: The *Vṛkṣāyurvedins* show a conspicuous lack of inquisitiveness and readiness to address themselves to theoretical questions; but this has clearly not detracted from the high reputation this Śāstra enjoyed from of old.<sup>58</sup> Whether it is due to its predominantly

<sup>56</sup> The fact that Surapāla refers only to parts or products of a human corpse, and not to the dead body as a whole does not in the least detract from the appropriateness of this statement.

<sup>57</sup> That *Āyurvedins* themselves should have developed quite independently a concept identical with or similar to that of Sāṃkhya *pariṇāma* can safely be ruled out.

<sup>58</sup> A particularly clear piece of evidence in this regard is *Manusmṛti* 1.46-48 (with which one should compare, in spite of the time gap, Surapāla's *Vṛkṣāyurveda* (cf. fn. 14 p. 130ff.); P. HACKER's remark on *Manu* 1.43-48 ("Two Accounts of Cosmography", in: *Jñānamuktāvalī. Commemoration Volume in Honour of Joh. Nobel*, Delhi 1963, 86 = Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 1978, 398), viz. "Divisions of living beings and plants. Not in TG I" (= a particular

practical outlook that the Vṛkṣāyurveda does not show any vestiges of an influence exercised on it by the Sāṃkhya system, is a problem that cannot be solved at the moment: The alluring, but obviously very vast and dense jungle of the reception of Sāṃkhya (as also its scope and its limits) still awaits its courageous explorer.

#### Appendix

When I gave a talk on the subject of the present article in Vienna in 1987 my attention was kindly drawn in the ensuing discussion by my friend Gerhard Oberhammer to a painting of Edvard Munch's that practically illustrates the relation between a human corpse and a tree the unknown Sāṃkhya author has in view. I finally succeeded in identifying the painting: It is given the title "Metabolism or Assimilation of Nutritive Material or Two Living Beings" and was, according to R. STANG,<sup>59</sup> painted around 1898, but later changed by the artist, viz. around 1918. The painting forms part of the marvellous collection of the Oslo Kommunes Kunstsamlinger, Munch-Museet and is catalogued there as "Metabolism 19899 (OKK M 419)". Its size is 175 x 143 cm. As it does not belong to the better known pieces and hence is not generally included in illustrated books on Munch, I deem it advisable to add to the present article at least a black-and-white reproduction of it. I am most grateful to the Oslo Kommunes Kunstsamlinger for granting me the permission to do so (see the plate on p. 315).

Important additional information on the painting is given by A. EGGUM in the exhibition catalogue "Edvard Munch. Symbols and Images".<sup>60</sup> "In its original form, the picture had another iconographic content. Up from the roots in the frame grew a small bush or a large flower with a small embryo inside. The woman's hand pointed toward the embryo and almost touched it ... A photograph from 1903 shows how centrally the motif was placed in the "Life Frieze", and we see that the upper part of the frame which depicts Christiania, was not yet completed. In his pamphlet *The Life Frieze*, Munch later expressed that he found the picture as necessary for the frieze as a buckle from the belt, even though it deviated somewhat from the general context. The picture was probably once repainted in connection with Munch's plans for a monumental execution of the "Life Frieze" motifs. A tree trunk between the man and the woman was added, which covers the

group of Puranic Texts as distinguished by W. KIRFEL) has therefore to be thus supplemented: "because these verses have been taken over from or inspired by certain Śāstra texts dealing with animals and plants".

<sup>59</sup> Cf. her book: *Edvard Munch — der Mensch und der Künstler*, Königstein i.T. 1979, p. 123.

<sup>60</sup> National Gallery of Art, Washington 1978, on cat. no. 46. My attention was kindly drawn to this article by Mrs. K. E. Lerheim, Secretary of the "Oslo Kommunes Kunstsamlinger".

bush or flower with the embryo ... The picture was originally part of an eschatology of metabolism, but this aspect is almost gone in the final version ...".

However, the final version not only almost perfectly matches the particular *pariṇāma* at issue in the present essay, but obviously also expresses much more clearly an idea that is met with, and more than once, in writings of Munch's, too. E.g. in his booklet "Livsfrisen" — which most probably dates from 1918 — he says (p. 2)<sup>61</sup> "The motif of the largest pictures, man and woman in the woods, ... is a picture of life as well as of death, and of the town which rises behind the trees." Or in a paper left by him he says:<sup>59</sup> "I rejoiced feeling myself die, united with — or transformed into this earth that always lived, always fermented, always was warmed by the sun ... I ought to be united with her. Out of my decomposing body plants and trees should grow ... I ought to be "in" them. Nothing will pass away. ... That is eternity."

But the elementary parallels to the Sāṃkhya-Vṛkṣāyurveda idea are not limited to Western art only; they can be found also in literary works and other written documents. I have not searched for them systematically, but I think that there should be material enough for a comparative study, a contribution to cultural anthropology which could perhaps even counteract to some extent our present alienation from nature. The few examples I have chanced upon during the last years will, I hope, at least demonstrate that this assumption is not entirely unjustified, or perhaps even inspire others to follow this path further.

A poem of Felix Pollak's entitled 'A Matter of History' begins thus:<sup>62</sup>

"It all has passed and is gone, the cries silenced, the blood /  
congealed in the earth. The cries dissolved in air, the blood /  
sucked up by grass, transformed into the sap of young trees. /"

In A. Watt's booklet "Nature, Man and Woman"<sup>63</sup> there is a foot-note which runs thus:

"It is curious to speculate upon the consequences of civilized man's refusal to be eaten by other forms of life, to return his body for the fertilization of the soil from which he took it. This is a significant symptom of his alienation from nature, and may be a by no means negligible deprivation of the earth's resources." A similar idea is found expressed already in G. Th. Fechner's "Nanna oder Über das Seelen-

<sup>61</sup> Cf. R. STANG, o.c. (fn. 59), pp. 123 and 301.

<sup>62</sup> I quote from: *Vom Nutzen des Zweifels. Gedicht* hrsg. von R. GRIMM, Frankfurt 1989, p. 48.

<sup>63</sup> Vintage Books, New York 1970, p. 105, fn. 5. The text of the English original I owe to the kind assistance of Dr. H. Jamison, Harvard.

leben der Pflanzen", <sup>64</sup> viz. on p. 154: "Mit demselben Rechte, wie man sagt, daß die Menschen und Thiere die Früchte des Feldes essen und fressen, kann man in der That sagen, daß die Früchte des Feldes die Menschen und Thiere fressen; denn alles, was von Menschen und Thieren abgeht, geht wieder in die Pflanzen über, und muß in sie übergehen, damit sie wachsen und gedeihen. Sie zerreißen den Menschen nur nicht so bei lebendigem Leibe, wie wir es mit ihnen tun. Sie warten auf das, was von uns abgeht, bis es zu ihnen kommt, erwarten unseren Tod, ehe sie sich ganz unserer bemächtigen."

And finally the text of an inscription I happened to discover in September 1989 near the top of a mountain in Austria called "Stoderzinken": "Hier irgendwo ruht die Asche von Emil Ritter von Horstig, gestorben am 30. Oktober 1931 im 87. Lebensjahr. Er wollte 'ein Blümlein am Stoder werden'": Cremation does not seem to stand in the way of the fulfillment of this modest wish.

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<sup>64</sup> Reference is to the 3rd edition, Hamburg und Leipzig 1903.