commonly claimed that these distinctive styles of argument, recently uncovered, served to dissolve many traditional philosophical problems. The enthusiasm with which philosophers embrace a new style of argumentation is not always matched by their readiness to examine its credentials, and this book played an important, if sobering, role.

See also: AUSTRALIA, PHILOSOPHY IN

List of works

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FRANK JACKSON

PATAÑJALI (*c.* 2nd century BC)

The grammarian Patañjali lived in the second century BC, before the appearance of the classical systems of Indian philosophy. The aspects of his thought that we would call philosophical are concerned primarily with questions of meaning and meaning-bearers in language.

1 Patañjali and philosophy

Patañjali is the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* (Great Commentary), which comments on Pāṇini's famous grammar called *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (*c.* fourth century BC) and on Kātyāyana's *Vārttikas*; the latter have only survived as part of the *Mahābhāṣya* (Great Commentary) (*c.* second century BC). Patañjali is one of the few authors of early India whose approximate date is probably known. He lived around the middle of the second century BC in the north of India during the incursions into the country of the Graeco-Bactrian king Menander, to which he refers. This early date is confirmed by the absence of influence from the classical systems of Indian philosophy on his thought, with the possible exception of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism.

The *Mahābhāṣya* is not primarily a philosophical treatise. It addresses some philosophical questions in its introduction (whose title is *Paspaśāhnika*) while commenting upon certain grammatical rules (*sūtra*) of Pāṇini. Interestingly, Patañjali (who often sides in this respect with Kātyāyana) does not always share Pāṇini's point of view.

2 The linguistic units that have meaning

Rule 1.2.45 of Pāṇini's grammar states that 'what is meaningful, but is not verbal root or affix, is nominal stem' (*arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam*). If we use the term 'stem' to refer to both verbal roots and nominal stems, this *sūtra* makes clear that for Pāṇini only stems and affixes really have meaning. Combinations of stems and affixes, that is, words and sentences, have at best meanings that are derived from those of the constituent stems and affixes. For Patañjali the situation is the exact opposite of this: words and sentences, not stems and affixes, are meaningful. This is clear from his discussion of rule 1.2.45 where he observes that this *sūtra* would assign the designation 'nominal stem' (*prātipadika*) to words and sentences. This contingency is avoided with the help of some far-fetched and unconvincing arguments. Next Patañjali turns to the question of how stems and affixes can be thought to have meaning, which he considers problematic, unlike Pāṇini. In Patañjali's opinion the nominal stem *vṛkṣa* on its own expresses no meaning. Cardona (1967–8) delineates the following solution offered by Patañjali: the method of concurrent occurrence of meaning and linguistic unit (*anvaya*) and absence of these two (*vyatireka*) shows that *vṛkṣa*, which is the common part of *vṛkṣas*, or 'one tree' and *vṛkṣau*, or 'two trees', must have the meaning, 'tree'. In this way, Patañjali derives the meaning of the stem *vṛkṣa* from the 'real' meanings 'one tree' and 'two trees'. The pair *pacati*,

'he cooks' and *paṭhati*, 'he recites', he similarly points out (*sūtra* 1.3.1) allows us to assign a meaning to the common part *-ati*. Speaking generally, the meanings of stems and affixes are derived from the meanings of complete words.

Patañjali's deviation from Pāṇini is most easily explained by the hypothesis that he was influenced by the Sarvāstivāda Buddhists, who had reified phonemes and words (and perhaps sentences), but not stems and affixes, into existing 'real' elements (*dharma*). This is confirmed by the fact that Patañjali, too, accepts phonemes and words, but not stems and affixes, as independently (and eternally) existing entities. In connection with these independently existing phonemes and words, Patañjali uses several times the expression *sphoṭa*, which plays a major role in the discussions of later grammarians. Unlike them, Patañjali does not look upon the *sphoṭa* as a meaning-bearer, according to Joshi (1967). He speaks, for example, of the *sphoṭa* of individual phonemes. This *sphoṭa* is different from the sound (*dhvani*) which manifests it. The word or phoneme (*śabda*) is the *sphoṭa* and the sound is a property of the word or phoneme. If one person speaks slowly, another quickly, the *sphoṭa* is the same, only the manifesting sound is different (see LANGUAGE, INDIAN THEORIES OF §§1, 3).

3 Do phonemes have meaning?

Although reticent with regard to the meaningfulness of stems and affixes, Patañjali pays great attention in his second chapter (*āhnika*) to the question of whether individual phonemes have meaning. He argues that certain stems and affixes consist of just one phoneme. The verbal root *i*, for example, means 'go'. Certain words which are identical but for one phoneme, express different meanings: *kūpa* means 'well', *sūpa* 'soup', *yūpa* 'sacrificial post'. Also, the removal of one phoneme can change the meaning: *vṛkṣa* means 'tree', *ṛkṣa* 'bear'. Finally, if phonemes had no meaning, collections of phonemes could have no meaning either; one hundred blind people cannot see more than what one blind person can see. Patañjali subsequently rejects these arguments. Sounds normally have no meaning, because they can be modified, elided, or change position in a grammatical derivation. Since only collections of phonemes have meaning, nothing can be concluded from sets of similar words like *kūpa*, *sūpa* and *yūpa*, nor indeed from the pair *vṛkṣa* and *ṛkṣa*. Collections of phonemes can have features which the constituent phonemes do not possess: a chariot, too, can perform functions which its parts cannot.

