

**HEMACANDRA'S**  
**PRAMĀṆAMĪMĀṢĀ**  
**A CRITIQUE OF ORGAN OF KNOWLEDGE**

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**A WORK ON**  
**JAINA LOGIC**

[Sanskrit Text in Roman Script with English Translation,  
Pt. Sukhlalji's Extensive Introduction and Philosophical Notes]

Edited by  
**NAGIN J. SHAH**



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**Ahmedabad-380014.**



The present work comprises (1) Sanskrit text of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* in Roman script, (2) its English translation, (3) Pt. Sukhlalji's extensive introduction and philosophical notes.

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* occupies an important position in the philosophical literature of India in general and in the Jaina philosophical literature in particular. In it Hemacandra deals with Jaina Logic in the context of other schools of Indian Logic. He is most successful because he was well equipped with the knowledge of those schools and at the same time he had astounding knowledge of Jaina Logic. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is an excellent text-book on Jaina Logic. Hemacandra has done full justice to the subject. His arrangement of topics is very systematic and no important topic is left out. While discussing a topic he covers all the necessary points and adduces all the essential arguments, avoiding unnecessary elaboration that may overwhelm and baffle students. His discourses embody solid results of his predecessors and take note of different views. His range of information is wide and deep. Thus here we have a work on Jaina Logic, from which students will derive comprehensive and authentic knowledge of the subject. Clarity of thought and lucidity of expression, judicious selection of material and systematic treatment, will definitely help students understand the subject without exertion.

Pt. Sukhlalji's introduction and philosophical notes open up new vistas for the study of Indian philosophy. They are exceptionally brilliant as they are written from the standpoint of a non-partisan, historical, comparative study. They display accurate understanding of the historical interrelationship obtaining between the various philosophical systems of India. Pt. Sukhlalji's aim in writing the philosophical notes was to pave the way for a broad-based study of all the Indian philosophical traditions.

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International centre for Jaina studies publication : 6

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GUJARAT VIDYAPITH

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## PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Gujarat Vidyapith, citadel of learning, founded by Mahatma Gandhi in October 1920, naturally aims at fostering research and learning in Indian religions, philosophies and culture. In the early years after its foundation, Gujarat Vidyapith was fortunate enough to have the distinctive services of the great scholars such as Pt. Sukhlalji, Acharya Dharmananda Kosambi, Pt. Bechardasji Doshi and Prof. R. C. Parikh. Their seminal research was published by Gujarat Vidyapith and it is being highly appreciated. Pt. Sukhlalji edited, from old manuscripts, Abhayadevasūri's voluminous Sanskrit commentary on Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka-prakarana* and it was published by Gujarat Vidyapith in five big volumes. In order to revive that great tradition and also to impart the knowledge of Jaina philosophy and religion, 'The International Centre for Jaina Studies' has been established in Gujarat Vidyapith in 1993. The Centre produces and publishes scholarly *Jaina Studies*. The present work is an instance in point.

Gujarat Vidyapith has great pleasure in publishing Ācārya Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* along with its English translation, and Pt. Sukhlalji's extensive introduction and philosophical notes. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is an excellent treatise on *Jaina logic*. Pt. Sukhlalji's introduction and philosophical notes "are full of such wealth of Indian philosophical materials the parallel of which is not easy to come across in the writings of the modern scholars in India and abroad."

Logic (*pramāṇavidyā*) is an important branch of Indian philosophy. It was highly developed in India. Indian logicians discussed various problems



of Logic with sincerity and offered solutions. Jaina logicians, too, earnestly took part in the debate and discussions carried on by logicians of other schools of thought and contributed greatly to Indian Logic. This will be evident from the present publication.

Prof. Nagin J. Shah, a renowned Sanskritist and eminent scholar of Indian philosophy, undertook the onerous task of editing the present work and successfully accomplished it. His learned 'Editor's Note' is instructive enough to introduce the subject to readers. Again, it is he who has transliterated the entire Sanskrit text into Roman script. He deserves our special thanks.

We express our gratefulness to the publisher of Bhārati Mahāvidyālaya Publications Jaina Series, Calcutta, in which appeared the English translation of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*. We are also indebted to the publisher of the Journal *Indian Studies Past & Present* in which appeared English translation of Pt. Sukhlalji's Hindi introduction and Philosophical Notes (*Bhāṣā-Tippaṇāni*); we are grateful to its learned editor Prof. Debiprasad Chattopadhyay.

I trust the present work will be of immense value to the students of Indian logic in general and those of Jaina Logic in particular.

Gujarat Vidyapith  
25-4-2002

Piyush R. Shah  
Actg. Registrar

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Book I — Lecture 1

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Opening verses : salutation to the *Arhat* and statement of the purpose, subject-matter and authorship of the work.

Basis of the work questioned; lack of definite beginning of the sciences stressed; *Tattvārthasūtras* given out as the basis (1).

Writing of aphorisms criticised as vainglorious pose; different writers have different tastes and so the criticism rejected as a trifle (2).

Composition of the work in Books, Lectures, etc., proposed; the first aphorism sets forth the subject-matter; inspiring of volitional impulse – its purpose (3).

Different meanings of *atha* – commencement, sequence – its utterance and promotion of well-being of the author and the hearers – salutation of *parameṣṭhins* by the *sūtrakāra* not incorporated in the work for consideration of economy (4).

Etymological meaning of *pramāṇa* – the most effective instrument of the determination of reality; meaning of *mīmāṃsā* (rendered critique) – complete consideration by the method of enumeration, definition and examination – these three defined and illustrated; classification is the condition of specific definition and so not separately considered (5).

Further meaning of the term *mīmāṃsā* – respectful disquisition which includes the consideration of *nayas* and *pramāṇa*, final emancipation (*mokṣa*) and means thereto and its opposites (6).

General definition of organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) – authentic definitive cognition of an object (7).

Definition – predication of an unknown characteristic in respect of a known fact. Definition being a case of Negative Inference; its subject, probandum and probans are clearly stated; problem of subject functioning as a probans solved by internal concomitance (8).

Definitive cognition is for the exclusion of sense-object contact, and doubt, indecision and indeterminate cognition (9).



Object (*artha*) placed under three heads – what is to be avoided, accepted and ignored – justification of the classification. Insertion of the term for exclusion of self-cognition; authentic (*samyak*) is for the exclusion of error (10-11).

Should self-cognition constitute an element of the definition of organ of knowledge ? Old Masters quoted; cognition of object impossible without intuition of the act of cognition – the intuition cannot be effected by a second cognition, because this will involve *regressus ad infinitum* – if the intuition made dependent upon cognition of object logical see-saw inevitable – Negative implication (*arthāpatti*) also being itself uncognised cannot be *causa cognoscendi* – thus self-cognition is established – other objections refuted – further grounds given; self-cognition though an element is not a logically necessary factor as it overlaps cases of erroneous cognition. (12-13).

The problem whether knowledge takes note of what is already known – if it does redundancy inevitable – hence the object must be previously uncognised; contention untenable – cognition taking note of previously cognised object not invalid as the cognition taking note of a future event – modes being momentary cannot be object of repeating cognitions – substance being eternal cannot be previously uncognised – hence cognition of a previously uncognised object cannot constitute necessary element of the definition – determinate perception (*avagraha*), speculation (*ihā*), etc., valid instances of knowledge, though taking note of the self-same object – recollection another instance (14-16).

Definitions of doubt, indecision and error; doubt (*saṁśaya*) refers to two extremes not possessed by the object – etymological meaning of *saṁśaya* – illustration – implication of the definition clarified; indecision (*anadhyavasāya*) fails to take note of specific characteristic – falls short of certitude – Buddhist's indeterminate intuition a case of indecision; error definitely takes a thing to be what it is not – illustrations (17-20).

Problem whether validity of an organ of knowledge self-determined or determined by another – validity cannot be self-intuited – if it were so,

there would be no occasion of dispute among thinkers – nor could it be intuited by another, for in that case the validating intuition should have its validity self-certified which would be inconsistent with the initial assumption – if the validating intuition required another cognition for its own validity *regressus ad infinitum* would be inevitable. Solution – validity of a cognition is sometimes determined by itself in such instances as the following – habitual cognition of one's own palm, intuition of the acts of bathing, drinking, etc. – validity of inference always self-certified; sometimes by subsequent confirmatory cognition or by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or by the cognition of an object invariably concomitant with it, validity of these being self-evident; verbal knowledge always certified by external evidence (21-24).

Naiyāyika's definition of organ of knowledge criticised. Buddhist view quoted and criticised – indeterminate cognition incapable of generating pragmatic consequence – if determinate cognition bringing up the rear generate pragmatic consequence, the consequences of the maxim of decoration with borrowed ornaments inevitable – validity of determinate cognition should be recognised – elimination of round-about procedure the consequence (25-27).

Two kinds of organ of knowledge – other views asserting more or less organs rejected – statement of the organs accepted by Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhyas, Naiyāyikas, Prābhākaras, Bhāṭṭas (28-29).

The two organs – Perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) and Non-perceptual (*parokṣa*); etymology of *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa* – perceptual cognition not the seniormost of all organs of knowledge (30-31).

Cārvāka position that there is no other organ of knowledge than perception refuted – realisation of the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions, of another man's thought, and negation of what transcends sense-intuition not possible without services of other organs of knowledge such as inference – the grounds elucidated; unfailing correspondence with fact the ground of validity of non-perceptual as well as of perceptual cognitions; the grounds of Dharmakīrti quoted (32-36).

Buddhist view accepting perception and inference as the only organs refuted; sense-intuition, mental intuition, self-intuition and transcendent intuition subsumed under perceptual; recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony subsumed under non-perceptual – comparison subsumed under recognition – presupposition subsumed under inference (37).

Why negation not a separate organ ? Since it has no object, reality being made up of both being and non-being – *Ślokavārtika* quoted. Mīmāṃsist accepts reality as partaking of nature of both being and non-being – *being* the province of perceptual cognitions – *non-being* cognised by negation – negation thus has object of its own – *Ślokavārtika* quoted. (38-40).

Mīmāṃsist position refuted – if non-being not different from being, perceptual cognition must cognise it – even if non-being is different from being, it has to be admitted that a jar is perceived when a plot of land bereft of the non-being of jar is perceived – non-apprehension of non-being concomitant with apprehension of being – cognition of negata not dislodged by organ of negation – otherwise, perceptual cognition would become erroneous because it cognised non-exclusive as exclusive (41-42).

Perceptual cognition defined – immediacy-cum-lucidity the defining characteristic – objections refuted (43-44).

Immediacy-cum-lucidity means 'independence of services of another organ', or 'apprehension of its content as this' (45-46).

Twofold division of perceptual cognition – transcendent and empirical, full manifestation of innate nature of self on total cessation of obstructive veils is transcendent – also called supreme (*mukhya*) being supreme of all cognitions, and pure (*kevala*) being independent of services of sense-organs, etc., and cognisant of all objects (47-48).

Self-luminous, nature of self established on the grounds of 'being not susceptible to doubt', 'being the knower', 'being the author of an act (of cognition) cannot be an object of it'; obscuration of knowledge, etc., by respective *karmas* justified – removal of obscuration effected by



meditation and contemplation; obscuration, though not historical but coeval with self, removable just like dross in ore of gold; obscuration of amorphous being possible like obscuration of consciousness by spirituous liquor, etc.; self a variable constant – a continuum running through successive modes; causality impossible in the theory of changless eternity and discontinuous flux – Akalaṅka quoted (49-53).

View that neither perceptual cognition, nor inference, nor authoritative texts prove transcendent intuition or a person possessed of it stated and refuted; transcendent intuition proved by 'necessity of final consummation of progressive development of knowledge', 'perceptibility of knowable things' and 'actual verification of astronomical knowledge'; were omniscience an impossibility, for whom would the Veda assert things spread over three divisions of time ? Scriptures confirmed by perceptual and inferential knowledge prove person cognisant of supersensible reality; non-absolutism subject-matter of scriptures – established by perceptual cognition and inference; scripture sets forth the truth and indirectly the omniscience of the *Arhat*; perceptual intuition of ascetics cognisant of supersensuous intuition (54-57).

Omniscience of a human being denied – Jaina reply – glory of *Tīrthaṅkara* stated – Freedom from the taint of all imperfections, the only criterion of Godhead; omniscience is also established by lack of contradictory proofs – perceptual cognition competent to record positive truth alone – direct intuition of whole race of mankind necessary for denying the possibility of omniscience; inference also incompetent; scriptural text denying omniscience not available (58-62).

Other varieties of transcendent intuition – visual intuition (*avadhi*) and intuition of the modes of other minds (*manahparyāya*) – etymological meaning of *avadhi* 'that which is confined' – it has for its object only things having shape and colour – two kinds of *avadhi*, congenital and acquired by merit; *manahparyāya* is the intuition of mental modes emerging into acts of thought – it knows external object by inference (63-65).

Difference of *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* consists in the difference of purity, scope, subject and object – elucidation (66-70).

Empirical (*sāṃvyavahārika*) intuition is conditioned by a sense and the mind – its varieties – etymology of *sāṃvyavahārika*, an intuition which leads to authentic activity by way of positive and negative endeavour (71-72).

Different varieties of self-cognition included in sense-perception, mental perception, transcendent perception, etc., according as they relate to sense-perception, mental perception, etc., self-cognition of recollection and the like included in mental perception (73).

Senses enumerated and defined – etymology of *indriya* – sense *qua* substance and sense *qua* function – classification of living beings according to the number of senses possessed; only the conditions of specific cognitions treated as sense-organs and so tongue, feet, hands etc., excluded; different senses mutually identical as well as numerically different – absolute identity would make cognition of taste, smell, etc., by the tactile organ a possibility which is absurd – absolute difference again would make the generation of a synthetic judgement an impossibility – agency of mind for such judgements also refuted – similarly senses are neither absolutely identical with nor absolutely different from the self – similarly substance-cum-mode, the datum of sense (74-82).

Sense *qua* substance is material atoms possessed of definite shape – sense *qua* function is attainment and conscious activity; sense *qua* attainment generates capacity to apprehend a relevant object – sense *qua* conscious activity is an activity of self cognising the object – conscious activity is result as well as an organ (83-87).

Definition of mind – the organ of apprehension of all objects of all the senses – also called *anindriya* or *no-indriya* – Umāsvāti's definition – mind *qua* substance is substantive matter transformed into mind-substance – mind *qua* function is attainment and specific activation of the self (88-90).

Object and light are not the direct conditions of cognition – they are of direct service to subsidence-cum-destruction of knowledge-obscuring *karman* but not to cognition – grounds stated (91-92).

Assuming that sense-intuition is generated by objective datum how would the Naiyāyika account for eternity of God's intuition ? As regards

human beings also, such organs as memory and recognition ought to be rejected as invalid because of the absence of the objective datum cognised in the past – Buddhist theory which suppose the cognition and its object to be related as effect and cause is also untenable because the object being momentary cannot exist at the time of its cognition – other problems raised and the conclusion that cognition and its object derive their existence from their own cause and stand in the relation of illuminator and illuminated established (93).

Cognition not an effect and a copy of the object – destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring *karman*, i.e., specific competency of the self, is the cause of cognition – postulation of competency inevitable even in the theory of causality – cognition being a psychical act cannot have spatial dimension and hence is not a copy of the object – hence Dharmakīrti's plea of structural similarity bereft of all substance – other objections raised (94-95).

Determinate perception (*avagraha*) defined – indeterminate intuition transformed into determinate perception – it is not mental construction (96-98).

Speculation (*īhā*) defined and illustrated – difference of *īhā* from Reasoning (*ūha*) which is the organ competent for the realisation of universal concomitance (99-101).

Perceptual judgement (*avāya*) defined. Retention (*dhāraṇā*) defined, the mental trace which is the causal stuff of memory is a species of cognition – had it been non-cognitional, it could not have produced recollection which is a species of cognition – absence of lapse also a condition of recollection and hence the definition not in conflict with the Bhāṣyakāra's definition "Absence of lapse is retention" (102-105).

Thread of unity through the different stages of perceptual cognition stressed – difficulty solved (106).

Nyāyasūtra's definition 'Unerring cognition produced by sense-object contact is perceptual and it is indeterminate and determinate' reinterpreted by Trilocana and others – according to them source of such cognition, be it cognitional or non-cognitional (e.g. sense-object contact),



is the organ of perceptual cognition – the reinterpretation criticised as unjustifiable – contact of organ of sight with its datum not possible – the organ can work from distance like magnetic stone (107-109).

Buddhist definition of perceptual cognition as free from conceptual construction irrational because it has no bearing upon practical activity (110).

Criticism of Jaimini's definition "cognition engendered upon the actual contact of sense-organs is perceptual" – it overlaps such cognitions as doubt and illusion – later interpretations stated and criticised (111-113).

Older Sāṅkhya definition of perceptual cognition as a modification of sense-organ untenable – modification of unconscious senses cannot be conscious – Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition "Perception is the determinate cognition of its specific object" extends to inference and hence untenable (114-115).

Hence immediacy-cum-lucidity is the only defining characteristic of perceptual cognition (116).

Substance-cum-mode, the object of knowledge – etymology of *dravya* (substance) and *pariṇāma* (mode) – Umāsvāti quoted; positions of Sāṅkhya, Buddhist, Kaṇāda and Akṣapāda stated – causal efficiency which is the only defining characteristic of reality is possible only if reality is substance-cum-mode – elaborate statement of grounds – rival positions of the absolutists refuted – Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory also refuted (117-129).

Defects of Non-absolutism (*syādvāda*) which rejects that substance and mode are either absolutely different or absolutely identical and affirms that they are somehow identical and different both – (1) affirmation and negation in one substratum mutually opposed; (2) split up in integrity if difference and identity posited with reference to different aspects; (3) aspects again mutually different and identical with reference to other sets of aspects and so on, *regressus ad infinitum* the consequence; (4) the aspects of difference and identity again would each have difference and identity, confusion the consequence;

(5) the aspect embodying difference will embody identity and *vice versa*, transfusion the consequence; (6) real, being both identical and different, incapable of being determined in definite reference, and so doubt inevitable; (7) absence of determination the consequence; and finally (8) impossibility of determination of objective reality. (130)

Defects unreal – (1) contradictorily opposed things never perceived in the same locus by the self-same cognition – when so perceived contradiction unreal – blue and not-blue not contradictorily opposed as they are perceived in unitary cognition of variegated canvas; (2) split up in the integrity of an entity also avoided, since the apparently opposed attributes have been proved to be perceived in the same locus; (3) *regressus ad infinitum* unreal – difference nothing other than substance and modes themselves – similarly identity is substance itself; (4) & (5) charges of confusion and transfusion parried by instance of cognition of multiform colour, and the synthesis of universal and particular in all reals; (6) doubt unjustified in a matter definitely established; (7) absence of determination also unjustified since an entity is known to be such by experience and consequently (8) charge of impossibility also unjustified. Hence reality as synthesis of substance and mode established (130).

Nature of reality vs. exercise of causal efficiency; real possessed of dual nature is incapable of exercising causal efficiency as pure substance or pure mode; an entity cannot exercise causal efficiency in sequence since, being efficient, it should not defer its action – substance being unamenable to change, entirely independent of services of auxiliaries – modes also, being momentary, unable to wait for two consecutive moments required for the reception of the service; nor causal activity possible in simultaneity since next moment the entity would be bereft of causal activity and hence bereft of reality (131).

Change defined – continuity together with surrender and appropriation of preceding and succeeding modes respectively constitutes change – this makes causal activity by a real possessing substance and modes as its moments a logical and real possibility. Reality – a *sui*

*generis* multiform entity comprising as its moments continuity, origination and cessation – hence causal activity possible simultaneously or successively according as relevant auxiliary conditions present themselves (132-133).

Resultant of an organ – illumination of the object, that is, cognition of the object; no incompatibility in self-same knowledge being regarded as the organ and its resultant – activity of knowledge referring to the object is the resultant – the same as relates to the subject is the organ, the illumination of the object being realised immediately on the occurrence of it – organ and the resultant identical in so far as they are the self-same cognition – they are different in respect of the relation of determinant and determinatum. Or cessation of ignorance is the resultant (134-143).

Of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgement, retention, memory, recognition, reasoning and inference each preceding one is the organ and the immediately succeeding one is the resultant; judgement of avoidance, acceptance and indifference are also resultants – the question of resultant a matter of volitional interest and point of view. (144-147).

Resultant is both identical with and different from its cognitive organs – grounds stated – Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika coinherence untenable (148-150).

The judgement 'I know the jar' reveals that self while cognising an object cognises itself as well – self is a variable constant (151-153).

## Book I — Lecture 2

152-203

Non-perceptual organ of knowledge defined – sub-divisions viz. recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony stated (1-5).

Recollection conditioned by stimulation of memory impression, it is non-discrepant with fact and so valid (6-8).

Recognition is synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection; Buddhist opposition stated and proved to be unsound.

Recognition is not a species of perception as the Naiyāyikas maintain, it is non-discrepant and hence valid (9-15).

Inductive Reasoning is knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation – perceptual cognition and inference unable to cognise universal concomitance – Vaiśeṣika view that the knowledge of universal concomitance is secured by reflective thought by way of elimination and assimilation criticised – Naiyāyika's position that universal concomitance results from perceptual cognition aided by inductive reasoning criticised (16-22).

Necessary concomitance defined as 'occurrence necessarily of the determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) on the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*)', or 'the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (*vyāpya*) exclusively in the locus where the determinant concomitant (*vyāpaka*) occurs' – the implications explained (23-26).

Inference defined as the knowledge of the probandum (*sādhya*) on the strength of the probans (*sādhana*) – its twofold division as subjective and syllogistic (27-29).

Subjective inference defined as 'the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained, by one's own self, as *having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum*' – implication of the definition explained – Buddhist theory of 'triple characteristic' of a valid probans stated, explained, and finally refuted as unnecessary – knowledge of the necessity of the universal concomitance alone is sufficient to prevent the triple fallacies of non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive probantia – implications of 'necessary universal concomitance' stated – Naiyāyika's 'quantuple characteristic' also is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance (30-34).

Universal concomitance consists in the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events and the knowledge of it is achieved by means of Inductive Reasoning (35-38).

Five types of probantia viz. essential identity, cause, effect, co-inherent in the same substratum, and opposite explained and solved –

non-cognition of the first four probantia is also valid ground for the establishment of relevant non-existence – illustrations of the last type of probans (39-52).

Probandum or thesis defined and illustrated. Six types of contradiction, viz. by perceptual cognition, inference, scriptural evidence, popular opinion, one's own statement and (linguistic) convention illustrated – probandum is a substantive qualified by an attribute sought to be proved, but in some cases an attribute alone is considered as the probandum – illustration (53-60).

The subject (*dharmin*) is 'what is endorsed by valid knowledge' – Buddhist objection and its answer – the subject is also established by conceptual knowledge – illustration – problem whether existence can be proved – when cognition of contradiction does not arise on the assertion of the subject, its possibility is presumed and in such case existence can be proved (61-67).

The question whether Example is a necessary factor of inference – probans being incompatible with the opposite of the probandum establishes the probandum and hence example is unnecessary – example defined out of deference to a pupil of slow understanding – its two-fold division based on similarity and dissimilarity – illustration (68-81).

## Book II — Lecture 1

204-293

Syllogistic inference defined as 'definite cognition resulting from statement of a probans' – 'statement' though only the condition of inference, is called inference by way of metaphor or transference of epithet which is a warranted procedure if there are contradiction of the primary conventional meaning, a purpose and a legitimate ground – the conditions found to be existent in the present case (1-5).

Syllogistic inference is twofold according as it is based on 'logical possibility of the probans on the occurrence of the probandum' and 'logical impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum' – illustrations – the difference merely formal, not in respect of ultimate intention and hence the statement of both unnecessary – *Nyāyāvatāra* quoted (6-12).

The statement of thesis (*pratijñā*) is for demonstrating the subject (*viṣaya*) – thesis draws attention of the hearer and so necessary – though the conclusion is known by implication, the advance statement of it as thesis has justification in order to rebut a possible doubt about the locus of the attribute to be proved (13-18).

Constitution of a syllogism – thesis plus probans endowed with positive or negative concomitance – the Buddhist view that ‘probans alone is to be stated for the conviction of a knowledgeable person’ is unjustifiable – in deference to the calibre of the person to be edified, the syllogism may have five propositions, viz., thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion or even more (19-22).

Thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion defined and illustrated – the inter-relation of the five members and other corroborative statements. (23-33)

Sham simulant (*ābhāsa*) defined – three fallacies of reason, viz., non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive and their sub-divisions defined and illustrated (34-48).

Sixteen types of false examples stated and illustrated – other types included in these very types – treatment of syllogistic inference concluded (49-59).

Confutation (*dūṣaṇa*) defined as the exposure of the fallacies inherent in an argument (60-61).

False confutation or sophism (*jāti*) defined as consisting in the allegations of non-existent defects – they are employed in opposition to a legitimate or false reason advanced by the proponent in case the true nature of the defects in the reasons is not realised – twenty-four types of sophisms stated, defined and illustrated in consonance with the plan adopted by Akṣapāda – the solution of all types of sophisms lies in the examination of the probans as to whether it embodies the characteristic, viz., incompatibility with the opposite (62-65).

Casuistry (*chala*) stated as nothing but sophism – three types (1) based on ambiguity, (2) based on generalisation, (3) based on metaphor – illustrations (66).

Legitimate Discourse defined as the statement of proof and refutation in the presence of judges and other members of the council with a view to the preservation of truth – it has four factors – Judge, President, Proponent and Opponent – it is known as Debate (*kathā*) – Disputation (*jalpa*) and Wrangling (*vitandā*) are not approved forms of Debate – grounds stated (67-71).

Victory and Defeat defined (72-74).

Defeat constitutes censure (*nigraha*) – mere misunderstanding or default of understanding as propounded by the Naiyāyikas does not constitute censure (75-78).

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## EDITOR'S NOTE

### Indian Logic and Its Schools

The term 'Logic' means 'a science of knowledge and the principles of its validity'. By 'knowledge' a logician understands empirical knowledge, that is, normal knowledge of the objects of our everyday experience. A logician *quâ* logician is not at all concerned with what we call 'supra-empirical' or 'supra-normal' knowledge. Even if he personally believes in some form of supra-empirical knowledge<sup>1</sup>, this belief of his should not come in the way of his duty as a logician. So we may safely define logician as one who argues in favour of the view that sense perception and inference are competent to reveal true nature of reality, that is, to generate valid knowledge. The logicians do differ as to the nature of valid knowledge, the criterion for testing the validity of a piece of knowledge, the number of the instruments of valid knowledge, the account of the various instruments of valid knowledge, so on and so forth. But they all will unite against those who contend that it is impossible for normal human beings to acquire valid knowledge in the course of their everyday life.

Ancient India has produced a good number of logicians endowed with critical acumen and subtle intelligence. They have devoted their lives to profound and penetrating discussions of the problems of empirical knowledge. They came from Brahmins, Buddhists and Jainas. Those coming from Brahmins are further subdivided into Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas and Mīmāṃsakas. In spite of their affiliations to different theologies, religions or dogmas, they all alike engaged themselves in the serious investigation into the problems pertaining to empirical knowledge.

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1. Except the Mīmāṃsakas, all believe in the supra-empirical knowledge which is necessarily perceptual in nature. Gautama, the author of the Nyāyasūtra, gives the definition of empirical perception only, leaving out of its purview the supra-empirical perception. But later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors tried to formulate such a definition of perception as may be applicable to both the empirical perception and the supra-empirical perception. The Buddhists and the Jainas did the same thing. Barring this, thinkers of all the schools discussed strictly the problems of Logic.

There flourished in India some philosophers who were not positively and seriously interested in the problems of Logic. Of them, again, some were positively hostile towards Logic while others were indifferent to it. We know that in India there arose some philosophers who maintained that the world of our everyday experience is nothing but an illusory show while the reality underlying it amenable only to supra-empirical knowledge. So it was but natural for these philosophers to denounce and denigrate Logic. Śūnyavāda, Vijñānavāda (two schools of Buddhism), and Advaita Vedānta are the most outstanding representatives of this trend. The remaining schools of Indian philosophy are deadly against illusionism and severely refute it. These schools are Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and non-Advaita Vedāntic systems among the Brahmanical ones, Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika among the Buddhist ones, and Jainism taken as a whole. They made sincere efforts to understand the constituents, operations and principles of the empirical world as also of human cognitive faculties through which the empirical world is to be grasped. In other words, they sought to develop empirical ontology and Logic. Though Sāṅkhya was a philosophical school with a hoary past, in the golden period of Indian philosophy when Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Sautrāntika and Jaina systems underwent extraordinary development, it refused to grow, and as a result of it no school of Logic after its name came into existence. About non-Advaita Vedāntic schools, the historical fact is that they arose in the Age when Sanskrit learning in general was on decline. Again, they were essentially theological rather than philosophical movements. Their excessive preoccupation with religious problems resulted in their failure to produce an independent school or schools of Logic. So, in fact, we have four schools of Indian Logic, viz. Mīmāṃsā School, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School, Buddhist School and Jaina School.

The Mīmāṃsā School had a tradition of discussing logical problems with a view to proving that empirical knowledge is not capable of grasping *dharma* (religious duty). In the golden period of Indian philosophy certain Mīmāṃsā stalwarts continued this tradition and undertook a detailed treatment of all the problems of Logic. Prabhākara and Kumārila contributed much to the development of Mīmāṃsā school of Logic.

Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas founded the most genuine school of Indian Logic. They dealt with all the problems of Logic with right earnest. As a matter of fact, their treatment of these problems provided a model for all logicians of other schools. The Mīmāṃsā, Jaina and Buddhist logicians received great impetus from their Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika counterparts. Uddyotakara, Jayanta, Udayana, Gaṅgeśa are the great Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians.

Buddhism was originally a school of ethico-spiritual teachings and remained so till the Buddhist masters wrote their works in Pali. The genuine philosophical activities started in the Buddhist tradition when Sanskrit was adopted as the medium of expression. The Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika writers tried, to the best of their ability, to imbibe the spirit of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers. They evinced interest in the problems of Logic. As a matter of fact, the founder of the Buddhist school of Logic is Dīnnāga (c. 345-425 A.D.). It is curious that he came neither from among the Vaibhāṣikas or Sautrāntikas nor from among the Śūnyavādins or Vijñānavādins. Mostly he speaks as a realist (Sautrāntika) but sometimes he speaks as an idealist (Vijñānavādin) in the very midst of serious and worthwhile discussions on Logic. The situation is intriguing and deserves scrutiny. Dīnnāga and his worthy followers like Dharmakīrti conducted the most celebrated researches and highly competent discussions pertaining to the problems of Logic. They compelled logicians of other schools to be more subtle, more penetrating and more equipped with intellectual resources to defend their positions against Buddhist attacks. We notice their conspicuous presence in the works of logicians of other schools. They were the matchless rivals for these logicians. "A comparative study of Dīnnāga and Gaṅgeśa, the founder of sub-school of Neo-Nyāya, will reveal that Gaṅgeśa's much-vaunted innovations are a tiny fraction – in many cases they are bodily the same – of those introduced in the school of Dīnnāga". This is the reason why Vidyabhushana in his *History of Indian Logic* calls Dīnnāga "the Father of Medieval Indian Logic" and declares that for Dīnnāga "there is no praise too high."

Thus there are four schools of Indian Logic, viz. Mīmāṃsā school, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, Buddhist school and Jaina school. We have dealt with, in brief, the first three schools of Indian Logic. Now we shall deal with the fourth one, that is, Jaina school of Indian Logic.

### Jaina School of Indian Logic

We take up what we call the Jaina school of Indian Logic. Jainism was, like Buddhism, a school of simple ethico-spiritual teachings. But its strong aversion to illusionism and its firm faith in the competence of empirical knowledge to grasp the empirical world gradually led it to take interest in the problems of Logic. The first conspicuous beginnings in this direction are evident in Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* and Siddhasena Divākara's *Nyāyavatāra*. Then followed a long line of competent Jaina logicians. The late entry of the Jaina logicians on the arena of Indian Logic put them in an advantageous position because it provided them an opportunity to study the giant logicians of other schools and to equip themselves with all the necessary resources before building up their own school of Logic. Again, their *anekānta* outlook urged them to find out truth inherent in the theories propounded by others and thus made them competent to act as moderators. Akalaṅka who gave final shape to the Jaina positions on Logic was born after the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school had produced Uddyotakara and Praśastapāda, the Mīmāṃsā school its Prabhākara and Kumārila, the Buddhist school its Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti. This does not mean that the Jaina's contribution to Indian Logic was meager or negligible, as will be evident from the study of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* and Philosophical Notes given in the third part of the present work.

### Origins of the Jaina Theory of Knowledge

The Jaina Āgamas recognise five types of knowledge, viz., *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*. *Matijnāna* includes sense perception, memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*sañjñā*), cogitation or hypothetical reasoning (*cintā*) and inference (*abhinibodha*)<sup>2</sup>. *Srutajnāna* is verbal knowledge, i.e. knowledge generated by words. *Avadhijnāna* is that knowledge which cognises spatially and temporally distant physical objects. *Manahparyāya*-

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2. Mahendrakumar's Hindi introduction to his edition of *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa*, Vol. 2, p. 11

Study the following : *tato dhāraṇā pramāṇaṃ smṛtiḥ phalam / tato 'pi smṛtiḥ pramāṇaṃ pratyabhijñā phalam / tato 'pi pratyabhijñā pramāṇaṃ ūhaḥ phalam / tato 'pi ūhaḥ pramāṇaṃ anumānaṃ phalam / Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, autocommentary, 1.1.39

*jñāna* is that knowledge which directly perceives the modes of other persons' mind-substances; these modes act as signs to infer thoughts or objects thought. *Kevalajñāna* is omniscience. The last three are supra-empirical knowledges, they are generated by special types of *dhyāna*; *kevalajñāna* is generated by *śukla-dhyāna*.

Now let us try to search for the source of this Jaina theory of five *jñānas*. In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5 and 4.5.6 there occurs the famous statement: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ*. It refers to four spiritual steps (*ādhyātmika sopāna*). They are *darśana*, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* (or *vijñāna*, i.e. *jñāna* due to *dhyāna*). These four steps are mentioned even in the oldest Jaina canonical work named *Ācārāṅgasūtra* (Prathamaśrutaskandha, 4.1.9)<sup>3</sup>. There occurs : *ditṭhaṃ*

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3. The scheme of four spiritual steps seems to be very old and an essential part of a tradition commonly shared by Upaniṣads, Jainism and Buddhism. It is interesting to note that in the Buddhist *Majjhima-nikāya* (Caṃkissutta, 2.173) there occurs detailed explanation of these spiritual steps. And these very four steps are made popular among the Jainas under the guise of 'three jewels' (*ratnatraya*). These 'three jewels' are *darśana*, *jñāna* and *cāritra*. The first member of the three jewels is identical with the first member of the four spiritual steps. In both the schemes the name given to the first member is '*darśana*'. In Jainism this '*darśana*' means *śraddhā*. Similarly, *Upaniṣads* too here employ the term '*darśana*' in the sense of *śraddhā*. This is corroborated by the two trios mentioned in the two statements (7.18-19 and 7.25) of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. In 7.18-19 there occurs : *nāmatvā vijānāti, matvaiva vijānāti... nāśraddadhan manute, śraddadhad eva manute*. Thus the trio of *śraddhā*, *manana* and *vijñāna* is mentioned here. In 7.25 we have : *evam paśyan evaṃ manvāna evaṃ vijānan*. Here the trio of *darśana*, *manana* and *vijñāna* is mentioned. And the context shows that the two trios are identical. This being the case, the first member of the first trio, viz. *śraddhā* exactly corresponds to and is identical with the first member of the second trio, viz. *darśana*. Thus the terms '*śraddhā*' and '*darśana*' employed here are synonymous. The second member of the three jewels, viz. *jñāna* includes in its fold *śrutajñāna* and *matijñāna* which are nothing but *śravaṇa* and *manana* i.e. the second and the third members of the scheme of four spiritual steps. *Cāritra* can be taken to stand for *dhyāna*, the fourth step because *dhyāna* is the acme of spiritual practice or it signifies the entire process of spiritual discipline beginning with five *yamas* (prime virtues). So, we conclude that the Jaina 'three jewels' tally with the four spiritual steps mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*.

*suyam mayam vññāyam*. Jaina theory of five *jñānas*, I feel, is rooted in this scheme of four spiritual steps. Jainas transformed *śravaṇa* and *manana* into two special types of knowledge, viz. *śrutajñāna* and *matijñāna*, setting aside altogether their original meaning, function and spiritual context. They even changed their order of occurrence. *Avadhijñāna*, *manahparyāyajñāna* and *kevalajñāna* are *kevalijñānas* or *yogijñānas*; they are, in fact, generated by special types of *dhyāna*; hence they are *vijñānas*; they are of the nature of *sākṣātkāra*. Thus these three *vijñānas* constitute the fourth spiritual step called *nididhyāsana* (or *vijñāna*).

Once we establish the identity of Jaina *matijñāna* with *manana*, the third step of the scheme of four spiritual steps, it will become quite clear that the Jaina theory of five *jñānas* is rooted in the scheme of four spiritual steps. The main arguments for identifying *matijñāna* with *manana* are as follows : (1) In *Upaniṣads* too the term '*mati*' is used for *manana*.<sup>4</sup> And Pūjyapāda in his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* writes : *mananamātram vā matiḥ* (1.9), and *mananam matiḥ* (1.13). (2) Jainas maintain that *matijñāna* covers sense perception, memory, recognition, hypothetical reasoning and inference, which are mutually so different in nature. They cannot satisfactorily answer the question as to why they have brought mutually so different cognitions under one head of *mati*. We can explain this phenomenon satisfactorily if we understand *matijñāna* to stand for *manana*. In *manana* (reflection), one employs all the *jñānas*, viz. sense perception, memory etc. This shows that *manana*, in the scheme of four spiritual steps, includes all the *jñānas*. (3) Again, Jainas cannot satisfactorily answer another question : When mutually so different cognitions (viz. sense perception, memory, recognition, hypothetical reasoning and inference) are brought under one head of *mati*, what prevented Jainas from including *śruta* (*śābdajñāna*) too in *matijñāna* ? If we do not take into account the original scheme of four spiritual steps, then we can definitely say that there is nothing to prevent them from including *śrutajñāna* in *matijñāna*. But in the scheme of four spiritual steps, *śravaṇa* step necessarily precedes *manana* step. This old tradition of four steps, on which Jainas have built the super-structure of their theory of five knowledges,

4. *Maitreyi ! ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ viditam/ Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 2.4.5

compelled them to keep *śrutajñāna* separate from *matijñāna*. This is the remnant of old scheme of four spiritual steps. (4) The four stages of *matijñāna* viz. *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā* are applicable to only one form of *matijñāna*, viz. sense perception but not to other forms, viz. memory, recognition, etc. But these four stages are applicable to *manana* (reflection) as a process taken in its entirety. Thus these stages are, in fact, the stages of *manana*. And when Jainas converted *manana* to a special type of knowledge called *matijñāna*, they transferred these four stages to *matijñāna* and hence the anomaly. The following passage from *Nāyādhammakahāo* (prathama adhyāya, 35) corroborates our interpretation : *tae ṇaṃ se sumiṇapāḍhagā Seṇiyassa raṇṇo evaṃ atthaṃ soccā ṇisamma haṭṭha jāva hiyayā taṃ sumiṇaṇ ogiṇhaṃti / ogiṇhaṃtā īhāṃ aṇupavisāṃti ... (śrutvā avagrṇanti / avagrhya īhāṃ anupraviśanti)*. This proves that the four stages originally belonged to *manana*. (5) Jainas have divided *avagraha* into *vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha*. For them *vyañjanāvagraha* means grasping of sense-object contact and *arthāvagraha* means grasping of the thing (which is in contact with the sense-organ). Thus, here for them the term 'vyañjana' has the sense of sense-object contact. But this is not the dictionary meaning. Sanskrit language has a special characteristic, viz. its words have capacity to yield so many etymological meanings. Hence we have in Sanskrit works like *Śatārthī* ('Hundred Meanings of a Verse'). Jainas have taken undue advantage of this and shown that the term 'vyañjana' etymologically means sense-object contact. But this seems to be unnatural and farfetched. As a matter of fact, the term 'vyañjana' here has its natural prevalent meaning viz. *śabda* (word). And the term 'artha' here in 'arthāvagraha' has the sense of 'wordmeaning'. Thus, 'vyañjanāvagraha' means 'grasping of words', and 'arthāvagraha' means 'grasping of wordmeanings'. This interpretation of ours is corroborated by the following *gāthā* :

*kāle viṇaye bahumāṇe uvahāṇe taha aṇiṇhavaṇe |  
vaṇjaṇa attha tadubhae aṭṭhaviho ṇāṇamāyāro ||*

Thus, *vyañjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha* actually constitute the ground and initial starting point of the process of *manana*.

In this manner, we prove the identity of *matijñāna* with *manana* and as a result of it the fact that Jaina theory of five *jñānas* is rooted in the very

old scheme of four spiritual steps. It is quite obvious that *avadhi*, *manah-paryāya* and *kevala* being *dhyānajanya* are of the nature of *sākṣātkāra* and the remaining two being not *dhyānajanya* are not of the nature of *sākṣātkāra*.

### Three Phases of Jaina Logic

As we have already noted, in the first phase Jainas propounded the theory of five *jñānas*, viz. *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*. Of the five, the first two were regarded as generated by sense-organs and mind while the remaining three were implicitly accepted as generated by special types of *dhyānas*. Hence the first two were considered to be not-*sākṣātkārātmaka* while the remaining three were considered to be *sākṣātkārātmaka*. They maintained that *jñānas* might be right (*samyak*) or wrong (*mithyā*). They contended that the *jñāna* which was accompanied by *smayak-darśana* was *samyak* (right) while the *jñāna* that was accompanied by *mithyā-darśana* was *mithyā* (wrong). And for them *samyak-darśana* was the tendency or attitude that was conducive to spiritual progress while *mithyā-darśana* was the tendency or attitude that was detrimental to the spiritual progress. This means that they determined rightness or wrongness of *jñāna* from the spiritual standpoint but not from the standpoint of Logic. The first phase is represented by the Jaina canonical works.

In the second phase real beginnings of Jaina Logic are noticed. Now, instead of the terms *samyak-jñāna* and *mithyā-jñāna*, the terms *pramāṇa* and *apramāṇa* were employed. By *pramāṇa* Jainas meant valid knowledge and by *apramāṇa* invalid knowledge. They considered knowledge to be valid or invalid not from the spiritual standpoint but from the standpoint of Logic. From the standpoint of Logic, the determinant of validity or otherwise of knowledge is its correspondence or non-correspondence with the external object/fact. In the science of Logic, only that knowledge is called valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) whose object is true to the concerned factual situation, while that knowledge is called invalid knowledge (*apramāṇa*) whose object is false to the same. In other words, valid knowledge cognises a thing as it is while invalid knowledge cognises a thing as it is not. Thus the Jaina thinkers started to determine knowledge as valid or invalid on the basis of the objective criterion of the science of Logic. Secondly, they classified the



*pramāṇas* into two, viz. *pratyakṣa* (perceptual or direct) and *parokṣa* (non-perceptual or indirect). So, according to them, sense perception, memory, recognition, cogitation or hypothetical reasoning and inference were *parokṣa* while *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala* were *pratyakṣa*. There arose a problem before them : They considered sense perception to be a *parokṣa pramāṇa*. But in the science of Logic it was considered to be a *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*, and even non-Jaina logicians treated it as a *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. The problem was solved by the Jaina logicians as follows. They brought under the head of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* sense perception, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*, and declared that sense perception was empirical perception (*sāmānyavahārika pratyakṣa*) while the remaining three were transcendent perception (*mukhya pratyakṣa*). In short, they treated sense perception and yogic perception as perception. In this way, their performance was almost in line with that of other non-Jaina logicians who treated *indriya-pratyakṣa* (sense perception) and *yogi-pratyakṣa* (yogic perception) under one head of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. And under the head of *parokṣa pramāṇa*, now onwards the Jaina logicians treated verbal knowledge (*śrutajñāna*), memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*sañjñā* or *pratyabhijñā*), cogitation or hypothetical reasoning (*cintā* or *tarka*) and inference (*abhinibodha* or *anumāna*). It is noteworthy that in this phase we find no evidence of Jaina logicians' acquaintance with the discussions conducted by logicians of other schools of Indian Logic. The views of non-Jaina schools of Logic were not studied with their supporting arguments, nor were they examined and criticised. Moreover, Jaina logicians of this phase did not provide any indication of their knowledge of so many important problems of Indian Logic. So, it is natural that they did not know as to what the Jaina position was with regard to those problems. They did not even define memory, recognition and hypothetical reasoning and establish their *pramāṇaship*. We may mention Siddhasena Divākara's (c. 400 A.D.) *Nyāyavatāra* as a representative of this period.

The third phase begins with the advent of Akalaṅka (c. 720-780 A.D.). He is rightly called the Father of Jaina Logic. His works on Jaina Logic are : *Laghīyastraya*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Pramāṇasaṅgraha* and *Siddhiviniścaya*. On all these he himself wrote short commentaries. He is comprehensive and compact, authentic and terse, cogent and subtle. He gave final shape to Jaina Logic. He has deeply studied all the important works of other schools of

Indian Logic. This becomes clear from his faithful presentation of *prima facie* views. His study enabled him to examine theories and views upheld by rival logicians and to clearly establish Jaina position with regard to all the problems of Indian Logic. He left no problem undiscussed. Dharmakīrti was his prime adversary.<sup>5</sup> He was very bitter in his attacks on Dharmakīrti. He formulates definitions of various logical concepts, clarifies the Jaina position on all the logical problems, establishes memory, recognition, hypothetical reasoning as *pramāṇas*. Thus he constructed a fullfledged Jaina Logic. He explained the Jaina views in the context of non-Jaina schools of Indian Logic. His refutation of the theories of rival logicians is thought-provoking. Thus his treatment is alounded, profound, penetrating and comprehensive. His works were seriously studied by the non-Jaina thinkers in those days and there is all possibility that his arguments were profitably utilised by them against the common rivals.<sup>6</sup>

In this phase Akalaṅka was followed by a line of competent and talented logicians. Let us have a brief survey. Māṇikyanandin (c. 850 A.D.) wrote *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*, the first systematic compendium of Jaina Logic. It contains 207 aphorisms. It is based on Akalaṅka's works.<sup>7</sup> Prabhācandra (980–1065 A.D.) wrote two mature commentaries on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyastraya* and Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*, respectively named as *Nyāyakumudacandra* and *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa*. Abhayadevasūri wrote a voluminous and illuminating commentary on Siddhasena Divākara's *Sanmatitarka*; it is known by the name *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* or *Vādamahārṇava* (1000 A.D.). Vādirājasūri (c. 1025 A.D.) was a logician of a very high calibre. He wrote *Pramāṇanirṇaya* and an extensive and profound commentary (*vivaraṇa*) on Akalaṅka's *Nyāyaviniścaya*. Vālideva Sūri (1086–1169 A.D.) composed *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*, a standard manual of Jaina Logic, consisting of eight chapters and 378 aphorisms. It is modelled after *Parīkṣāmukhasūtra*. Vālideva Sūri himself wrote a commentary on it. Its

5. See *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy – A Study*, Nagin J. Shah, L. D. Series No. 11, Ahmedabad, 1967.

6. *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā – Critique of an Authority*, Nagin J. Shah, Sanskrit-Sanskriti Granthamālā No. 7, Ahmedabad, 1999, p. 34 (Introduction).

7. *Akalaṅkavaco'mbhodher uddadhre yena dhūmatā / nyāyavidyā'mṛtaṃ tasmai namo Māṇikyanandine* // Anantavīrya's *Prameyaratnamālā*, 2.

title is *Syādvādaratnākara*. It is encyclopaedic in nature and contains quotations from forgotten authors and works. It extensively explains and refutes rival theories. And it ably expounds the Jaina position on different problems of Indian Logic. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, an excellent systematic text-book of Jaina Logic, was written by Āc. Hemacandra (1089-1172 A.D.). It is neither too elaborate nor too brief. Śāntiācārya (1125 A.D.) wrote an important commentary (*vṛtti*) on *Nyāyāvatāravārtika*. Anantavīrya (c. 1225 A.D.) is the author of *Prameyaratnamālā*, a commentary on *Parīkṣāmukha*, as also of elaborate commentaries on Akalaṅka's *Siddhiviniścaya* and *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*. His commentaries are elaborate and profound. Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaṇī (1608-1688 A.D.) was a great logician well-versed in Navyanyāya Logic. He wrote several works on Jaina Logic. We mention here only two of them, viz. *Jaina Tarkabhāṣā* and *Jñānabindu*. They testify to his power of comprehension and expression. He deals with the subject-matter cogently and systematically.

#### Āc. Hemacandra and His works

Born in 1088 (or 1089) A.D. in a Moḍha family in Dhandhukā town in Gujarat, Āc. Hemacandra, called Caṅgadeva in his childhood, was initiated in the Order of Jaina monks at a very early age by the famous Jaina monk Devacandrasūri, under whom he mastered many branches of traditional Indian learning and earned for him the significant title 'Omniscient of the Iron Age' (*'kalikālasarvajña'*). He was made Ācārya in the year 1110 A.D. Gujarat's two most illustrious kings, Siddharāja Jayasīṃha and his successor Kumārapāla held him in high esteem. It was at Siddharāja's request that Āc. Hemacandra composed his *magnum opus Siddhahema-vyākaraṇa*. Prof. Buhler rightly maintains that "the success of his grammar appears to have induced Hemacandra to extend further the scope of his work and to write a number of handbooks..." He wrote *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* (handbook of Poetics), *Chandonuśāsana* (handbook of Metrics) and *Yogaśāstra*. He composed *Dvyāśrayakāvya*, *Vitarāgastutis* and *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*. "To the students of Sanskrit Literature, he is perhaps best known by his epic poem *Triṣaṭṭīśalākāpuruṣacarita*, describing the legendary and mythological history of the world as conceived in Jainism. To the modern philologists, his most significant contributions are a complete Sanskrit and Prakrit grammar, two

Sanskrit dictionaries called the *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* and the *Anekārthakośa*, a dictionary of popular Prakrit idioms called the *Deśināmamālā*... His Prakrit grammar was edited and translated by Pischel (Halle, 1877-80), who also edited the *Deśināmamālā* (Bombay, 1880). His *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* was edited by Bohltink and Rieu (St. Petersburg, 1847), and Zachariae edited *Anekārthakośa* (Vienna, 1893)". Prof. Jacobi observes that "Hemacandra has very extensive and at the same time accurate knowledge of many branches of Hindu and Jaina learning combined with great literary skill and an easy style. His strength lies in encyclopaedical work rather than in original research but the enormous mass of varied information which he gathered from original sources, mostly lost to us, makes his works an inestimable mine for philological and historical research"<sup>8</sup>

### **Pramāṇamīmāṃsā – An Excellent Text-book on Jaina Logic**

Āc. Hemacandra is well known for his comprehensive treatment of whatever subject he undertook. In *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* he deals with Jaina Logic in the context of other schools of Indian Logic. He is most successful in his performance because he was well equipped with the knowledge of those schools and at the same time he had astounding knowledge of Jaina Logic. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is an excellent text-book on Jaina Logic. Hemacandra's purpose was to produce a standard text-book and he achieved his purpose. He, being an ideal teacher, knew what was to be presented and what was to be withheld (*ācīnoty arthān ity ācāryaḥ*). He has done full justice to the subject. His arrangement of topics is very systematic and no important topic is left out. While discussing a topic he covers all the necessary points and adduces all the essential arguments, avoiding unnecessary elaboration that may overwhelm and baffle students. His discourses embody solid results of his predecessors and take note of different views. His range of information is wide and deep. At places he divulges important historical information. The following is an instance in point. He writes : *atra pūrvācāryakṛtavayākhyā-vaimukhyena saṅkhyāvadhbhis Trilocana-Vācaspatipramukhair ayam arthaḥ samarthito yathā 'indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyabhicāri pratya-kṣam' ity eva pratyakṣalakṣaṇam / .....vibhāgavacanam etat 'avyapadeśyam vyavasāyātmakam' / Gautama defines perception : indriyārthasannikarṣo-*

8. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VI, p. 591

*tparinam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam* / Hemacandra informs us that before Trilocana there was the old Nyāya tradition which interpreted this aphorism as presenting definition only and not the divisions also. The aphorism means : Perception is that cognition which is born of a sense-object contact, is non-verbal (*avyapadeśyam*), is non-erroneous, and is determinate. But it is Trilocana, Vācaspati's teacher, who initiated the new tradition of interpreting the aphorism as presenting both the definition and divisions, as shown by Hemacandra.

Thus here is a standard text-book on Jaina Logic, from which students will derive comprehensive and authentic knowledge of the subject. Clarity of thought and lucidity of expression, judicious selection of material and systematic treatment, will definitely help students understand the subject without exertion.

#### About the Present Work

The present work comprises (1) Sanskrit text of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* in Roman script, (2) its English translation (3) Pt. Sukhlalji's extensive Introduction (English) and (4) his philosophical notes (English).

Sanskrit text of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* in Roman script is printed here for the first time. It is specially prepared for the present work. An English translation of this Sanskrit text was done by Prof. S. K. Mookerjee, an eminent scholar of Indian philosophy, in collaboration with Prof. Nathmal Tatia, a renowned scholar of Jaina philosophy. It was first published in Bhārati Mahāvidyālaya Publications Jaina Series (No. 5) in the year 1946 A.D. from Calcutta. But it was accompanied with neither the Sanskrit text nor the critical explanatory notes. For his translation Prof. Mookerjee utilised Pt. Sukhlalji's edition of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* published in Singhi Jaina Granthamālā (No. 9) in 1939 from Ahmedabad-Calcutta; this Panditji's edition contained his Hindi introduction and Hindi notes (Bhāṣā-Tippaṇāni). Panditji's introduction and notes were translated into English by my friends and colleagues Dr. I. H. Jhaveri and Dr. K. K. Dixit respectively, and were published in the Journal *Indian Studies : Past & Present*, Vol. II, Nos. 2 & 3 by its editor Prof. Debiprasad Chattopadhyay, a great celebrated scholar of Indian philosophy, who later on issued them in a book-form under the title *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic & Metaphysics* in the year 1961. But this

book did not contain the Sanskrit text of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* or its English translation. This being the situation the Gujarat Vidyapeeth decided to bring out a comprehensive volume containing all these together at one place along with necessary indices as an aid to scholars. I appreciate the decision. And the result is now before the scholars. I am deeply grateful to the translators and the publishers.

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Nagin J. Shah

## PRONUNCIATION

The vowels in Sanskrit are the same as in Italian, except that the sound of *a* approaches that of *a* in *rural*, and *ā* that of *a* in *father*. A vowel with a bar (–) above it is long; *r*, *l* are respectively pronounced as *ri*, *li*. The consonants are almost as in English, except that *g* is always hard and the sound of *c* approaches that of *ch* in *church*; *ṭ*, *ḍ* etc. (indicated by a dot below) are cerebrals and are the same as *t* in *turn*, *d* in *drum*, and so on; *t*, *d*, *n* are pure dentals; the aspirated letters *kh*, *gh*, *ch* etc. have the sound of the first letter plus an aspiration; *ṇ* is like *n* in *sing*; *ṅ* is like *n* in *tinge*; *ś* is like *s* in *sure*; *h* is a pure aspirate; *m̐* is the symbol of a nasal.

For the convenience of the general reader the Sanskrit alphabet along with their transliterations are given below.

### Vowels

अ *a*, आ *ā*, इ *i*, ई *ī*, उ *u*, ऊ *ū*, ऋ *r̐*  
लृ *l̐*, ए *e*, ऐ *ai*, ओ *o*, औ *au*

### Consonants

क *k*, ख *kh*, ग *g*, घ *gh*, ङ *ṅ*  
च *c*, छ *ch*, ज *j*, झ *jh*, ञ *ṇ*  
ट *ṭ*, ठ *ṭh*, ड *ḍ*, ढ *ḍh*, ण *ṇ*,  
त *t*, थ *th*, द *d*, ध *dh*, न *n*  
प *p*, फ *ph*, ब *b*, भ *bh*, म *m*  
य *y*, र *r*, ल *l*, लृ *l̐*, ल्ह *lh*,  
व *v*, श *ś*, ष *ṣ*, स *s*, ह *h*

– *m̐* or *m̐*, : *h*





**FIRST PART**

# **Pandit Sukhlalji's Introduction**



# INTRODUCTION

## 1. THE NATURE OF THE JAINA STANDPOINT (*dṛṣṭi*)

Indian philosophical systems fall under two main classes; some of them are realistic (*vāstavavādin*) and others idealistic (*avāstavavādin*; illusoristic ?). Those which view the gross (*sthūla*) world, i.e. the world apprehended by the empirical (*laukika*) organs of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), to be as real as the subtle (*sūkṣma*) world, i.e. the world apprehended by the transcendental (*lokottara*) organs of knowledge,—that is to say, those which maintain that there is no difference between the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and the absolute (*pāramārthika*) truth, that all truth is of the same kind though differing in degree, that all objects revealed (*bhāsita*) through whatever organ of knowledge are equally real even if this revelation (*bhāṇa*) be relatively full or meagre, clear or vague, and that even real objects are capable of being expressed in words (*vāṇī-prakāśya*)—are realistic systems. They may also be called positivistic (*vidhimukha*) systems or systems talking in terms of “it is thus” and “it is so” (*idamitthaṃvādin*, *evamvādin*). They include the Cārvāka, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, and Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems, the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism, the Madhvite school of Vedānta, etc.

Those which view the external (*bāhya*), perceptible (*dṛśya*) world to be unreal (*mithyā*) and the internal (*āntarika*) one alone to be ultimately real (*parama-satya*)—that is to say, those which, having classified truth into the empirical and the absolute, the apparent (*sāṃvṛtika*) and the real (*vāstavika*), treat as unreal everything that is apprehended by the empirical organs of knowledge and is expressed in words—are idealistic systems. They may also be called negativistic (*niṣedhamukha*) systems or systems

talking in terms of “it is not so” (*anevamvādin*). The Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda schools of Buddhism, the Śaṅkarite school of Vedānta, etc. are systems of this type.

Its basic attitude of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) notwithstanding, the Jaina standpoint is absolutely realistic (*ekāntataḥ vāstavavādin*) in nature. For according to it too, the objective truth (*bhāva-satyatva*) revealed through sense-perception (technically called *mati-jñāna*), etc. is on a par with that revealed through transcendental intuition (technically called *kevala-jñāna*), that is to say, the two types of truth may differ as to their quantity but not as to their quality and nature. Sense-perception etc. reveal a few substances (*dravya*) and a limited number of their modes (*paryāya*) while transcendental intuition reveals the totality of substances and the totality of their modes, but the two do so in precisely the same manner and with precisely the same sort of validity. Thus even though the Jaina system grants that certain extremely subtle objects (*sūkṣmatama bhāva*) are incapable of description (*anirvacanīya*) it insists that the objects capable of description (*nirvacanīya*) are nevertheless real. This however is not the case with Śūnyavāda, Śaṅkarite Vedānta, etc.

## 2. THE UNCHANGING CHARACTER (*aparivartīṣṇutā*) OF THE JAINA STANDPOINT

Now the important question to be considered is whether the realistic nature of the Jaina standpoint as outlined above has retained the same form throughout the course of history or a change in some form or other has been introduced in it by someone at some period. An allied question will be : If the Jaina standpoint has all along retained a fixed nature and, unlike the Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions, has undergone no change or development of thought, what can be the reason for it ?

The available history of the Jaina tradition reaches as far back as pre-Mahāvīra times, and ever since the realistic nature of the Jaina standpoint has remained absolutely unaltered in essence—as is also the case with the philosophical systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, etc. Of course, the Jaina philosophical literature, like the

philosophical literature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc., testifies to a gradually developing subtlety and clarity in regard to the descriptions (*vyākhyā*), definitions (*lakṣaṇa*), and logical justification (*upapatti*) of the categories (*padārtha*) like 'organ of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa*), 'object of valid knowledge' (*prameya*), etc. — so much so that Jaina philosophers like Yaśovijaya have even employed the refined Navya-Nyāya technique in their further analysis of the Jaina descriptions and definitions; nevertheless, throughout the course of history the realistic nature of the Jaina standpoint has not in the least undergone that type of change which we come across in the Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions.

The Buddhist tradition was certainly realistic to begin with, but the two schools of Mahāyāna, viz. Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda, brought about a radical transformation in it. As a result, its realism changed into absolute idealism (*aikāntika avāstāvavāda*). This is what we mean by the change of outlook (*dṛṣṭi-parivartana*) within the Buddhist tradition. The same was the case with the Vedāntic tradition. The Upaniṣads and Vedāntasūtras contained vague seeds (*aspaṣṭabīja*) of idealism together with clear-cut indications (*spaṣṭasūcana*) of realism, but Śaṃkarācārya interpreted all this only idealistically and thus laid the solid foundation of that idealism which, as a result of further development and change of outlook, subsequently branched forth into a number of schools like *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭivāda* etc.<sup>1</sup> Now this changing character of the Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions and the unchanging character of the rest ones impel us to investigate into the causes of this divergence.

Idealism, which considers the gross world (*sthūla jagat*) to be an empirical reality (*vyāvahārika satya*) or an unreality (*asatya*) and the internal world (*āntarika jagat*) to be the sole ultimate reality (*parama satya*), can possibly arise only when either the process of analysis (*viśleṣaṇa-kriyā*) or the process of synthesis (*samanvaya-kriyā*) is carried to its logical extreme. We find that this condition (requisite for the rise of idealism) is absent in all the philosophical traditions except the Buddhist and Vedāntic

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1. A solipsist school within Śaṃkarite Vedānta. According to it, the world lasts only so long as it is perceived. The word literally means 'the doctrine that whenever a thing is seen it is created'.—Tr.

ones. Buddha analysed everything, gross as well as subtle, to such an extent that no scope was left for anything of the nature of a permanent substance (*sthāyi-dravya*). In the Upaniṣads, on the other hand, the process of synthesizing all diversities (*bheda*) and varieties (*vividhatā*) culminated in the postulation of one permanent principle (*sthira tattva*) in the form of Brahman. In due course, Lord Buddha's acute-minded disciples developed the Master's analysis to such an extent that the continuous substances (*akhaṇḍa dravya*) and the substantial diversities (*dravya-bheda*) of our everyday use (*vyavahāropayogin*) were reduced to bare names; what remained as absolutely real was something momentary but indescribable (*anirvacanīya*). Similarly, the spirit of synthesis reflected in the Upaniṣadic principle of Absolute Brahman was developed by Śaṃkarācārya to such an extent that the empirical world so full of diversities (*bheda-pradhāna*) was ultimately reduced to a bare name and an illusion (*māyā*). Of course, had there been no extremist analysers (*aikāntika viśleṣaṇakārin*) like Nāgārjuna and extremist synthesisers (*aikāntika samanvayakārin*) like Śaṃkarācārya, the distinction between the empirical and the absolute truth would not have made its appearance in these two traditions. Even then, we should not forget that the capacity to give rise to an idealistic outlook was inherent (*nihita*) in the very ground (*bhūmikā*) of the Buddhist and Vedāntic traditions, and that such a capacity was entirely absent in the ground of the realistic systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, and Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems undertake not only analysis but also synthesis. And since they attach equal importance (*sama-prādhānya*) and ascribe equal competence (*samāna-balatva*) to analysis and synthesis they do not declare one to be real at the expense of the other. Hence there is neither scope for nor possibility of idealism finding room in these systems. This explains why these systems throughout remained realistic even though they too produced plenty of acute-minded thinkers who were match for Nāgārjuna, Śaṃkarācārya, etc. The same applies to the Jaina system of philosophy. Starting with an analysis (of the real) into different substances (*dravya*) the system no doubt goes to the length of analysing even the subtlest modes (*pariyāya*), but in spite of his accepting the reality of the modes that are the final resultants in this analytic process the Jaina does not reject the reality

of permanent substances as will do the Buddhist. Likewise, starting with the synthesis of the modes and the substances the Jaina system ultimately arrives at the one principle of reality (*sat-tattva*), but it does not deny in the manner of Brahmvāda reality to the diversity of substances and to the modes that are the resultants in the analytic process. All this was possible because Jainism relatively acknowledged the equal competence (*tulya-bala*) and equal truth (*samāna-satya*) of the two standpoints, viz. the standpoint of substance (*dravyārthika dṛṣṭi*) and the standpoint of modes (*paryāyārthika dṛṣṭi*). Consequently, we do not find in it either extreme analysis as we do in Buddhism or extreme synthesis as we do in Vedānta. And this, in turn, is why the realistic nature of the Jaina standpoint remained unaltered in essence.

### 3. THE SPHERE OF APPLICATION (*śakti-maryādā*) OF AN ORGAN OF KNOWLEDGE (*pramāṇa*)

What is the universe ? What is its nature ? What are its constituent elements (*tattva*) ? What is the nature of these elements ? —these and others are the questions that have not been answered by philosophers in a uniform fashion. It is so because one's answer to these questions depends upon one's view as to the competence (*śakti*) of the organs of knowledge, about which philosophers hold divergent views. The views held by the Indian philosophers as to the degrees of competence (*śakti-tāratamya*) of the various organs of knowledge can be classified as under :

1. Those advocating sole competence of sense-organs (*indriyādhipatya-vādin*).
2. Those advocating sole competence of non-sensuous organs (*anindriyādhipatya-vādin*).
3. Those advocating equal competence of sense-organs and non-sensuous organs (*ubhayādhipatya-vādin*).
4. Those advocating sole competence of the Scripture (*āgamādhipatya-vādin*).
5. Those advocating incompetence of all organ whatsoever (*pramāṇ-opaplava-vādin*).

[1] *Indriyādhipatyavāda* : According to this view, the competence of an organ of knowledge is solely dependent on sense-organs while the mind (*manas*) can at the most follow sense-organs but can never originate true knowledge without their aid, that is, concerning things (allegedly) beyond the reach of sense-organs. On this view, true knowledge, if at all possible, can be had only through sense-organs. The view is upheld by the Cārvāka system alone. Not that the Cārvāka repudiates the organs of knowledge like inference, verbal testimony, etc. which are a matter of our everyday practice, and yet he declares himself to be an advocate of perception—and sense-perception at that—being the sole organ of knowledge. This only means that according to the Cārvāka, an empirical organ of knowledge—be it inference, verbal testimony, or any other—is not valid unless its findings are confirmed by sense-perception. In other words, the Cārvāka has no objection to a piece of knowledge being regarded as valid in case it is not contradicted by sense-perception.

[2] *Anindriyādhipatyavāda* : By “non-sensuous organs” (*anindriya*) we understand three internal organs (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), viz. *manas*, *citta*, and *ātman*.<sup>2</sup> And the second view under consideration regards a non-sensuous organ in the form of *citta* as the sole organ of true knowledge. The view is upheld by Śūnyavāda, Vijñānavāda, and Śaṅkarite Vedānta. According to it, true knowledge can be generated by nothing save the purified *citta*. The upholders of this view flatly deny the competence of sense-organs to generate true knowledge, and they aver that sense-organs are not only cripple but also deceptive. The idea underlying this contention is that a piece of knowledge which is contradicted or unconfirmed by the findings of *citta*—particularly of the *citta* purified by meditation (*dhyāna-śuddha*) is never valid even if it be reckoned as such in our everyday dealings.

[3] *Ubhayādhipatyavāda* : The third view does not advocate in the manner of the Cārvāka the sole competence of sense-organs and incompetence of the mind-absolutely-unaided-by-sense-organs; nor does it advocate the sole competence of the non-sensuous *citta* and incompetence or

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2. These terms are almost untranslatable, but let us say that *manas* is the organ of empirical introspection (and an accessory to sense-organs), *citta* the organ of transcendental realization, and *ātman* the ultimate principle of consciousness.—Tr.



deceptivity of sense-organs. According to this view, sense-organs can become competent enough—even if with the aid of the mind (*manas*)—and generate true knowledge; on the other hand, there are according to it cases where a non-sensuous organ originates true knowledge even without the aid of sense-organs. Hence the epithet *ubhayādhīpatya-vāda* attributed to this view. It is upheld by the systems like Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā etc. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga system, even while acknowledging the competence of sense-organs, regards *antaḥ-karaṇa* as capable of independently generating true knowledge. What the Sāṃkhya-Yoga says of *antaḥ-karaṇa* the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika says of *manas*. However, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga does not regard *ātman* as capable of independently generating true knowledge, and that is because the system attributes to *buddhi* the capacity for generating true knowledge while treating the conscious principle *puruṣa* as devoid of all change (*niratiśaya*).<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does regard an *ātman* as capable of independently having true knowledge—even if God be the only *ātman* of this type; for God, according to the system, is devoid of a body and a *manas* and yet capable of having knowledge. The Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika are also upholders of this view, for they too consider sense-organs and *manas* to be equally competent for generating true knowledge.

[4] *Āgamādhīpatyavāda* : The fourth view accepts, concerning certain matters, the competence neither of sense-organs nor of non-sensuous organs but of the scripture alone. This view is upheld only by the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. Of course, concerning ordinary matters the system upholds the *ubhayādhīpatya* view as do the Sāṃkhya-Yoga etc., while it is only concerning transcendental merits (*dharma*) and demerits (*adharma*) that it accepts the competence of the scripture and of it alone. And even though for the Śaṅkarite Vedānta the scripture constitutes a principal authority concerning Brahman the system does not fall under this fourth view, for it also admits concerning this very Brahman the competence also of an *antaḥ-karaṇa* purified by meditation.

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3. *Puruṣa* is the Sāṃkhya-Yoga equivalent for *ātman*. The idea is that an organ of knowledge must undergo some change in the course of acquiring knowledge, but since *puruṣa* is devoid of all change it is not an organ of knowledge.—Tr.

[5] *Pramāṇopaplavavāda* : The fifth and the last view denies the competence of an organ-of-knowledge as such, be it a sense-organ, an inference, or a scripture. According to this view, there is no perfect organ competent enough to generate true knowledge. All organs of knowledge are for it either cripple or deceptive. The upholder of this view is called *tattvopaplava-vādin* (lit. 'one who throws overboard all categories') who is but the Cārvāka gone extreme. The view has been expounded in clear-cut terms by Jayarāśi in his *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*.

Of these five views, the third, viz. *ubhayādhipatyavāda*, is accepted by the Jaina system. For it no doubt maintains that sense-organs are competent to generate true knowledge, but it goes on to add that each of the two non-sensuous organs, *manas* and *ātman*, is capable of independently generating true knowledge. As for an *ātman*'s independent capacity to generate true knowledge, the Jaina system differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in that the former attributes this capacity to all *ātman*s without exception while the latter to God alone. The Jaina system repudiates *tattvopaplavavāda* because it, unlike the latter, does accept the competence of several organs of knowledge. It opposes the Cārvāka view of 'sole competence of sense-organs' because it, unlike the latter, does accept the independent competence of two non-sensuous organs. It rejects *Vijñānavāda*, *Śūnyavāda*, and *Brahmavāda* because it, unlike the latter, does accept the competence of sense-organs. Lastly, it is opposed to *āgamādhipatyavāda* because it, unlike the latter, accepts, concerning transcendental merits and demerits, the competence also of the two non-sensuous organs, *manas* and *ātman*.

#### 4. THE TOTAL EXTENT (*vistāra*) OF THE KNOWABLE SPHERE (*prameya-pradeśa*)

One's view as to the extent of the knowable sphere depends on his view as to the competence of the organs of knowledge. Thus for the Cārvāka, who believes in the sole competence of sense-organs, the sphere of the knowable remained confined to the gross, perceptible (*dṛśya*) world, while for those who acknowledged the competence of a non-sensuous organ this sphere got extended in various ways. Whoever believed in the competence of a non-

sensuous organ admitted the existence of a subtle (*sūkṣma*) world over and above the gross (*sthūla*) one. However, even when philosophers agreed as to the existence of a subtle world they held divergent views as to the nature of this world, views that followed from their respective lines of speculation and the traditions handed down to them. These views and schools based thereon may be divided into two broad groups. One of these groups comprises those views which conceive the subtle world as composed of physical (*jaḍa*) as well as conscious (*cetana*) elements (*tattva*), the other those which conceive it as composed only of conscious elements or of consciousness (*caitanya*) as such. Here let us take note of one distinction between the Western and Indian philosophies. In India there arose no philosophical system which posited subtle physical elements at the root of the gross world while denying the existence of all subtle conscious elements; on the other hand, there have here arisen systems which posit nothing except subtle conscious elements at the root of the gross world. It is in this sense alone that India may be regarded as a spiritualist (*caitanyavādin*) country.<sup>4</sup>

Indian philosophical speculation has got a bearing on the religious-ethical doctrines of rebirth (*punarjanma*), efficacy of all action (*karmavāda*), bondage (*bandha*), emancipation (*mokṣa*), —doctrines that are universally accepted by all who believe in a subtle conscious element and who therefore seek within the framework of their respective philosophical tenets to bring these doctrines in line with the notion of a conscious element. Within the circle of the philosophical systems that posit subtle elements there are current the following four theories on whose basis attempts have been made to demonstrate the relation of the gross world to the subtle one and to explain causation :

[1] *Ārambhavāda* [Theory of Novel Creation]

[2] *Pariṇāmaavāda* [Theory of Real Modification]

[3] *Pratītyasamutpādvāda* [Theory of Dependent Origination]

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4. The suggestion is that the West has and India has not produced "systems which posit subtle physical elements at the root of the gross world while denying the existence of all subtle conscious elements". Such systems may be characterized as "subtle materialism" as contrasted with the Cārvāka's gross materialism. And India may be regarded as a spiritualist country because it produced no 'subtle materialism' even if it did produce gross materialism.—Tr.

[4] *Vivartavāda* [Theory of Illusory Modification]

[1] *Ārambhavāda* : To put it in a nutshell, it has got the following four characteristic features : [i] the positing of an infinite number of mutually distinct (*paraspara-bhinna*) ultimate causes (*mūla-kāraṇa*), [ii] the positing of an absolute distinction (*ātyantika bheda*) between the cause and the effect, [iii] the assertion that a cause—be it eternal (*nitya*) or transient (*anitya*)—remains unchanging (*apariṇāmin*) during the course of the creation of the effect concerned, and [iv] the assertion that an altogether novel (*apūrva*) effect, that is, an effect that was non-existent (*asat*) before its creation (*utpatti*), is created and lasts for a limited period of time (*kiñcitkālīna sattā*).

[2] *Pariṇāmavāda* : Its characteristic features (given below) are just the opposite of those of *Ārambhavāda* : [i] the acceptance of one single ultimate cause (*mūla kāraṇa*), [ii] the positing of a real non-distinction (*vāstavika abheda*) between the cause and the effect, [iii] the assertion that even an eternal (*nitya*) cause exists and functions in the form of a changing (*pariṇāmin*) entity, and [iv] the assertion that a particular effect exists in its cause and all particular effects taken collectively exist in one ultimate cause throughout the course of time [lit. in all the three periods of time], that is to say, the total denial of the creation (*utpatti*) of an altogether novel (*apūrva*) entity.

[3] *Pratītyasamutpādayāda* : Its three characteristic features are : [i] the positing of an absolute distinction (*ātyantika bheda*) between the cause and the effect, [ii] the total rejection of a persisting cause, changeless (*nitya*) or changing (*pariṇāmin*), and [iii] the assertion that an effect that was non-existent (*asat*) before its creation comes to be created.

[4] *Vivartavāda* : Its three characteristic features are : [i] the positing of an absolute reality (*pāramārthika satya*) which neither produces anything nor undergoes any change (*anutpādaya, apariṇāmin*), [ii] the total rejection of the suggestion that the manifest (*bhāsamāna*) world—either gross or subtle—is created (*utpanna*) [out of a first cause] as also of the suggestion that it is evolved (*pariṇata*) [out of a first cause], and [iii] the assertion that the gross world possesses an unreal (*avāstavika*) or imaginary (*kālpānika*) existence, in other words, that it is merely an illusory (*māyika*)

appearance (*bhāsa*).

[1] **Ārambhavāda** : This theory maintains that there exists an infinite number of subtle elements in the form of atoms whose mutual combinations (*pārasparika sambandha*) result in the formation of an altogether novel gross, physical world which later on perishes for good (*sarvathā naṣṭa*). According to the theory, these subtle constituent-elements (of the physical world) are beginningless, endless, and changeless (*anādi-nidhana, aparīṇāmin*), and if there is at all any change it is in their qualities (*guṇa*) and attributes (*dharma*). Having thus established the relation of the gross physical world with the subtle physical elements the theory goes on to posit the existence of subtle conscious elements. It thus posits an infinite number of mutually distinct (*paraspara-bhinna*) conscious elements which too are beginningless, endless, and changeless. And just as having conceived the subtle physical elements as utterly changeless (*aparīṇāmin*) this theory posits in these elements the separate existence of qualities and attributes that originate and perish (*utpāda-vināśa-śālin*), so also having conceived the conscious elements as beginningless, endless, and changeless it posits in these elements the separate existence of qualities and attributes that originate and perish. On this theory, the gross physical world is related to the subtle physical elements as an effect (*upādeya*) is related to its material cause (*upādāna*); on the other hand, the relation of the gross physical world with the subtle conscious elements is one of mere conjunction (*saṃyoga*).

[2] **Pariṇāmavāda** : It is of two kinds, viz. (a) *Pradhānapariṇāmavāda* or 'Theory of the Real Modification of Pradhāna' and (b) *Brahmapariṇāmavāda* or 'Theory of the Real Modification of Brahman'.

(a) **Pradhānapariṇāmavāda** : According to this theory, there lies at the root of the gross world a subtle element called *pradhāna* which exists not in the form of an infinite number of mutually distinct atoms but in a continuous form (*akhaṇḍarūpa*) far subtler than that of atoms, and which, though beginningless and endless like atoms, is not changeless like them but constantly undergoes multifarious types of modifications (*nānā-pariṇāma-pariṇata*). On this theory, the gross world is nothing except the totality of perceptible modifications (*dr̥śya pariṇāma*) of the subtle element *pradhāna*.

Thus unlike atomism (*paramāṇuvāda*), *Pradhāna-pariṇāmapavāda* does not conceive the subtle element as changeless, nor does it consider the gross physical world to be an altogether novel creation out of this subtle element; for according to the latter theory, the subtle element *pradhāna*, which is doubtless as much physical as are atoms, constantly goes on getting modified into various perceptible, physical forms. Having maintained that the relation between the gross physical world on the one hand and the single subtle-but-physical element *pradhāna* on the other is one of non-distinction (*abheda*), this theory goes on to posit in the subtle world conscious elements as well. These conscious elements are infinite in number as they are in *Ārambhavāda*, but the two differ in that the conscious elements of *Ārambhavāda*, though themselves changeless, are possessed of qualities and attributes that originate and perish while those of *Pradhānapariṇāmapavāda* are not possessed of any such qualities and attributes. Since this latter type of conscious elements are utterly changeless (*kūṭastha*) they cannot undergo any modification, since they are utterly attributeless (*nirdharmaka*) they cannot act as seat of qualities and attributes. *Pradhānapariṇāmapavāda* argues that since it is the subtle physical element which possesses qualities and attributes that originate and perish, the conscious elements must be somewhat different from the physical one in this respect; for if the conscious elements too possessed qualities and attributes of that type there would be nothing to distinguish them from the subtle physical element. Hence the theory maintains that if the subtle conscious elements are at all to be posited it is proper for the sake of distinguishing them from the subtle physical element that they be conceived as not only attributeless but also changeless. Thus it was that conscious elements found room in *Pradhānapariṇāmapavāda* but in the form of attributeless and changeless entities.

(b) *Brahmapariṇāmapavāda* : This theory, which seems to be only a development of *Pradhānapariṇāmapavāda*, granted that there lies at the root of the gross world some subtle element which is the cause of the gross world. But it saw no sense in positing subtle conscious elements distinct from and standing alongside the subtle, physical causal element, *pradhāna*—more so when these conscious elements were absolutely func-

tionless (*akiñcitkara*) (like an *ajāgalastana*). This theory not only realized the futility of the separate existence of the conscious elements as posited by *Pradhānapariṇā mavāda* but also considered it unnecessary to assume that these conscious elements are infinite in number. Accordingly, the new theory visualized the subtle world in such a manner that it would not only properly explain the creation of the gross world out of the subtle one but would also eliminate the flaw inherent in the futile (*niṣprajojana*) assumption of an infinite number of good-for-nothing (*akiñcitkara*) conscious elements. Thus it posited at the root of the gross world not two mutually opposite (*paraspara-virodhi*) types of elements—one physical and the other conscious—but just one conscious element called Brahman; this Brahman was conceived as a changing entity (like *pradhāna* of the earlier theory) so that it was possible to explain the gross world—consisting of physical as well as conscious entities—as one emerging (*āvirbhāva*); out of the single conscious element Brahman and merging back (*tirobhāva*) into the same. The only point of difference between *Pradhānapariṇā mavāda* and *Brahmapariṇā mavāda* is that according to the former the physical element constantly undergoes change (*pariṇāmin*) and the conscious elements remain utterly unchanging (*apariṇāmin*), whereas according to the latter the ultimate subtle element, which is exclusively conscious, itself undergoes change and from it there subsequently arise two streams of change (*pariṇāma-pravāha*)—one physical and the other conscious.

[3] *Pratītyasamutpādavāda* : According to this theory too, there lie at the root of the gross physical world two types of subtle elements, one physical and the other conscious, the former called *rūpa*, the latter *nāma*. In this theory the subtle elements of the physical as well as conscious types—and not the subtle elements of the physical type alone, as in *Ārambhavāda*—are considered to be atomic (*paramāṇu-rūpa*). However, even though atoms are posited here as in *Ārambhavāda* they are here conceived in a totally different manner from those in *Ārambhavāda*. In *Ārambhavāda* atoms themselves are no doubt supposed to be changeless, but the theory posits in these atoms a series (*paramparā*) of qualities and attributes that originate and perish; *Pratītyasamutpādavāda*, on the other hand, conceives in its own distinctive manner the series of qualities and

attributes that originate and perish but it posits no permanent (*sthāyin*) atomic substances (*paramāṇu-dravya*) in the form of the substrata (*ādhārabhūta*) of these qualities and attributes. Similarly, according to *Pratītyasamutpāḍavāda*, there exists no permanent conscious element, single or otherwise. All that the theory maintains is that there exist in the subtle world the physical series of states that originate and perish as also the conscious series of states that originate and perish, but that the latter type of series are as much devoid of permanent substrata as the former type. The atoms are here called 'atoms' (*paramāṇu*) because they are subtlest (*sūkṣmatama*) and impartite (*avibhājya*), and not because they are permanent, impartite substances. On this theory, it is senseless to postulate permanent substances over and above qualities and attributes that originate and perish, just as it is futile to postulate utterly changeless (*kūṭastha*) conscious elements utterly devoid of qualities and attributes. Thus the theory posits in the subtle world two types of streams (*dhārā*) which are by nature totally distinct from one another and are yet not totally immune from exerting influence on one another. This theory differs from *Pradhānapariṇāma* and *Brahmapariṇāma* in that, unlike the latter two, it does not believe in the existence of a permanent substance of any type whatsoever. According to it, even if there exist no permanent substances in the form of fixed resting media (like a *kīlaka* or *śaṅku*) it is the nature of an outgoing (*pūrva*) modification-moment (*pariṇāma-kṣaṇa*) that while perishing it gives rise to the incoming (*uttara*) modification-moment, that is to say, the mere existence of the moribund (*vināśonmukha*) outgoing modification-moment is sufficient to produce the incoming modification-moment without requiring a fixed substratum. It is owing to this that the theory is called *Pratītya-samutpāḍavāda* (i.e. Theory of Dependent Origination). Really speaking, *Pratītyasamutpāḍavāda* is *Paramāṇuvāda* (atomism) as well as *Pariṇāma* (evolutionism) and yet essentially different from both.

[4] **Vivartavāda** : It is of two main kinds, viz. (a) *Nityabrahmavivartavāda* or "Theory of Illusory Modification of the Eternal Brahman" and (b) *Kṣaṇikavijñānavivartavāda* or "Theory of Illusory Modification of the Momentary Consciousness". According to both, the gross world is a mere



appearance (*bhāsamātra*), a mere imagination (*kalpanā-mātra*), a product of illusion or of past mental impressions (*māyājanita*, *vāsanājanita*). *Vivartavāda* maintains that the universe cannot be such an entity as may contain elements—external or internal, gross or subtle—that are mutually distinct (*prthak*) and discontinuous (*khaṇḍita*). On its showing, whatever is real in the universe can be just one because the universe is really continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) and impartite (*avibhājya*). And to conclude from it, the apparent dualities (*dvandva*) of attributes (*dharma*) such as external and internal, long and short, far and near, are simply chimerical (*kālpanika*). Thus on this theory, the gross world of our everyday experience (*loka-siddha sthūla viśva*) is but a product of imagination (*kālpanika*) and an apparent reality (*prātibhāsika satya*); on the other hand, the ultimate reality (*pāramārthika satya*) remains hidden beneath (*tala-nihita*) the gross world and is amenable to pure meditation (*viśuddha-dhyāna-gamya*), which, in turn, is why its true nature eludes an ordinary man's (*prākṛta jana*) grasp.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā accept *Ārambhavāda*, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Caraka—the physician—*Pradhānapariṇāmavāda*. *Brahmapariṇāmavāda* has found favour with the old Vedāntists like Bhartṛprapañca and Vallabhācārya among the moderns. *Pratītyasamutpāda-vāda* is upheld by Buddhists, *Vivartavāda* by the adherents of Śaṅkarite Vedānta, *Vijñānavāda*, and *Śūnyavāda*.

The following seems to be the historical course of development of the above narrated theories and the ideas underlying them. To begin with, the enquiry into causal relationships (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*) was confined to the physical world and to it alone. Gradually, when conscious elements lying beyond the physical ones were discovered and posited, the theory of causation—in the form of a theory of permanence-in-change (*pariṇāmi-nityatva*)—which had already been applied to the gross, physical world was extended to these conscious elements as well. But then arose the question : How are we to distinguish the conscious elements from the physical ones if both are permanent-undergoing-change (*pariṇāmi-nitya*) ? — and this impelled the thinkers to retain the concept of conscious elements but to view these elements as permanent-devoid-of-change (*kūṭastha-nitya*) while applying the theory of causation, i.e., the theory of permanence-in-change,

only to the physical realm. Now began an investigation into the nature of permanence-without-change (*kūṭastha-nityatā*) that had thus come to be attributed to the conscious elements. And then ultimately vanished not only this concept of permanence-without-change but also that concept of permanence-in-change which had till now found application in the physical realm; what remained to be admitted was just the stream of modifications (*pariṇamana-dhārā*). Thus overdone analysis (*ātyantika viśleṣaṇa*) culminated in the doctrine of mere modifications (i.e. modifications without a substantival identity), in momentarism (*kṣaṇikatvavāda*). On the other hand, overdone synthesis (*ātyantika samanvaya*) gave rise to the doctrine that consciousness is the sole ultimate reality (*caitanya-mātra-pāramāṛthika-vāda*). On having hit at one ubiquitous (*sarva-vyāpaka*) conscious element the synthesis-minded philosophers saw no need for positing any independently real, physical element. And then they said to themselves, "When there is no independently real, physical element of any kind why should even the apparent (*dṛśyamāna*) stream of modifications (*pariṇamana-dhārā*) be deemed real ?" This type of speculation resulted in the emergence of the doctrine that consciousness is the sole ultimate reality, a doctrine according to which all diversity and the entire physical world are altogether imaginary.

The different stages in this line of development can be summarily represented thus :

[1] Permanence-in-change (*pariṇāmi-nityatā*) attributed only to the physical realm.

[2] Permanence-in-change attributed to the physical as well as conscious realms.

[3] Permanence-in-change attributed to the physical realm and permanence-without-change (*kūṭastha-nityatā*) to the conscious.

[4] (a) Both permanence-in-change and permanence-without-change rejected and the reality of a mere stream of modifications (*pariṇāma-pravāha*) accepted.

(b) The reality only of consciousness—of consciousness in the form of something permanent-devoid-of-change (*kūṭastha-nitya*)—accepted while everything else declared to be imaginary (*kālpanika*) or unreal

(*asatya*).

Coming to the Jaina system, we find that it posits over and above the perceptible world an infinite number of two utterly distinct types of subtle elements, one physical and the other conscious. The gross world is according to it only an effect (*kārya*) or modification (*pariṇāma*) of the subtle physical elements. The subtle physical elements of the Jaina system are atomic in nature but they are far subtler than the atoms posited in *Ārambhavāda*. Even though an atomist, the Jaina conceives the atoms as constantly undergoing change (*pariṇāmin*) precisely in the manner of the *pradhāna* etc. of *Pariṇāmavāda*; and the gross world is according to him but a transformation (*rūpāntara*) or modification (*pariṇāma*) of these very atoms. Really speaking, the Jaina is a *pariṇāmavādin*. However, there is a difference between *pariṇāmavāda* as advocated by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, old Vedānta, etc. and the same as advocated by the Jaina : In the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system *Pariṇāmavāda* has been applied to the physical element alone while the conscious elements have been left untouched thereby; on the other hand, in Bhartṛprapañca etc. *Pariṇāmavāda* has been applied to the conscious element alone. As contrasted with these two, in Jainism *Pariṇāmavāda* has been applied to the physical as well as conscious, the gross as well as subtle; in one word, the Jaina *Pariṇāmavāda* may be called an all-comprehensive (*sarva-vyāpaka*) *Pariṇāmavāda*. In a sense, even Bhartṛprapañca's *Pariṇāmavāda* may be called an all-comprehensive *Pariṇāmavāda*, but "all" for Bhartṛprapañca means the conscious Brahman alone and nothing else while "all" for the Jaina means the physical as well as conscious elements.<sup>5</sup>

Thus both *Ārambhavāda* and *Pariṇāmavāda* find a full recognition and attain a harmonious synthesis everywhere in the Jaina system. However, there is in this system no scope whatsoever for *Pratītya-samutpādavāda* and *Vivartavāda*. Inasmuch as the Jaina system regards all real things as permanent-undergoing-change (*pariṇāmi-nitya*) and all of

5. For both Bhartṛprapañca and the Jaina everything is a modification of some permanent substance; but Bhartṛprapañca would say that everything is a modification of the one conscious substance Brahman while the Jaina would say that everything is a modification either of a physical substance or of a conscious substance.—Tr.

them as equally real, it is opposed to *Pratītyasamutpāḍavāda* and *Vivartavāda*—as are also the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, etc. Again, the Jaina system is one with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, etc. in recognizing the plurality of conscious elements, but its conception of them is in many ways different from that of the latter systems. In the Jaina system a conscious element is not an ubiquitous substance as it is in Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, etc. nor is it atomic in size as it is in Viśiṣṭādvaita etc., nor merely a substanceless (*nīdravyaka*) stream of cognitions (*jñāna-dhārā*) as it is in Buddhism. The conscious elements posited by the Jaina are medium-sized (*madhyama-parimāṇa-vat*) and are capable of expanding (*vistāra*) and contracting (*saṃkoca*). To that extent they are not much distinct from the physical elements. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Yoga systems, an ordinary soul (*jīvātman*) is akin to the supreme soul (*paramātman*) in that both are a soul, i. e. a conscious entity, but there is a fundamental difference of nature between the two owing to which an ordinary soul can never become the supreme soul, nor was the supreme soul ever an ordinary soul suffering bondage. The Jaina system is quite opposed to this thesis as are also Vedānta etc. According to it, there is no natural difference (*sahaja bheda*) between an ordinary soul (*jīvātman*) and an almighty soul (*Īśvara*); for the capacity to become a supreme soul (*paramātman*) is common to all ordinary souls, a capacity that may—and does—become manifest (*vyakta*) when means (*sādhana*) for it are available. However, the Jaina system does differ from Vedānta insofar as the latter is believer in one supreme soul (*eka-paramātma-vādin*) while the former, because of its acceptance of a plurality of conscious elements, is in principle believer in a plurality of supreme souls (*bahu-paramātma-vādin*).

## ANEKĀNTAVĀDA—THE PRINCIPAL JAINA CONTRIBUTION TO INDIAN LOGIC

The first and the foremost of the contributions—one that is the key to the rest—made by the Jaina savants to Indian Logic (*pramāṇa-śāstra*) is the systematic exposition (*śāstrīya nirūpaṇa*) of *Anekāntavāda* or the Doctrine of Non-Absolutism and (its corollary) *Nayavāda* or the Doctrine of Partial Truths.

There are two mutually distinct, fundamental standpoints (*dr̥ṣṭi*) for looking at the universe—one is that which tends towards generalization (*sāmānya-gāminī*), the other that which tends towards particularization (*viśeṣa-gāminī*). The former starts with the observation of similarities (*samānatā*), but it is gradually inclined to emphasize non-distinction (*abheda*) and finally views the universe as rooted in something one and single; hence it arrives at the conclusion that whatever is an object of awareness (*pratīti*) is, really speaking, some one single element (*tattva*). Thus passing beyond the initial stage (*prāthamika bhūmikā*) of viewing similarities the standpoint in question culminates in viewing essential identity (*tāttvika ekatā*); whatever element is here asserted to be the sole object of awareness is also declared to be the sole reality (*sat*). Owing to its excessive preoccupation with the one ultimate real, this standpoint either fails to take note of diversities or it takes note of them but dismisses them as empirical (*vyāvahārika*) or non-ultimate (*apāramārthika*) because according to it they are unreal (*avāstavika*). This applies to all diversity we are aware of, be it diversity in respect of time (*kālakṛta* : as, for example, that between the antecedent seed and the subsequent sprout), or diversity in respect of space (*deśakṛta* : as, for example, that between the simultaneously existing *prākṛtika*, i.e. physical, modifications like jars, cloths, etc.), or innate diversity irrespective of space and time (*deśa-kāla-nirapekṣa sāhajika* : as, for example, that between *prakṛti*, i.e. the root physical element, and *puruṣa*, i.e. the root conscious element, or that between one *puruṣa* and another).

As against this, the second standpoint sees dissimilarity (*asamānatā*) everywhere, and gradually searching for the root of this dissimilarity it

finally reaches that stage of analysis (*viśleṣaṇa-bhūmikā*) where even similarity (*samānatā*), nothing to say of identity (*ekatā*), appears to be something artificial (*kṛtrima*, unreal); hence it arrives at the conclusion that the universe is but a conglomeration (*puñja*) of several discrete existents (*bheda*) utterly dissimilar from one another. According to it, there really exists no single element (at the root of diversities), nor does there obtain any real similarity (between one existent and another). This applies to single elements like *prakṛti* which (allegedly) pervade all space and persist for all time, as also to single elements like atoms which (allegedly) are mutually different substances (occupying different points in space) but ones that persist for all time.

The above-stated two standpoints are fundamentally different from one another, for one of them is based exclusively on synthesis the other exclusively on analysis. These two fundamental lines of thought (*vicāra-saraṇi*) and the derivative lines of thought developing out of the two give rise to a number of mutually conflicting views on a number of topics. We thus see that the first standpoint with its tendency to generalization led to the formulation of the doctrine of 'one, non-dual *Brahman* (*Brahmādvaita*)—the sole real element—occupying all space and time (*samagra-deśa-kāla-vyāpin*) and free from the limitations of space and time (*deśa-kāla-vinirmukta*)'. This doctrine, on the one hand, dubbed as unreal (*mithyā*) all diversity and all organs of knowledge taking note of this diversity, while, on the other hand, it asserted that the real-element (*sat-tattva*) lies beyond the reach (*pravṛtti*) of speech (*vāṇī*) and logic (*tarka*) and is amenable to bare experience (i.e. experience untrammelled by speech and logic) (*mātra anubhava-gamya*). Likewise, the second standpoint with its tendency to particularization led to the formulation of the doctrine of 'an infinite number of discrete existents, each different from the rest not only as to its spatio-temporal location but also as to its very nature'. This doctrine too, on the one hand, dubbed all non-distinction (*abheda*) as unreal while, on the other hand, asserted that the ultimate discrete existents lie beyond the reach of speech and logic and are amenable to bare experience. Thus both the doctrines in question did ultimately arrive at one common conclusion, viz, that whatever is revealed by speech and logic is a nullity (*śūnya*) while

the ultimate reality is amenable to bare experience; but their ultimate objectives (*lakṣya*) being utterly different the two came in headlong clash and emerged as rivals to each other.

There also came into existence a number of lines of thought that either sprang from or were related to these two fundamental lines. Some of them accepted non-distinction (*abheda*) but only in respect of space and time or in respect of mere time, that is, not in respect of essential or substantival nature. Thus one line of thought did posit multiplicity of substances but regarded them all as eternal from the point of view of time and ubiquitous from that of space; the Sāṅkhya doctrine of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*prakṛtipuruṣavāda*) is an instance in point. Another line of thought came to attribute a comparatively greater extension to the sphere of diversity. Thus even while positing entities that are eternal and ubiquitous this line also posited a multiplicity of entities that are physical by nature (and hence occupying different points in space); the (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) doctrine of atomic-as-well-as-ubiquitous-substances (*paramāṇu-vibhu-dravya-vāda*) is an instance in point.

It was but natural that the standpoint of exclusive non-dualism (*advaita-mātra*) and exclusive monism (*san-mātra*)—a standpoint tolerant of no diversity in any respect—should lead to the formulation of numerous doctrines based on the acceptance of non-distinction (*abheda-mūlaka vāda*). And this is what actually happened. Thus this standpoint gave rise to the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, according to which there is a non-distinction between a cause and its effect; similarly, it gave rise to the doctrine of non-distinction between an attribute (*dharma*) and that which possesses this attribute (*dharmin*), a quality (*guṇa*) and that which possesses this quality (*guṇin*), a substratum (*ādhāra*) and that which is supported by this substratum (*ādheya*), and so on and so forth. On the other hand, the standpoint of exclusive pluralism (*dvaita-mātra*)<sup>6</sup> and exclusive distinction (*bheda-mātra*) led to the formulation of numerous doctrines based on the acceptance of distinction (*bheda-mūlaka vāda*). Thus it gave rise to the doctrine of *asatkāryavāda*, according to which there is absolute distinction between a cause and its effect; similarly, it gave rise to the doctrine of

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6. Here “*dvi*” stands not for ‘two’ but for ‘more than one’ Tr.

absolute distinction between an attribute and that which possesses this attribute, a quality and that which possesses this quality, a substratum and that which is supported by this substratum, and so on and so forth. Thus we find that in the field of Indian philosophical speculation a number of mutually antagonistic views (*mata*) and systems (*darśana*) arose out of the fundamental standpoint of generality (along with its derivative standpoints) and the fundamental standpoint of particularity (along with its derivative standpoints). These views and systems, without caring for the element of truth that might underlie a rival view or system, made it their prime concern to attack one another.

The doctrine of pre-existence (*sad-vāda*)—be it non-dualistic (as in Vedānta) or dualistic as in Sāṅkhya—cannot achieve its basic aim without accepting *satkāryavāda*, according to which there is a non-distinction between a cause and its effect; on the other hand, the doctrine of pre-non-existence (*asad-vāda*)—be it applied to momentary entities as in Buddhism or to static and eternal entities as in Vaiśeṣika etc.—cannot achieve its basic aim without accepting *asatkāryavāda* (according to which there is absolute distinction between a cause and its effect).<sup>7</sup> Hence *satkāryavāda* came in clash with *asatkāryavāda*. Similarly, the theory of permanence-without-change (i.e. eternity : *kūṭasthatā*, *kālika nityatā*) and all-pervadedness (i.e. ubiquity : *vibhūtā*, *daiśika vyāpakatā*)—a theory resulting from the doctrine of pre-existence, dualistic or non-dualistic—came in clash with the theory of spatially as well as temporally impartite, ultimate elements (*deśa-kāla-kṛta-niraṃśa-aṃśa-vāda*), that is, with the theory of impartite moments (*niraṃśa kṣaṇa-vāda*)—a theory resulting from the doctrine rival to the doctrine of pre-existence. Now those who regard the entire universe as some single (*eka*), continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) element (*tattva*) as also those who regard it as a mere conglomeration (*puñja*) of impartite (*niraṃśa*), ultimate elements (*aṃśa*) could achieve their respective aims only by maintaining that the ultimate real posited in their respective systems is incapable of definition and description through words (*anirvacanīya*,

7. By *sadvāda* or the doctrine of pre-existence we mean the doctrine that an entity exists always (or it is not a real entity); by *asadvāda* or the doctrine of pre-nonexistence we mean the doctrine that a real entity—at least in case it happens to be a produced entity—exists only for an interval of time (possibly for one moment). Tr.



*anabhilāpya, śabdāgocara*); for if the real is capable of definition through words it can be neither some single, continuous element nor a multiplicity of impartite, ultimate elements, and this, in turn, is because definition puts an end as it were to continuity (in one single form) as well as to impartibility. Thus the theory of indefinability (*anirvacanīyatvavāda*) arose as a natural corollary to the doctrine of one continuous real as also to the doctrine of impartite distinct reals. But this theory was taken exception to by the Vaiśeṣika logicians and others who averred that to describe and define every real entity (*vastumātra*) is not only a possibility but also an accomplished fact. Thus arose the theory of definability (*nirvacanīyatvavāda*) that came in clash with the rival theory of indefinability (*anirvacanīyatvavāda*).

In a like manner, some people upheld the view that it is dangerous to arrive at a final conclusion by means of an organ of knowledge—of whatever sort—unaided by reason (*hetu*) or logic (*tarka*); others, on the contrary, maintained that logic possesses no independent force, and that the Scripture, inasmuch as it does possess an independent force, is the senior most (*mūrdhanya*) of all organs of knowledge. Hence the clash between these two viewpoints. Again, the fatalist (*daiva-vādin*) would say that everything depends on fate (*daiva*) and that human endeavour (*puruṣārtha*) is independently of no avail, the protagonist of human endeavour would maintain just the opposite view that man's endeavour is independently capable of delivering the goods (*kāryakara*). Thus each thought that the other was in the wrong. Likewise, one one-sided view (*naya*) emphasized the importance of the denoted entity (*artha*) at the cost of the denoting word (*śabda*), the other that of the denoting word at the cost of the denoted entity; and the two argued against each other. Similarly, some thought that absence (*abhāva*) is an independent entity alongside the positive one (*bhāva*) while others that it is but of the nature of the positive entity, and thus developed the attitude of hostility between them. Furthermore, some thought that an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the resulting piece of knowledge (*pramiti*) are utterly distinct (*atyanta bhinna*) from the knower (*pramātā*) concerned, while others that they are non-distinct (*abhinna*) from the latter. Lastly, some emphasized that the

sole means for attaining the desired (ultimate) result is action performed in conformity with the *Varṇa-Āśrama* rules, others insisted that knowledge alone will lead to (absolute) bliss, while still others maintained that devotion (*bhakti*) is the only instrument for realizing the summum bonum. Thus on a number of major and minor problems pertaining to metaphysics and ethics several such views had been in vogue as were extremist (*ekānta*) and wholly antagonistic to one another.

On noticing this debating sport (*vāda-līlā*) indulged in by the advocates of the extremist doctrines (*ekānta*), the following question occurred to the teachers who were inheritors of the non-absolutist (*anekānta*; non-extremist) standpoint : Why are these doctrines—each claiming to be true—so much in conflict with one another ? Is it that *none* of them contains *any* element of truth, or that *each* of them contains *some* element of truth, or that *some* of them contains *some* element of truth, or that *each* of them contains the *whole* truth ? The cogitation over this question furnished these teachers with a clue that would put an end to all conflict and reveal the whole truth; the clue was the non-absolutist standpoint that forms the ground (*bhūmikā*) of the doctrine called *Anekāntavāda*. This standpoint enabled our teachers to see that all particular theory based on logic (*sayuktika*) is true to a certain extent and from a certain point of view. However, when a particular theory, refusing to take into account the line of thought and the sphere of application (*sīmā*) of the rival theory, imagines that everything lies within the sphere covered by its own standpoint it turns blind to the truth contained in this rival theory. And the same thing happens with this rival theory (that is to say, it too imagines that everything lies within the sphere covered by its own standpoint). Under these circumstances, justice demands that a theory be tested keeping in view its specific line of thought and its specific sphere of application, and in case it passes the test it should be treated as an aspect (*bhāga*) of truth; subsequently, a sort of necklace ought to be prepared with the various aspects of truth—uncontradictory of one another—acting as diamonds (*satyāṃśa-rūpa-maṇi*) and the idea of whole truth acting as the running thread (*pūrṇa-satya-rūpa-vicāra-sūtra*). These considerations impelled the Jaina teachers to synthesize (*samanvaya*; harmonize), on the basis of their

non-absolutist standpoint, all the theories that were then prevalent. And this is how their thought ran. When certain pure (*śuddha*) and selfless (*niḥsvārtha*) minds are cognizant of similarity culminating in identity and when certain other minds (no less pure and selfless) are cognizant of (diversity culminating in) impartite ultimate elements, how can we say that one of these cognitions (*pratīti*) is valid and the other not? If one of these cognitions is somehow treated as invalid the same logic will compel you to treat the other as equally so. Moreover, granting that one of these cognitions is valid and the other not, you will have to offer a logical explanation (*upapatti*) of what in our everyday dealings (*sārvajanika vyavahāra*) is taken as forming the object of the cognition—of identity or of diversity as the case may be—dismissed as invalid. Certainly, a mere assertion to the effect that one of these cognitions is valid and the other not will not mean a logical explanation of our everyday dealings, empirical (*laukika*) or śāstric (*śāstrīya*). Nor can you leave these dealings unexplained. So the monistic-*Brahmavādin's* explanation of the phenomena in question will lie in treating as a product of ignorance (*avidyā-mūlaka*) all diversity and our cognition thereof, while the momentarist's explanation will lie in treating as a product of ignorance all similarity or identity and our cognition thereof.

These thoughts led the advocates of *Anekāntavāda* to realize, in the light of their non-absolutist standpoint, that all cognition—be it cognition of identity or that of diversity—is after all valid (*vāstavika*). A cognition is valid in relation to its own object, but when it arrogates to itself the right to demonstrate the unreality of the object of another cognition seemingly contradictory of itself it turns invalid. The cognition of identity and the cognition of diversity seem to be contradictory of each other simply because one of them is mistaken to be the whole truth (*pūrṇa-pramāṇa*). As a matter of fact, both these cognitions are valid so far as they go, but neither is the whole truth though each is a part (*aṃśa*) thereof. The total nature of reality ought to be such that these seemingly contradictory cognitions might reveal it in their respective ways but without contradicting one another and might both be treated as valid insofar as both go to reveal the total nature of reality. This synthesis, that is, the idea that the two cognitions in

question have two different spheres to operate in (*vyavasthā-garbhita vicāra*), enabled the advocates of *Anekāntavāda* to see that there is no real conflict between monism (*sad-advaita*) and pluralism (*sad-dvaita*), for the total nature of reality comprises identity as well as diversity, generality as well as particularity. For example, when we think of that huge mass of water and disregard its place, time, colour, taste, dimension, etc. it appears before us in the form of one single entity called ocean. On the other hand, when we take into account the place, time, etc. of this very mass of water we begin to see a number of oceans—small and big—instead of one; gradually, we do not even perceive even a single drop of water but certain impartite elements like colour, taste, etc., and, eventually, they too appear as nought (*sūnya*). Cognition of the mass of water as one single ocean is valid, and so also is its cognition as (a conglomeration of) ultimate elements. The cognition of one (single ocean) is valid because it views diversities (*bheda*) not as standing out separately from one another but as together exhibiting one common form; likewise, the cognition of diversities-as-to-spatio-temporal-location-etc.—diversities which totally demarcate (*vyāvṛtta*) the elements concerned from one another—is valid because these diversities are actually there. Inasmuch as the mass of water is in fact one as well as a multiplicity, our cognition of it as one single ocean is as much valid as our cognition of it as a multiplicity of ultimate elements; but since neither of these cognitions grasps the total nature of reality, neither of them is the whole truth, though the two together do constitute the whole truth. Analogously, when we view the entire universe as one single real, in other words, when we take note of “existence” (*sattā*) which is common (*anugamaka*) to all diverse existents, we say that all reality is one and single; for while taking note of the all-comprehensive (*sarva-vyāpaka*) “existence” we are aware of no diversities demarcated from one another, and that, in turn, is because all diversities are here revealed as exhibiting one collective and common form, viz. “existence”. Hence the epithet “Monism” or “Doctrine of Non-dual Reality” (*sad-advaita*) attributed to this viewpoint. When we confine our attention to what is common to all existents and call the universe ‘(one single) real’ (*sat*) the denotation of the word “real” becomes so wide as to exclude nothing (i.e. no existing entity)

whatsoever. However, when we view the universe as possessed of the mutually demarcated diversities of qualities and attributes, it no more appears in the form of one real (*sat*) but becomes a multiplicity of reals. In that case, the denotation of the word “real” undergoes corresponding limitation (for now we do not at all speak of real in general but only of this or that type of real). Thus we say that some reals are physical while some conscious; going further in the direction of noticing diversities we say that there are a number of physical reals and a number of conscious reals. Thus when we view the one all-comprehensive real as divided into mutually demarcated diversities, it appears before us as a multiplicity of reals. This is the viewpoint of “Pluralism” or the “Doctrine of Diverse Reals” (*sad-dvaita*). Thus the monistic and pluralistic viewpoints are valid in their respective spheres, but they will go to constitute the whole truth only when they are combined together as complementary to each other (*sāpekṣa-bhāvena*). This then is the synthesis, arrived at from the non-absolutist standpoint, of monism and pluralism which are generally supposed to be mutually antagonistic.

The same idea can be elucidated with the help of the illustration of trees and the forest. When the several, mutually different, particular trees are viewed not in the form of this or that particular tree but in a collective, general form designated “forest” the particular features of these different trees do not cease to exist but they are so much absorbed (*līna*) in the general feature—observed for the time being—of these trees as to appear to be non-existent. In this case we see the forest and it alone, and our outlook may be characterised as monistic. Again, sometimes we take note of these trees one by one, that is, in the form of particular entities. Here we see the particular entities and them alone, and the general feature of these entities is so much absorbed in their particular features—observed for the time being—as to appear to be non-existent. Now an analysis of these two cognitions (*anubhava*) will suggest that neither can be regarded as solely true, i.e. true at the cost of the other. Both are true within their respective spheres but neither represents the whole truth; for the whole truth lies in a proper synthesis of these two cognitions. Only such a synthesis can do justice to the two cognitions, viz. cognition of the forest in general and

cognition of each, single, particular tree, both of which are uncontradicted (*abādhitā*). The same holds good of the monistic and pluralistic world-views (that is to say, they too represent the whole truth only when properly synthesized).

The above was an account of the monism *versus* pluralism controversy in regard to features that might be spatial (*daiśika*), temporal (*kālika*), or non-spatiotemporal (*deśakālātīta*); there is a special controversy between the doctrine of temporal generality (*kālika sāmānya*) or eternalism (*nityatvavāda*) and the doctrine of temporal particularity (*kālika viśeṣa*) or momentarism (*kṣanikatvavāda*). These two doctrines too seem to be mutually antagonistic, but the non-absolutist standpoint suggests that there is no real conflict between the two. Thus when an element (*tattva*) is viewed as being continuous (*akhaṇḍa*) throughout the three periods of time, that is, as beginningless and endless, it is certainly eternal (*nitya*), for in that case it is of the form of a continuous flow (*akhaṇḍa pravāha*) that has no beginning and no end. But when the same element—undergoing that continuous flow—is viewed as divided in terms of relatively large or small temporal units (*kāla-bheda*) it appears as having assumed a limited (*sīmita*) form which lasts for this or that interval and which therefore has a beginning as well as an end. And in case the interval in question is too brief to admit of further dissection by means of intellectual weapons (*buddhi-śāstra*), that portion of the element-in-continuous-flow which occupies this interval is called momentary (*kṣanika*) because it is smallest possible. The words eternal and momentary are considered to be each other's antonyms (*viruddhārthaka*); for the connotation of one includes lack of a beginning and of an end (*anādi-anantatā*) while that of the other possession of a beginning and of an end (*sādi-sāntatā*). However, viewing from the non-absolutist standpoint, we can see that the same element which is called 'eternal' insofar as it is of the form of a continuous flow may also be called 'momentary' insofar as it undergoes a change (*parivartana*) or a new modification (*pariyāya*) every moment. The basis of one viewpoint is the observation of beginninglessness and endlessness, that of the other the observation of beginnings and ends. But the total nature of a real entity comprises the lack of a beginning and of an end as also the possession of a

beginning and of an end. Hence the viewpoints in question, though true within their respective spheres, will yield the whole truth only when properly synthesized.

This synthesis, too, can be elucidated with the help of an illustration. The total life-activity of a tree—right from the beginning upto the time of fructification—completes its course only by flowing through the successive stages represented by the seed, the root, the sprout, the trunk, the branches and twigs, the leaves, the flowers, the fruits. etc. So when we view an entity as a 'tree' we have in mind the total life-activity continuously flowing through these various stages. On the other hand, when we grasp, one by one, the successively emerging elements—like root, sprout, trunk, etc.—of this life-activity we have in mind but these various elements, each possessing a limited duration. Thus our mind takes note of the life-activity in question sometimes in one continuous form and sometimes in a discontinuous form, that is, element by element. On closer investigation it becomes evident that neither is the continuous life-activity either the whole truth or but a product of imagination, nor are the discontinuous elements either the whole truth or but a product of imagination.<sup>8</sup> Even granting that the continuous life-activity absorbs within itself the totality of discontinuous elements or that the discontinuous elements absorb within themselves the total continuous life-activity, the fact remains that a real entity, viewed in its total nature, is continuous as well as discontinuous, and that therefore it is grasped only when both these aspects of its nature are (separately) taken note of. These two aspects are both real so far as each of them goes, but they become totally real only when synthesized. To view the tree as a beginningless and endless flow in time is to indicate it as an eternal entity, to view the tree as made up of (the successively emerging) elements is to indicate it as a transient or momentary entity. The transient constituent elements (*ghaṭaka*) are inconceivable without a substratum in the form of an eternal flow, and this eternal flow is inconceivable without those

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8. That the continuous life-activity is the whole truth and discontinuous elements but a product of imagination is the eternalist's position, that the discontinuous elements are the whole truth and the continuous life-activity but a product of imagination is the momentarist's position. Tr.

transient constituent elements. Thus the view that eternity is real while transience unreal and the view that transience is real while eternity unreal give rise to the eternalism *versus* momentarism controversy which, however, is eliminable from the non-absolutist standpoint.

The non-absolutist standpoint also eliminates the controversy between the doctrine of definability and the doctrine of indefinability. For according to it, only that aspect of an entity's nature is amenable to description (*pratipādyā*) which can be made an object of conventions (i.e. conventional attribution of words : *saṅketa*). Now even though a convention is established by *buddhi* (i.e. intellect) which is subtle in the extreme (*sūkṣmatama*), the object of this convention must be some gross (*sthūla*) aspect of the nature of an entity; for there are innumerable (subtle) aspects of an entity's nature which are inherently incapable of description through words. It is in this sense that the one continuous real (*akhaṇḍa sat*) as well as the impartite moment (i.e. ultimate element) (*niraṃśa kṣaṇa*) are indefinable, while the gross entities of medium duration (and extension) are capable of definition. Thus the doctrine of definability and the doctrine of indefinability—applied to the entire universe or to an element thereof—are true within their respective spheres and wholly true when taken together.

Nor is it self-contradictory to view a thing as a positive entity and also as an 'absence'. For a thing is never cognized either solely through its positive traits (*mātra vidhimukhena*) or solely through its negative traits (*mātra niṣedhamukhena*). E.g. the milk is cognized as milk and also as not-curd, i.e. something different from curd. This means that the milk is of a positive-cum-negative nature (*bhāva-abhāva-ubhaya-rūpa*). Thus it is not self-contradictory to maintain that a thing is a positive entity and also an 'absence', for two different cognitions take note of these two aspects of the thing's nature. Similarly, the non-absolutist standpoint resolves the controversy as to whether the members of other similar pairs (*dvandva*) —e.g. 'attribute and the possessor of the attribute' (*dharma-dharmin*), 'quality and the possessor of the quality' (*guṇa-guṇin*), 'cause and effect' (*kārya-kāraṇa*), 'substratum and superstratum' (*ādhāra-ādheya*)—are identical with one another or different from one another.



When the authoritativeness (*āptatva*) and the validity-of-source (*mūla-prāmāṇya*) (of a verbal testimony) are in doubt, it is always well to decide an issue after examining (*parīkṣā*) the matter ratiocinatively (*hetuvāda-dvārā*); but in case the authoritativeness (of the testimony in question) is beyond doubt, resort to ratiocination only leads to an infinite regress and is to be discarded. In this latter case reliance on the Scripture (*āgamavāda*) has to be our sole guide. Thus both ratiocination and reliance-on-the-Scripture have a scope, but they apply to different subject-matters (*viṣaya*) or to different sorts of exposition (*pratipādana*) of the same subject-matter. In one word, there is no conflict between the two. The same is the case with the doctrine of Fate (*daivavāda*) and the doctrine of Human Endeavour (*pauruṣavāda*), for there is no conflict between them either. In those cases where endeavour based on rational calculation (*buddhi-pūrvaka pauruṣa*) is an impossibility, problems can be solved only by the doctrine of Fate, where endeavour of this type is possible the doctrine of Human Endeavour is in place. Thus the doctrine of Fate and the doctrine of Endeavour can be reconciled harmoniously, provided one keeps in view that the two cover different aspects of life.

The non-absolutist standpoint easily succeeds also in eliminating the opposition between the 'doctrine of absolute presence of the effect in the cause' and the 'doctrine of absolute absence of the effect in the cause'. For according to it, the effect (*kārya*) is present as well as absent in the material cause (*upādāna*). E. g. even before it is actually turned into a bangle, a piece of gold has the capacity (*śakti*) to turn into a bangle; thus viewed in the form of a 'capacity' (*śakti*), that is, in the form of something non-distinct from the cause, the effect can be said to be present even before it is actually produced. However, even though present in the form of a capacity, this effect is not there to be seen (*upaladbha*), because the absence of necessary accessories (*utpādana-sāmagrī*) has prevented it from emerging into being. i.e. from being produced; in this sense the effect is absent (before it is actually produced). Again, after the bangle has disappeared and the material concerned turned into an earring, the bangle is doubtless not there to be seen, but since even the gold-turned-into-an-earring possesses the capacity to turn into a bangle, the actually absent bangle can be said to be potentially present in this gold.

The Buddhist's 'doctrine of mere conglomeration of atoms' (*kevala-paramāṇupūñja-vāda*) and the Naiyāyika's 'doctrine of an altogether novel composition' (*apūrva-avayavi-vāda*) come in conflict with one another. But the non-absolutist standpoint with its acceptance of *skandha*, which is neither a mere conglomeration of atoms nor something so contradictory of experience (*bādhita*) as a composite standing over and above its component-parts, properly resolves the conflict and works out a flawless synthesis of the two doctrines. Thus the non-absolutist standpoint has impartially synthesized, on so many questions, the current doctrines that were clashing with each other. And in the course of its doing so, the doctrine of *Nayas* (*nayavāda*) and the doctrine of *Bhaṅgas* (*bhaṅgavāda*) follow as a natural corollary; for a proper formulation of non-absolutism requires as its preliminary an analysis of the different stands and viewpoints, a demarcation of their respective subject-matters, and a determination of their roles concerning one and the same subject-matter.

No one corner of a house makes the whole house, nor do the different corners of this house lie in one particular direction. The view (*avalokana*) had of the house from one of the two opposite directions—like south and north, or east and west—is certainly not full but nor is it false. It is the totality (*samuccaya*) of the views had of the house from different possible angles which may be called a full view of the house. Thus the view had of the house from one particular angle is a necessary part of the total view of the house. Analogously, the formulation of thoughts and views (*cintana-darśana*) concerning the nature of an entity or of the entire universe is accomplished from various stands (*apekṣā*). And a stand is determined by a multiplicity of factors like the innate constitution (*sahaja racanā*) of the mind, the impressions (*saṃskāra*) received from outside, the nature of the object thought about, etc. Such stands—for thinking about the nature of things—are many in number. And since these stands form the basis or the starting point of the viewing process (*vicāra*; lit. thought-process) they are also called 'angles of vision' (*drṣṭikoṇa*) or 'points of view' (*drṣṭibindu*). The harmonious totality (*sāra-samuccaya*) of the thoughts and views concerning a thing formed from different stands—however contradictory of each other in appearance—is called the total view or the non-

absolutist view of this thing. The view formed from a particular stand is a part of this total view, and though the different such views (i.e. the views formed from different particular stands) are (seemingly) contradictory of one another, they are really uncontradictory of one another inasmuch as they all find synthesis in the total view.

When a mind ignores and takes no account of diversities—qualitative (*guṇa-dharma-kṛta*) or essential (*svarūpa-kṛta*) as well as numerical (*vyaktitva-kṛta*)—while confining its attention to mere continuity (*akhaṇḍatā*) the universe appears to it as one and continuous. Understood from this standpoint of non-distinction (*abheda*), the word 'real' means something one and continuous (and nothing more), and this type of partially true understanding of things is technically called *saṅgraha-naya* (where 'naya' stands for a partially true understanding of things). The view taken of the universe from the standpoint of diversities—qualitative as well as numerical—is technically called *vyavahāranaya*, for here special importance is assigned to the diversities on which is grounded our everyday experience (*loka-siddha vyavahāra*). On this view, the word 'real' denotes not something one and continuous but things different and discontinuous. When this tendency to take note of diversities confines its attention to mere temporal diversities, and concludes that the present alone is real because it alone is capable of performing a function (*kāryakara*), that is so say, when the past and the future are excluded from the denotation of the word 'real', there results a partially true understanding of things which is technically called *ṛjusūtra-naya*. It is so called because it seeks to avoid the labyrinth (*cakravayūha*) of the past and the future while sliding along the straight line (*ṛju-rekhā*) representing the present.

The above-stated three attitudes consider the nature of things without basing themselves on (the consideration of) words and their qualities and attributes. Hence the three resulting understandings are designated *artha-naya*. But there are also possible attitudes which consider the nature of things basing themselves on (the consideration of) words and their qualities and attributes. The understandings resulting from these attitudes are designated *śabda-naya*. Grammarians are the chief advocates of the various *śabda-nayas*, for it is on account of the divergent standpoints upheld by the grammarians that one *śabda-naya* differs from others.

Those grammarians who regard all words as impartite (*akhaṇḍa*) or etymologically underived (*avyutpanna*), certainly, do not base on etymology their distinction of the meaning of one word from that of another, but they too hold that words mean different things according as they possess different attributes (*dharma*) in the form of gender, person, tense, etc. This type of distinguishing the meaning of one word from that of another is called *śabda-naya* or *sāmprata-naya*. On the other hand, those grammarians who regard all words as etymologically derived (*vyutpanna*) posit distinction between the meanings of even such words as are generally admitted to be synonymous; this view, according to which (for example) the synonyms like 'śakra', 'indra', etc. have different meanings, is called *samabhirūḍha-naya*. Lastly, there is a view according to which a word applies to a thing not in case this thing *sometimes* satisfies the etymology of the word in question, but only in case this thing is for the time being satisfying this etymology.<sup>9</sup> This view is called *evambhūta-naya*. Apart from these six logical *nayas* there is a seventh called *naigama-naya*. 'Nigama' literally means local convention (*deśa-rūḍhi*), and this seventh *naya* stands for the view which includes—in accordance with local conventions—all kinds of doctrines of distinction and the doctrines of non-distinction.<sup>10</sup> These are the seven chief (not all) *nayas*, and, really and generally speaking, whatever understanding of things results from the adoption of one particular standpoint rather than any other is the *naya* corresponding to that standpoint.

The Jaina texts also speak of the two *nayas* called *dravyārthika-naya* and *paryāyārthika-naya*; however, these are not something over and above the above-mentioned seven *nayas* but a mere broad classification (*saṅkṣipta vargīkaraṇa*) of and an introductory ground (*bhūmikā*) to these very seven *nayas*. *Dravyārthika-naya* is that line of thought which takes 'substance'

9. E.g. 'go' – the Sanskrit word for cow – means 'that which moves'. Hence on this view, a cow cannot be called 'go' when it is not actually in motion.—Tr.

10. More literally, 'naigama-naya' may mean understanding based on the convention of the market-place. Really speaking, it is not a considered conviction concerning the nature of things but just an uncritical acceptance of whatever views are offered as and when occasion arises. There is also another interpretation of the word "naigama-naya", but that is not relevant in the present context.—Tr.

(*dravya*) into account, that is, which takes into account what is general (*sāmānya*), common (*anvaya*), non-distinctive (*abheda*), or unitary (*ekatva*) about things. The *nayas* called *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, and *vyavahāra* are comprised within *dravyārthika-naya*. Of these, *saṃgraha-naya*, inasmuch as it takes note of pure non-distinction, is the pure (*śuddha*) or basic (*mūla*) *dravyārthika-naya*; but even *vyavahāra-naya* and *naigama-naya*, which no doubt take note of certain distinctions, are invariably cognizant also of non-distinction of some type or other. Hence it is that these latter two *nayas* are also classed under *dravyārthika-naya*, but they are *dravyārthika-nayas* of an impure (*aśuddha*) or mixed (*miśrita*) type (and not of the pure and basic type as is *saṃgraha-naya*).

*Paryāyārthika-naya* is the name for that line of thought which takes 'modes' (*paryāya*) into account, that is, which takes into account what is particular (*viśeṣa*), exclusive (*vyāvṛtti*), or distinctive (*bheda*) about things. The remaining four *nayas*—i.e. *ṛjusūtra* etc.—are comprised within *paryāyārthika-naya*. Consideration of distinctions by a neglect of non-distinctions starts with *ṛjusūtra-naya*, and hence the Texts call this *naya* the *prakṛti* or root-basis (*mūla*) of *paryāyārthika-naya*. The remaining three *nayas*—i.e. *śabda-naya* (*sāmprata-naya*) etc.—are in a way the amplifications of this basic sort of *paryāyārthika-naya*.

Similarly, the line of thought which attaches sole utility to knowledge will be called *jñāna-naya* while that which attaches sole utility to action will be called *kriyā-naya*. In short, the total—i.e. non-absolutistic—view of the universe is unlimited (*niḥśīma*) because the *nayas* that form the basis of this view are unlimited (in number).

The multifarious views concerning one and the same entity that result from the adoption of the various stands (*apekṣā*), angles of vision (*drṣṭikoṇa*), and approaches (*manovṛtti*) constitute the foundation of *Bhaṅgavāda* or the Doctrine of Manifold Judgment. When two views whose subject-matters are diametrically opposite of each other are sought to be synthesised, and with this end in view such (simple) judgments are formed as give expression to the positive as well as negative aspects of the (two) subject-matters in question, the result is a (complex) sevenfold judgment (*saptabhaṅgī*). The Doctrine of Partial Truths (*nayavāda*) is the basis of the

Doctrine of Sevenfold Judgment (*saptabhaṅgī*), and the latter doctrine aims at an all-comprehensive (*vyāpaka*) harmoniously synthesized—i.e. non-absolutistic—understanding of things. Just as inference-for-the-sake-of-others (*parārthānumāna*)—i.e. inference expressed in the form of verbal propositions—is resorted to when one seeks to convey to others a piece of knowledge that one has come to acquire through some particular organ of knowledge, similarly, resort is taken to the simple judgments that go to constitute a complex sevenfold judgment when one seeks to convey to others how certain mutually contradictory traits are harmoniously synthesized in one single whole. Thus the Doctrine of Partial Truths (*ṇayavāda*) and the Doctrine of Manifold Judgment (*bhaṅgavāda*) are natural corollaries to the non-absolutistic standpoint.

True, in the Vedicist philosophical systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta, etc. and so also in the philosophy of Buddhism, we often come across a tendency (*dṛṣṭi*) to view the same thing from different standpoints and thus synthesize its various aspects;<sup>11</sup> but the utmost insistence (*ātyantika āgraha*) that *every* aspect of *everything* must be viewed from *every* possible standpoint, and the unflinching faith that the consummation of all thought-process lies only in a synthesis of all possible standpoints, are to be found *nowhere except in the Jaina system of philosophy. It was as a result of this* insistence (and this faith) that the Jainas gave birth to those independent (*svatantra*), systematic disciplines (*vyavasthita śāstra*) called ‘Doctrine of Non-Absolutism’ (*anekāntavāda*), ‘Doctrine of Partial Truths’ (*ṇayavāda*), and ‘Doctrine of Sevenfold Judgment’ (*saptabhaṅgī*), disciplines which became a part and parcel of their treatment of Logic (*pramāṇa-śāstra*) and on which no other school produced even a single or even a minor text. Though an advocate of *Vibhajyavāda* (Doctrine of the Avoidance of Extremes) and *Madhyamamārga* (Middle Path), the Buddhist system remained blind to the element of permanence exhibited by a real entity, and hence declared everything to be but momentary. Similarly, though actually employing the word “*anekānta*” to characterize their own standpoint,<sup>12</sup> the

11. See *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, p. 2; *Siddhānta-bindu*, p. 119 seq.; *Vedāntasāra*, p. 25; *Tarkasaṅgrahadīpikā*, p. 175; *Mahāvagga*, 6.31.

12. *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 2.1.18.

Naiyāyikas could not help harping on the thesis that atoms, souls, etc. are absolutely unchanging (*sarvathā aparīṇāmin*). Again, the Vedāntists, even while taking recourse to the various standpoints called 'empirical' (*vyāvahārika*), 'ultimate' (*pāramārthika*), etc., could not help insisting that all standpoints except the standpoint of *Brahman* (*Brahma-dṛṣṭi*) are of an inferior—or even utterly false—sort. The only reason for this anomaly seems to be that these systems did not imbibe the spirit of non-absolutism to the same extent as did the Jaina. Thus the Jaina synthesizes all the standpoints and, at the same time, grants that all these standpoints are equally competent and true so far as their respective spheres are concerned. Since the Jaina's non-absolutistic standpoint and the systematic treatises composed by him on the subject, concern themselves exclusively with the time-honoured philosophical controversies like identity versus difference, generality versus particularity, eternity versus transience, etc., it might appear, at first sight, that all this is repetitive, hackneyed, and something lacking in originality; but the spirit of accepting (nothing save) the total (*akhaṇḍa*), living (*saṁjīva*), and all-sided (*sarvāṁśa*) truth—a spirit reflected in the standpoint and the treatises in question—which is so characteristic of the Jaina and which found entrance in Logic through him, is capable of successful employment in all the fields of life, and may on that account be regarded, not unduly, as a contribution made to (Indian) Logic by the Jaina savants.

— Translated by Dr. Indukala H. Jhaveri





SECOND PART

# TEXT AND TRASLATION

*Traslation by*

SATKARI MOOKERJEE

*in collaboration with*

NATHMAL TATIA



## TEXT-TRANSLATOR S. K. MOOKERJEE'S

### NOTE

The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra occupies an important position in the philosophical literature of India in general and in the Jaina philosophical literature in particular. It is a standard text-book on Jaina logic and epistemology which every student of Jaina philosophy has got to study. It is quite natural that Hemacandra is deeply indebted to the previous writers both of Jaina and non-Jaina schools and a fastidious critic will find in Hemacandra's texts reproduction both of *ipissima verba* as well as of thoughts of previous writers, sometimes acknowledged and sometimes without explicit acknowledgement. But this need not detract from the merits of the work since Indian writers do not make a fetish of originality either of thought or of language and they make no scruple of inserting the arguments of predecessors even in their own language provided the views expressed therein accord with their philosophical position. The writings of predecessors are looked upon as public property and they are used with perfect freedom and impunity. It is absolutely plain that authors like Hemacandra with their extraordinary command of the Sanskrit idiom could with the least difficulty express these thoughts in their own language and pass them off as their own original production. But the fact that these authors with their uncommon felicity of verbal expression did not stoop to such tactics is symptomatic of a profound trait of Indian character in the past ages. It shows that they were more interested in the views which they regarded as sound exponents of truth than in their personal triumph. And as for the reproduction of the very linguistic expressions or the manner of delivery it can be accounted for by the hypothesis that they thought them to be unexceptionable forms of expression which required no improvement or variation for being more effective or impressive. We, therefore, take the

earliest opportunity of sounding a warning against the application of tests of recent criticism in the assessment of the value of an ancient philosophical work.

As regards the originality of thought which is so highly praised in Europe and in the modern universities of India, our ancient writers did not set an inordinate value on it. It was as much a matter of minor importance with them as originality of verbal expression. A serious work on philosophical topic did not hold an isolated position in India. It was rather a link in the expanding chain of philosophical speculations and what was the object of serious concern was fidelity to the fundamentals of the school, and originality was more or less suspect with the adherents of the system as rather furnishing a pitfall for error or misconception. We must not, therefore, expect either originality of expression or of thought in the sense of an abrupt departure from the fundamental tenets which give the school a stamp of distinctive individuality. What then should be the criteria of our judgement of the claim of a new book on our attention ? In other words, what are the grounds for believing a book to be worthy of our study and attention ? Again, what justification would there be for the writing of a book when it does not and cannot lay claim to establish a new conclusion or to throw new light on the problems that have exercised the human mind ? To make it more precise and to press the question home on the issue at hand, we may ask why did Hemacandra compose his work and what was his purpose if he could not establish an original thesis ?

It is an undeniable fact that Hemacandra is one of the later writers, if not the latest, of the mediaeval period on Jaina Philosophy. Hemacandra was preceded by a galaxy of talented writers on Jaina logic, the foremost of whom are Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda and Prabhācandra of the Digambara School and Siddhasena Divākara, Haribhadra, Siddharṣi and Abhayadeva of the Śvetāmbara School. He had in Vādī Devasūri, the author of the encyclopaedic work, *Syādvādaratnākara*, a living contemporary. All of them wrote on Jaina logic and epistemology and there is scarcely any topic or problem which has not been discussed thoroughly in their works. This being the situation there scarcely seems to be any necessity for writing a book on the above lines. What was then the incentive for Hemacandra to

compose this work ? It is a fact that Hemacandra had very little scope for making a new contribution. But the previous writings were extremely elaborate and not at all calculated to satisfy the needs of average students. It would take years of extraordinary labour to make a study of these works and there again is every possibility for missing the forest in the trees. It was necessary that there should be a work which would not degenerate into a compendious manual and at the same time would embody the solid results achieved by the previous thinkers. The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is not as learned a work as the *Syādvādaratnākara* or the works of Prabhācandra. But the *Syādvādaratnākara* is encyclopaedic both in size and scope and in spite of its wonderfully lucid and elegant treatment is bound to remain a sealed book to the majority of students. And as regards Prabhācandra's works, they are literally formidable for their abstruse array of arguments and their forbidding language which has neither grace nor literary charm. The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is written on the same pattern of *sūtra* and commentary as the celebrated work of Vādī Devasūri. But it compares favourably with the latter in that it avoids the unremitting elaboration of arguments and prolixity of expression which have stood in the way of its popularity. It contains all the arguments that are necessary to elucidate a problem and the range of information is not substantially inferior to that of the more ambitious works referred to above. Hemacandra could satisfy the critic in the words of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa who frankly avowed that he had no original theory of his own to offer to the readers and his purpose for writing the work was to give a rounded exposition and treatment which would satisfy the needs of the average run of students who would learn all that was essential without unnecessary exertion.

It is not to be expected that Hemacandra's work can be understood independently of the aid of a teacher. Hemacandra did not sacrifice matter for that would involve injustice both to the subject-matter and to the students. But he had to compress his information within a limit so that it would not frighten the young learners by its sheer bulk. The result has been that Hemacandra is rather terse and more suggestive than expressive. It is an ideal text book and in spite of its truncated character all the relevant problems of logic and epistemology have received an adequate treatment in it. It is

absolutely clear that a student of Jaina logic and epistemology will derive a comprehensive knowledge of the subject from the study of this work. The popularity of this book is due to its comprehensive character alone. It is no doubt a difficult book but considering the range of topics dealt with within the limits it is idle to expect that it should be easy to follow. Hemacandra's purpose was to write a standard text book and he did not condescend to cater for men of dull understanding. The *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is most probably the last work of Hemacandra and from all available manuscripts of the work which end abruptly in the same place it is evident that he could not finish it. Whatever might be the reason the book remains incomplete. It is a great loss that we do not get the entire book which was in the contemplation of the author.

We have given a faithful English translation of this standard work and as translation involves exposition and thus serves the purpose of a commentary within its natural limitations it may be reasonably expected that this English translation will help the understanding of this work and consequently of the problems of Jaina logic and epistemology among the students of our universities. It is contemplated to add critical and explanatory notes which will appear in a separate part. For the present we wish that the English translation should see the light of the day and reach the hands of scholars interested in Indian thought. We are conscious of the limitations of our work and we have fully realised in the course of our labour that however one may try to make it as perfect as possible no translation can be a substitute for the original. This particularly holds good in the case of Sanskrit works. Our authors have developed a technique and a style which are peculiar to Sanskrit works which are known for their love of economy of expression. Besides, Indian logic has got a technique of its own which has very little in common with that of European logic. Our difficulty has been particularly enhanced by the fact that Hemacandra is fond of laconic expression and is again determined to leave no expression vague or ambiguous. He has sought to clarify the meanings of technical terms both by logical definitions and etymological explanations. These etymological explanations have caused us the greatest difficulty and we are not sure that they will be intelligible to persons who are not acquainted

with Sanskrit idiom. But the translator is bound to give a faithful rendering of the text and it will be an unpardonable offence on his part if he seeks to avoid these linguistic speculations or to give his own independent exposition. We felt that it would be far easier and pleasanter to give an independent exposition in one's own language than to give a faithful translation. But whereas an independent exposition of the matter would be liable to suspicion of misrepresentation and the modern look of it might give the impression that modern thoughts have been introduced in the name of an ancient writer, a faithful translation on the other hand avoids this risk inasmuch as it presents the thoughts of the writer in his own language. It further serves to acquaint a modern mind with the ancient technique and mode of presentation. An exposition can be appreciated if it is preceded by a knowledge of the text either in the original or in the translation. It may not therefore be wrong to expect that our present venture will serve a useful purpose.

It will be sheer perversity if we do not frankly put on record our obligation and gratitude to Pandit Sukhlal Sanghavi, the editor of the original text with a critical introduction and notes in Hindi. Pt. Sukhlalji is the most learned man in the Jaina Community and one of the foremost scholars of India. His knowledge of the Buddhist, Jaina and Nyāya systems is astounding and this has enabled him to edit the masterpieces of Jaina Philosophy with perfect mastery and accuracy. The world will remain indebted to him for his contributions. He is one of the few intellectual stalwarts in the traditional field of Sanskrit scholarship that still are left to us. Had he been born in Europe he would have received the unstinted homage of the whole continent. India at present is too much obsessed with economic and political problems to appreciate scholarship. We therefore take this opportunity of expressing our admiration for this uncommon man. We have followed his text and the plan of arrangement adopted and our departure has been inconsiderable.

— Satkari Mookerjee

## ABBREVIATIONS

A	=	Answer
AN	=	<i>Āvaśyakaniryukti</i>
Aph.	=	Aphorism
AV	=	<i>Ayogavyavacchedikā</i>
DV	=	<i>Daśavaikālikasūtra</i>
DV, Nir.	=	<i>Daśavaikālikasūtraniryukti</i>
HB	=	<i>Hetubindu</i>
LT	=	<i>Laghīyastrayī</i>
MBh	=	<i>Mahābhāṣya</i>
NA	=	<i>Nyāyāvatāra</i>
NB	=	<i>Nyāyabindu</i>
NM	=	<i>Nyāyamañjarī</i>
NS	=	<i>Nyāyasūtra</i>
NSa	=	<i>Nyāyasāra</i>
O	=	Objection
PMS	=	<i>Parīkṣāmukhasūtra</i>
PP	=	<i>Pramāṇaparīkṣā</i>
PS	=	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i>
PV	=	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i>
Q	=	Question
SB	=	<i>Śābarabhāṣya</i>
SS	=	<i>Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya</i>
SiV	=	<i>Siddhiviniścaya</i>
ST	=	<i>Sanmatitarka</i>
SV	=	<i>Ślokavārttika</i>
ŚvU	=	<i>Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣat</i>
TS	=	<i>Tattvārthasūtra</i>
TSN	=	<i>Tattvasaṃgraha</i>
TSV	=	<i>Tattvārthaślokavārttika</i>
VA	=	<i>Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya</i>
		(gā = gāthā)

**Note :** Sometimes the translator uses the term 'intuition' in the sense of perception. Editor.



Kalikālasarvajña Hemacandrācāryaviracitā  
Svopajñavṛttisahitā

# PRAMĀṆAMĪMĀṢĀ

*anantadarśanajñānavīryānandamayātmane |*  
*namo'rhate kṛpākṛptadharmatīrthāya tāyine ||1||*  
*bodhibījam upaskartuṁ tattvābhyāsenā dhīmatām |*  
*jainasiddhāntasūtrāṇāṁ sveṣāṁ vṛttir vidhīyate ||2||*

HEMACANDRA'S

# PRAMĀṆAMĪMĀṢĀ

A CRITIQUE OF ORGAN OF KNOWLEDGE

A WORK ON

## JAINA LOGIC

*(Written by Ācārya Śrī Hemacandra, the omniscient  
of the Iron age, accompanied with the  
commentary written by himself)*

BOOK I

LECTURE-1

Salutation to the *Arhat* who comprises in his being infinite faith, infinite knowledge, infinite energy and infinite bliss; to the saviour who has constructed out of mercy the bridge to righteousness. (1)

In order to develop the seed of enlightenment of the intelligent ones by means of repeated exercise over ultimate truths, a commentary is being written by me on the aphorisms of Jaina doctrine composed by myself. (2)

1. *nanu yadi bhavadīyānīmāni jainasiddhāntasūtrāṇi tarhi bhavataḥ pūrvam kāni kim īyāni vā tāny āsann iti ? atyālpam idam anvayauṅkthāḥ / Pāṇini-Piṅgala-Kaṇāda-Akṣapādādibhyo 'pi purvam kāni kim īyāni vā vyākaraṇādisūtrāṇīty etad api paryanuyuṅkṣva ! anādaya evaitā vidyāḥ saṁkṣepavistaravivakṣayā navanavībhavanti tattatkarṭṛkāś cocyante / kiṁ nāśrauṣiḥ 'na kadācid anīdṛśaṁ jagat' iti ? yadi vā prekṣasva Vācakamukhyaviracitāni sakalāśāstracūdāmaṇibhūtāni Tattvārthasūtrāṇīti /*

1. (Q) Now, if these aphorisms on Jaina doctrine are your own (handiwork), then what and made by whom were the aphorisms prior to yours ? (A) You have posed only a very small fragment of the question. You might as well ask : What and made by whom were the aphorisms on Grammar and other sciences prior to Pāṇini, Piṅgala, Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda and so on ? (The truth is :) These sciences are without any definite beginning in time, but they appear to grow ever new according as they are delivered in abridged and amplified forms and as such are said to be the handiwork of this or that person. Have you not heard (the dictum) : The world has never been unlike the present ? Or, if you are so inclined, you may cast a glance at the *Tattvārthasūtras* (aphorisms on the ultimate truths), the crest jewel of all *śāstras* (rational systematic works), composed by (Umāsvāti called) the foremost *Vācaka*.

2. *yady evam Akalaṅka-Dharmakīrtiyādivat prakaraṇam eva kiṁ nārabhyate, kim anayā sūtrakāratvāhopuruṣikayā ? maivam vocaḥ; bhinnarucir hy ayaṁ janaḥ tato nāsyā svecchāpratibandhe laukikaṁ rājakīyaṁ vā śāsanam astīti yatkiñcid etat /*

2. (Q) If that be the case, why is it that you do not set out to compose a discursive treatise (*prakaraṇa*) following (the example of) Akalaṅka, Dharmakīrti and the like ? Why do you assume the role of a writer of aphorisms—a vainglorious pose (in all conscience) ? (A) Don't be censorious. The present writer follows his own taste and there is neither public (opinion) nor a royal command to put a restraint upon the free exercise of his will. So your contention is a frivolous trifle.

3. *tatra varṇasamūhātmakaiḥ padaiḥ, padasamūhātmakaiḥ sūtraiḥ, sūtrasamūhātmakaiḥ prakaraṇaiḥ, prakaraṇasamūhātmakaiḥ āhnikaiḥ, āhnikasamūhātmakaiḥ pañcabhir adhyāyaiḥ śāstram etad aracayad ācāryaḥ /*

*tasya ca prekṣāvatpravṛttyaṅgam abhidheyam abhidhātum idam ādi-sūtram –*

***atha pramāṇamīmāṃsā ||1||***

3. Now the Master (Ācārya) has composed this *śāstra* in five Books (*adhyāyas*), each consisting of a group of Lectures (*āhnikas*); of the latter again each consists of a number of discourses (*prakaraṇas*); each discourse is made of a group of aphorisms (*sūtras*); each aphorism consists of a number of inflected words (*padas*) each of which in its turn is composed of a number of syllables (*varṇas*). The following is the first aphorism of the work, which proposes to set forth the subject matter to be dealt with, (the knowledge of which is) a necessary condition of inspiring the volitional impulse of a man of intelligence (towards the study of the work).

**(Aph.) Now a critique of organs of knowledge. (1)**

4. *atha ity asya adhikārārthatvāc chāstreṇādhikriyamāṇasya prastūya-mānasya pramāṇasyābhidhānāt sakalaśāstratātparyavyākhyānena prekṣāvanto bodhitāḥ pravartitāś ca bhavanti / ānantaryārtho vā 'atha'-śabdaḥ, Śabda-Kāvya-Chandonuśāsanebhyo 'nantaram pramāṇam mīmāṃsyata ity arthaḥ / anena Śabdānuśāsanādibhir asyaikakartṛkatvam āha / adhikārārthasya ca 'atha'-śabdasyānyārthanīyamānakusumadāmajalakumbhāder darśanam iva śravaṇam maṅgalāyāpi kalpata iti / maṅgale ca sati paripanthivighnavighātāt akṣepeṇa śāstrasiddhiḥ, āyusmacchrotrkatā ca bhavati / parameṣṭhinamaskā-rādikam tu maṅgalam kṛtam api na niveśitam lāghavārthinā sūtrakāreṇeti /*

4. The word *atha* (now) means commencement and (in the present context) signifies that (the treatment of) organs of knowledge which are to be set forth in this work is being undertaken and thus by expounding the objective of the whole work serves to enlighten and induce intelligent readers (to the study of it). Or, let the word *atha* stand for the idea of sequence. The meaning would thus become : organ of knowledge is being discussed subsequent to the treatment of Grammar (*śabda*), Poetics (*kāvya*) and Prosody (*chandas*). Understood in this sense the word (*atha*) serves to signify that this (work) is the product of the same author as that of Grammar, etc. Again, the word *atha*, (though used) in the sense of commencement, by the very fact of its phonetic value being apprehended, serves to promote well-being just as the sight of a garland of flowers, or a

pitcher filled with water, though carried for some other purpose, does. The promotion of well-being eliminates obstructive demerit and thus leads to the completion of the work without a hitch and hearers are blessed with long life (as a consequence). The author of the aphorisms has performed the auspicious ceremony of salutation of the (five exalted beings called) *parameṣṭhins*, but he does not propose to incorporate it in the work for consideration of economy (of labour).

5. *prakarṣeṇa saṁśayādivyavacchedena mīyate paricchidyate vastutattvaṁ yena tat pramāṇam pramāyām sādihakatamam, tasya mīmāṃsā uddeśādirūpeṇa paryālocanam / trayī hi śāstrasya pravṛttiḥ — uddeśo lakṣaṇam parīkṣā ca / tatra nāmadheyamātrakīrtanam uddeśaḥ, yathā idam eva sūtram / uddiṣṭasyāsādhāraṇadharmavacanam lakṣaṇam / tad dvedhā sāmānyalakṣaṇam viśeṣalakṣaṇam ca / sāmānyalakṣaṇam anantaram eva sūtram / viśeṣalakṣaṇam “viśadaḥ pratyakṣam” [1.1.13] iti / vibhāgas tu viśeṣalakṣaṇasyaivāṅgam iti na pṛthag ucyate / lakṣitasya ‘idam itthaṁ bhavati netthaṁ’ iti nyāyataḥ parīkṣaṇam parīkṣā, yathā tṛtīyam sūtram /*

5. [That *pramāṇa* (organ of knowledge) is the most effective instrument of the determination (*pramā*) of the nature of reality follows from the analysis of the etymological meaning of its components. The prefix *pra* means ‘in excellent form’, i.e., to the exclusion of doubt and the like and *√mā* means ‘to determine’ and the suffix *lyuṭ* means ‘an instrument’. The meaning of the whole word] *Pramāṇa* (thus) comes to be what is the most effective instrument of the determination of reality in its true character through the preliminary exclusion of doubt, (error and indecision). *Mīmāṃsā* (critique) of it (organ of knowledge) consists in complete consideration (of the subject-matter) by the method of enumeration and so on. The procedure of a scientific work is threefold, viz., enumeration, definition and examination. Among these, enumeration consists in the specification of bare names, and this very aphorism is an example of the same. Definition is the statement of the peculiar characteristic of the thing enumerated. It is again of two kinds, viz., general and specific. The immediately following aphorism is an instance of general definition. Specific definition has its illustration in the aphorism (1.1.13) ‘That which is immediate and lucid is perceptual cognition.’ Classification is only a preliminary condition of

specific definition and as such is not separately considered. Examination consists in (the application of) the logical tests to the thing defined in order to make out that the thing defined is of the nature affirmed and not otherwise. The third aphorism serves as its example.

6. *pūjītavicāravacanaś ca 'mīmāṃsā'-śabdaḥ / tena na pramāṇa-mātrasyaiva vicāro 'trādhikṛtaḥ, kintu tadekadeśabhūtānām durnayanirākaraṇadvāreṇa pariśodhitamārgāṇām nayānām api – “pramāṇanayair adhigamaḥ” [Tattvārthasūtra 1.6] iti hi Vācakamukhyaḥ, sakalapuruṣārtheṣu mūrdhābhiṣiktasya sopāyasya sapratipakṣasya mokṣasya ca / evaṃ hi pūjito vicāro bhavati / pramāṇamātravicāras tu pratipakṣanirākaraṇaparyavasāyī vākkalahamātram syāt / tadvivakṣāyām tu “atha pramāṇaparīkṣā” [Pramāṇa-parīkṣā, p.1] ity eva kriyeta / tat sthitam etat – pramāṇanayapariśodhita-prameyamārgaṃ sopāyaṃ sapratipakṣaṃ mokṣaṃ vivakṣitum mīmāṃsā-grahaṇam akāry ācāryeṇeti ||1||*

6. The term *mīmāṃsā* (critique) means respectful disquisition. It follows from this that dissertation on organ of knowledge alone is not undertaken in this work, but it also embraces the consideration of *nayas* (partial glimpses) which are parts of *pramāṇa* with their scope determined by means of exclusion of false *nayas*. As has been observed by the foremost *Vācaka* (Umāsvāti) : Acquisition (of knowledge of ultimate truth) is by means of *pramāṇas* and *nayas*. (TS, 1.6). The work treats also of final emancipation (*mokṣa*) together with the means thereto and its opposites, it being the foremost among the ultimate values to be desired by mankind. The dissertation thus becomes entitled to respectful consideration (owing to its comprehensive scope as specified above). A dissertation on knowledge alone would on the other hand degenerate into a mere polemic since it is bound to resolve itself ultimately into the refutation of rival theories. If that (dissertation on knowledge) were the intention (of the *Sūtrakāra*) the introductory aphorism should have been worded as : Now an examination (instead of critique) of organ of knowledge. (PP, p. 1). To sum up the result : The Master has chosen the word critique (*mīmāṃsā*) in order to make it understood that (his objective is to deal with) the problem of emancipation together with its means of realisation and its opposites, after a thorough evaluation of the objects of valid knowledge by means of *pramāṇas* and *nayas*. (1).

7. *tatra pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam āha –*

***samyag arthanirṇayaḥ pramāṇam ||2||***

7. Now he propounds the general definition of organ of knowledge (pramāṇa) —

(Aph.) **An organ of knowledge is the authentic definitive cognition of an object. (2).**

8. *pramāṇam iti lakṣyanirdeśaḥ, śeṣaṁ lakṣaṇam, prasiddhānuvādena hy aprasiddhasya vidhānaṁ lakṣaṇārthaḥ / tatra yattad avivādena pramāṇam iti dharmi prasiddhaṁ tasya samyag arthanirṇayātmakatvaṁ dharmo vidhīyate / atra pramāṇatvād iti hetuḥ / na ca dharmiṇo hetutvam anupapannam; bhavati hi viśeṣe dharmiṇi tatsāmānyam hetuḥ, yathā ayaṁ dhūmaḥ sāgniḥ, dhūmatvāt, pūrvopalabdhadhūmavat / na ca dṛṣṭāntam antareṇa na gamakatvam; antarvyāptyaiva sādhyasiddheḥ, 'sātmakaṁ jīvaccharīram, prañādimattvāt' ityādivad iti darśayisyate /*

8. The expression 'organ of knowledge' specifies the thing to be defined. The rest is the definition. Definition consists in the predication of an unknown (characteristic) in respect of a known fact given as the subject. In the present context the subject is the substantive which is known as 'organ of knowledge' without dispute, and of it the characteristic of 'being authentic definitive cognition of an object' is predicated. [Definition being a case of purely negative inference presupposes a subject, a probandum and a probans]. The probans thereof is the character of 'being organ of knowledge'. There is nothing repugnant in the subject functioning as a probans. It stands to reason that where the individual is a subject, its relevant universal may serve as probans as in the following example : 'The smoke is co-existent with fire, since it has the character of being smoke just like the cases of smoke cognised before.' The absence of (a different kind of) example does not detract from its probative force as the knowledge of the probandum is secured by internal concomitance alone. It will be shown (in 1. 2. 18) that the case is quite on a par with the syllogism : The living body is possessed of a soul because it is possessed of vital functions.

9. *tatra nirṇayaḥ saṁśayānadhyaavasāyāvikalpakatvarahitaṁ jñānam / tato 'nirṇaya'-padenājñānarūpasyendriyasannikarṣādeḥ, jñānarūpasyāpi saṁśayādeḥ pramāṇatvaniṣedhaḥ /*

9. The term 'definitive cognition' in the definition stands for a species of cognition which is devoid of the characteristic of doubt, indecision and indeterminate cognition. Thus the use of the term 'definitive cognition' serves to negate the character of organ of knowledge of sense-object contact as it is not a cognition and of doubt, etc., though they are included in the category of cognition.

10. *aryate 'rthyate vā artho heyopādeyopekṣaṇīyalakṣaṇaḥ, heyasya hātum, upādeyasyopādātum, upekṣaṇīyasyopekṣitum arthyamānatvāt / na cānupādeyatvād upekṣaṇīyo heya evāntarbhavati; aheyatvād upādeya evāntarbhāvaprakṣaṇīyo upekṣaṇīya eva ca mūrdhābhīkto 'rthaḥ, yogibhis tasyaivāryamānatvāt / asmadādīnām api heyopādeyābhyām bhūyān evopekṣaṇīyo 'rthaḥ; tan nāyam upekṣitum kṣamaḥ / arthasya nirṇaya itī karmaṇi śaṣṭhī, nirṇyamānatvena vyāpyatvād arthasya / arthagrahaṇam ca svanirṇayavyavacchedārtham tasya sato 'pyalakṣaṇatvād itī vakṣyāmaḥ /*

10. The *artha* (object) is what is attained or aimed at (by a cognition) and it is placed under (three heads, viz.,) what is to be avoided, what is to be accepted and what is to be ignored, inasmuch as the avoidable is sought to be avoided, the acceptable is sought to be accepted and the ignorable is sought to be ignored. It cannot be contended that the ignorable should be subsumed under the avoidable on the ground of its being unfit for acceptance, since (by similar logic) its inclusion under the acceptable may also be a possibility being the opposite of the avoidable. On the contrary, (the category of) the ignorable constitutes a field of overwhelming importance so far as the ascetics are concerned (the number of things ignored by them being far greater than that of what they seek to attain or to avoid). And even as regards men constituted like us, the magnitude of what is to be ignored far outweighs that of what is to be accepted and what is to be avoided. So it does not deserve to be left out of consideration. In the expression 'the definitive cognition of object' (*arthasya nirṇayaḥ*), the genitive case-ending (in the original) has the force of an objective case, as the object is directly accessible (to cognition), the object being what is definitively cognised. The insertion of the term 'object' in the definition is made for the sake of the exclusion of self-cognition, as we will show that though it is a fact it is not an exclusive characteristic.

11. *samyag ity aviparītārtham avyayam samañcater vā rūpam / tac ca nirṇayasya viśeṣaṇam, tasyaiva samyaktvāsamyaktvayogena viśeṣtum ucitatvāt; arthas tu svato na samyag nāpy asamyag iti sambhava-vyabhicārayor abhāvāt na viśeṣaṇīyaḥ / tena samyag yo 'rthanirṇaya iti viśeṣaṇād viparyayanirāsaḥ / tato 'tivyāptyavyāptyasambhavadōṣavikalam idaṁ pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam* ||2||

11. The term *samyak* (authentic) means what is not contrary to fact and is an indeclinable. Or, it may be a derivative of *vañc* with *sam* as its prefix. This is an adjective to 'definitive cognition', because it is this alone which is competent to be determined as authentic or unauthentic. As regards the object, it is neither authentic nor unauthentic by itself and so does not deserve this adjective to qualify it, since it lacks the conditions of possibility and contingency. The result of the qualification of 'definitive cognition of an object' by the adjective 'authentic' is the exclusion of error. So this general definition of organ of knowledge is destitute of the faults of undesirable extension, non-inclusion and absurdity. (2)

12. *nanu arthanirṇayavat svanirṇayo 'pi vṛddhaiḥ pramāṇa-lakṣaṇatvena uktaḥ – "pramāṇam svaparābhāsi" [Nyāyavatāra 1] iti, "svārthavyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam" [Tattvārthaśloka-vārtika 1.10.77] iti ca / na cāsāv asan, 'ghaṭam aham jñāmi' ityādau kartṛkarmavat jñapter apy avabhāsamānatvāt / na ca apratyakṣopalambhasyārthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati / na ca jñānāntarāt tadupalambhasambhāvanam, tasyāpy anupalabdhasyā prastutopalambhapratyakṣikārābhāvāt / upalambhāntarasambhāvāne cānavasthā / arthopalambhāt tasyopalambhe anyonyāśrayadoṣaḥ / etena 'arthasya sambhavo nopapadyeta na cet jñānam syāt' ity arthāpattyāpi tadupalambhaḥ pratyuktaḥ; tasyā api jñāpakatvenājñātāyā jñāpakatvāyogāt / arthāpattyantarāt tajjñāne anavasthetaretarāśrayadoṣāpattes tadavasthaḥ paribhavaḥ / tasmād arthonmukhataye va svonmukhatayāpi jñānasya prati-bhāsāt svanirṇayātmakatvam apy asti / nanu anubhūter anubhāvyatve ghaṭādivad ananubhūtitvaprasaṅgaḥ; maivam vocaḥ; jñātur jñātrtvena iva anubhūter anubhūtitvenaivānubhavāt / na cānubhūter anubhāvyatvam doṣaḥ; arthāpekṣayā 'nubhūtitvāt, svāpekṣayā 'nubhāvyatvāt, svapitṛputrāpekṣayai-kasya putratvapitṛtvavat virodhābhāvāt / na ca svātmani kriyāvirodhah; anubhavasiddhe 'rthe virodhāsiddheḥ / anumānāc ca svasamvedanasiddhiḥ;*



*tathāhi – jñānaṃ prakāśamānaṃ evārthaṃ prakāśayati, prakāśakatvāt, pradīpavat / saṃvedanasya prakāśyatvāt prakāśakatvam asiddham iti cet; na; ajñānanirāsādidvāreṇa prakāśakatvopapatteḥ / na ca netrādibhir anai-kāntikatā; teṣāṃ bhāvendriyarūpāṇāṃ eva prakāśakatvāt / bhāvendriyāṇāṃ ca svasaṃvedanarūpataiveti na vyabhicāraḥ / tathā, saṃvit svaprakāśā, arthapratītitvāt, yaḥ svaprakāśo na bhavati nāsāv arthapratītiḥ yathā ghaṭaḥ / tathā, yat jñānaṃ tat ātmabodhaṃ praty anapekṣitaparavyāpāram, yathā gocarāntaragrāhijñānāt prāgbhāvi gocarāntaragrāhijñānaprabandha-syāntyajñānam, jñānaṃ ca vivādādhyāsitam rūpādijñānam iti / saṃvit svaprakāśe svāvēntarajātiyaṃ nāpekṣate, vastutvāt, ghaṭavat / saṃvit paraprakāśyā, vastutvāt, ghaṭavad iti cet; na; asyāprayojakatvāt, na khalu ghaṭasya vastutvāt paraprakāśyatā api tu buddhivyatiriktatvāt / tasmāt svanirṇayo 'pi pramāṇalakṣaṇam astv ity āśaṅkyāha –*

*svanirṇayaḥ sann apy alakṣaṇam, apramāṇe 'pi bhāvāt ||3||*

12. Now (a problem is raised), 'cognition of (its own) self has also been propounded by the old masters as an element of the definition of organ of knowledge just like the cognition of an object'. Compare (the definitions) : 'organ of knowledge is revelatory of self and other' (NA, 1), and 'organ of knowledge is the cognition which is of the nature of determination of self and an object' (TSV, 1.10.77). Nor is this (sc. cognition of self) unjustified, since in (the introspection) 'I know the jar' and the like, the fact of cognition is as much revealed (as a content) as (the elements of) subject and object. It is not possible that the cognition of an object can happen to a subject who does not intuit the act of cognition. It cannot be supposed that the cognition of such an act is effected by a second cognition, since the latter, too, being equally uncognised cannot amount to an intuition of the (first) cognition in question. If a third cognition is requisitioned for the purpose, it will lead to a *regressus ad infinitum* [the third being in the same situation with the second *qua* uncognised will require a fourth and the fourth a fifth and so on if no cognition is supposed to be self-intuited]. If the cognition of the act (of cognition) be made dependent upon the cognition of object, it will give rise to the fallacy of logical see-saw. This (exposure of absurdity) is sufficient to dismiss the attempt to account for such cognition by resort to negative implication, viz., 'the realisation of the object would

not be possible unless there were a cognition of the same.' [The idea is that a thing can be known only by means of a cognition and not otherwise. The fact of knownness therefore implies the presence of cognition. The reason for rejection of the aforementioned hypothesis lies in the fact that] implication being itself uncognised as the cause of cognition cannot possibly be a *causa cognoscendi* (which it is admitted to be and as such should be believed to be self-intuitive). If again the (first) implication (of the act of cognition) be supposed to be cognised by another implication, the result will be either an infinite regress or a logical see-saw [according as a series of implications is postulated or the first implication is made known by the second and *vice versa*] and this makes the discomfiture (of the opponent) inevitable as before. Thus (the conclusion is inescapable that) as cognition is (invariably) felt as self-regarding, it must be admitted that it is cognisant of its own self as well.