4 The meaning of a word

What is the meaning of a word according to Patañjali? In the second *āhnika* four kinds of words are distinguished according to what they refer to: words that refer to a genus (*jātiśabda*), those that refer to a quality (*guṇaśabda*), those that refer to an action (*kriyā śabda*) and arbitrary proper nouns (*yadṛcchā śabda*). The first three of these clearly designate nouns, adjectives and verbs respectively. But in the first *āhnika* Patañjali enumerates (twice over) the following four classes of words: nominal words (*nāman*), verbs (*ākhyāta*), preverbs (*upasarga*) and particles (*nipāta*). This enumeration is taken from Yāska's *Nirukta* (*c.* third century BC [1967: I.1]), where the meanings of these different types of words are elaborately discussed. Nominal words (nouns and adjectives), for example, are there described as 'having *entity* as their predominant notion' (*sattvapradhāna*), verbs as 'having *being* as their predominant notion' (*bhāvapradhāna*) (Kahrs 1986: 117). Patañjali was probably aware of the meanings assigned to words there.

Elsewhere (especially in *sūtra* 1.2.64) Patañjali distinguishes two possible meanings of words: the form (*ākṛti*) or the individual object (*dravya*). The former of these two positions is associated with the name of Vājapyāyana. Vyāḍi, on the other hand, held that words denote individual objects. Here, it seems, the discussion concerns itself with nouns primarily. In fact, there is reason to believe that for Patañjali 'form' (*ākṛti*) and 'genus' (*jāti*) were synonyms. Patañjali himself held that both form and individual object constitute the meaning of words.

See also: MEANING, INDIAN THEORIES OF §§1–2

List of works

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* Yāska (*c.* 3rd century) *Nirukta*, ed. and trans. L. Sarup, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967. (The meanings of different types of words are discussed in detail.)

JOHANNES BRONKHORST

PATERNALISM

Restriction of people's liberty of action is paternalistic when it is imposed for the good of those whose liberty is restricted and against their will. The argument in favour of paternalism is that, if one can prevent people from harming themselves, there is no reason not to do so. Versions of the ethical creed of liberalism tend to oppose paternalism. One argument is that as a practical matter the policy of permitting paternalism tends to do more harm than good in the long run, or at least less good than a strict refusal to countenance paternalism would achieve. Another argument appeals to a right of autonomy which paternalism is held to violate whether or not its consequences on the whole are undesirable. Paternalist advocacy can be 'hard' or 'soft'; soft paternalism is the doctrine that paternalism can only be justifiable when the individual action that is being restricted was not chosen in a substantially voluntary way.

1 The concept of paternalism

One behaves paternalistically if one treats an adult as though one were a parent dealing with a child. One's behaviour shows concern for the welfare of the person and a presumption that one's judgment about what will promote it is superior. The paradigm of paternalism, and the focus of most philosophical discussion of it, is restriction of people's liberty against their will for their own good.

Whether a restriction of liberty is paternalistic or not depends on its rationale. If most people want a law requiring that they wear seat-belts when riding in cars for their own protection, and we enact a law in order to cater to this desire, enforcing this policy restricts people's liberty, but not against their will. In its application to the minority who do not want to be under this requirement, the law is still not paternalistic – though it may be unfair – if its rationale is administrative convenience and not the aim of restricting people's freedom against their will for their own good.

2 Utilitarianism for and against paternalism

The case for paternalism is simple. If we can prevent people from harming themselves, why not do it? According to act utilitarianism, one ought always to do whatever would produce the most good (utility) for people (and perhaps other sentient creatures) (see UTILITARIANISM). Whenever restricting someone's liberty to prevent harm to that very person is the utility-maximizing act, then act utilitarianism requires us to do it. Utilitarianism imposes stricter requirements of benevolence than most people accept (see HELP AND BENEFICENCE). One might hold that the better the cost-to-benefit ratio of a paternalistic act, the more obligatory the performance of the act. Or one might hold that so long as a paternalist imposition would do more good than harm, it is permissible even if not morally required.

In *On Liberty* (1859), a classic statement of a liberal utilitarian antipaternalism, John Stuart Mill does not dispute the theoretical possibility that in particular circumstances restricting someone's liberty for their own good might be the best thing to do from a utilitarian standpoint. Mill nevertheless proposes a liberty principle, which asserts that in modern societies the liberty of a sane and cognitively competent adult should never be restricted except to prevent harm to other persons who do not consent to this involvement (see MILL, J.S. §12).

Among its several implications, Mill's liberty principle forbids paternalistic restriction of liberty. Mill argues that we should adhere to this principle