(Q) If cognition be an object of cognition, like a jar, it would become not-cognition (i.e., would cease to be a cognition).

(A) You cannot argue like that, since a cognition is felt as cognition just as the self is felt as self. Nor is there any logical absurdity in the fact that cognition is also cognisable, since it is a 'cognition' with reference to the object and 'cognisable' with reference to its own self (that is to say, a cognition cognises its own self just as it does an object). There is no incompatibility in the situation just as there is none in the same person being a son and father with reference to his own father and son. Nor can an incompatibility be alleged in the action of the self upon itself, since incompatibility cannot occur in a thing attested to be true by direct experience.

The fact of self-cognisance (of a cognition) can also be proved by inference. Cognition reveals an object only while it reveals (itself), since it is revelatory just as a light. It ought not to be urged that a cognition being an object of revelation cannot logically function as an agent of revelation. For it is quite legitimate that it should be an agent of revelation by reason of effecting expulsion of ignorance and the like. It should not, however, be contended that the rule propounded breaks down in the case of sense-organs, eye and the like (which though revelatory are not self-revealed and so the probans 'revelatory' is not necessarily concomitant with self-revela-

tion). There is no break of the rule since it is (not physical organs but) their spiritual counterparts which are revelatory and they are self-revealed as a matter of necessity. And (the truth of our contention is proved by the following syllogistic arguments) : Consciousness is self-revealing, since it is cognition of an object; whatever is not self-revealing is not cognition of an object, for example – a jar (which is not cognition of an object as it is not self-revealing). Whatever is a cognition is independent of the service of another (cognition) for its own cognition, just as the last member of a series of cognitions of an object immediately preceding the cognition of another object is. The cognition of colour, etc., which is the subject-matter of dispute is certainly a cognition (and therefore must be independent for its own cognition). An entity, for instance a jar, does not require another entity of the same genus or of a subordinate species for its revelation; a cognition is such an entity; (therefore it does not require another cognition of the same genus or of a subordinate species for its own revelation).

(Q) A cognition, being an entity, must be liable to be revealed by another just like the jar.

(A) No. The probans (viz. 'being an entity') is devoid of a logical sanction. (The fact of 'being an entity' has no bearing upon its revelation by itself or by another. It is a question of ultimate fact which can be decided by the verdict of experience). The fact that a jar is revealed by an other (sc. cognition) is not due to the fact that it is an entity but because it is other than cognition.

(The opponent now drives home the conclusion that) self-cognition, too, should be (included in) the definition of knowledge. Anticipating all this, he (*sūtrakāra*) observes (as follows) :

(Aph.) **Self-cognition, though (unavoidably) present, is not (a necessary element of) the defining characteristic, as it overlaps cases of erroneous cognition. (3)**

13. *sann api iti paroktam anumodate / ayam arthaḥ – na hi asti ity eva sarvaṁ lakṣaṇatvena vācyaṁ kintu yo dharmo vipakṣād vyāvartate / svanirṇayas tu apramāṇe 'pi saṁśayādaḥ vartate; na hi kācīt jñānamātrā sāsti yā na svasaṁviditā nāma / tato na svanirṇayo lakṣaṇam ukto 'smābhīḥ, vṛddhais tu parīkṣārtham upakṣipta ity adoṣaḥ ||3||*

13. By the expression 'though (unavoidably) present' the author approves of the opponent's contention. The meaning is this : It ought not to be urged that whatever attribute is present (in a thing) should be included in the definition (of it), simply because it is present therein, but only that attribute which is absent from its opposite. Self-cognition, however, is common to such erroneous cognition as doubt and the like. There is not a single instance of cognition which is not *ipso facto* self-cognised. Therefore, we have not propounded self-cognition as a defining characteristic. The old masters, however, introduced it with a view to its examination (by first learners). Hence no fault (in the definition). (3)

14. *nanu ca paricchinnaṃ arthaṃ paricchinatā pramāṇena piṣṭaṃ piṣṭaṃ syāt / tathā ca grhītagrāhiṇāṃ dhārāvāhijñānānām api prāmāṇya-prasaṅgaḥ / tato 'pūrvārthanirṇaya ity astu lakṣaṇam, yathāhuḥ – "svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam" [Parīkṣāmukha, 1.1] iti, "tatrāpūrvārthavijñānam" iti ca / tatrāha –*

***grahīṣyamāṇagrāhiṇa iva grhītagrāhiṇo 'pi nāprāmāṇyam ||4||***

14. (A fresh difficulty is being raised :) If knowledge is to take note of what is already known, it would be as redundant as the act of grinding what has already been ground to dust. (If this contingency is excepted to) then a series of repeating cognitions cognisant of the pre-cognised (object) should also be accorded the status of valid knowledge. So let the definition be (as follows) : Cognition of an object previously uncognised (is knowledge). And so also has it been propounded (in the following definitions) : A cognition which is of the nature of ascertainment of itself and an organ of a previously uncognised object is knowledge (PMS, 1. 1); or (simply) as 'A cognition of an object unknown before.'

To meet the difficulty, the author remarks :

(Aph.) **The cognition taking note of an object previously cognised does not lack the status of organ of knowledge exactly as the cognition which takes note of what is to be cognised in future. (4)**

15. *ayam arthaḥ – dravyāpekṣayā vā grhītagrāhitvaṃ vipratīḍidhyeta paryāyāpekṣayā vā ? tatra paryāyāpekṣayā dhārāvāhijñānānām api grhītagrāhitvaṃ na sambhavati, kṣaṇikatvāt paryāyāṇām; tatkathaṃ tannivṛttyar-*

*thaṃ viśeṣaṇam upādīyeta ? atha dravyāpekṣayā; tad apy ayuktaṃ; dravyasya nityatvād ekatvena gr̥hītagrahīṣyamāṇāvasthāyor na bhedaḥ / tatas ca kaṃ viśeṣam āśrītya grahīṣyamāṇagrāhiṇaḥ prāmāṇyam, na gr̥hītagrāhiṇaḥ ? api ca avagrahehādīnāṃ gr̥hītagrāhitve 'pi prāmāṇyam iṣyata eva / na caiṣāṃ bhinna-viṣayatvam; evaṃ hy avagr̥hītasya anīhanāt, īhītasya anīścayād asamañjasam āpadyeta / na ca paryāyāpekṣayā anadhigataviśeṣāvasāyād apūrvārthatvaṃ vācyaṃ; evaṃ hi na kasyacid gr̥hītagrāhitvam ity uktaprāyam /*

15. This is the meaning (which can be brought out as follows) : Does the repudiation of the cognition of the cognised object have reference to the substance or a mode ? If it is the mode which is referred to, then even the series of repeating cognitions cannot be alleged to take stock of the same precognised object, since the modes are momentary in duration. In that case what would be the necessity of incorporating this qualifying proviso for the exclusion of the contingency (i.e., repeated cognition of the same object) ? If, on the other hand, (the repeating cognition in question be supposed) to relate to the substance, that will also be (an) illegitimate (position). Substance being (the self-same) unity, being eternal (irrespective of the modes occurring in it), does not admit of any variation in either state *qua* cognised before or to be cognised hereafter. So (we do not see any reason for this distinctive treatment since the opponent) cannot point to a distinguishing circumstance in the cognition of an object to be known hereafter on the basis of which it should be accorded the rank of organ of knowledge which is denied to the cognition of a precognised object. [The Jaina cannot at any rate insist on the absence of previous cognition as a condition of valid knowledge. The commentator accordingly contends :] Further, determinate perception, speculation and the rest are acknowledged to be valid instances of knowledge in spite of the fact that the succeeding cognition takes stock of what has been cognised by the preceding ones. It cannot be contended that these cognitions are conversant with different objects. If that were the case, the object of determinate perception would not be the object of speculation and the object of speculation would not be the object of judgment – a contingency which would throw out of gear (the whole apparatus of epistemology). It would not again be a sound contention to maintain that the cognitions under consideration are each conversant with an uncognised

element furnished by (the ever-occurring change of) modes. This would be tantamount to admission that no cognition is possessed of a content which is cognised before.

16. *smṛteś ca pramāṇatvenābhyupagatāyā gṛhītagrāhitvam eva satattvam / yair api smṛter aprāmāṇyam iṣṭaṁ tair apy arthād anutpāda eva hetutvenokto na gṛhītagrāhitvam, yad āha –*

*“na smṛter apramāṇatvaṁ gṛhītagrāhitākṛtam /  
api tv anarthajanyatvaṁ tadaprāmāṇyakāraṇam //”*

[Nyāyamañjarī p. 23] iti ||4||

16. As regards recollection which is acknowledged to be an organ of knowledge, its essential character consists in the cognition of a precognised object. And even those, who assert recollection to be destitute of the status of an organ of knowledge, base their conclusion on the fact that it is not directly derived from an object and not on the fact that it is cognisant of the precognised object. As has been observed (by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa) : “That recollection has not the status of an organ of knowledge is not due to the fact that it is cognisant of a precognised object. The reason for its invalidity, on the contrary, is found in its origination independent of an object.” (NM, p. 23). (4)

17. *atha pramāṇalakṣaṇapratikṣiptānāṁ saṁśayānadyavasāyavi-  
paryayānāṁ lakṣaṇam āha –*

*anubhayatrobhayaakoṭisparsī pratyayaḥ saṁśayaḥ ||5||*

17. Now he proposes to set forth the definitions of doubt, indecision and error which have been rebutted by the definition of an organ of knowledge.

(Aph) **Doubt is the cognition which refers to both the extremes with reference to an object which is not possessed of such dual character. (5)**

18. *anubhayasvabhāve vastuni ubhayāntaparimarsanaśīlaṁ jñānaṁ sarvātmanā śeta ivātmā yasmin sati sa saṁśayaḥ, yathā andhakāre dūrād ūrdhvākāravastūpalambhāt sādhakabādhakapramāṇābhāve sati ‘sthāṇur vā puruṣo vā’ iti pratyayaḥ / anubhayatragrahaṇam ubhayarūpe vastuny ubhayakoṭisaṁsparśe ‘pi saṁśayatvanirākaraṇārtham, yathā ‘asti ca nāsti ca ghaṭaḥ’, ‘nityaś cānityaś cātmā’ ityādi ||5||*

*viśeṣānullekhy anadyavasāyaḥ ||6||*

18. The cognition, which fully touches both the (opposite) extremes with *reference to an object which does not (actually) possess such a dual character*, is designated as *saṁśaya* (doubt), inasmuch as the self, on its emergence, seems to retire into a perfectly supine state (owing to the loss of vigil). For example, we may cite the case of the cognition 'Whether it is a post or a human being', which arises on the apprehension, from a distance, of a tall object in darkness, when proofs either by way of confirmation or refutation are equally found to be wanting. The insertion (of the qualifying adjunct) 'with reference to an object which is not possessed of such a dual character' is needed for the preclusion of the definition of doubt from overlapping such cases of cognition as take note of both the extremes in objects which are really possessed of such a dual nature. As instances (of the latter category) we may cite such judgements as "The jar exists and does not exist" or, "The self is both permanent and impermanent." (5)

(Aph.) A cognition which fails to take note of specific characteristic is (called) indecision. (6)

19. *dūrāndhakārādivasād asādhāraṇadharmāvamarsarahitaḥ pratyayaḥ aniścayātmakatvāt anadhyavasāyaḥ, yathā 'kim etat' iti / yad apy avikalpakam prathamakṣaṇabhāvi pareṣāṁ pratyakṣapramāṇatvenābhimatam tad apy anadhyavasāya eva, viśeṣollekhasya tatrāpy abhāvāt iti ||6||*

*atasmimś tad eveti viparyayaḥ ||7||*

19. A cognition which fails to grasp the specific characteristic of its object owing to distance, darkness and the like is called 'indecision', because it falls short of certitude delivering itself in the form 'What may it be.' And as regards indeterminate intuition arising at the first moment (of sense-object contact) which is regarded by others (sc. Buddhists) as perceptual knowledge, it is nothing but a case of 'indecision' inasmuch as it also lacks consideration of specific characteristics. (6)

(Aph.) Error is a cognition which definitely takes a thing to be what it is not. (7)

20. *yat jñāne pratibhāsate tadrūparahite vastuni 'tad eva' iti pratyayo viparyāsarūpatvād viparyayaḥ, yathā dhātuvaiṣamyān madhurādiṣu dravyeṣu tiktādipratyayaḥ, timirādidoṣāt ekasminn api candre dvicandrādipratyayaḥ, nauyānāt agacchatsv api vṛkṣeṣu gacchatpratyayaḥ, āsubhramaṇāt alātādāv acakre 'pi cakrapratyaya iti / avasitam pramāṇalakṣaṇam ||7||*

20. When a cognition has for its content a characteristic, which is actually wanting in the object concerned, and still the object is definitely believed to be possessed of that (very characteristic in pursuance of the cognition), it (the cognition) is a case of error (literally a contrary cognition), being the reverse (of the objective fact). The following cases are examples of it. (1) The cognition of a substance which is sweet as bitter and such-like cases owing to the disorder of bodily humours; (2) the cognition of one self-identical moon as two owing to the affection of the eye; (3) the cognition of trees, though actually fixed and stationary, as moving owing to the (swift) movement of a boat; (4) the cognition of fire-brand and the like as circular, though they are non-circular, on account of swift rotation (by a person).

The (consideration of the) definition of organ of knowledge comes to an end here. (7)

21. *nanu astūktalakṣaṇam pramāṇam; tatprāmāṇyam tu svataḥ, parato vā niścīyeta ? na tāvat svataḥ; tadd hi svasamviditavāt jñānam ity eva grhṇīyāt, na punaḥ samyaktvalakṣaṇam prāmāṇyam, jñānatvamātraṁ tu pramāṇābhāsaśādhāraṇam / api ca svataḥ prāmāṇye sarveṣāṁ avipratipattiprasaṅgaḥ / nāpi parataḥ; param hi tadgocaragocaram vā jñānam abhyupeyeta, arthakriyānirbhāsam vā, tadgocaranāntarīyakārthadarśanam vā ? tac ca sarvaṁ svato 'anavadhṛtapramāṇyam avyavasthitam sat katham pūrvam pravartakam jñānam vyavasthāpayet ? svato vā 'sya prāmāṇye ko 'parādhah pravartakajñānasya yena tasyāpi tan na syāt ? na ca prāmāṇyam jñāyate svata ity uktam eva, paratas tv anavasthety āśaṅkyāha -*

***prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ svataḥ parato vā ||8||***

21. Let an organ of knowledge be as it is defined. But how is its validity determined—(is it determined) by itself or another ? It cannot certainly be (determined) by itself. A cognition being self-intuited should intuit itself as being cognition, pure and simple. It cannot be expected to take note of the element of authenticity which constitutes its validity. And so far as the (intuited) character of being cognition is concerned, it is shared in common with false knowledge. Moreover, if validity were self-intuited, there would occur no occasion of dispute among philosophers. Nor can it (validity) be supposed to be apprehended by some other (cognition). The other cognition in question may be considered to be either (1) one



which has for its object the self-same object of the cognition (the validity of which is under dispute), or (2) a cognition (which verifies it) by taking note of its utility, or (3) the cognition of an object which is invariably concomitant with the object of the former cognition. All these (possibilities), having, as they do, a validity not self-certified, are themselves undetermined (in logical status) and as such how can they be expected to determine the initial cognition, which leads to activity, (as valid) ? And if these latter cognitions have their validity self-certified, what is the offence of the initial cognition, that should deprive it of the right of self-validation ? It has already been definitely asserted that validity of a cognition is not known by itself and if, on the other hand, it is supposed to be determined by an outsider (sc. cognition), the result would be a *regressus ad infinitum*.

Having all these considerations in view the author propounds (the following) :

(Aph.) Determination of validity is either by itself or by some other. (8)

22. *prāmāṇyāniścayaḥ kvacit svataḥ yathā 'bhyāsadaśāpanne svakaratalādi jñāne, snānapānāvagāhanodanyopasāmadāv arthakriyānirbhāse vā pratyakṣajñāne; na hi tatra parīkṣākāṅkṣā 'sti prekṣāvatām, tathāhi – jalajñānam, tato dāhapipāsārtasya tatra pravṛttiḥ, tats tatprāptiḥ, tataḥ snānapānādīni, tato dāhodanyopasāma ity etāvataiva bhavati kṛtī pramātā; na punar dāhodanyopasāmajñānam api parīkṣate ity asya svataḥ prāmāṇyam / anumāne tu sarvasminn api sarvathā nirastasamastavyabhicārāśaṅke svata eva prāmāṇyam, avyabhicārīṅgasamutthatvāt; na liṅgākāraṁ jñānaṁ liṅgaṁ vinā, na ca liṅgaṁ liṅginaṁ vineti /*

22. Determination of validity is in some cases achieved (by a cognition) by itself. Such for instance is the habitual cognition of one's own palm (induced by a repeated course of experience); or the direct intuition of results (by verification afforded by) such (tests) as the acts of bathing, drinking, immersion and alleviation of thirst and like processes. To be sure, in these cases there is no demand for further verification felt by a rational mind. By way of corroboration (one may point the following analysis of a typical knowledge-situation): in the first place, there is cognition of water; in the second place, there occurs, on the part of a person affected with heat and

thirst, a volitional impulse towards it; in the third place, there is eventual attainment (of the object); in the fourth place, the processes of bathing, drinking and so on take place; in the last place, there occurs cessation of heat and thirst. And this alone gives final satisfaction to the (knowing) subject. And he does not feel an urge for further scrutiny of his cognition of the cessation of heat and thirst. This establishes (the conclusion) that the validity (of the cognition) is self-determined. As regards inference, however, the intuition of self-validity in all its cases is quite obvious when all the possibility of doubt of the universal concomitance (on which the inference is based) being contingent has been entirely eliminated. For (doubt is impossible when the inference) is known to follow from a probans necessarily concomitant (with the probandum). There cannot be cognition of a probans in the absence of the probans and a (real) probans cannot exist unrelated to its probandum.

23. *kvacit parataḥ prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ, yathā anabhyāsadaśāpanne pratyakṣe / nahi tat arthena grhītāvyabhicāram iti tadekaviṣayāt saṁvādakāt jñānāntarād vā, arthakriyānirbhāsād vā, nāntarīyārthadarśanād vā tasya prāmāṇyaṁ niścīyate / teṣāṁ ca svataḥ prāmāṇyaniścayāt nānavasthādi-dausthyāvakāśaḥ /*

23. On some occasions the intuition of validity is secured by means of an external datum. We may point for instance to the (primal) perceptual cognition unconfirmed by repeated experience. Since such cognition has not as yet been ascertained to stand in unfailing correspondence with the (relevant) object, its validity is determined by a subsequent confirmatory cognition of the same object, or by a cognition of its pragmatic consequences, or again by the cognition of an object invariably concomitant with it. As regards the latter, their validity is self-evident and so there is no loophole for the charge of infinite regress and the like.

24. *śābde tu pramāṇe dṛṣṭārthe 'rthāvyabhicārasya durjñānatvāt saṁvādādyadhīnaḥ parataḥ prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ; adṛṣṭārthe tu dṛṣṭārthagraho-parāga-naṣṭa-muṣṭyādipratipādakānāṁ saṁvādena prāmāṇyaṁ niścīyate saṁvādam antarenāpy āptoktatvenaiva prāmāṇyaniścaya iti sarvam upapannam /*

24. As regards verbal knowledge its unfailing correspondence with the (relevant) object is not realisable (by itself) and so its validity is (only) determined by the external evidence furnished by verification and the like in

those cases where the object (of the verbal cognition) is capable of being directly perceived. As regards (the cases of verbal propositions that refer to) an object which is not amenable to perception, their validity is determined, irrespective of verification, on the ground of their having been delivered by a trustworthy person, on the analogy of his other statements regarding such perceivable facts as the eclipse of the planets, loss of an article, secret contents of a closed fist, whose authenticity has been attested by verification. Thus all (the issues connected with the problem) find a rational explanation (in our view).

25. *“arthopalabdhihetuḥ pramāṇam” iti Naiyāyikāḥ / tatrārthopalabdḥau hetutvaṁ yadi nimittatvamātram; tadā tat sarvakāraḥ sādḥāraṇam iti karṭṛkarmāder api pramāṇatvaprasaṅgaḥ / atha karṭṛkarmādivilakṣaṇaṁ karaṇam hetuśabdena vivakṣitam; tarhi tat jñānam eva yuktaṁ nendriya-sannikarṣādi, yasmin hi saty artha upalabdho bhavati sa tat karaṇam / na ca indriyasannikarṣasāmagryādaḥ saty api jñānābhāve sa bhavati, sādḥakatamaṁ hi karaṇam avyavahitaphalaṁ ca tad iṣyate, vyavahitaphalasyāpi karaṇatve dadhibhojanāder api tathāprasāṅgaḥ / tan na jñānād anyatra pramāṇatvam, anyatropacārāt /*

25. The Naiyāyikas assert that “The organ of knowledge is that which is the condition of the cognition of an object’. Now if the condition of the cognition of an object referred to in the definition be only an ‘efficient condition’ (other than what is propounded as material and non-material cause by the Naiyāyika), then the subject, the object and so on should also be regarded as having the characteristic of ‘being an organ of valid knowledge’, since this (i.e. the character of ‘being an efficient condition’) is the common attribute of all the (conditions which are meant by the) grammatical cases. If, on the other hand, the term ‘condition’ is taken to stand for the instrumental case as distinct from the subject, the object and so forth, then it should logically be considered to be an act of cognition and not a sense-organ or its contact (with the object), etc. Now, that alone is the instrumental case of a cognition on the operation of which the object is immediately known. (It is a fact that) a cognition (of an object) does not occur even in the presence of such conditions as sense-organ and its contact, if (the conditioning) cognition is absent. The instrumental case is that which is the most efficient condition

which is found to be immediately followed by the effect. If, on the contrary, a condition which is remotely conducive to an effect is regarded as its instrument, then even (such remote condition of the alertness of sense-organs as) 'partaking of a dish of curd' would also lay claim to their recognition as such. The conclusion is thus irresistible that none but a cognition can be regarded as the organ of knowledge, except by way of metaphor.

26. "*samyaganubhavasādhanaṃ pramāṇam*" [Nyāyasāra, p. 1] *ity atrāpi sādhanagrahaṇāt kartṛkarmanirāseṇa karaṇasya pramāṇatvaṃ sidhyati, tathāpy avyavahitaphalatvena sādhakatamatvaṃ jñānasyaiva iti tad eva pramāṇatvenaiṣṭavyam /*

26. In (another definition propounded as) 'That which is the instrument of authentic cognition is the organ of knowledge' (NSa, p. 1), the insertion of the word 'instrument' is intended for the exclusion of the subject and the object, and thus ends in proving that the organ of knowledge is none other than the instrumental case. Such being the case, the most effective condition is certainly none else than cognition, inasmuch as it is immediately followed by the effect and so that (sc. cognition) alone should be accepted as the organ of knowledge.

27. "*pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam*" [Pramāṇavārtika, 2.1] *iti Saugatāḥ / tatrāpi yady avikalpakam jñānam; tadā na tad vyavahārajanana-samartham / sāmvyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya lakṣaṇam iti ca bhavantaḥ, tat katham tasya prāmāṇyam ? uttarakālabhāvino vyavahārajananasamarthād vikalpāt tasya prāmāṇye yācitakamaṇḍananyāyaḥ, varam ca vyavahārahetor vikalpasyaiva prāmāṇyam abhyupagantum; evam hi param-parāparīśramam parihṛto bhavati / vikalpasya cāprāmāṇye katham tannimitto vyavahāro 'visamvādi ? drśyavikalpyayor arthayor ekikaraṇena taimirikajñānavat samvādābhyupagame copacaritam samvāditvaṃ syāt / tasmād anupacaritam avisamvāditvaṃ pramāṇasya lakṣaṇam icchatā nirṇayaḥ pramāṇam eṣṭavyaḥ iti ||8||*

27. The Buddhists assert 'It is non-discrepant cognition that is the organ of knowledge,' (PV, 2. 1). If the cognition referred to in the definition be regarded as indeterminate, it would not be capable of generating a pragmatic consequence. If you maintain that the definition is concerned with a conventional organ of knowledge, how can you establish its validity ? The

validity (of indeterminate cognition) has been supposed to be effected by a determinate cognition bringing up the rear which is capable of generating a pragmatic consequence. But this is exposed to the consequences of the maxim of decoration with borrowed ornaments. It stands to reason that the determinate cognition capable of pragmatic consequences should rather have its claim to validity recognised. The acceptance of this course would serve to eliminate the labour of resort to a roundabout procedure. Again, if determinate cognition were invalid, how could the activity inspired by it be (as a matter of universal rule) never incongruent (with fact) ? If the congruence be accounted for on the ground of identification of the concept with the perceptum as is the case with the perceptual cognition of a person suffering from disorder of the eye, then the congruence in question would be a factitious one (resorted to by way of metaphor). So if (the Buddhist) is to intend natural, as opposed to factitious, validity as the defining characteristic of (perceptual) cognition, he must accept that it is determinate cognition that is the organ of knowledge. (8)

28. *pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam uktvā parīkṣya ca viśeṣalakṣaṇam vaktukāmo vibhāgam antareṇa tadvacanasyāśakyatvāt vibhāgapratipādanārtham āha –*

***pramāṇam dvidhā ||9||***

28. The author has set forth the general definition of the organ of knowledge and has also subjected it to scrutiny. Now, he proposes to propound the specific definition and with this end in view he sets forth the divisions of the same, in view of the fact that the formulation of such a definition is not possible without the previous demonstration of its divisions.

(Aph.) **The organ of knowledge is of two kinds. (9)**

29. *sāmānyalakṣaṇasūtre pramāṇagrahaṇam parīkṣayāntaritam iti na 'tadā' parāmṛṣṭam kintu sāksād evoktam pramāṇam iti / dvidhā dviprakāram eva, vibhāgasyāvadhāraṇaphalatvāt / tena pratyakṣam evaikam pramāṇam iti Cārvākāḥ, pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇam iti Vaiśeṣikāḥ, tāny eva iti Sāṅkhyaḥ, sahopamānena catvārīti Naiyāyikāḥ, sahārthāpattiyā pañceti Prābhākaraḥ, sahābhāvena ṣaḍ iti Bhāṭṭāḥ iti nyūnādhikapramāṇavādināḥ pratikṣiptāḥ / tatpratikṣepaś ca vakṣyate ||9||*

29. The expression 'organ of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*), though included in the general definition given in the aphorism (no. 2), has been intercepted by (the discourse involved in) scrutiny and so it is not referred to by the pronoun 'that' (in the aphorism as this might make it difficult to understand the reference). Hence the expression 'organ of knowledge' is bodily inserted herein. The expression 'of two kinds' has the meaning 'of two varieties *only*' – since classification implies exclusive determination as its logical upshot. The consequence of this (exclusive determination) is that the views of philosophers (of different schools), who assert the number of such organs to be more or less (than this), are to be rejected. The Cārvākas maintain that perception is the only organ of knowledge and none else. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers contend that there are three such organs, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony, which is also the position of the Sāṅkhyas. The Naiyāyikas accept comparison in addition to the three. The Prābhākaras again accept the four organs and add presupposition as the fifth. The followers of Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) accept negation as an additional organ and thus assert six such organs in all. The refutation of these views will be given (in a subsequent section). (9)

30. *tarhi pramāṇadvaividhyaṃ kiṃ tathā yathāhuḥ Saugatāḥ "pratyakṣam anumānam ca" [Pramāṇasamuccaya, 1.2; Nyāyabindu, 1.3] iti, utānyathā ? ity āha –*

***pratyakṣam parokṣam ca ||10||***

30. [But a doubt arises in this connection.] Is the twofold classification to be understood in terms of what has been propounded by the Buddhists, viz., as 'Perception and Inference' (PS, I. 2; NB, I. 3) or in a different way ? [In order to set at rest all doubt,] he observes :

**(Aph.) (Namely,) Perceptual and Non-perceptual. (10)**

31. *āsnute akṣṇoti vā vyāpnoti sakaladravyakṣetrakālabhāyān iti akṣo jīvaḥ, āsnute viśayam iti akṣam indriyaṃ ca / pratiḥ pratigatārthaḥ / akṣam pratigatam tadāśritam, akṣāṇi cendriyāṇi tāni pratigatam indriyāṇy āśrityojjihīte yat jñānam tat pratyakṣam vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇam / akṣebhyaḥ parato vartate iti pareṇendriyādinā cokṣyata iti parokṣam vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇam eva / cakāraḥ svaviśaye dvayos tulyabalatvakhyāpanārthaḥ / tena yad āhuḥ – "sakalapramāṇajyeṣṭhaṃ pratyakṣam" iti tad apāstam /*

*pratyakṣapūrvakatvād itarapramāṇānām tasya jyeṣṭhateti cet; na; pratyakṣasyāpi pramāṇāntarapūrvakatvopalabdheḥ, liṅgāt āptopadeśād vā vahnyādikam avagamya pravṛttasya tadviṣayapratyakṣotpatteḥ ||10||*

31. [The etymological meaning of the word *pratyakṣa* is stated here]. The word *akṣa* is derived from √*aś* or √*akṣa* meaning 'to pervade'. That which pervades (i.e. embraces) all substance, space, time and mode is entitled *akṣa* which means an individual self. The word (*akṣa*) may also denote a sense-organ, since it also pervades (that is, apprehends) an object. The prefix *prati* has the sense of *pratigata* i.e. resident or dependent. (The whole word *pratyakṣa* then means) what is resident in *akṣa*, (that is to say, in the individual). The word *akṣa* also means sense-organs. And so the cognition which arises in dependence upon the sense-organs is called *pratyakṣa*, perceptual cognition, of which the definition will be stated later. *Parokṣa*, non-perceptual cognition, is that which is placed beyond the province of senses or that which is left untouched by an other, i.e., a sense-organ and the like, and its definition will be stated below. The conjunction 'and' is intended to stress the equal competence of both in their respective provinces. This serves to refute the position of those who maintain that perceptual cognition is the seniormost of all organs of knowledge. It cannot be contended that as all other organs are preceded by preceptual cognition, the latter should be regarded as the seniormost of them. It is (not infrequently) observed that perceptual cognition also follows in the wake of other organs. Thus, for example, a person having become aware of fire and so on either by means of a characteristic mark (probans) or the instruction of a trustworthy person proceeds towards it and comes to have perceptual cognition of the same. (10)

32. *na pratyakṣād anyat pramāṇam iti Laukāyatikāḥ / tātṛāha—vyavasthānyadhīniṣedhānām siddheḥ pratyakṣetarapramāṇa-siddhiḥ ||11||*

32. According to the adherents of Cārvāka, there is no other organ of knowledge than perception. In (order to refute) this position the author says :

(Aph.) **That there are organs of knowledge other than perception is proved by the realisation of determination, knowledge of other men's thoughts, and negation. (11)**

33. *pramāṇāpramāṇavibhāgasya, parabuddheḥ, atīndriyārthanīṣedhasya ca siddhir nānumānādipramāṇam vinā/Cārvāko hi kās'cij jñānavyaktiḥ saṁvādi-*

*tvenāvyabhicāriṇīr upalabhyānyāś ca viśaṁvāditvena vyabhicāriṇīḥ, punaḥ kālāntare tādr̥ṣītarāṇāṁ jñānavyaktīnāṁ avāśyaṁ pramāṇetarate vyavasthāpayet / na ca sannihitārthabalena utpadyamānaṁ pūrvāparaparāmarśasūnyaṁ pratyakṣaṁ pūrvāparakālabhāvinīnāṁ jñānavyaktīnāṁ prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyavyavasthāpakaṁ nimittam upalakṣayitum kṣamate / na cāyaṁ svapratītigocarāṇāṁ api jñānavyaktīnāṁ paraṁ prati prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyaṁ vā vyavasthāpayitum prabhavati / tasmād yathādr̥ṣṭajñānavyaktisādharmyadvāreṇa idānīntanajñānavyaktīnāṁ prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyavyavasthāpakaṁ parapratipādakaṁ ca parokṣāntargatam anumānarūpaṁ pramāṇāntaram upāsīta /*

33. The realisation of the distinction between valid and invalid cognitions, of another man's thought, and negation of what transcends sense-intuition is not possible without the services of other organs of knowledge such as inference. The Cārvāka positivist is also (found) to determine at a subsequent time that some cognitions are valid and some are invalid on the basis of their analogy to past experiences which he has found to be non-discrepant and discrepant (with fact) respectively according as they did correspond or failed to correspond (with reality). It is not possible that a perceptual cognition, which derives its genesis from a datum present (to the senses) and which is incapable of taking cognisance of what has preceded and what will follow, should have the capacity of discerning a characteristic capable of determining the validity and invalidity of the individual cognitions occurring before and after. And even with regard to those specific cases of cognitions of which he has direct cognisance, the Cārvāka will not be in a position to determine the validity or invalidity of them to the satisfaction of an outsider. Hence it follows that he must have recourse to a different organ of knowledge which must be of the nature of inference and as such included under the head of non-perceptual cognition, which will enable him to determine the validity and invalidity of present cases of knowledge on the basis of their analogy to cases of knowledge found to be veridical and also to convince an outsider (of the truth).

34. *api ca apratipitsitam arthaṁ pratipādayan 'nāyaṁ laukiko na parīkṣakah' ity unmattavad upekṣaṇīyaḥ syāt / na ca pratyakṣeṇa paracetovṛttīnāṁ adhigamo 'sti / ceṣṭāviśeṣadarśanāt tadavagame ca parokṣasya prāmāṇyam anicchato 'py āyātam /*



34. Moreover, a person who seeks to prove a fact which is not wanted to be known (by anybody), certainly runs the risk of being ignored with contempt like a man who has gone out of his senses, since thereby he would act neither as a man of common sense nor as a philosopher. Nor again is it possible to have acquaintance with what passes in other people's mind by means of perception. If, on the other hand, (it is asserted that) such acquaintance (with another man's knowledge) is achieved by the study of his (outward) activity, the validity of non-perceptual cognition is established even against his will.

35. *paralokādinīṣedhaś ca na pratyakṣamātreṇa śakyah kartum, sannihitamātraviśayatvāt tasya / paralokādikaṁ cāpratiṣidhya nāyaṁ sukham āste pramāṇāntaraṁ ca necchatīti dīmbhahevākaḥ /*

35. The negation of (post-mortem existence in) the other world and the like is not capable of being asserted merely on the basis of perceptual intuition which has its jurisdiction only over what is present to the senses. The behaviour of the Cārvāka, who finds no peace without the denial of (life in) the other world and so on, but still refuses to admit the validity of other organs of knowledge, reminds one of the conduct of a (perverse) child.

36. *kiñca, pratyakṣasyāpy arthāvyabhicārād eva prāmāṇyaṁ tac cārtha-pratibaddhaliṅgaśabdadvārā samunmajjataḥ parokṣasyāpy arthāvyabhicārād eva kiṁ neṣyate ? vyabhicāriṇo 'pi parokṣasya dārśanād aprāmāṇyam iti cet; pratyakṣasyāpi timirādidoṣād apramāṇasya dārśanāt sarvatrāprāmāṇya-prasaṅgaḥ / pratyakṣābhāsaṁ tad iti cet; itaratrāpi tulyam etad anyatra pakṣapātāt / Dharmakīrtir apy etad āha –*

*“pramāṇetarasāmānyasthiter anyadhiyo gateḥ /  
pramāṇāntarasadbhāvaḥ pratiṣedhāc ca kasyacit //1//  
arthasyāsambhave 'bhāvāt pratyakṣe 'pi pramāṇatā /  
pratibaddhasvabhāvasya tddhetutve samaṁ dvayam” //2// iti*

36. Furthermore, the validity of even perceptual cognition can be established only on the evidence of its unfailing correspondence with fact. (It passes one's understanding) why should the Cārvāka not acknowledge the validity of non-perceptual cognitions, arising either from verbal testimony or from a logical ground known to be necessarily concomitant with a fact, on the identical ground of unfailing correspondence with fact. The Cārvāka may

contend that the invalidity of non-perceptual cognition is proved by the fact that there are also cases of such cognitions which are found to lack unfailing correspondence with fact. But this would make the denial of validity of every cognition inevitable, since even perceptual cognitions, arising from diseased vision and suchlike defects, are also found to be invalid [and thus should throw doubt over perceptual cognition as a class, which is the only case of valid knowledge according to the opponent. The result will be unrelieved scepticism, since neither perceptual cognition nor non-perceptual cognition, which is unreservedly declared by him to be invalid, will have indubious claim to validity]. The Cārvāka might retort : Well, it is a case of simulated perception (and so its invalidity does not affect veridical intuitions). But the case is exactly the same with the other (sc. non-perceptual cognition), but for your biased obsession. Dharmakīrti also makes similar observation :

“The existence of another organ of knowledge (viz. inference) is established by means of the community of nature (which a subsequent cognition exhibits) with a (past) cognition of attested validity or its opposite (sc. an invalid cognition); (secondly,) by the cognisance of other people’s thoughts; and (thirdly,) by the denial of a particular position. The validity of a perceptual cognition also is due to (its necessary concomitance with an objective fact, i.e.,) its impossibility without the existence of a (corresponding) object and the two cases (perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions) are exactly similar, if necessary concomitance be the ground of this (validity), (which is also present in the case of non-perceptual cognition to assure its validity).”(1-2)

37. *yathoktasāṅkhyāyoge 'pi ca parokṣārthaviṣayam anumānam eva Saugatair upagamyate; tad ayuktaṃ; śabdādīnām api pramāṇatvāt teṣāṃ ca anumāne 'ntarbhāvayitum aśakyatvāt / ekena tu sarvasaṅgrāhiṇā pramāṇena pramāṇāntarasaṅgrāhe nāyam doṣaḥ / tatra yathā indriyajamānasātmasaṃvedanayogijñānānām pratyakṣeṇa saṅgrahāḥ tathā smṛtipratyabhijñānohānumānāgamānām parokṣeṇa saṅgraho lakṣaṇasyāviśeṣāt / smṛtyādīnām ca viśeṣalakṣaṇāni svasthāna eva vakṣyante / evaṃ parokṣasyopamānasya pratyabhijñāne, arthāpatter anumāne 'ntarbhāvo 'bhidhāsyate ||11||*

37. Though the number (of organs of knowledge) as set forth is endorsed by them, yet the Buddhists insist on regarding all non-perceptual cognitions as necessarily partaking of the nature of inference. But this is an

untenable position. Verbal testimony and others are also organs of knowledge and it is impossible to include them under the head of inference. Of course, there is no logical aberration in the fact that one all-comprehensive organ of knowledge should include other such organs (as particular instances). For instance, the sense-intuition, mental intuition (introspection), self-intuition and the transcendent intuition of the *yogins* are all subsumed (as species) under (the genus) perceptual intuition; and recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony are included under non-perceptual cognition, since the definition applies to all of them without exception. As for the specific definitions of recollection and so on, they will be stated in their proper places. As regards comparison which is regarded as a case of non-perceptual cognition (by the *Nyāya* and the *Mīmāṃsā* schools), it will be shown to be included under recognition, and as for presupposition (believed to be an independent organ by the *Mīmāṃsā* school), that also will be shown to be subsumed under inference. (11)

38. *yat tu pramāṇam eva na bhavati na tenāntarbhūtena bahirbhūtena vā kiñcit prayojanam, yathā abhāvaḥ / katham asyāpramāṇyam ? nirviṣayatvāt iti brūmaḥ / tad eva katham ? iti cet –*

***bhāvābhāvātmakatvād vastuno nirviṣayo 'bhāvaḥ ||12||***

38. As regards (the disputed cases, for example,) negation, which is not regarded as an organ of knowledge at all, it will serve no purpose to show that it is included in or excluded from (one of the accredited organs). Why should it be denied the status of an organ of knowledge ? The answer is that it has no corresponding object. Why should it not have one ? (To this query the author gives the reply) :

(Aph.) Since reality partakes of the nature of being and non-being (both), negation cannot have an object of its own. (12)

39. *na hi bhāvaikarūpaṁ vastv asti viśvasya vaiśvarūpyaprasaṅgāt; nāpy abhāvaikarūpaṁ nīrūpatvaprasaṅgāt; kintu svarūpeṇa sattvāt pararūpeṇa cāsattvāt bhāvābhāvarūpaṁ vastu tathāiva pramāṇānām pravṛtteḥ / tathāhi – pratyakṣaṁ tāvat bhūtaḥ evedaṁ ghaṭādir na bhavatīty anwayavatireka-dvāreṇa vastu paricchindat tadadhikaṁ viṣayam abhāvaikarūpaṁ nirācaṣṭa iti kaṁ viṣayam āsṛityābhāvalakṣaṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ syāt ? evaṁ parokṣaṇy api pramāṇāni bhāvābhāvarūpavastugrahaṇapravaṇāny eva, anyathā 'saṅkīrṇa-*

*svasvaviṣayagrahaṇāsiddheḥ, yad āha –*

*“ayam eveti yo hy eṣa bhāve bhavati nirṇayaḥ /  
naiṣa vastvantarābhāvasaṃvittyanugamād rte //” iti*

*[Ślokavārtika, Abhāva., śl. 15]*

39. It is absolutely unthinkable that the nature of reality should be exhausted exclusively by the element of being, as in that case all things would have all the possible characteristics (and thus there would be no real diversity). Nor is it possible that reality should consist in the element of non-being alone, since that will result in denuding it of all character. In point of fact, a reality is made up of both being and non-being (as its constitutive elements), since it has being in respect of its own nature and non-being in respect of the nature of another and this is the invariable finding of all organs. Thus, for instance, it is manifest that a perceptual cognition determines by way of affirmation and negation its object in the following terms : It is certainly a surface of the ground and not a jar and the like, and this contradicts an additional object of the nature of pure non-being. What does then remain of the objective real with reference to which negation as an organ could function ? Likewise, non-perceptual organs also invariably tend to take note of such a dual reality partaking of the nature of both being and non-being. (The denial of this), on the contrary, would make the apprehension of mutually exclusive facts as their relevant objects impossible. Our position is endorsed by the following observation :

“That a positive real is determined as ‘this is exclusively of such and such a character’ is not capable of being understood without the concomitant cognisance of the negation of what is different from it.” (SV, *Abhāva*, śl. 15)

40. *atha bhavatu bhāvābhāvarūpatā vastunaḥ, kiṃ naś chinnam ?,  
vayam api hi tathaiva pratyapīpadāma / kevalam bhāvāmśa indriyasanni-  
kṣṭatvāt partyakṣapramāṇagocaraḥ abhāvāmśas tu na tathety abhāva-  
pramāṇagocara iti katham aviṣayatvaṃ syāt ?, taduktam –*

*“na tāvad indriyenaīṣā nāstīty utpādyate matiḥ /  
bhāvāmśenaiva saṃyogo योग्यत्वād indriyasya hi //1//  
grhītvā vastusadbhāvaṃ smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam /  
mānaśaṃ nāstitājñānaṃ jāyate ’kṣānapekṣayā //2//” iti*

*[Ślokavārtika, Abhāva., śl. 18, 27]*

40. (The Mīmāṃsist might contend) : Well, let reality be accepted as partaking of the nature of both being and non-being, but that does not affect our position in the least, as we, too, have proved this very truth. (Our contention is that) only the positive element of being with which a sense-organ comes in contact is the province of perceptual cognitions and as regards the element of non-being, it cannot be so (i.e., the object of sense-contact and sense-intuition). The latter (i.e., non-being) is consequently held to be cognised by a separate organ, viz., negation. How can then it be maintained that (negation as an organ) would have no object ? Thus has it been observed (by Kumāṛila) :

“The judgment ‘a thing does not exist’ cannot be supposed to be generated by a sense-organ, since a sense-organ can have connection with the element of being alone for which it is competent. The negative judgment is due to a purely mental activity which comes into being after the presence of a real (sc. the locus of negation) is cognised and the relevant negatum is recalled independently of all the aid of sense-organ.” (SV, *Abhāva*, śl. 18, 27)

41. *nanu bhāvāṁśād abhāvāṁśasyābhede katham pratyakṣeṇāgrahaṇam ? bhede vā ghaṭādyabhāvarahitam bhūtalam pratyakṣeṇa grhyata iti ghaṭādayo grhyanta iti prāptam, tadabhāvāgrahaṇasya tadbhāvāgrahaṇa-nāntarīyakatvāt / tathā cābhāvapramāṇam api paścāt pravṛttam na tāt sārāyitum paṭiṣṭham syāt, anyāthā ’saṅkīrṇasya saṅkīrṇatāgrahaṇāt pratyakṣam bhrāntam syāt /*

41. [The contention of the Mīmāṃsist is not free from objections.] If the element of non-being be not different from the element of being, why should it not be liable to apprehension by perceptual cognition (like the latter). If, again, it be different, still it has to be admitted that (the negata, viz.,) jar and the like are perceived when (a locus, e.g.,) a plot of land is perceived as bereft of the non-being of jar and the like. It is a universal rule that the non-apprehension of the non-being of anything is necessarily concomitant with the apprehension of its being. Such being the case, the organ of negation (if possible at all) would necessarily follow in its wake and thus would not be able to dislodge (the cognition of) the negata. If the situation were otherwise, a perceptual cognition would invariably be erroneous, if it cognised a non-exclusive object as exclusive.

42. *api cāyaṃ pramāṇapañcakanivṛttirūpatvāt tucchaḥ / tata evā-jñānarūpaḥ katham pramāṇam bhavet ? / tasmād abhāvāṃśāt kathañcid abhinnaṃ bhāvāṃśaṃ paricchindatā pratyakṣādinā pramāṇena abhāvāṃśo grhīta eveti tadatiriktaviśayābhāvāt nirviśayo 'bhāvaḥ / tathā ca na pramāṇam iti sthitam ||12||*

42. Furthermore, this (so-called organ) is nothing but a fiction being of the nature of the negation of five positive organs. And thus it is the reverse of cognition and as such how can it function as organ (which is invariably of the nature of cognition) ? So it must be admitted that such organs as perceptual cognition and the rest invariably take note of non-being while they are employed in apprehending the element of being which is somehow identical with the element of non-being. It follows, therefore, that negation as an organ has no object, since there is no (such) thing (as pure non-being) separate and distinct from the (double nature of the) real. The conclusion, therefore, stands that it cannot be an (additional organ.) (12)

43. *vibhāgaṃ uktvā viśeṣalakṣaṇam āha —*

***viśadaḥ pratyakṣam ||13||***

43. Having set forth the classification (of the organ of knowledge), the author now proposes to formulate the specific definition (of each class) :

(Aph.) (Of these viz., perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions) that which is immediate-cum-lucid is perceptual cognition. (13)

44. *sāmānyalakṣaṇānūvādena viśeṣalakṣaṇavidhānāt 'samyag arthanir-ṇayaḥ' iti pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam anūdya 'viśadaḥ' iti viśeṣalakṣaṇaṃ prasiddhasya pratyakṣasya vidhīyate / tathā ca pratyakṣaṃ dharmi / viśada-samyagarthanirṇayātmakam iti sādhyo dharmāḥ / pratyakṣatvād iti hetuḥ / yad viśadasamyagarthanirṇayātmakam na bhavati na tat pratyakṣam, yathā parokṣam iti vyatirekī / dharmiṇo hetutve 'anvayadoṣa iti cet; na; viśeṣe dharmiṇi dharmisāmānyasya hetutvāt / tasya ca viśeṣaṇiṣṭhatvena viśeṣeṣv anvayasambhavāt / sapakṣe vṛttim antareṇāpi ca vipakṣavyāvṛttibalād gamakatvam ity uktam eva ||13||*

44. Since the predication of a specific characteristic (sic. specific definition) is made by adding (a differentia) to the general characteristic (of which it is an instance), the differentia 'immediate-cum-lucid' is predicated of

what is known to be perceptual cognition, in addition to the general characteristic of an organ of knowledge, viz., 'authentic definitive cognition of an object'. [As definition is a species of inference, it consists of three terms – the subject or the minor term, the probandum or the major term and the probans or the middle term; of the terms of the present definition], '(this) perceptual cognition' is the subject, 'of the nature of immediate authentic definitive cognition of an object' is the probandum and 'quality of being a perceptual cognition' is the probans. (The cogency of the inference is based on negative concomitance, viz.,) Whatever is not of the nature of an immediate authentic definitive cognition of an object is not a case of perceptual cognition, as for instance, non-perceptual cognition, by way of opposition. It has been urged that the impossibility of logical connection would be the defect if the subject itself were made the probans. But the contingency does not arise, since the subject is a specific individual and the probans is the universal character of the subject (typifying a class). And there is no logical incompatibility in the connection of such an attribute with the subject, since universal is always exemplified in the particular individuals. And it has already been established that a probans proves (the probandum) by virtue of its necessary absence in heterologous cases, in spite of the fact that it is not existent in the homologous instances (since such non-existence does not detract from its probative force).

45. *atha kim idaṁ vaiśadyaṁ nāma ? / yadi svaviśayagrahaṇam; tat parokṣe 'py akṣūṇam / atha sphuṭatvam; tad api svasaṁviditatvāt sarvavijñānānāṁ samam ity āśaṅkyāha –*

***pramāṇāntarānapekṣedantayā pratibhāso vā vaiśadyam ||14||***

45. Now, what does the attribute 'immediate-cum-lucid' consist in ? If it be supposed to consist in the apprehension of its relevant object, that would make it applicable without offence to non-perceptual cognition (which) also (possesses this characteristic). Again, if it be construed as being 'transparent', that also (would not be a differentia, since it) is a common characteristic of all cognitions, as they are self-intuited. Having kept this objection in view, he defines it as follows :

(Aph.) 'Immediacy-cum-lucidity' consists in either its independence of the services of another organ, or in the apprehension of its content as 'this'. (14)

46. *prastutāt pramāṇād yad anyat pramāṇam śabdaliṅgādiññānam tat pramāṇāntaram tannirapekṣatā 'vaiśadyam' / na hi śabdānumānādivat pratyakṣam svotpattau śadbaliṅgādiññānam pramāṇāntaram apekṣate ity ekam vaiśadyalakṣaṇam / lakṣaṇāntaram api 'idantayā pratibhāso vā' iti, idantayā viśeṣaṇiṣṭhatayā yāḥ pratibhāsaḥ samyagarthanirṇayasya so 'pi 'vaiśadyam' / 'vā'śabdo lakṣaṇāntaratvasūcanārthaḥ ||14||*

46. An organ such as 'the cognition of a linguistic symbol', or, 'of the (concomitant) probans' other than the organ under consideration is here referred to as 'another organ'. 'Immediacy-cum-lucidity' consists in its independence of such an organ. To be sure, a perceptual cognition does not stand in need of another organ such as the cognition of the linguistic symbol or of a probans in order to be brought into being, unlike the cases of verbal or inferential knowledge. This is one definition of 'immediacy-cum-lucidity'. The other definition is 'the apprehension of its content as *this*'. The apprehension by an authentic cognition of its content as *this*, that is to say, as referring to a particular existent, also gives a clue to 'immediacy-cum-lucidity'. The conjunction 'either-or' (vā) is inserted to indicate the possibility of another definition. (14)

47. *atha mukhyasāmvyavahārikabhedenā dvaividhyam pratyakṣasya hṛdi nidhāya mukhyasya lakṣaṇam āha -*

*tat sarvathāvaraṇavilaye cetanasya svarūpāvirbhāvo mukhyam kevalam ||15||*

47. Now having in contemplation the twofold division of perceptual cognition as transcendent and empirical (pragmatic) the author proposes the definition of transcendent (perception) :

(Aph.) The (full) manifestation of the innate nature of a conscious self, emerging on the total cessation of all obstructive veils, is called 'that' (intuition) transcendent and pure. (15)

48. *'tat' iti pratyakṣaparāmarśārtham, anyathā anantaram eva vaiśadyam abhisambadhyeta / dīrghakālanirantarāsatkāṛāsevitratnatrayaparakarṣaparyante ekatvavitarkāvicāradhyānabalena niḥśeṣatayā jñānāvaraṇā-dīnām ghātikarmaṇām prakṣaye satī cetanāsvabhāvasyātmanah prakāśasvabhāvasya iti yāvat, svarūpasya prakāśasvabhāvasya sata evāvaraṇāpagamena 'āvirbhāvaḥ' āvirbhūtaṁ svarūpaṁ mukham iva śarīrasya sarvajñānānām*



*pradhānam 'mukhyam' pratyakṣam / tac cendriyādisāhāyakavirahāt sakalavi-  
ṣayatvād asādhāraṇatvāc ca 'kevalam' ity āgame prasiddham /*

48. The pronoun 'that' is advisedly employed to indicate that it refers to 'perceptual cognition'. Had it not been put in it, the word 'immediacy-cum-lucidity', which precedes it immediately, would have been syntactically construed with it. The self has consciousness as its essence and stuff, and is consequently luminous by its very nature. The manifestation of the luminous nature of the self, which is nothing but the self as manifested, is styled *mukhya*, that is transcendent, intuition. It is supreme of all cognitions, just as the face is the supreme part of the body (and so is called *mukhya*). It is characterized as 'pure' (*kevala*) in scriptures, since it is independent of the services of (an external instrument such as) sense-organs, is cognisant of all objects, and thus stands apart (in a category of its own), having nothing in common (with other modes of cognition). [The manifestation of the luminous being of the self occurs] on the disappearance of the obscuring veils which occurs on the total purging of all the destructive *karmas* that serve to obfuscate the innate knowledge, (belief and conduct). (This purgation, again,) is occasioned by the acquisition of the perfection of what is called 'triple jewel' by a course of prolonged, unremitting and reverent practice, and by the power of unflagging meditation on an aspect (of an entity conscious or unconscious), as laid down in the scripture, without change of object.

49. *prakāśasvabhāvatā katham ātmanah siddheti cet; ete brūmah –  
ātmā prakāśasvabhāvaḥ, asandigdhasvabhāvatvāt, yaḥ prakāśasvabhāvo na  
bhavati nāsāv asandigdhasvabhāvo yathā ghaṭaḥ, na ca tathātmā, na khalu  
kaścid aham asmi na veti sandigdhe iti nāsiddho hetuḥ / tathā, ātmā prakāśa-  
svabhāvaḥ, boddhṛtvāt, yaḥ prakāśasvabhāvo na bhavati nāsau boddhā yathā  
ghaṭaḥ, na ca na boddhā "tmeti / tathā, yo yasyāḥ kriyāyāḥ kartā na sa  
tadviśayo yathā gatikriyāyāḥ kartā Caitro na tadviśayaḥ, jñaptikriyāyāḥ kartā  
cātmeti /*

49. (Q) But how do you establish the (self-)luminous nature of the self ? (A) (By the following arguments,) we reply : Firstly, "The self is of a self-luminous nature, because its being is not susceptible to doubt. That which is not of self-luminous nature cannot but be susceptible to doubt, e.g.,

a jar. The self is not like (a jar) by any means. Nobody is known to doubt 'Do I exist or not' and so the probans ('not susceptible to doubt') is not non-existent (in the subject)". Secondly, "The self is of luminous nature, because it is the knower. Whatever is not of luminous nature, such as a jar for example, is not a knower. It is not a fact that the self is not knower." Thirdly, "That which is the author of an act cannot be the object of such an act. (We may point by way of illustration to a typical instance), Caitra is the author of the act of going but is never the object of the latter. The self is the author of the act of knowing (and hence cannot be its object)".

50. *atha prakāśasvabhāvatva ātmanaḥ katham āvaraṇam ?, āvaraṇe vā satatāvaraṇaprasaṅgaḥ; naivam; prakāśasvabhāvasyāpi candrārṅkāder iva rajonīhārābhrapaṭalādibhir iva jñānāvaraṇīyādikarmabhir āvaraṇasya sambhavāt, candrārṅkāder iva ca prabalapavamānaprāyair dhyānabhāvanādibhir vilasyeti /*

50. (Q) If the self be luminous by nature, why should it be subject to obscuration ? And if obscuration be possible, it must be subject to obscuration for all time. (A) The objection is groundless. It is observed that though luminous in nature, the moon, the sun and such other bodies are liable to be obscured by a veil of dust, by fog, by a patch of cloud and so on. The case of the self is exactly parallel to these, when it is found to be obscured by knowledge-obscuring *karmas* and the like. And the removal of the obscuration of the self is effected by (the practice of prescribed courses of) meditation and contemplation exactly as the obscuration of the sun, the moon and such other bodies is removed by a blast of wind.

51. *nanu sādītve syād āvaraṇasyopāyato vilayaḥ; naivam; anāder api suvarṇamalasya kṣāramṛtputapākādinā vilayopalambhāt, tadvad evānāder api jñānāvaraṇīyādikarmaṇaḥ pratipakṣabhūtaratnatrayābhyāsenā vilayopapatteḥ /*

51. (Q) There is nothing strange about the fact that an obscuration having a definite origin is liable to be removed by some means: (But the obscuration of the self is not a historical event, being coeval with it). (A) No, (the fact of origin is entirely irrelevant). The dross found in an ore of gold is as old as the gold, but still it is found to be removed by the action of an alkaline substance, or by calcination in a sealed vessel. Exactly like this

case, the removal of knowledge-obscuring *karmas*, though without beginning, can become a possibility by the repeated practice of the triple jewel, which is its antidote.

52. *na cāmūrtasyātmanah katham āvaraṇam iti vācyam; amūrtāyā api cetanāsakter madirāmadanakodravādibhir āvaraṇadarśanāt /*

52. Nor is it a sound objection to say ‘How can there be obscuration of an amorphous being like the self?’ The power of consciousness, although immaterial and amorphous, is not infrequently found to be obscured by the consumption of spirituous liquor, intoxicating drugs and (fermented) wild grains. (So the objection has no basis).

53. *athāvaraṇīyatatpratipakṣābhyām ātmā vikriyeta na vā ? / kim cātaḥ ? /*

*“varṣātapābhyām kiṁ vyomnaś carmany asti tayoh phalam /  
carmopamaś cet so ‘anityaḥ khatulyaś ced asatphalaḥ //”*

*iti cet; na; asya dūṣaṇasya kūṭasthanityatāpakṣa eva sambhavāt, pariṇāmi-  
nityaś cātmeti tasya pūrvāparaparyāyotpādavināśasahitānuvṛttirūpatvāt,  
ekāntanityakṣaṇikapakṣayoḥ sarvathā arthakriyāvirahāt, yad āha –*

*arthakriyā na yujyeta nityakṣaṇikapakṣayoḥ /*

*kramākramābhyām bhāvānām sā lakṣaṇatayā matā //*

*[Laghīyastraya, 2.1] iti ||15||*

53. (Q) But does the self undergo change by (the action of) the obscuring *karmas* and their opposites? (A) What would you deduce from this? (Q) “Well, both rainfall and sunshine leave the sky (pure space) unaffected; they produce their effects on a piece of leather. If (the self) be like leather, it would be impermanent (and perishable); if, on the other hand, it resembled space, it would be bereft of any change”. (A) Not so. The alleged absurdity would be inevitable if the eternity (of the self) were held to be only static (impervious to change). In the Jaina point of view the self is a variable constant and is of the nature of a continuum running through the succession of modes in which the cessation of the predecessor is synchronous with the origination of the successor. On the contrary, the exercise of causal efficiency would be impossible in every way, if things were absolutely permanent, or absolutely momentary (which are the respective positions of the Vedāntist and the Buddhist Fluxist). So it has been observed (by Akalaṅka) :

“The exercise of causal efficiency would be unaccountable in the theory of (changeless) eternity and of (discontinuous) flux, since it (i.e., exercise of causal efficiency) can be a characteristic of entities which admit of sequence and non-sequence” (LT. 2. 1). (15)

54. *nanu pramāṇādhīnā prameyavyavasthā / na ca mukhyapratyakṣasya tadvato vā siddhau kiñcit pramāṇam asti / pratyakṣam hi rūpādiviṣaya-viniyamitavyāpāraṁ nātīndriye 'rthe pravartitum utsahate / nāpy anumānam, pratyakṣadr̥ṣṭālīṅgālīṅgisambandhabalopajananadharmakatvāt tasya / āgamas tū yady atīndriyajñānapūrvakas tatsādhakāḥ; tadetaretarāśrayaḥ -*

“narte tad āgamāt sidhyen na ca tenāgamo vinā /” iti

[Ślokavārtika, Sū. 2., Śl. 142]

*apauruṣeyas tu tatsādhako nāsty eva / yo 'pi -*

“apāñipādo hy amano grahītā paśyaty acakṣuḥ sa śṛṇoty akarṇaḥ /

*sa vetti viśvaṁ na hi tasya vettā tam āhur agryaṁ puruṣaṁ mahāntam /”*

[Śvetāśvatara, 3.9]

*ityādiḥ kaścīd arthavādarupo 'sti nāsau pramāṇam vidhāv eva prāmāṇyopagamāt / pramāṇāntarāñāṁ cātrānavasara evety āśaṅkyāha -*

***prajñātīśayaviśrāntyādisiddhes tatsiddhiḥ ||16||***

54. (Q) The determination of the reality of objects depends on the organs of knowledge. There is not an iota of proof in favour of transcendent intuition, or, of a person possessed of it. The function of perceptual cognition is entirely restricted to such (sensible) objects as colour and the like, and hence it (i.e., perception) cannot have the capacity of extending to a super-sensible fact. Inference, too, cannot be of any help, since it unfailingly derives its genesis from the concomitance of the probans and the probandum as observed by perceptual cognition. As regards the proof afforded by authoritative texts, if they are believed to be the outcome of transcendent intuition, the argument would be a case of logical see-saw, since “It (viz., transcendent intuition) cannot be established without appeal to scriptural authority and scriptural authority would not be valid without the former (viz., transcendent intuition)” (SV, v. 142 *ad sutra* 2). As for impersonal scripture (sic. the Vedas), there is not (a single sentence in it) which would prove the position. There are of course such statements as the following :

"Though without hands and feet He moves fast and catches hold of things; He sees, though without eyes, and hears, though without ears. He knows the whole universe and there is none to know Him. Him (the Seers) declare to be the supreme Male – the Great One" (ŚvU, 3.19).

But the statement is of a parasitical nature (meant to exhort the sacrificer) and hence has no validity of its own, which is acknowledged to belong exclusively to injunctive statements. The other organs of knowledge again have absolutely no jurisdiction over the present (issue). With this objection in view, the author says :

(Aph.) The proof of it follows from the proof of the necessity of the final consummation of the progressive development of knowledge and other grounds. (16)

55. *prajñāyā atīśayaḥ tārātamyam kvacid viśrāntam, atīśayatvāt, parimāṇātīśayavad ity anumānena niratīśayaprajñāsiddhyā tasya kevalajñānasya siddhiḥ, tatsiddhirūpatvāt kevalajñānasiddheḥ / 'adī'-grahaṇāt sūkṣmāntaritatadūrārthāḥ kasyacit pratyakṣāḥ prameyatvāt ghaṭavad ity ato, jyotirjñānāvisamvādānyāthānupapattēś ca tatsiddhiḥ, yad āha –*

*"dhīr atyantaparokṣe 'rthe na cet puṁsām kutaḥ punaḥ / jyotirjñānāvisamvādaḥ śrutāc cet sādhanāntaram //"*

[Siddhivinīścaya, p. 413A]

55. The progressive development, that is to say, the realisation of degrees of excellence, of knowledge must reach its consummation somewhere, since this is the way of all progression, as seen in the progression of magnitude. This argument proves knowledge *ne puls ultra*, which furnishes the proof of pure transcendent knowledge, since the proof of transcendent knowledge is the same as that of the former. The mention of 'other grounds' (in the aphorism) stands for the following proofs. The objects, which are subtle (infra-, and supra-sensible), intercepted by barriers and remote, are perceived by some person, since they are knowable, as is the case with a jar. This is one further proof. And there is another more proof of this, found in the actual verification of astronomical knowledge which is unaccountable on any other hypothesis. Thus has it been observed :

"If the knowledge of absolutely imperceptible things be not possible for a person, how can the verification of astronomical knowledge be

accounted for ? If you account for it by appeal to scripture, that furnishes another proof ” (SiV. p. 413A).

56. *api ca “nodanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṛṣṭaṃ evaṇjātīyakam artham avagamayati nānyat kiñca-nendriyam” [Śābara Bhāṣya, 1.1.2] iti vadatā bhūtādyarthaparijñānaṃ kasyacit puniso ’bhimatam eva, anyathā kasmai Vedas trikālaviṣayam artham nivedayet ? sa hi nivedayaṃs trikālaviṣayatattvajñam evādhikāriṇam upādatte, tad āha –*

*“trikālaviṣayam tattvaṃ kasmai Vedo nivedayet /  
akṣayyāvaraṇaikāntāt na ced veda tathā naraḥ //”*

*[Siddhiviniścaya, p. 414 A]*

*iti trikālaviṣayavastunivedanānyathānupapatter atīndriyakevalajñānasiddhiḥ /*

56. Furthermore, the opponent too must admit that the knowledge of past and other (inconceivable) objects is possible to some person when he affirms, “The Vedic injunction makes known past, present, future, subtle, intercepted, distant and suchlike objects of which none of the sense-organs is capable.” (SB, 1.1.2). Were it not so, for whose sake would the Veda assert things that are spread over all the three divisions of time ? In the very act of such assertion, it presupposes a duly qualified subject who is certainly capable of cognising the truths which hold good for the three divisions of time. Thus has it been observed : “For whose sake does the Veda affirm truths which hold good for all the three divisions of time, if no person could comprehend them to be so, the obscuring veils being absolutely (fixed and) ineradicable ?” (SiV, p. 413A). Thus is proved the possibility of pure supersensuous transcendent intuition from the assertion of facts spread over three divisions of time, which is otherwise unaccountable.

57. *kiñca, pratyakṣānumānasiddhasaṃvādaṃ śāstram evātīndriyārthadarśisadbhāve pramāṇam / ya eva hi śāstrasya viśayaḥ syādvādaḥ sa eva pratyakṣāder apīti saṃvādaḥ, tathāhi –*

*“sarvam asti svarūpeṇa pararūpeṇa nāsti ca /  
anyathā sarvasattvaṃ syāt svarūpasyāpy asambhavaḥ //”*

*iti diśā pramāṇasiddhaṃ syādvādaṃ pratipādayann āgmo ’rhatas sarvajñatām api pratipādayati, yad astuma –*

*“yādīyasamyaktvabalāt pratīmo bhavādṛśānāṃ paramātmabhāvam /*

*kuvāsanāpāśavināśanāya namo 'stu tasmai tava śāsanāya //"* iti

[*Ayogavyavaccheda-dvātrimśikā*, 21]

*pratyakṣaṁ tu yady apy aindriyakaṁ nātīndriyajñānaviṣayaṁ tathāpi samādhi-  
balalabdhanmakam yogipratyakṣam eva bāhyārthasyeva svasyāpi vedakaṁ  
iti pratyakṣato 'pi tatsiddhiḥ /*

57. Moreover, the very (contents of) scriptures, which are confirmed by verification afforded by perceptual and inferential knowledge, furnish the proof of the existence of a person cognisant of supersensible reality. The doctrine of non-absolutism, which is the very subject-matter of scriptures, is found to be as well the self-same subject-matter of perceptual cognition and the like, and this constitutes its verification. To be explicit, the doctrine of non-absolutism is established by such indubitable proof as the argument "Everything exists in its own individuality, and does not exist in the individuality of another. Were it not so, everything would be alike existent, and thus there would possibly be no individuality at all." The scripture sets forth this truth, and thus indirectly sets forth the omniscience of the *Arhat* also (who is the author of the scripture). I, too, have affirmed this in a hymn : "I offer my homage to your instruction, so that the noose of evil predispositions may meet its destruction – the instruction by realising the authenticity of which we find ourselves in the position to realise the glory of your status as the Supreme Self" (AV, 21).

Though empirical sense-intuition cannot apprehend the existence of supersensuous intuition, the intuition of ascetics, born of the force of meditation, is undoubtedly as cognisant of its own self as it is cognisant of an external object. And thus it (sic. the supersensuous intuition) is also proved by the evidence of perceptual intuition.

58. *atha –*

*"jñānam apratighaṁ yasya vairāgyaṁ ca jagatpateḥ /*

*aiśvaryaṁ caiva dharmaś ca sahasiddhaṁ catuṣṭayam //"*

*iti vacanāt sarvajñatvam īśvarādīnām astu mānuṣasya tu kasyacid  
vidyācaraṇavato 'pi tadasambhāvanīyam, yat Kumārilaḥ –*

*"athāpi Vedadehatvād BrahmaViṣṇuMaheśvarāḥ /*

*kāmaṁ bhavantu sarvajñāḥ sārvaajñyaṁ mānuṣasya kim,? //"* iti

[*Tattvasaṅgraha*, kā. 3208]

āḥ ! sarvajñāpalāpapātakin ! durvadavādin ! mānuṣatvanindārthavādāpade-  
śena devādhidevān adhikṣipasi ? / ye hi janmāntarārjitorjitapunyaprāgbhārāḥ  
surabhavabhavam anupamaṁ sukham anubhūya duḥkhapaṅkamagnam  
akhilam jīvalokam uddidhīrṣavo narakeṣv api kṣaṇam kṣiptasukhāsikāmṛta-  
vr̥ṣṭayo manuṣyalokam avateruḥ janmasamayasamakālacalitāsanasakala-  
surendravṛndavihitajanmotsavāḥ kiṅkarāyamāṇasurasamūhāhamahamikā-  
rabdhasevāvidhayaḥ svayam upanatām atiprājyasāmṛājyaśriyaṁ tṛṇavad  
avadhūya samatṛṇamaṇīsatrumitravṛttayonijaprabhāvaprasāmitetimara-  
kādi jagadupadravāḥ śukladhyānānalanirdagdaghātikarmāṇa āvirbhūtani-  
khilabhāvābhāvasvabhāvāvabhāsi kevalabaladalitasakalajīvalokamoha-  
prasarāḥ surāsuravinirmittāṁ samavasaraṇabhuvam adhiṣṭhāya svasvabhāṣā-  
pariṇāminībhir vāgbhiḥ pravartitadharma tīrthāś catustriṁśadatiśayamayāṁ  
tīrthanāthatvalakṣmīm upabhujya param brahma satatānandaṁ sakalakarma-  
nirmokṣam upeyivāṁsas tān mānuṣatvādisādhāraṇadharmopadeśenāpavadan  
Sumerum api leṣṭvādinā sādharmaṇīkartuṁ pāṛthivatvenāpavadeḥ ! / kiṅca,  
anavaratavanitāṅgasambhogadurlalitavṛttināṁ vividhahetisamūhadhāriṇām  
akṣamālādyāyattamaṇaḥ samyamānām rāgadveṣamohakaluṣitānām  
Brahmādinām sarvavittvasāmṛājyam !, yad avadāma stutau –

“madena mānena manobhavana krodhena lobhena sasammadena /  
parājītānām prasabham surāṇām vṛthaiva sāmṛājyaruḥ pareṣām //” iti  
[Ayogavyavaccheda-dvātriṁśikā, 25]

athāpi rāgādidoṣakāluṣyavirahitāḥ satatajñānānandamayamūrtayo Brahmā-  
dayaḥ; trahi tādr̥śeṣu teṣu na vipratipadyāmahe, avocāma hi –

“yatra tatra samaye yathā tathā yo ’si so ’sy abhidhaya yayā tayā /  
vītadoṣakaluṣaḥ sa ced bhavān eka eva bhagavan namo ’stu te //” iti  
[Ayogavyavaccheda-dvātriṁśikā, 31]

kevalam Brahmādidivatāviśayaṇām śrutismṛtipurāṇeti hāsakathānām vaita-  
thyam āsajyeta / tad evam sādha kebhyaḥ pramāṇebhyo ’tīndriyajñānasiddhir  
uktā ||16||

**bādhakābhāvāc ca ||17||**

58. (Q) “The Lord of the world has these four (perfections) which are concomitant with his being, viz., knowledge, dispassion, power and righteousness – all untrammelled by fetters”. Well, on the strength of this assertion, one may allow for omniscience in God and other divinities. But it



is inconceivable in a human being, though endowed with learning and (appropriate) conduct. It has been verily contended by Kumāṛila : “Brahman, Viṣṇu and Maheśvara, of whom the Vedas are the (external) embodiment, may, for aught we know, be allowed to be omniscient. But how can omniscience be predicated of human being ?” (TSN, v. 3208). (A) O thou defiled by the sin of the repudiation of an omniscient ! Utterer of unutterable slander ! Darest thou vilify them who are even the lords of gods on the pretext of censuring humanity ? Thou might as well slander the Sumeru Mount (the abode of gods), and put it on the same level with a clod of earth, on the ground of its earthy constitution, when thou darest denigrate those (perfect souls), who, having enjoyed the fortune of the mastery of righteousness with its twenty-four excellences, have attained the ever blissful state of supreme Brahman, with the dissolution of all bonds of Karmic matter; who, having experienced the unparalleled happiness incident to celestial birth which they attained by dint of superabundance of merit of high order acquired in previous births, descended to the world of men with the mission of delivering the whole world of suffering souls submerged in the quagmire of misery after having scattered showers of nectar of happiness for the nonce in the hells; whose birth was celebrated (with festivities) by all the lords of gods whose thrones moved simultaneously with the birth of these blessed ones; in whose honour the gods assumed the role of menials, and vied with one another in offering their worshipful services; who discarded like a blade of grass the fortune of an empire with its superabundant glory, which automatically presented itself; who were equally impartial in thier dealings with friend and foe, a gem and a blade of grass; who subdued, by their natural power, such calamities of the world as epidemics, *ītis* (excess of rainfall, draught, rats, locusts, rapacious birds, the oppression of the military of the state as well as of an aggressor); who have burnt to cinders the destructive *karmas* by the fire of white (pure) meditation; who destroyed the progress of ignorance of the entire living creatures by dint of transcendent knowledge which illumined the whole order of existent and non-existent facts falling within its ken; who promulgated the path of righteousness in a language which transformed itself into the respective dialects of the peoples concerned from the

preaching hall which was constructed by the gods and demons. Further, how can Brahman and the like spoil for the glorious possession of the empire of omniscience, who are vitiated by attachment, antipathy and ignorance, whose mental restraint is dependent upon such devices as the counting of a rosary, who bear arms of various descriptions and who are incessantly occupied with the enjoyment of the persons of women and thus evince indelicate dispositions ? As I have observed in a hymn : “In vain do the other divinities spoil for the highest sovereignty when they are forcibly vanquished by vanity, pride, sexual love, anger, avarice and a feeling of elation” (AV. 25).<sup>1</sup>

If, on the other hand, Brahman and the rest be (held to be) free from the pollution of the faults of attachment and the like and be the perennial embodiment of knowledge and bliss, in that case, we will not enter a caveat against them. As I have observed (elsewhere) : Whatever be thy creed, whatever be thy role, whatever be thy personality and whatever be thy name, if alone thou, O Lord, art free from the taint of all imperfections, I offer my obeisance to thee. (AV, 31). But in that case, the stories concerning the divinities such as Brahman as recorded in the *Vedas*, *Smṛtis*, *Purāṇas* and *Itihāsas* are to be condemned as false.

Thus the possibility of supersensuous knowledge has been established by means of positive proofs. (16)

(Aph.) **And also on account of the lack of contradictory proofs. (17)**

59. *sunīcitāsambhavadbādhakatvāt sukhādivat tatsiddhiḥ iti sambhadyate / tathāhi kevalajñānabādhakam bhavat pratyakṣam vā bhavet pramāṇāntaram vā ? / na tāvat pratyakṣam; tasya vidhāv evādhikārāt –*

*“sambaddham vartamānam ca grhyate caksurādinā //” [Ślokavārtika, Sū. 4, Śl. 84] iti svayam eva bhaṇanāt /*

59. The construction is : ‘It (omniscience) is established like pleasure and the like on account of the lack of well-attested contradictory grounds’. To be elaborate, let us pose the problem : What can be the proof contradictory of transcendent knowledge – perceptual cognition or some other organ ?

1. Our author here loses all patience with the opponent and indulges in invectives which are not all parliamentary — a procedure of which we cannot approve according to our modern standards of debate. (Tr.)

Perceptual cognition cannot furnish a contradiction as it is competent to record positive truth alone. As has been observed by (Kumārila) himself : Our senses such as the visual organ apprehend what is present and is in relation (with them) (SV, Sū 4, v 84).

60. *atha na pravartamānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ tadbādhakaṃ kintu nivartamānaṃ tat; tad hi yadi niyatadeśakālaviṣayatvena bādhakaṃ tarhi sampratipadyāmahe / atha sakaladeśakālaviṣayatvena; tarhi na tat sakaladeśakālapuruṣapariṣatsākṣātkāraṃ antareṇa sambhavatīti siddhaṃ naḥ samīhitam / na ca Jaiminir anyo vā sakaladeśādisākṣātkārī sambhavati sattvapuruṣatvādeḥ rathyāpuruṣavat / atha prajñāyāḥ sātīṣayatvāt tatprakarṣo 'py anumīyate; tarhi tata eva sakalārthadarśī kiṃ nānumīyate ? / svapakṣe cānupalambhaṃ apramāṇayan sarvajñābhāve kutaḥ pramāṇayed aviśeṣāt ? /*

60. Now, it is contended that the contradiction is furnished by sense-intuition not when it is in operation, but by the same when it has ceased to operate. If, however, such negative evidence be supposed to have reference to a determinate sphere of space and time, we agree. If, on the contrary, it were supposed to have reference to the entire extent of space and time, it could not be effective without direct intuition of the whole race of mankind spread over all the divisions of space and time, and the admission of such possibility would only establish the position we seek to prove. Now it is not deemed possible that Jaimini or any other person should have the capacity to have intuition of all places and times on the ground of their being an ordinary human being or an ordinary animal, just like the man in the street. If, on the other hand, the superiority of those persons is inferred on the ground of their excellence of knowledge, why should not then a person having direct knowledge of all objects be inferred on that very ground ? How can the opponent advance lack of perception as a proof contradictory of an omniscient when he does not admit its validity in proving his own thesis ?

61. *na cānumānaṃ tadbādhakaṃ sambhavati; dharmigrahaṇam antareṇānumānāpravr̥tteḥ, dharmigrahaṇe vā tadgrāhakapramāṇabādhitatvād anutthānam evānumānasya / atha vivādādhyāsitaḥ puruṣaḥ sarvajño na bhavati vaktr̥tvāt puruṣatvād vā rathyāpuruṣavad ity anumānaṃ tadbādhakaṃ brūṣe; tad asat; yato yadi pramāṇaparidr̥ṣṭārthavaktr̥tvaṃ hetuḥ; tadā viruddhaḥ, tādr̥śasya vaktr̥tvasya sarvajña eva bhāvāt / athāsadbhūtārtha-*

*vaktṛtvam; tadā siddhasādhyatā, pramāṇaviruddhārthavādinām asarvajñatve-  
neṣṭatvāt / vaktṛtvamātram tu sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvād anaikāntikam  
jñānaprakarṣe vaktṛtvāpakarṣādarśanāt, pratyuta jñānātīśayavato vaktṛtvātīśa-  
yasyaivopalabdheḥ / etena puruṣatvam api nirastam / puruṣatvam hi yadi  
rāgādyadūṣitam tadā viruddham, jñānavairāgyādiguṇayuktapuruṣatvasya  
sarvajñatām antareṇānupapatteḥ / rāgādīdūṣite tu puruṣatve siddhasādhyatā /  
puruṣatvasāmānyam tu sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikam ity abādhakam /*

61. Nor again can inference be deemed to afford a contradictory proof in respect of that (an omniscient person). There can possibly be no inference without knowledge of the subject (minor term, sic. the omniscient person). If the knowledge of the subject be allowed, the organ of such knowledge would contradict the opposite finding of inference and thus would make the rise of such inference impossible. The contradictory inference might be put in the following syllogistic form : 'The person under dispute is not omniscient since he is speaker, or a human being, just like the man in the street.' But this is an unsound argument. If the logical ground, viz., 'speaker' be interpreted as 'the speaker of a fact known by an accredited organ' it would be a case of contradictory reason (since it will prove the very opposite conclusion) inasmuch as the quality of being a speaker of such truth is possible only in an omniscient person. If again, 'the speaker' be meant to be the speaker of a fact which does not exist in reality, the argument would be a case of proving an admitted truth. It is admitted that a person who speaks what is contrary to the verdict of all organs of knowledge is not omniscient. The quality of being a mere speaker is inconclusive as a logical ground, since its absence from the opposite (sic. the omniscient) is a matter of doubt. It is common knowledge that the defects of the delivery of a speaker diminish in proportion to the growth of his knowledge and on the contrary the excellence of the speaker is seen to grow with the progress of knowledge. This (refutation of the logical ground, viz., 'being a speaker') would also serve to dismiss the validity of the other ground, viz., manhood. If manhood be undefiled by attachment and the like, then it would prove the opposite of the intended conclusion. Without omniscience it is not possible that a person can come into possession of knowledge, dispassion and suchlike virtues. (If the denial of omniscience be based upon) manhood

vitiated by such defects as attachment and the rest, it would be an instance of wasted labour as there is none to dispute its obvious truth. If the quality of manhood as such (be put forward as a contradictory ground) it is bound to fail, since the incompatibility (of manhood with omniscience) – the opposite (of what the opponent seeks to establish) – is a matter of doubt (as has been shown above that it is the speaking of untruth which is incompatible with omniscience and the speaking of truth, on the contrary, a necessary accompaniment of such perfection. This also holds good of manhood when it is absolved from the moral and intellectual limitations).

62. *nāpy āgamas tadbādhakaḥ tasyāpauruṣeyasyāsambhavāt; sambhave vā tadbādhakasya tasyādarśanāt / sarvajñopajñāś cāgamaḥ katham tadbādhakaḥ ?, ity alam atiprasaṅgeneti ||17||*

62. Nor again can a scriptural text be cited as an invalidating proof. If reliance be placed on uncreated impersonal scripture it would be to no purpose as uncreated scripture does not exist. Were (the Vedas) to be regarded as uncreated revelation, still there would be no difficulty since there is no text which is found to contradict the existence of an omniscient. As regards the scripture which owes its origin to an omniscient person how can it be supposed to contradict the possibility of omniscience (which is its very presupposition) ? (The position is proved beyond the shadow of doubt by enough argument), and there is no necessity of further elaboration.

63. *na kevalam kevalam eva mukhyam pratyakṣam api tv anyad apīty āha —*

*tattāratamye avadhimanaḥparyāyau ca ||18||*

63. Pure intuition is not the only instance of transcendent intuition, but there are other varieties also.

(Aph.) Owing to the variation of the degrees of that (cessation of the obstructive veils), it (transcendent intuition admits of two varieties, viz.), visual intuition (of limited extension) and intuition of the modes of other minds. (18)

64. *sarvathāvaraṇavilaye kevalam, tasyāvaraṇavilayasya 'tāratamye' āvaraṇakṣayopaśamaviśeṣe tannimittakaḥ 'avadhiḥ' avadhijñānam 'manaḥparyāyāḥ' manaḥparyāyajñānam ca mukhyam indriyānapekṣam pratyakṣam / tatrāvadhiyata iti 'avadhiḥ' maryādā sā ca "rūpiṣv avadheḥ" [Tattvārthasūtra,*

1.28] *iti vacanāt rūpavaddravyaviṣayā avadhyupalakṣitaṃ jñānam apyavadhiḥ / sa dvedhā bhavapratyayo guṇapratyayaś ca / tatrādyo devanārakāṇāṃ pakṣiṇām iva viyadgamanam / guṇapratyayo manuṣyāṇāṃ tirścāṃ ca /*

64. Pure intuition occurs on the complete cessation of all possible veils. But when there is variation in degrees of this cessation of veil, that is to say, there are differences (qualitative and quantitative) in the subsidence and annihilation of these veils there occur two varieties of supersensuous intuition, viz., *avadhi* visual intuition of varying range and *manahparyāya* the intuition of the modes of other peoples' minds. *Avadhi* means 'limit' from (the etymology) 'that which is confined' and so it is said "*Avadhi* is limited to objects having shape and colour" (TS, 1. 28) and has for its object only things which have shape and colour. [Though *Avadhi* means limit], the intuition that is determined by it is also called *avadhi* (for the sake of brevity). It is of two kinds according as it is congenital or acquired by merit. Of these the first belongs to the denizens of heaven and hell, just as movement in the sky belongs to birds. The second variety is possible for men and lower animals.

65. *manaso dravyarūpasya paryāyāś cintanānugūṇāḥ pariṇāmabhedās tadviṣayaṃ jñānam 'manahparyāyah' / tathāvidhamanahparyāyānyathānu-papattyā tu yad bāhyacintanīyārthajñānam tat ānumānikam eva na manahparyāyapratyakṣam, yad āhuḥ –*

"*jāṇai bajjheṇumāṇeṇaṃ /*" [*Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, gā. 814]

65. The mind is a particular substance and its modes are the different changes of state emerging into acts of thought. And the intuition of these states is called *manahparyāya*, mental state (for the sake of brevity). Now the cognition of external objects of thought is necessarily inferential in character derived as it is by necessary implication from the cognition of thoughts which are impossible without objects. As has been said : "The external object is known by inference" (VA, gā, 814). (18)

66. *nanu rūpidravyaviṣayatve kṣāyopaśamikatve ca tulye ko viśeṣo 'vadhimanahparyāyayor ity āha –*

***viśuddhikṣetrasvāmiviṣayabhedāt tadbhedah ||19||***

66. Now both *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* are equally conditioned by the cessation and subsidence of karmic veils and have reference to material

object having shape and colour, then why should a difference be made between them ? In reply to this question (the next aphorism) is stated.

(Aph.) The difference of the two consists in the difference of purity, scope, subject and object. (19)

67. *saty api kathañcit sādharṃye viśuddhyādibhedād avadhimanahparyāyajñānāyor bhedaḥ / tatrāvadhijñānān manahparyāyajñānaṃ viśuddhatarāṃ / yāni hi manodravayāṇi avadhijñānī jānīte tāni manahparyāyajñānī viśuddhatarāṇi jānīte /*

67. There is a difference between the intuition called *avadhi* and *manahparyāya* owing to the difference in respect of purity and the rest, notwithstanding their community of nature in certain respects. Of these, the intuition of mental states is more lucid than visual intuition. The person possessing *avadhi* intuition cognises the mind-substances but the person possessing the *manahparyāya* intuition knows the self-same objects in a more lucid form.

68. *kṣetrakṛtāś cānāyor bhedaḥ – avadhijñānaṃ aṅgulasāsaṅkhyeyabhāgādiṣu bhavati ā sarvalokāt, manahparyāyajñānaṃ tu manuṣyakṣetra eva bhavati /*

68. There is also a difference between them in reference to scope. The scope of *avadhi* intuition varies from an extremely minute part of an *aṅgula* (about  $\frac{3}{4}$  of an inch) upto all the inhabited worlds. But the *manahparyāya* intuition is confined to the sphere inhabited by human beings.

69. *svāmikṛto 'pi – avadhijñānaṃ saṃyatasyāsaṃyatasya saṃyatāsaṃyatasya ca sarvagatiṣu bhavati; manahparyāyajñānaṃ tu manuṣyasaṃyatasya prakṛṣṭacāritrasya pramattādiṣu kṣīṇakaṣāyānteṣu guṇasthānakeṣu bhavati / tatrāpi vardhamānapariṇāmasya netarasya / vardhamānapariṇāmasyāpi ṛddhiprāptasya netarasya / ṛddhiprāptasyāpi kasyacin na sarvasya iti /*

69. There is difference also in reference to subject. *Avadhi* intuition is possible for living beings in all the four states (in the three different stages of spiritual progress, viz.,) restrained, unrestrained, and partially-restrained-cum-partially-unrestrained. But *manahparyāya* intuition is possible only for a human being possessed of self-restraint and of exalted conduct occupying any one of the stages of spiritual perfection ranging from the sixth to the twelfth, and even regarding these stages it is possible

only for those whose spiritual development is continually on the wax; and with regard to the latter only those who are possessed of supernatural powers are entitled to this intuition and not any one else, and again it is possible only for a few and not all of them.

70. *viṣayakṛtaś ca – rūpavaddravyeṣv asarvāparyāyeṣv avadher viṣayani-bandhas tadanantabhāge manaḥparyāyasya iti / avasitaṁ mukhyaṁ pratyakṣam ||19||*

70. There is difference in reference to objects also. The jurisdiction of *avadhi* intuition is limited to material objects (with shape and colour) and that again not covering all their modes; but that of *manaḥparyāya* extends to by far the minuter parts called *ananta*. Here ends the discourse on transcendent intuition. (19)

71. *atha sāmvyavahārikam āha –*

*indriyamanonimitto 'vagrahehāvāyadhāraṇātmā sāmvyavahārikam ||20||*

71. Now we shall deal with empirical intuition.

(Aph.) Empirical intuition is conditioned by a sense and the mind and is of the nature of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgment, and retention. (20)

72. *indriyāṇi sparśanādīni vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇāni, manaś ca nimittaṁ kāraṇaṁ yasya sa tathā / sāmānyalakṣaṇānuvṛtteḥ samyagarthanirṇaya-syedaṁ viśeṣaṇaṁ tena 'indriyamanonimittaḥ' samyagarthanirṇayaḥ / kāraṇam uktvā svarūpam āha – 'avagrahehāvāyadhāraṇātmā' / avagrahādayo vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇāḥ ta ātmā yasya so 'vagrahehāvāyadhāraṇātmā' / 'ātma'grahaṇaṁ ca krameṇotpadyamānānām apy avagrahādīnāṁ nātyantiko bhedaḥ kintu pūrvapūrvasyottarottararūpatayā pariṇāmād ekātmakatvam iti pradarśanārtham / samīcīnaḥ pravṛttinivṛttrūpo vyavahāraḥ sāmvyavahāras tatprayojanaṁ 'sāmvyavahārikam' pratyakṣam / indriyamanonimittatvaṁ ca samastaṁ vyastaṁ ca boddhavyam / indriyaprādhānyāt manobalādhānāc cotpadyamānaḥ indriyajāḥ / manasa eva viśuddhisavyapekṣād upajāyamāno manonimitta iti /*

72. The senses are touch and the rest which will be defined later. The intuition which has for its condition the senses and the mind is called such. This clause is to be construed as an adjective to 'authentic definitive



cognition of an object' which follows from the general definition (and is to be read into the present aphorism). Thus the definition of empirical intuition comes to be 'authentic definitive cognition which is conditioned by the senses and the mind'. Having stated its condition, he now states its nature as 'of the nature of determinate perception, etc.' Determinate perception and the rest will be defined. And the intuition which consists of these varieties is said to be of the nature of the same. The phrase 'of the nature of (the same)' is employed to demonstrate the fact that determinate perception and the rest do not absolutely differ from one another, but the antecedent variety only develops into the subsequent variety and thus all of them partake of the same essential nature. The term *sāṃvyavahārika* (rendered empirical) is derived from *sāṃvyavahāra* which means 'authentic activity by way of positive and negative endeavour' and thus the word *sāṃvyavahārika* comes to mean an intuition which leads to such activity as its result. The meaning of the phrase 'conditioned by a sense and the mind' is to be understood in both distributive and collective reference. It is said to be 'conditioned by a sense' when a sense plays a major part and the mind exerts influence in its generation; and it is said to be 'conditioned by the mind' when it is generated by the mind alone endowed with a particular kind of purity.

73. *nanu svasaṃvedanaṃ rūpam anyad api pratyakṣam asti tat kasmān noktam ?, iti na vācyaṃ; indriyajajñānasvasaṃvedanasyendriyapratyakṣe, anindriyajasukhādisaṃvedanasya manahpratyakṣe, yogipratyakṣasvasaṃvedanasya yogipratyakṣe 'ntarbhāvāt / smṛtyādisvasaṃvedanaṃ tu mānasam eveti nāparaṃ svasaṃvedanaṃ nāma pratyakṣam astīti bhedenā noktam* ||20||

73. (Q) Now, self-cognition is a recognised variety of perceptual cognition. Why does the author omit its enumeration ? (A) The objection cannot be advanced (with justification) inasmuch as the self-cognition relating to sense-perception is included in sense-perception; the self-cognition of the perception of pleasure, etc., is conditioned by the mind and as such is subsumed under mental perception; the self-cognition of the transcendent perception of the ascetic is subsumed under the transcendent perception of the ascetic; as regards the self-cognition of the acts of recollection and the like, they are nothing but mental perceptions; and

since there is no additional variety of perception called self-cognition, it has not been stated as a separate kind of perception (20).

74. *indriyety uktam itīndriyāṇi lakṣayati –*

*sparsārasagandharūpaśabdagrahaṇalakṣaṇāni sparsānarasana-ghrāṇacakṣuḥśrotrāṇīndriyāṇi dravya-bhāvabhedaṇi ||21||*

74. Senses have been referred to and the author now defines them.

(Aph.) The senses are touch, taste, smell, sight, ear having respectively for their characteristic the capacity of apprehending touch, taste, odour, coloured shape and sound. Each of these again is of two kinds, called substance and function. (21)

75. *sparsādigrahaṇaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ yeṣāṁ tāni yathāsaṅkhyāṁ sparsānā-dīnīndriyāṇi, tathāhi sparsādyupalabdhiḥ karaṇapūrvā kriyātvāt chidikriyāvat / tatrendreṇa karmaṇā sṛṣṭānīndriyāṇi nāmakarmodayanimittatvāt / indrasyātmano liṅgāni vā, karmamalīmasasya hi svayam arthān upalabdhum asamarthasyātmano 'rthopalabdhau nimittāni indriyāṇi/*

75. The senses of touch, etc., are respectively those having the characteristic of the capacity of apprehending touch and the rest. The proof is as follows : Cognitions of touch and the like must be conditioned by relevant instruments, since they are acts like the act of cutting. *Indriyas* (senses) are so called because they have been produced by *indra* which means *karman*, since the senses are brought into being by manifestation of *nāma-karman* as their condition. The reason for their being named *indriyas* may also be due to the fact that they are the distinguishing marks of the self which is designated by the name *indra*. The senses serve as the organs of perception of objects for a self which is contaminated with *karman* and is thus unable to perceive things by itself.

76. *nanv evam ātmano 'rthajñānam indriyāt liṅgād upajāyamānam ānumānikaṁ syāt / tathā ca liṅgāparijñāne 'numānānudayāt / tasyānumānāt parijñāne 'navasthāprasaṅgaḥ; naivam; bhāvendriyasya svasaṁviditatvenānavasthānavakāśāt / yad vā, indrasyātmano liṅgāny ātmagamakāni indriyāṇi karaṇasya vāsyādivat kartrādhiṣṭhitatvadarśanāt /*

76. (Q) The cognition of an object by the self, generated as it is by a mark, viz., a sense, should be regarded as inferential. Such being the case,

the inference cannot arise if there be a lack of the knowledge of the mark. If the mark were to be known by another inference, the result would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. (A) The objection is baseless, since the senses *qua* (spiritual) functions are intuited by themselves and so the consequence of infinite regress has no *raison d'être*. Or (an alternative explanation may be given) : The senses are the marks of the self and as such they afford proof of the self's existence. It is universally seen that an instrument (and the sense is an instrument), like the carpenter's axe, is operated by an agent.

77. *tāni ca dravyabhāvarūpeṇa bhidyante / tatra dravyendriyāṇi nāmakarmodayanimittāni, bhāvendriyāṇi punas tadāvaraṇavīryāntarāyakṣa-yopasāmanimittāni / saīṣā pañcasūtrī sparśagrahaṇalakṣaṇaṁ sparśanendriyaṁ, rasagrahaṇalakṣaṇaṁ rasanendriyam ityādi / sakalasaṁsāriṣu bhāvāc charīravypakatvāc ca sparśanasya pūrvam nirdeśaḥ, tataḥ krameṇālpālpajīva-viṣayatvād rasanaghrāṇacakṣuḥśrotrāṇām /*

77. The senses again are divided into two categories, viz., substance and function. Of these, the sense *qua* substance is caused by the manifestation of the corresponding *nāma-karman*. The senses *qua* functions are brought into being by the subsidence and destruction of the obscuring *karman* and obstructive *karman* frustrating the relevant capacity. The present aphorism is a conglomeration of five aphorisms, viz., 'the sense of touch has the capacity of apprehending touch as its characteristic', 'the sense of taste has the capacity of apprehending taste as its characteristic' etc. The place of honour (in the order of enumeration) has been assigned to the sense of touch since it is universally present in all living beings subject to transmigration and as it pervades the whole body. And the respective positions in the order of enumeration of the senses of taste, smell, sight and hearing are due to their incidence in progressively decreasing number of embodied beings.

78. *tatra sparśanendriyaṁ tadāvaraṇakṣayopasāmasambhavaṁ prthivyaptejovāyuvanaspatīnām śeṣendriyāvaraṇavatām sthāvarāṇām jīvānām / teṣāṁ ca "puḍhavi cittamantamakkhāyā" [Daśavaikālika, 4.1] ityāder āptāgamāt siddhiḥ / anumānāc ca – jñānaṁ kvacid ātmani paramā-pakarṣavat apakṛṣyamānaviśeṣatvāt parimāṇavat, yatra tadapakarṣaparyantaḥ ta ekendriyāḥ sthāvarāḥ / na ca sparśanendriyasyāpy abhāve bhasmādiṣu*

*jñānasyāpakarṣo yuktaḥ / tatra hi jñānasyābhāva eva na punar apakarṣas tato yathā gaganapariṃāṇād ārabhyāpakṛṣyamāṇaviśeṣam parimāṇam paramāṇau paramāpakarṣavat tathā jñānam api kevalajñānād ārabhyāpakṛṣyamāṇaviśeṣam ekendriyeṣv atyantam apakṛṣyate / pṛthivyādīnām ca pratyekam jīvatvasiddhir agre vakṣyate / sparśanarasanendriye kṛmi-apādikā-nūpuraka-gaṇḍūpada-śaṅkha-śuktikā-śambūkā-jalūkāprabhṛtīnām trasānām / sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇāni pipīlakā-rohaṇikā-upacikā-kunthu-tubaraka-trapusa-bīja-karpāsāsthikā-śatapadī-ayenaka-tṛṇapatra-kāṣṭhāhārakādīnām / sparśana-rasana-ghrāṇa-cakṣuṃṣi bhramara-vaṭara-sāraṅga-makṣikā-puttikā-daṁśa-maśaka-vṛścika-nandyāvarta-kīṭaka-pataṅgādīnām / saha śrotreṇa tāni matsya-uraga-bhujaga-pakṣi-catuṣpadānām tiryagyonijānām sarveṣāṃ ca nāraka-manuṣya-devānām iti /*

78. Of these the sense of touch is born from the subsidence and destruction of the corresponding veiling *karman* and is present in such immobile creatures as earth-bodied, water-bodied, fire-bodied and air-bodied beings, and plants, which have the remaining senses veiled by obscuring *karman*. The existence of these creatures is established by the statement of authoritative scripture as follows : The earth-bodied being is stated to be animated with consciousness (DV, 4. 1). It is established by inference also. Consciousness must reach its lowest limit of diminution in some soul, since it is a determination admitting of progressive diminution, like magnitude. Now, (the living beings) in which the lowest limit of diminution is reached are immobile one-sensed creatures. It cannot be legitimately urged that knowledge reaches its maximum diminution in burnt cinders since they lack even the sense of touch. There is absolute non-existence of consciousness in the latter and not a diminution of the same. And as magnitude which is seen to undergo diminution from the magnitude of space as its highest limit and reaches its maximum diminution in the atom, so also consciousness which is known to suffer diminution from its highest limit in perfect knowledge reaches its utmost culmination in one-sensed creatures. And it will be proved below that earth-bodied and the rest are living conscious beings. The two senses, viz. touch and taste, are present in such mobile creatures as Worms, Solecids (Vermes without lateral appendages), Annelids (ring-like vermes with unsegmented lateral appendages), Knotty-legged (Anthropoda),

Conchifera, Pearl-mussel, helix, leeches and the like. The senses of touch, taste, and smell are present in ants (Formicidae), red-ants (*rohaṇikās*), bugs and flees (*upacikās*, *kunthus*, *tubarakas*, Hemiptera, Hemimetabola), cucumber, cotton-weevils and lice (Aptera), centipeds, *ayenakas*, Plant-lice (*trṇapatras*), *kāṣṭhāhāarakas* (Termites, white-ants), and the like. The sense of touch, taste, smell and sight are present in black-bees, *vaṭaras* (Wasps), *sāraṅgas* (Hornets), flies, gnats, gadflies, mosquitoes, scorpions, spiders (*nandīvartas*), butterflies and moths (*kīṭakas*), grasshoppers and locusts (*pataṅgas*), etc. These (four) combined with the sense of hearing are present in fish, apodal reptiles, limbed reptiles and Batrachians, birds, quadruped brutes belonging to the groups of subhuman species and in men, gods and denizens of hell without exception.

79. *nanu vacanādānaviharaṇotsargānandahetavo vāk-pāṇi-pāda-pāyūpasthalakṣaṇāny apīndriyāṇīti Sāṅkhyās tat katham pañcaiva indriyāṇi ?; na; jñānaviśeṣahetūnām eveha indriyatvenādhikṛtatvāt, ceṣṭāviśeṣanimittatvenendriyatvakalpanāyām indriyānantyaprasaṅgaḥ, ceṣṭāviśeṣāṇām anantatvāt, tasmād vyaktinirdeśāt pañcaiva indriyāṇi /*

79. (Q) According to the philosophers of the Sāṅkhya school, there are five other organs, viz., the tongue, hands, feet, rectum and generative organ which are respectively the organs of speech, prehension, walking, evacuation and gratification. That being the case, why should the number of sense-organs be fixed at five only ? (A) The question does not arise; only those which are the conditions of specific cognitions are treated of under the head of sense-organs in the present context. If the rank of sense-organs were accorded to them on the ground of their being instruments of particular varieties of physical action, the number of sense-organs would have to be extended indefinitely since no limit can be set to different kinds of action. It follows therefore from the specification of the individual senses that the number of sense-organs is only five (neither more nor less).

80. *teṣāṃ ca paraṣparaṃ syād abhedo dravyārthādeśāt, syād bhedaḥ paryāyārthādeśāt, abhedaikānte hi sparśanena sparśasyeva rasāder api grahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ / tathā cendriyāntarakalpanāvaiyarthyaṃ, kasyacit sākalye vaikalye vānyeṣāṃ sākalyavaikalyaprasaṅgaś ca / bhedaikānte 'pi teṣāṃ ekatra saṅkalanajñānanajanakatvābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ santānāntarendriyavat /*

*manas tasya janakam iti cet; na; tasyendriyanirapekṣasya tajjanakatvābhāvāt / indriyāpekṣam mano 'nusandhānasya janakam iti cet; santānāntarendriyāpekṣasya kuto na janakatvam iti vācyam / pratyāsatter abhāvād iti cet; atra kā pratyāsattir anyatraikadravyatādātmyāt ?, pratyāsattyantarasya ca vyabhicārād iti / etena teṣām ātmanā bhedaibhedaikāntau prativyūdhau / ātmanā karaṇānām abhedaikānte kartṛtvaprasaṅgaḥ, ātmano vā karaṇatvaprasaṅgaḥ, ubhayor ubhayātmakatvaprasaṅgo vā, viśeṣābhāvāt / tatas teṣāṃ bhedaikānte cātmanāḥ karaṇatvābhāvaḥ santānāntarakaraṇavad viparyayo veti pratītisiddhatvād bādhakābhāvāc cānekānta evāśrayaṇīyaḥ /*

80. (As regards the relationship of these sense-organs) they can be regarded as mutually identical when viewed from the standpoint of substantial unity and can again be regarded as numerically different from one another if viewed from the standpoint of differential modes. If the identity (of the sense-organs) were absolute the consequence would be that the tactile organ could take cognisance of taste and the rest just as it does of touch. That again would make the postulation of other organs a superfluity. And further the perfection or partial defection of one would make the corresponding perfection and defection of others an inevitable consequence. And if, on the other hand, the mutual difference of these (organs) were absolute, they could not possibly co-operate in the generation of a synthetic judgement involving reference to the identity of the different sense-data (e.g., the judgement 'I see what I touch') as is seen to be the case with reference to the organs of different persons. This (synthetic judgement in question) cannot be set down to the causality of the mind since it cannot produce such (a cognition) without the aid of sense-organs. Nor should it be contended that the mind aided by the sense-organ is the cause of this synthetic reference, since the question would arise, why should not (the mind) produce (the result) aided by the sense-organs of other subjects. (The opponent may retort that the question does not arise) since there is no relation (between the mind of one person and the sense-organ of another). But what is the kind of relation in question, if it be anything else than identity with one substance ? (The postulation of) any other kind of relation is (out of the question) since it is found to lack necessary concomitance (with synthetic judgement). The same (line of argument) would suffice to

dismiss the theories of absolute difference and absolute identity of the senses with the self. If the senses were absolutely identical with the self, the former would function as the subject or the latter would function as the organs, or both would function in dual capacity, since there is no difference (in the relation of identity). If, on the other hand, the senses were absolutely different from the self, they could not be held to belong to the self as its organs, just as the senses of other subjects are not. Or, in the alternative, the reverse might be the case (i.e., the senses of A would be the senses of B and *vice versa*). It follows, therefore, that (the relation in question) should be accepted in terms of non-absolutist position (as neither absolutely different nor absolutely identical but both), which is endorsed by the verdict of experience which again is not liable to (be set aside by) an invalidating proof.

81. *dravyendriyāṇām api parasparam svārambhakapudgaladravyebhyaś ca bhedābhedadvārānekānta eva yuktaḥ, pudgaladravyārthādeśād abhedasya paryāyārthādeśāc ca bhedasyopapadyamānatvāt /*

81. As regards (the relation of) the senses *qua* substance among one another and to the material atoms from which they are produced, it should also be understood in terms both of identity and difference from the same standpoint of non-absolutism, since the element of identity (of the senses) is intelligible in respect of the matter *qua* substance and the element of difference is intelligible (in respect of the same) *qua* modes.

82. *evam indriyaviṣayāṇām sparśādīnām api dravyaparyāyarūpatayā bhedābhedātmakatvam avaseyam, tathāiva nirbādhām upalabdheḥ / tathā ca na dravyamātram paryāyamātram vendriyaviṣaya iti sparśādīnām karmasāadhanatvam bhāvasāadhanatvam ca draṣṭavyam ||21||*

82. The same (line of argument) would enable us to understand the dual relation of identity-cum-difference of the data of senses, e.g., touch and the rest *qua* substance and modes, as attested by experience uncontradicted by any other proof. It follows, therefore, that the datum of sense is neither a pure substance nor a pure mode, and this is corroborated by (the grammatical interpretation of the terms) *sparsā* and the like in the sense of object and act; (thus *sparsā* may mean an object of touch which is a substance and act *qua* touch which is a mode). (21)

83. 'dravyabhāvabhedāni' ity uktam tāni krameṇa lakṣayati —

**dravyendriyam niyatākārāḥ pudgalāḥ ||22||**

83. It has been said (sūtra 21) that the senses are of two kinds, viz., as substance and function, and the author now propounds their respective definitions.

(Aph.) The sense qua substance is material atoms as possessed of definite shape. (22)

84. 'dravyendriyam' ity ekavacanam jātyāśrayanāt / niyato viśiṣṭo bāhya ābhyantaraś cākārāḥ samsthānaviśeṣo yeṣāṃ te 'niyatākārāḥ' pūraṇa-galanadharmāṇaḥ sparśarasagandhavarṇavantāḥ 'pudgalāḥ', tathāhi śrotrādiṣu yaḥ karṇaśaṣkulīprabhṛtir bāhyaḥ pudgalānām pracayo yaś cābhyantaraḥ kadambagolakādyākārāḥ sa sarvo dravyendriyam, pudgaladravyarūpatvāt / aprādhānye vā dravyaśabdo yathā Aṅgāramarddako dravyācārya iti / apradhānam indriyam dravyendriyam, vyāpāravaty api tasmin sannihite 'pi cālokaprabhṛtini sahakāripaṭale bhāvendriyam vinā sparśādyupalabdhyasiddheḥ ||22||

**bhāvendriyam labdhyupayogau ||23||**

84. The singular number in the 'sense qua substance' has reference to the class character, the word 'definite' means 'specific' and relates to both internal and external (shape), and 'shape' means 'particular structural arrangement', and so the whole expression 'as possessed of definite shape' comes to mean (that) 'the atoms having a specific structural arrangement' (are the sense qua substance). The (atoms) are called *pudgalāḥ* because they are subject to accretion (*pūraṇa*) and decomposition (*galana*). And they are possessed of the qualities of touch, taste, odour and colour. Thus, e.g., in the case of the auditory organ the external combination of the atoms in the shape of an ellipse and the internal combination of the same in the globular shape of a *kadambaka* flower are both to be taken in their entirety as the sense qua substance and this is typical of the rest of the organs. The reason (of their being called substance) is that they are the same as the material substance. The term *dravya* in *dravyendriya* (rendered sense qua substance) may in the alternative be taken to connote inferiority as it is found in the proposition 'Aṅgāramardaka is a *dravyācārya* (inferior teacher)'. So the expression *dravyendriya* would mean 'an inferior sense-organ'.



Its inferiority is due to the fact that even when it is in operation and the whole group of auxiliary conditions such as light, etc., are present intact, the cognition of touch and the like does not materialise without the arousal of the function-sense. (22)

(Aph.) **The function-sense is (of two kinds, viz.) attainment and conscious activity. (23)**

85. *lambhanam 'labdhiḥ' jñānāvaraṇakarmakṣayopasamaviśeṣaḥ / yatsannidhānād ātmā dravyendriyanirvṛttiṃ prati vyāpriyate tannimitta-ātmanaḥ pariṇāmaviśeṣa upayogaḥ / atrāpi 'bhāvendriyam' ity ekavacanaṃ jātyāśrayaṇāt / bhāvaśabdo 'nupasarjanārthaḥ / yathaivendanadharmayo-gitvenānupacaritendratvo bhāvendra ucyate tathaivendraliṅgatvādidharma-yogenānupacaritendraliṅgatvādidharmayogi 'bhāvendriyam' /*

85. 'Attainment' means acquisition (of the manifestation of the sense-activity) which consists in the subsidence-cum-destruction of a particular kind of *karman* which obscures knowledge. Conscious activity is a particular modification of the self due to the former (i.e. attainment) owing to the presence of which the self is directed to the substance-sense-organ roused to activity. Here also the singular number in the expression 'function-sense-organ' has reference to the class. The word 'function' (*bhāva*) has the sense of (actual) pre-eminence. Just as the individual who is actually and not by way of metaphor in possession of the attribute of sovereignty (over gods and thus the predication of the attribute is not a case of false attribution by a rhetorical device) is called real functioning sovereign, so also (the changed state of the self) is called the real functioning sense when it is actually and not by way of metaphor in possession of the attributes of 'being a sign of this self' and the like.

86. *tatra labdhisvabhāvaṃ tāvad indriyaṃ svārthasaṃvittāva ātmano yogyatām ādadhad bhāvendriyatām pratipadyate / na hi tatrāyogyasya tadutpattir ākāśavad upapadyate svārthasaṃvidyogyataiva ca labdhir iti / upayogasvabhāvaṃ punaḥ svārthasaṃvidi vyāpārātmakam / na hy avyāpṛtaṃ sparśanādisaṃvedanaṃ sparśādi prakāśayitum śaktam, suṣuptādīnām api tatprakāśakatvaprapṛteḥ /*

86. Of these (two function-senses), the sense *qua* attainment generates the capacity of the self to apprehend a relevant object and thus comes to

exercise the role of a function-sense. The competence of the self for the apprehension of its object is (called) attainment, (the acquisition of which is necessary in view of the fact that) the said apprehension is not produced in a substance which is constitutionally incompetent for the same, e.g., space which is incapable of developing conscious activity. The sense *qua* conscious activity again is of the nature of an activity in respect of the cognition of an object. (The postulation of this conscious activity as sense is necessitated by the consideration that) the sensing of touch and the like by the tactile sense, etc., is not capable of revealing its object touch and the like unless it is appropriated by the conscious activity of the self; (otherwise) the emergence of such cognition in deep sleep also would be an undeniable possibility.

87. *svārthaprakāśane vyāpṛtasya samvedanasyopayogatve phalatvād indriyatvānupapattir iti cet; na; kāraṇadharmasya kārye 'nuvṛtteḥ / na hi pāvakasya prakāśakatve tatkāryasya pradīpasya prakāśakatvaṁ virudhyate / na ca yenaiva svabhāvenopayogasyendriyatvam, tenaiva phalatvam iṣyate yena virodhaḥ syāt / sādhakatamasvabhāvena hi tasyendriyatvaṁ kriyārūpatayā ca phalatvam / yathaiva hi pradīpaḥ prakāśātmanā prakāśayatīty atra sādhakatamaḥ prakāśātmā karaṇam, kriyātmā phalam, svatantratvāc karteti sarvaṁ idam anekāntavāde na durlabham ity alaṁ prasaṅgena ||23||*

87. (Q) The conscious activity (of the self) employed upon the sense-apprehension of a relevant object is rather the result, and as such cannot be regarded as an organ (which is necessarily of the nature of a condition). (A) The objection does not apply to the case since (it is a general rule that certain) attributes of the cause follow into the effect. There is nothing repugnant in the fact that because fire has the quality of illuminating things, the light of the lamp and the like which are its effects should also have the capacity. Nor is it admitted that conscious activity is an organ in the same capacity in which it is the result which might involve a contradiction. It becomes an organ in the capacity of the efficientmost instrument and becomes the result in the capacity of an act both of which characters are discernible in it. (The matter becomes clear from the example of) a light which discharges the function of the efficientmost instrument in its character as an illuminator, and is the effect in its character as the act of illumination, and plays the role of an agent on account of its independent status. And all

this is not at all difficult to vindicate from the position of non-absolutism and there is no necessity for further elaboration. (23)

88. 'manonimittah' ity uktam iti mano lakṣayati –  
sarvārthagrahaṇam manah ||24||

88. It has been said (in aphorism 20 that empirical intuition is) 'conditioned by the mind'. (And for its clarification the author now) proposes to give the definition of the mind.

(Aph.) The mind is the organ of apprehension of all objects (of all the senses). (24)

89. sarve na tu sparśanādīnām sparśādivat pratiniyatā evārthā grhyante 'neneti 'sarvārthagrahaṇam manah' 'anindriyam' iti 'noindriyam' iti cocyate / sarvārtham mana ity ucyamāne ātmany api prasaṅga iti karaṇatvapratipādanārtham 'grahaṇam' ity uktam / ātmā tu karteti nātivyāptiḥ, sarvārthagrahaṇam ca manasaḥ prasiddham eva / yat Vācakamukhyaḥ "śrutam anindriyasya" [Tattvārthasūtra, 2.22] / śrutam iti hi viśayiṇā viśayasya nirdeśaḥ / upalakṣaṇam ca śrutam mateḥ tena matiśrutayor yo viśayaḥ sa manaso viśaya ity arthaḥ / "matiśrutayor nibandho dravyeṣv asarvaparīkṣeṣu" [Tattvārthasūtra, 1.27] iti Vācakavacanāt matiśrutajñānayoḥ sarvaviśayatvam iti manaso 'pi sarvaviśayatvam siddham /

89. All the objects (of all the senses) – and not specifically determined such as touch is of the tactile sense – are apprehended by the mind and so it is called 'the organ of apprehension of all the objects'. It is also designated as 'non-sense' (anindriya) or 'not-sense' (no-indriya). If the aphorism were worded simply as 'the mind is (cognisant of) all the objects', then this (definition of the mind) would also apply to the self, and so the phrase 'the organ of apprehension' (grahaṇam) has been inserted in order to emphasise the instrumental character (of the mind). And thus the definition does not extend to the self which is but the agent. That the mind is cognisant of all sense-objects is a matter of common knowledge. As has been observed by Umāsvāti, the foremost of the Vācakas – (The object of) scriptural (cognition) is (the object) of the mind (TS, 2.22). The term 'scriptural', though it stands for a cognition having objective reference, here stands for object. The term 'scriptural' is typical of sensuous cognition also. Thus it comes to mean that whatever is the object of sensuous and non-sensuous

cognition is also the object of the mind. It has been observed by the *Vācaka* :  
 “The sensuous and non-sensuous cognitions have for their scope (all) substances though not with all their modes” (TS, 1. 27). And it follows from this statement of the *Vācaka* that sensuous and non-sensuous cognitions jointly are cognisant of all objects, and thus *a fortiori* the mind is also proved to be cognisant of all things.

90. *mano 'pi pañcendriyavad dravyabhāvabhedāt dvividham eva / tatra dravyamano manastvena pariṇatāni pudgaladravyāṇi / bhāvamanas tu tadāvaraṇīyakarmakṣayopasamātmā labdhir ātmanaś cārthagrahaṇonmukho vyāpāraviśeṣa iti ||24||*

90. The mind is also of two kinds, just like the five senses, according as it differs as substance and function. The mind *qua* substance is nothing but substantive matter transformed into it (viz., the mind-substance). The mind *qua* function is the attainment (*labdhi*) consisting in the subsidence-cum-destruction of the relevant obscuring *karman* and the specific activation of the self apt to apprehend its object (*upayoga*). (24)

91. *nanv atyālpam idam ucyate 'indriyamanonimittah' iti / anyad api hi cakṣurjñānasya nimittam artha ālokaś cāsti, yad āhuḥ –*

*“rūpālokamanskāracakṣurbhyaḥ samprajāyate / vijñānaṁ maṇisūryāṁśugośakṛdbhya ivānalaḥ //” iti*

*atrāh –*

***nārthālokau jñānasya nimittam avyātirekāt ||25||***

91. (Q) Well, the statement (of the etiology of sensuous cognition) ‘it is conditioned by a sense and the mind’ is extremely inadequate. Thus, for instance, visual cognition has for its additional conditions (the presence of) the object and light. As has been remarked “The (visual) cognition is produced by the coloured object, light, attention and visual organ (all combined), just as fire is produced by (the combination of) the lens, the solar ray and dried cow-dung”. In answer to this, (the author) says :

(Aph.) **The object and light are not conditions of cognition, because of the lack of concomitance in difference between the two. (25)**

92. *bāhyo viśayaḥ prakāśaś ca na cakṣurjñānasya sāksāt kāraṇam, deśakālādivat tu vyavahitakāraṇatvaṁ na nivāryate, jñānāvaraṇādikṣayo-*

*paśamasāmagryām ārād upakāritvenāñjanādivac cakṣurupakāritvena cābhyu-  
pagamāt / kutaḥ punaḥ sākṣān na kāraṇatvam ity āha – ‘avyatirekāt’ vyati-  
rekābhāvāt / na hi tadbhāve bhāvalakṣaṇo ‘nvaya eva hetuphalabhāvaniścaya-  
nimittam, api tu tadabhāve ‘bhāvalakṣaṇo vyatireko ‘pi / na cāsāv arthālokaḥ  
hetubhāve ‘sti; marumarīcikāḍau jalābhāve ‘pi jalajñānasya, vṛṣadamśādīnām  
cālokābhāve ‘pi sāndratamatamaḥpaṭalavilīptadeśagatavastupratipatteś ca  
darśanāt / yogīnām cātītānāgatārthagrahaṇe kim arthasya nimittatvam?/  
nimittatve cārthakriyākāritvena sattvād atītānāgatavakṣatīḥ /*

92. The external object and light are not the direct cause of visual cognition, though it is not denied that they are remote conditions just as time, space and the like are. It is admitted that they are of direct service to the cause of subsidence-cum-destruction of the knowledge-obscuring *karman*, and also (of indirect service) by benefiting the visual organ like a collyrium-paint. (Q) But why should not they be held to be the direct cause (of the visual cognition) ? The answer is : ‘because there is no concomitance in difference between them’. Certainly the method of agreement which consists in (the observation) that ‘A is followed by B’ is not alone competent to determine the relation of cause and effect, but it must be supplemented by the method of difference which consists in (observing) that the absence of A is followed by the absence of B. But this (concomitance in difference) is not observed so as to ensure the causality of the object and light. For example, it is observed that the cognition of water takes place in mirage in the desert in spite of the absence of water in it and cats and the like have, notwithstanding the absence of light, perceptual cognition of objects in a place steeped in thick pall of darkness. And regarding the intuition of past and future events by ascetics, how can objects have any causal efficiency ? (The admission of past and future events) exercising causal efficiency (which is a criterion of existence) as condition (of intuition) would on the contrary (invest them with existence and) make them cease to be past and future.

93. *na ca prakāśyād ātmalābha eva prakāśakasya prakāśakatvam, pradiṭṭhāder ghaṭādibhyo ‘nutpannasyāpi tatprakāśakatvadarśanāt / īśvarajñā-  
nasya ca nityatvenābhyupagatasya katham arthajanyatvaṁ nāma ?/ asma-  
dādīnām api janakasyaiva grāhyatvābhyupagame smṛtipratyabhiññānādeḥ  
pramāṇasyāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ / yeṣāṁ caikāntakṣaṇiko ‘rtho janakaś ca*

*grāhya iti darśanam teṣām api janyajanakayor jñānārthayor bhinnakālatvān  
na grāhyagrāhakabhāvaḥ sambhavati / atha na janyajanakabhāvātiriktaḥ  
sandarśāyogolakavat jñānārthayoḥ kaścīd grāhyagrāhakabhāva iti matam,*

*“bhinnakālaṁ katham grāhyam iti ced grāhyatām viduḥ /  
hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam //”*

*[Pramāṇavārtika, 3.247]*

*iti vacanāt; tarhi sarvajñajñānasya vārtamānikārthaviṣayatvaṁ na kathañcid  
upapadyate vārtamānikakṣaṇasyājanakatvāt ajanakasya cāgrahaṇāt / svasarṇ-  
vedanasya ca svarūpājanyatve katham grāhakatvaṁ svarūpasya vā katham  
grāhyatvam iti cintyam / tasmāt svasvasāmagrīprabhavayor dīpaprakāśa-  
ghaṭayor iva jñānārthayoḥ prakāśyaprakāśakabhāvasambhavān na jñānani-  
mittatvam arthālokayor iti sthitam /*

93. Nor can it be maintained that the capacity for illumination possessed by the illuminator is nothing but its individual being that is derived from the object to be illuminated, since it is definitely observed that light, though not engendered from the jar and the like, does actually illuminate them. And how can the opponent (sic. Naiyāyika who believes sense-intuition to be generated by an objective datum) allege that the intuition of God, which is (believed to be) eternal, is generated by an object? And as regards ordinary human beings like us the theory that it is only the generator (of cognition) which can be the object of cognition would necessarily lead to the rejection of the validity of such organs of knowledge as memory and recognition. (The object of these cognitions is a past datum which cannot be supposed to exert its influence upon them as their generating condition). Regarding the view (of the Buddhists) who maintain that an existent is absolutely momentary and that the cognitum is (necessarily) the generator (of the cognition in question, it would suffice to point out that) in this theory the cognition and its object which are supposed to be related as effect and cause respectively cannot possibly stand in the relation of cogniser and cognitum on account of their being separated by an interval of time. It may be maintained that the relation of cognitum and cogniser subsisting between cognition and its object is not anything distinct and different from the relation of causality unlike the relation between a pair of pincers and an iron ball, and this (position has

been endorsed) by the argument (of Dharmakīrti), viz., “How can a thing occurring at a point of time different (from that of the cognition) be the object (of such a cognition) ? The answer is that the philosophers who are conversant with the rationale (of the origin of knowledge) affirm that the character of being a cognitum consists in nothing but the causal efficiency of the object to imprint its likeness on the cognition concerned” (PV, 3. 247). If that (be the true position), then the intuition of an omniscient would under no circumstance be supposed to be conversant with an object present at the time, inasmuch as a present datum (synchronizing with it) cannot be its cause and what is not a cause cannot be thought (*ex hypothesi*) to be the object of the cognition. The problem again deserves the serious consideration (of the opponent) as to how can a cognition exercise its self-intuitive function, that is to say, how can a cognition become its own cogniser ungenerated as it is by itself and how again can the self of a cognition be its object (though it is not its generator) ? The conclusion, therefore, legitimately follows from the above considerations that cognition and its object derive their existence from their own causes and stand in the relation of illuminator and illuminated just like the light of the lamp and the jar. And this knocks down the plea that the objective datum and light are the causal conditions of (perceptual) cognition.

94. *nanv arthājanyatve jñānasya katham pratikarmavyavasthā ?, tadutpattitadākāratābhyām hi sopapadyate, tasmād anutpannasyātadākārasya ca jñānasya sarvārthān praty aviśeṣāt; naivam; tadutpattim antareṇāpy āvaraṇakṣayopaśamalakṣaṇayā yogyatayaiva pratiniyatārthaprakāśakatvopapatteḥ / tadutpattāv api ca yogyatā avaśyāśrayaṇīyā, anyathā 'śeṣārthasānnidhye 'pi kutaścid evārthāt kasyacid eva jñānasya janmeti kautaskuto 'yam vibhāgaḥ / tadākāratā tv arthākārasaṅkrāntyā tāvad anupapannā, arthasya nirākāratva-prasaṅgāt / arthena ca mūrtenāmūrtasya jñānasya kīdrśam sādṛśyam ity arthaviśeṣagrahaṇapariṇāma eva sābhyauepyā / ataḥ –*

“*arthena ghaṭayaty enām nahi muktvā 'rtharūpatām /*”

[*Pramāṇavārtika*, 3.305]

*iti yatkiñcid etat /*

94. (Q) If a cognition be not causally conditioned by its object what will be the means of determining the relation of cognition and cognitum ?

The determination of this relation finds an easy explanation in the theory which holds that cognition is an effect and a copy of the object. (The opposite theory fails to explain) how can a cognition which is neither produced by nor is a copy of its object (have reference to that particular object) when (as a pure act of awareness without any intrinsic specific determination) it can unreservedly relate to all possible things. (A) The position is not so (desperate). That a cognition reveals a particular determinate object is due to the destruction-cum-subsidence of the relevant obscuring *karman*, which constitutes its specific competency and the relation of causality has no bearing upon it. The postulation of competency is, on the contrary, inevitable even in the theory of causality; otherwise there would be no explanation possible of the determination that a particular cognition is generated by a particular object though an infinite number of objects is present there (to any one of which it could be affiliated). As regards the sameness of structural form (of the cognition) it cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis that it is transferred by the object to the cognition concerned, as this would deprive the physical object of its own structure. And what again can be the kind of similarity between a physical object which possesses spatial dimension and a psychical act of cognition which lacks spatial dimension? And so (the similarity of structural form) must be understood to be nothing other than the transition (of consciousness as such) into the cognition of a particular object. And so the plea (of Dharmakīrti) "Consciousness is brought into relation with a physical object by means of structural similarity and never without it" (PV, 3. 305) is bereft of all substance.

95. *api ca vyaste samaste vaite grahaṇakāraṇam syātām / yadi vyaste; tadā kapālādyakṣaṇo ghaṭāntyakṣaṇasya, jalacandro vā nabhaścandrasya grāhakaḥ prāpnoti, tadutpattes tadākāratvāc ca / atha samaste; tarhi ghaṭottarakṣaṇaḥ pūrvaghaṭakṣaṇasya grāhakaḥ prasajati / jñānarūpatve saty ete grahaṇakāraṇam iti cet; tarhi samānajātīyajñānasya samanantara-pūrvajñānagrāhakatvaṁ prasajyeta / tan na yogyatām antareṇānyad grahaṇakāraṇam paśyāmaḥ ||25||*

95. Further, let us consider whether the two factors (causality and structural similarity) are jointly or severally the conditions of (objective)



cognition. If the latter alternative (i.e., causality or structural similarity were determinant of the cognitive relation), then the parts of the jar in the first moment (of their origin) should be cognisant of the whole jar in the last moment, or, the moon's reflection in water should be cognisant of the moon in the firmament, as (in the former case) the two phenomena stand in the relation of causality and (in the latter case) structural similarity subsists (between the two). If both of them collectively (determined the same), then the jar in the subsequent moment should be held to be cognisant of the jar in the previous moment (the former being both an effect as well as a structural facsimile of the latter). If it is held that the two factors operate as the conditions of cognition only when they relate to states of cognition (and thus the alleged consequences are ruled out), then a subsequent cognition which is homogeneous with the immediately precedent cognition which generates it should be cognisant of the latter. Thus (on the scrutiny of the opponent) we do not find anything else than competency to be the condition of cognition. (25)

96. 'avagrahehāvāyadhāraṇātmā' ity uktam ity avagrahādīn lakṣayati –  
akṣārthayoge darśanānantaram arthagrahaṇam avagrahaḥ || 26 ||

96. It has been observed before that (empirical intuition consists) of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgement and retention and now with reference thereto he defines determinate perception and the rest.

(Aph.) **Determinate perception is the cognition of the object, which follows in the wake of indeterminate intuition upon the contact of the sense-organ with an object. (26)**

97. 'akṣam' indriyaṁ dravyabhāvarūpam, 'arthah' dravyaparyāyātmā tayoh 'yogah' sambandho 'natidūrāsannavyavahitadeśādyavasthānalakṣaṇā yogyatā / niyatā hi sā viśayaviśayiṇoh, yad āha –

"puṭṭham suṇei saddam rūvaṁ puṇa pāsae apuṭṭham tu //"

[Āvaśyaka-niryukti, 5]

ityādi / tasminn akṣārthayoge sati 'darśanam' anullikhitaviśeṣasya vastunaḥ pratipattiḥ / tadanantaram iti kramapratipādanārtham etat / etena darśana-syāvagrahaṁ prati pariṇāmitoktā, naḥy asata eva sarvathā kasyacid utpādaḥ, sato vā sarvathā vināśa iti darśanam evottaraṁ pariṇāmaṁ pratipadyate / 'arthasya' dravyaparyāyātmano 'rthakriyākṣamasya' 'grahaṇam', 'samyag

*arthanirṇayaḥ' iti sāmānyalakṣaṇānuvṛtter nirṇayo na punar avikalapakam darśanamātram 'avagrahaḥ' /*

97. Sense-organ is of two kinds – the material organ and the (psychical) function. The object is a composite of substance and modes. The 'contact' between them is a relation (which in the ultimate analysis transpires to be) a sort of competency constituted by the situation (of the object) in a spatio-temporal context which is neither too far, nor too near, nor intercepted (by an obstructive barrier). And this (competency) of the sense and object is a specifically determinate (characteristic). Thus has it been observed "One hears a word when it is in conjunction (with the auditory organ) but sees a coloured shape even without conjunction" (AN, 5) and so on. Now, indeterminate intuition is the cognition of an object which leaves the specific determinations out of account and it takes place (immediately) on that very sense-object contact. The expression 'which follows in the wake of that (indeterminate intuition)' serves to show the chronological order. This further elucidates the fact that indeterminate intuition is (the stuff which is) transformed into determinate perception. It is a truism that nothing is produced which was absolutely non-existent and nothing absolutely existent suffers destruction. Thus indeterminate intuition itself undergoes transformation into the subsequent state (sic. determinate perception). (In the phrase 'the cognition of the object'), 'the object' stands for an entity which consists of substance and modes, capable of exercising causal efficiency, and 'the cognition' is to be understood as definitive cognition in pursuance of the wording of the general definition (sic.) 'authentic definitive cognition' which runs down (to the present aphorism). So determinate perception is not (to be confounded with) mere indeterminate cognition.

98. *na cāyaṁ mānaso vikalpaḥ, cakṣurādisannidhānāpekṣatvāt pratisaṅkhyānenāpratyākhyeyatvāc ca / mānaso hi vikalpaḥ pratisaṅkhyānena nirudhyate, na cāyaṁ tatheti na vikalpaḥ ||26||*

*avagrhītaviśeṣākāṅkṣaṇam ihā ||27||*

98. This (determinate perception) must not be held to be a mental construction, since it depends (for its existence) on the active exercise (lit. vicinity) of the sense-organ such as sight and also because it is not liable to be corrected by discursive thought. A mental construction, on the other

hand, is cancelled by discursive thought. But this (determinate perception) is not so (found to be cancelled by discursive thought) and consequently it cannot be a mental construction. (26)

(Aph.) Speculation is inquisitive pursuit (for the knowledge) of specific details of the perceived datum. (27)

99. *avagrahagr̥hītasya śabdāder arthasya 'kim ayam śabdaḥ śāṅkhaḥ śārṅgo vā' iti saṁśaye sati 'mādhuryādayaḥ śāṅkhadharmā evopalabhyante na kārkaśyādayaḥ śāṅgadharmāḥ' ity anvayavyatirekarūpaviśeṣaparyālo-canarūpā mateś ceṣṭā 'ihā' / iha cāvagrahehayor antarāle abhyaste 'pi viṣaye saṁśayajñānam asty eva āśubhāvāt tu nopalakṣyate / na tu pramāṇam, samyagarthanirṇayātmakatvābhāvāt /*

99. On the determinate perception of an objective datum, for example a sound, there arises a doubt whether the sound emanates from a conch or a horn, and the mind is driven to consider the specific points of agreement and difference in the form (of the judgement) 'it is perceived as sweet and agreeable which qualities belong to the sound of a conch and not as harsh and shrill which are the qualities of the sound of a horn'. The mental urge as embodied in the aforementioned consideration is called speculation. It is absolutely certain that doubt crops up in the interval between determinate perception and speculation even when the object is a matter of habitual perception. But its existence is not detected owing to the rapidity (of the succession). But it is not valid knowledge, since it lacks the (fundamental) characteristic of being authentic and definitive cognition.

100. *nanu parokṣapramāṇabhedarūpam ūhākhyam pramāṇam vakṣyate tat kas tasmād īhāyā bhedaḥ ? / ucyate – trikālagocaraḥ sādhyasā-dhanayor vyāptigrahaṇapaṭur ūho yam āśritya "vyāptigrahaṇakāle yogīva sampadyate pramātā" iti nyāyavido vadanti / īhā tu vārtamānikārthaviṣayā pratyakṣaprabheda ity apaunaruktyam /*

100. (Q) It will be stated later on that there is a species of non-perceptual organ of knowledge called *ūha*, reasoning. What then is the difference from that (reasoning) of this speculation ? (A) Reasoning is the organ competent for the realisation of universal concomitance between the probans and the probandum and has reference to all the three divisions of time (sic. past, present and future). The logicians affirm that the subject while

apprehending the universal concomitance exercises this organ and appears to attain to the level of (supernatural intuition of) an ascetic. But speculation takes stock of things existing in the present time and is a species of perceptual cognition and thus there is no room for (the charge of) repetition.

101. *īhā ca yadyapi ceṣṭocyate tathāpi cetanasya seti jñānarūpaiveti yuktam pratyakṣabhedatvam asyāḥ / na cānirṇayarūpatvād apramāṇatvam asyāḥ śaṅkanīyam; svaviśayanirṇayarūpatvāt, nirṇayāntarāsādrśye nirṇayāntarāṇām apy anirṇayatvaprasaṅgaḥ ||27||*

*īhitaviśeṣanirṇayo 'vāyaḥ ||28||*

101. Though speculation is said to be of the nature of conation, it appertains to the conscious self and thus must be of the nature of cognition. It stands to reason then that it should be considered as a species of perceptual cognition. One should not however call in question its title to validity on the ground that it is of the nature of indeterminate cognition, since it is a fact that it is a determinate cognition in regard to its own subject matter. If the lack of analogy with other instances of determinate cognition were the ground (of this allegation), the accepted instances of determinate cognition would be liable to be (condemned as) indeterminate in character (on the ground of difference from speculation). (27)

(Aph.) **Perceptual judgement is the determination of the specific characteristic which was the object of speculation. (28)**

102. *īhākroḍīkṛte vastuni viśeṣasya 'śaṅkha evāyaṁ śabda na śārṅgaḥ' ity evaṁrūpasyāvadhāraṇam 'avāyaḥ' ||28||*

*smṛtihetur dhāraṇā ||29||*

102. Perceptual judgement is the (final) determination of the specific characteristic regarding the object of speculation as illustrated by the proposition 'the sound must be of the conch and not of the horn'. (28)

(Aph.) **Retention is the condition of memory. (29)**

103. *'smṛteḥ' atītānusandhānarūpāyā 'hetuḥ' pariṇāmikāraṇam, saṁskāra iti yāvat, saṅkhyeyam asaṅkhyeyam vā kālām jñānasyāvasthānam 'dhāraṇā' / avagrahādayas tu traya āntarmauhūrtikāḥ /*

103. The condition is the causal stuff capable of change (into the effect) as memory which consists in the recollection of a past event. It is

nothing but the latent mental trace (left over as legacy by previous experience). Retention is thus the continued existence of a cognition for an (indefinite) length of time which has been designated as *saṅkhyeya* or *asaṅkhyeya*. The trio consisting of determinate perception and the rest (viz., speculation and perceptual judgement) can exist for a period of time varying from a mathematical instant to a *muhūrta* (forty-eight minutes) minus one instant.

104. *saṃskārasya ca pratyakṣabhedarūpatvāt jñānatvam unneyam, na punar yathāhuḥ pare – “jñānād atirikto bhāvanākhyo ’yaṃ saṃskāraḥ” iti / asya hy ajñānarūpatve jñānarūpasmṛtījanakatvaṃ na syāt, nahi sattā sattāntaram anuvīṣati / ajñānarūpatve cāsyātmadharmatvaṃ na syāt, cetanadharmasyācetanatvābhāvāt /*

104. The latent mental trace should be deduced to be a species of cognition from the fact that it is a species of perceptual cognition. It must not, on the contrary, be supposed as has been done by a class of philosophers (Vaiśeṣikas) that it is different from cognition as such and so called (by a different name, viz.,) *bhāvanā* (a sort of psychic leaven). If it were not cognitional in character, it could not produce recollection which is a species of cognition. Certainly one kind of existence cannot be transformed into another (opposite) kind of existence. If, on the contrary, it were non-cognitive in nature, it could not possibly be an attribute of the self, since it is a truism that the characteristic of a conscious entity cannot be unconscious *per se*.

105. *nanv avicyutim api dhāraṇām anvaśiṣan vṛddhāḥ, yad Bhāṣyakāraḥ – “aviccū dhāraṇā hoi” [Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya, gāthā 180] tat katham smṛtihetor eva dhāraṇātvam asūtrayaḥ ? / satyam, asty avicyutir nāma dhāraṇā, kintu sā ’vāya evāntarbhūtetī na pṛthag uktā / avāya eva hi dīrghadīrgho ’vicyutir dhāraṇety ucyate iti / smṛtihetutvād vā ’vicyutir dhāraṇayaiva saṅgrhītā / na hy avāyamātrād avicyutirahitāt smṛtir bhavati, gacchatṛṇasparśaprāyaṇām avāyānām pariśīlanavikalānām smṛtījanakatvā-darśanāt / tasmāt smṛtihetū avicyutisaṃskārāv anena saṅgrhītāv ity adoṣaḥ / yadyapi smṛtir api dhāraṇābhedatvena siddhānte ’bhihitā tathāpi parokṣa-pramāṇabhedatvād iha nokteti sarvam avadātam /*

105. (Now a problem arises in this connection). The older Jaina masters assert that absence of lapse is also a case of retention. The

following statement of the Bhāṣyakāra “absence of lapse is retention” (VABh, 180) (may be quoted in support). How then (in the face of such declaration) have you stated in the aphorism that the condition of memory alone is retention ? (A) True, there is such a thing as absence of lapse which is called retention. But this is included within the fold of perceptual judgement and for this reason it has not been separately mentioned. Perceptual judgement when protracted for a length of time is entitled retention *qua* freedom from lapse. Or, as freedom from lapse is also a condition of memory, it has been included under retention (as defined by us). It is positive that mere perceptual judgement bereft of absence of lapse does not give rise to recollection. Perceptual judgements which are not subjected to attentive reflection are almost on the level of (unheeded cases of perception) as the touch of grass by a man in (hurried) motion and such cases of cognition are not found to give rise to any recollection. Thus there is no occasion for complaint as this (aphorism in question) includes both ‘absence of lapse’ and ‘mental trace’ as the conditions of recollection. Although recollection itself has been affirmed to be a species of retention in authoritative texts, it has not been mentioned in the aphorism, since it is an instance of non-perceptual knowledge (and as such is not relevant to the present context). Thus all the relevant issues have been elucidated.

106. *iha ca kramabhāvinām apy avagrahādīnām kathañcid ekatvam avgseyam / viruddhadharmādhyāso hy ekatvapratipattiparipanthī / na cāsau pramāṇapratipanne 'rthe pratyarthitām bhajate / anubhūyate hi khalu harṣaviṣādādiviruddhāvartākrāntam ekam caitanyam / viruddhadharmādhyāsāc ca bibhyadbhir api katham ekam citrapaṭi jñānam ekānekākārolle khaśekharam abhyupagamyate Saugataiḥ, citram vā rūpaṁ Naiyāyikādibhir iti ? /*

106. Now, in the present context one should take clear cognisance (of the fact) that there is somehow a thread of unity which runs through the different stages of perceptual cognitions, sic., determinate perception and the rest in spite of their occurrence in succession. It is certain that the presence of contradictorily opposed attributes is an impediment to the knowledge of identity; but such occurrence does not operate as an impediment in the case of an object which is apprehended by an accredited organ of knowledge. It is

a commonplace of experience that the self-same consciousness is felt to be vested with such (apparently) incompatible states as pleasure and pain and so on. How is it that the Buddhists who are notorious for their horror of (contradiction in) the juxtaposition of opposite attributes, do admit (the validity of) the unitary cognition of variegated carpet, with its obvious reference to unity and multiplicity of the same ? And how do again the Naiyāyikas and their allies admit the possibility of a diversified colour ?

107. *Naiyāyikās tu – “indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam” [Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4] iti pratyakṣalakṣaṇam ācakṣate / atra ca pūrvācāryakṛtavyākhyāvaimukhyena saṅkhyāvadbhis Trilocana-Vācaspatipramukhair ayam arthaḥ samarthito yathā – indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyabhicāri pratyakṣam ity’ eva pratyakṣalakṣaṇam / ‘yataḥ’śabdādhyāhāreṇa ca yattador nityābhisa-mbandhād uktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam jñānam yato bhavati tat tathāvidha-jñānasādhanam jñānarūpam ajñānarūpam vā pratyakṣam pramāṇam iti / asya ca phalabhūtasya jñānasya dvayī gatiḥ avikalpam savikalpam ca / tasya ubhayaḥ api pramāṇarūpatvam abhidhātum vibhāgavacanam etad ‘avyapadeśyam vyavasāyātmakam’ iti /*

107. The Naiyāyikas propound the definition of perceptual cognition in the following terms : The unerring cognition that is produced by sense-object contact is perceptual and it is (both) indeterminate and determinate (NS, 1.1.4)<sup>1</sup>. Now scholars of eminence with Trilocana and Vācaspati in the vanguard have set their face against the interpretation of the *sūtra* by the previous exponents and sought to propound their interpretation in the following terms. They contend that the definition of perceptual cognition is (summed up in the clause) “That unerring cognition which is produced by sense-object contact is perceptual.” (Now these exponents propose to) read (into the aphorism the term) ‘whence’ as an ellipsis and on the strength (of the dictum) that (the relative and demonstrative pronouns) ‘which’ and

1. According to the old Nyāya tradition, the aphorism presents definition only, and not the divisions also. Hence the translation of the aphorism should be as follows : Perception is that cognition (*jñāna*) which is born of a sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣotpanna*), is non-verbal (*avyapadeśya*), is non-erroneous (*avyabhicārin*), and is determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*). One may study Jayanta’s explanation of the aphorism in his *Nyāyamañjarī*. — Editor

'that' stand universally and necessarily in relation (they further supply the term 'that' and they interpret the aphorism thus completed as follows) : (The source) 'from which' the cognition as qualified by the aforesaid adjectives is engendered, that (source), in other words, the instrument of such cognition, be it of the nature of cognition or different from it, is the organ of cognition known as perceptual. Now the cognition resulting from it is possibly of two kinds, indeterminate and determinate. The statement of the classification (in the aphorism) as 'indeterminate and determinate' is intended to bring home the fact that the instruments of both such cognitions are to be regarded as organs of knowledge.

108. *tatrobhayarūpasyāpi jñānasya prāmāṇyam upekṣya 'yataḥ'-śabdādhyāhāra-kleśenājñānarūpasya sannikarṣādeḥ prāmāṇyasamarthanam ayuktam / katham hy ajñānarūpāḥ sannikarṣādayo 'rthaparicchittau sādha-katamā bhavanti vyabhicārāt ?, saty apīndriyārthasannikarṣe 'rthopalabdher abhāvāt / jñāne saty eva bhāvāt, sādha-katamaṁ hi karaṇam avyavahita-phalaṁ ca tad iti /*

108. Now, the attempt to invest such non-cognitional facts as sense-object contact with the status of organ of knowledge is (extremely) unjustifiable, particularly when it seeks to achieve this end by resort to the tortuous stratagem of supplying an ellipsis in (flagrant) disregard of the claim to validity of both these kinds of cognition. How can sense-object contact and the like which are not of the nature of cognitions function as efficientmost instruments of the determination of object, lacking as they are in necessary concomitance, since the cognition of object fails to materialise in spite of the sense-object contact being present and is seen to emerge into being only when there is a cognition at the back of it ? An instrument is what is the efficientmost condition and immediately produces the effect.

109. *sannikarṣo 'pi yadi yogyatātiriktaḥ saṁyogādisambandhas tarhi sa cakṣuṣo 'rthena saha nāsti aprāpyakāritvāt tasya / drśyate hi kācābhra-sphatikādivyavahitasyāpy arthasya cakṣuṣopalabdhīḥ / atha prāpyakāri cakṣuḥ karaṇatvād vāsyādivad iti brūṣe; tarhy ayaskāntākaraṇaṇopalena lohāsannikṛṣṭena vyabhicāraḥ / na ca saṁyuktasaṁyogādiḥ sannikarṣas tatra kalpayitum śakyate, atiprasaṅgād iti /*



109. If, again, the sense-object contact is something different from the aptitude (of the sense-organ) and is deemed to be of the nature of relation like conjunction, then certainly no such contact with the object is possible for the organ of sight which acts from distance, aloof and out of contact. It is a matter of observation that things are perceived by sight even when they are intercepted by such transparent media as glass, mica and lens. If you contend that the organ of sight is an instrument and as such it can work only in close contact like (other instruments such as) the carpenter's axe, (it can be easily refuted by citing the case of) the magnetic stone which attracts iron, though out of touch with it – which shows that the concomitance in question is not universal. It is not possible to suppose that there is an actual contact between them in the shape of conjunction-cum-conjunction through a medium (e.g., A is in conjunction with B and B with C and so A is in mediate conjunction with C. In the present case the magnet may be supposed to be indirectly conjoined with iron through the space which connects both at the two ends). Such indirect relation is available everywhere (even as between facts which do not stand in causal connection).

110. *Saugatās tu “pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam” [Nyāyabindu, 1.4] iti lakṣaṇam avocan / “abhilāpasamśargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā tayā rahitam” [Nyāyabindu, 1.5-6] kalpanāpoḍham iti / etac ca vyavahārānupayogitvāt pramāṇasya lakṣaṇam anupapannam, tathāhi etasmād viniścityārtham arthakriyārthinaḥ tatsamarthe ’rthe pravartamānā viśamvāda-bhājo mā bhūvann iti pramāṇasya lakṣaṇaparīkṣāyāṁ pravartante parīkṣakāḥ / vyavahārānupayoginaś ca tasya vāyasasadasaddaśanaparīkṣāyām iva niṣphalaḥ pariśramaḥ / nirvikalpottarakālabhāvināḥ savikalpakāt tu vyavahāropagame varam tasyaiva prāmāṇyam āstheyam, kim avikalpakena śikhaṇḍineti ? /*

110. The Buddhists again have propounded the definition (of perceptual cognition in the proposition) “Perceptual cognition (is a cognition which) is free from conceptual construction and is not erroneous” (NB, 1. 4). “The conceptual construction is a cognition the content of which is liable to be associated with verbal expressions. And the cognition which is untainted with such conceptual construction is to be understood as the meaning of the clause ‘which is free from conceptual construction’ ” (NB, 1.5-6.). This definition of an organ of knowledge is irrational, since it has no bearing

upon practical activity. In support of our position we need only observe that philosophers set about the task of evaluating the likely definitions of knowledge as an organon, with the sole object in view that persons, desirous of practical advantages may be directed to the pursuit of objects capable of yielding such benefits and be saved from disappointment. The labour involved in the philosophical examination of the definition which is devoid of all practical consequences is as infructuous as the speculation regarding the existence or otherwise of the teeth of a crow. If, on the other hand, the practical activity is supposed to be conditioned by determinate knowledge which occurs subsequently to the indeterminate cognition, the consideration (of equity) would rather make it inevitable that all validity should be set down to the credit of determinate cognition. The postulation of indeterminate cognition (as an intermediary link), which is as inoperative as Śikhaṇḍin, is an absolute superfluity.

111. *Jaiminīyās tu dharmam prati animittatvavyājena "satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittam vidyamāno-palambhanatvāt" [Jaiminīyasūtra, 1.1.4] ity anuvādabhaṅgyā pratyakṣalakṣaṇam ācakṣate, yad āhuḥ –*

*"evam saty anuvāditvaṁ lakṣaṇasyāpi sambhavet /" iti*

*[Śloka-vārtika, sūtra 4.39]*

*vyācakṣate ca – indriyāṇām samprayoge sati puruṣasya jāyamānā buddhiḥ pratyakṣam iti /*

111. The followers of Jaimini, on the plea (of eliminating those sources of knowledge) which are not organs (of the knowledge) of religious duty set forth the definition of perceptual cognition rather by way of reproduction of a known fact (than as an original contribution) in the following terms : "The cognition which is engendered in (the mind of) a person upon the actual contact of sense-organs (*satsamprayoge*) is perceptual (awareness) and being awareness of an object existing at the present moment, it is not a competent organon (for religious duty)" (MS, 1. 1. 4). So has it been observed (by Kumārila) : Such being the case, it is possible to regard the definition as the reproduction of a known fact (SV, sū 4. 39). It has been interpreted as follows : The cognition that occurs to a subject as a sequel to the contact of sense-organs is perceptual (awareness).

112. atra saṁśayaviparyayabuddhijanmano 'pīndriyasamprayoge sati pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgād ativyāptiḥ / atha 'satsamprayoge' iti satā samprayoge iti vyākhyāyate tarhi nirālambanavibhramā evārthanirapekṣajanmāno nirastā bhavayur na sālambanau saṁśayaviparyayau / atha sati samprayoge iti satsaptamī pakṣa eva na tyajyate saṁśayaviparyayanirāsāya ca 'samprayoga' ity atra 'sam' ity upasargo varṇyate, yad āha –

“samyagarthe ca saṁśabdo duṣprayoganivāraṇaḥ /  
duṣṭatvāc chuktikāyogo vāryate rajatekṣaṇāt //” iti

[Ślokavārtika, sūtra 4.38-39]

tathāpi prayogasamyaktvasyātīndriyatvena pratyakṣānavagamyatvāt kāryato 'vagatir vaktavyā / kāryaṁ ca jñānam na ca tad aviśeṣitam eva prayoga-samyaktvāvagamanāyālam / na ca tadviśeṣaṇaparam aparam iha padam asti / satāṁ samprayoga iti ca varaṁ nirālambanavijñānanivṛttaye, 'sati' iti tu saptamyaiva gatārthatvād anarthakam /

112. Now the definition is too wide inasmuch as it overlaps such congnitions as doubt and illusion which also occur as the result of sense-contact and thus should, (in terms of the definition), be accepted as instances of perceptual cognition. If the term 'actual contact' be interpreted as contact with actually existent datum, it would lead to the exclusion of the cases of hallucination alone which are unfounded on reality and come into being independently of an objective datum. It will fail to exclude doubt and illusion which are based upon real data. Again, if the phrase, 'upon actual contact' (satsamprayoge), be interpreted as 'upon the happening of the contact as an antecedent event' (sati samprayoge) and thus the locative construction (in the original Sanskrit) be not surrendered at all, the prefix 'sam' (actual) in the term samprayoge (contact) may be deemed competent for the exclusion of doubt and illusion. And exactly this has been proposed (by Kumārila in the following) : The prefix 'sam' (actual) has the sense 'authentic' and thus serves to preclude (the cases of) defective contact. (Thus for instance), the contact with shell, which gives rise to the visual preception of silver, is debarred since it is vitiated by a defect (SV, sū 4.38-39). [The proposed interpretation is open to grave objection]. The authenticity of contact is a supersensuous fact and so cannot be known by perceptual intuition. It must be admitted that the knowledge (in question) can be had

by (inference based on) the effect. The effect here is the (perceptual) cognition and certainly it is not competent to produce the assurance of the authenticity of the contact unless it is qualified (by a restricting adjective). But as the definition stands, there is no such word present in it as can be understood as its qualifying adjective. (The term *satsamprayoge*, on the actual contact, should be analysed as) *satā samprayoge* (on the contact with actually present objects) and this would serve to exclude (subjective) objectless cognitions. The construction with the term *sati* is redundant, since its purpose is served by the locative case-ending (in *samprayoge*).

113. *ye 'pi "tatsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma satpratyakṣaṃ yadvīṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tena samprayoge indriyāṇāṃ puruṣasya buddhijanma satpratyakṣaṃ yad anyaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ anyasamprayoge bhavati na tat pratyakṣam /" [Śābara-bhāṣya, 1.1.5] ity evaṃ tatsator vyatyayena lakṣaṇam anavadyam ity ahuḥ, teṣāṃ api kliṣṭakalpanaiva, saṃśaya-jñānena vyabhicārānivr̥tteḥ / tatra hi yadvīṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tena samprayoga indriyāṇāṃ asty eva / yadyapi cobhayaviṣayaṃ saṃśaya-jñānaṃ tathāpi tayor anyatareṇendriyaṃ saṃyuktam eva ubhayāvamarśitvāc ca saṃśayasya yena saṃyuktaṃ cakṣus tadviṣayaṃ api taj jñānaṃ bhavaty eveti nātivyāptiparihāraḥ / avyāptiś ca cākṣuṣa-jñānasyendriyasamprayogajatvābhāvāt / aprāpyakāri ca cakṣur ity uktaprāyam /*

113. One exponent (Śābara) seeks to make out the definition free from all faults (by proposing a change in the syntactical construction) through the transposition of the words *tat* and *sat* (in the aphorism) as follows : *tatsamprayoge .... satpratyakṣam*, and he interprets the changed definition thus : The cognition which is engendered in a person upon the actual contact of the sense-organ with the fact which is the object of resulting cognition is authentic perception; the cognition, on the contrary, of an object which is different from that with which the sense is in contact is not (authentic) preception (SB, 1. 1. 5). But the result achieved is nothing more than a tortuous exposition (which effects no improvement), since it fails to remove the contingency of its extension to doubt. Now in doubt, the sense is certainly in contact with the objective datum which is the object of the resulting cognition. Though doubt is a cognition of two objects, yet it is undeniably a fact that the sense is in contact with one of the objects

concerned. Doubt being cognisant of two alternative objects, it is absolutely positive that it has for its object that very fact with which the sense, say sight, is in actual contact. Thus the definition fails to avoid its unwarranted extension. The definition again lies exposed to the charge of being too narrow, since it fails to include visual perception which is not the result of sense-contact. That the organ of sight functions independently of actual contact with the object has been established before.

114. “śrotrādivṛttir avikalpikā pratyakṣam” iti Vṛddhasāṅkhyāḥ / atra śrotrādīnām acetanatvāt tadvytṛteḥ sutarām acaitanyam iti katham pramāṇatvam ?/ cetanasamsargāt taccaitanyābhyupagame varam cita eva prāmāṇyam abhyupagantum yuktam/na cāvikalpakatve prāmāṇyam astīti yatkiñcid etat /

114. The older exponents of Sāṅkhya define perceptual cognition to be a modification of the sense-organ, such as the organ of hearing, and to be indeterminate. Now, the sense-organs beginning with the organ of hearing are devoid of consciousness and it follows *a fortiori* that a modification of such organs must be devoid of consciousness. How can then such modification serve as an organ of knowledge ? If, on the other hand, it is assumed to derive its conscient character from its association with a conscious principle (sic. self), it stands to reason that the status of an organ of knowledge should rather be accorded to the conscious self. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that indeterminate cognition is an organ of knowledge. This (definition under review) is thus found to be hollow.

115. “prativīṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam” [Sāṅkhya-kārikā, 5] iti pratyakṣalakṣaṇam iti Īśvarakṛṣṇaḥ / tad apy anumānena vyabhicāritvād alakṣaṇam / atha ‘pratiḥ’ ābhimukhye vartate tenābhiniukhyena viṣayādhyavasāyaḥ pratyakṣam ity ucyate; tad apy anumānena tulyam ghaṭo ‘yam itivad ayaṁ parvato ‘gnimān ity ābhimukhyena pratīteḥ / atha anumānādivilakṣaṇo ‘bhiniukho ‘dhyavasāyaḥ pratyakṣam; tarhi pratyakṣalakṣaṇam akaraṇīyam eva śabdānumānalakṣaṇavilakṣaṇatayaiva tatsiddheḥ /

115. Īśvarakṛṣṇa propounds the definition of perception in the following terms : Perception is the determinate cognition of its specific object (prativīṣayādhyavasāyaḥ). This also is not a proper definition on account of its undue extension to inference. It may, however, be contended that the word ‘prati’ (rendered specific) here stands for ‘position in the front’ and thus

perception is the determinate cognition of an object standing in front. But this also is on the same level with inference. Just as the perception 'this is a jar' refers to the object present in the front, so also the inference 'this hill is possessed of fire' (has reference to an object standing in front and thus there would be no difference between perception and inference). It may be held that determinate cognition of an object in the front as distinguished from inference is to be understood as perceptual cognition. But in that case there would be no necessity for setting forth the definition of perception as the proposed (definition) would be automatically known by virtue of its mere difference from the definitions of verbal and inferential cognitions.

116. *tataś ca parakīyalakṣaṇānām duṣṭatvād idam eva 'viśadaḥ pratyakṣam' iti pratyakṣalakṣaṇam anavadyam ||29||*

116. Now, it follows (from the examination of) the definitions propounded by rival philosophers which have been found to be vitiated (by some defect or other) that the definition of perception (proposed by us) viz., 'that which is immediate and lucid is perceptual cognition' is (the only possible definition which is) free from censure. (29)

117. *pramāṇaviśayaphalaprāmāṭrūpeṣu caturṣu vidhiṣu tattvaṁ parisamāpyata iti viśayādilakṣaṇam antareṇa pramāṇalakṣaṇam asampūrṇam iti viśayaṁ lakṣayati –*

***pramāṇasya viśayo dravyaparyāyātmakaṁ vastu ||30||***

117. (The knowledge of) reality is summed up under the four topics, viz., knowledge, the object of knowledge, the result (of knowledge) and the subject. And so the definition of organ of knowledge is bound to remain incomplete unless the definitions of the object and the rest are known. Accordingly the author proposes to define the object (as follows) :

**(Aph.) The object of an organ of knowledge is the real which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode. (30)**

118. *pratyakṣasya prakṛtatvāt tasyaiva viśayātau lakṣayitavye 'pramāṇasya' iti pramāṇasāmānyagrahaṇaṁ pratyakṣavat pramāṇāntarāṇām api viśayādilakṣaṇam ihaiva vaktuṁ yuktam aviśeṣāt tathā ca lāghavam api bhavatīty evaṁ artham / jātīnirdeśac ca pramāṇānām pratyakṣādinām 'viśayaḥ' gocaro 'dravyaparyāyātmakaṁ vastu' / dravati tāṁs tān paryāyān gacchati iti dravyaṁ dhrauvyalakṣaṇam / pūrvottaravivartavartyanvaya-*

*pratyayasamadhigamyam ūrdhvatāsāmānyam iti yāvat / pariyanty utpādavinaśadharmāṇo bhavantīti paryāyā vivartāḥ / tac ca te cātmā svarūpaṁ yasya tat dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu, paramārthasad ity arthaḥ, yad Vācakamukhyaḥ – “utpādayayadhrauvyayuktam sat” [Tattvārthasūtra, 5.29] iti, Pāramarṣam api “upannei vā vīgamei vā dhuvei vā” iti /*

118. Though it is perceptual cognition that is the subject matter of consideration and accordingly such issues as the definition of the object and the result of the same should alone be considered in the present context, yet the expression ‘an organ of knowledge’ (in the aphorism) stands for the whole class. In consideration of the fact that there is no difference (in this respect among the several kinds of organs of knowledge) it is appropriate that the definition of the object etc. of the other kinds of organs of knowledge, as of perceptual cognition, should also be stated here and this procedure would have the further advantage of logical economy. The expression ‘organ of knowledge’ (in the aphorism) stands for the whole class and so includes all the varieties of knowledge, perceptual and the rest, and the object of all these is a real which is of the nature of substance-cum-mode. The term *dravya* (rendered substance) is derived from *√dru* (to go) and etymologically means that which runs through the different modes – which sets forth the characteristic of persistence. It thus ultimately transpires to be the vertical universal which is revealed by the cognition of its identity running (in succession) through the antecedent and subsequent states. The term *paryāya* (rendered mode) etymologically denotes the state which has the characteristics of coming into existence and ceasing to be (in succession). The real which is of the nature of substance and mode (*dravyaparyāyātmakam*) thus comes to mean that which has the former (sic. identity) and the latter two (coming into existence and ceasing to be) as constitutive of its nature. The term real thus means what is truly existent as an objective fact (in its own right). This has been endorsed by *Vācakamukhya* (in the aphorism) “Real is that which is endowed with origin, cessation and persistence” (TS, 5. 29) and also by the following statement of *Paramarṣi* “Real originates, ceases and is continuous”.

119. *tatra ‘dravyaparyāya’grahaṇena dravyaikāntaparyāyaikāntavā-diparikalpita viṣayavyudāsaḥ / ‘ātma’grahaṇena cātyantavyatiriktadravyapa-*

ryāyavādiKāṇāda-Yaugābhyupagataviṣayanirāsaḥ / yac chrīSiddhasenaḥ –  
 “dohim vi naehim nīyam satthamulūeṇa tahavi micchattaṃ /  
 jam sāvisayappahāṇattaṇeṇa annonnaniravikkha //”

[Sanmati, 3.49] tti ||

119. The incorporation of ‘substance-cum-mode’ (in the definition) serves to counteract the conception of the object of knowledge as exclusively substance and as pure mode respectively advocated by the philosophers (of the Sāṅkhya and Buddhist schools). The insertion of the term ‘nature’ is intended for the refutation of the conception of the object sponsored by the adherents of Kāṇāda and Akṣapāda who maintain that substance and modes are absolutely different from one another. (The following statement of) Siddhasena lends support (to our position) : Ulūka has built his system in pursuance of both *nayas* (points of view), yet it is vitiated by untruth, because he has advocated that substance and modes are mutually independent and that each is supreme in its own sphere (ST, 3. 49). (30)

120. *kutaḥ punar dravyaparyāyātmakam eva vastu pramāṇānāṃ viṣayo na dravyamātram paryāyamātram ubhayaṃ vā svatantram ? ity āha –*  
*arthakriyāsāmarthyāt ||31||*

120. But what is the reason that the real which is the object of the organs of knowledge should be only a complex of substance-cum-mode and neither pure substance nor pure mode nor both independent of each other ? In reply the author states :

(Aph.) **Because of the capacity for the generation of practical consequences. (31)**

121. ‘*arthasya*’ hānopādānādilakṣaṇasya ‘*kriyā*’ niṣpattis tatra ‘*sāmarthyāt*’, *dravyaparyāyātmakasyaiva vastuno rthakriyāsamarthatvād ity arthaḥ ||31||*

121. Practical consequences are of the nature of acceptance and avoidance and the like. ‘Generation’ means production. The capacity for such is possible only in a real which is a complex of substance-cum-mode. (Hence the impossibility of alternative conceptions above referred to). (31)

122. *yadi nāmaivam tataḥ kim ity āha –*

*tallakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ ||32||*

122. Granted that this is the case; but what consequences would you



deduce therefrom ? In reply to such a question he states :

(Aph.) **Because reality has that for its characteristic. (32)**

123. 'tad' arthakriyāsāmarthyam 'lakṣaṇam' asādhāraṇam rūpam yasya tat tallakṣaṇam tasya bhāvas tattvam tasmāt / kasya ? / 'vastunaḥ' paramārthasato rūpasya / ayam arthaḥ – arthakriyārthī hi sarvaḥ pramāṇam anveṣate, api nāmetāḥ prameyam arthakriyākṣamaṇi viniścitya kṛtārtho bhaveyam iti na vyasanitayā / tadyadi pramāṇaviśayo 'rtho 'rthakriyākṣamo na bhavet tadā nāsau pramāṇaparīkṣaṇam ādriyeta / yad āha –

“arthakriyā'samarthasya vicāraiḥ kim tad 'rthinām /  
ṣaṇḍhasya rūpavairūpye kāmīnyāḥ kim parīkṣayā //”

[Pramāṇavārtika, 1.215] iti /

123. 'That' (in the aphorism) means capacity for generating a practical consequence. 'Characteristic' means the peculiar nature. So the expression 'has that for its characteristic' is equivalent to 'has capacity for generating a practical consequence as its peculiar nature'. The fact of having this is the reason (for the exclusion of the opposite views). What does it pertain to ? It pertains to the real, i.e., the fact which is possessed of independent existence. The meaning (of the whole aphorism) is this : It is invariably the case that every person engages in the pursuit of an organ of knowledge only when he is impelled by the desire for the acquisition of a practical consequence, in the hope that he will be able to satisfy his requirement by finding the object capable of yielding the (desired) consequence with the aid of such knowledge, and not wantonly (without regard for practical consequence). It is a truism that if (the subject is persuaded that) the object of an organ is not capable of satisfying a requirement he will not set any store by the pursuit of such an organ. As has been observed (by Dharmakīrti) : “What will a person have to do with the examination of an object which is incapable of yielding the consequence of which he is in quest ? What can a woman in love gain from the examination of the beauty or ugliness of an impotent man ?” (PV, 1. 215).

124. tatra na dravyaikaarūpo 'rtho 'rthakriyākārī, sa hy apracyutānut-pannasthiraikaarūpaḥ katham arthakriyāṁ kurvīta krameṇākrameṇa vā ?, anyonyavyavacchedarūpāṇām prakārāntarāsambhavāt / tatra na krameṇa; ... kālāntarabhāvinīḥ kriyāḥ prathamakriyākāla eva prasahya kuryāt

sāmarthasya kālakṣepāyogāt, kālakṣepiṇo vā 'sāmarthyapṛāpteḥ / samartho 'pi tattatsahakārisamavadhāne taṁ tam arthaṁ karotīti cet; na tarhi tasya sāmarthyam aparasahakārisāpekṣavṛttitvāt, "sāpekṣam asamartham" [Pātañjala-Mahābhāṣya, 3.1.8] iti hi kiṁ nāśrauṣiḥ ? / na tena sahakāriṇo 'pekṣyante 'pi tu kāryam eva sahakāriṣv asatsv abhavat tān apekṣata iti cet; tat kiṁ sa bhāvo 'samarthaḥ ? / samarthaś cet; kiṁ sahakārimukhaprekṣaṇa-dīnāni tāny upekṣate na punar jhaṭīti ghaṭayati ? / nanu samartham api bījam ilājālādisahakārisahitam evāṅkuram karoti nānyathā; tat kiṁ tasya sahakāribhiḥ kiñcid upakriyeta, na vā ? / no cet; sa kiṁ pūrvavan nodāste / upakriyeta cet; sa tarhi tair upakāro bhinno 'bhinno vā kriyata iti nirvacanīyam / abhede sa eva kriyate iti lābham icchato mūlakṣatir āyātā / bhede sa katham tasyopakāraḥ ?, kiṁ na Sahya-Vindhyāder api ? / tatsambandhāt tasyāyam iti cet; upakāryopakārayoḥ kaḥ sambandhaḥ ? / na saṁyogaḥ; dravyayor eva tasya bhāvāt / nāpi samavāyas tasya pratyāsattiviprakarṣā-bhāvena sarvatra tulyatvān na niyatasambandhisambandhatvam yuktam, tattve vā tatkr̥ta upakāro 'syābhyupagantavyaḥ, tathā ca saty upakārasya bhedābhedakalpanā tadavasthaiva / upakārasya samavāyād abhede samavāya eva kr̥taḥ syāt / bhede punar api samavāyasya na niyatasambandhisambandhatvam / niyatasambandhisambandhatve samavāyasya viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvo hetur iti cet; upakāryopakārakabhāvābhāve tasyāpi pratīnīyamahetutvābhāvāt / upakāre tu punar bhedābhedavikalpadvāreṇa tad evāvartate / tan naikāntanītyo bhāvaḥ krameṇārthakriyām kurute /

124. Now, regarding the (character of reality) it must be held that a real which is exclusively of the nature of substance cannot be possessed of causal efficiency. How can a substance, having a static identity which does not admit of lapse or growth in being, exercise any causal efficiency which is possible either in succession or in non-succession, since there is no *terium quid* in between two mutually exclusive opposites ? Of these two, the alternative of succession is out of the question. A substance will perforce discharge in the very time of executing its primal causal operation all the operations which are (as a matter of fact) due in other times, since there is no reason for an entity which is fully endowed with the relevant capacity to wait idly and let the opportunity slip. On the contrary, a thing which waits for a lapse of time is to be condemned of incapacity . It might be contended

that though possessed of capacity, it actually produces its relevant consequences only when it comes to be associated with the relevant set of auxiliary conditions. But the contention is suicidal, since in that case the entity in question would have to be denied the capacity which is admitted to be vested in an entity needing the association of other factors. Have you not heard the dictum : That which stands in need of others is incapable ? (MBh, 3. 1. 8). It might be further argued that the entity (*qua* cause) does not stand in need of the auxiliaries, but it is only the effect, which does not come into being in the absence of auxiliaries, that requires (the presence of) these (ancillary conditions). But the question arises, is the entity concerned incapable (of the effects in question) ? If it is conceded to be possessed of the capacity why should it wait in indifference for the effects which are condemned to look forward in utter helplessness to the emergence of the auxiliary conditions, and not, on the contrary, produce the effects on the spur of the moment ? It has been argued that the seed which is quite endowed with the causal capacity is seen to produce sprout only when it is associated with the auxiliary conditions such as soil, water and so on and not otherwise. In that case the question pertinently arises whether the auxiliaries are of any service to the basal cause or not. If they render no service, why should it not persist in the state of neutrality as before ? If they are supposed to render some service, the question has to be decided (how does the service in question relate to the basal entity) ? Does the service rendered by them become identical or remain numerically different ? If the relation be one of absolute identity, (the issue transpires that) it is the basal cause that is produced and this puts (the opponent in the position of a merchant) who invested his money for profit, but eventually lost even the capital. If the service under consideration maintains its numerical difference, how can it (be supposed to) relate to that (main cause) ? (If that is not a bar), what would prevent such a relationship between the Vindhya and Sahya (the mountain ranges of the Eastern and Western Ghats) ? It may be urged that one (A) belongs to the other (B) by virtue of a definite relation in which it stands to the other. (Granted), but what is the relation between service and receiver of service ? It cannot be contactual conjunction, since it is possible only between two substances. Nor can it be

inherence, since (*ex hypothesi*) it is present everywhere in like manner and there is no gulf of separation to cut off its incidence and thus it does not seem logically justifiable that it should function as a relation between determinate terms. And even if this were allowed to be possible, it must be admitted that the terms render some service to it (*sic. inherence*). Such being the case, the dilemma regarding the relation of the service in question in terms of identity or difference would emerge in the same way as before. If the service produced were regarded as identical with inherence, it would be (tantamount to the admission) that it is inherence that has been brought into being. And if the service in question were to remain different and aloof, inherence could not be supposed to behave as a relation between determinate terms. It would be a poor defence to argue that relation of substantive and adjective determines its specific incidence, for the former relation also cannot function as a determinate condition unless there be a relation of benefactor and beneficiary between them at its back. And the admission of an actual benefit accruing will open the gate to the old dilemma based on difference and identity for making a fresh appearance. (The conclusion) therefore (irresistibly follows that) an entity absolutely eternal is not capable of exercising a causal activity in succession.

125. *nāpy akrameṇa / na hy eko bhāvaḥ sakalakālakalābhāvinīr yugapat sarvāḥ kriyāḥ karotīti prātīti'kam / kurutām vā, tathāpi dvitīyakṣaṇe kiṁ kuryāt ? / karaṇe vā kramapakṣabhāvi doṣaḥ / akaraṇe 'narthakriyākāritvād avastutvaprasaṅgaḥ – ity ekāntanityāt kramākramābhyām vyāptārthakriyā vyāpakānupalabdhibalāt vyāpakanivṛttau nivartamānā vyāpyam arthakriyā-kāritvaṁ nivartayati tad api svavyāpyam sattvam ity asan dravyaikāntaḥ /*

125. Nor again does it fare better in non-succession. It is not endorsed by experience that a self-identical entity simultaneously discharges all the functions which are due to occur in all the divisions of time. Let it be supposed that it does so. What will it do in the second moment ? If it does anything, the difficulties incident to the alternative, viz., successive discharge of causal efficiency will reappear. And if it does not do anything (at the second moment), it would forfeit its claim to reality being destitute of causal efficiency (which is the criterion of reality). The exercise of causal activity is determined by succession and non-succession (as its determinant

concomitants). The absence of these determinant concomitants ascertained on the evidence of the non-observation of them entails as its consequence the absence of causal activity in the absolutely eternal entity, and this (absence of causal activity) in its turn proves the absence of the agent of causal activity. This (lack of causal agency) necessarily involves the lack of existence which is its determinate concomitant. Thus an absolutely unchanging substance transpires to be a non-entity.

126. *paryāyaikāntarūpo 'pi pratikṣaṇavināśī bhāvo na krameṇārthakriyāsamartho deśakṛtasya kālakṛtasya ca kramasyaivābhāvāt / avasthitasyaiva hi nānādeśakālavatyāptir deśakramaḥ kālakramaś cābhidhīyate / na caikāntavināśini sāsti / yad āhuḥ –*

*“yo yatraiva sa tatraiva yo yadaiva tadaiva saḥ /  
na deśakālayor vyāptir bhāvānām iha vidyate //”*

126. An entity again (supposed to be) of the nature of an absolute mode is no more capable of exercising its causal activity in succession inasmuch as it is liable to perish in the immediately succeeding moment and as such succession either in respect of time or of space is not possible (of being predicated of it). In fact, occupation of different points of space and occurrence at different moments of time which are possible only for an enduring entity, are respectively designated as spatial and temporal succession and certainly such characteristics are not predicable of an absolutely perishable entity. As has been aptly observed (by some one) : “Whatever is in a point of space is exclusively there alone and whatever is at a moment of time is also exclusively thereat. Thus it is not possible for entities to continue through different points of space and time”.

127. *na ca santānāpekṣayā pūrvottarakṣaṇānām kramaḥ sambhavati, santānasya avastutvāt / vastutve 'pi tasya yadi kṣaṇikatvam na tarhi kṣaṇebhyaḥ kaścid viśeṣaḥ / athākṣaṇikatvam; susthitaḥ paryāyaikāntavādaḥ! yad āhuḥ –*

*“athāpi nityam paramārthasantaṁ santānanāmānam upaiṣi bhāvam/  
uttiṣṭha bhikṣo ! phalitās tavāśāḥ so 'yam samāptaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgavādaḥ //”*

[Nyāyamañjarī, p. 464]

127. Nor is succession possible of preceding and succeeding moments in the role of a continuum, since continuum is an unreal (abstrac-

tion). And if it were supposed to be a reality and at the same time momentary in duration, it would not have any difference from the constituent moments (and so the impossibility of historical continuity will not be transcended). If (the continuum were) not momentary, the doctrine of absolute modes would have a happy defence indeed ! As has been said (by Jayantabhaṭṭa) : "If, on the other hand, you admit an absolutely real and eternal entity which you call by the name of continuum, then arise, O monk ! your hopes have indeed borne fruit. The doctrine of momentariness of things has received the finishing blow (once for all)". (NM, p. 464).

128. *nāpy akrameṇa kṣaṇike 'rthakriyā sambhavati / sa hy eko rūpādikṣaṇo yugapad anekān rasādikṣaṇān janayan yady ekena svabhāvena janayet tadā teṣāṃ ekatvaṃ syād ekasvabhāvajanyatvāt / atha nānāsvabhāvair janayati – kiñcid upādānabhāvena kiñcit sahakāritvena; te tarhi svabhāvās tasyātmabhūtā anātmabhūtā vā ? / anātmabhūtāś cet; svabhāvahāniḥ / yadi tasyātmabhūtāḥ; tarhi tasyānekatvaṃ svabhāvānāṃ caikatvaṃ prasajyeta / atha ya evaikatropādānabhāvaḥ sa evānyatra sahakāribhāva iti na svabhāvabheda iṣyate; tarhi nityasyaika rūpasyāpi krameṇa nānākāryakāriṇaḥ svabhāvabhedaḥ kāryasāṅkaryāṃ ca mā bhūt / athākramāt kramiṇāṃ anutpatter naivam iti cet; ekānaṃśakāraṇāt yugapad anekakāraṇasādhyānekakāryavirodhāt kṣaṇikānāṃ apy akrameṇa kāryakāritvaṃ mā bhūd iti paryāyaikāntād api kramākramayor vyāpakayor nivṛttyaiva vyāpyā 'rthakriyāpi vyāvartate / tadvyāvṛttau ca sattvam api vyāpakānupalabdhibalenaivā nivartate ity asan paryāyaikānto 'pi /*

128. The other alternative of the exercise of causal efficiency in non-succession is no more tenable of a momentary entity. If the selfsame moment called colour which is supposed to produce the taste-moment and others is to produce all these diverse results in and through a self-identical nature, the effects should in all logical propriety be identical being produced by a self-identical nature. If, on the contrary, the cause is thought to produce (all the diverse effects) through diverse natures according as it functions as a material cause and as an auxiliary condition (in respect of the diverse effects), then the question will arise whether these natures are integral to that (cause) or not integral. If they were not integral (to the cause), they would not constitute the nature of the latter. And if they are constitutive of

the very nature of the cause, then either of these two consequences would become irresistible. This (cause) would be as diverse (as the natures) or the natures in question would become as simple an identity (as the cause would be, if it never abandoned its simplicity). If, again, it is thought that what plays the role of a material cause in one context plays also the role of an auxiliary condition in another and thus no diversity of nature be admitted, then there would be nothing (repugnant in the supposition) that an eternal and uniform entity also executes diverse effects in succession without undergoing change of nature and without giving rise to the consequence of the effects being identical in nature. If it is contended that the latter (hypothesis) is untenable on the ground of the impossibility of the production of successive effects simultaneously from a non-successive (cause), owing to the (palpable) contradiction involved (in the supposition) that one simple self-identical cause should simultaneously produce diverse effects which are (as a matter of fact) capable of being produced by a number of diverse causes, (the same difficulty) would make the production of diverse effects by a momentary entity all at one time equally an impossibility. Thus the determinant concomitants (of production), namely succession and non-succession, are found to be impossible in a real supposed to be absolutely of the nature of a (momentary) mode, and this (impossibility) makes the production of an effect which is its determinate concomitant impossible. The absence of this (productive activity) entails the absence of reality (in an absolutely momentary mode) in pursuance of the law that the lack of the evidence of the presence of the determinant (takes away the warrant of the presence of the determinate). (Thus the theory of reality) consisting entirely in a mode is found to be unsound.

129. *Kāṇādās tu dravyaparyāyāv ubhāv apy upāgamaṇ pṛthivyādīni guṇādyādhārarūpāṇi dravyāṇi, guṇādayas tv ādheyatvāt paryāyāḥ / te ca kecit kṣaṇikāḥ, kecid yāvaddravyabhāvināḥ, kecin nityā iti kevalam itaretaravīnirluṭhitadharmidharmābhyupagamān na samīcīnaviṣayavādināḥ / tathāhi – yadi dravyād atyantavilakṣaṇaṁ sattvaṁ tadā dravyaṁ asad eva bhavet / sattāyogāt sattvam asty eveti cet; asatāṁ sattāyoge 'pi kutaḥ sattvam ?, satāṁ tu niṣphalaḥ sattāyogaḥ / svarūpasattvaṁ bhāvānām asty eveti cet; tarhi kiṁ śikhaṇḍinā sattāyogena ? / sattāyogāt prāk bhāvo na san nāpy*

*asan, sattāsambandhāt tu san iti cet; vān mātram etat, sadasadvilakṣaṇasya prakārāntarasyasambhavāt / api ca 'padārthaḥ sattā yogaḥ' iti na tritayaṁ cakāsti / padārthasattayoś ca yogo yadi tādātmyam, tad anabh-yupagamabādhitam / ata eva na saṁyogaḥ, samavāyas tv anāśrita iti sarvaṁ sarveṇa sambadhnīyān na vā kiñcit kenacit / evaṁ dravyaguṇakarmaṇām dravyatvādibhiḥ, dravyasya dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣaiḥ, pṛthivyaptejovāyūnām pṛthivītvādibhiḥ, ākāśādīnām ca dravyāṇām svaguṇair yoge yathāyogaṁ sarvaṁ abhidhānīyam, ekāntabhinnānām kenacit kathañcit sambandhāyogāt ity Aulūkyapakṣe 'pi viśayavyavasthā duḥsthā /*

129. Now the followers of Kaṇāda admit (the reality of) both substance and modes. (Of these) earth and the rest are substances, being receptacles of qualities and the like. Qualities and actions are the modes being contents thereof. Of them some are transitory, some endure as long as the substance and some are eternal. Now these philosophers cannot be regarded as exponents of the true nature of reality, since they assert that substrates and attributes are absolutely different from one another. Now by way of proof (the question may be put) whether existence is absolutely different from substance. If it be so, substance would by itself be non-existent. If it were contended that substance becomes existent by virtue of the inherence of existence in it, (the contention would be unsound). How can non-entity be made existent by participation in existence ? And if entities (substance etc. were intrinsically) existent, the inherence of existence would be a superfluity. If again things are believed to be possessed of existence *per se* (as an inalienable part of their individuality), then why should a superfluous intermediary be postulated in the shape of inherence of existence ? It has been contended that a thing is neither existent nor non-existent before its participation in existence as such and it becomes existent only as a consequence of its relation to existence. But this is a verbalism (and has no meaning) since a *tertium quid* different from existent and non-existent both is an impossibility. Moreover, (there is no evidence from experience) that there are felt three elements (in a real, viz.,) the entity, existence, and a relation (between them). Again, if the relation between an entity and its existence were a case of identity, that would be contradicted by their refusal to endorse it. Regard being had to this (same very reason of



denial), the relation cannot be supposed to be conjunction (which is possible only between two substances). As for inherence, it is not (believed to be) dependent (for its being upon the terms, and if such an independent fact can serve as a relation) everything can come into relation with every other thing, or no entity can be in relation with any other entity. Now all these considerations are liable to be pressed according to the nature (of the terms) against the relation posited between substance and substancehood, quality and qualityhood, action and actionhood; between one substance and another substance, quality, action, universal, specificity; between earth and earthhood, water and waterhood, fire and firehood, air and airhood; between substances such as ether (*ākāśa*) and their relevant qualities. (It is crystal clear that) there can possibly be no relation in any way whatsoever between things which are absolutely different. It has become obvious that the determination of (the nature of) reals in the scheme of Kaṇāda is vitiated (by a fundamental defect).

130. *nanu dravyaparyāyātmakatve 'pi vastunas tadavastham eva dausthyam; tathāhi – dravyaparyāyayor aikāntikabhedābhedaparihāreṇa kathaṇcid bhedābhedavādaḥ Syādvādibhir upeyate, na cāsau yukto virodhā-didoṣāt – vidhipraṭiṣedharūpayor ekaṭra vastuny asambhavān nīlānīlavat 1 / atha kenacid rūpeṇa bhedaḥ kenacid abhedāḥ; evaṁ sati bhedasyānyad adhikaraṇam abhedasya cānyad iti vaiyadhikaraṇyam 2 / yaṁ cātmānaṁ purodhāya bhedo yaṁ cāśrityābhedas tāv apy ātmānau bhinnābhinnāv anyathaikāntavādaprasaktis tathā ca saty anavasthā 3 / yena ca rūpeṇa bhedas tena bhedaś cābhedaś ca yena cābhedas tenāpy abhedas ca bhedaś ceti saṅkaraḥ 4 / yena rūpeṇa bhedas tenābhedo yenābhedas tena bheda iti vyatikaraḥ 5 / bhedābhedātmakatve ca vastuno viviktenākāreṇa niścetum aśakteḥ saṁśayaḥ 6 / tataś cāpratipattiḥ 7 / iti na viśayavyavasthā 8 / naivam; pratīyamāne vastuni virodhasyāsambhavāt / yatsannidhāne yo nopalabhyate sa tasya virodhīti niścīyate / upalabhyamāne ca vastuni ko virodhagandhāvakāśaḥ ? / nīlānīlayor api yady ekatropalambho 'sti tadā nāsti virodhaḥ / ekaṭra citrapaṭījñāne Saugatair nīlānīlayor virodhāna-bhyupagamāt, Yaugaiś caikasya citrasya rūpasyābhyupagamāt, ekasyaiva ca paṭādeś calācalaraktāraktāvṛtānāvṛtādiviruddhadharmāṇām upalabdheḥ prakṛte ko virodhaśaṅkāvakāśaḥ? / etena vaiyadhikaraṇyadoṣo 'py apāstaḥ;*

tayor ekādhikaraṇatvena prāguktayuktidiśā pratīteḥ / yad apy anavasthānam  
 dūṣaṇam upanyastam tad apy anekāntavādimatānabhijñātaiva, tanmataṁ hi  
 dravyaparyāyātmake vastuni dravyaparyāyāv eva bhedaḥ bhedadhvaninā  
 tayor evābhidhānāt, dravyarūpeṇābhedaḥ iti dravyam evābhedaḥ ekāne-  
 kātmakatvād vastunaḥ / yau ca saṅkaravyatikarau tau mecakajñānani-  
 darśanena sāmānyaviśeṣadr̥ṣṭāntena ca parihṛtau / atha tatra tathāpratibhāsaḥ  
 samādhānam; parasyāpi tad evāstu pratibhāsasyāpakṣapātītivāt / nirṇīte  
 cārthe saṁśayo 'pi na yuktaḥ, tasya sakampapratipattirūpatvād akampapрати-  
 pattau durghaṭatvāt / pratipanne ca vastuny apratipattir iti sāhasam /  
 upalabdhyabhidhānād anupalambho 'pi na siddhas tato nābhāva iti  
 dr̥ṣṭeṣṭāvīruddham dravyaparyāyātmakam vastv iti ||32||

130. Now an objection is raised. Even if a real were supposed to consist of substance and mode both, the same difficulty would persist as before. Thus, for instance, the exponents of *Syādvāda* (the doctrine of non-absolutism affirming multiple nature of things) reject the view that substance and mode are either absolutely different or absolutely identical and think that they are somehow identical and different both. But this position cannot be legitimate inasmuch as it is vitiated by contradiction and other defects as follows : (1) Affirmation and negation cannot coexist in one substratum like blue and not-blue (owing to their mutual opposition). (2) If difference is affirmed in respect of one aspect and identity in respect of another, the result will be that the difference will have one locus and identity another and thus there will be a split in the integrity of the locus. (3) The aspect in reference to which the difference is asserted and the aspect in reference to which identity is affirmed – both of these aspects are to be regarded as mutually identical and different in order to avoid the consequence of absolutism, and this would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum* (the locus of the opposite predicates being placed under the necessity of bifurcation and the bifurcated aspects being again identical-cum-different would again require bifurcation in their turn and so on). (4) The aspect in which difference is posited will have difference and identity both as its traits, and likewise the aspect in which identity is asserted will have identity and difference as its predicates, and this means confusion (which consists in the incidence of opposite attributes in the same substratum). (5) The aspect

which embodies difference will embody identity also, and the aspect which embodies identity will embody difference, and this thus gives rise to the fallacy of transfusion (the exchange of function and attributes). (6) A real being both identical and different will not lend itself to be determined in a definite reference, and this would create doubt. (7) The consequence will be absence of determination. And (8) this will result in the impossibility of determination of objective reality.

No, there is no occasion for contradiction in a thing which is cognised as such. One thing is supposed to be the opposite of another when in the presence of one the other is not perceived. But in a perceived datum what is the *raison d'être* of the faintest trace of contradiction ? As regards blue and not-blue, if they were perceived in one locus, there would be no contradiction (in the situation), and thus the Buddhists do not acknowledge the contradiction between blue and not-blue in the (unitary) cognition of a variegated canvas. And as regards the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher he admits the reality of multiform colour. Further, when one single piece of linen is found to possess (in harmony) the apparently opposed attributes of being mobile and immobile, red and not-red, covered and not-covered, what then is the ground for allegation of doubt ? This (line of argument) would again put a quietus to the charge of the bifurcation of locus, since, in conformity with the principle set forth above, they have all been (proved to be) perceived in the same locus. As regards the charge of infinite regress, it is advanced by one who is ignorant of the position of the non-absolutist who unmistakably maintains that in a real which is the synthesis of substance and mode, the difference is not anything else than substance and modes themselves, because the term 'difference' (whenever employed) stands for these two elements alone. When it is asserted that identity is in the aspect of substance, it is to be understood that substance itself and not anything else constitutes the identity in question, and (the proposition) that a real is one and many (lends support to this truth). As regards the charges of confusion and transfusion, they are easily parried by the instance of the cognition of the multiform colour, and the instance of the synthesis of universal and particular in all reals. If, on the contrary, it is maintained that the solution of the difficulties in the above-quoted instances is furnished by direct experi-

ence of the data, the same (experience) will also come to the aid of the opponent (sic. Jaina philosopher), since experience cannot be guilty of partiality. And there is no logical justification for the emergence of doubt in a matter which has been definitely established. Doubt is a sort of cognition in which the mind wavers (between two conflicting alternatives). It is absolutely out of the question when the cognition is found to be unfaltering and unwavering. To say that knowledge is not possible regarding an object that is known is a bold assertion. The establishment of knowledge proves that there is no justification for the charge of lack of knowledge, and consequently for the impossibility (of such a multiform real). The conclusion follows that the conception of reality as synthesis of substance and mode is not incompatible with verdict of experience and interest (of truth).

131. *nanu dravyaparyāyātmakatve 'pi vastunaḥ katham arthakriyā nāma ? / sā hi kramākramābhyām vyāptā dravyaparyāyaikāntavad ubhayātmakād api vyāvartatām / śakyam hi vaktum ubhayātmā bhāvo na krameṇārthakriyām kartum samarthah, samarthasya kṣepāyogāt / na ca sahakāryapekṣā yuktā, dravyasyāvīkāryatvena sahakārikṛtopakāranirapekṣatvāt / paryāyāṇām ca kṣaṇikatvena pūrvāparakāryakālāpratīkṣaṇāt / nāpy akrameṇa, yugapadd hi sarvakāryāṇi kṛtvā punar akurvato 'narthakriyākāritvād asattvam, kurvataḥ kramapakṣabhāvī doṣaḥ / dravyaparyāyavādayoś ca yo doṣaḥ sa ubhayavāde 'pi samānaḥ -*

*"pratyekaṁ yo bhaved doṣo dvayor bhāve katham na saḥ ?"*  
*iti vacanād ity āha -*

***pūrvottarākāraparihārasvīkārasthīlakṣaṇapariṇāmenāsyārthakriyopapattiḥ ||33||***

131. But the question arises – how can even a real consisting of substance and mode exercise causal efficiency ? The exercise of causal efficiency has been found to be a concomitant of succession and non-succession, and must be held to be incompatible also with a real of dual nature exactly in the same way as it has been found to be incompatible with pure substance or pure mode (advocated by the absolutists). It is perfectly allowable to assert **that** a real possessed of a dual nature is not capable of exercising causal efficiency in sequence on the ground that an efficient entity has no reason **for** deferring its action. (The hypothesis) that it stands in need

of the auxiliaries is absolutely illegitimate for the substance which is unamenable to change is entirely independent of the service of the auxiliaries. And as for the modes, they are momentary, and so they cannot be supposed to wait for two consecutive moments (required for the reception of the service accruing from the auxiliaries and for producing the expected effect at the next moment). Nor (is the exercise of causal activity possible) in simultaneity because a real which simultaneously executes all its effects and ceases to do so again will forfeit its claim to reality being bereft of causal activity. And if it does produce (an effect at the next moment) the charges incidental to the theory of successive activity will come in force. Thus the defects which appertain to the theory of pure substance or pure mode are found to be equally shared by the theory of dual reality in conformity with the dictum : Why should not the defect which is inevitable in each of the alternatives be not inevitable when both the alternatives are affirmed"? In reply to this objection, the author says :

(Aph.) The realisation of causal activity by the same is warranted by its (susceptibility to) change having for its characteristics continuity, and surrender and appropriation of the antecedent and consequent determinations (respectively). (33)

132. 'pūrvottarayoh' 'ākārayoh' vivartayoh yathāsaṅkhyena yau 'parihārasvīkārau' tābhyāṁ sthitiḥ saiva 'lakṣaṇam' yasya sa cāsau pariṇāmaś ca, tena 'asya' dravyaparyāyātmakasyārthakriyopapadyate /

132. Continuity together with the surrender and appropriation respectively of the preceding and succeeding determinations, that is to say, of the states (in due order), constitutes the defining characteristic of change, and this makes the exercise of the causal activity by the same, that is to say, by a real possessing substance and mode as its moments, a logical and real possibility.

133. ayam arthaḥ – na dravyarūpaṁ na paryāyarūpaṁ nobhaya-rūpaṁ vastu, yena tattatpakṣabhāvi doṣaḥ syāt, kintu sthityutpādavyayāt-makaṁ śabalaṁ jātyantaram eva vastu / tena tattatsahakārisannidhāne krameṇa yugapad vā tāṁ tām arthakriyāṁ kurvataḥ sahakārikṛtāṁ copakāraparamparām upajīvato bhinnābhinnopakārādinodanānumodanāpra-

*muditātmanah ubhayapakṣabhāvidoṣaśaṅkākalāṅkā'kāndiśīkasya bhāvasya na vyāpakānupalabdhībalenārthakriyāyāḥ, nāpi tadvyāpyasattvasya nivr̥ttir iti siddham dravyaparyāyātmakam vastu pramāṇasya viśayaḥ ||33||*

133. This is the purport. A real is neither of the nature of substance, nor of the nature of mode, nor a combination of both so that the defects pertaining to all these positions would become insuperable. It is, on the contrary, a *sui generis* multiform entity comprising as its moments continuity, origination and cessation. Thus it exercises its several causal operations simultaneously or successively according as the relevant auxiliary conditions present themselves; appropriates the chain of services rendered by the auxiliary conditions and runs its jolly course of self-development according as it puts aside and accepts the services becoming different and identical both. It does not run away like a fugitive frightened by the scandal of the charges lying against both the alternatives. The charge of the impossibility of causal activity on the warrant of the realised default of concomitant determinants and the consequential charge of the impossibility of existence which is a concomitant determinate of the aforesaid (causal efficiency), are out of place in such an entity. It is therefore established that a real composed of substance and mode as its elements is the object of an organ of knowledge. (33)

134. *phalam āha –*

***phalam arthaprakāśaḥ ||34||***

134. Now he sets forth the resultant.

(Aph.) The resultant is the illumination of the object. (34)

135. '*pramāṇasya*' *iti vartate; pramāṇasya 'phalam' 'arthaprakāśaḥ' arthasaṁvedanam; arthārthī hi sarvaḥ pramātety arthasaṁvedanam eva phalam yuktaṁ / nanv evaṁ pramāṇam eva phalatvenoktaṁ syāt, om iti cet, tarhi pramāṇaphalayoḥ abhedaḥ syāt / tataḥ kim syāt ? / pramāṇaphalayoḥ aikye sadasatpakṣabhāvī doṣaḥ syāt, nāsataḥ karaṇatvaṁ na sataḥ phalatvam / satyam, asty ayaṁ doṣo janmani na vyavasthāyām / yad āhuḥ –*

*"nāsato hetutā nāpi sato hetoḥ phalātmatā /*

*iti janmani doṣaḥ syād vyavasthā tu na doṣabhāḡ //"* ***iti ||34||***

135. The expression 'of an organ of knowledge' follows (from aph. 30 and is to be read into the present aphorism. The meaning thus comes out) : the resultant of an organ of knowledge is 'illumination of the object',

that is, cognition of the object. Now, all subjects are actuated by a desire for a real (capable of satisfying an end), and so the cognition of the object should legitimately be the resultant of it. But a difficulty arises — if this be the case, then (knowledge which is given out to be) the organ itself would be said to be the resultant. If you say “Yes, that is so” the consequence would be the identity of the organ and the resultant. What is the harm if it be so ? (No). If the organ and resultant be identical it would be liable to the objection which applies to the position of non-existent (cause) and existent (effect). A non-existent can not be an organ, nor a (previous) existent be the resultant. True, this defect is really present in respect of origination and not in respect of determination. As has been said “A non-entity cannot be a cause, nor can the existent cause be itself the resultant. This charge applies if it is a case of efficient causation (origination), but a case of determination (which it is held to be) is not liable to such accusation.”

[The force of the contention can be brought out as follows. The organ of knowledge being a species of efficient cause can be so only if it produces expected effect, viz., knowledge. But when the organ is said to be nothing but knowledge and knowledge again is said to be the resultant it commits the fallacy of making the cause and effect identical. It is obvious on the face of it that the cause and effect must be different and they must occur at different moments of time. If there is no difference, chronological and numerical, the assertion of causality is nothing short of non-sense. Hemacandra admits the justice of this objection *in abstracto* but he avers that the present instance does not fall within it, because the relation of organ and knowledge is not of efficient causality and hence is not temporal. It is a logical relation and it is the logical relation of determination which occurs at the same time. And there is no logical incompatibility in the same thing being its own determinant and determinate. The relation of determination as maintained here does not presuppose numerical difference, but only a difference of function. And this is going to be substantiated in the following aphorism]. (34)

136. *vyavasthām eva darśayati* –

*karmasthā kriyā* ||35||

136. The author is showing the nature of determination :

(Aph.) (Its) activity (reference) concerns the object. (35)

137. *karmonmukho jñānavyāpāraḥ phalam ||35||*

137. The activity of knowledge having reference to the object is the resultant. (35)

138. *pramāṇaṁ kim ity āha –*

*karṭṛsthā pramāṇam ||36||*

138. What is the organ ? In reply he states :

(Aph.) (The same activity) as relates to the subject is the knowledge. (36)

139. *karṭṛvyāpāraṁ ullikhan bodhaḥ pramāṇam ||36||*

139. The cognition in so far as it takes note of the activity of the subject is the organ. (36)

140. *katham asya pramāṇatvam ? / karaṇaṁ hi tat sādhakatamaṁ ca karaṇam ucyate / avyavahitaphalaṁ ca tad ity āha –*

*tasyāṁ satyāṁ arthaprakāśasiddheḥ ||37||*

140. But how can it be an organ of knowledge ? An organ is an instrument, and the efficientmost (of the causal conditions) is stated to be the instrument, and it is immediately attended with the effect. In answer he says :

(Aph.) The illumination of the object is realised (immediately) upon the occurrence of that. (37)

141. *'tasyāṁ' iti karṭṛsthāyāṁ pramāṇarūpāyāṁ kriyāyāṁ 'satyāṁ' 'arthaprakāśasya' phalasya 'siddheḥ' vyavasthāpanāt / ekajñānagatatvena pramāṇaphalayor abhedo, vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakabhāvāt tu bheda iti bhedābhedarūpaḥ syādvādam abādhitam anupatati pramāṇaphalabhāva itīdam akhilapramāṇasādhāraṇam avyavahitaṁ phalam uktam ||37||*

141. 'Upon the occurrence of that' means 'after the activity in the shape of knowledge which has been stated to be the organ has taken place in the subject.' Realisation of the illumination of the object means 'the determination of it as the resultant.' The organ and the resultant stand in relation of identity in so far as the two belong to the self-same cognition. Their difference is in respect of the relation of determinant and determinatum. Thus the relation of organ of knowledge and the resultant partakes of the dual character of identity and difference, and as such follows the track of the theory of non-absolutism (*syādvāda*) which stands uncontradicted. The immediate effect which is common to all cognitive organs is thus set forth in



the given discourse. (37)

142. *avyavahitam eva phalāntaram āha –*

*ajñānanivṛttir vā ||38||*

142. The author now states an alternative resultant as immediate (as the previous) :

(Aph.) **Or the cessation of ignorance. (38)**

143. *pramāṇapravṛtteḥ pūrvaṁ pramātur vivakṣite viṣaye yat 'ajñānam' tasya 'nivṛttiḥ' phalam ity anye / yad āhuḥ –*

*"pramāṇasya phalaṁ sākṣād ajñānavinivartanam / kevalasya sukhopekṣe śeṣasyādānāhānadhīḥ //"*

*[Nyāyavatāra, 28] iti ||38||*

143. Others hold that the resultant is the cessation of the ignorance of the subject regarding the object in question before the application of the organ of knowledge. As has been said : The immediate effect of an organ of knowledge is the removal of ignorance; that of pure transcendent knowledge is bliss and unconcern (for everything else); that of the rest is the notion of acceptance and avoidance (NA, 28). (38)

144. *vyavahitam āha –*

*avagrahādīnām vā kramopajanadharmāṇām pūrvaṁ pūrvaṁ  
pramāṇam uttaram uttaram phalam ||39||*

144. He now states the remote (resultant) :

(Aph.) **Or, of determinate perception and the rest, which have the characteristic of occurring successively, each antecedent member (of the order) is the cognitive organ and each succeeding member is the resultant. (39)**

145. *avagrahehāvāyadhāraṇāsmṛtipratyabhijñānohānumānānām krameṇopajāyamānānām yad yat pūrvaṁ tat tat pramāṇam yad yad uttaram tat tat phalarūpaṁ pratipattavyam / avagrahapariṇāmaṁ hy ātmā īhārūpa-phalatayā pariṇamati itihāphalāpekṣayā avagrahaḥ pramāṇam / tato 'pīhā pramāṇam avāyaḥ phalam / punar avāyaḥ pramāṇam dhāraṇā phalam / īhādharmaṇāyor jñānopādānatvāt jñānarūpatonneyā / tato dhāraṇā pramāṇam smṛtiḥ phalam / tato 'pī smṛtiḥ pramāṇam pratyabhijñānam phalam / tato 'pī pratyabhijñā pramāṇam ūhaḥ phalam / tato 'py ūhaḥ pramāṇam anumānam phalam iti pramāṇaphalavibhāga iti ||39||*

145. It is to be understood that of determinate perception, speculation, perceptual judgement, retention (disposition), memory, recognition, reasoning and inference, which occur in the order of immediate succession, each immediate antecedent is the cognitive organ and each immediate successor is the resultant. The self possessed of the determinate perception as its evolved state is transformed into the state of speculation and so determinate perception functions as organ in relation to its resultant in the shape of speculation. And subsequently to it speculation again is the organ and perceptual judgement is the resultant. Again perceptual judgement is the organ and retention (disposition) is the resultant. And speculation and retention (disposition) can be inferred as partaking of the character of cognition being derivatives of cognition. Next in order, retention (disposition) is to be regarded as the organ and memory as the resultant. Next to that, again, memory is the organ and recognition is the resultant. Next again to that, recognition is the organ and reasoning is the resultant. Lastly, reasoning is the organ and inference is the resultant. This completes the division of organ and resultant. (39)

146. *phalāntaram āha –*

*hānādibuddhaya vā ||40||*

146. Now he states a different kind of resultant :

(Aph.) Or the judgements of avoidance and the rest. (40)

147. *hānopādānopekṣābuddhaya vā pramāṇasya phalam / phalabahutvapratipādanam sarveṣāṃ phalatvena na virodho vaivakṣikatvāt phalasyeti pratipādanārtham ||40||*

147. The judgements of avoidance, acceptance and indifference are the resultants of a cognitive organ. The enunciation of a plurality of resultants is made with the purpose of bringing home the truth that there is no antagonism among the different resultants, since they partake of one common character of 'being resultant' and the question of what is a resultant is a matter of volitional interest and point of view. (40)

148. *ekāntabhinnābhinnaphalavādimataparīkṣārtham āha –*

*pramāṇād bhinnābhinnam ||41||*

148. Now with a view to examination of the views of rival philosophers who hold that the resultant is absolutely identical with or

absolutely different (from the cognitive instruments), he states :

(Aph.) It is both identical with and different from its cognitive organs. (41)

149. *karaṇarūpatvāt kriyārūpatvāc ca pramāṇaphalayoḥ bhedaḥ / abhede pramāṇaphalabhedavyavahārānupapatteḥ pramāṇam eva vā phalam eva vā bhavet / apramāṇād vyāvṛtṭyā pramāṇavyavahārah, aphalād vyāvṛtṭyā ca phalavyavahāro bhaviṣyatīti cet; naivam; evaṁ sati pramāṇāntarād vyāvṛtṭyā 'pramāṇavyavahārah, phalāntarād vyāvṛtṭyā 'phalavyavahāro 'py astu, vijātīyād iva sajātīyād api vyāvṛttatvād vastunaḥ /*

149. A cognitive organ being of the nature of an instrument and the resultant being of the nature of an effect are mutually different. If the relation be one of absolute identity, the conventional treatment of a cognitive organ and its resultant as numerically different would be logically absurd and in that case, it would be either exclusively a cognitive organ or exclusively a resultant. It might be urged that the treatment (of the self-same fact) as a cognitive organ is justified on account of its difference from what is not a cognitive organ, and also as a resultant on account of its difference from what is not a resultant. But the contention has no substance. If this were (the basis of such differentiation), the fact of one cognitive organ being numerically different from another cognitive organ should make the former liable to be treated as a not-organ. Likewise, the numerical difference of one resultant from another resultant should justify its treatment as a not-resultant. The truth is that a real is different from both what is homogeneous and what is heterogeneous (and thus difference alone cannot be made the basis of classification, as it does away with the element of identity which is the presupposition of such procedure).

150. *tathā, tasyaivātmanaḥ pramāṇākāreṇa pariṇatis tasyaiva phalarūpatayā pariṇāma ity ekapramātr apekṣayā pramāṇaphalayoḥ abhedaḥ / bhede tv ātmāntaravat tadanupapattiḥ / atha yatraivātmani pramāṇam samavetaṁ phalam cpi tatraiva samavetaṁ iti samavāyalakṣaṇayā pratyāsattiyā pramāṇaphalavyavasthitir iti nātmāntare tatpraśaṅga iti cet; na; samavāyasya nityatvād vyāpakatvān niyatātmavat sarvātmasv apy aviśeṣān na tato niyatapramātrsambandhapratiniyamah tat siddham etat pramāṇāt phalam kathaṁcid bhinnam abhinnam ceti ||41||*

150. [It has been shown that the difference between a cognitive organ and its resultant cannot be obliterated]. Now, the same (logical necessity would compel us to recognise) that a cognitive organ and its resultant are identical in so far as they relate to one individual subject, in view of the fact that the self-same self which changes into a cognitive organ transforms itself as the resultant. If (the two modes were) different absolutely, the relation (between the organ and the resultant) would be as absurd (even in the same subject) as it is (between two such modes occurring) in two different subjects.<sup>1</sup> Now it has been contended (by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school) that the self in which a cognitive organ inheres is the very self in which the resultant is found to inhere and the determination of the two occurrences as organ and resultant is effected by the relation of inherence, and this prevents the occurrence of either of the events in a different self (though the two events are absolutely different and do not participate in some form of identity which the Jaina theory would have us accept). But the contention is untenable. Inherence is propounded to be eternal and ubiquitous, and is thus bound to be as existent in one self as in all other selves, and thus it fails to account for the determinate relation (of the events) to a particular subject. The conclusion, therefore, follows that the result is somehow different from and identical with the cognitive organ. (41)

151. *pramātārāṇi lakṣayati –*

*svaparābhāsī pariṇāmy ātmā pramātā ||42||*

151. Now the author is propounding the definition of the subject :

- 
1. It is not possible that A has his cognitive organ set in activity and B comes to have the expected cognition. The absurdity is plain in the supposition that A opens his eyes and B has the vision. But what is the reason behind this absurdity ? It is nothing but the fact that the two events are not absolutely isolated and unrelated as they would be if the occurrence of one were followed by the occurrence of the other in numerically different subjects. That they are possible only in the same subject proves that they are not isolated occurrences but cemented by a bond which is the index of their identity as opposed to unqualified difference. The bond of identity is not exclusive of and antagonistic to the numerical difference of the terms which are held together. Identity coinciding with numerical difference shows that neither of them is absolute. This is the non-absolutist interpretation which the Jaina philosopher offers as the solution of the apparent contradiction.

(Aph.) The subject is the self which reveals its own self as well as another and is liable to change. (42)

152. *svam ātmānaṁ param cārtham ābhāsayitum śīlaṁ yasya sa 'svaparābhāsi' svaṁ mukhatayā 'rthon mukhatayā cāvabhāsanāt ghaṭam ahaṁ jñānāmīti karmakarṭṛkriyāṇāṁ pratīteḥ, anyatarapratītyapalāpe pramāṇābhāvāt / na ca paraprakāśakatvasya svaprakāśakatvena virodhaḥ pradīpavat / nahi pradīpaḥ svaprakāśe param apekṣate / anenaikāntasvābhāsiparābhāsi vādimatanirāsaḥ / svaparābhāsy eva 'ātmā pramātā' /*

152. The self has the nature of revealing its own self as well as an object which is other than the self. That this is the case is apparent from the circumstance that the self has a subjective and an objective reference as is unfolded in the judgement 'I know the jar' in which (the three factors) the subject, object and the act are clearly open to notice. There is absolutely no ground for repudiating the cognition of any one of them. Nor is there any incompatibility between auto-revelation and hetero-revelation, which is found to be the case with light. Certainly a light does not depend upon anything other (than its own self) when it reveals its own self. This finding constitutes the *reductio ad absurdum* of the theories sponsored by a school of thinkers that cognition only reveals its own self and also the other theory which maintains that the cognition reveals only an object.

153. *tathā, pariṇāma uktalakṣaṇaḥ sa vidyate yasya sa 'pariṇāmī' / kūṭasthanitye hy ātmani harṣa-viśāda-sukha-duḥkha-bhogādayo vivartāḥ pravṛttinivṛttidharmāṇo na varteran / ekāntanāśini ca kṛtanāśākṛtābhyāgamau syātām, smṛtipratyabhijñānananihitapratyunmārgaṇaprabhṛtayaś ca pratiprāṇipratītā vyavahārā viśīryeran / pariṇāmini tūtpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-dharmaṇy ātmani sarvam upapadyate / yad āhuḥ –*

*yathā 'heḥ kuṇḍalāvasthā vyapaiti tadanantaram / sambhavaty ārjavāvasthā sarpatvaṁ tv anuvartate //*  
*tathaiva nityacaitanyasvarūpasyātmano hi na / niḥśeṣarūpavigamaḥ sarvasyānugamo 'pi vā //*  
*kiṁ tv asya vinivartante sukhaduḥkhādilakṣaṇāḥ / avasthās tās ca jāyante caitanyaṁ tv anuvartate //*  
*syātām atyantānāśe hi kṛtanāśākṛtāgamau / sukhaduḥkhādibhogaś ca naiva syād ekarūpiṇaḥ //*

*na ca kartṛtvabhokṛtve puṁso 'vasthām samāśrite /  
tato 'vasthāvatas tattvāt kartaivāpnoti tatphalam //*

*[Tattvasaṅgraha, kā. 223-227]*

*iti anenaikāntanityānityavādayudāsaḥ / 'ātmā' ity anātmavādinō vyudasyati /  
kāyapramāṇatā tv ātmanaḥ prakṛtānupayogān nokteti susthitaṁ  
pramāṭṛlakṣaṇam ||42||*

*ity ācārya śrī Hemacandraviracitāyāḥ*

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsāyās tadvr̥tteś ca*

*prathamasyādhyāyasya prathamam āhnikam /*

153. In the phrase 'liable to change', change should be understood in terms of the definition given before. Were the self an unchanging constant, such phenomena as joy, depression, pleasure, pain, enjoyment and the like which are liable to origination and cessation would not be possible attributes. Were it, on the other hand, absolutely perishable the (ethical fallacies of) loss of earned merit and acquisition of unearned deserts would become unavoidable. Furthermore, such activities, which are known to be the characteristic of every living being as memory, recognition, search for an article deposited in the past would entirely collapse. But all these facts find an easy and natural explanation in the conception of a dynamic self which necessarily owns up the characteristics of origination, cessation and persistence. As has been said :

"Just as the coiled state passes away and the state of erect posture succeeds, but the character of the serpent as serpent continues, so with regard to the self as an eternal continuous principle possessed of the nature of pure consciousness, there is neither efflux of its total nature, nor is there the continuity of its entire character. But the states such as pleasure and pain which happened to it in the past pass away and other states supervene, and consciousness continues throughout. If the self were liable to absolute destruction, there would arise the fallacy of lost deserts and unearned enjoyment, and were it again absolutely uniform the (transitional) experiences of pleasure and pain would be absolutely unexplainable. The agent and the enjoyer both are not the changing modes of the self, but it is self which as the agent reaps these consequences being the self-same entity which owns up these states" (TSN, 223-7).

This line of argument would serve to condemn the theories which posit the self to be absolutely unchanging or absolutely perishable. 'The self' (in the aphorism) dismisses the theory of not-self (of the Buddhist). The fact that the self comes to possess the same dimension as the body it inhabits has not been dealt with, because the problem has no bearing on the present topic. The definition of 'subject' is thus found to be sound and secure. (42)

**Here ends the First Lecture of the First Book of  
"A Critique of Organ of Knowledge" and the Gloss thereon  
composed by the Ācārya Śrī Hemacandra.**

## **|| *atha prathamādhyāye dvitīyam āhnikam* ||**

1. *ihoddiṣṭe pratyakṣaparokṣalakṣaṇe pramāṇadvaye lakṣitaṇi pratyakṣam / idānīm parokṣalakṣaṇam āha –*

***aviśadaḥ parokṣam ||1||***

### **BOOK I**

#### **LECTURE 2**

1. Of the two-fold organ of knowledge, which consists of perceptual and non-perceptual varieties which were specified at the outset (as the topics of discussion), the perceptual has been defined. Now, the author proposes the definition of the non-perceptual variety as follows :

**(Aph.) The non-perceptual is what lacks immediacy-cum-lucidity. (1)**

2. *sāmānyalakṣaṇānuvādena viśeṣalakṣaṇavidhānāt ‘samyag arthanirṇayaḥ’ ity anuvartate / tenāviśadaḥ samyag arthanirṇayaḥ parokṣapramāṇam iti ||1||*

2. Now (in pursuance of the dictum that) the predication of a specific characteristic (in the specific definition) is made by way of adding (a differentia) to the general definition, the phrase ‘authentic definitive cognition’ has to be read into the present aphorism (as the continuant link). Accordingly, (the full definition assumes the form) : “The non-perceptual organ of knowledge is definitive authentic cognition which lacks immediacy-cum-lucidity.” (1)

3. *vibhāgam āha –*

***smṛtipratyabhijñānohānumānāgamās tadvidhayaḥ ||2||***

3. He sets forth the sub-divisions (of the above) :

**(Aph.) The varieties of the same are recollection, recognition, inductive reasoning, inference and verbal testimony. (2)**

4. *‘tad’ iti parokṣasya parāmarśas tena parokṣasyaite prakārā na tu svatantrāṇi pramāṇāntarāṇi prakrāntapramāṇasaṅkhyāvighātaprasaṅgāt /*

4. ‘The same’ refers to the non-perceptual. Thus these are to be taken as the varieties of the non-perceptual cognition and not as independent organs, since (the latter alternative) would involve contradiction of the number of cognitive organs stated before.



5. *nanu svatantrāṇy eva smṛtyādīni pramāṇāni kiṃ nocyante ? , kim anena draṇḍamaṇḍakabhakṣaṇanyāyena ? / maivaṃ vocaḥ, parokṣalakṣaṇa-saṅgrhītāni parokṣapramāṇān na vibhedavartīni; yathaiva hi pratyakṣalakṣaṇasaṅgrhītānīndriyajñāna-mānasa-svasaṃvedana-yogijñānāni Saugatānāni na pratyakṣād atiricyante, tathaiva hi parokṣalakṣaṇākṣiptāni smṛtyādīni na mūlapramāṇasaṅkhyāparipanthīnīti / smṛtyādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ dvandvaḥ ||2||*

5. (Q) But why should not recollection and the rest be affirmed as independent organs ? Why this insensate imitation of the way of feeding on gruel current in the Draviḍa country ? (A) Do not speak like that. Now (the types of cognition), which are comprehended by the definition of non-perceptual cognition, cannot be regarded as different and distinct from non-perceptual cognition as an organ. Just as the types of intuition, viz., sense-intuition, mental intuition, self-intuition, and transcendent intuition of the mystics, which are comprehended within the definition of perceptual intuition according to the Buddhists, are not regarded as separate from perceptual intuition (by them), so exactly recollection and the rest, which fall within the purview of the definition of non-perceptual cognition, ought not to be regarded as standing in conflict with the number of fundamental organs of knowledge. The five words beginning with *smṛti* (recollection) are to be construed as members of the *dvandva*-compound. (2)

6. *tatra smṛtiṃ lakṣayati –*

*vāsanodbodhahetukā tad ity ākārā smṛtiḥ ||3||*

6. Of them, he now defines recollection.

(Aph.) Recollection (is a cognition which) has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression and which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun ‘that’. (3)

7. *‘vāsanā’ saṃskāras tasyāḥ ‘udbodhaḥ’ prabodhas taddhetukā tanni-bandhanā,*

*“kālam asaṃkhaṃ saṃkhaṃ ca dhāraṇā hoi nāyavvā”*

*[Viśeṣāvaśyakabhaṣya, gā. 333]*

*iti vacanāc cirakālasthāyiny apī vāsanā ‘nūdbuddhā na smṛtihetuḥ, āvaraṇakṣayopaśamasadrśadarśanādisāmagrīlabdhaprabodhā tu smṛtiṃ janayatīti ‘vāsanodbodhahetukā’ ity uktam / asyā ullekham āha ‘tad ity ākārā’ sāmānyoktau napuṃsakanirdeśas tena sa ghaṭaḥ, sā paṭī, tat kuṇḍalam ity ulle-*

*khavatī matiḥ smṛtiḥ /*

7. A memory-impression is the disposition (deposited by past experience). Its 'stimulation' means its emergence to the surface of consciousness. The clause 'which has for its condition, etc.,' means that the emergence of recollection is necessarily conditioned by it (stimulation). It is apparent from the remark "A disposition can persist for a length of time which may be calculable (*saṅkhyeya*) or incalculable (*asaṅkhyeya*)" (VB, 333) that a disposition, though it may have continued for a great length of time, does not operate as the cause of memory unless it is roused (by a stimulus). When, however, the requisite conditions such as the exhaustion and subsidence of the obstructive veils, observation of similar objects and the like are at work to bring it to maturation, it produces recollection. And so the clause 'which has for its condition the stimulation of a memory-impression' has been stated. The clause "which refers to its content by a form of the pronoun 'that' " is inserted for setting forth its mode of deliverance. The word *tat* (in the original aphorism) is given in the neuter gender in order to bring out that no specific gender is implied. Thus all these cognitions which deliver their content as 'that (*saḥ*, masculine) jar (*ghaṭaḥ*)', 'that (*sā*, feminine) cloth (*paṭī*)', 'that (*tat*, neuter) ear-ring (*kuṇḍalam*)' are cases of recollection.

8. *sā ca pramāṇam avisamvāditvāt svayaṁ nihitapratyunmārgaṇādivyavahārāṇāṁ darśanāt / nanv anubhūyamānasya viśayasyābhāvān nirālambanā smṛtiḥ katham pramāṇam ? / naivam, anubhūtenārthena sālambanatvopapattē, anyathā pratyakṣasyāpy anubhūtārthaviśayatvād aprāmāṇyaṁ prasajyeta / svaviśayāvabhāsanam smṛter apy aviśiṣṭam / vinaṣṭo viśayaḥ katham smṛter janakaḥ ?, tathā cārthājanyatvān na prāmāṇyam asyā iti cet; tat kiṁ pramāṇāntare 'py arthajanyatvam avisamvādahetur iti vipralabdho 'si ? / maivam muhaḥ, yathaiva hi pradīpaḥ svasāmagrībalalabdhajanmā ghaṭādibhir ajanito 'pi tān prakāśayati tathaivāvaraṇakṣayopasāmasavyapekṣendriyānindriyabalalabdhajanma samvedanam viśayam avabhāsayati / "nānanukṛtānvayavyatirekaṁ kāraṇam nākāraṇam viśayaḥ" iti tu pralāpamātram, yogijñānasyātītānāgatārthagocarasya tadajanyasyāpi prāmāṇyaṁ prati vipratipatter abhāvāt / kiñca, smṛter aprāmāṇye 'numānāya datto jalāṇalīḥ, tayā vyāpter aviśayīkaraṇe tadutthānāyogāt; liṅgagrahaṇa-sambandhasmaraṇapūrvakam anumānam iti hi sarvavādisiddham / tataś ca*

*smṛtiḥ pramāṇam, anumānaprāmāṇyānyathānupapatter iti siddham ||3||*

8. It is an organ of knowledge since it is never found to be discrepant with fact which is further attested by such (successful) activities as search for thing deposited by one's own self. But how can recollection be an organ when it is not cognisant of a datum perceived at the present, and thus is found to lack an objective basis ? No. It is certainly possessed of an object that has been experienced in the past. [The reality of the object, and not its actually felt presence, is the condition of validity of a cognition. If it be contended, on the analogy of perception, that the object must be felt as present in order that the cognition may be valid, one might with equal propriety contend that] perceptual cognition is invalid since it is found to lack the criterion of referring to a fact that has been experienced in the past. If revelation of the relevant object (be the criterion of validity), it is found to be equally present in the case of memory also. (Q) But how can a defunct object be the generating condition of recollection ? Hence it cannot lay claim to validity as it is not generated by an object. (A) [The doubt raised has no substance]. Are you deluded to think that the condition of lack of discrepancy in other organs of knowledge consists in their being generated by an object ? You ought not to be led away by such delusion (as the situation has no concern with causation). Thus as, for instance, light which comes into being on the operation of its own conditions reveals the objects, jar and the like, though not generated by them, so also does a cognition reveal its object, if it is brought into existence by its requisite conditions, viz., sense-organ, or the mind accompanied by the elimination and subsidence of the obscuring veil. The statement that "Nothing is the cause which is not followed in agreement and in difference (by an event) and nothing is the object which is not the cause (of its cognition)" is only a nonsensical utterance, since there is no dispute regarding the validity of the mystic's intuition of the past and unborn objects, though it is not generated by the latter. Moreover, if recollection be convicted of invalidity, one must offer oblation of water to inference (that is to say, one must be prepared to repudiate the validity of inference), since there is no possibility of inference being realised unless recollection has already taken note of the necessary concomitance. It is universally accepted by all logicians that inference is conditioned by apprehension of the probans and recollection of its necessary

concomitance (with the probandum). It is established, therefore, that recollection is to be accepted as an organ of knowledge, as otherwise the validity of inference would become unaccountable. (3)

9. *atha pratyabhijñānam lakṣayati –*

***darśanasmarāṇasambhavam tad evedam tatsadṛśam tad-  
vilakṣaṇam tatpratiyogītyādisaṅkalanam pratyabhijñānam ||4||***

9. Now the author sets forth the definition of recognition.

(Aph.) Recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection as typified by such forms as 'that necessarily is it' (judgement of identity), 'it is like that' (judgement of similarity), 'that is dissimilar to that' (judgement of dissimilarity), 'this is different from that' (judgement of difference), and the like. (4)

10. 'darśanam' pratyakṣam, 'smaraṇam' smṛtis tābhyāṃ sambhavo yasya tat tathā darśanasmarāṇakāraṇakam saṅkalanājñānam 'pratyabhijñānam' / tasyollekham āha – 'tad evedam', sāmānyanirdeśena napuṃsakatvam, sa evāyam ghaṭaḥ, saiveyam paṭī, tad evedam kuṇḍam iti / 'tatsadṛśaḥ' gosadṛśo gavayaḥ, 'tadvilakṣaṇaḥ' govilakṣaṇo mahiṣaḥ, 'tatpratiyogi' idam asmād alpaṃ mahat dūram āsannaṃ vetyādi / 'ādi'grahaṇāt –

"romaśo danturaḥ śyāmo vāmanaḥ pṛthulocanaḥ /  
yas tatra cipītaghrāṇas taṃ Caitram avadhārayeḥ //"

[Nyāyamañjarī, p. 143]

"payombubhedī haṃsaḥ syāt śatpādair bhramaraḥ smṛtaḥ /  
saptaparṇas tu vidvadbhir vijñeyo viṣamacchadaḥ //  
pañcavarṇam bhaved ratnaṃ mecakākhyam pṛthustanī /  
yuvatiś caikaśṛṅgo 'pi gaṇḍakaḥ parikīrtitaḥ //

ity evam ādiśabdaśravaṇāt tathāvidhān eva Caitra-haṃsādīn avalokya tathā satyāpayati yadā, tadā tad api saṅkalanājñānam uktam, darśanasmarāṇasambhavatvāviśeṣāt / yathā vā audīcyena kramelakam nindatoktam 'dhikkarabham atidīrghagrīvam pralamboṣṭham kaṭhoratikṣṇakaṇṭakāśīnam kutsitāvayava-sanniveśam apaśadam paśūnām' iti / tad upaśrutya dākṣiṇātya uttarāpatham gatas tādṛśam vastūpalabhya 'nūnam ayam artho 'sya karabhaśabdasya' iti [yad avaiti] tad api darśanasmarāṇakāraṇakatvāt saṅkalanājñānam pratyabhijñānam /

10. 'Observation' is perceptual cognition. 'Recollection' is an act of memory. These two (separately and jointly) are the conditions of recognition which is a kind of synthetic judgement. The author exhibits the form in which it delivers the contents : 'That necessarily is it.' The neuter gender in the original is given in order to bring out that no special gender is implied. Thus all such judgements as 'this (masc.) is necessarily that jar', 'this (fem.) is necessarily that cloth', 'this (neut.) is necessarily that waterpot' are the cases (of judgement of identity); 'this is like that', e.g., 'the cow is like the gayal' (judgement of similarity). (The judgement of dissimilarity, viz.,) 'this is dissimilar to that' is (illustrated by the proposition) 'the buffalo is different from the cow.' As for the judgement of difference, it is exemplified in the following : 'this is less than, greater than, farther than, nearer than that, etc.' The employment of the words 'and the like' (in the aphorism) is for (the inclusion of such cases as) the following :

"Know him to be Caitra who is shaggy all over the body, has protruding teeth, is swarthy, dwarfish, possessed of broad eyes and a snub nose" (NM, p. 143). "The swan is (an aquatic fowl which is) capable of separating milk from water (in a solution). The bee is (the fly) possessed of six feet. The seven-leafed tree is to be known by the learned as one that possesses an odd number of leaves in each stem. A jewel with five colours is called multicoloured. A young damsel is one who possesses swelling breasts. The one-horned animal is said to be the rhinoceros."

When, on hearing such descriptions, one finds out Caitra, swan and the rest, and vouches them for the objects as described, all these instances of synthetic judgements are to be classed under recognition, since (they satisfy the terms of the definition), being generated by observation and recollection. The following is also an instance in point. Suppose a Northerner happens to censure a camel in the following terms : Cursed be the camel, the worst of the brutes, with its long crooked neck, with its elongated upper lip, with its ugly disposition of limbs, addicted as it is to feeding on hard and sharp bramble. Suppose a Southerner who has heard all these, and happens to see, on a visit to North India, a thing of the above description, he would naturally judge – 'the object ahead is certainly what is meant by the word camel.' Now this synthetic judgement is to be accepted as a case of

recognition, since it is derived from observation and recollection as its conditions.

11. *yeṣāṃ tu sādṛśyaviṣayam upamānākhyam pramāṇāntaram tesāṃ  
vailakṣaṇyādiviṣayam pramāṇāntaram anuṣajyeta / yad āhuḥ –*

*“upamānam prasiddhārthasādharmyāt sādhyasāadhanam /  
tadvaidharmyāt pramāṇam kiṃ syāt sañjñipratipādanam //”*

[*Laghīyastraya 3.10*]

*“idaṃ alpaṃ mahad dūram āsannaṃ prāṃśu neti vā /  
vyapekṣātaḥ samakṣe ’rthe vikalpaḥ sādhanāntaram //”*

[*Laghīyastraya 3.12*]

11. Now, those philosophers who acknowledge a judgement of similarity to be an independent organ called ‘comparison’ cannot decline to regard judgements of dissimilarity and the rest as separate cognitive organs :

“Comparison is (regarded as) the organ of knowledge of the relation of similiarity to a known object. If so, why not cognition of the name-relation based on diversity be regarded as a (separate) organ of knowledge ?” (LT, 3.10). “Moreover, the following judgements, on the basis of the relation between perceived data, should be regarded as independent organs also : ‘This is less, greater, farther, nearer, taller or otherwise than the other’ (LT, 3.12).

12. *atha sādharṇyam upalakṣaṇam yogavibhāgo vā kariṣyata iti cet;  
tarhy akuśalaḥ sūtrakāraḥ syāt, sūtrasya lakṣaṇarahitavāt / yad āhuḥ –*

*“alpākṣaram asandigdham sāravad viśvatomukham /  
astobham anavadyam ca sūtram sūtravido viduḥ //”*

*astobham anadhikam /*

• 12. If, however, the term ‘similarity’ be regarded as a typical illustration (and not an exhaustive enumeration), or if you resort to the stratagem of splitting the aphorism (in order to add the predicate ‘dissimilarity’ in a resultant aphorism), your procedure will show that the author of the aphorism is an unskilled craftsman, since his aphorism is found to lack in the essential characteristics (of an aphorism). As has been observed – “Those who are acquainted with the nature of an aphorism lay it down that an aphorism is one which consists of the minimum of syllables, is indubious (in significance), states only the essential elements, is comprehensive of all

issues, is devoid of superfluity, and is not liable to censure.” ‘Devoid of superfluity’ means devoid of an excess.

13. *nanu ‘tat’ iti smaraṇam ‘idam’ iti pratyakṣam iti jñānadvayam eva, na tābhyām anyat pratyabhijñānākhyam pramāṇam utpaśyāmaḥ / naitad yuktam, smaraṇa-pratyakṣābhyām pratyabhijñānaviśayasyārthasya grahītum aśakyatvāt / pūrvāparākāraikadhurīṇam hi dravyam pratyabhijñānasya viśayaḥ / na ca tat smaraṇasya gocaras tasyānubhūtavīśayatvāt , yad āhuḥ –*

*“pūrvapramitamātre hi jāyate sa iti smṛtiḥ /  
sa evāyam itīyam tu pratyabhijñā ‘tīrekiṇī’ //”*

*[Tattvasaṅgraha, kā. 453]*

*nāpi pratyakṣasya gocaraḥ, tasya vartamānavivartamātravṛttitvāt / na ca darśanasmaraṇābhyām anyad jñānam nāsti, darśanasmaraṇottarakālabhāvino jñānāntarasyānubhūteḥ / na cānubhūyamānasyāpalāpo yuktaḥ atiprasaṅgāt /*

13. [Now the scholiast records the objections of the Buddhist who denies that recognition is a unitary cognition, far less an organ. The Buddhist observes] : “We do not find any phenomenon called recognition, which is given out as a separate organ, as anything different from the two cognitive acts, viz., recollection indicated by the word ‘that’ and perception indicated by ‘this’.” This is certainly not a sound contention. (A little reflection will show that) the object which is envisaged by recognition cannot be comprehended by recollection and perception combined together. The province of recognition is the substance which stands out as the identity in and through its antecedent and subsequent modes. Certainly, this identity cannot be the content of recollection which is cognisant only of what has been experienced before. As has been said, “Now, recollection comes to cognise only what has been known before and refers to its content as ‘that’ (a past event). As for recognition (which envisages the identity of a past datum with a present one) in the form ‘that is this’ it is certainly different from it” (TSN, 453). Nor can this (identity) possibly be the content of perception which is constrained to take stock of a present mode alone. Nor is it a sound contention that there is no cognition different from perception and recollection, inasmuch as it (recognition) is a different cognition which is distinctly felt to emerge

subsequently to perception and recollection. It is certainly not a justifiable attitude to deny what is felt, since this (habit of disregarding the plain testimony of experience) may lead to unwholesome consequences (denial of what the opponent rightly believes to be true).

14. *nanu pratyakṣam evedam pratyabhijñānam ity eke / naivam, tasya sannihitavārtamānikārthaviśayatvāt /*

*“sambaddham vartamānam ca grhyate cakṣurādinā”*

[Ślokavārtika, sūtra 4, śloka 84]

*iti mā sma vismarah / tato nātītavartamānāyor ekatvam adhyakṣajñānagocarah / atha smaraṇasahakṛtam indriyam tad ekatvaviśayaṁ pratyakṣam upajanayatīti pratyakṣarūpatā 'sya gīyata iti cet; na; svaviśayavinīyamita-mūrter indriyasya viśayāntare sahakāriśatasamavadhāne 'py apravṛtteḥ / nahi parimalasmarāṇasahāyam api cakṣurindriyam aviśaye gandhādu pravartate / aviśayaś cātītavartamānāvasthāvīpy ekam dravyam indriyāṇām / nāpy adṛṣṭasahakārisahitam indriyam ekatvaviśayam iti vaktum yuktam uktād eva hetoḥ / kiñca, adṛṣṭasavyapekṣād evātmanas tad vijñānam bhavatīti varam vaktum yuktam / dṛśyate hi svapnavidyādīsaṁskṛtād ātmano viśayāntare 'pi viśiṣṭajñānotpattiḥ / nanu yathā 'ñjanādīsaṁskṛtaṁ cakṣuḥ sātīśayaṁ bhavati tathā smaraṇasahakṛtam ekatvaviśayaṁ bhaviṣyati / naivam, indriyasya svaviśayānatilāṅghanenaivātīśayopalabdheḥ, na viśayāntaragrahaṇarūpeṇa / yad āha Bhaṭṭaḥ –*

*“yaś cāpy atīśayo dṛṣṭaḥ sa svārthānatilāṅghanāt /*

*dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syāt na rūpe śrotravṛttitah //” iti*

[Ślokavārtika, sūtra 2, śloka 114]

*tat sthitam etat viśayabhedāt pratyakṣād anyat parokṣāntargataṁ pratyabhijñānam iti /*

14. (The scholiast now proposes to take up the issue with the Naiyāyikas) who maintain that recognition is nothing but a species of perception. But this view cannot be accepted to be true. For the province of perceptual cognition is limited to what is actually present and given to the senses. You (Naiyāyika) ought not to forget the dictum “That which is in direct contact with senses and actually present is directly apprehended by the senses of sight and the like” (SV, sū. 4, 84). Hence the identity of a past and a present datum cannot lie within the jurisdiction of perception. It has



been urged that a sense-organ as aided and reinforced by memory does give rise to the perception of such an identity, and so recognition is asserted to be a species of perceptual cognition. But this is an impossibility. A sense-organ, which is entirely delimited to its own relevant sphere, cannot be supposed to proceed to another object (which is beyond its jurisdiction), in spite of the aid rendered by a hundred of auxiliary factors. It is a truism that the sense of sight cannot take stock of odour and the like which transcend its province, though it may be aided by a memory of its fragrance. A substance *qua* the identity which embraces the past and the present states does certainly fall outside the scope of senses. Nor will it be a sound argument, for the reasons set forth above, to maintain that a sense-organ aided by an unseen potency can apprehend this identity. On the other hand, it will be more appropriate to assert that this cognition of identity directly eventuates from the self as reinforced by such unseen potency. It is seen that a self reinforced and strengthened by the knowledge of a secret science, acquired in dream, comes to have a distinct kind of knowledge even in regard to objects which are beyond its ken. It has been contended that just as the organ of vision acquires additional efficiency when it is anointed with the paint of a collyrium, so likewise it might acquire efficiency regarding identity when it is in alliance with recollection. But this (analogical) argument overreaches itself. The additional efficiency that might be acquired by a sense-organ is never found to overstep its proper jurisdiction. It is never found to operate in the way of apprehending an object which lies within the jurisdiction of another sense. We may quote (Kumārila) Bhaṭṭa in support : “Where an additional efficiency is seen to materialise (in a sense-organ), it is found to manifest itself in the apprehension of such objects as are distant and infra-sensible, and is never found to transgress the limits of its proper jurisdiction which would be the case if the auditory organ were to operate on colour” (SV, sū 2, 114). The conclusion must be taken to be established that recognition, which has an object of a different kind from that of perception, is different from the latter, and falls within the category of indirect non-perceptual cognitions as organs.

15. *na caitad apramāṇam viśaṁvādābhāvāt / kvacid viśaṁvādād aprāmāṇye pratyakṣasyāpi tathā prasaṅgo durnivāraḥ / pratyabhijñāna-*

*paricchinnasya cātmādīnām ekatvasyābhāve bandhamokṣavyavasthā nopapa-  
dyate / ekasyaiva hi baddhatve muktatve ca baddho duḥkhitam ātmānam  
jānan muktisukhārthī prayateta / bhede tv anyā eva duḥkhy anyā eva sukhīti  
kaḥ kim artham vā prayateta ? tasmāt sakalasya dṛṣṭādrṣṭavyavahārasyaika-  
tvamūlatvād ekatvasya ca pratyabhijñāyattajīvitatvād bhavati pratyabhijñā  
pramāṇam iti ||4||*

15. It (recognition) cannot be regarded as lacking in validity, since the lack of discrepancy (which is the criterion of validity) is present in it. If an occasional occurrence of discrepancy (e.g., in the case of growing hair, nail, flame, etc.,) were to condemn it as a whole kind to invalidity, the same issue would be unavoidable in the case of perception also. Moreover, if the identity of the self and the like, as determined by the evidence of recognition, were to lack objective reality (as a rule), the logical justification of bondage and emancipation (as states of the same ethico-religious aspirant) would become absolutely impossible. If it is the self-same person who suffers bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person in bondage feeling himself to be subject to the misery (of bondage) can be expected to put forth the requisite labour to achieve the joy of freedom. If, on the other hand, there was no personal identity and one is unhappy and another achieves happiness, who will labour and for what end ? It follows, therefore, that recognition is a valid organ since the sense of identity can have a lease of life only if there is recognition to validate its claim, and it is this sense of identity, again, which is at the root of all secular and spiritual activity. (4)

16. *athohasya lakṣaṇam āha –*

***upalambhānupalambhanimittam vyāptijñānam ūhaḥ ||5||***

16. Now the author is propounding definition of Inductive Reasoning :  
(Aph.) **Inductive Reasoning is the knowledge of universal concom-  
itance conditioned by observation and non-observation.**  
(5)

17. *‘upalambhaḥ’ pramāṇamātram atra gr̥hyate na pratyakṣam eva  
anumeyasyāpi sādhanasya sambhavāt, pratyakṣavad anumeyeṣv api vyāpter  
avirodhāt / ‘vyāptiḥ’ vakṣyamāṇā tasyā ‘jñānam’ tadgrāhī nimāyaviśeṣa ‘ūhaḥ’/*

17. ‘Observation’ in this context stands for valid cognition as such, and not for perceptual cognition alone, since the middle term (probans)

may be an object of inference also, and there is no incompatibility in the fact of universal concomitance obtaining between terms known by inference as (between terms known) by perception. 'Universal concomitance' will be explained subsequently and the knowledge of it is a specific kind of determinate cognition taking stock of the same. Such (determinate cognition) is Inductive Reasoning.

18. *na cāyaṃ vyāptigrahaḥ pratyakṣād eveti vaktavyam / nahi pratyakṣaṃ yāvān kaścit dhūmaḥ sa deśāntare kālāntare vā pāvakasyaiva kāryaṃ nārthāntarasyetīyato vyāpārān kartuṃ samartham sannihitaviṣaya-balotpatter avicāra-  
katvāc ca /*

18. Now, it cannot be maintained that such knowledge of universal concomitance is derived exclusively from perceptual evidence. It is not conceivable that perception is competent to discharge the entire series of operations (that are involved in the knowledge that) 'Whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire in all places and times, and not of anything else.' The reason is that it (sic. perception) is not discursive and owes its genesis to the influence exerted by a datum that is present.

19. *nāpy anumānāt, tasyāpi vyāptigrahaṇakāle yogīva pramātā sampadyata ity evaṃbhūtabhārasamarthatvāt / sāmartye 'pi prakṛtam evānumānaṃ vyāptigrāhakam, anumānāntaraṃ vā ? / tatra prakṛtānumānāt vyāptipratipattāv itaretarāśrayaḥ / vyāptau hi pratipannāyām anumānam ātmānam āśādayati, tadātmalābhe ca vyāptipratipattir iti / anumānāntarāt tu vyāptipratipattāv anavasthā tasyāpi grhītavyāptikasyaiva prakṛtānumānavyāptigrāhakatvāt / tadvyāptigrahaś ca yadi svata eva, tadā pūrveṇa kim aparāddhaṃ yenānumānāntaraṃ mṛgyate / anumānāntareṇa cet; tarhi yugasahasreṣv api vyāptigrahaṇāsambhavaḥ /*

19. Nor can it be maintained that such knowledge is obtained by inference inasmuch as this too is quite unequal to the stupendous burden imposed by the knowledge of universal concomitance, when, on the occasion, the subject becomes (as omniscient as) a *yogin* (mystic). Even were its competency (for such a task) conceded, it remains to be thrashed out – which of the inferences, the present one or another, is cognisant of this universal concomitance ? If the knowledge of concomitance were supposed to be secured by the present inference, the result would be a

logical see-saw. Inference comes into being only after universal concomitance has been ascertained, and the knowledge of universal concomitance will again be secured just on the emergence of this very inference. If it was supposed that the knowledge of universal concomitance were to be secured by another act of inference, the result would be a vicious infinite series. The latter inference, which is supposed to yield the knowledge of universal concomitance which is the condition of the contemplated inference, is possible only if the universal concomitance (which makes it possible) has been already apprehended (as an antecedent condition). If the apprehension of this universal concomitance were thought to be secured by its own self (that is to say, if it were self-evident) then why should the previous cognition of universal concomitance be condemned (of incompetency) and why again a second inference be held in request for the purpose ? If, however, (the universal concomitance underlying the validating inference were sought to be secured) by means of another inference, the apprehension of universal concomitance would not be possible of realisation even in thousands of epochs.

20. *nanu yadi nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ avicāraṃ tarhi tat-prṣṭhabhāvī vikalpo vyāptiṃ grahīṣyatīti cet; naitat, nirvikalpakena vyāpter agrahaṇe vikalpena grahītum aśakyatvāt nirvikalpakagrāhītārthaviṣayatvād vikalpasya / atha nirvikalpakaviṣayanirapekṣo 'rthāntaragocarō vikalpah; sa tarhi pramāṇam apramāṇaṃ vā ? / pramāṇatve pratyakṣānumānātiriktaṃ pramāṇāntaraṃ titikṣitavyam / aprāmāṇye tu tato vyāptigrahaṇaśraddhā ṣaṇḍhāt tanayadohadaḥ / etena – “anupalambhāt kāraṇavyāpakānupalambhāc ca kāryakāraṇavyāpyavyāpakabhāvāvagamaḥ” iti pratyuktam, anupalambhasya pratyakṣaviśeṣatvena kāraṇavyāpakānupalambhayaś ca liṅgatvena tajjanitasya tasyānumānatvāt, pratyakṣānumānābhyāṃ ca vyāptigrahaṇe doṣasyābhihatavāt /*

20. (Q) Even conceding that indeterminate perception is undiscursive (and hence incompetent for universal concomitance), there is no reason (for doubt) that determinate reflection which follows in its wake should seize hold of universal concomitance. (A) But this is not possible. If indeterminate perception were not competent to apprehend universal concomitance, the determinate reflection would not succeed in comprehending the same for

the reason that reflection has for its contents the same data as are apprehended by indeterminate perception. If, however, reflective thought were supposed to be conversant with a different datum and were not in any way dependent upon the contents of indeterminate perception, (the initial objection of equal incompetency would be avoided, no doubt, but this would give rise to another difficulty, viz.,) whether this reflective thought were an organ of knowledge or otherwise. If it be considered to be an organ, you are compelled to tolerate an additional organ in excess of perception and inference. And if it be regarded as invalid, expectation of the knowledge of universal concomitance therefrom would only be as absurd as the expectation of a child from an impotent (husband). This very consideration will demolish the contention (of the Buddhist). "The relation of necessary concomitance and that of causality are known from the non-observation (of the effect and of the determinate concomitant) following upon the non-observation of the cause and the determinant concomitant". Non-observation of the effect and of the determinate concomitant is a species of perceptual cognition, and non-observation of the cause and that of the determinant concomitant being nothing but the logical ground, the knowledge resulting from it would be nothing but inference. And we have already set forth the objections that lie against the capacity of perception and inference for apprehension of universal concomitance.

21. *Vaiśeṣikās tu pratyakṣaphalenohāpohavikalpajñānena vyāptipratipattir ity āhuḥ / teṣāṃ apy adhyakṣaphalasya pratyakṣānumānāyor anyataratve vyāpter aviśayīkaraṇam, tadanyatve ca pramāṇāntaratvaprāsaktiḥ / atha vyāptivikalpasya phalatvān na pramāṇatvam anuyoktum yuktam; na, etatphalasyānumānalakṣaṇaphalahetutayā pramāṇatvāvirodhāt sannikarṣaphalasya viśeṣajñānasyeva viśeṣajñānāpekṣayeti /*

21. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers, on the other hand, hold that reflective thought, which works by way of elimination and assimilation, is the effect of perceptual cognition and the knowledge of universal concomitance is secured by this (reflective thought). If (this reflection which is) the result of perception falls under the head either of perception or of inference, the old difficulty of incompetency (of perception or of inference) for the realisation of universal concomitance would remain (unresolved). And if,

again, be it different from both of them, it would be tantamount to the admission of an additional organ of knowledge. It will not be a valid contention to say that the knowledge of universal concomitance is only the result, and as such the question of its being an organ does not simply arise. The fact is that though it is a result (of perceptual cognition), it is a condition of a subsequent result in the shape of inference, and as such there is no inherent incompatibility of its serving as an organ (regarding inference). The case is exactly on a par with the knowledge of the adjectival determination which, though itself the result of sense-object contact, serves as an organ of the knowledge of the substantive (in the judgment).

22. *Yaugās tu tarkasahitāt pratyakṣād eva vyāptigraha ity āhuḥ / teṣām api yadi na kevalāt pratyakṣād vyāptigrahaḥ kintu tarkasahakṛtāt tarhi tarkād eva vyāptigraho 'stu / kim asya tapasvino yaśomārjanena, pratyakṣasya vā tarkaprasādalabdhyavyāptigrahāpalāpakṛtaghnatvāropeṇeti ? / atha tarkaḥ pramāṇam na bhavatīti na tato vyāptigrahaṇam iṣyate / kutaḥ punar asya na pramāṇatvam, avyabhicāras tāvad ihāpi pramāṇāntarasādhāraṇo 'sty eva ? / vyāptilakṣaṇena viśayeṇa viśayavattvam api na nāsti / tasmāt pramāṇāntarā-grhītavvyāptigrahaṇapravaṇaḥ pramāṇāntaram ūhaḥ ||5||*

22. As regards the Naiyāyikas, they hold that the apprehension of universal concomitance results from perceptual cognition when aided and reinforced by inductive reasoning. When it is admitted even by them that apprehension of universal concomitance is effected by perception not in isolation but only when it is aided by reasoning, it is quite proper to acknowledge that the apprehension of such concomitance should be set down to the credit of reasoning alone. What is sought to be gained by this attempt at obliterating the credit of reasoning (the poor victim of injustice), and by exposing perception to the charge of ingratitude which is involved in the repudiation of the favour of reasoning which alone makes the former capable of the knowledge of universal concomitance ? It may be urged that reasoning cannot be an organ of knowledge and so it is not regarded as the instrument of the knowledge of universal concomitance. But we do not see any valid ground why reasoning should not be regarded as an organ of knowledge, (particularly when it fulfils all the criteria that an organ of knowledge possesses). As for the criterion of lack of discrepancy (between

knowledge and its object), it does share it with all acknowledged organs of knowledge, and it is not a truth that it does not possess a distinctive object of its own, since its object is nothing but universal concomitance itself. It follows, therefore, that reasoning is a separate organ of knowledge which serves to give knowledge of universal concomitance which is not apprehended by any other accepted organ. (5)

23. *vyāptiṃ lakṣayati –*

***vyāptir vyāpakasya vyāpye sati bhāva eva vyāpyasya  
vā tatraiva bhāvaḥ ||6||***

23. Now the author sets forth the definition of necessary concomitance in the following terms :

(Aph.) Necessary concomitance consists in the ‘occurrence necessarily’ (*bhāva eva*) of the determinant concomitant (major term) on the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (middle term), or, the occurrence of the determinate concomitant (middle term) ‘exclusively in the locus’ (*tatraiva*) (where the major term occurs). (6)

24. ‘*vyāptiḥ*’ *iti yo vyāpnoti yaś ca vyāpyate tayo ubhayor dharmah / tatra yadā vyāpakadharmatayā vivakṣyate tadā ‘vyāpakasya’ gamyasya ‘vyāpye’ dharme ‘sati’, yatra dharmiṇi vyāpyam asti tatra sarvatra ‘bhāva eva’ vyāpakasya svagato dharmo vyāptiḥ / tataś ca vyāpyabhāvāpekṣā vyāpyasyaiva vyāptatāpratītiḥ / na tv evam avadhāryate – vyāpakasyaiva vyāpye sati bhāva iti, hetvabhāvaprasaṅgāt avyāpakasyāpi mūrtatvādes tatra bhāvāt / nāpi – vyāpye saty evety avadhāryate, prayatnānantarīyakatvāder ahetutvāpatteḥ, sādharmaṇas ca hetuḥ syān nityatvasya prameyeṣv eva bhāvāt /*

24. ‘Necessary concomitance’ (the relation of determination) is the property of both the terms — that which determines (the occurrence) and that (the occurrence of) which is determined. Now, in so far as it is considered as the property of the determinant (major term), the necessary occurrence ( *bhāva eva*) of the determinant, that is, of the inferable predicate, on the occurrence of the determinate (middle), in other words, in all the cases where the determinate (middle) exists, is an illustration of necessary concomitance *qua* the intrinsic property of the determinant (major). Such being the case, the determinate alone is described as the

concomitant (and not the determinant, notwithstanding the fact that the determinant equally with the determinate is the locus of necessary concomitance), and this characterisation of the determinate as 'concomitant' is to be understood only with reference to quality *qua* determinate (and thus in conformity with linguistic usage, the term 'concomitant', *vyāpta*, is to be taken as the equivalent of 'determinate concomitant' and not of 'determinant concomitant').

[The employment of the adverb 'necessarily' in the aphorism is intended for conveying restrictive qualification and its construction cannot be reversed]. The restrictive qualification 'necessarily' is thus not to be construed with 'determinant concomitant' (but with the word 'occurrence'. Were it to be so construed, it would mean the occurrence of the major exclusively and thus the occurrence of the middle would be excluded and this would mean that the middle term is not concomitant with the major) and would thus cease to function as the logical ground, (and it would further involve contradiction of the actual truth), since there is also present such attribute as 'limited magnitude' which is other than the major term in the same locus with it. Nor can again the restrictive adverb 'necessarily' be construed with the phrase 'on the occurrence of the determinate concomitant' (which would come to mean that the occurrence of the determinant is necessarily bound up with the occurrence of the determinate, in other words, nothing would be the determinant major term, which is not necessarily concomitant with the determinate middle). Were it so, such a fact as the quality of 'being produced by an exertion' would not function as a logical ground (of the inference of impermanence, since the latter is not necessarily coincident with the former as is found to be the case with a flash of lightning which is impermanent though not a product of exertion). Furthermore, this would involve the admission of a common (inconclusive) attribute as a logical ground, inasmuch as permanence is found to be coincident with the attribute of being cognisable; (if one were to argue 'Sound is permanent, since it is cognisable', the argument, though fallacious, would pass muster as valid if necessary concomitance were defined as 'the occurrence of the major on the occurrence 'necessarily of the middle'. In the case cited above 'permanence', which is the major, necessarily coincides with



the attribute 'cognisability'. In other words, a permanent is necessarily cognisable and nothing is permanent which is not cognisable. In order to obviate such a contingency, the proposed construction of the definition of necessary concomitance as the 'occurrence necessarily' of the major on the occurrence of the middle should be regarded as the only legitimate interpretation).

25. *yadā tu vyāpyadharmatayā vyāptir vivakṣyate tadā 'vyāpyasya vā' gamakasya 'tatraiva' vyāpake gamye sati yatra dharmiṇi vyāpako 'sti tatraiva 'bhāvaḥ' na tadabhāve 'pi vyāptir iti / atrāpi naivam avadhāryate – vyāpyasyaiva tatra bhāva iti, hetvabhāvaprasaṅgād avyāpyasyāpi tatra bhāvāt / nāpi – vyāpyasya tatra bhāva eveti, sapakṣaikadeśavṛtter ahetutvaprāpteh sādharmaṇasya ca hetutvaṁ syāt, prameyatvasya nityeṣv avaśyaṁbhāvād iti /*

25. When necessary concomitance is viewed as the property of the determinate concomitant, it should be construed as the occurrence of the determinate — that is, of the logical ground — exclusively in the locus (*tatraiva*) in which the determinant — that is, the inferable predicate — exists, and not in a locus where the determinant is non-existent. Here, too, the restrictive qualification is not to be construed as the occurrence of the 'determinate exclusively' (*vyāpyasya eva*), since such construction would be tantamount to the stultification of the middle term (for it would not be concomitant with the major and thus would fail to prove the existence of the major term, for which a middle term is requisitioned). And (further such assertion would be incorrect) since things other than the middle term are also present. Nor again can the construction be as follows : the middle term 'exists necessarily' (*bhāva eva*) in the locus of the major (and is thus co-extensive with the latter). For this would result in the repudiation of a middle term which exists in a part of locus of the major, and would lead to the acceptance of an (inconclusive) common term as a true middle. Thus the quality of 'being cognisable' would be vested with the title of a sound middle term, since it necessarily occurs in all things which are eternal. [The argument in view is, for example, 'sound is eternal because it is cognisable'. Here the middle term 'cognisable' is invariably present in all eternal things, and thus would satisfy the criterion involved in the proposed construction. The absurdity which necessarily results from all the hypothetical construc-

tions shows that the construction of the restrictive qualification in the definition of necessary concomitance cannot be other than what is set forth in the aphorism].

26. *vyāpyavyāpakadharmatāsaṅkīrtanaṁ tu vyāpter ubhayatra tulyadharmatayaikākārā pratītir mā bhūd iti pradarsanārtham / tathāhi – pūrvatrāyogavyavacchedenāvadhāraṇam uttaratrānyayogavyavacchedeneti kuta ubhayatraikākārātā vyāpteḥ ? / tad uktam –*

*“liṅge liṅgī bhavaty eva liṅginy evetarat punaḥ /*

*niyamasya viparyāse 'sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ //” iti ||6||*

26. The characterisation of the middle and the major as determinate and determinant respectively is deliberately undertaken to guard against the possibility of the relation of necessary concomitance being understood in a uniform fashion on the ground that it is the common attribute of both the terms. Thus, in reference to the former alternative (as given in the aphorism), the restrictive qualification has the force of excluding the contingent occurrence (of the major term in the locus of the middle), and in reference to the middle, it has the force of excluding the occurrence (of the middle) in a locus other than that (of the major). Thus how can there be the possibility of necessary concomitance being regarded as the uniform characteristic of both the middle and the major ? As has been said : “The major ‘necessarily exists’ (*bhavaty eva*) in the locus in which the middle occurs, and as for the latter (the middle), it occurs ‘exclusively in a locus where the major exists’ (*liṅgini eva*). If this necessary restriction were reversed, the concomitance between the middle and the major term will not be necessary”. (6)

27. *atha kramaprāptam anumānaṁ lakṣayati –*

*sādhanaṁ sādhyaṁ vijñānam anumānam ||7||*

27. Now the author defines inference which comes next in order.

(Aph.) Inference is the knowledge of the probandum (major term) on the strength of the probans (middle term). (7)

28. *sādhanaṁ sādhyaṁ ca vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇam / drṣṭād upadiṣṭād vā 'sādhanaṁ' yat 'sādhyaṁ' 'vijñānam' samyagarthanirṇayātmakaṁ tad anumīyate 'neneti 'anumānam' liṅgagrahaṇa-sambandhasmarāṇayoḥ paścāt paricchedanam ||7||*

*tat dvīdhā svārthaṁ parārthaṁ ca ||8||*

28. The probans and the probandum are (to be understood) in terms of the definitions propounded below. The knowledge of the probandum, which is of the nature of authentic cognition of a real fact, and which arises from a probans either observed or expressly stated, is called inference (*anumāna*), literally, a cognition which takes place subsequent to the apprehension of the probans and recollection of the necessary relation (between the probans and the probandum). It is called *anumāna*, being an organ of subsequent (*anu*) cognition (*māna*).

(Aph.) It is of two kinds — for one's own self (subjective) and for others (syllogistic). (8)

29. 'tat' anumānam dviprakāram svārtha-parārthabhedāt / svavyāmohanivartanakṣamam 'svārtham' / paravyāmohanivartanakṣamam 'parārtham' ||8||

29. It, that is, inference is of two varieties according as it is subjective or syllogistic. Subjective inference is what is calculated to remove personal misconception and syllogistic inference is competent to remove the misconception of another person. (8)

30. tatra svārtham lakṣayati –

svārtham svañīścitasādhyāvinābhāvaikalakṣaṇāt  
sāadhanāt sādhyajñānam ||9||

30. Of these, the author defines subjective inference as follows :

(Aph.) Subjective inference consists in the knowledge of the probandum from the probans ascertained, by one's own self, as having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. (9)

31. sādhyam vinā 'bhavanam sādhyāvinābhāvaḥ svenātmanā niścitaḥ sādhyāvinābhāva evaikaṁ lakṣaṇam yasya tat 'svañīścitasādhyāvinābhāvaikalakṣaṇam' tasmāt tathāvidhāt 'sāadhanāt' liṅgāt 'sādhyasya' liṅgino 'jñānam' 'svārtham' anumānam / iha ca na yogyatayā liṅgam parokṣārthapratipatteḥ aṅgam, yathā bījam aṅkurasya, adṛṣṭād dhūmād agner apratipatteḥ; nāpi svaviśayajñānāpekṣam yathā pradīpo ghaṭādeḥ, dṛṣṭād apy anīścitāvinābhāvād apratipatteḥ / tasmāt parokṣārthanāntariyakatayā niścayanam eva liṅgasya vyāpāra iti 'niścita'grahaṇam /

31. Necessary concomitance with the probandum means the impossi-

bility of the probans apart from the probandum. And the knowledge of the probandum from such a probans definitely cognised by the arguer himself as having for sole and solitary characteristic this inseparable relation with the probandum is called subjective inference. The probans is also designated as the sign (*liṅga*) and the probandum as the signet (content, *liṅgin*). It is to be understood in this context that the probans or the sign is the condition of the cognition of an unperceived datum not by virtue of its causal efficiency as a seed is of sprout. The knowledge of fire does not arise from the mere presence of smoke unobserved. Nor again does such knowledge materialise from the cognition of the probans as such as is found to be the case with light revealing a jar. It is never found that a probans though observed but not known as having a necessary concomitance leads to the knowledge of anything beyond itself. The operation of the sign or probans, therefore, consists in the definite knowledge of its impossibility independent of the unperceived datum, and it is for this reason that the word 'ascertained' has been inserted in the aphorism.

32. *nanu cāsiddhviruddhānaikāntikahetvābhāsanirākaraṇārthan*  
*hetoḥ pakṣadharmatvam, sapakṣe sattvam, vipakṣād vyāvṛttir iti traila-*  
*kṣaṇyam ācakṣate Bhikṣavaḥ / tathāhi – anumeye dharminī liṅgasya sattvam*  
*eva niścitam ity ekaṁ rūpam / atra sattvavacanenāśiddham cākṣuṣatvādi*  
*nirastam / evakāreṇa pakṣaikadeśāsiddho nirasto yathā anityāni pṛthivyādinī*  
*bhūtāni gandhavattvāt / atra pakṣikṛteṣu pṛthivyādiṣu caturṣu bhūteṣu*  
*pṛthivyām eva gandhavattvam / sattvavacanasya paścātkr̥tenaivakāreṇ-*  
*āsādhāraṇo dharmo nirastaḥ / yadi hy anumeya eva sattvam ity ucyeta*  
*śrāvaṇatvam eva hetuḥ syāt / niścitagrahaṇena sandigdhasiddhaḥ sarvo*  
*nirastaḥ / sapakṣe eva sattvam niścitam iti dvitīyaṁ rūpam / ihāpi*  
*sattvagrahaṇena viruddho nirastaḥ / sa hi nāsti sapakṣe / evakāreṇa*  
*sādhāraṇānaikāntikaḥ, sa hi na sapakṣe eva vartate kiṁ tu vipakṣe 'pi /*  
*sattvagrahaṇāt pūrvam avadhāraṇakaraṇena sapakṣāvyāpino 'pi*  
*prayatnānantarīyakatvāder hetutvam uktam, paścād avadhāraṇe hi ayam*  
*arthaḥ syāt – sapakṣe sattvam eva yasya sa hetur iti prayatnānantarīyakatvam*  
*na hetuḥ syāt / niścitavacanena sandigdhanvayo 'naikāntiko nirastaḥ yathā*  
*sarvajñaḥ kaścid vaktr̥tvāt, vaktr̥tvam hi sapakṣe sarvajñe sandigdham /*  
*vipakṣe tv asattvam eva niścitam iti tṛtīyaṁ rūpam / tatrāsattvagrahaṇena*

*viruddhasya nirāsaḥ / viruddho hi vipakṣe 'sti / evākāreṇa sādharmaṇasya vipakṣaikadeśavṛtter nirāsaḥ, prayatnānantarīyakatve hi sādhye 'nityatvaṃ vipakṣaikadeśe vidyudādāv asti, ākāśādaṃ nāsti / tato niyamenāsyā nirāso 'sattvaśabdāt / pūrvāsmiṇ avadhāraṇe hi ayam arthaḥ syāt – vipakṣa eva yo nāsti sa hetuḥ, tathā ca prayatnānantarīyakatvaṃ sapakṣe 'pi nāsti tato na hetuḥ syāt tataḥ pūrvam na kṛtam / niścita-grahaṇena sandigdha-vipakṣavyāvṛttiko 'naikāntiko nirastaḥ / tad evaṃ trairūpyam eva hetor asiddhādi-doṣaparihāra-kṣamam iti tad evābhyupagantum yuktam iti kim ekalakṣaṇakatveneti ? /*

32. [The Buddhist position]. The Buddhist monks assert, in order to rebut the fallacies of non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive probantia, the triple characteristic of the (valid) probans, viz., its subsistence in the subject (the minor term), its subsistence in the homologue, and the absence of the same in a heterologue. Thus the first characteristic is satisfied when it is definitely known that there is 'subsistence necessarily' (*sattvam eva*) of the probans in the subject (minor term) of inference. The assertion of subsistence serves to exclude the non-existent middle term such as visibility (e.g., in the inference : Sound is perishable since it is visible – the probans 'visible' is invalid since it does not belong to sound). The insertion of the word 'necessarily' serves to exclude the fallacy of non-existence (of the probans) in a part of the subject (minor term), which is illustrated in the following case : Earth and the other elements are impermanent since they are possessed of smell. In this instance, the attribute of smell subsists only in earth out of the four elements which are all made the subject. The insertion of the particle 'necessarily' subsequent to the word 'subsistence' is intended to exclude an uncommon attribute. If the position were stated in the order 'the subsistence in the subject alone', the quality 'audibility' alone would serve as the probans (as the quality of 'being audible' belongs to word alone and nothing else). The expression 'definitely known' serves to exclude all cases of middle terms whose subsistence is a matter of doubt. The second characteristic is satisfied when it is definitely known that there is subsistence (of the probans) in the homologue alone. The insertion of the word 'subsistence' in this (definition) is calculated to dismiss the contradictory (probans), which certainly does not occur in a homologue. The insertion of the word 'alone' rebuts (the fallacy

of) the common inconclusive probans, since the latter does not subsist in the homologue alone but in the heterologue also. The employment of the restrictive particle 'alone' after the homologue (in the English rendering) is intended to assert that such attributes as 'being the outcome of exertion' are instances of valid probans, notwithstanding the fact that they do not embrace the whole extent of the homologue.<sup>1</sup> If, on the other hand, the restrictive particle were put after 'subsistence' the meaning would be this : 'the (valid) probans is one whose subsistence in the homologue is necessary and universal' and in that case 'the outcome of exertion' would not be reckoned as a valid probans. The insertion of the clause 'it is definitely known' is made for the purpose of excluding the inconclusive reason whose concomitance in agreement is a matter of doubt. Thus, for instance, in the inference 'X is omniscient, because he is a speaker' the attribute of 'being speaker' is of doubtful occurrence in the homologue 'omniscient'. (It is not necessary that an omniscient person must always speak and, on the contrary, it is quite possible that there may have been an omniscient person who has not made a single utterance in his life-time. So the attribute of 'being speaker' is not necessarily concomitant with omniscience). The third characteristic is that the valid probans must be definitely known as having 'non-existence necessarily' (*asattvam eva*) in the heterologue. The term 'non-existence' serves to exclude the contradictory. The contradictory necessarily occurs in the heterologue. The term 'necessarily' serves to exclude an attribute which occurs in a part of the heterologue, and is thus common (both to the homologue and to the heterologue). Thus the attribute 'impermanence' is incompetent probans with regard to the probandum 'being the outcome of exertion' since the former occurs in a part of the heterologue, viz., a flash of lightning, and does not occur in space and the like (which are instances of the heterologue). So this type of attribute is of necessity excluded by the employment of the term 'non-existence'. If the

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1. The reference is to the following inference : Word is impermanent, because it is an outcome of exertion, as a jar is. Herein the probans belongs to the jar, no doubt, but does not belong to a lightning flash which though impermanent is not the outcome of exertion. The inference is valid, since there is necessary relation between impermanence and the attribute of 'being the outcome of exertion.' It is universally true that all that is produced by exertion is impermanent, though not

restrictive adverb 'necessarily' were placed after (the term 'heterologue' in the translation) the meaning would be as follows : The valid probans is, that which does not exist in heterologue alone (with the implication that its non-existence is necessarily confined to the heterologue and its existence in the homologue is a matter of universal necessity). The result would be that the attribute 'being outcome of exertion' which does not occur even in certain homologous instances could not be regarded as a valid probans. In order to preclude this (confusion, the adverb 'alone') was not placed after (the heterologue). The insertion of the expression 'must be definitely known' is intended for the rejection of the inconclusive reason whose non-existence in the heterologue is a matter of doubt. [Thus the inference 'X must be non-omniscient, since he is a speaker' is invalid, because the absence of the probans in an omniscient person (heterologue) is a matter of doubt. There is no inherent impossibility for an omniscient person to be capable of giving instruction by speech]. The conclusion irresistibly follows that the triple characteristic alone is capable of excluding the fallacies of impossibility and the rest from the purview of valid probans and it is proper that we should accept this as the necessary condition and not the unitary characteristic (insisted upon by the Jaina logician).

33. *tad ayuktam, avinābhāvanīyamaniṣṭayād eva doṣatrayaparihāropapatteḥ / avinābhāvo hy anyathānupapannatvam / tac cāsiddhasya viruddhasya vyabhicāriṇo vā na sambhavati / trairūpye tu saty apy avinābhāvābhāve hetor agamakatvadarśanāt, yathā sa śyāmo Maitratanaayatvāt itaraMaitraputravad ity atra / atha vipakṣān niyamavati vyāvṛttis tatra na dṛśyate tato na gamakatvam; tarhi tasyā evāvinābhāvarūpatvād itararūpasadbhāve 'pi tadabhāve hetoḥ svasādhyasiddhiṁ prati gamakatvāniṣṭau saiva pradhānam lakṣaṇam astu / tatsadbhāve 'pararūpadvayanirapekṣatayā gamakatvopapattes ca, yathā santy Advaitavādinō 'pi pramāṇāni iṣṭāniṣṭasā-*

the converse, i.e., all impermanent things are products of exertion. This restrictive interpretation of the second characteristic is intended to prove the fact that the necessary connection of the probans and the probandum is not necessarily a case of equipollence. Thus there are two possible cases of necessary concomitance. One is found in the case when the two terms are co-extensive and thus the universal proposition becomes convertible (*samavyāpti*) and the other is a case of unequal extension when the proposition is not convertible as in "All men are mortal."

*dhanadūṣaṇānyathānupapattēḥ / na cātra pakṣadharmatvaṁ sapakṣe sattvaṁ cāsti, kevalam avinābhāvamātreṇa gamakatvopapattiḥ / nanu pakṣadharmatā'bhāve śvetaḥ prāsādaḥ kākasya kārṣṇyād ityādayo 'pi hetavaḥ prasajyeran; naivam, avinābhāvabalenaivāpakṣadharmāṇām api gamakatvābhyupagamāt / na cēha so 'sti / tato 'vinābhāva eva hetoḥ pradhānaṁ lakṣaṇam abhyupagan-tavyam, sati tasmin asaty api trailakṣaṇye hetor gamakatvadarśanāt / na tu trairūpyaṁ hetulakṣaṇam avyāpakatvāt / tathā ca sarvaṁ kṣaṇikaṁ sattvād ity atra mūrddhābhīkṣṭe sādhanē Saugataiḥ sapakṣe 'sato 'pi hetoḥ sattvasya gamakatvam iṣyata eva / tad uktam—*

*“anyathā'nupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim ? /*

*nānyathā'nupapannatvaṁ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim ? //” iti*

33. The contention is devoid of substance. The knowledge of the necessity of the universal concomitance alone is calculated to prevent the triple fallacies. 'Necessary universal concomitance' consists in the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory (of the probandum). This incompatibility with the contradictory cannot be brought home in regard to a reason which is impossible, contradictory or inconclusive. With regard to the triple characteristic, on the other hand, a reason is found to lack all cogency in spite of its triple characteristic, if the condition of universal concomitance be not present in it. The inference 'X must be swarthy in complexion, like other sons of Maitra, since he is the son of Maitra (a man of swarthy complexion)' is an instance in point. It may be contended that the necessity of absence in the heterologue is not satisfied by the probans (in the above inference) and the lack of cogency is due to this defect. That being the case, this element of the 'necessity of absence in the heterologue' should be alone reckoned as the necessary factor of universal concomitance, since the absence of this condition in spite of the presence of other characteristics is responsible for the incapacity of a probans to prove a probandum. It is legitimate that this alone should be regarded as the dominant characteristic (of a valid probans). Furthermore, the presence of this condition alone, irrespective of the other two characteristics, is found to invest a probans with full cogency. Thus the following inference may be cited as an example : (The admission of) organs of valid knowledge is necessary for the monist also, as the proof of the desired conclusion and disproof of the undesired positions



become otherwise absurd. In this instance of inference, there is subsistence of the probans neither in the subject (minor term), nor in the homologue. But still the probans is found to be conclusive, only on the ground of the presence of universal concomitance (proved by the necessity of the incompatibility of the probans with the contradictory possibility). It has been contended that if subsistence in the subject (minor term) be not a necessary condition, the probans in such inferences as “The palace is white, because the crow is black” would pass for a valid one. No, this is not possible. Even the probantia which do not subsist in the subject (minor term) are admitted to be perfectly cogent only because they possess universal concomitance. In the present case this universal concomitance is not present (and so the inference is not valid). Thus universal concomitance alone should be regarded as the principal characteristic of a probans, the presence of which even in the absence of the triple characteristic makes the probans valid and cogent. The triple characteristic, furthermore, is not a necessary feature of a valid probans, since it is not universal. Thus in the following case of inference – All is momentary, since existent – which is the most predominant argument of the Buddhists (being the corner-stone of his whole metaphysical edifice), the probans ‘existent’ is held by them to be valid, though it does not occur in a homologue (since every existent is included in the subject and there is nothing outside which can serve as an example). Thus has it been said :

“What does the triple characteristic serve, if incompatibility with the contradictory be present ? And what would again this triple characteristic avail, if incompatibility with the contradictory is absent ?”

34. *etena pañcalakṣaṇakatvam api Naiyāyikoktaṁ pratyuktam, tasyāpyavinābhāvaprapañcatvāt / tathāhi – trairūpyaṁ purvoktam, abādhitaviśayatvam, asatpratipakṣatvaṁ ceti pañca rūpāṇi / tatra pratyakṣāgamabādhita-karmanirdeśānantaraprayuktatvaṁ bādhitaviśayatvaṁ yathā ’nuṣṇas tejo-vayavī kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat / brāhmaṇena surā peyā dravadravayatvāt kṣīravat iti / tanniṣedhād abādhitaviśayatvam / pratipakṣahetubādhitatvaṁ satpratipakṣatvaṁ yathā ’nityaḥ śabdo nityadharmānupalabdheḥ / atra pratipakṣahetuḥ – nityaḥ śabdo ’nityadharmānupalabdheḥ iti / tanniṣedhād asatpratipakṣatvam / tatra bādhitaviśayasya satpratipakṣasya cāvinābhāvābhāvādavinābhāvenaiva rūpadvayam api saṅgrhītam / yad āha – “bādhāvinābhāvayor*

*virodhāt*” [Hetubindu, pari. 4] iti / api ca, svalakṣaṇalakṣita pakṣaviṣaya tvā-  
bhāvāt taddoṣeṇaiva doṣadvayam idam caritārthaṁ kiṁ punar vacanena ? /  
tat sthitam etat sādhyāvinābhāvaikalakṣaṇād iti ||9||

34. The aforesaid consideration will also serve to dispose of the quantuple characteristic maintained by the Naiyāyika, since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance. Thus the aforesaid triple characteristics plus the absence of contradiction of the probandum and the absence of a countervailing probans constitute the five characteristics. Of them, the inference with the contradicted probandum consists in the employment of a probans subsequent to the assertion of the probandum contradicted by perceptual cognition or verbal testimony. “A body of fire is unhot being a product, like a jar” is an example of the same (contradicted by perceptual cognition). “Wine may be drunk, as it is a liquid substance, like milk” is an example (of contradiction by verbal testimony). The negation of this possibility gives rise to (the fourth characteristic of) a probans having an uncontradicted probandum. A probans which is assailed by a counter-probans is an instance of countervailing probans. “Sound is impermanent, as no characteristic of a permanent entity is found to be present therein” (is an inference the probans of which is offset by) a countervailing probans (in the inference) “Sound is eternal, as no characteristic of an impermanent entity is found to be present therein.” The negation of this possibility gives out (the fifth characteristic, viz.,) the absence of a countervailing probans. Now, the two cases of contradicted probandum and countervailing probans lack universal concomitance and so the necessity of universal concomitance includes (within its ambit) the two latter characteristics also (and hence their addition is a superfluity). As has been observed : “The opposition between contradiction and universal concomitance (is irreconcilable)” (HB, ch. 4). Moreover, these two fallacies are accounted for by the default of the characteristics which are asserted by (the Naiyāyika) himself to be the defining attributes of the subject-matter of inference and hence they ought to be regarded as defects of the latter. What is sought to be gained by this explicit formulation ? Thus it is established that a probans having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary relation with the probandum (is alone sufficient to make inference possible). (9)

35. *tatrāvinābhāvaṃ lakṣayati –*

*sahakramabhāvinoh sahakramabhāvaniyamo 'vinābhāvaḥ ||10||*

35. Now the author is propounding the definition of universal concomitance :

(Aph.) **Universal concomitance consists in the universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence of simultaneous and successive events. (10)**

36. *'sahabhāvinoh' ekasāmagryadhīnayoh phalādigatayo rūparasayoh vyāpya-vyāpakayoś ca śiṃśapātvavṛkṣatvayoh, 'kramabhāvinoh' kṛttikodayaśakāṭodayayoh, kāryakāraṇayoś ca dhūma-dhūmadhvajayor yathāsaṅkhyam yaḥ 'sahakramabhāvaniyamaḥ' sahabhāvinoh sahabhāvaniyamaḥ kramabhāvinoh kramabhāvaniyamaḥ, sādhyā-sāadhanayor iti prakaraṇāl labhyate saḥ 'avinābhāvaḥ' ||10||*

36. Synchronous events are those which are the co-products of the same set of causal conditions such as colour and taste of a fruit, or which stand in the relation of determinate concomitant (included) and determinant concomitant (includent) such as genus and species, e.g., tree (genus) and *śiṃśapā* (species). Successive events are those which occur in succession, as for instance, the appearance of *kṛttikā*<sup>1</sup> and *śakāṭa*<sup>2</sup>; or, which are related as effect and cause, e.g., smoke and fire. The universal necessity of synchronous and successive occurrence respectively of those two sets of facts, that is to say, the necessity of synchronism of synchronous events and the necessity of succession of successive events, is what is meant by universal concomitance. It is gathered from the context that the terms of the relation function as probans and probandum. (10)

37. *athaivamvidho 'vinābhāvo niścitaḥ sādhyapratipattyaṅgam ity uktam / tanniścayaḥ kutaḥ pramāṇāt ? / na tāvat pratyakṣāt, tasyaindriyakasya sannihitaviśayavinīyamitavyāpārāt / manas tu yady api sarvaviśayam tathāpi indriyagrhitārthagocarātvenaiva tasya pravṛttiḥ / anyathāndhabadhirādyabhāvaprasaṅgaḥ / sarvaviśayatā tu sakalendriyagocarārthaviśayatvenaivocyate na svātantryeṇa / yogipratyakṣeṇa tv avinābhāvagrahaṇe*

1. The pleiades. The third of the 27 lunar mansions or asterisms (consisting of six stars).

2. Also called *rohiṇī*. Name of the fourth lunar mansion (containing five stars) figured by a cart.

'numeyārthapratipattir eva tato 'stu, kiṃ tapasvinā 'numānena ? / anumānāt tv avinābhāvanīścaye 'navasthetaretarāśrayadoṣaprasaṅga ukta eva / na ca pramāṇāntaram evaṃvidhaviṣayagrahaṇapraṇaṃ astīty āha –

**ūhāt tannīścayaḥ ||11||**

37. Now it has been observed that universal concomitance of the aforesaid type is the condition of the knowledge of the probandum, when understood (as such). But what is this organ by which such understanding is achieved ? Certainly it is not by perceptual cognition, since being sensuous its operation is confined to an object standing in close proximity (to the senses). Nor can the mind (be the organ) which, though it is capable of cognising all possible objects, is subject to the limitation that it can operate only in the sphere of the objects which have been apprehended by the senses. Otherwise (if there was no such limitation), there would be no case of a person subject to blindness or deafness. As regards the capacity of mind for the apprehension of all possible objects, it should be understood as having reference to the objects which are cognisable by all the senses taken together, and not in its independent capacity. If mystic intuition (were to be posited as the organ) for the comprehension of universal concomitance, what would be the necessity of inference, perfectly unavailing, as the knowledge of the probandum to be inferred would be easily secured by the former ? Were knowledge of universal concomitance supposed to be secured by inference, it has been shown that it would give rise to the consequences of *regressus ad infinitum* or a logical see-saw. Nor is again an additional organ available, which can be credited with the capacity for the apprehension of such (a relation as its) object. With this consideration in view, the author observes :

(Aph.) **The knowledge of the same is (achieved) by means of Inductive Reasoning. (11)**

38. 'ūhāt' tarkād uktalakṣaṇāt tasyāvinābhāvasya 'nīścayaḥ' ||11||

38. Inductive Reasoning is *reductio ad absurdum*, which has already been defined (1. 2. 4). The knowledge of the same, i.e., universal concomitance is secured by its aid.

39. lakṣitaṃ parīkṣitaṃ ca sādhanam / 'idānīm tat vibhajati –  
svabhāvaḥ kāraṇaṃ kāryam ekārthasamavāyi virodhi ceti  
pañcadhā sādhanam ||12||

39. The probans has been defined and examined. Now the author propounds its classification :

(Aph.) The probans is of five types, viz., essential identity, cause, effect, co-inherent in the same substratum, and opposite.  
(12)

40. *svabhāvādīni catvāri vidheḥ sādhanāni, virodhi tu niṣedhasyeti pañcavidhaṁ 'sādhanam' / 'svabhāvaḥ' yathā śabdānityatve sādhye kṛtakatvaṁ śrāvaṇatvaṁ vā /*

40. The first four beginning with essential identity are the probantia for a positive probandum. The last, viz., the opposite, is the probans for a negative one. Thus we have five types of probantia. Of these, essential identity is illustrated by the attribute of 'being a product' or 'audible' with regard to the inference of impermanence in a word – (word is impermanent, because it is a product or because it is audible).

41. *nanu śrāvaṇatvasyāsādhāraṇatvāt katham vyāptisiddhiḥ ? / viparyaye bādhakapramāṇabalāt sattvasyeveti brūmaḥ / na caivam sattvam eva hetuḥ tadviśeṣasyotpattimattva-kṛtakatva-prayatnānantarīyakatva-pratyayabhedabhedivāder ahetutvāpatteḥ / kiñca, kim idam asādhāraṇatvaṁ nāma ? / yadi pakṣa eva vartamānatvam; tat sarvasmin kṣaṇike sādhye sattvasyāpī samānam / sādhyadharmavataḥ pakṣasyāpi sapakṣatā cet; iha kaḥ pradveṣaḥ ? / pakṣād anyasyaiva sapakṣatve lohalekhyam vajram pārthivatvāt kāṣṭhavad ity atra pārthivatvam api lohalekhyatām vajre gamayet / anyathānupapatter abhāvān neti cet; idam eva tarhi hetulakṣaṇam astu / apakṣadharmasyāpi sādhanatvāpattir iti cet; astu yady avinābhāvo 'sti, śakaṭodaye kṛttikodayasya, sarvajñasadbhāve saṁvādina upadeśasya gamakatvadarśanāt / kākasya kārṣṇyam na prāsāde dhāvālyam vinānupadyamānam ity anekāntād agamakam / tathā, ghaṭe cākṣuṣatvaṁ śabde 'nityatām vināpy upapadyamānam iti / tan na śrāvaṇatvādir asādhāraṇo apy anityatām vyabhicarati / nanu kṛtakatvāc chabdasyānityatve sādhye paryāyavād dravye 'py anityatā prāpnoti / naivam, paryāyāṇām evānityatāyāḥ sādhyatvāt, anuktaṁ apicchāviṣayīkṛtaṁ sādhyam bhavātīti kim sma prasmarati bhavān ? / nanu kṛtakatvānityatvayos tādātmye sādhanavat sādhyasya siddhatvam, sādhyavac ca sādhanasya sādhyatvaṁ prasajati / satyam etat, kintu mohanivartanārthaḥ prayogaḥ / yad āha –*

*“sāder api na sântatvaṃ vyāmohād yo 'dhigacchati /  
sādhyasādhanataikasya taṃ prati syān na doṣabhāk //”*

41. Here a difficulty arises : Audibility is an uncommon attribute. How can universal concomitance between it (and impermanence) be established ? Our answer is that it is established by the evidence of the organ of *reductio ad absurdum* of the contradictory possibility. The case is exactly on a par with that of the attribute 'existence' (which is made the ground of the proof of impermanence by the Buddhist). It would not be a tenable contention to urge that existence alone is the legitimate probans in the case under consideration (and audibility is only a case of existence and as such cannot be looked upon as an independent probans in its own right). Were it so, such probantia as 'having an origin', 'being a product', 'being a consequent to exertion', 'being variable with the variation of casual factors', which are the derivative species of existence, would cease to be legitimate grounds of inference. Moreover, what is this concept of uncommon attribute thought to consist in ? If it is supposed to consist in the fact that an attribute is present exclusively in the subject (minor term), the situation is exactly the same in the case of existence (put forward as the probans) in order to prove that all entities are momentary. If it be maintained that the subject may also serve as the homologue, if known to be possessed of the attribute which is the probandum, then what is the ground for aversion against the present case (audibility) ? If, on the other hand, any term entirely other than the subject be regarded as (a legitimate) homologue, then the inference 'diamond is inscribable by iron, being a derivative product of the element of earth, just like a piece of wood' would be vaild as the probans 'being an earthy substance' would be competent to bring home the probandum 'being inscribable by iron' in the diamond. If you seek to escape the fallacy under the contention that there is not the inherent incompatibility (of the probans 'being an earthy substance') with the contradictory (of the probandum 'inscribable by iron' – in other words, the possibility that an earthy substance may be uninscribable by iron is not shown to be absurd), then it is quite proper that the latter condition alone should be regarded as the only characteristic of a probans. But this would make even what is not an attribute of the subject a ground of inference, (so may the opponent

contend). We answer : Let it be so, provided necessary concomitance is at its back. It is common experience that the emergence of the star *kṛttikā* (pleiades) serves as the ground of inference of the emergence of *śakaṭa* (*rohiṇī*), and instruction found to be congruent with fact serves as the ground of inference of the speaker being omniscient. The blackness of the crow, on the contrary, is not a valid ground, as it is inconclusive (for the proof of the whiteness of the palace), since the blackness of the crow is not logically impossible without the whiteness of the palace. Likewise, the attribute of the jar 'being visible' is intelligible even without reference to the impermanence of word; (hence the former is not the probans of the latter.) It follows, therefore, that such attributes as 'audibility', though uncommon, are not contingent to impermanence (but, on the contrary, necessarily concomitant with it).

(Q) Now, if the impermanence of word is to be established on the ground of its being a product, will it not establish impermanence of substance as it does in the case of modes ?

(A) Certainly not so. It is impermanence of the modes only that is sought to be proved. How do you forget that the probandum is what is intended to be established though not expressly stated ? A problem is again raised – If the quality of 'being a product' and 'impermanence' are essentially identical, the probandum is as much a proved fact as the probans, or the probans will be accounted unproved like the probandum. The answer is – This (your contention) has truth in it. But the syllogistic argument is employed in order to remove a delusion; as has been observed : "For a person who does not realise through delusion that a thing which has a definite beginning must have a definite end, the self-same entity used as probans and probandum is not liable to objection."

42. *'kāraṇam' yathā bāṣpabhāvena maśakavartirūpatayā vā sandihyamāne dhūme 'gniḥ, viśiṣṭameghonnatir vā vṛṣṭau / katham ayam ābālagopālāvipālāṅganādiprasiddho 'pi nopalabdhaḥ sūkṣmadarśināpi Nyāyavādinā ?/ kāraṇaviśeṣadarśanād hi sarvaḥ kāryārthī pravartate / sa tu viśeṣo jñātavyo yo 'vyabhicārī / kāraṇatvaniścayād eva pravṛttir iti cet; astv asau liṅga-viśeṣaniścayaḥ pratyakṣakṛtaḥ, phale tu bhāvinī nānumānād anyannibandhanam utpāśyāmaḥ / kvacid vyabhicārāt sarvasya hetor ahetutve kāryasyāpi*

*tathā prasaṅgaḥ / bāṣpāder akāryatvān neti cet; atrāpi yat yato na bhavati na tat tasya kāraṇam ity adoṣaḥ / yathaiva hi kiñcit kāraṇam uddiśya kiñcit kāryam, tathaiva kiñcit kāryam uddiśya kiñcit kāraṇam / yadvad evājanakam prati na kāryatvam, tadvad evājanyam prati na kāraṇatvam iti nānayoḥ kaścīd viśeṣaḥ / api ca rasād ekasāmagryanumānena rūpānumānam icchatā Nyāyavādinestam eva kāraṇasya hetutvam / yad āha –*

*“ekasāmagryadhīnasya rūpāde rasato gatiḥ /*

*hetudharmānumānena dhūmendhanavikāravat //”*

*[Pramāṇavārtika, 1.10] iti /*

42. The cause (as probans is illustrated in the following situations). For example, fire serves as the probans of smoke when the latter becomes the subject-matter of doubt as to whether it is a volume of vapour or an assemblage of mosquitoes; or upsurge of a special variety of cloud as the probans of impending rain-fall. It is passing strange how it has escaped the notice of the Buddhist logician who plumes himself upon his minute observation although it is a matter of common knowledge among such ignorant persons as children, cowherds, shepherds and women and the like. It is a truism that all persons who are interested in the effect set to work after the observation of a special kind of cause. The special kind that is to be known is what is an invariable concomitant (of the effect in question). (Q) Is not the activity due to the knowledge of causality alone ? (A) Yes, it may be granted that the knowledge of (the cause as) the special kind of probans is derived from perceptual cognition, but with regard to the effect which is yet to come into being, we cannot imagine anything as the source of its knowledge save and except inference. If all causes are to be condemned to be destitute of the character of valid probans on the ground of the fallibility of some individual cases, the same contingency will be inevitable in the case of (such recognised probantia as) the effect also. It may be urged that the contingency does not arise inasmuch as (such pseudo-effects as) vapour and the like are not effects proper. But then in the present case also there is no room for objection, since the formula of causality is : If A is not the outcome of B, B is not the cause of A. (The causal relation is to be understood in a specific reference). Thus as a particular effect is affiliated to a particular cause, so exactly a particular cause is to be affiliated to a particular effect. Just as the relation of ‘being an effect’



is not understood with reference to what is not its *causa essendi*, so also the relation of 'being a cause' is not to be understood with reference to what is not its effect. Thus there is no material difference between the two situations. Furthermore, the Buddhist logician also endorses the position that the cause may function as a probans while he advocates the inference of colour from the presence of taste mediated by the inference of the self-same set of causal conditions (of which the two are the common effects). As has been observed (by Dharmakīrti) : "The knowledge of colour which is the co-product (with taste) of the self-same set of causal conditions from the presence of taste is made possible through the inference of causal efficiency (of the cause of taste with regard to colour). The case is on a par with smoke (serving as the probans of) transformation of fuel" (PV, 1. 11)

43. *na ca vāyam api yasya kasyacit kāraṇasya hetutvaṃ brūmaḥ / api tu yasya na mantrādīnā śaktipratibandho na vā kāraṇāntaravaikalyam / tat kuto vijñāyata iti cet; asti tāvad viguṇād itarasya viśeṣaḥ / tatparijñānam tu prāyaḥ pāṃśurapādānām apy asti / yad āhuḥ –*

*"gambhīragarjitārambhanirbhinnagirigahvarāḥ /  
tvaṅgattaḍillatāsaṅgapiśaṅgottuṅgavigrahāḥ //"*

[Nyāyamañjarī, p. 129]

*"rolamba-gavala-vyāla-tamālamalinatviṣaḥ /  
vṛṣṭiṃ vyabhicarantiha naivamprāyāḥ payomucaḥ //"*

[Śaddarśanasamuccaya, 20]

43. We, too, affirm the character of logical ground (probans) not of any and every cause, but only of that which has not suffered from obstruction of its (causal) energy by means of spells and the like, or from inadequacy owing to the diminution of any causal condition. But how can this be ascertained ? Well, there is a (clear) difference between what is deficient and what is other than it (adequate). And the knowledge of this is found to arise even among common folk with no education. As has been said, "Such types of cloud do not fail to be attended with shower of rain which make the caves and ravines of mountains reverberate with their thundering roars, with their upraised bodies rendered yellow by the flashes of lightning entwining like creepers, as black as black-bees, horns of buffalos, black snakes and *tamāla* trees" (NM, p. 129 and SS, 20).

44. 'kāryam' yathā vr̥ṣṭau viśiṣṭanadīpūrah, kṛṣānau dhūmah, caita-  
nye prāṇādīḥ / pūrasya vaiśiṣṭyam katham vijñāyata iti cet; uktam atra  
Naiyāyikāḥ / yad āhuḥ –

“āvartavartanāsāliviśālakaluṣodakāḥ /

kallolavikatāsphālasphuṭaphenacchaṭāṅkitāḥ //

vahadbahalaśevālaphalasādvalasaṅkulāḥ /

naḍīpūraviśeṣo 'pi śakyate na na veditum ? //” [Nyāyamañjarī, p. 130]

iti dhūmaprāṇādīnām api kāryatvaniścayo na duṣkaraḥ / yad āhuḥ –

“kāryam dhūmo hutabhujāḥ kāryadharmānuvṛttitāḥ /

sa bhavaṁs tadabhāve 'pi hetumattām vilaṅghayet //”

[Pramāṇavārtika, 1.35]

44. The effect as probans is illustrated by such instances as the appearance of a particular type of flood serving as the probans of rainfall, smoke serving as the probans of fire, vital functions of consciousness. But how can this special nature of the flood be known ? The Naiyāyikas have given the answer to this in the following words : “It is not a fact that the special nature of the flood is not capable of being known with its enormous volume of muddy water exhibiting eddies and whirlpools, marked with conspicuous lines of foam, swirling with mighty waves, littered with the floating masses of moss, fruits, and patches of green grass” (NM, p. 130). As regards smoke and vital functions also, it is not difficult to ascertain that they are effects. As has been observed : “Smoke is the effect of fire, as the characteristics of effect are observed to be present in it. If it were to come into existence even when it (the cause) were absent, it would forfeit the character of being conditioned by a cause” (PV, 1. 35).

45. kāraṇābhāve 'pi kāryasya bhāve ahetutvam anyahetutvaṁ vā  
bhavet / ahetutve sadā sattvam asattvaṁ vā bhavet / anyahetutve dṛṣṭād  
anyato 'pi bhavato na dṛṣṭajanyatā anyābhāve 'pi dṛṣṭād bhavato nānyahetu-  
katvam ity ahetukataiva syāt / tatra cōktam – “yas tv anyato 'pi bhavann  
upalabdho na tasya dhūmatvaṁ hetubhedāt / kāraṇaṁ ca vahnir dhūmasya  
ity uktam //” api ca –

“agnīsvabhāvaḥ śakrasya mūrddhā yady agnir eva saḥ /

athānagnīsvabhāvo 'sau dhūmas tatra katham bhavet //”

[Pramāṇavārtika, 1.37] iti /

45. If the effect were to come into existence even in the absence of a cause the former (the effect) would either be destitute of a cause or have a cause other than the recognised one. If it (the effect) were destitute of a cause, it must have either existence or non-existence for all time (neither of which is warranted by experience). If it were supposed to be conditioned by some other cause, then being the consequence of a condition other than the observed datum, it could not be regarded as the product of the observed datum. Again, on the other hand, being perceived to follow upon the observed datum even in absence of any other (antecedent condition), the effect in question cannot be regarded as the effect of another cause. And thus the effect would be destitute of every possible cause (both the observed and the unobserved data being ruled out of court). As has been said in this connection "What has been apprehended to emerge into existence from some other (cause) cannot have the properties of smoke just because of the difference of causes. It has been asserted that fire is the cause of smoke." Moreover, "If the head of Śakra (king of gods) were of the nature of fire, it would be nothing but natural fire (capable of producing smoke). If, on the other hand, it were of a nature different from that of fire, how can smoke be possibly there ?" (PV, 1. 37).

46. *tathā cetanām vinānupapadyamānaḥ kāryaṁ prāṇādir anumāpayati tām śrāvaṇatvam ivānityatām, viparyaye bādhakavaśāt sattvasyevāsyāpi vyāptisiddher ity uktaprāyam / tan na prāṇādir asādhāraṇo 'pi cetanām vyabhicarati /*

46. Likewise, vital function *qua* effect serves as the ground of the inference of consciousness without which it is impossible, even as audibility is the ground of inference of impermanence. As regards its universal concomitance (with the probandum) it has already been asserted almost in so many words that the former is established by the *reductio ad absurdum* of the contradictory possibility as is the case with existence (as the probans of momentariness). Thus vital function, though it is the uncommon peculiar attribute (serves as a legitimate ground of inference, since) it does not lack necessary concomitance with consciousness.

47. *kiñca, nānvayo heto rūpaṁ tadabhāve hetvābhāsābhāvāt / vipakṣa eva san viruddhaḥ, vipakṣe 'pi – anaikāntikaḥ, sarvajñatve sādhye vaktṛtvasyāpi*

*vyatirekābhāva eva hetvābhāsātve nimittam, nānvayasandeha iti Nyāyavādināpi vyatirekābhāvād eva hetvābhāsāv uktau / asādhāraṇo 'pi yadi sādhyābhāve asann iti niścīyeta tadā prakārāntarābhāvāt sādhyam upasthāpayan nānaikāntikah syāt / api ca yady anvayo rūpaṁ syāt tadā yathā vipakṣaika-deśavṛtteḥ kathaṁcid avyatirekāḍ agamakātvam, evaṁ sapakṣaika-deśavṛtter api syāt kathaṁcid ananvayāt / yad āha -*

*“rūpaṁ yady anvayo hetor vyatirekavad iṣyate /*

*sa sapakṣobhaya na syād asapakṣobhaya yathā //”*

*sapakṣa eva sattvam anvayo na sapakṣe sattvam eveti cet; astu, sa tu vyatireka evety asmanmatam evāṅgīkṛtaṁ syāt / vayam api hi pratyapi-padāma anyathānupapattye kalakṣaṇo hetur iti /*

47. Furthermore, concomitance in agreement is not a characteristic of a probans, since its default does not entail a fallacy. A probans which exists exclusively in the heterologue, is (dubbed as the fallacy of the type called) the contradictory. What exists also in the heterologue (as well as in the homologue) is known as inconclusive. As regards the attribute 'speakerhood' advanced to prove omniscience, (it is regarded as fallacious and) the reason of it being a fallacy is due to its absence of concomitance in difference and not doubt of its concomitance in agreement – by this observation the Buddhist logician also has affirmed the two types of fallacy to be due exclusively to the absence of concomitance in difference. As regards the uncommon attribute again, it cannot be deemed inconclusive, if it can be ascertained to cease to exist in the absence of the probandum, and thus in default of an alternative possibility, it perforce establishes the probandum. Moreover, if concomitance in agreement were a characteristic (of a valid probans), then a probans which exists only in a part of the homologue should also be regarded as devoid of probative force on the ground of its partial lack of concomitance in agreement, exactly on the analogy of an attribute which exists only in a part of the heterologue and is thus deemed incompetent on account of its partial lack of concomitance in difference. As has been aptly observed : If concomitance in agreement were deemed a characteristic of a probans, just as the concomitance in difference is, then it could not have both (existence and non-existence) in the homologue, just as it cannot have both (existence and non-existence) in the heterologue. (The

Buddhist may urge that) concomitance in agreement means the existence of the probans exclusively in the homologue and not universal and necessary existence in the same. Granted, but this is indeed tantamount to concomitance in difference. And thus you would endorse the position which is maintained by us. It is we who have been at pains to establish that a valid probans has incompatibility with the contradictory as its sole and solitary characteristic.

48. *tathā, ekasminn arthe dr̥ṣṭe 'dr̥ṣṭe vā samavāyy āsritam sādhanam sādhyena / tac caikārthasamavāyitvam ekaphalādigatayo rūpa-rasayoh, śakaṭodaya-kṛttikodayayoh, candrodaya-samudravṛddhyoh, vṛṣṭi-sāṇḍapipīlikāksobhayoh, nāgavallīdāha-patrankothgryoh / tatra 'ekārthasamavāyī' raso rūpasya, rūpam vā rasasya; nahi samānakālabhāvinoḥ kārya-kāraṇabhāvaḥ sambhavati /*

48. [As for the coinherent in the same substratum, it is illustrated by the situation in which] an attribute inheres, that is to say, subsists along with the probandum in one and the same substratum whether perceived or unperceived. Now, such coinherence in the same substratum is found between colour and taste belonging to one and the same fruit and the like, between the emergence of *śakaṭa* and that of *pleiades*, between moon-rise and the sea-tide, between (impending) rainfall and commotion of ants carrying their larvae, and between combustion of the betelcreeper and the withering of its leaves. Of these, taste is the coinherent of colour or colour is of taste. The relation in question cannot possibly be that of cause and effect subsisting as it does between two synchronous phenomena.

49. *nanu samānakālakāryajanakam kāraṇam anumāsyate iti cet; na tarhi kāryam anumitam syāt / kāraṇānumāne sāmāthyāt kāryam anumitam eva, jñyābhāve janakatvābhāvād iti cet; hantaivam kāraṇam kāryasyānumāpakam ity anīṣṭam āpadyeta / śakaṭodayakṛttikodayādīnām tu yathā'vinābhāvam sādhyasādhanabhāvaḥ / yad āha -*

*"ekārthasamavāyas tu yathā yeṣām tathaiva te / gamakā gamakas tan na śakaṭaḥ kṛttikoditeḥ //"*

*evam anyeṣv api sādhanēṣu vācyaḥ / nanu kṛtakatvānityatvayor ekārthasamavāyaḥ kasmān neṣyate ?; na, taylor ekatvāt / yad āha -*

*"ādyantāpekṣiṇī sattā kṛtakatvam anityatā /*

*ekaiva hetuḥ sādhyam ca dvayam naikāśrayam tataḥ ///* iti /

49. It may be urged (that all these cases are instances of causality and therefore) the object of inference is (invariably) a cause productive of two synchronous effects. No, in that case the effect will not be inferred. It may be contended that even when the cause is inferred, the effect is also invariably inferred by implication, since the absence of the effect entails the absence of the cause. But this contention would be tantamount to the endorsement of the proposition that the cause is the ground of inference of the effect, a consequence repudiated (by the Buddhist logician). As for the appearance of *śakaṭa* and that of pleiades and suchlike phenomena, the relative position of the terms as probans and probandum is to be comprehended in conformity with the nature of invariable concomitance. As has been observed : "As regards coinherence in the same substratum, the ground of inference is to be understood in accordance with the relative position of the terms. Thus (the rise of) *śakaṭa* is not the ground of inference of the rise of pleiades." This principle is to be asserted in the case of other probantia also. (Q) But why should you not regard (the incidence of the attributes of) 'being a product' and 'being impermanent' as a case of coinherence in the same substratum ? The answer is : this is not possible as the two attributes are one and the same. As has been said : "The same period of existence relative to a beginning and to an end respectively is viewed as the attribute of 'being a product' and as 'impermanent'. It is the self-same (period of existence) that serves as the probans and the probandum, and so it is not a case of two attributes subsisting in a common substratum."

50. *svabhāvādīnām caturṇām sādhanānām vidhisādhanatā, niṣedhasā-dhanatvam tu virodhinaḥ / sa hi svasannidhānenetarasya pratiṣedham sādhayati anyathā virodhāsiddheḥ /*

50. The four probantia beginning with essential identity are instruments for proving positive conclusions; the opposite, however, is the instrument for establishing a negative conclusion. The latter establishes the negation of the other by its presence; were it otherwise, the relation of opposition (between them) would not be established.

51. *'ca'śabdo yata ete svabhāvakāraṇakāryavyāpakā anyathānupapannāḥ svasādhyam upasthāpayanti tata eva tadabhāve svayam na bhavanti,*

*teṣām anupalabdhir apy abhāvasādhanīty āha / tatra svabhāvānupalabdhir yathā nātra ghaṭaḥ, draṣṭuṃ yogyasyānupalabdheḥ / kāraṇānupalabdhir yathā nātra dhūmo 'gnyabhāvāt / kāryānupalabdhir yathā nātrāprati-baddhasāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni san̄ti dhūmābhāvāt / vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā nātra śimśapā vṛkṣābhāvāt /*

51. The implication of the word 'and' is : since essential identity, cause, effect and determinant concomitant (as the grounds of inference) lead to the establishment of their respective probandum by virtue of their incompatibility with their opposites, it follows that they cannot possibly come into being in the absence of the probanda concerned, and so the non-cognition of these (grounds of inference) is also valid ground for the establishment of relevant non-existence. Of them, the non-cognition of essential identity is illustrated by the case "The jar is not here, since it is not perceived though competent to perception." The non-cognition of the cause, is illustrated by the case "There is no smoke here, as there is no fire". The case of the non-cognition of the effect is : "The causes of smoke with their powers unfrustrated are not present here, since there is absence of smoke". The case of the non-cognition of the determinant concomitant is : "The existence of the *śimśapā* tree is out of the question, since the existence of trees (as a class) is impossible (in the place)".

52. *virodhi tu pratiṣedhyasya tatkāryakāraṇavyāpakānām ca viruddhaṃ viruddhakāryaṃ ca / yathā na śītasparśaḥ, nāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni śītakāraṇāni, na romaharṣaviśeṣaḥ, na tuṣārasparśaḥ, agner dhūmād veti prayoganānātvam iti ||12||*

52. As regards the opposite, it is what is opposed to the negatum or to the effect, cause or determinant concomitant thereof, or to the effect of its opposite. The respective examples of the above are as follows : There is no touch of cold (herein, as fire is present); the casual conditions of cold with their powers unfrustrated cannot be present (here, as fire is present in this place); there can be no case of horripilation of the kind (due to cold, as there is fire in the place); there is no possibility of the feel of snow (here, as there is fire in the place). If smoke is substituted for fire in the instances cited above, it will give rise to cases of inference on the basis of the effect of the opposite. Thus the syllogistic forms of inference on the basis of the opposite

as probans are of various types.<sup>1</sup> (12)

53. *sādhanaṁ lakṣayitvā vibhajya ca sādhyasya lakṣaṇam āha –  
siṣādhayaṣitam asiddham abādhyam sādhyam pakṣaḥ ||13||*

53. After having defined and classified probans, the author now sets forth the definition of the probandum :

(Aph.) The probandum, (otherwise called) the thesis, is what is intended to be proved, unproved (before), and incapable of being contradicted. (13)

54. *sādhayitum iṣṭam 'siṣādhayaṣitam' / anena sādhayitum anīṣṭasya sādhyatvavyavacchedaḥ, yathā Vaiśeṣikasya nityaḥ śabda iti śāstroktatvād Vaiśeṣikeṇābhyupagatasyāpy ākāśaguṇatvāder na sādhyatvam, tadā sādhayitum anīṣṭatvāt / iṣṭaḥ punar anukto 'pi pakṣo bhavati, yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātāt vāc chayanāśanādyāṅgavad ity atra parārthā ity ātmārthāḥ / buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakaṁ kṣityādi kāryatvād ity atrā'sarīra-sarvajñapūrvakatvam iti /*

54. The phrase 'intended to be proved' (is significant and) serves to rebut the possibility of what is not intended (by the arguer) to be

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1. The fundamental ground of inference of negation is nothing but the relation of opposition in which the probans stands to the probandum. And this opposition may be direct and indirect. Fire is directly opposed to cold and thus on the perception of fire one can naturally and legitimately infer the absence of cold. The indirect types of opposition are based on the indirect opposition between the probans and the probandum which is necessarily related to the negatum either as cause or condition. Thus the presence of fire being opposed to the presence of cold ensures the absence of the cause of cold, since the presence of the latter would make the presence of cold inevitable, and thus the absence of cold is the ground for inference of the absence of the requisite causal conditions of cold. The fact of the matter is that fire and cold being related as opposites, the presence of fire is the immediate ground of the inference of the absence of cold. The absence of cold again is the ground of inference of the absence of the requisite causal condition of cold. The dictum is that the effect proves the cause and the absence of the effect proves the absence of the requisite causal conditions of the same. The inferences based on these indirect types of opposition are rather cases of plurality of inference and it is only due to the facility induced by constant practice that they are regarded as unitary processes of inference. The point to be considered in all these types of inference is the relative position of the negatum concerned in its relation to the direct opposite of the probans. Thus in the first instance the negatum is the cause of cold, the effect of



established, being regarded as the probandum. For instance, the proposition "Word is eternal" cannot be regarded as the probandum of the Vaiśeṣika, nor again the fact of it (word) being a quality of ether be regarded as a probandum, though it is set forth in the system (of Vaiśeṣika philosopher as a valid conclusion) and hence endorsed by the Vaiśeṣika philosopher, because that is not intended to be proved (and hence is irrelevant to the discourse in question). A probandum may be what is desired (to be established) though it may not be expressed. Thus, for instance, (in the argument of the Sāṅkhya) 'visual organ and the like are subservient to an other, since they are composite bodies like bed, articles of food and such other subservient things,' the phrase 'subservient to an other' means 'subservient to the self' (and this is the probandum). Again, (in the argument of the Vaiśeṣika) 'earth and the like have for its antecedent an intelligent agent, as they are products,' the probandum is to be understood to be 'have for its antecedent a disembodied omniscient being'.

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which is the direct opposite of the probans fire. The opposition really subsists between fire and cold and the derivative opposition between fire and all that is necessarily related with cold either as its cause or its effect or as its concomitant is indirect as the probans immediately leads to the inference of its opposite which in its turn leads to the inference of the facts necessarily related with it. The absence of shivering is directly inferable from the absence of cold which is inferred from the presence of fire. The absence of a particular species of cold is inferred from the absence of the genus cold. Thus fire is the direct ground of inference of absence of cold and the latter is the ground of inference of the absence of its effect, or its particular species. So, at bottom all these inferences are multiple in character and hence they are regarded as cases of indirect inference. The indirectness of inference based on the opposition between the probans and the necessary correlates of the probandum has been illustrated in all the cases cited above. But the same may be due to the character of the probans also according as it is a necessary correlate of the opposite. Thus smoke is opposed to cold only because it being the effect of fire leads to the inference of fire which in its turn leads to the inference of the absence of cold. Thus the inference of the absence of cold is not directly capable of being reached from the presence of smoke but only because the presence of fire is inferred as the intermediate stage in the process. The enumeration of the types of syllogism serve rather the useful purpose of exercises for a student of logic and it is imperative that one must not lose sight of the fact that these are not cases of inference based on opposition proper, but rather of that between facts with which the probans and the probandum are necessarily related.

55. 'asiddham' ity anenānādhyavasāya-saṁśaya-viparyaya-viśayasya vastunaḥ sādhyatvam, na siddhasya yathā śrāvaṇaḥ śabda iti / "nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte nyāyaḥ pravartate" [Nyāyabhāṣya, 1.1.1] iti hi sarvapārśadam /

55. The word 'unproved' (in the aphorism) means that the probandum is always a fact which is the object of indecision, doubt and erroneous judgement and not a proved fact, as in the example 'Word is audible'. The dictum "A logical discourse does not come into play in regard to a matter which is unknown or definitely established" is universally acknowledged by all schools of thought.

56. 'abādhyam' ity anena pratyakṣādibādhitasya sādhyatvaṁ mā bhūḍ ity āha / etat sādhyasya lakṣaṇam / 'pakṣaḥ' iti sādhyasyaiva nāmāntaram etat ||13||

56. The phrase 'incapable of being contradicted' means that the probandum cannot be what is contradicted by perception and the rest. This (aphorism) sets forth the definition of the probandum. The word 'thesis' is only another synonym of what is called the probandum and not anything else. (13)

57. abādhyagrahaṇavyavacchedyāṁ bādhāṁ darśayati -

**pratyakṣānumānāgamalokasvavacanapratītayo bādhāḥ ||14||**

57. Now the author sets forth contradiction which is sought to be eliminated by the employment of the expression 'incapable of being contradicted.'

(Aph.) Contradiction is constituted by perceptual cognition, inference, scriptural evidence, popular opinion, one's own statement and (linguistic) convention. (14)

58. pratyakṣādīni tadviruddhārthopasthāpanena bādhakatvāt 'bādhāḥ' / tatra pratyakṣabādhā yathā anuṣṇo 'gñiḥ, na madhu madhuram, na sugandhi vidalan mālātīmukulam, acākṣuṣo ghaṭaḥ, aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ, nāsti bahir arthaḥ, ityādi / anumānabādhā yathā saroma hastatalam, nityaḥ śabda iti vā / atrānupalambhena kṛtakatvena cānumānabādhā / āgamabādhā yathā pretyā'sukhaprado dharma iti / paraloke sukhapradatvaṁ dharmasya sarvāgamasiddham / lokabādhā yathā śuci naraśiraḥkapālam iti / loke hi naraśiraḥkapālādīnām aśucitvaṁ prasiddham / svavacanabādhā yathā mātā me vandhyeti / pratītibādhā yathā acandraḥ śaśīti / atra śasinaś candraśabdavācyaṭvaṁ pratītisiddham iti pratītibādhā ||14||

58. Perceptual cognition and the rest are regarded as evidence of contradiction since they serve to contradict (the alleged statements) by presenting facts which are contradictorily opposed to the propositions asserted. Contradiction by perceptual cognition is illustrated by the following cases : Fire is not hot, honey is not sweet, the blooming jessamine bud is not fragrant, the jar is not visible, sound is not audible, there is no extra-mental object, and so on and so forth. [All these assertions are contradicted by evidence of direct experience]. Contradiction by inference is illustrated in the following cases : The palm of the hand is overgrown with hair; or, word is eternal. Now, these assertions are respectively contradicted by inferences based on 'non-perception' and 'being a product' as their logical grounds. Contradiction by scriptural evidence is illustrated by the statement 'a pious act results in unhappiness in the next world'. That a pious act is the cause of happiness in the next world is endorsed by scriptures (of all schools of religion). Contradiction by popular opinion is exemplified in the assertion "Human skulls are ceremonially clean". That human skull and the like are ceremonially unclean is much too well-established by popular opinion. Contradiction of one's own statement is exemplified by such assertion as "My mother is barren". Contradiction by (linguistic) convention (is illustrated in the case) : "The rabbit-bearing luminary is not the moon". This assertion is contradicted by linguistic convention which sanctions the usage that the rabbit-bearing luminary is also designated by the term 'moon'. (14)

59. *atra sādhyam dharmah, dharmadharmisamudāyo veti samśayavyavacchedāyāha* –

***sādhyam sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī, kvacit tu dharmah ||15||***

59. The author propounds (the next aphorism) with a view to the elimination of the doubt whether the probandum consists in an attribute or a synthetic whole composed of the attribute and the substantive.

(Aph.) **The probandum is a substantive qualified by an attribute sought to be proved; but in some cases an attribute alone is considered as the probandum. (15)**

60. 'sādhyam' sādhyasabdavācyaṁ pakṣasabdābhidheyam ity arthaḥ / kim ity āha 'sādhyadharmeṇa' anityatvādinā 'viśiṣṭo dharmī' śabdādiḥ / etat prayogakālāpekṣaṁ sādhyasabdavācyaṭvam / 'kvacit tu' vyāptigrahaṇakāle

'dharmah' sādhyasābdenocyate, anyathā vyāpter aghaṭanāt / nahi dhūma-darśanāt sarvatra parvato 'gnimān iti vyāptiḥ śakyā kartum pramāṇavirodhād iti ||15||

dharmisvarūpanirūpaṇāyāha –

**dharmī pramāṇasiddhaḥ ||16||**

60. The term 'probandum' stands for 'what is designated by the word 'probandum'' and is the same thing as is also designated by the term 'thesis'. But what is designated by this term ? Well, it is the substantive qualified by the attribute sought to be proved, as for example, 'word' as the substantive qualified by the attribute 'impermanent' ('word is impermanent') is a probandum. This meaning of the term 'probandum' is denoted when it is used to designate a member of a syllogism. The phrase 'but in some cases' means 'at the time of the comprehension of universal concomitance' and in such situation the term 'probandum' is employed to designate an attribute. Were the meaning to be understood otherwise, there would be no comprehension of universal concomitance. Certainly one cannot comprehend in all cases, on the observation of smoke, the universal proposition that the hill is possessed of fire, since this is in direct conflict with valid knowledge.<sup>1</sup> (15)

The author introduces the next aphorism in order to expound the nature of the subject.

(Aph.) **The subject is what is endorsed by valid knowledge. (16)**

61. 'pramāṇaiḥ' pratyakṣādibhiḥ prasiddho 'dharmī' bhavati yathā agnimān ayaṁ deśa iti / atra hi deśaḥ pratyakṣeṇa siddhaḥ / etena "sarva evānumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhena dharmadharminyāyena, na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣate" iti Saugataṁ mataṁ pratikṣipati / nahīyaṁ vikalpabuddhir antar bahir vā 'nāsāditālambanā dharmiṇaṁ vyavasthāpayati, tadavāstavatve tadādhārasādhyasādhanayor api vāstavatvānupapatteḥ tadbuddheḥ pāramparyeṇāpi vastuvyavasthāpakatvāyogāt / tato vikalpenāyena vā vyavasthāpitaḥ parvatādir viśayabhāvaṁ bhajann eva dharmitān

1. The necessary concomitance of smoke can be comprehended with fire as such and the occurrence of the latter in a hill is only accidental. So when it is said that the probans and the probandum ought to be understood as related by way of universal concomitance, the term 'probandum' can mean exclusively an attribute and the introduction of the subject as the substantive is illegitimate, as there can be no universal relation with the subject which may be variable.

*pratipadyate / tathā ca sati pramāṇasiddhasya dharmitā yuktaiva //16//*

61. The subject is what is established by such organs of valid knowledge as perception, as for example, 'this locality is possessed of fire'. In this case, the locality is established by perception. By this assertion the author refutes the Buddhist doctrine "All this assertion of probans (ground of inference) and probandum (object of inference) is due to the conception of subject and predicate which has its genesis in our understanding and does not presuppose existence and non-existence in the external world". It is not possible that conceptual knowledge unrelated to an object either inside or outside can establish a subject. And with the unreality of the subject, the reality of probans and probandum which have their seat in the subject, cannot be logically tenable. Thus conceptual knowledge cannot lay claim to establish the nature of reality even in a remote fashion. So it must be admitted that a hill and the like can assume the character of the logical subject (only) when it becomes the object of and as such is determined by conceptual or non-conceptual cognition. Such being the case, it is quite reasonable to assert that what is established by an accredited cognitive organ ought to be accepted as the subject. (16)

62. *apavādam āha -*

*buddhisiddho 'pi ||17||*

62. Now he states an exception :

(Aph.) It (subject) is also established by conceptual knowledge.

(17)

63. *naikāntena pramāṇasiddha eva dharmī kintu vikalpabuddhisiddho 'pi dharmī bhavati / 'api' śabdena pramāṇa-buddhibhyām ubhābhyām api siddho dharmī bhavatīti darśayati / tatra buddhisiddhe dharmiṇi sādhyadharmaḥ sattvaṃ asattvaṃ ca pramāṇabalena sādhyate yathā asti sarvajñāḥ, nāsti śaṣṭhaṃ bhūtaṃ iti /*

63. The subject is not exclusively established by an organ of knowledge. The subject can be one which is affirmed by conceptual knowledge also. The particle 'also' (in the aphorism) indicates that there may be a subject which is established both by an organ of knowledge as well as by conceptual knowledge. Now with regard to the subject affirmed by conceptual knowledge, the probandum, that is the predicate to be proved, e.g.,

existence or non-existence, is established on the strength of (the verdict of) an organ of knowledge, for instance, 'There exists an omniscient person', 'A sixth element is not in existence'; (the subjects are affirmed as ideally possible, but the predicate is established by the application of the organs of knowledge).

64. *nanu dharmiṇi sāksād asati bhāvābhāvobhayadharmāṇām asiddha-viruddhānaikāntikatvenānumānaviṣayatvāyogāt katham sattvāsattvayoḥ sādhyatvam ? / tadāha-*

*"nāsiddhe bhāvadharmo 'sti vyabhicāry ubhayāśrayaḥ /*

*viruddho dharmo 'bhāvasya sā sattā sādhyate katham ? //"*

*[Pramāṇavārtika, 1.192-3]*

64. But how is it possible, it may be urged, to establish existence or non-existence as the predicates regarding a subject which is not directly cognised to exist – particularly when the predicates cannot be legitimate objects of inference in view of the fallacies of non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive probans involved in the assertion of a probans positive, negative and neutral (common to both) in character ? As has been observed (by Dharmakīrti) : "How can existence be proved ? If the subject is not known to be existent, an attribute pertaining to existents cannot belong to it (as probans); if the probans again be equally affirmable of both (existent and non-existent) it is bound to be inconclusive. If again, it (the probans) be a characteristic of the non-existent, it will transpire to be contradictory (since it will end in proving the non-existence of the subject)" (PV, I. 192-3).

65. *naivam, mānasapratyakṣe bhāvarūpasyaiva dharmiṇaḥ pratipannatvāt / na ca tatsiddhau tatsattvasyāpi pratipannatvād vyartham anumānam, tad abhyupetaṁ api vaiyātyād yo na pratipadyate taṁ praty anumānasya sāphalyāt / na ca mānasajñānāt kharaviṣāṇāder api sabbhāvasambhāvanāto 'tiprasaṅgaḥ, tajjñānasya bādhakapratyayaviplāvitasattākavastuviṣayatayā mānasapratyakṣābhāsavāt / katham tarhi ṣaṣṭhabhūtāder dharmitvam iti cet; dharmiprayogakāle bādhakapratyayānudayāt sattvasambhāvanopapatteḥ / na ca sarvajñādaḥ sādhakapramāṇāsattvena sattvasamītiḥ, suniścītā'sambhavad-bādhakapramāṇatvena sukhādāv iva sattvaniścayāt tatra samīśayāyogāt /*

65. No such contingency arises in our position. The subject envisaged in conceptual intuition is undoubtedly positive in character. But it may be

urged that if a positive subject is envisaged, it follows that its existence is also envisaged by the same cognition, and so inference (called in request to prove existence) is superfluous. The answer is that inference is necessarily fruitful for compelling recognition of the truth by a person who refuses to accept truth, though realised by him, out of perversity. It cannot be urged that if mental intuition (is to be banked upon as an organ of knowledge) it may lead to the establishment of such fictions as an ass' horn (and thus reliance upon such intuition will inevitably) result in (the obliteration of all distinction between truth and falsehood) – the fallacy called over-extension. But no such consequence arises. The alleged intuition (of fictions like ass' horn) is not an intuition proper, but only a deceptive appearance, since the existence of the object of such intuition is clearly set aside by the sense of contradiction involved in it. But how can then fictions like the sixth element be made a logical subject ? The answer is that when the subject is asserted, the cognition of contradiction does not arise and hence its possibility is presumed. It cannot, however, be contended (on the analogy of the aforesaid cases) that the existence of omniscient being is liable to be called in question owing to the absence of all proofs in its support. The truth is that the existence of such a being is asserted as clearly as pleasure and pain, and more so on account of unimpeachable realisation of the impossibility of any evidence contradicting its possibility and so there is no reasonable ground for doubt regarding this.

66. *ubhayasiddho dharmī yathā anityaḥ śabda iti / nahi pratyakṣe-  
ṇārvāgdarśibhir aniyatadigdeśakālāvacchinnāḥ sarve śabdāḥ śakyā niścetum  
iti śabdasya pramāṇa-buddhyubhayasiddhatā tenānityatvādir dharmāḥ  
prasādhya ita ||17||*

66. The subject established by both (an accredited organ of knowledge and mental intuition) is illustrated by such propositions as 'Word (as a class) is perishable'. The subject 'word' is established both by valid knowledge and mental intuition, since all the individual words spread over infinite time and space are not capable of being cognised through perceptual cognition by persons whose power of vision is limited within a narrow sphere. (But it is the entire class of words that is made the subject and hence the necessity of resort to mental intuition over and above empirical

intuition). The predicate 'perishable' and the like are established (of this indefinite number of individuals for which the subject stands). (17)

67. *nanu dṛṣṭānto 'py anumānāṅgatayā pratītaḥ / tat katham sādhyasādhane evānumānāṅgam ukte na dṛṣṭāntaḥ ?, ity āha –*  
*na dṛṣṭānto 'numānāṅgam ||18||*

67. A question is raised (by the opponent). It is established by tradition that example is a necessary factor of inference. Such being the case, why have the probans and probandum exclusively been asserted as factors of inference and not example also ? In anticipation of such a contention the author says :

(Aph.) **Example is not a factor of inference. (18)**

68. *'dṛṣṭāntaḥ' vakṣyamāṇalakṣaṇo nānumānasya 'aṅgam' kāraṇam*  
*||18||*

68. 'Example' is to be understood in terms of the definition to be propounded hereafter. It is not a factor, that is, a condition, of inference. (18)

69. *kuta ity āha –*

*sādhyanamātrāt tatsiddheḥ ||19||*

69. Why should it not be so ? He answers :

(Aph.) **Because it (inference) is realised by means of the probans alone. (19)**

70. *dṛṣṭāntarahitāt sādhyānyathānupapattilakṣaṇāt 'sāadhanāt' anumānasya sādhyapratipattilakṣaṇasya bhāvān na dṛṣṭānto 'numānāṅgam iti /*

70. Because inference which consists in the knowledge of the probandum is made possible from a probans which is by its inherent character known to be incompatible with the opposite of the probandum and for this no reference to an example is felt to be necessary. It is for this reason that an example is not regarded as a factor of inference.

71. *sa hi sādhyapratipattaḥ vā, avinābhāvagrahaṇe vā, vyāptismaraṇe vopayujyeta ? / na tāvat prathamah pakṣaḥ, yathoktād eva hetoḥ sādhyapratipatter upapattēḥ / nāpi dvitīyaḥ, vipakṣe bādhakād evāvinābhāvagrahaṇāt / kiñca, vyaktirūpo dṛṣṭāntaḥ / sa katham sākalyena vyāptim gamayet ? / vyaktyantareṣu vyāptyartham dṛṣṭāntāntaram mṛgyam / tasyāpi vyaktirūpatvena sākalyena vyāpter avadhārayitum asākyatvād aparāpara-dṛṣṭāntāpekṣāyām anavasthā syāt / nāpi tritīyaḥ, grhītasambandhasya*



*sādhana-darśanād eva vyāptismṛteḥ / agrhītasambandhasya dṛṣṭānte 'py  
asmaraṇāt upalabdhīpūrvakatvāt smaraṇasyeti ||19||*

71. Would it be of service in the knowledge of the probandum, or in the apprehension of necessary concomitance, or in the recollection of necessary concomitance ? The first alternative is not tenable, since the knowledge of the probandum quite naturally and legitimately follows from the probans as specified before. Nor does the second alternative stand (a better chance) for the reason that the apprehension of necessary concomitance is achieved by proof of the contradiction of the opposite possibility (in other words, *reductio ad absurdum*). Moreover, example is nothing but the statement of an individual instance. How can such an individual case be of help in the knowledge of necessary concomitance which is necessarily universal in reference ? It would be necessary to ferret out another example in order to understand the extension of the concomitance to another individual case. But the latter (example), again, being nothing more than an individual, there would be no ground for the determination of necessary concomitance in its universal reference, and the search for examples one after another would only lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*. The third alternative, again, will equally prove to be abortive. Recollection of necessary concomitance is possible on the apprehension of the probans for a person who has apprehended the relation (between the probans and the probandum). And if the person concerned is not previously aware of the relation in question, no amount of example would enable him to recollect the concomitance, since recollection is necessarily conditioned by an antecedent apprehension. (19)

72. *dṛṣṭāntasya lakṣaṇam āha –*

*sa vyāptidarśanabhūmiḥ ||20||*

72. The author now propounds the definition of example :

(Aph.) That is the locus of the apprehension of necessary concomitance. (20)

73. 'sa' iti dṛṣṭānto lakṣyaṁ 'vyāptiḥ' lakṣitarūpā 'darśanam' para-smai pratipādanaṁ tasya 'bhūmiḥ' āśraya iti lakṣaṇam /

73. 'That' stands for the example which is the subject-matter of definition. 'Necessary concomitance' is to be understood in terms of the

definition given before. 'Apprehension' (here means) communication to another person (of the truth of the concomitance which an example serves to drive home to the other party). The locus, that is, the objective substratum of such communication (is the example). This is the definition (of the example).

74. *nanu yadi dṛṣṭānto 'numānāṅgam' na bhavati tarhi kim artham lakṣyate ? / ucyate / parārthānumāne bodhyānurodhād āpavādikasyōdā-haraṇasyānujñāsyamānatvāt / tasya ca dṛṣṭāntābhīdhānarūpatvād upapannam dṛṣṭāntasya lakṣaṇam / pramātur api kasyacit dṛṣṭāntadṛṣṭabahirvyāptibale-nāntarvyāptipratipattir bhavatīti svārthānumānaparvaṇy api dṛṣṭāntalakṣaṇam nānupapannam ||20||*

74. Now it may be urged if example is not a condition of inference (on your view), why should you take the trouble of propounding definition of the same ? The answer is : (It is in pursuance of the recognition of) illustration which will be allowed for as a case of exception out of deference to a pupil (of slow understanding) in syllogistic argument (employed for the conviction of the other party to a debate). And even in the field of subjective inference (for arriving at subjective conviction) the definition of example is not entirely inappropriate in view of the fact that there may be a person who is helped to arrive at the knowledge of internal concomitance from the observation of external concomitance in an example. (20)

75. *tadvibhāgam āha -*

*sa sādharṃyavaidharṃyābhyāṃ dvedhā ||21||*

75. The author now sets forth the divisions (of the example) :

(Aph.) That is of two kinds according as it is based on similarity and dissimilarity. (21)

76. *sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ 'sādharṃyeṇa' anvayena 'vaidharṃyeṇa' ca vyatirekeṇa bhavatīti dviprakāraḥ ||21||*

76. 'That', i.e., example is of two different kinds according as it is based on 'similarity', i.e., concomitance in agreement, and on 'dissimilarity', i.e., concomitance in difference. (21)

77. *sādharṃyadrṣṭāntam vibhajate -*

*sādhana-dharṃya-prayuktasādhya-dharṃya-yogī*

*sādharṃyadrṣṭāntaḥ ||22||*

77. The author now expounds the example based on similarity :

(Aph.) The example based on similarity is an individual possessed of the probandum logically entailed by the possession of probans. (22)

78. *sādhanaadharmaṇa prayukto na tu kākatālīyo yaḥ sādhyadharmaḥ tadvān 'sādharmyadr̥ṣṭāntaḥ' / yathā kṛtakatvenānitye śabde sādhye ghaṭādīḥ* ||22||

78. The example based on similarity is an individual which is endowed with the probandum logically enforced by the nature of a probans and not as a matter of accident as illustrated by the maxim of 'fall of plam-fruit and death of the crow'. Thus, for instance, jar and the like serve as examples in relation to word which is sought to be proved to be perishable on the ground of its being a product. (22)

79. *vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭāntaṁ vyācaṣṭe –*

*sādhyadharmanivṛttiprayuktasādhanaadharmanivṛttiyogī*  
*vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭāntaḥ* ||23||

79. The author now sets forth the example based on dissimilarity :

(Aph.) The example based on dissimilarity is an individual which is shown to be characterised by the default of the probans which is entailed as a necessary consequence by the default of the probandum. (23)

80. *sādhyadharmanivṛtṭyā prayuktā na yathākathañcit yā sādhanaadharmanivṛtṭiḥ tadvān 'vaidharmyadr̥ṣṭāntaḥ' / yathā kṛtakatvenānitye śabde sādhye ākāśādir iti* ||23||

*ity ācārya śrī Hemacandraviracitāyāḥ*

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsāyās tadvṛtteś ca*

*prathamasyādhyāyasya dvitīyaṁ āhnikam //*

80. The example based on dissimilarity is an individual which exhibits the destitution of the probans logically entailed by the destitution of the probandum and not by way of accident. Thus ether and the like serve as such examples in relation to word which is sought to be proved to be perishable on the ground of its being a product. (23)

Here ends the Second Lecture of the First Book of  
'A Critique of Organ of Knowledge' and the Gloss thereon  
composed by the Master Śrī Hemacandra.

|| *atha dvitīye adhyāye prathamam āhnikam* ||

1. *lakṣitaṁ svārtham anumānam idānīm kramaprāptaṁ parārtham anumānaṁ lakṣayati –*

*yathoktasāadhanābhidhānajaḥ parārtham* ||1||

## BOOK II

### LECTURE 1

1. Subjective inference has been defined and now the author proposes to give the definition of syllogistic inference which comes next in order.

(Aph.) **Syllogistic inference is (definite cognition) resulting from statement of a probans having the characteristics set forth before. (1)**

2. 'yathoktam' *svanīścitasādhyāvinābhāvaikalakṣaṇaṁ yat 'sāadhanam' tasyābhidhānam / abhidhīyate parasmai pratipādyate aneneti 'abhidhānam' vacanam, tasmā jātaḥ samyag arthanirṇayaḥ 'parārtham' anumānaṁ paropadeśāpekṣaṁ sādhyavijñānam ity arthaḥ* ||1||

2. 'Having the characteristics set forth before' means having the sole and solitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum, ascertained by one's own self. (The probans in question must have this qualification, and) the statement of such a probans (implies that it is) an assertion which is the instrument of communication to another person (of this fact) and the definite authentic cognition of fact that arises from such (assertion) is designated as 'syllogistic inference' which means, in other words, knowledge of the probandum derived from the communication made by another person. (I)

3. *nanu vacanaṁ parārtham anumānam ity āhus tat katham ity āha – vacanam upacārāt* ||2||

3. A question is raised. Syllogistic inference is (customarily) stated to consist in verbal assertion. But how does it accord (with the definition of inference) ? In reply to this (the author) says :

(Aph.) **'Statement' is called inference by way of metaphor. (2)**

4. *acetanaṁ hi vacanaṁ na sāḁṣāt pramitiphalahetur iti na nirupacaritapramāṇabhāvabhājanam, mukhyānumānahetur tūpacaritānu-*

*mānābhīdhānapātratām pratipadyate / upacāraś cātra kāraṇe kāryasya / yathoktasāadhanābhīdhānāt tadviśayā smṛtir utpadyate, smṛteś cānumānam, tasmād anumānasya paramparayā yathoktasāadhanābhīdhānam kāraṇam, tasmīn kāraṇe vacane kāryasyānumānasyopacāraḥ samāropaḥ kriyate / tataḥ samāropāt kāraṇam vacanam anumānaśabdenocyate / kārye vā pratipādakānumānajanye vacane kāraṇasyānumānasyopacāraḥ / vacanam aupacārikam anumānam na mukhyam ity arthaḥ /*

4. A statement being a non-mental fact cannot be the direct condition of valid knowledge as its result, and as such cannot possess the character of a cognitive organ in its own right and without resort to a metaphor. But it comes to be designated by the appellation 'inference' by transference of epithet, being the condition of inference proper. The transference in the present case consists in the ascription of the nature of effect to its condition. There arises a recollection of it (probans) from the statement of the probans as set forth before, and this recollection gives rise to inference. Thus the statement of the probans as defined before is the indirect condition of inference. Now, (by a recognised rhetorical device) the character of the effect, here inference, is transferred to, that is to say, super-imposed upon the condition, i.e., statement. It is by virtue of this transference that the statement, that is the condition (of inference), is designated by the term 'inference'. Or (viewed from the other side), it may be considered to be a case of superimposition of the condition, viz., inference, on the effect, viz., statement, which is the result of the inference made by the arguer. The statement is thus designated as inference by (the rhetorical device of) transference of epithet, and is not 'inference' proper in the conventional sense of the term.

5. *iha ca mukhyārthabādhe prayojane nimitte copacāraḥ pravartate / tatra mukhyo 'rthaḥ sāṅgāt pramītiphalāḥ samyag arthanirṇayaḥ pramāṇaśabdasamānādhikaraṇasya parārthānumānaśabdasya, tasya bādha, vacanasya nirṇayatvānupapatteḥ / prayojanam anumānāvayavāḥ pratiññādaya iti śāstre vyavahāra eva, nirṇayātmāny anarṇiśe tadvyavahārānupapatteḥ / nimittam tu nirṇayātmakānumānaśabdenocyate ||2||*

*tad dvedhā ||3||*

contradiction of the primary conventional meaning, a purpose (that is, a result to be achieved) and a legitimate ground (that is, recognised relation between the primary and secondary meaning. And all these conditions are present in the present context). The primary meaning of the term 'syllogistic inference' which is in apposition with the term 'organ of knowledge' (which follows from the aphorism 1. 1. 2, and is to be construed in apposition with the term 'statement' in 2. 1. 2) is authentic definitive knowledge having direct knowledge as its result. This primary meaning is contradicted because a statement cannot be the same thing as cognition. The purpose (of this tortuous procedure) is (for validating) the usage, in standard works on logic, of thesis and the rest as members of inference, which usage would not be possible if the meaning 'cognition' were adhered to, since a cognition has no parts or members. The ground (of this transference of epithet) is that statement is the condition of inference which is a case of cognition (and thus there is recognised relation between the primary and the secondary meaning). (2)

(Aph.) That is twofold. (3)

6. 'tad'vacanātmakam parārthānumānam 'dvedhā' dviprakāram ||3||

6. 'That' stands for syllogistic inference which consists in statement.

The term 'twofold' means that it has two different types. (3)

7. prakārabhedam āha –

tathopapattyanyathānupapattibhedāt ||4||

7. The author now states the (ground of) difference of types :

(Aph.) The difference is due to (the consideration of firstly) the logical possibility on the occurrence of the other and (secondly) of logical impossibility in the absence of the other. (4)

8. 'tathā' sādhye saty eva 'upapattiḥ' sādhanasyety ekaḥ prakārah / 'anyathā' sādhyābhāve 'anupapattiḥ' ceti dvitīyaḥ prakārah / yathā agnimān ayam parvataḥ tathaiva dhūmavattvopapatteḥ, anyathā dhūmavattvānupapatter vā / etāvanmātrakṛtaḥ parārthānumānasya bhedo na pāramārthikaḥ sa iti bhedapadena darśayati ||4||

8. 'On the occurrence of the other' means on the necessary occurrence of the probandum. 'Logical possibility' is to be understood in relation

to the probans (in other words, when the possibility of probans is understood to be necessarily dependent on the occurrence of the probandum). This is one type. The second type arises from the consideration of the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the other, that is to say, of the probandum. To cite concrete examples : The hill is on fire, because the logical possibility of its being possessed of smoke is intelligible only on that condition (that is, on the necessary occurrence of fire); or, because the fact of its possession of smoke would become logically impossible in the absence of the other (fire). The difference of syllogistic inference is conditioned merely by this (difference of form) and not a real difference and this is indicated by the term 'difference' (in the aphorism). (4)

9. *etad evāha* –

*nānayos tātparye bhedaḥ ||5||*

9. That this alone is the case (i.e. that the difference is merely formal) is expressly stated (in the aphorism following) :

(Aph.) The difference between these two is not in respect of ultimate intention. (5)

10. 'na' 'anayoḥ' tathopapattyanyathānupapattirūpayoḥ prayoga-prakārayoḥ 'tātparye' 'yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthah' ity evaṁlakṣaṇe tatparatve, 'bhedaḥ' viśeṣaḥ / etad uktam bhavati anyad abhidheyam śabdasānyat prakāśyam prayojanam / tatrābhidheyāpekṣayā vācakatvam bhidyate, prakāśyam tv abhinnaṁ, anvaye kathite vyatirekagatir vyatireke cānvayagatir ity ubhayatrāpi sādhanasya sādhyāvinābhāvaḥ prakāśyate / na ca yatrābhidheyabhedaḥ tatra tātparyabhedo 'pi / nahi pīno Devadatto divā na bhuṅkte, pīno Devadatto rātrau bhuṅkte ity anayor vākyayor abhidheyabhedo 'stīti tātparyeṇāpi bhetavyam iti bhāvaḥ ||5||

10. 'Between these two', that is, between logical possibility and impossibility as exhibited in the difference of verbal form, there is no difference, i.e., opposition, so far as the ultimate intention is taken into account. Ultimate intention is ultimate meaning as understood in terms of the definition 'The meaning of a word is that which is ultimately intended by it'. What is implied by it is this : The primary meaning expressed by a word is one thing and the ultimate meaning (i.e. logical content) intended as the result is quite another. In the present context there is difference (between

the verbal propositions), so far as they are expressive of different primary meanings, but the logical content intended by them is identical. When concomitance in agreement is stated (in a propositional form), the concomitance in difference is understood by implication, and when, on the other hand, concomitance in difference is stated (in a propositional form) the concomitance in agreement is understood by implication. But both these propositions imply the same logical content, viz., the necessary concomitance of the probans with the probandum. It is not necessarily true that there is difference of logical meaning with the difference of primary meaning. The two propositions, viz., “Devadatta is stout, but does not take his meals in daytime” and “Devadatta is stout, and takes his meals at night” have different expressed meaning, but it does not follow that their logical meaning should differ on that account. This is the upshot. (5)

11. *tātparyābhedasyaiva phalam āha –*

*ata eva nobhayoḥ prayogaḥ ||6||*

11. The consequence of the identity of logical content is set forth (in the following aphorism) :

(Aph.) For this very reason, the statement of both (the propositions) is not (necessary). (6)

12. *yata eva nānayos tātparye bhedaḥ 'ata eva nobhayoḥ' tathopapattyanyathānupapattyor yugapat 'prayogaḥ' yuktaḥ / vyāptyupadarśanāya hi tathopapattyanyathānupapattibhyāṁ hetoḥ prayogaḥ kriyate / vyāptyupadarśanam caikayaiva siddham iti viphalo dvayoḥ prayogaḥ / yad āha –*

*“hetos tathopapattyā vā syāt prayogo 'nyathāpi vā /*

*dvidvidho 'nyatareṇāpi sādhyasiddhir bhaved iti //” [Nyāyāvatāra 17]*

12. Since there is no difference in logical content, the simultaneous employment of both the propositions stating positive and negative concomitance respectively is not warranted. The statement of the probans with its logical possibility and impossibility respectively with and without the probandum (that is to say, with positive and negative concomitance) is made for the demonstration of necessary concomitance. And when the demonstration of necessary concomitance is accomplished by one of them, the employment of both the propositions is superfluous. As has been observed : “The employment of the probans may be twofold, viz., in a



proposition showing its logical possibility (in connection) with the probandum (i.e., positive concomitance), and its impossibility when out of connection with the probandum (i.e., negative concomitance) in another proposition. But so far as the question of the knowledge of (necessary concomitance of the probans with) the probandum is concerned, it is achieved by either of them" (NA, 17).

13. *nanu yady·ekenaiva prayogeṇa hetor vyāptyupadarśanam kṛtam iti kṛtaṇi viphalena dvitīyaprayogeṇa; tarhi pratijñāyā api mā bhūt prayogo viphalatvāt / nahi pratijñāmātrāt kaścīd arthaṇi pratipadyate, tathā sati hi vipratipattir eva na syād ity āha –*

*viṣayopadarśanārthaṇi tu pratijñā ||7||*

13. Now, a question is raised : If the demonstration of necessary concomitance of the probans is achieved by either of the propositions, the employment of the second proposition is superfluous and as such is to be dispensed with. But (parity of reasoning requires that) the statement of thesis should be (as a member of syllogism) dispensed with on the ground of its superfluity. It is certainly not a fact that a person comes to understand a conclusion from the thesis alone. Were it true, there would be no room for divergence of views. In order to rebut this contention, the author states (the next aphorism) :

(Aph.) **But the thesis is intended for demonstrating the subject. (7)**

14. *‘viṣayaḥ’ yatra tathopapattyā anyathānupapattyā vā hetuḥ svasādhyasādhanāya prārthyate, tasya ‘upadarśanam’ parapratiṭāṇ āropaṇaṇi tadarthaṇi punaḥ ‘pratijñā’ prayoktavyeti śeṣaḥ /*

14. ‘The subject’ is that with reference to which the probans with its positive or negative concomitance is requisitioned for establishing its relevant probandum. The demonstration of it means communication of the same to another person. It is for this reason that the thesis is *to be stated* (the italicised expression supplies an ellipsis).

15. *ayam arthaḥ – parapratiṭāṇāya vacanam uccārayatā prekṣāvatā tad eva pare bodhayitavyā yad bubhutsante / tathāsaty anena bubhutsitābhidhāyinā pare bodhitā bhavanti / na khalv aśvān pṛṣṭo gavayān bruvāṇaḥ praṣṭur avadheyavacano bhavati / anavadheyavacanaś ca kathaṇi pratipādako nāma ? / yathā ca śaikṣo bhikṣuṇācacakṣe – bhoḥ śaikṣa,*

*piṇḍapātam āhareti / sa evam ācarāmīty anabhidhāya yadā tadarthaṁ prayatate tadā tasmai krudhyati bhikṣuḥ – āḥ śiṣyābhāsa bhikṣukheṭa, asmān avadhīrayasīti vibruvāṇaḥ / evam anityaṁ śabdaṁ bubhutsamānāya anityaḥ śabda iti viṣayam anupadarśya yad eva kiñcid ucyate – kṛtakatvād iti vā, yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityam iti vā, kṛtakatvasya tathaivopapatter iti vā, kṛtakatvasyānyathānupapatter iti vā, tat sarvam asyānapekṣitam āpātato 'sambaddhābhidhānabuddhyā; tathā cānavahito na boddhum arhatīti /*

15. This is the implication. When a sane person utters a sentence for the enlightenment of another person, he ought to take care to communicate only that which the persons intended to be enlightened desire to know. It is only by following this procedure that a person who states only what is desired to be known succeeds in enlightening others. It is a truism that a person who speaks of gayals when asked about horses cannot expect to enlist respectful attention to his assertion from the interrogator. And how can a person succeed in enlightening others when his assertion is not even entitled to serious consideration ? To give a concrete illustration : Suppose a monk commands his acolyte "O acolyte ! serve food." Suppose, again, the acolyte does not return an answer (in some such words) "I am doing so, O Sir !" but actually sets about for it. The monk thereupon takes offence and rebukes him "Ah ! False pupil, a rascal of a monk, thou slightest me !" Similarly, when a person desires to know (how) a word is impermanent and another person seeks to convince him by stating whatever reason comes handy, e.g., 'because it is a product', or 'whatever is a product is perishable', or 'the fact of being a product is logically possible on that ground alone', or 'the fact of its being a product would be logically impossible were it otherwise' – without caring to state the subject in some such proposition as 'word is perishable' – all these assertions fail to receive audience from the person addressed who would take them to be irrelevant statements. Thus all these assertions fall flat upon him and he does not succeed in understanding anything for want of attention.

16. *yat kṛtakaṁ tat sarvam anityaṁ yathā ghaṭaḥ, kṛtakaś ca śabda iti vacanam arthasāmarthyenaivāpekṣitaśabdānityatvaniścāyakam ity avadhānam atreti cet; na, parasparāśrayāt / avadhāne hi saty ato 'rthaniścayaḥ, tasmāc cāvadhānam iti / na ca parṣatprativādinau pramāṇīkṛtavādinau yad etadvacanasambandhāya prayatiṣyete / tathāsati na hetvādyapekṣeyātām,*

*tadavacanād eva tadarthaniścayāt / anityaḥ śabda ityapekṣite ukte kuta ity āśaṅkāyām kṛtakatvasya tathaivopapatteḥ kṛtakatvasyānyathānupapatter vety upatiṣṭhate, tad idam viśayopadarśanārthatvaṁ pratiññāyā iti ||7||*

16. It might be contended that ‘Whatever is a product is perishable, e.g., a jar. Sound is a product’ is a (perfect) syllogism which will by the mere logical implication of its meaning drive home the intended conclusion ‘Sound is perishable’ and so it will (not fail to) enlist proper attention. No, since the contention involves a vicious circle. There would arise knowledge of the conclusion from it (i.e., the syllogism), if attention were directed to it, and the direction of attention again would be possible if there were such (knowledge at its back). Nor could it be supposed that both the council (of umpires) and the opponent would have unquestioning faith in the authority of the proponent, and as such would endeavour to bring out the logical relation of the premises stated by him (and thus there would be no room for suspicion of the lack of proper attention). Were it so, the parties concerned would not demand the statement of the probans and the rest since they would be persuaded of the truth of his contention in spite of his omission of the statement (of reasons etc.). [But the situation becomes entirely different] when the contemplated conclusion ‘Sound is perishable’ is propounded as the thesis, and in anticipation of the query ‘What is the ground (of this assertion) ?’ the statement – ‘the fact of its being a product is logically possible only on the condition (of its being perishable)’, or ‘the fact of its being a product is logically impossible without implication (of its perishability)’, appropriately presents itself (as the answer to the query). This constitutes the logical justification of the thesis for the purpose of demonstrating the subject. (7)

17. *nanu yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityaṁ yathā ghataḥ, kṛtakaś ca śabda ity ukte gamyata etad anityaḥ śabda iti, tasya sāmānyalabdhatvāt, tathāpi tadvacane punaruktatvaprasaṅgāt, “arthād āpannasya svaśabdena punarvacanaṁ punaruktam” [Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.15] / āha ca – “ḍiṇḍikarāgaṁ parityajyākṣiṇī nimīlya cintaya tāvat kim iyatā pratītiḥ syān na veti, bhāve kim prapañcamālayā” [Hetubindu, pariccheda 1] ity āha –*

***gamyamānatve ’pi sādhyadharmādhārasandehāpanodāya dharmiṇi pakṣadharmopasaṁhāravat tadupapattiḥ ||8||***

17. It has been further contended that when a syllogism is stated in the typical form, e.g., "Whatever is a product is perishable just as jar, and sound is a product", the conclusion necessarily follows that "Sound is perishable". It (the conclusion) is derived from logical implication. And if in disregard of this consideration, an express statement of the same is made, the consequence would be a case of superfluous tautology which has been defined as follows : "The statement of a fact, derived by implication, again by means of explicit language constitutes tautology". It has been observed (facetiously by Dharmakīrti) : Dismiss this fascination for the way of dunderheads (who love to kick a row from the very start of any procedure), shut up your eyes and (calmly) contemplate whether the syllogism (proposed) gives rise to knowledge (of the conclusion). If it does so, what purpose would this (uncalled for) elaboration serve ?" With this objection in view, the author says :

(Aph.) Though (the conclusion is) known by implication, (the advance statement of) it (as thesis) has justification in order to rebut a possible doubt about the locus of the attribute to be proved (major term), just as is the case with the assertion of the probans in the subject (minor premise). (8)

18. *sādhyam eva dharmas tasyādhāras tasya sandehas tadapanodāya – yaḥ kṛtakaḥ so 'nitya ity ukte 'pi dharmiviśayasandeha eva – kim anityaḥ śabdo ghaṭo veti ?, tannirākaraṇāya gamyamānasyāpi sādhyasya nirdeśo yuktaḥ, sādhyadharmiṇi sādhanadharmāvbodhanāya pakṣadharmopasañhā-ravacanavat / yathā hi sādhyavyāptasādhanadarśanena tadādhārāvagatāv api niyatadharmisambandhitāpradarśanārtham kṛtakaś ca śabda iti pakṣadharmopasañhāravacanam tathā sādhyasya viśiṣṭadharmisambandhitāvbodhanāya pratijñāvacanam apy upapadyata eveti ||8||*

18. When a person asserts a proposition, viz., "What is a product is perishable", it is absolutely certain that a doubt will arise regarding the subject – Is it sound or a jar that is asserted to be perishable ? In order to rebut such a doubt about the locus of the attribute sought to be proved, it is necessary and legitimate that a statement of the thesis ('Sound is perishable') should be made. It is exactly on a par with the statement of the minor premise which is employed for imparting knowledge of the incidence of the

probans in the subject. (To be explicit), though it is a fact that when the probans is stated to be necessarily concomitant with the probandum, the locus of such a probans is known (in the generality of cases), it is felt to be necessary that the minor premise, viz., 'Sound is a product' should be expressly stated for demonstrating the factual relation of the probans with a definite subject. Likewise, the statement of the thesis equally answers a logical necessity in that it serves to generate knowledge of the factual relation of the major term with a definite subject. (8)

19. *nanu prayogaṃ prati vipratipadyante vādinah, tathāhi – pratijñāhetūdāharaṇānīti tryavayavam anumānam iti Sāṅkhyāḥ / sahopanayena caturavayavam iti Mīmāṃsakāḥ / sahanigamanena pañcāvayavam iti Naiyāyikāḥ / tad evaṃ vipratipattau kīdrśo 'numānaprayoga ity āha –*

***etāvān prekṣaprayogaḥ ||9||***

19. Now a problem arises from the fact that philosophers (of different schools) hold different views with regard to the constitution of syllogism. Thus, for instance, the Sāṅkhyas maintain that a syllogism consists of three members, viz., thesis, logical ground and example. The Mīmāṃsakas assert four members with the addition of application (to the three mentioned above). The Naiyāyikas (assert) five members with the addition of conclusion (to the four mentioned above). In view of such divergence of opinion, the question naturally arises : What is the proper form of a syllogism ? The author answers :

(Aph.) This much constitutes a syllogism adequate for a knowledgeable person. (9)

20. *'etāvān' eva yad uta tathopapattyānyathānupapattyā vā yuktam sādhanam pratijñā ca / 'prekṣāya' prekṣāvate pratipādyāya tadavabodhanārthaḥ 'prayogaḥ' na tvadhikaḥ yathāhuh Sāṅkhyādayaḥ, nāpi hīno yathāhuh Saugatāḥ – 'viduṣāṃ vācya hetur eva hi kevalaḥ' [Pramāṇavārtika, 1.28] iti ||9||*

20. 'This much' means the thesis and also the probans endowed with positive or negative concomitance. It is the syllogism (adequate) for the conviction of an intelligent person. And it is neither more as the Sāṅkhyas maintain, nor less as the Buddhists affirm in the following proposition. "The probans alone is to be stated for (the conviction of) a knowledgeable person" (PV, 1. 28). (9)

21. *nanu parārthapravṛttaiḥ kāruṇikair yathākathañcit pare pratibodhayitavyā nāsadvyavasthopanyāsair amīṣāṃ pratibhābhāṅgaḥ karaṇīyaḥ, tat kim ucyate etāvān prekṣaprayogaḥ ?, ity āśaṅkya dvitīyam api prayogakramam upadarśayati –*

***bodhyānurodhāt pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni  
pañcāpi ||10||***

21. It may be legitimately urged that persons of charitable disposition, who have taken up the mission of service of people at large, should endeavour to enlighten others by whatever method they would find it to be convenient. It is not proper that one should produce confusion of understanding in the public mind by promulgation of questionable theories. That being the case, how can it be said that this much is the syllogism for a knowledgeable person ? Anticipating such an objection, the author endorses a second form of syllogism (out of concession).

(Aph.) In deference to (the calibre of) the person to be edified (the syllogism may have) five propositions also, viz., thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion. (10)

22. ‘*bodhyaḥ*’ śiṣyas tasya ‘*anurodhaḥ*’ tadavabodhanaprati-jñāpāratantryaṃ tasmāt, pratijñādīni pañcāpi prayoktavyāni / etāni cāvaya-vasañjñayā procyante / yad Akṣapādaḥ – “*pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ*” [Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.32] iti / ‘*api*’-śabdāt pratijñādīnāṃ śuddhayaś ca pañca bodhyānurodhāt prayoktavyāḥ / yac chrīBhadrabāhusvāmipūjyapādāḥ –

“*katthai pañcāvayavaṃ dasahā vā savvahā ṇa paḍikutṭṭhaṃ ti //*”

[Daśavaikālika-Niryukti, 50]

22. ‘The person to be edified’ means a pupil and ‘deference to him’ means obligation to the pledge of edification of the same (pupil). It is in pursuance of such obligation that the five propositions also, beginning with thesis, ought to be affirmed. These propositions are designated by the name of members, as has been observed by Akṣapāda : Thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion are the members (NS, 1.1.32). The particle ‘also’ (in the aphorism) is significant and implies that each of the five members, thesis and the rest, should be supplemented by a corroborative statement, totalling five in all out of deference to (the requirement of) the

pupil. As has been remarked by His Holiness Bhadrabāhusvāmin of adorable feet : “(The syllogism) is said to consist of five members, or of ten members in the alternative. We denounce neither (but accept both as legitimate).” (DV, Nir. 50).

23. *tatra pratijñāyā lakṣaṇam āha –*

*sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā ||11||*

23. Now he sets forth the definition of the proposition :

(Aph.) **The thesis is the statement of the theme to be proved. (11)**

24. *sādhyaṁ siṣādhayaṣitadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī, nirdiśyate aneneti nirdeśo vacanam, sādhyasya nirdeśaḥ ‘sādhyanirdeśaḥ’ ‘pratijñā’ pratijñāyate ‘nayeti kṛtvā, yathā ayaṁ pradeśo ‘gnimān iti ||11||*

24. The theme-to-be-proved is the subject with the predicative attribute contemplated to be established. Statement here means a sentence which states a fact. The statement of the theme-to-be-proved is called the thesis (*pratijñā*) which sets forth a pledge (or undertaking to be logically established). “This locality is possessed of fire” is a typical illustration. (11)

25. *hetuṁ lakṣayati –*

*sādhanatvābhivyañjakavibhaktyantaṁ sādhanavacanam hetuḥ ||12||*

25. The author now defines the reason (as follows) :

(Aph.) **Statement of a probans ending in an inflexion unfolding the character of probans is (called) the reason. (12)**

26. *sādhanatvābhivyañjikā vibhaktiḥ pañcamī trtīyā vā tadantam, ‘sādhanasya’ uktalakṣaṇasya ‘vacanam’ hetuḥ / dhūma ityādirūpasya hetutvanirākaraṇāya prathamam padam / avyāptavacanahetutvanirākaraṇāya dvitīyam iti / sa dvividhas tathopapattyananyathānupapattibhyām, tadyathā dhūmasya tathaivopapatter dhūmasyānyathānupapatter veti ||12||*

26. “The inflexion unfolding the character of probans’ is either the fifth or the third case-ending (in Sanskrit). The statement of a probans as defined before with the proper case-ending is what is called reason. The phrase ‘ending in an inflexion, etc.’ serves to rebut the role of probans of a word with the first case-ending, e.g., (the unqualified statement of it as) smoke (without the relevant case-ending in Sanskrit and such words as ‘because’ or ‘since’ prefixed to it in English). The expression (second in order in the Sanskrit original) ‘statement of a probans’ serves to repudiate the

character of reason to the statement of an attribute lacking in necessary concomitance. This (statement) is twofold according as its concomitance is shown affirmatively or negatively. (The proposition) 'the existence of smoke is logically justifiable only on the condition of its positive concomitance (with fire)' or 'the existence of smoke is logically impossible unless the said concomitance be a fact' are typical examples. (12)

27. *udāharaṇam lakṣayati* –

*dr̥ṣṭāntavacanam udāharaṇam ||13||*

27. Now he defines the illustration :

(Aph.) **Illustration is the statement of an example. (13)**

28. '*dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ*' *uktalakṣaṇas tatpratipādakam* '*vacanam*' '*udāharaṇam*' *tad api dvividham dr̥ṣṭāntabhedāt / sādhanadharmaprayuktasādhyadharmayogī sādharmanyadr̥ṣṭāntas tasya vacanam sādharmanyodāharaṇam, yathā yo dhūmavān so 'gnimān yathā mahānasapradeśaḥ / sādhyadharmanivṛtti-prayuktasādhanadharmanivṛtṭiyogī vaidharmanyadr̥ṣṭāntas tasya vacanam vaidharmanyodāharaṇam, yathā yo 'gninivṛttimān sa dhūmanivṛttimān yathā jalāśayapradeśa iti ||13||*

28. Illustration is the statement which sets forth the example in conformity with the definition given before. It is also of two kinds on account of the difference of examples. The statement of an example based upon similarity of attribute is called illustration in agreement – the example found to have the attribute to be proved (the probandum) entailed as a consequence of the attribute adduced as the logical ground (probans). "Whatever is possessed of smoke is possessed of fire, as for example, the kitchen" is a typical instance (of illustration in agreement). Illustration in difference is the statement of an example in dissimilarity in which the absence of the attribute *qua* probans is logically entailed by the absence of the attribute *qua* probandum. "Whatever is possessed of the absence of fire is possessed of the absence of smoke, e.g., a lake" may be cited as a typical case. (13)

29. *upanayalakṣaṇam āha* –

*dharmiṇi sādhanasyopasaṃhāra upanayaḥ ||14||*

29. He now propounds the definition of application :

(Aph.) **Application is the act of bringing the probans into connection with the subject. (14)**



30. *dr̥ṣṭāntadharminī viṣṭasya sādhanadharmasya sādhyadharminī yaḥ 'upasaṁhāraḥ' saḥ 'upanayaḥ' upasaṁhriyate 'nenopanīyate 'neneti vacanarūpaḥ, yathā dhūmavān cāyam iti ||14||*

30. The probans is the attribute which was found in the example (subject of the illustration – as concomitant with the probandum) and the predication of the same (probans) in respect of the subject is called application (*upanaya*), an act by which the probans is brought into connection (*upsaṁhriyate*) with the subject.<sup>1</sup> It is of the nature of a proposition. The proposition “It is possessed of smoke” is a typical example of the same. (14)

31. *nigamanam lakṣayati –*

*sādhyasya nigamanam ||15||*

31. He now defines the conclusion.

(Aph.) Conclusion is (the predication) of the probandum. (15)

32. *sādhyadharmasya dharminy upasaṁhāro nigamyate pūrveṣāṁ avayavānām artho 'neneti 'nigamanam', yathā tasmād agnimān iti /*

32. The predication of probandum as an attribute of the subject is called conclusion which consists in a proposition that unfolds the logical intention of the foregoing members (premises). The proposition “Therefore it is possessed of fire” is an illustration of it.

33. *ete nāntariyakatvapratipādakā vākyaikadeśarūpāḥ pañcāvayavāḥ / eteṣāṁ eva śuddhayaḥ pañca , yato na śaṅkitasamāropitadoṣāḥ pañcāpy avayavāḥ svām svām anādīnavām arthaviṣayām dhiyam ādhātum alam iti pratiññādīnām taṁ taṁ doṣam āśaṅkya tatparihārarūpāḥ pañcaiva śuddhayaḥ prayoktavyā iti daśāvayavam idam anumānavākyaṁ bodhyānurodhāt prayoktavyam iti ||15||*

1. ‘*dharminī sādhanasyopasaṁhāra upanayaḥ*’. The word *upasaṁhāra* is derived by Hemacandra in the sense of the instrumental case. *Upa* means ‘proximity’, i.e., connection, ‘*saṁ*’, with and *√hr̥* to carry forward, and the word *upanaya* which consists of *upa* and *√nī* which also means ‘carrying’ has the same etymological meaning with *upasaṁhāra*. The etymological meaning of both the words thus comes to be that proposition which carries forward an attribute into connection with the subject. The *upanaya* rendered ‘application’ is the logical equivalent of the minor premise in which the middle term is predicated of the minor term, i.e., the subject. Literally, the word *upasaṁhāra* and *upanaya* mean simply an instrument of predication and in terms of the definition given, it stands for a proposition in which the probans (i.e., the middle term) is predicated of the subject, the minor term.

33. These five members are rather parts of one (self-contained) proposition, each member contributing a quota of meaning which stands in necessary relation (with what is conveyed by others). The five corroborative statements (alluded to in 2. 1. 10.) relate to these five members respectively. None of the five members can generate an unexceptionable conviction of the truth of their meaning, if they happen to be subject to defects, either suspected or erroneously superimposed. It is, therefore, necessary that each of these members – thesis and the rest should be supplemented by corroborative statements in which the likely charges should be anticipated and resolved. It follows, therefore, that in pursuance of the requirement of the pupils, a syllogism consisting of ten members should be employed (in order to disarm even the faintest suggestion of doubt). (15)

34. *iha śāstre yeṣāṃ lakṣaṇam uktam te tallakṣaṇābhāve tadābhāsāḥ suprasiddhā eva / yathā pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇābhāve saṁśayaviparyayānādhyavasāyāḥ pramāṇābhāsāḥ, saṁśayādilakṣaṇābhāve saṁśayādyābhāsāḥ, pratyakṣalakṣaṇābhāve pratyakṣābhāsam, paroḥṣāntargatānām smṛtyādinām svasvalakṣaṇābhāve tattadābhāsatetyādi / evaṁ hetūnām apī svalakṣaṇābhāve hetvābhāsatā sujñānaiva / kevalam hetvābhāsānām saṅkhyāniyamāḥ prativyaktiniyataṁ lakṣaṇam ca neṣatkarapratipattīti tallakṣaṇārtham āha –*

***asiddhaviruddhānaikāntikās trayo hetvābhāsāḥ ||16||***

34. The topics which have been defined in this treatise (should be understood and used in terms of their respective definitions). In default of any constituent element of these definitions, they are customarily regarded as sham simulations. Thus, for example, on account of the lack of the characteristics of valid cognition in general, doubt, error, and indecision are called sham simulations of valid cognition; in the absence of the characteristic of doubt and the like, the cognitions in question are called sham simulations of doubt, etc.; in the absence of the characteristic of perceptual cognition, it is called a sham simulation of perceptual cognition; likewise, in the defection of the relevant characteristics, memory and the like included under the head of indirect cognitions are designated as sham simulants. Similarly, when a probans lacks in its essential characteristic, it can be easily detected as a sham dissembler of the same, i.e., as a fallacy. In view

of the consideration that the determinate number and the characteristics of individual fallacies in particular do not lend themselves to easy apprehension, the author gives (a list of) the fallacies with a view to the formulation of their definitions.

(Aph.) The fallacies of reasons are three, viz., non-existent, contradictory and inconclusive. (16)

35. *ahetavo hetuvad ābhāsamānāḥ 'hetvābhāsāḥ' asiddhādayaḥ / yadyapi sādhanadoṣā evaite aduṣṭe sādhane tadabhāvāt tathāpi sādhanābhīdhāyake hetāv upacārāt pūrvācāryair abhihitās tatas tatprasiddhibādhām anāśrayadbhir asmābhir api hetudoṣatvenaivocyanta iti /*

35. The reasons which are not probantia proper, but which do have the deceptive appearance of real probantia are called fallacious reasons, such as non-existent and the rest. Though the defects actually belong to probantia (and not to reasons) because they do not occur if the probantia are valid, yet these defects are transferred by extension of meaning to the reasons which are but statements of probantia and they have been designated by previous writers as defects of reasons. We have not thought fit to make a break with the tradition and have also designated them as defects of reason (as a tribute to the custom).

36. *'trayaḥ' iti saṅkhyāntaravyavacchedārtham / tena kālātīta-prakaraṇasamayor vyavacchedaḥ / tatra kālātītasya pakṣadoṣeṣv antarbhāvaḥ / "pratyakṣāgamabādhitakarmanirdeśānantaraprayuktaḥ kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ" iti hi tasya lakṣaṇam iti, yathā anuṣṇas tejo'vayavī kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavad iti / prakaraṇasamas tu na sambhavaty eva; na hy asti sambhavo yathoktalakṣaṇe 'numāne prayukte 'dūṣite vā 'numānāntarasya / yat tūḍāharaṇam – anityaḥ śabdaḥ pakṣa-sapakṣayor anyataratvāt ity ekenokte dvitīya āha – nityaḥ śabdaḥ pakṣa-sapakṣayor anyataratvād iti / tad atīvāsāmpratam / ko hi caturaṅgasabhāyām vādī pratīvādī vaivaṁvidham asambaddham anunmatto 'bhidadhīti ? ||16||*

36. The number 'three' is expressly stated for rebutting any other possible number. It is for this reason that the so-called fallacies viz., contradictory and countervailed reasons are excluded from the category of fallacy of reason. Of these two, the contradicted reason is easily subsumed under defects of thesis – (a fact which is apparent from the definition and

illustration given as follows) : The reason employed after the assertion of a predicate which is contradicted by preception or verbal evidence is called contradicted (literally mistimed on account of the absence of the predicate at the time of the assertion of the reason). This is the definition, and it is illustrated by the following argument : The mass of fire is unwarm, since it is a product, just like a jar (which is unwarm). As regards countervailed reason, it is not possible at all. There is not the remotest possibility of another inference, so long as the inference as defined before stands as employed or unrefuted. An illustration is given of it as follows : Suppose one asserts "Sound is impermanent, being either a subject or a homologue" and immediately the second man retorts "Sound is eternal being either a subject or homologue". But this is the height of impropriety. Who can make such incoherent assertions in a council consisting of four parties (the president, the umpire, the proponent and the opponent) – be he the proponent or the opponent – unless he has taken leave of his senses ? (16)

37. *tatrāsiddhasya lakṣaṇam āha –*

*nāsann aniścitasattvo vā 'nyathānupapanna iti sattvasyāsiddhau  
sandehe vā 'siddhaḥ ||17||*

37. Now the definition of the fallacy called 'non-existent probans' is stated below :

(Aph.) The non-existent probans arises from lack of proof, or doubt of its existence, according as the reason assigned is found to be non-existent and lacking in necessary concomitance, or lacking in definite proof of its existence as well as necessary concomitance. (17)

38. 'asan' avidyamāno 'nānyathānupapannaḥ' iti sattvasyāsiddhau 'asiddhaḥ' hetvābhāsaḥ svarūpāsiddha ity arthaḥ / yathā anityaḥ śabdaś cākṣuṣatvād iti / apakṣadharmatvād ayam asiddha iti na mantavyam ity āha – 'nānyathānupapannaḥ' iti / anyathānupapattirūpahetulakṣaṇavirahād ayam asiddho nāpakṣadharmatvāt / nahi pakṣadharmatvaṁ hetor lakṣaṇaṁ tadabhāve 'py anyathānupapattibalād hetutvopapatter ity uktaprāyam / Bhaṭṭo 'py āha –

"pitroś ca brāhmaṇatvena putrabrāhmaṇatānumā /  
sarvalokaprasiddhā na pakṣadharmam apekṣate //" iti

38. The fallacy called 'non-existent probans' arises when there is no proof of its existence, that is to say, when the reason is found to be non-existent and to lack in necessary concomitance; in other words, when the reason is found to be non-existent *eo ipso*. "Word is perishable, since it is visible" is a typical instance. It must not be supposed that it is called non-existent, since it is not a necessary attribute of the subject and so the author adds the phrase 'found to lack in necessary concomitance' (to rebut the prevailing misconception). The reason is 'non-existent' not because it is not the attribute of the subject, but because it lacks in necessary concomitance which is the (sole and sufficient) characteristic of valid probans. It is not the necessary characteristic of a probans that it must belong to the subject as its attribute. That an attribute can function as a valid probans, even in spite of the lack of its existence in the subject provided it is armed with necessary concomitance has been sufficiently indicated. As has been observed by Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila) also : "It is a matter of common knowledge that the son is inferred to be a Brāhmaṇa on the ground of the Brāhmaṇahood of his parents and for this the subsistence of the probans in the subject is not required."

39. *tathā 'anīścitasattvaḥ' sandigdhasattvaḥ 'nānyathānupapannaḥ' iti sattvasya sandehe 'py asiddho hetvābhāsaḥ sandigdhasiddha ity arthaḥ / yathā bāṣpādibhāvena sandihamānā dhūmalatāgnisiddhāv upadiśyamānā, yathā cātmanaḥ siddhāv api sarvagatatve sādhye sarvatropalabhyamāna-guṇatvam, pramāṇābhāvād iti ||17||*

39. Likewise, a reason 'which is lacking in definite proof of its existence', that is to say, whose existence is subject to doubt and (also) is 'lacking in necessary concomitance' is also a case of the fallacy called 'non-existent probans' even when its existence is subject to doubt. It is also called 'doubted-cum-non-existent'. Thus, for instance, (this fallacy occurs when) a rising column of smoke doubted to be stream of vapour is adduced to establish fire, or when the ubiquity of the soul which, though by itself is a proved fact, is sought to be proved on the ground of 'its having a quality perceived everywhere', (the fallacy being) due to the fact that there is no proof (in support of the truth of the reasons advanced). (17)

40. *asiddhaprabhedān āha –*

*vādirativādyubhayabhedāc caitadbhedāḥ ||18||*

40. The author now enunciates the varieties of non-existent reasons.  
(Aph.) The different varieties of this fallacy arise from the difference of the proponent, opponent, and both (combined). (18)

41. 'vādī' pūrvapakṣasthitāḥ 'prativādī' uttarapakṣasthitāḥ ubhayaṃ dvāv eva vādiprativādinau / tadbhedād asiddhasya 'bhedaḥ' / tatra vādyasiddho yathā pariṇāmī śabda utpattimattvāt / ayaṃ Sāṅkhyasya svayaṃ vādino 'siddhaḥ,' tanmate utpattimattvasyānabhyupetatvāt, nāsad utpadyate nāpi sad vinaśyaty utpāda-vinaśayor āvirbhāvatirobhāvarūpatvād iti tatsiddhāntāt / cetanās taravaḥ sarvatvagapaharaṇe maraṇāt / atra maraṇaṃ vijñānendriyāyurnirodhalakṣaṇaṃ taruṣu Bauddhasya prativādinō 'siddham' / ubhayaśiddhas tu cākṣuṣatvam uktam eva / evaṃ sandigdhasiddho 'pi vādiprativādyubhayaḥ' | 18 |

41. The proponent is one who propounds a thesis. The opponent is the party that gives the reply (in opposition) and 'both' stands for the proponent and the opponent combined. The difference of non-existent reason arises from the difference of the parties concerned (from whose standpoint the lack of evidence is judged). The instance of non-existent from the point of view of the proponent is furnished by the proposition : Sound is liable to change, since it has origination. The reason is non-existent when the Sāṅkhya himself is its proponent, inasmuch as he does not admit the truth of origination. His philosophical position is that a nonentity does not come into being and an entity does not cease to be, and origination and cessation are cases of manifestation and unmanifestation (and so origination and cessation in their ordinary acceptance are impossible phenomena). Or, take the proposition (asserted by the Jaina) : "Trees are animate beings, since they meet with death if they are stripped of the whole of their bark". The reason (assigned here, viz.,) 'death' which connotes interception of life, sense organ, and consciousness is non-existent in trees with regard to a Buddhist (who is the) opponent here. As for the case of reason with regard to both, the instance of 'visibility' that has been cited before will serve as an illustration. (The consideration of the first type of 'non-existent' based on definite lack of proof is now finished). And as for the doubted-cum-non-existent variety, it too should be understood to be

threefold on the basis of the difference of proponent, opponent and both (as explained before). (18)

42. *nanv anye 'pi viśeṣyāsiddhādayo hetvābhāsāḥ kaiścid iṣyante te kasmān noktā ity āha –*

*viśeṣyāsiddhādīnām eṣv evāntarbhāvaḥ ||19||*

42. (But a question may be raised). There are other cases of fallacies called non-existent in respect of the substantive and the like which are endorsed by some logicians, but why are they not specified here ? In reply to this (charge of omission), the author observes :

(Aph.) The so-called fallacies 'non-existent in respect of the substantive' and the like are included necessarily in these (varieties noticed above). (19)

43. *'eṣv eva' vādirativādyubhayāsiddheṣv eva / tatra viśeṣyāsiddhādaya udāhriyante / viśeṣyāsiddho yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ sāmānyavattve sati cākṣuṣatvāt / viśeṣaṇāsiddho yathā anityaḥ śabdaś cākṣuṣatve sati sāmānya-viśeṣavattvāt / bhāgāsiddho yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvāt / āśrayāsiddho yathā asti pradhānam viśvapariṇāmitvāt / āśrayaikadeśāsiddho yathā nityāḥ pradhāna-puruṣeśvarāḥ akṛtakatvāt / vyarthaviśeṣyāsiddho yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatve sati sāmānyavattvāt / vyarthaviśeṣaṇāsiddho yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ sāmānyavattve sati kṛtakatvāt / sandigdaviśeṣyāsiddho yathā adyāpi rāgādiyuktaḥ Kapilaḥ puruṣatve sati adyāpy anutpanna-tattvajñānatvāt / sandigdaviśeṣaṇāsiddho yathā adyāpi rāgādiyuktaḥ Kapilaḥ sarvadā tattvajñānarahitatve sati puruṣatvāt ityādi / ete 'siddhabhedā yadānyataravādyasiddhatvena vivakṣyante tadā vādyasiddhāḥ prativādyasiddhā vā bhavanti / yadobhayavādyasiddhatvena vivakṣyante tadobhayāsiddhā bhavanti ||19||*

43. 'Necessarily in these (varieties)' means 'in the non-existent in respect of the proponent, opponent and both'. Now, the cases of non-existent substantive and the like are being illustrated here. "Sound is perishable, since it has visibility while possessed of a universal" is a case of non-existent substantive (since the attribute of visibility used as the substantive is non-existent). The case of non-existent adjective is illustrated by the following proposition : "Sound is perishable being possessed of a specific universal accompanied with visibility" (the adjective 'accompanied, etc.' is

non-existent). The variety called 'non-existent in respect of a part (of the subject)' is illustrated in the syllogism : "Sound is perishable, being the product of an effort", (there being cases of sound such as a clap of thunder which is not the product of a volitional effort, and thus the reason is true only of a part and not of the other part). The following is a case of 'non-existent subject' : Primordial matter is existent, since it is the prius of the evolution of the whole world (since the existence of such principle is not endorsed by philosophers other than the Sāṅkhyas). The case of 'non-existent part of a subject' is the following argument (when advanced by a Sāṅkhya or a Naiyāyika as the former does not believe in God and the latter in Primordial Matter) : Primordial Matter, Self and God are eternal verities being ungenerated. The case of non-existent because of a superfluous substantive is the following : "Sound is perishable being produced-cum-possessed-of-universal"(since the substantive element of 'being possessed of universal' is a superfluity as the probandum is proved even without it). The case of non-existent because of a superfluous adjective is as follows : "Sound is perishable being possessed-of-universal-cum-produced" (since the adjectival element 'being possessed of universal' is superfluous inasmuch as the substantive alone establishes the probandum). The fallacy called 'non-existent because of doubtful substantive' is illustrated as follows : "Kapila is still subject to attachment and the like, because he is a human being and still unblessed with the knowledge of ultimate reality"(since the clause 'still unblessed etc.' is not true from the point of view of the proponent who is a Sāṅkhya). The case of non-existent because of a doubtful adjective is the following argument : "Kapila is still subject to attachment, etc., since he is a human being destitute of the ultimate truth for all the time" (since the adjectival phrase 'destitute etc.' is an object of doubt). These varieties of non-existent reason turn out to be cases of non-existent from the point of view of the proponent or the opponent according as the reasons concerned happen to be non-existent with regard to the proponent or the opponent. When they are so asserted to be non-existent by both the parties, they transpire to be cases of non-existent with regard to both. (19)

44. *viruddhasya lakṣaṇam āha –*

*viparītanīyamo 'nyathaivopapadyamāno viruddhaḥ ||20||*



44. The author next enunciates the definition of the fallacy called contradictory.

(Aph.) The contradictory is a reason which is necessarily of the opposite concomitance and is thus possible in the absence (of the probandum) as a matter of necessity. (20)

45. *‘viparītaḥ’ yathoktād viparyasto ‘niyamaḥ’ avinābhāvo yasya sa tathā, tasyaivopadarśanam ‘anyathaivopapadyamānaḥ’ iti / yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvāt, parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātavāc chayanāśānā-dyaṅgavad ity atrāsaṁhatapārārthye sādhye cakṣurādīnāṁ saṁhatatvaṁ viruddham / buddhimatpūrvakaṁ kṣityādi kāryatvāt ity atrāsarīrasarvajña-kartṛpūrvakatve sādhye kāryatvaṁ viruddhasādhanād viruddham /*

45. ‘Opposite’ means contrary to what has been stated (to be the nature of necessary concomitance). ‘Concomitance’ means necessary relation. The reason which has this (opposite concomitance is called contradictory). The phrase ‘possible in the absence’ is only an explication of this (characteristic). For instance, “Sound is eternal because it is a product” (is an illustration of the contradictory since the reason ‘being a product’ is concomitant with the opposite of the probandum, viz., eternal. A product is necessarily perishable and so can never be eternal). Another instance (of the fallacy is found in the argument of Sāṅkhya, viz.,) “The organ of vision, and the like exist for the purpose of an other since they are composite bodies, like bed, articles of food and such other subservient things.” Now in this argument ‘subservience to a non-composite entity’ is what is sought to be proved. But (the reason advanced, viz.,) the composite constitution of the visual organ, etc., transpires to be contradictory (of the intended probandum since it proves the opposite of it, viz., that it is subservient to another composite thing, viz., the embodied person). “Earth and the like have an intelligent agent as their cause since they are products” (is an argument of the Naiyāyika which is another instance of) the contradictory reason because ‘being a product’ proves the very opposite of the intended probandum, viz., the fact of being created by a disembodied omniscient agent (in view of the fact that all intelligent agents are found to be embodied persons and we have no experience of a single instance of a pure disembodied spirit functioning as the creator of any thing).

46. *anena ye 'nyair anye viruddhā udāhṛtās te 'pi saṅgrhītāḥ / yathā sati sapakṣe catvāro bhedaḥ / pakṣavipakṣavyāpakō yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvāt / pakṣavyāpakō vipakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ sāmānyavattve saty asmadādibāhyendriyagrāhyatvāt / pakṣaikadeśavṛttir vipakṣavyāpakō yathā anityā pṛthvī kṛtakatvāt / pakṣavipakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvāt / asati sapakṣe catvāro viruddhāḥ / pakṣavipakṣavyāpakō yathā ākāśaviśeṣaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ prameyatvāt / pakṣavyāpakō vipakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā ākāśaviśeṣaguṇaḥ śabdo bāhyendriyagrāhyatvāt / pakṣaikadeśavṛttir vipakṣavyāpakō yathā ākāśaviśeṣaguṇaḥ śabdo 'padātmakatvāt / pakṣavipakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā ākāśaviśeṣaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvāt / eṣu ca caturṣu viruddhatā, pakṣaikadeśavṛttiṣu caturṣu punar asiddhatā viruddhatā cety ubhayasamāveśa iti ||20||*

46. The other varieties of the contradictory which have been (set forth and) illustrated by other logicians are also comprehended by this (definition within its scope). Thus there are four varieties when a homologue is available. (1) When the reason is includent of the subject and the heterologue, e.g., "Word is eternal, since it is a product" (the reason 'being a product' occurs in the subject 'word' and perishable entities such as a jar – constituting the entire sphere of the heterologue). (2) One which covers (the whole of) the subject and a part of the heterologue e.g., "Sound is eternal being possessed of a universal and being cognisable by an external sense-organ possessed by us" (as the reason occurs in the subject 'sound' and also in such perishable entities as the jar, though not in subtle composite substances like diads which are not cognisable by an external sense-organ). (3) One which exists in a part of the subject but in the whole of the heterologue, e.g., "Earth is eternal since it is a product" (here the reason 'being a product' exists in all composite bodies of earth but not in the atoms of earth and thus is found to exist only in a part of the denotation of the subject. It embraces, on the other hand, the whole extension of the heterologue and is thus contradictory). (4) One which exists only in a part of the subject and of the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is eternal being a consequence of effort" (the reason here applies to such sounds as produced by animal agency but not to natural phenomena like the noise of a river current

or thunder and so the reason is partially true of the subject. It is, again, partially true of the heterologue, since not all produced phenomena are consequences of volitional effort, viz., a lightning-flash which though perishable is a purely natural occurrence). There are four varieties of the contradictory in the absence of the homologue. (1) A reason which occurs in the whole of the subject and the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is a specific quality of ether, since it is knowable (an attribute which belongs to the subject in its entire denotation and to the whole extent of the heterologue which in the present case is everything other than the specific quality of ether). (2) Which belongs to the whole of the subject, but to the part of the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is a specific quality of ether being cognisable by an external sense-organ" (since 'sound' as a class is certainly audible and hence the reason belongs to the whole of the subject without exception, but as regards the heterologues represented by everything other than sound which is exclusively specific quality of ether, they are not all cognisable by an external organ such, for instance, as the magnitude of ether). (3) A reason which exists only in a part of the subject and the whole of the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is a specific quality of ether, since it is not an inflected word" (that is, a sound which has a meaning. The reason holds good only of a part of the subject, viz., unmeaning sounds only but belongs to the whole of the heterologue which is not sound). (4) A reason which exists only in a part of the subject and of the heterologue, e.g., "Sound is a specific quality of ether, being a consequence of effort" (since all sounds are not consequence of effort, the reason is partially true of the subject, and since also whatever is not a specific quality of ether, that is to say, the whole class of the heterologue, is not the consequence of effort, the reason exists only in a part of the latter). In four cases (out of these eight) the contradictory is the exclusive fallacy. But in the other four cases where the reason belongs to a part of the subject there is a combination of both the fallacies, viz., the non-existent and the contradictory. (20)

47. *anaikāntikasya lakṣaṇam āha –*

*nīyamasyāsiddhau sandehe vā 'nyathāpy upapadyamāno*

*'naikāntikaḥ ||21||*

47. The author now states the definition of the 'inconclusive'.

(Aph.) The inconclusive reason is one which is possible even in the absence of the probandum and occurs when the necessary concomitance is either non-existent or subject to doubt. (21)

48. 'niyamah' avinābhāvas tasya 'asiddhau' 'anaikāntikah' yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ prameyatvāt, prameyatvaṃ nitye 'py ākāśādāv astīti / sandehe yathā asarvajñāḥ kaścid rāgādimān vā vaktṛtvāt / svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭābhyāṃ hi sarvajñatvavītarāgatvābhyāṃ na vaktṛtvasya virodhaḥ siddhaḥ, na ca rāgādikāryaṃ vacanam iti sandigdho 'nvayaḥ / ye cānye 'nyair anaikāntikabheda udāhṛtās ta uktalakṣaṇa evāntarbhavanti / pakṣatrayavyāpakō yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ prameyatvāt pakṣasapakṣavyāpakō vipakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā gaur ayaṃ viśāṇitvāt / pakṣavipakṣavyāpakāḥ sapakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā nāyaṃ gauḥ viśāṇitvāt / pakṣavyāpakāḥ sapakṣavipakṣaikadeśavṛttir yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ pratyakṣatvāt / pakṣaikadeśavṛttiḥ sapakṣavipakṣavyāpakō yathā na dravyāṇy ākāśa-kāla-dig-ātma-manāṃsi kṣaṇikaviśeṣaguṇarahitatvāt / pakṣavipakṣaikadeśavṛttiḥ sapakṣavyāpī yathā na dravyāṇi dik-kāla-manāṃsi amūrtatvāt / pakṣasapakṣaikadeśavṛttir vipakṣavyāpī yathā dravyāṇi dik-kāla-manāṃsi amūrtatvāt / pakṣatrayaikadeśavṛttir yathā anityā pṛthvī pratyakṣatvād iti ||21||

48. 'Necessary concomitance' means absence of existence of the probans without (the probandum) and when it is non-existent, the reason is 'inconclusive'. For instance, in the proposition "Sound is perishable, since it is knowable", the reason 'to be knowable' (is inconclusive since it) exists even in such eternal entities as ether. The same fallacy, again, occurs when necessary concomitance is subject to doubt. The proposition "X is non-omniscient, or possessed of attachment and the like, since he is a speaker" may be (cited as) an example of the above. The concomitance in agreement (between speakerhood and non-omniscience, etc.,) is subject to doubt inasmuch as the incompatibility of 'being a speaker' with 'omniscience' or 'absence of attachment' which are by their nature placed beyond (the range of perceptual cognition) cannot be established (by intuition or by inference since) speech is not the effect of attachment and the like. The other varieties of the 'inconclusive reason' which have been cited by some logicians are necessarily included under the 'Inconclusive' as defined by us. Thus, for

instance, (1) the reason which covers the three terms (*viz.*, the subject, the homologue and the heterologue), e.g., “Sound is perishable since it is knowable” (the quality of ‘being knowable’ which is the reason adduced belongs to the subject ‘sound’, the homologue ‘jar’ and the heterologue ‘space’, ‘time’, etc.). (2) Which covers the subject and the homologue and belongs to a part of the heterologue, e.g., “It is a cow, since it is possessed of horns” (the reason ‘possession of horns’ is a quality of the subject, of the homologue ‘other cows’, and of a part of the heterologue ‘a buffalo’, though not of the ‘horse’ which is another part of the same). (3) Which covers the subject and the heterologue and belongs to part of the homologue, e.g., “It (the goat) is not a cow, since it is possessed of horns,” (here ‘possession of horns’ is a quality of the subject – the goat as a class, and of the heterologue, not-not-cow, i.e., the cow as a class, and it belongs only to a part of the homologue, *viz.*, not-cow, i.e., horse, buffalo and the like of which buffalo and the like are possessed of horns while the horse and the like are not). (4) That which exists in the whole of the subject and in a part only of the homologue and the heterologue, e.g., “Sound is perishable since it is perceivable” (here the quality of ‘being perceivable’ exists in the whole of the subject – sound as a class, but belongs only to a part of the homologue, *viz.*, the jar, though not to diads which are also included in the homologue ‘being perishable.’ It is also found in a part of the heterologue – eternal entities such as universal which is perceived in a perceivable substratum, and not in space, etc., which are also included in the heterologue ‘being eternal’). (5) That which belongs to only a part of the subject and to the whole of the homologue and the heterologue, e.g., “Ether, time, space, self and mind are not substances, since they are destitute of specific qualities which are momentary.” (Here the reason belongs only to a part of the subject, that is, to all the terms barring the self and ether which are possessed of momentary specific qualities, *viz.*, pleasure, pain, etc., and sound respectively. It covers the whole of the homologue, *viz.*, non-substances, that is, all the categories other than substance, which do not possess any quality – specific or generic. The reason also belongs to all cases of the heterologue, *viz.*, the four substances – earth, water, air and fire which are possessed of specific qualities but not momentary specific

qualities). (6) That which exists in a part of the subject and the heterologue, but in the whole of the homologue, e.g., "Space, time and mind are not substances since they are destitute of limited dimensions." (Here the quality, viz., 'being destitute of limited dimension' belongs only to a part of the subject, viz., space and time and not mind which is possessed of atomic dimension according to the Naiyāyika. It again belongs only to a part of the heterologue, viz., earth, water, etc., though not to self. The reason covers the whole of the homologue, that is, non-substances, such as quality, action, etc.) (7) That which exists in the whole of the heterologue, but only in a part of the subject and the homologue, e.g., "Space, time and mind are substances, since they are destitute of limited dimension." (Here the reason belongs to space and time but not to mind – the subject. It again belongs only to a part of the homologue, viz., self and ether, though not to earth and the rest. The reason covers the whole of the heterologue, viz., non-substances such as quality and the like). (8) That which exists only in a part of all the terms, e.g., "Earth is perishable, being an object of perception". (Here the reason belongs to earth which is not atomic, only to a part of the homologue – water and the like other than atomic, and to a part of the heterologue, such as universal, though not to ether, space and the like). (21)

49. *udāharaṇadoṣān āha –*

***sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyām aṣṭāv aṣṭau dṛṣṭāntābhāsāḥ ||22||***

49. The author now states the defects of illustration :

(Aph.) **False examples are eight in number in each class according as it is based upon similarity and dissimilarity. (22)**

50. *parārthānumānaprastāvād udāharaṇadoṣā evaite dṛṣṭāntaprabhavatvāt tu dṛṣṭāntadoṣā ity ucyante / dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādharmaivaidharmyabhedena dvividhatvāt pratyekam 'aṣṭāv aṣṭau' dṛṣṭāntavad ābhāsamānāḥ 'dṛṣṭāntābhāsāḥ' bhavanti ||22||*

50. Though in conformity with the context of syllogistic inference they should be necessarily designated as the defects of illustration, yet they are called defects of example, since they are derived from the examples (proper). Examples again are of two kinds according as they are based upon similarity and dissimilarity and each one of these (two classes) has got eight false examples which have merely the semblance of examples proper. (22)

51. *tān evodāharati vibhajati ca –*

*amūrtatvena nitye śabde sādhye karma-paramāṇu-ghaṭāḥ  
sādhyasāadhanobhayavikalāḥ ||23||*

51. He now illustrates and classifies these very (false examples).

(Aph.) When sound is sought to be proved to be eternal on the ground of the lack of finite magnitude, action, atom and jar (would be false examples) being destitute of probandum, probans and both respectively. (23)

52. *nityaḥ śabdaḥ amūrtatvād ity asmin prayoge karmādayo yathā-  
saṅkhyam sādhyādivikalāḥ / tatra karmavad iti sādhyavikalāḥ, anityatvāt  
karmaṇaḥ / paramāṇuvad iti sādhanavikalāḥ, mūrtatvāt paramāṇūnām /  
ghaṭavad iti sādhyasāadhanobhayavikalāḥ, anityatvān mūrtatvāc ca ghaṭasyeti /  
iti trayaḥ sādharmaḍṛṣṭāntābhāsāḥ ||23||*

*vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇukarmākāśāḥ sādhyādyavyatirekiṇaḥ ||24||*

52. In the syllogism “Sound is eternal, since it is destitute of definite magnitude”, action and the rest (i.e. atom and jar) as examples will be found to be destitute of the probandum and the rest (i.e., probans, and both probans and probandum) respectively. Thus ‘like action’ (if stated as an example) would be one destitute of the probandum since action is non-eternal; (if the example be stated as) ‘like an atom’, it would be one without probans, since atoms are possessed of a finite magnitude; the example ‘like a jar’ would be destitute of both probans and probandum, since a jar is both non-eternal and possessed of finite magnitude. These three are typical cases of false examples in agreement. (23)

(Aph.) In respect of opposition (concomitance in difference) atom, action and ether are false examples, being not in opposition with the probandum and the rest (viz., probans and both). (24)

53. *nityaḥ śabdaḥ amūrtatvād ity asminn eva prayoge ‘paramāṇu-  
karmākāśāḥ’ sādhyasāadhanobhayāvyatirekiṇo ḍṛṣṭāntābhāsā bhavanti / yan  
nityam na bhavati tad amūrtam api na bhavati yathā paramāṇur iti  
sādhyāvyatirekī, nityatvāt paramāṇūnām / yathā karmeti sādhanāvyāvṛttaḥ,  
amūrtatvāt karmaṇaḥ / yathākāśam ity ubhayāvyāvṛttaḥ, nityatvād  
amūrtatvāc cākāśasya iti traya eva vaidharmyaḍṛṣṭāntābhāsāḥ ||24||*

53. In the very syllogism (cited also before) “Sound is eternal being destitute of finite magnitude”, atom, action and ether are false examples being not in opposition with the probandum, probans and both. Whatever is not eternal is not destitute of finite magnitude (to put it in the positive form : “Whatever is perishable is possessed of finite magnitude”), for instance (in opposition), an atom”. The example (viz., atom) is not possessed of concomitance in opposition with the probandum (in other words, is not concomitant with the opposite of the probandum), inasmuch as atoms are eternal. Were action cited (as the opposite example) it would be one lacking the absence of the probans since action is destitute of finite magnitude (and not lacking in the probans as it should have been). Were ether (cited as an example in opposition it would be one) lacking the absence of both (the probans and probandum), for ether is both eternal and bereft of finite magnitude. Thus these three are the types of false examples in opposition. (24)

54. *tathā* –

*vacanād rāge rāgān maraṇadharmakiñcijjñatvayoḥ  
sandigdhasādhyādyanvavyatirekā rathyāpurūṣādayaḥ ||25||*

54. Likewise,

(Aph.) When attachment is sought to be established on the ground of speech, and ‘mortality’ and ‘limitation of knowledge’ on the ground of attachment, the man-in-the-street and the like will be examples of doubtful concomitance in agreement and in difference in respect of the probandum and the rest (viz., the probans and both). (25)

55. *sandigdhasādhyasāadhanobhayānvayāḥ sandigdhasādhyasādhano-  
bhayavyatirekāś ca trayas trayo drṣṭāntābhāsā bhavanti / ke ity āha –  
‘rathyāpurūṣādayaḥ’ / kasmīn sādhye ?/ ‘rāge’ ‘maraṇadharmakiñcijjñatvayoḥ’  
ca / kasmād ity āha – ‘vacanāt’ ‘rāgāt’ ca / tatra sandigdhasādhyadharmānvayo  
yathā vivakṣitaḥ puruṣaviśeṣo rāgī vacanād rathyāpurūṣavat / sandigdha-  
sāadhanadharmānvayo yathā maraṇadharmā ‘yam rāgāt rathyāpurūṣavat /  
sandigdhobhayadharmānvayo yathā kiñcijjñāno ‘yam rāgāt rathyāpurūṣavat iti /  
eṣu paracetovṛttinām duradhigamatvena sādharmanyadrṣṭānte rathyāpurūṣe  
rāga-kiñcijjñatvayoḥ sattvaṁ sandigdham / tathā sandigdhasādhyavyatireko  
yathā rāgī vacanāt rathyāpurūṣavat / sandigdhasāadhanavyatireko yathā*



*marañadharmā 'yam rāgāt rathyāpuruṣavat / sandigdhobhayavyatireko yathā kiñcijjño 'yaṃ rāgāt rathyāpuruṣavat / eṣu pūrvavat paracetovrtter duranvayatvād vaidharmyadṛṣṭānte rathyāpuruṣe rāgakiñcijjñatvayor asattvaṃ sandigdham iti ||25||*

55. Three types of false examples are possible in each case according as the presence of the probandum, probans or both is subject to doubt or the absence of the probandum, probans and both is subject to doubt (in the examples concerned). What are examples, pray ? (The answer is) the man-in-the-street and the like. In respect of what probandum ? (The answer is) in respect of attachment on the one hand and 'mortality' and 'limitation of knowledge' on the other. On what logical grounds, pray ? (The answer is) on the ground of speech and on the ground of attachment (respectively). Of these, the example of doubtful concomitance with the probandum in agreement is "The person under contemplation is subject to attachment (to worldly things), as he makes a speech like the man-in-the-street". (Here it is doubtful whether the man-in-the-street is actually possessed of attachment because speech is not necessarily concomitant with attachment). The example of doubtful concomitance of the probans in agreement is "The person in question is subject to mortality being possessed of attachment like the man-in-the-street." (It is doubtful whether the man-in-the-street is possessed of attachment). The example of doubtful concomitance of both in agreement is "The person concerned possesses limited knowledge since he is possessed of attachment like the man-in-the-street". In all these arguments the example in agreement is the man-in-the-street, but the presence of attachment and limited knowledge is a matter of doubt since the mental conditions of another person are not easily accessible to an outsider. Similarly, the example of doubtful concomitance in difference in respect of the probandum is "X is a prey to attachment since he makes a speech, unlike the man-in-the-street (who happens to be mute)". The example of doubtful concomitance in difference in respect of the probans is "X is subject to mortality since he is possessed of attachment, unlike the man-in-the-street". The example of doubtful concomitance in difference in respect of the both (the probans and the probandum) is "X is a man of limited knowledge, since he is subject to attachment, unlike the man-in-the-street". In all the latter syllogisms just as in

the previous ones, the non-existence of attachment and limited knowledge in the man-in-the-street – an example in opposition – is a matter of doubt because of the inaccessibility of the mind of another person. (25)

56. *tathā* –

*viparītānvayavyatirekau* ||26||

56. Likewise,

(Aph.) The two cases of reversed concomitance in agreement and difference. (26)

57. ‘*viparītānvayaḥ*’ ‘*viparītavyatirekaḥ*’ *ca dr̥ṣṭāntābhāṣau bhavataḥ* / *tatra viparītānvayo yathā yat kṛtakam tad anityam iti vaktavye yad anityam tat kṛtakam yathā ghaṭa ity āha* / *viparītavyatireko yathā anityatvābhāve na bhavaty eva kṛtakatvam iti vaktavye kṛtakatvābhāve na bhavaty evānityatvam yathā ākāśa ity āha* / *sādhanaadharmānuvādena sādhyadharmasya vidhānam ity anvayaḥ* / *sādhyadharmavyāvṛtṭyanuvādena sādhanadharmavyāvṛtti-vidhānam iti vyatirekaḥ* / *tayor anyathābhāve viparītatvam* / *yad āha* –

“*sādhyānuvādāl līngasya viparītānvayo vidhiḥ* /

*hetvabhāve tv asatsādhyam vyatirekaviparyaye* //” *iti* ||26||

*apradarśitānvayavyatirekau* ||27||

57. There are again two false examples, viz., of reversed concomitance in agreement and reversed concomitance in difference. Of these, the reversed concomitance in agreement is illustrated in the following situation : when the concomitance in agreement is stated (inversely) in the form “Whatever is perishable is a product such as a jar” instead of the legitimate form “Whatever is a product is perishable”. (The fact is that the proposition “All products are perishable” is true, but the converse is false). The case of reversed concomitance in difference is illustrated when the universal proposition is stated as “Whatever is not a product is not perishable, for example, ether” instead of the legitimate form “Whatever is not perishable is not a product”. Legitimate form of the statement of concomitance in agreement is one in which the probans is given as the subject and the probandum as the predicate. Legitimate form of the statement of concomitance in difference is one in which the absence of the probandum is the subject and the absence of the probans is the predicate. The fallacy of the reversed example occurs when the order of assertion is reversed. As has been observed : “When the

probandum is made the subject and the probans the predicate, it gives rise to the fallacy of example called reversal of concomitance in agreement. And the fallacy of reversal of concomitance in difference occurs when the absence of the probans is made the subject and the absence of the probandum is made the predicate. (26)

(Aph.) The other two cases are cases of undemonstrated concomitance in agreement and in difference. (27)

58. 'apradarśitānvayaḥ' 'apradarśitavyatirekaḥ' ca dṛṣṭāntābhāsau / etau ca pramāṇasyānupadarśanād bhavato na tu vīpsāsarvāvadhāraṇa-padānām aprayogāt, satsv api teṣv asati pramāṇe tayoṛ asiddher iti / sādhyavikalasādhana-vikalobhayavikalāḥ, sandigdhasādhyānvayasandigdhasādhana-nvayasandigdhobhayānvayāḥ, viparītānvayaḥ, apradarśitānvayaś cety aṣṭau sādharṇyadrṣṭāntābhāsāḥ / sādhyāvyāvṛttasādhana-vyāvṛttobhayāvyāvṛttāḥ, sandigdhasādhyavyāvṛttisandigdhasādhana-vyāvṛttisandigdhobhayavyāvṛttayaḥ, viparītavyatirekaḥ, apradarśitavyatirekaś cety aṣṭāv eva vaidharṇyadrṣṭāntābhāsā bhavanti /

58. The other two cases of false example are (1) one of "undemonstrated concomitance in agreement" and (2) one of "undemonstrated concomitance in difference". These two (fallacies of example) arise when the proof (of universal concomitance) is not demonstrated and not merely from the omission of expressions connoting unqualified extension, such as whatever<sup>1</sup>, all, and such adverbs as exclusively or

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1. For example the universal concomitance may be stated in the form 'Whatever is a product is perishable' (yad yat kṛtakam tad anityam); this form of assertion connotes indefinite extension (vīpsā); secondly 'All that are products are perishable'. The word 'all' signifies that the subject is taken in its entire denotation. Thirdly, it may be expressed as 'That which is a product is necessarily perishable' (yat kṛtakam tad anityam eva). The adverb 'necessarily' (eva, in the original Sanskrit) signifies necessity (avadhāraṇa). All these verbal forms do not differ in their ultimate import which consists in the assertion of the universal proposition. What Hemacandra seeks to emphasise is the truth that the universal proposition, however variously it may be expressed, does not by itself warrant a valid inference unless it be materially true. Indian logicians have not recognised mere formal validity as the criterion of logical validity. In the Aristotelian syllogism the universal proposition is introduced by the word 'All'. Hemacandra admits the justice of this formal procedure, but does not restrict the expression of universal concomitance to this particular mode. There are other equally valid modes of

necessarily, since the concomitance in agreement and in difference is not established in spite of the employment of these expressions, unless there is independent proof of the same. Thus there are eight types of false examples in agreement, viz., (1) destitute of the probandum, (2) destitute of the probans, (3) destitute of both, (4) with doubtful positive concomitance in respect of the probandum, (5) with doubtful positive concomitance in respect of the probans, (6) with doubtful positive concomitance in respect of both, (7) with reversed positive concomitance, and (8) with undemonstrated positive concomitance. There are again eight false examples in opposition, viz., (1) one not in opposition with the probandum, (2) not in opposition with the probans, (3) not in opposition with both, (4) with doubtful absence of the probandum, (5) with doubtful absence of the probans, (6) with doubtful absence of both, (7) with reversed negative concomitance, and (8) with undemonstrated negative concomitance.

59. *nanv ananvayāvyatirekāv api kaiścid dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsāv ukau, yathā rāgādīmān ayaṁ vacanāt / atra sādharṇyadr̥ṣṭānte ātmani rāga-vacanayoḥ saty api sāhitye, vaidharṇyadr̥ṣṭānte copalakhaṇḍe satyām api saha nivṛttau pratibandhābhāvenānvayavyatirekayor abhāva ity ananvayāvyatirekau / tau kasmād iha noktau ? / ucyate – tābhyāṁ pūrve na bhidyanta iti sādharṇyavaidharṇyābhyāṁ pratyekam aṣṭāv eva dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsā bhavanti / yad āhuḥ –*

*“liṅgasyānanvayā aṣṭāv aṣṭāv avyatirekiṇaḥ /*

*nānyathānupapannatvaṁ katharṇcit khyāpayanty amī //” iti ||27||*

59. A contention may be raised. Some logicians have given two other types of false examples, viz., (1) lacking in positive concomitance, (2) lacking in negative concomitance. Take for instance the argument “A is subject to such passions as attachment, because he indulges in speech.” An ordinary soul would be an example in agreement and a piece of stone would be an example in opposition. But in spite of the co-presence of attachment and speech in the positive example (viz., a soul) and in spite of the co-absence of the two in the negative example (viz., a piece of stone), it must

statement also. But the validity is bound to remain merely formal and unprobativ unless it be exponent of material truth. The statement of such universal propositions, positive or negative, is *de rigueur* in a formal syllogism, the omission of which constitutes an offence stated in the aphorism. For instance, the argument ‘Socrates is mortal because he is a man’ is a faulty syllogism.

be accepted that universal concomitance in agreement and in difference is absent (in the example cited) since the concomitance of the two (speech and passion) is not enforced by necessity. Thus (the two examples) are cases of the fallacies called 'non-concomitance in agreement' and 'non-concomitance in difference'. Why are they not mentioned here (by the author) ? The aforesaid cases (of fallacious examples) are not in any wise different from these two, (in other words, they are included in the cases cited above). Thus the number of false examples in agreement and in opposition do not exceed eight in each case. As has been observed : "There are eight (examples) of non-concomitance in agreement and eight (examples) of non-concomitance in difference. These serve to demonstrate in a manner the absence of necessary concomitance of the probans employed". (27)

60. *avasitaṃ parārthanumānam idānīm tannāntarīyakaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ lakṣayati –*

***sādhana-doṣodbhāvanam dūṣaṇam ||28||***

60. The treatment of syllogistic inference is concluded. Now, the author gives the definition of confutation connected with the same.

(Aph.) Confutation consists in the exposure of the fallacies inherent in an argument. (28)

61. 'sādhanaṣya' parārthanumānasya ye asiddhviruddhādayo 'doṣāḥ' pūrvam uktāḥ teṣāṃ udbhāvyate prakāśyate 'neneti 'udbhāvanam' sādhana-doṣodbhāvakaṃ vacanaṃ 'dūṣaṇam' / uttaratrābhūtagrahaṇād iha bhūtadoṣodbhāvanā dūṣaṇeti siddham ||28||

61. 'Argument' stands for syllogistic inference. The fallacies are the defects styled non-existent, contradictory and so on as said before. Exposure means that which serves to expose, that is, to drive home and consists in a statement directly revealing the aforesaid fallacies. Such statement is entitled confutation. It follows, however, from the employment of the adjective 'untrue' in the next (aphorism), that confutation in the present (aphorism) stands for the exposure of fallacies truly present (in the argument advanced by the opponent). (28)

62. *dūṣaṇalakṣaṇe dūṣaṇābhāsalakṣaṇaṃ sujñānam eva bhedaprati-pādanārthaṃ tu tallakṣaṇam āha –*

***abhūtadoṣodbhāvanāni dūṣaṇābhāsā jātyuttarāṇi ||29||***

62. When one has the knowledge of the true nature of a confutation, one can easily divine the character of a false confutation (that is, which has an outward semblance of the same). But the author propounds the characteristic of the same with a view to demonstration of its different varieties.

(Aph.) False confutations consist in the allegations of non-existent defects and are called counterfeit rejoinders (or sophisms). (29)

63. *avidyamānānām sādhanadoṣāṇām pratipādanāny adūṣaṇāny api dūṣaṇavad ābhāsamānāni 'dūṣaṇābhāsāḥ' / tāni ca 'jātyuttarāṇi' / jātiśabdah sādṛśyavacanah / uttarasadrśāni jātyuttarāṇi uttarasthānaprayuktatvāt / uttarasadrśāni jātyuttarāṇi / jātyā sādṛśyena uttarāṇi jātyuttarāṇi / tāni ca samyagghetau hetvābhāse vā vādinā prayukte jhaṭiti taddoṣatattvāpratibhāse hetupratibimbanaprāyāṇi pratyavasthānāny anantatvāt parisaṅkhyātum na śakyante, tathāpy Akṣapādadarśitadiśā sādharmyādipratyavasthānabhedena sādharmyavaidharmyotkarṣāpakarṣavarṇyāvarṇyavikalpasādhyaprāptyaprāptiprasaṅgapratidrṣṭāntānutpattisaṅśayaprakaraṇāhetvarthāpattyaviśeṣopapattyupalabdhyānupalabdhinityānityakāryasamarūpatayā caturviṃśatir upadarśyante /*

63. The allegations of defects which do not really exist in the arguments (advanced by the proponent) constitute false confutations, since they only have the appearance of confutation, though in reality they are innocuous charges. These are called counterfeit rejoinders or sophisms (*jāti*). The word '*jāti*' (sophism) connotes analogy. Because they resemble true rejoinders being employed in the place of legitimate replies they are called counterfeit rejoinders (sophisms). Thus the meaning of the term 'counterfeit rejoinders' is analogous rejoinders, that is to say, counterfeit rejoinders are rejoinders by analogy. They are as it were reflections of true reasons, and are employed in opposition to a legitimate or false reason advanced by the proponent in case the true nature of the defects in the reasons is not realised. And though as a matter of fact there is no limit to these cases of opposition and hence it is not possible to count their number, yet in consonance with the plan adopted by Akṣapāda they are demonstrated to be of twenty-four types according as the basis of opposition is variously considered to be similarity and the like, and they are called (1) Parity per

Similarity, (2) per Dissimilarity, (3) per Augmentation, (4) per Subtraction, (5) per Uncertainty, (6) per Certainty, (7) per Contingency, (8) per Probandum, (9) per Contact, (10) per Non-contact, (11) per Interrogation, (12) per Counter-instance, (13) per Non-generation, (14) per Doubt, (15) per Neutralisation, (16) per Non-probativeness, (17) per Implication, (18) per Non-difference, (19) per Logical Ground, (20) per Apprehension, (21) per Non-apprehension, (22) per Eternality, (23) per Non-eternality and (24) per Character of Outcome.

64. *tatra sādharmyeṇa pratyavasthānaṁ sādharmyasamā jātiḥ / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavad iti prayoge kṛte sādharmyaprayogeṇaiva pratyavasthānam – nityaḥ śabdo niravayavatvād ākāśavat / na cāsti viśeṣahetur ghaṭasādharmyāt kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabdo na punar ākāśasādharmyān niravayavatvān nitya iti 1 / vaidharmyeṇa pratyavasthānaṁ vaidharmyasamā jātiḥ / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ity atraiva prayoge sa eva pratihetur vaidharmyeṇa prayujyate – nityaḥ śabdo niravayavatvāt; anityaṁ hi sāvayavaṁ dr̥ṣṭaṁ ghaṭādīti / na cāsti viśeṣahetur ghaṭasādharmyāt kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabdo na punas tadvaidharmyān niravayavatvān nitya iti 2 / utkarṣāpakarṣābhyāṁ pratyavasthānam utkarṣāpakarṣasame jāti / tatraiva prayoge dr̥ṣṭāntadharman kañcit sādhyadharminy āpādayann utkarṣasamāṁ jātiṁ prayuñkte – yadi ghaṭavat kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabdo ghaṭavad eva mūrto 'pi bhavatu / na cen mūrto ghaṭavad anityo 'pi mā bhūd iti śabde dharmāntarotkarṣam āpādayati 3 / apakarṣas tu ghaṭaḥ kṛtakaḥ sann āsrāvaṇo dr̥ṣṭa evaṁ śabdo 'py astu / no ced ghaṭavad anityo 'pi mā bhūd iti śabde śrāvaṇatvadharman apakarṣatīti 4 / varṇyāvarṇyābhyāṁ pratyavasthānaṁ varṇyāvarṇyasame jāti / khyāpanīyo varṇyas tadviparīto 'varṇyaḥ / tāv etau varṇyāvarṇyau sādhyadr̥ṣṭāntadharman viparyasyan varṇyāvarṇyasame jāti prayuñkte – yathāvidhaḥ śabdadharmāḥ kṛtakatvādir na tādṛg ghaṭadharman yādṛg ghaṭadharman na tādṛk śabdadharmā iti 5-6 / dharmāntaravikalpena pratyavasthānaṁ vikalpasamā jātiḥ / yathā kṛtakaṁ kiñcin mṛdu dr̥ṣṭaṁ rāṅkavaśayyādi, kiñcin kaṭhinaṁ kuṭhārādi, evaṁ kṛtakaṁ kiñcid anityaṁ bhaviṣyati ghaṭādi kiñcin nityaṁ śabdādīti 7 / sādhyasāmyāpādanena pratyavasthānaṁ sādhyasamā jātiḥ / yathā – yadi yathā ghaṭas tathā śabdaḥ, prāptaṁ tarhi yathā śabdas tathā ghaṭa iti / śabdaś ca sādhyā iti ghaṭo 'pi sādhyo bhavatu /*

tataś ca na sādhyah sādhyasya dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ syāt / na ced evaṁ tathāpi  
vailakṣaṇyāt sutarām adr̥ṣṭānta iti 8 / prāptyaprāptivikalpābhyām pratyava-  
sthānam prāptyaprāptisame jāti / yathā yad etat kṛtakatvaṁ tvayā sādhanam  
upanyastaṁ tat kiṁ prāpya sādhayaty aprāpya vā ? / prāpya cet dvayor  
vidyamānāyor eva prāptir bhavati, na sadasator iti / dvayoś ca sattvāt kiṁ  
kasya sādhyam sādhanam vā ? 9 / aprāpya tu sādhanatvam ayuktam  
atiprasaṅgād iti 10 / atiprasaṅgāpādanena pratyavasthānam prasaṅgasamā  
jātiḥ / yathā yady anityatve kṛtakatvaṁ sādhanam kṛtakatva idānīm kiṁ  
sādhanam ? / tatsādhane 'pi kiṁ sādhanam iti ? 11 / pratidr̥ṣṭāntena  
pratyavasthānam pratidr̥ṣṭāntasamā jātiḥ / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ  
prayatnānantarīyakatvāt ghaṭavad ity ukte jātivādy āha – yathā ghaṭaḥ  
prayatnānantarīyako 'nityo dr̥ṣṭa evaṁ pratidr̥ṣṭānta ākāśam nityam api  
prayatnānantarīyakam dr̥ṣṭam, kūpakhananaprayatnānantaram upalambhād  
iti / na cedam anaikāntikatvodbhāvanam, bhaṅgyantareṇa pratyavasthānāt  
12 / anutpattyā pratyavasthānam anutpattisamā jātiḥ / yathā anutpanne  
śabdākhye dharmiṇi kṛtakatvaṁ dharmah kva vartate ? tad evaṁ hetvabhāvād  
asiddhir anityatvasyeti 13 / sādharṁyasaṁā vaidharṁyasaṁā vā yā jātiḥ  
pūrvam udāhṛtā saiva saṁśayenopasaṁhriyamāṇā saṁśayasamā jātir bhavati/  
yathā kiṁ ghaṭasādharṁyāt kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabda uta tadvaidharṁyād  
ākāśasādharṁyād vā niravayavatvān nitya iti ? 14 / dvitīyapakṣotthā-  
panabuddhyā prayujyamāṇā saiva sādharṁyasaṁā vaidharṁyasaṁā vā jātiḥ  
prakaraṇasaṁā bhavati / tatraiva anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti  
prayoge nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāc chabdatvavad iti udbhāvanaparakāra-  
bhedaṁtre sati nānātvaṁ draṣṭavyam 15 / traikālyānupapattyā hetoḥ  
pratyavasthānam ahetusaṁā jātiḥ / yathā hetuḥ sādhanam / tat sādhyāt  
pūrvam paścāt saha vā bhavet ? / yadi pūrvam; asati sādhye tat kasya  
sādhanam ? atha paścāt sādhanam; pūrvam tarhi sādhyam; tasmīnś ca  
pūrvasiddhe kiṁ sādhanena ? / atha yugapat sādhyasādhane; tarhi tayoh  
savyetaragoviṣāṇāyor iva sādhyasādhanabhāva eva na bhaved iti 16 /  
arthāpattyā pratyavasthānam arthāpattisamā jātiḥ / yady anityasādharṁyāt  
kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ, arthād āpadyate nityasādharṁyān nitya iti / asti  
cāsyā nityenākāśādinā sādharṁyam niravayavatvam ity udbhāvana-  
prakārabheda evāyam iti 17 / aviśeṣāpādanena pratyavasthānam aviśeṣasaṁā  
jātiḥ / yathā yadi śabdaghaṭāyor eko dharmah kṛtakatvam iṣyate tarhi



*samānadharmayogāt tayoṛ aviśeṣe tadvad eva sarvapadārthānām aviśeṣaḥ prasajyata iti 18 / upapattyā pratyavasthānam upapattisamā jātiḥ / yathā yadi kṛtakatvopapattyā śabdasyānityatvam, niravayavatvopapattyā nityatvam api kasmān na bhavati ? / pakṣadvayopapattyā 'nadyavasāyaparyavasānatvaṁ vivakṣitam ity udbhāvanaprakārabheda evāyam 19 / upalabdhyā pratyavasthānam upalabdhisamā jātiḥ / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvād iti prayukte pratyavatiṣṭhate – na khalu prayatnānantarīyakatvam anityatve sādhanam; sādhanam hi tad ucyate yena vinā na sādhyam upalabhyate / upalabhyate ca prayatnānantarīyakatvena vinā 'pi vidyudādāv anityatvam / śabde 'pi kvacid vāyuegabhaḥjyamānavanaspatyādi janye tathaiyeti 20 / anupalabdhyā pratyavasthānam anupalabdhisamā jātiḥ / yathā tatraiva prayatnānantarīyakatvāhetāv upanyaste saty āha jātivādī – na prayatnakāryaḥ śabdaḥ prāg uccāraṇād asty evāsāv āvaraṇayogāt tu nopalabhyate / āvaraṇānupalambhe 'py anupalambhān nāsty eva śabda iti cet; na, āvaraṇānupalambhe 'py anupalambhasadbhāvāt / āvaraṇānupalabdheś cānupalambhād abhāvaḥ / tadabhāve cāvaraṇopalabdher bhāvo bhavati / tatas ca mṛdantaritamūlakīlodakādivad āvaraṇopalabdhikṛtam eva śabdasya prāg uccāraṇād agrahaṇam iti prayatnakāryatvābhāvān nityaḥ śabda iti 21 / sādhyadharmanityānityatvavikalpena śabdānityatvāpādanam nityasamā jātiḥ / yathā anityaḥ śabda iti pratijñāte jātivādī vikalpayati – yeyam anityatā śabdasyocyate sā kim anityā nityā veti ? / yady anityā; tad iyam avaśyam apāyinīty anityatāyā apāyān nityaḥ śabdaḥ / athānityatā nityaiva; tathāpi dharmasya nityatvāt tasya ca nirāśrayasyānupapattes tadāśrayabhūtaḥ śabdo 'pi nityo bhavet, tadanityatve taddharmanityatvāyogād ity ubhayathāpi nityaḥ śabda iti 22 / sarvabhāvānityatvopapādanena pratyavasthānam anityasamā jātiḥ / yathā ghaṭena sādharmyam anityena śabdasyāstīti tasyānityatvaṁ yadi pratipādyate, tad ghaṭena sarvapadārthānām asty eva kim api sādharmyam iti teṣāṁ apy anityatvaṁ syāt / atha padārthāntarāṇām tathābhāve 'pi nānityatvam; tarhi śabdasyāpi tan mā bhūd iti / anityatvaṁātrāpādanapūrvakaviśeṣodbhāvanāc cāviśeṣasamāto bhinneyaṁ jātiḥ 23 / prayatnakāryānāntātvopanyāsenā pratyavasthānam kāryasamā jātiḥ / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnānantarīyakatvād ity ukte jātivādy āha – prayatnasya dvairūpyaṁ dṛṣṭam – kiñcid asad eva tena janyate yathā ghaṭādi, kiñcit sad evāvaraṇavyudāsādinā 'bhivyajyate yathā mṛdantari-*

*tamūlakīlādi, evaṃ prayatnakāryānānātvād eṣa prayatnena śabdo vyajyate janyate veti saṁśaya iti /saṁśayāpādanaprakārabhedāc ca saṁśayasamātaḥ kāryasamā jātir bhidyate 24 /*

64. Now, among these, when the opposition is based on similarity, the sophism is an instance of Parity per Similarity. For instance, (1) when the proponent argues 'Sound is non-eternal since it is a product, like a jar', and the opposition is set up, on the same basis of similarity, in the counter-argument as follows : 'Sound is eternal being devoid of parts like space', there is no reason for discriminating as to why sound should be non-eternal on the ground of its similarity to a jar being a product, and not eternal on the ground of its similarity to space being devoid of parts. (2) When the opposition is based on dissimilarity, the sophism is called Parity per Dissimilarity. For example, 'Sound is non-eternal being a product' is the original syllogism and the counter-argument is propounded on the basis of dissimilarity as follows : "Sound is eternal being devoid of parts. What is non-eternal is found to be possessed of parts, just as a jar." There is no reason for discrimination that sound should be regarded as non-eternal on the ground of its similarity to a jar in respect of being a product, and not eternal on the ground of its dissimilarity from jar in respect of possession of parts. (3) The opposition based on augmentation and subtraction respectively gives rise to the sophism called Parity per Augmentation and Parity per Subtraction. Thus in the self-same syllogism, the opponent may use the sophism called Parity per Augmentation by insisting on the occurrence of some additional attribute of the example in the subject (in which it is non-existent), e.g., "If sound be held non-eternal on the ground of its similarity to a jar in respect of the attribute of being product, it should be possessed of limited dimension equally with the jar. If it be not possessed of such dimension it should not be regarded as non-eternal like jar." (In the argument in opposition the opponent) seeks to enforce the admission of an additional attribute in excess in sound. (4) Parity per Subtraction (is illustrated in the following) : "The jar being a product is found to be inaudible; by parity (of reasoning) sound should also be so (inaudible). If it be not so, it ought not to be also non-eternal like the jar". (The opponent here) seeks to subtract the attribute of 'audibility' from sound. (5-6) The

opposition based on 'uncertainty (the attribute of 'having to be proved') and certainty (provedness of the predicate) gives rise to the cases of sophisms per Uncertainty and per Certainty respectively. The attribute which is to be established is one which is uncertain, and the opposite of it is one which is established and so certain, and they are the respective attributes of the subject and the example. When the opponent reverses these attributes (by attributing to the example uncertainty which is the characteristic of the predicate of the subject and attributing to the subject certainty which is the characteristic of the predicate in the example) he is said to employ these two counterfeit rejoinders (sophisms). (For example, the opponent adopts this procedure when he insists that) the attribute of 'being a product' which belongs to sounds is not the self-same attribute of the jar (being associated with an unproved predicate in the former and with a proved predicate in the latter), and likewise, the attribute (of 'being product') is not the same in sound as it is in the jar (being associated with a doubtful predicate in the former and with the same as established in the latter). (7) The opposition based on the analogy of the contingency of some other attribute constitutes the sophism called Parity per Contingency. For example, (when one argues as follows) : "Some products are found to be soft, e.g., a blanket, bed, etc.; some again are hard, e.g., an axe; likewise, some products, such as the jar, will possibly be non-eternal, and some products such as sound may be eternal" (here the contingency of such attributes as softness or hardness, though found in a product, is made the basis of the affirmation of the contingency of permanence in regard to sound). (8) The opposition based on the extension of the analogy of the probandum is called Parity per Probandum. The following argument is an illustration. If sound is similar to a jar, it follows that a jar is similar to sound. But sound has to be proved (to be impermanent) and so (by parity) the jar ought also to be subject to proof. Such being the case, one to be proved cannot possibly serve as example for another which is equally to be proved (since the example is always one in which the predicate is a proved fact). If, however, the similarity were not (symmetrical, the jar cited as example) would not be an example all the more since the divergence (between jar and sound is pronounced). (9) The sophisms called Parity per Contact and per Non-contact arise when opposi-

tion is disjunctively based on attainment and non-attainment respectively. The following argument is an instance in point : Well, the fact of 'being produced' is the reason advanced by you, but does it prove the predicate by coming in contact with it or out of contact ? On the former alternative (the position transpires to be as follows) : Contact is possible between two present facts and not between one present and another absent, and when both (the probans and the probandum) are equally present, which can possibly be the probandum and the probans ? (10) And if, on the other hand, there is no contact it is logically impossible that one should be the probans (of the other without an actual relation) since this would involve unwarranted extension. (11) When the opposition is based upon unwarranted extension of interrogation it is called the sophism of Parity per Interrogation. (It arises when one argues) : If the fact of being a product be the probans of its impermanence, what again is the probans of being a product and what again is the probans of that probans (and so on without end) ? (12) When the opposition is set up on the analogy of the heterologue, it is called the sophism of Parity per Heterologue. The following situation is an illustration. Suppose one argues : Sound is impermanent, it being a consequence of effort, like a jar, and in refutation the sophist makes the following rejoinder : As jar which is a consequence of effort is found to be impermanent, so also the space cited as a heterologue which though permanent is found to be the consequence of effort, since it is perceived subsequently to the effort of digging a well. This instance of the rejoinder should not be regarded as tantamount to exposure of the fallacy called Inconclusive reason, since the opposition is based upon a method quite different from that of the former. (13) The opposition based upon non-generation gives rise to the sophism called Parity per Non-generation. For example, when one asks "Wherein does the property 'being produced' exist when the subject itself, viz., 'sound' has not been produced ?" Such being the case impermanence cannot be established (in sound) for the impossibility of the probans. (14) The sophism based upon similarity or dissimilarity which has already been illustrated is turned into the sophism called Parity per Doubt when it is affirmed in the form of a doubt. For example, "Is sound non-eternal by reason of similarity to the jar on the ground of its being

product ?” or “Is it eternal by reason of its dissimilarity to the jar or its similarity to space in respect of incomposite constitution ?” (15) The sophism based upon parity per similarity or parity per dissimilarity is converted into what is called the sophism ‘Parity per Neutralisation’ when the former is propounded with the intention of setting up a second (rival) thesis. Thus, for instance, when in opposition to that very syllogism (which has been used all along as the centre of dispute) viz., “Sound is non-eternal, as it is a product, like the jar”, (the following syllogism is employed) viz., “Sound is eternal, since it is audible like sound-universal (class character inherent in all sounds).” The difference (of the present sophism from those based upon similarity and dissimilarity) is to be understood to consist merely in the difference of the mode of statement. (16) When the opposition is based upon the allegation of impossibility of the occurrence of the probans in all the three time-determinations (past, present and future) the sophism called Parity per Non-probantiveness arises. The probans is that which is an instrument of proving (the probandum). Now the question arises whether such probans exists, either before or after or synchronously with the probandum. If it (probans) be (supposed to exist) before (the probandum), of what can it be the probans when the probandum does not exist ? If the probans be (supposed to come) after (the probandum), it must be held that the probandum exists prior (to the probans) and what can a probans avail when the probandum (for the proof of which it is held in request) exists as an accomplished fact (before the occurrence of the probans) ? Finally, if it be held that the probans and the probandum exist simultaneously together then none of them can play the role of probans or probandum in regard to the other like the left and right horns of a cow. (17) The opposition based upon (logical) implication gives rise to the sophism Parity per Implication. (The following is an example). If sound be non-external by reason of its similarity to non-eternal things in respect of the property of ‘being produced’, it follows by implication that what bears resemblance to eternal entities should be eternal. But sound has resemblance with such eternal entities as space and the like in respect of incomposite constitution. This variety is nothing more than a variation in the mode of statement. (18) If the opposition is based upon non-difference, it would be a case of Parity per Non-difference.

For instance, if the quality of 'being product' be the common property of sound and jar, and if on the basis of this common property the two are recognised to be non-different, then all things should have to be regarded as non-different (on the basis of the property of existence which is present in all). (19) The opposition based upon the presence of logical ground is called Parity per Presence of Logical Ground. Thus, for instance, if the non-eternity of sound be inferred from the character of 'being a product' serving as a logical ground, then why should it not be regarded as eternal on the ground of its incomposite constitution ? What is intended by this sophism is that the upshot must be a case of indetermination, since there are present in both the alternatives equally cogent logical grounds and thus it is nothing but a variation of the manner of statement at bottom. (20) The opposition based upon apprehension is called Parity per Apprehension. The following situation is an illustration. When a person puts forward the argument "Sound is non-eternal since it is a consequence of effort," and the opponent raises the objection as follows (it gives rise to the sophism under question) : Certainly, the fact of being the consequence of effort cannot be the ground of the inference of impermanence. That alone is asserted to be the logical ground (or probans) without which the probandum is not apprehended. But lightning and such other phenomena are found to be impermanent though they are not the consequences of effort. And even with regard to sound itself which is produced by the breaking of a tree and the like due to the impact of a violent storm, it is equally found to be (not an outcome of effort). (21) The opposition based upon non-apprehension is called Parity per Non-apprehension. Thus, for instance, in the aforesaid argument in which the ground is asserted to be 'the outcome of effort', the opponent may employ this type of sophism in the form of the argument as follows : "Sound is not the product of effort. It undoubtedly exists before it is articulated though it is not perceived owing to the presence of an obstructive barrier". It may be urged in opposition "The barrier is not perceived (and hence it must be fictitious). The non-apprehension of sound (in spite of the absence of a barrier precluding its apprehension) proves that sound (unarticulated) certainly does not exist". The answer is : No, non-apprehension is equally present with regard to the alleged non-apprehension of the barrier (which goes

unperceived). The fact that the non-apprehension of a barrier is unperceived shows that it does not exist. The non-existence of this (non-apprehension of the barrier) establishes the existence of the apprehension of the barrier. It follows, therefore, that the non-apprehension of sound prior to its articulation is occasioned by the apprehension of obstructive barrier, and it is thus on a par with roots, posts, water etc., which lie underground (hidden from view). The conclusion is established that sound is eternal, since it is not the product of effort (as alleged by the Naiyāyika). (22) The sophism based on parity per eternity consists in urging the necessity of sound being eternal by urging the dilemma of eternity and non-eternity with regard to the attribute to be proved (probandum). It occurs when in opposition to the assertion "Sound is non-eternal" the opponent urges the dilemma : Is the character of being non-eternal which is predicated of sound non-eternal or eternal ? If it be non-eternal, then it is of necessity subject to cessation and thus with the cessation of the character of non-eternity sound must be held to be eternal. If, on the other hand, the attribute of non-eternity be itself eternally present, then the very fact that the attribute is eternally present and further that the presence of an attribute without a substratum is impossible entails the consequence that sound too, being a substratum of the attribute in question, must be eternally present. The non-eternity of this (substratum) makes the eternal presence of the attribute an absurdity. The conclusion, therefore, follows (from the consideration of both the horns of the dilemma) that sound is eternal eitherwise. (23) The sophism called Parity per Non-eternity consists in the opposition derived from the supposed truth of the proposition "All existents are non-eternal". Thus it may be contended : If you seek to prove that sound is non-eternal on the ground of some attribute shared in common with the jar which is non-eternal, then it must be admitted that all existents are non-eternal since they must share in some common attribute with the jar. If, on the other hand, the non-eternity of other entities is not proved notwithstanding the community of attribute, there is no reason why this possibility be not admitted in the case of sound also. This sophism differs from Parity per Non-difference in that it seeks to establish a specific attribute by showing that all entities are non-eternal (whereas the other sophism seeks to prove that they are non-different). (24) The opposition

based on the demonstration of the diversity of the character of the outcome of effort constitutes the sophism called Parity per Character of Outcome. It occurs when in opposition to the assertion "Sound is non-eternal because it is an outcome of effort", the opponent propounds the following sophism : "It is a matter of observation that there are two varieties of effort — by one something that was non-existent, e.g., a jar is brought into existence and the other serves to make manifest by removal of obstruction something which has already been in existence, as is found to be the case with roots, posts, etc., lying buried underground. Such being the condition of things, it is obviously a case of doubt whether sound is produced or made manifest, since the diversity of outcomes of effort is an established truth". The sophism based upon parity per character of outcome differs from Parity per Doubt, because there is a difference in the manner of assertion of doubt.

65. *tad evam udbhāvanaviṣayavikalpabhedena jātīnām ānantye 'py asaṅkīrṇodāharaṇavivakṣayā caturviṃśatir jātibhedā ete darśitāḥ / pratisamādhānam tu sarvajātīnām anyathānupapattilakṣaṇānumānalakṣaṇaparīkṣaṇam eva / na hy aviluptalakṣaṇe hetāv evaṇiprāyāḥ pāṁśupātāḥ prabhavanti / kṛtakatvaprayatnānantarīyakatvayoś ca dṛḍhapratibandhatvān nāvaraṇādikṛtām śabdānupalambhanam api tv anityatvakṛtam eva / jātīprayoge ca pareṇa kṛte samyag uttaram eva vaktavyam na pratīpam jātyuttarair eva pratyavastheyam āsamañjasya prasaṅgād iti /*

65. Though as a matter of fact the number of sophisms is practically infinite if stress be laid upon the difference of the contents of the assertions, we have demonstrated herein only twentyfour types as we intend (to avoid overlapping contents and) to show only unmixed instances. The solution of all types of sophisms lies in the examination of the probans as to whether it embodies the characteristic, viz., incompatibility with the opposite. It is obvious that such attempts at throwing the dust in the eyes cannot be successful if the probans possesses the unmistakable characteristic of a sound probans. The necessity of concomitance between a product and an outcome of effort is securely established and it cannot be alleged that the non-apprehension of sound is due to obstruction of some barrier, but must be explained by reason of its being a contingent phenomenon. When, however, the opponent employs a sophism, the proponent ought to



formulate sound refutation and never to take his stand upon other sophisms by way of opposition since this would only lead to a consequence incompatible (with the canons of honourable dialectic).

66. *chalam api ca samyag uttaratvābhāvāj jātyuttaram eva / uktam hy etad udbhāvanaprakārabhedenānantāni jātyuttarāṇīti / tatra parasya vadato 'rthavikalpopapādanena vacanavighātaś chalam / tat tridhā vākchalam sāmānyachalam upacārachalam ceti / tatra sādharāṇe śabde prayukte vaktur abhipretād arthād arthāntarakalpanayā tanniṣedho vākchalam / yathā navakambalo 'yam māṇavaka iti nūtanavivakṣayā kathite paraḥ saṅkhyām āropya niṣedhati – kuto 'sya nava kambalā iti ? / sambhāvanayātiprasaṅgino 'pi sāmānyasyopanyāse hetutvāropanena tanniṣedhaḥ sāmānyachalam / yathā aho nu khalv asau brāhmaṇo vidyācaraṇasampanna iti brāhmaṇastuti-prasaṅge kaścid vadati – sambhavati brāhmaṇe vidyācaraṇasampad iti / tat chalavādī brāhmaṇatvasya hetutām āropya nirākurvan abhiyūṅkte – yadi brāhmaṇe vidyācaraṇasampad bhavati, vrātye 'pi sā bhavet vrātyo 'pi brāhmaṇa eveti / aupacārike prayoge mukhyapratīṣedhena pratyavasthānam upacārachalam / yathā mañcāḥ krośantīti ukte paraḥ pratyavatiṣṭhate – katham acetanāḥ mañcāḥ krośanti mañcasthās tu puruṣāḥ krośantīti / tad atra chalatrāye 'pi vṛddhavyavahārāprasiddhasābdasāmarthyaparīkṣaṇam eva samādhānaṁ veditavyam iti ||29||*

66. As regards casuistry, it should be regarded as nothing but sophism, since it also lacks the character of a sound answer. It has been already remarked that the number of sophism is infinite according as it is based upon the difference in the manner of demonstration (and so there is no incompatibility if cases of casuistry are subsumed under sophisms when they are found to embody the characteristics of the latter). As for casuistry, it consists in the refutation of the statement put forward by the proponent by ascribing a meaning different (from what is intended). It is of three different types, viz., (1) based upon ambiguity, (2) based upon generalisation and (3) based upon metaphor. Of these, (the first variety, viz.,) Verbal Ambiguity consists in the refutation of the proponent when he makes use of a verbal expression susceptible of double meaning by putting upon the same a meaning altogether different from one intended by him (the proponent). Thus, for instance, when a person makes the assertion "The boy is

*navakambala* (possessed of a new blanket, or possessed of nine blankets)” intending to convey the meaning of ‘new’ (by the word *nava*), the opponent seeks to refute this statement by attributing the meaning of number (nine) by rejoining “How can he have nine blankets (when he has only one) ?” (2) When by way of presumption a statement is made in general terms, which taken literally may extend to unintended cases, and the opponent seeks to refute it by attributing to it the character of a logical probans, it gives the illustration of casuistry based upon generalisation. Suppose, for instance, that there is an occasion of eulogising a particular Brāhmaṇa endowed with learning and right conduct and a man delivers himself in a casual way of the statement “Learning and piety are (as a rule) quite natural in Brāhmaṇas” (without meaning that Brāhmaṇahood is the necessary concomitant of learning and piety, but only bases it on probability). Suppose again that a casuist seeks to refute this by making a counter-charge on the supposition that Brāhmaṇahood is made the logical ground and rejoins “If learning and piety be the properties of Brāhmaṇas, then they should be equally present even in the uninitiated Brāhmaṇa on the ground of his Brāhmaṇahood”, (it becomes a case of the second type of casuistry). (3) Casuistry based upon metaphor consists in the opposition based upon the refutation of the primary meaning of a word used in a figurative or a metaphorical sense. Suppose a man makes the statement “The platforms are shouting” and the opponent opposes it as follows : “How can inanimate platforms shout ? It is certainly the men on the platform who are shouting”, (the opposition becomes a case of casuistry based on metaphor). Now, the solution of all the three types of casuistry is found to be furnished by the scrutiny of the denotative capacity of a word sanctioned by the usage of normal adults. (29)

67. *sādhana-dūṣaṇādyabhidhānam ca prāyo vāde bhavātīti vādasya lakṣaṇam āha –*

*tattvasamrakṣaṇārtham prāśnikādisamakṣam*

*sādhana-dūṣaṇavadanam vādaḥ ||30||*

67. Since the statement of proof and refutation is a matter of frequent occurrence in legitimate discourse, the author propounds the definition of a legitimate discourse (in the following aphorism) :

(Aph.) The statement of proof and refutation in the presence of

judges and other members of the council with a view to the preservation of truth is called a legitimate discourse. (30)

68. *svapakṣasiddhaye vādinah 'sāadhanam' tatpratīṣedhāya pratīvādinō 'dūṣaṇam' / pratīvādinō 'pi svapakṣasiddhaye 'sāadhanam' tatpratīṣedhāya vādinō 'dūṣaṇam' / tad evaṁ vādinah sādhanadūṣaṇe pratīvādinō 'pi sādhanadūṣaṇe dvayor vādipratīvādibhyām 'vadanam' abhidhānam 'vādaḥ' / katham ity āha – 'prāśnikādisamakṣam' / prāśnikāḥ sabhyāḥ –*

*"svasamayaparasamayajñāḥ kulajāḥ pakṣadvayepsitāḥ kṣamiṇaḥ / vādapatheṣv abhiyuktās tulāsamāḥ prāśnikāḥ proktāḥ //"*  
*ity evamlakṣaṇāḥ / 'ādi'grahaṇena sabhāpativādipratīvādi-parigrahaḥ, seyaṁ caturāṅgā kathā, ekasyāpy aṅgasya vaikalye kathātvānupapatteḥ / na hi varṇāśramapālanakṣamaṁ nyāyānyāyavyavasthāpakam pakṣapātaraḥ hitvena samadrṣṭim sabhāpatim yathoktalakṣaṇāmś ca prāśnikān vinā vādipratīvādināu svābhimatasāadhanadūṣaṇasaraṇim ārādhayitum kṣamau / nāpi duḥśikṣitakutarkaleśavācālabāliśajanaviplāvito gatānugatiko janaḥ sanmārgam pratipadyeteti / tasya phalam āha – 'tattvasamirakṣaṇārtham' / 'tattva'sabdena tattvaniścayaḥ sādhujanahrdayaviparivartī grhyate, tasya rakṣaṇam durvidagdhanajanitavikalpakalpanāta iti /*

68. 'Proof' is the argument propounded by the proponent in order to establish his thesis and 'refutation' is the counter-argument set forth by the opponent in order to controvert the aforesaid thesis. The opponent also has to offer proof in order to establish his own thesis, and the (original) proponent has to submit counter-arguments in refutation of the position of opponent. Thus the proponent has his own 'proof' and 'refutation', and the opponent too has also his own 'proof' and 'refutation' (in opposition). A legitimate discourse thus consists of the assertions of these two sets of arguments and counter-arguments as employed respectively by the proponent and the opponent. What is the procedure ? In reply (to this question the author) says : 'in the presence of the judges and other members'. Judges are the members of the council, who are possessed of the following qualifications set forth in the definition given as follows : "Those are called judges who are equally familiar with the philosophy of their own school and that of others, men of high pedigree, freely chosen by both the parties, tolerant (of small peccadilloes), possessed of long acquaintance with the

methods of legitimate discourse, and as impartial as the weighing balance". The expression 'other members' stands for the President, Proponent and the Opponent. The discourse thus rests on four factors, and is known as Debate. And if even one of the factors be wanting, it would forfeit its title to be regarded as a legitimate Debate. It is a truism that neither the proponent nor the opponent can hope for success in the pursuit of their respective plan of 'proof' and 'refutation' according to their free convictions, unless there be present (to maintain order and discipline) judges endowed with the qualifications set forth before, and a President who is free from partiality and had equal consideration for both (proponent and opponent), capable of discrimination between rightful and wrongful procedure, and able to enforce the observance of duties incumbent upon the different castes and graduated stages of life. Nor would it be possible that the mass of people who (are incapable of independent judgement and) are prone to blindly follow in the footsteps of persons happening to gain the upper hand will unwaveringly pursue the path of right conduct, once their convictions are upset by a set of fools who on account of their wrong education are vociferous with their sophistical arguments (and determined to subvert the moral order). (The author) states the purpose of such debate by the words : 'with a view to the preservation of truth'. By the word 'truth' is to be understood 'conviction of truth' which is uppermost in the minds of persons known for their rectitude, and this has to be preserved from the onslaughts of sophistry created by a set of people misguided by a vicious training.

69. *nanu tattvarakṣaṇaṃ jalpasya vitaṇḍāyā vā prayojanam / yad āha – "tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāparicaraṇavat" [Nyāyasūtra, 4.2.50] iti; na, vādasyāpi nigrāhassthānavattvena tattvasaṃrakṣaṇārthatvāt / na cāsya nigrāhassthānavattvam asiddham / "pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ" [Nyāyasūtra, 1.2.1] iti vādalakṣaṇe siddhāntāviruddha ity anenāpasiddhāntasya, pañcāvayavopapanna ity anena nyūnādhikayor hetvābhāsapañcakasya cety aṣṭānām nigrāhassthānānām anujñānāt, teṣāṃ ca nigrāhassthānāntaropalakṣaṇatvāt / ata eva na jalpavitaṇḍe kathe, vādasyaiva tattvasaṃrakṣaṇārthatvāt /*

69. (Q) The preservation of truth is the objective of Disputation or Wrangling as has been stated (in the NS, 4. 2. 50) : Disputation and Wrangling are resorted to for the purpose of defending conviction of truth just as a hedge of thorny brambles is set up for the protection of sprouting seeds. (A) No, even a legitimate discourse which is held to be liable to the application of censure is equally directed to the preservation of truth. Nor can it be contended that it is not a fact that it falls within the scope of censure. It is apparent from the definition of 'legitimate discourse' laid in the aphorism (NS, 1. 2. 1.) : "A legitimate discourse consists in the propounding of a thesis and a counterthesis, each supported by an argument consisting of five members, not standing in opposition to the established truth, and in which the establishment of a thesis and the refutation of the counterthesis are sought to be achieved by means of recognised organs of knowledge and legitimate reasoning". The expression 'not standing in opposition to the established truth' implies the recognition of the censure called 'the admission of a position incompatible with established truth'; the expression 'consisting of five members' again implies the application of censures called 'incomplete', 'redundant' and the 'five fallacies', in all, of the eight types of censure, and these are rather indicative of other types of censure (that can possibly be applied even in a legitimate discourse). It follows, therefore, that Disputation and Wrangling are not approved forms of Debate, since it is legitimate discourse alone that is competent to achieve the defence of truth.

70. *nanu "yathoktopapannachalajātīnigrahasthānasādhanopālambho jalpaḥ" [Nyāyasūtra, 1.2.2], "sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā" [Nyāyasūtra, 1.2.3] iti lakṣaṇe bhedāj jalpavitaṇḍe api kathe vidyete eva; na; pratipakṣasthāpanāhīnāyā vitaṇḍāyāḥ kathātvāyogāt / vaitaṇḍiko hi svapakṣam abhyupagamyāsthāpayan yatkiñcid vādena parapakṣam eva dūṣayan katham avadheyavacanaḥ ? / jalpas tu yadyapi dvayor api vādi-prativādinoh sādhanopālambhasambhāvanayā kathātvam lābhate tathāpi na vādād arthāntaram, vādenaiva caritārthatvāt / chalajātīnigrahasthāna-bhūyastvayogād acaritārtha iti cet; na, chalajātīprayogasya dūṣaṇābhāsatvenāprayojyatvāt, nigrahasthānānām ca vāde 'py aviruddhatvāt / na khalu khaṭacapeṭāmukhabandhādayo 'nucitā nigrahā jalpe 'py upayujyante / ucitānām ca nigrahasthānānām vāde 'pi na virodho 'sti / tan na vādāt jalpasya*

*kaścīd viśeṣo 'sti / lābhapūjākhyātikāmitādīni tu prayojanāni tattvādhyavasāya-  
saṁrakṣaṇalakṣaṇapradhānaphalānubandhīni pūṇīṣadharmatvād vāde 'pi  
na nivārayitum pāryante /*

70. (Q) It has been urged that Disputation and Wrangling are certainly legitimate forms of debate, since they are distinguished by characteristics (which are not found in a 'legitimate discourse' and that it is so is obviously deducible from) their respective definitions viz., "Disputation is that which is endowed with the said characteristics (aiming at the establishment of a thesis by means of accredited organs of knowledge and refutation of the counter-thesis by Reasoning) in which casuistry, sophism and censures are employed in addition in support and refutation" [NS, 1.2.2] and "Wrangling is (a debate) which is destitute of the establishment of the thesis opposite to the position refuted." [NS, 1.2.3] (A) No, this is not admissible. Wrangling which does not aim at establishing the opposite position (of what is refuted) cannot be regarded as a legitimate form of debate. How can a mere wrangler, who does not claim to establish his own position and seeks to refute the position of the opponent by means of any argument that comes handy, lay claim to respectful attention (and consideration) ? As regards Disputation though it is entitled to be regarded as a legitimate form of Debate in virtue of the consideration that both the proponent and the opponent respectively aim at establishing (their own position) and refuting (the opposite thesis), still it cannot be regarded as a different species of Debate from what is called a 'Legitimate Discourse'. The reason is that a legitimate discourse can entirely account for it (Disputation). It has been urged that the purpose (of a Disputation) is not served (by a Legitimate Discourse) in view of the frequent application of Casuistry, Sophism and Censures (in the former). But this is not a legitimate contention, inasmuch as the application of Casuistry and Sophism which are only the simulations of refutation is to be ruled out of court and as for Censures, they are incompatible with a Legitimate Discourse also. It is a truism that such improper devices as the use of whip, slap, and gagging of the mouth are not regarded as legitimate means of securing defeat of the opponent. The application, on the other hand, of legitimate censures is not anywise repugnant to a Legitimate Discourse. Thus there is no difference in character

between a Disputation and a Legitimate Discourse. As regards such coveted personal interests as gain, honour and reputation, they are apt to follow as a matter of necessity upon the achievement of the main objective, viz., the preservation of the conviction of truth and thus cannot be prevented (from operating as incentives) even in a (dispassionate) Philosophical Discourse, since (such desires) are natural to human beings.

71. *nanu chalajātiprayogo 'saduttaratvād vāde na bhavati, jalpe tu tasyānujñānād asti vādajalpayor viśeṣaḥ / yad āha –*

*“duḥśikṣitakutarkāmśaleśavācālitanānāḥ /*

*śakyāḥ kim anyathā jetuṁ vitanḍātopapaṇḍitāḥ //*

*gatānugatiko lokaḥ kumārgaṁ tatpratāritaḥ /*

*mā gād iti chalādīni prāha kārūṇiko munīḥ //” iti*

*naivam / asaduttaraiḥ parapratikṣepasya kartum ayuktatvāt; na hy anyāyena jayaṁ yaśo dhanam vā mahātmānaḥ samīhante /atha prabala-prativādidarśanāt tajjaye dharmadhvaṁsasambhāvanāt, pratibhākṣayeṇa samyaguttarasyaṇpratibhāsād asaduttarair api pāṁśubhir ivāvakirann ekāntaparājayād varam sandeha iti dhiyā na doṣam āvahatīti cet; na, asyāpavādikasya jātyuttaraprayogasya kathāntarasamarthanasāmorthyābhāvāt / vāda eva dravyakṣetrakālabhāvānusāreṇa yady asaduttaram kathamcana prayuñjīta kim etāvatā kthāntaram prasajyeta ? / tasmāj jalpavitāṇḍā-nirākaraṇena vāda evaikāḥ kathāprathāṁ labhata iti sthitam ||30||*

71. (Q) It is contended (by the Naiyāyika) that there is a fundamental difference between a Legitimate Discourse and a Disputation, because the application of Casuistry and Sophism, which are illegitimate forms of argument, is banned in a Legitimate Discourse whereas it meets with approbation in Disputation. As has been observed (by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in NM, p. 11) “How can such misguided zealots vociferously rattling forth the tiny tit-bits of sophistry and those even not properly taught and apt to show their proficiency in the vigorous pursuit of wrangling, be defeated except by recourse (to Casuistry and so on) ? The gracious sage has propounded Casuistry (and Sophism) with a view to guard against the eventuality that the mass of people, who are apt to follow blindly in the footsteps of others who show the way, may be inveigled into treading the wrong path being deluded by (the sophistry of) those (artful persons)”.

(A) No, this cannot be a legitimate procedure. It is improper to secure refutation of the opponent with unfair arguments. High-souled persons do not seek to attain, as a matter of established practice, either victory or fame or wealth by unfair means. It has been contended that (resort to such tactics) does not entail an offence when the opponent is found to be possessed of superior resources and a victory on his part is calculated to bring about loss of religion (on the part of the vanquished) and a legitimate counter-argument does not present itself owing to the loss of presence of mind, and in these circumstances the proponent attempts to throw dust (in the eyes of the opponent) by means of even unfair dialectic, realising that the emergence of a doubtful situation is preferable to certain defeat. But the contention is not convincing. It only shows that employment of such sophisms may be necessitated by a situation of exceptional gravity, but this cannot be regarded as the consideration powerful enough to vindicate the justice of its being considered as a distinct type of Debate. Suppose that the proponent is driven to employ an unfair argument even in a Legitimate Discourse in deference to the peculiar nature of a particular substance, time, place and function, will that alone make it assume the character of a different kind of Debate ? It is, therefore, established that a Legitimate Discourse alone is entitled to be considered as the only form of Debate in view of the fact that the claims of Disputation and Wrangling have been successfully demolished. (30)

72. *vādaś ca jayaparājayāvasāno bhavatīti jayaparājayayor lakṣaṇam āha –*

*svapakṣasya siddhir jayaḥ ||31||*

72. Considering that Legitimate Discourse is terminated by either victory or defeat, the author propounds the definition of victory and defeat (in the aphorism).

(Aph.) **Victory consists in the proof of one's respective position. (31)**

73. *vādinah prativādinō vā yā svapakṣasya siddhiḥ sā jayaḥ / sā ca svapakṣasāadhanadoṣaparihāreṇa parapakṣasāadhanadoṣodbhāvanena ca bhavati / svapakṣe sādhanam abruvaṇn api prativadī vādisāadhanasya viruddhatām udbhāvan vādinam jayati, viruddhatodbhāvanenaiva svapakṣe sādhanā-*



syoktatvāt / yad āha – “viruddham hetum udbhāvya vādinam jayatitarah” iti ||31||

**asiddhiḥ parājayah ||32||**

73. The proof of one's respective position either by the proponent or the opponent constitutes (his respective) victory. This again is compassed by repudiation of the charges brought against the probans employed in support of one's position, and by demonstration of defects in the probans employed in support of the opponent's position. The opponent succeeds even when he does not adduce a probans in support of his position in defeating the proponent by proving that the probans employed by the proponent is contradictory. The reason is that exposure of the contradictoriness (of the probans employed by the proponent) is tantamount to the statement of a probans in support of one's position. As has been observed : “The other party (opponent) defeats the proponent when the former shows the probans employed to be contradictory.” (31)

(Aph.) Defeat consists in the failure of proof. (32)

74. vādinah prativādino vā yā svapakṣasya ‘asiddhiḥ’ sā ‘parājayah’ / sā ca sādhanābhāsābhīdhānāt, samyaksādhane ‘pi vā paroktadūṣaṇānu-ddharaṇād bhavati ||32||

74. The failure to establish one's position whether by the proponent or by the opponent constitutes defeat (of the party concerned). This failure is due to the statement of a false probans, or to the inability to repudiate the charges advanced by the opponent against the probans employed in spite of its being legitimate. (32)

75. nanu yady asiddhiḥ parājayah, sa tarhi kīdṛṣo nigrahah ?, nigrāhāntā hi kathā bhavatīty āha –

**sa nigrāho vādiprativādinoh ||33||**

75. But a question is raised. If failure to prove one's position constituted defeat, what would then be the nature of censure ? It is common knowledge that a debate ultimately culminates in censure. In reply the author says :

(Aph.) That is censure of the proponent or the opponent. (33)

76. ‘saḥ’ parājaya eva ‘vādiprativādinoh’ ‘nigrahah’ na vadhabandhādi / athavā sa eva svapakṣāsiddhirūpaḥ parājayo nigrahahetutvād nigrāho nānyo

yathāhuḥ pare – “vipratipattir apratipattiś ca nigrahassthānam” [Nyāyasūtra, 1.2.19] iti ||33||

76. ‘That’, in other words, ‘defeat itself’ constitutes the censure of the proponent and the opponent, and not execution or imprisonment and the like. Or, that defeat alone consisting in the failure to prove one’s position is called censure (in a figurative way), since it is the cause of censure and it (censure) cannot be anything different as has been (erroneously) propounded by others : “The occasion of censure is misunderstanding or default of understanding” (NS, 1.2.19). (33).

77. tatrāha –

**na vipratipattyapratipattimātram ||34||**

77. In opposition to this the author asserts :

(Aph.) **Mere misunderstanding or default of understanding does not (constitute censure). (34)**

78. viparītā kutsitā vigarhaṇīyā pratipattiḥ ‘vipratipattiḥ’ – sādhanābhāse sādhanabuddhir dūṣaṇābhāse ca dūṣaṇabuddhiḥ / apratipattis tv ārambhaviṣaye ‘nārambhaḥ’ / sa ca sādhane dūṣaṇam dūṣaṇe coddharaṇam tayor akaraṇam ‘apratipattiḥ’ / dvidhā hi vadī parājīyate – yathākartavyam apratipadyamāno viparītaṁ vā pratipadyamāna iti / vipratipattyapratipatti eva ‘vipratipattyapratipattimātram’ ‘na’ parājayahetuḥ kintu svapakṣasyāsiddhir eveti / vipratipattyapratipattyos ca nigrahassthānatvanirāsāt tadbhedānām api nigrahassthānatvaṁ nirastam /

78. Misunderstanding is understanding which is perverted, vitiated and worthy of condemnation. It consists in regarding a false probans as a legitimate probans, and a false confutation as a legitimate confutation. As regards ‘default of understanding’, it consists in the failure to accomplish the object due to be accomplished. This (‘failure to accomplish’) is again (illustrated by) the ‘failure to achieve’ the confutation of the probans (employed by the other party), and the repudiation of the objection (of the opponent), and this constitutes ‘default of understanding’. It is held that the proponent is defeated in either way, viz., when he fails to attend to what is to be done or resorts to the opposite course. The expression ‘mere misunderstanding and default of understanding’ means misunderstanding and default of understanding *per se*. The expression ‘does not (constitute

censure)' means that it is not the cause of defeat. On the contrary, the failure to prove one's own position alone (is the cause of defeat and censure). It follows from the repudiation of misunderstanding and default of understanding as the occasion of censure that the varieties of the same are also to be repudiated as occasions of censure.

79. *te ca dvāviṃśatir bhavanti / tadyathā – 1. pratijñāhāniḥ, 2. pratijñāntaram, 3. pratijñāvirodhaḥ, 4. pratijñāsamnyāsaḥ, 5. hetvantaram, 6. arthāntaram, 7. nirarthakam, 8. avijñātārtham, 9. apārthakam, 10. aprāptakālam, 11. nyūnam, 12. adhikam, 13. punaruktam, 14. ananubhāṣaṇam, 15. ajñānam, 16. apratibhā, 17. vikṣepaḥ, 18. matānujñā, 19. paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇam, 20. niranuyojoyānuyogaḥ, 21. apasiddhāntaḥ, 22. hetvābhāsāś ceti / atrānanubhāṣaṇam ajñānam apratibhā vikṣepaḥ paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇam ity apratipattiprakārāḥ / śeṣā vipratipattibhedāḥ /*

79. These (censures) are again (said to be) of twenty-two varieties. They are as follows : (1) abandonment of the thesis; (2) amendment of the thesis; (3) contradiction of the thesis; (4) repudiation of the thesis; (5) amendment of the reason; (6) irrelevant digression; (7) meaningless jargon; (8) unintelligible assertion; (9) want of syntactical construction; (10) violation of the temporal order; (11) deficiency; (12) superfluity; (13) tautology; (14) failure of reproduction; (15) want of comprehension; (16) bewilderment; (17) evasion; (18) acceptance of the charge; (19) overlooking the censurable; (20) censure of the uncensurable; (21) acceptance of the opposite position; and (22) fallacies of reason also. Of these, silence, want of comprehension, bewilderment, evasion and overlooking the censurable are the different modes of default of understanding. The rest are the varieties of misunderstanding.

80. *tatra pratijñāhāner lakṣaṇam – “pratidrṣṭāntadharmānujñā svadrṣṭānte pratijñāhāniḥ” [Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.2] iti sūtram / asya Bhāṣyakāriyam vyākhyānam – “sādhyadharmapratyanīkena dharmeṇa pratyavasthitaḥ pratidrṣṭāntadharmaḥ svadrṣṭānte 'nujānan pratijñāṁ jahātīti pratijñāhāniḥ / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ aindriyakatvād ghaṭavad ity ukte paraḥ pratyavatiṣṭhate – sāmānyam aindriyakam nityam drṣṭam kasmān na tathā śabdo 'pīty evaṁ svaprayuktahetor ābhāsātām avasyann api kathāvasānam akṛtvā pratijñātyāgam karoti – yady aindriyakam sāmānyam nityam, kāmam ghato 'pi nityo*

'stv iti / sa khalv ayaṁ sādhanasya dṛṣṭāntasya nityatvaṁ prasajan nigamanāntam eva pakṣaṁ jahāti / pakṣaṁ ca parityajan pratijñāṁ jahātīty ucyate pratijñāśrayatvāt pakṣasyeti" [Nyāyabhāṣya, 5.2.2] / tad etad asaṅgatam eva, sākṣād dṛṣṭāntahānirūpatvāt tasyāḥ tatraiva dharmā parityāgāt / paramparayā tu hetūpanayanigamanānām api tyāgaḥ, dṛṣṭāntā-sādhutve teṣāṁ apy asādhutvāt / tathā ca pratijñāhānir evety asaṅgatam eva / Vārtikakāraḥ tu vyācāṣṭe – "dṛṣṭaś cāsāv ante sthitatvād antaś ceti dṛṣṭāntaḥ pakṣaḥ / svadṛṣṭāntaḥ svapakṣaḥ / pratidṛṣṭāntaḥ pratipakṣaḥ / pratipakṣasya dharmāṁ svapakṣe 'bhyanuḥjanan pratijñāṁ jahāti – yadi sāmānyam aindriyakam nityaṁ śabdo 'py evam astv iti" [Nyāyavārtika, 5.2.2] / tad etad api vyākhyānam asaṅgatam, ittham eva pratijñāhāner avadhārayitum aśakyatvāt / na khalu pratipakṣasya dharmāṁ svapakṣe 'bhyanuḥjanata eva pratijñātyāgo yenāyam eka eva prakāraḥ pratijñāhānau syāt, adhikṣepādibhir ākulībhāvāt prakṛtyā sabhābhīrutvād anyamanaskatvāder vā nimittāt kiñcit sādhyatvena pratijñāya tadviparītaṁ pratijñānānasyāpy upalambhāt puruṣabhrānter anekakāraṇakatvopapatter iti 1 /

80. Of these, the definition of 'abandonment of the thesis' is given in the aphorism (NS, 5. 2. 2.) : 'Abandonment of the thesis' consists in the admission of the property of the counter-example in the example cited by one's own self (the proponent). The interpretation of this as given by the Bhāṣyakāra (Vātsyāyana) is as follows : "When the proponent is assailed by the assertion of a property which is the opposite of the probandum and he admits the property belonging to the counter-example in the example cited by himself, he abandons his own thesis and this becomes a case of 'abandonment of the thesis'. Suppose, for example, the proponent puts forward the argument 'Sound is non-eternal because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, just as a jar is' and the opponent assails it (by the argument) 'A universal is perceptible by a sense-organ, but is observed to be eternal, why then sound also should not be so (eternal) ?' If in the situation the proponent does not terminate the debate, though realising the fallacy in the probans adduced by himself, but, on the contrary, asserts 'If a universal, though perceptible, be eternal, let the jar also be eternal (on your own showing)', he abandons his own thesis. The proponent in such a case abandons his whole position including the conclusion by admitting the

eternal existence of the example (the jar which he has) cited in proof (of his position). And by abandoning his own position, he is said to abandon the thesis, since the position is grounded upon the thesis" (NB, 5.2.2).

(Criticism) The interpretation given here entirely lacks relevancy since it amounts to direct abandonment of the example inasmuch as the predicated attribute is abandoned in the example alone. It is only indirectly that the reason, application and conclusion too are abandoned, since the unsoundness of the example entails the unsoundness of these factors (as a matter of necessity). It becomes, therefore, entirely devoid of bearing (upon the issue) to assert that it is only a case of 'abandonment of the thesis'.

The author of the Vārttika (Uddyotakara), on the other hand, proposes the following interpretation : "The word '*dr̥ṣṭānta*' (in the original aphorism NS, 5.2.2. does not mean example but the thesis which follows from the etymological meaning of the term, viz.,) that which is *dr̥ṣṭa* (observed) and *anta*, that is to say, that which is observed (to be established) at the end, and this is the thesis. The word *svadr̥ṣṭānta* therefore comes to mean one's own thesis and *pratidr̥ṣṭānta* is but the counter-thesis. When the proponent is driven to admit the presence of the attribute predicated in the counter-thesis as the predicate in his own thesis, he abandons his (original) thesis. [Suppose, for example, the proponent first asserts the syllogism 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is perceived by a sense-organ', and the opponent opposes it by asserting that universals also are perceived by sense-organ but they are nevertheless eternal and so the probans 'to be perceived by a sense-organ' is inconclusive. If now the proponent makes a fresh assertion] "well, if a universal, though perceivable by sense, is eternal, let also sound be so (eternal)" – (the proponent is said to surrender his thesis) (NV, 5. 2. 2.).

(Criticism) This interpretation also is not quite sound, since it makes it impossible to arrive at an exclusive (and exhaustive) determination of the nature of the 'abandonment of the thesis'. It is certainly not a fact that 'abandonment of the thesis' arises only when the proponent admits the presence of the predicate of the counter-thesis in his own thesis, and so this would be the only possible mode of 'abandonment of the thesis'. It is also found that a person originally makes assertion of one predicate and next

asserts the opposite predicate for various reasons such as personal embarrassment on account of a censure or a rebuff received, or owing to a natural timidity which makes him fight shy of the council, or absentmindedness. And it is a truism that human error may naturally be induced by causes more than one. (1)

81. *pratijñātārthapratīṣedhe pareṇa kṛte tatraiva dharmiṇi dharmāntaram sādhanīyam abhidadhataḥ pratijñāntaram nāma nigrahassthānam bhavati / anityaḥ śabdaḥ aindriyakatvād ity ukte tathaiva sāmānyena vya-bhicāre nodite yadi brūyāt – yuktam sāmānyam aindriyakam nityam tad hi sarvagatam asarvagatas tu śabda iti / so 'yam 'anityaḥ śabdaḥ' iti pūrvapratijñātaḥ pratijñāntaram 'asarvagataḥ śabdaḥ' iti kurvan pratijñāntareṇa nigrhīto bhavati / etad api pratijñāhānivan na yuktam, tasyāpy anekanimittatvopapatteḥ / pratijñāhānitaś cāsyā katham bhedaḥ, pakṣatyā-gasyobhayatrāviśeṣāt ? yathaiva hi pratidṛṣṭāntadharmasya svadrṣṭānte 'bhyanuñjānāt pakṣatyāgas tathā pratijñāntarād api / yathā ca svapakṣa-siddhyartham pratijñāntaram vidhīyate tathā śabdānityatvasiddhyartham bhrāntivaśāt 'tadvac chabdo 'pi nityo 'stu' ity anuñjānam, yathā cābhrānta-syedaṁ viruddhyate tathā pratijñāntaram api / nimittabhedāc ca tadbhede aniṣṭanigrahassthānāntarāṇām apy anuṣaṅgaḥ syāt / teṣāṁ ca tatrāntarbhāve pratijñāntarasyāpi pratijñāhānāv antarbhāvaḥ syād iti 2 /*

81. When the matter of the thesis is controverted by the opponent and the proponent asserts some other property as the probandum with reference to the same subject, it turns out to be the occasion of the censure, viz., 'amendment of the thesis'. Suppose, for instance, that the proponent asserts the syllogism "Sound is non-eternal because it is perceptible by sense-organ" and the opponent drives home the failure of necessary concomitance (between non-eternity and sensibility) on the basis of universals. If in the circumstance (the proponent) observes (in defence) "It is quite legitimate that a universal, though sensible, is eternal since it is ubiquitous whereas sound is non-ubiquitous" the proponent here asserts a new thesis, viz., "Sound is non-ubiquitous" in opposition to his original thesis "Sound is non-eternal" and thus makes himself subject to censure 'amendment of the thesis'.

(Criticism) But this variety also is as unsound as 'abandonment of the thesis' since it can be induced by causes more than one. How again can there

be a difference in this variety from 'abandonment of the thesis' when there is no difference in respect of the surrender of position in both the varieties ? Just as the admission of the predicate of the counter-example in the example cited by oneself involves surrender of position, so also does the 'amendment of thesis'. Just as again the 'amendment of the thesis' is resorted to for the purpose of establishing one's position so also is the admission 'Let sound also be eternal like that (universal)' made through mistake for the purpose of establishing the thesis 'Sound is non-eternal'. Just again as this (veering of position) is an absurdity (and hence impossible) in a man who is not under delusion, such also is the 'amendment of the thesis'. If the difference of conditions be made the basis of the difference of these (two occasions of censure), it will make the admission of other undesirable cases of censure inevitable (in addition to the recognised types). If these (additional cases) can admit of inclusion in this ('abandonment of the thesis'), 'amendment of the thesis' can (with equal propriety) be subsumed under the same 'abandonment of the thesis'. (2)

82. *"pratijñāhetvor virodhaḥ pratijñāvirodhaḥ" [Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.4] nāma nigrahaśthānaṁ bhavati / yathā guṇavyatiriktaṁ dravyaṁ rūpādibhyo 'rthāntarasyānupalabdher iti / so 'yaṁ pratijñāhetvor virodhaḥ – yadi guṇavyatiriktaṁ dravyaṁ kathaṁ rūpādibhyo 'rthāntarasyānupalabdhiḥ ?, atha rūpādibhyo 'rthāntarasyānupalabdhiḥ kathaṁ guṇavyatiriktaṁ dravyam iti ?, tad ayaṁ pratijñāviruddhābhīdhanāt parājīyate / tad etad asaṅgatam / yato hetunā pratijñāyāḥ pratijñātve niraste prakārāntarataḥ pratijñāhānir eveyam uktā syāt, hetudoṣo vā viruddhatālakṣaṇaḥ, na pratijñādoṣa iti 3 /*

82. "Contradiction of the thesis' consists in contradiction between the thesis and the reason" (NS, 5. 2.4) and this is an occasion of censure. It is illustrated in the following syllogism : 'Substance is distinct and different from qualities since no entity different from colour and the like is perceived'. Herein is a contradiction between the thesis and the reason. If there be a substance different and distinct from qualities, how can there be non-cognition of an entity distinct from colour and the like ? If, on the other hand, there be no cognition of an entity different from colour and the like, how can you affirm (the proposition) 'Substance is different from quality ? In the circumstance the proponent is declared

vanquished for his assertion (of a clause) repugnant to the thesis.

(Criticism) This verily is an untenable position. For the probans (only) serves to demonstrate that the thesis (employed) does not possess the requisite characteristics of a thesis proper and this amounts to a statement in different words that the present case is nothing different from 'abandonment of the thesis'. Or, it is case of a fallacy of reason called contradictory and is not a defect of the thesis. (3)

83. *pakṣasādhane pareṇa dūṣite taduddharaṇāśaktyā pratijñām eva nihnuvānasya pratijñāsamnyāso nāma nigrahassthānaṁ bhavati / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ aindriyakatvād ity ukte tathaiva sāmānyenānaikāntikatāyām udbhāvitāyām yadi brūyāt ka evam āha anityaḥ śabda iti sa pratijñāsamnyāsāt parājito bhavatīti / etad api pratijñāhānito na bhidyate, hetor anaikāntikatvopalambhenātrāpi pratijñāyāḥ parityāgāviśeṣāt 4 /*

83. When the probans employed in support of one's position is confuted by the opponent and (the proponent) finding himself unable to meet the objection, repudiates his thesis, he becomes liable to the censure called 'repudiation of the thesis'. Suppose, for instance, the proponent asserts the syllogism 'Sound is non-eternal because it is perceptible by a sense' and (the opponent) exposes the fallacy of inconclusive reason on the basis of universals. If, in the circumstance, the proponent retorts "Who says that sound is non-eternal ?" he is vanquished on the ground of repudiation of the thesis.

(Criticism) This, too, does not differ (in substance) from 'abandonment of the thesis' since (the proponent) here realises that his reason is inconclusive (and practically surrenders his thesis) and consequently 'repudiation of the thesis' is not practically different from 'abandonment of the thesis'. (4)

84. *aviśeṣābhihite hetau pratiṣiddhe tadviśeṣaṇam abhidadhato hetvantaram nāma nigrahassthānaṁ bhavati / tasminn eva prayoge tathaiva sāmānyasya vyabhicāreṇa dūṣite - 'jātimattve sati' ityādiviśeṣaṇam upādāno hetvantareṇa nigrhīto bhavati / idam apy atiprasṛtam, yato 'viśeṣokte drṣtānte upanaye nigamane vā pratiṣiddhe viśeṣam icchato drṣtāntādyantaram api nigrahassthānāntaram anuṣajyeta, tatrāpy ākṣepāsamādhānānāṁ samānatvād iti 5 /*



84. When a reason stated without a qualification is refuted (by the opponent) and (the proponent) qualifies it by an adjective, it becomes a case of censure called 'amendment of the reason'. If the aforesaid syllogism is controverted as before on the ground of lack of necessary concomitance in the case of universal and the proponent seeks to qualify the reason ('perceptible by a sense-organ') by the adjective 'being possessed of a universal', he becomes liable to the censure called 'amendment of the reason'.<sup>1</sup>

(Criticism) (The admission of) this involves far-reaching consequences. For instance, if example, application or conclusion be stated without qualification and (the opponent) finds fault with them and (the proponent turns round and) proposes to add a qualifying adjective (in each case), this would make inevitable the admission of other types of censure, viz., 'amendment of the example' and so on – there being absolute uniformity in the objections and their solutions here as elsewhere ('amendment of the reason'). (5)

85. *prakṛtād arthād arthāntaram tad anaupayikam abhidadhato 'rthāntaram nāma nigrahassthānam bhavati / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ / kṛtakatvād iti hetuḥ / hetur iti hinoter dhātos tupratyaye kṛdantam padam / padam ca nāmākhyātanipātopasargā iti prastutya nāmādini vyācakṣaṇo 'rthāntareṇa nigrhyate / etad apy arthāntaram nigrahassthānam samarthe sādhanē dūṣaṇe vā prokte nigrahāya kalpeta, asamarthe vā ? na tāvat samarthe; svasādhyaṁ prasādhya nṛtyato 'pi doṣābhāvāl lokavat / asamarthe 'pi prativādinah pakṣasiddhau tat nigrahāya syād asiddhau vā ? prathamapakṣe*

1. A thing may be perceptible by a sense-organ and yet eternal, for instance, a universal. So when the proponent seeks to establish that 'Word is non-eternal' on the ground of its being perceptible, he is guilty of employing an inconclusive reason. If in the situation the opponent charges him with the fallacy of inconclusive reason, and the proponent seeks to wriggle out by proposing the adjective 'being possessed of universal' he is convicted of giving up his original reason and resorting to a fresh one. Of course, the charge of inconclusive reason is avoided when the syllogism is put in the form 'Word is non-eternal because it is perceptible by a sense-organ, being possessed of a universal'. The rider 'being possessed of a universal' serves to eliminate universals which though perceptible are not possessed of other universals according to the dictum 'A universal cannot be informed by another universal'.

*tatpakṣasiddher evāśya nigrāho na tv ato nigrāhasthānāt / dvitīyapakṣe 'py ato na nigrāhaḥ, pakṣasiddher ubhayor apy abhāvād iti 6/*

85. When a person makes assertion of a fact which is entirely different from and has no bearing upon the matter under consideration, he is liable to censure called 'irrelevant digression'. For instance, when a man asserts the syllogism "Word is non-eternal, the reason (*hetu*) is that it is a product. The word *hetu* (reason) is derived from the root *√hi* with the *kṛt*-suffix *tu*. It is thus a significant word (*pada*). Significant words are of four kinds, viz., nominal base (*nāman*), a verb-form (*ākhyāta*), an indeclinable (*nipāta*), and a prefix (*upasarga*)" and then sets forth the nature of these nominal bases, and so on, he is liable to the censure called 'irrelevant digression'.

(Criticism) Well, the question is this – Is this 'irrelevant digression', which is regarded as an occasion of censure, calculated to bring about defeat when the reason adduced in support or refutation is found to be valid or when invalid ? Certainly there is no occasion (for the censure) when the reason is valid. If a person has successfully established his thesis and then like ordinary people even begins to dance in joy, what is there to be found fault with in his conduct ? And even supposing that the reason is invalid, does it become an occasion of censure after the opponent has established his thesis or before he does so ? On the first alternative, the establishment of the opponent's thesis itself encompasses the defeat of the proponent and the defeat is not due to this (irrelevant digression). On the second alternative, again, the question of defeat does not arise simply because both the parties are on the same footing as neither has established his position. (6)

86. *abhidheyarahitavarṇānupūrvīprayogamātram nirarthakam nāma nigrāhasthānam bhavati / yathā anityaḥ śadbhaḥ kacaṭatapānām gajāda-dabativād ghajhaḍhadhabhavad iti / etad api sarvathārthaśūnyatvān nigrāhāya kalpeta, sādhyānupayogād vā ? tatrādyavikalpo 'yuktaḥ sarvathārthaśūnyaśabdasyaivāsambhavāt, varṇakramanirdeśasyāpy anukāryeṇārthenārthavattvopapatteḥ / dvitīyavikalpe tu sarvam eva nigrāhasthānam nirarthakam syāt sādhyasiddhāv anupayogitvāviśeṣāt / kiñcidviśeṣamātreṇa bhede vā khātīkṛta-hastāsphālana-kakṣāpiṭṭitāder api sādhyānupayogīno nigrāhasthānāntaratvānuṣaṅga iti 7 /*

86. The mere utterance of a number of unmeaning syllables in succession is the occasion of censure called 'meaningless jargon'. For instance, "Word is non-eternal because a, b, c, d are e, f, g, h, like i, j, k, l".

(Criticism) Well, does this variety also become an occasion of censure because (the reason employed) is absolutely devoid of all meaning, or because it has no bearing upon the probandum ? The first horn of the dilemma is opposed to reason, since a word absolutely devoid of meaning is an impossibility. As regards the series of letters articulated in succession, they too have a meaning in the shape of the phonetic values which are represented by them<sup>1</sup>. If the second horn of the dilemma be admitted, all the types of censure would be reduced to this variety of 'meaningless jargon' inasmuch as there is no difference *inter se* so far as this lack of bearing upon the proof of the probandum is taken into consideration. If the difference caused by slight variations is made the ground of the difference of the types of censure, then a mimic cry, a wave of the hand and a poke in the sides of the opponent's body and such other acts, should also be regarded as occasions of censure in view of their lack of bearing on the probandum. (7)

87. *yat sādhanavākyaṃ dūṣaṇavākyaṃ vā trir abhihitam api pariṣatprativādibhyāṃ boddhuṃ na śakyate tat avijñātārthaṃ nāma nigrāhasthānaṃ bhavati / atredam ucyate – vādinā trir abhihitam api vākyaṃ pariṣatprativādibhyāṃ mandamatitvād avijñātam, gūḍhābhīdhānato vā, drutocārād vā ? prathamapakṣe satsādhanavādinō 'py etan nigrāhasthānaṃ syāt, tatrāpy anayor mandamatitvenāvijñātatvasambhavāt / dvitīyapakṣe tu patravākya-prayoge 'pi tatprasāṅgaḥ, gūḍhābhīdhānatayā pariṣatprativādinor mahā-prājñayor apy avijñātatvopalambhāt / athābhyāṃ avijñātam apy etat vādī vyācaṣṭe; gūḍhopanyāsam apy ātmanaḥ sa eva vyācaṣṭām, avyākhyāne tu*

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1. The meaning of a word is that which is expressed by it. The expressed meaning is in the generality of cases a fact which is apparently independent of the word. But if we look closer it will transpire that the fact expressed as the meaning is coloured by the expression and this is the reason why two synonyms do not express an absolutely identical fact. Thus in poetry the same fact is best expressed by the same word repeated twice and a different synonym fails to bring out the identity aimed at. Cf. "The sun rises red and red it sets. The behaviour of the wise is absolutely uniform in prosperity and in adversity."

*jayābhāva evāśya, na punar nigrahaḥ, parasya pakṣasiddher abhāvāt / drutoccāre 'py anayoḥ kathañcit jñānaṁ sambhavaty eva, siddhānta-dvayaveditvāt / sādhyānupayogini tu vādinaḥ pralāpamātre tayoḥ avijñānaṁ nāvijñātārthaṁ varṇakramanirdeśavat / tato nedam avijñātārthaṁ nirarthakād bhidyata iti 8 /*

87. If a syllogism aiming at establishing a conclusion or at demolishing it be such as not to be capable of being understood, though reiterated thrice, by both the council and the other party, it becomes an object of censure called 'unintelligible assertion'.

(Criticism) Hereupon we propose to make the following observation : Is the failure on the part of the council and of the opponent to understand the meaning of the syllogism propounded by the proponent, though reiterated for three times, due to their dull understanding, or recondite expressions or swift articulation ? On the first alternative, even a person who propounds a logically sound syllogism runs the risk of falling a victim to this censure, since there is every possibility of his being not understood by the council and the opponent on account of their dullness of intellect. On the second alternative, there is a risk (of the application) of this (censure) to the syllogism of epistolary debate since it is an usual occurrence that owing to the employment of recondite expressions in them, such syllogisms are not understood by the council and the opponent though they may be men of high intellectual equipment. If it be contended that when the syllogism in question fails to be understood by these parties (the council and the opponent) the proponent explains the meaning of the same (and so the debate proceeds without hitch), then here also let the proponent himself explain the meaning of the recondite expressions (to the satisfaction of the parties concerned). If no explanation be forthcoming (from the proponent),

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*udeti savitā tāmras tāmra evāstam eti ca /*

*sampattau ca vipattau ca sādḥnām ekarūpatā /*

If the word 'red' be replaced by a synonym, say scarlet, the uniformity stressed will not be secured so much as by the repetition of the same word. This shows that the content or the meaning of a word is not only an objective fact but also its own self, rather a complex of the two. Even when a word has no meaning in the shape of an objective fact, it has a meaning so far as its own form is concerned. Accordingly, Hemacandra asserts that a word absolutely devoid of meaning is an impossibility.

he will be declared to have failed to score victory, but not to be defeated so long as the opponent does not establish his own position. As for swift articulation, it is quite possible that the council and the opponent should somehow succeed in gaining insight into the meaning inasmuch as they are conversant with the final position of both the advocates. If, on the other hand, the proponent's argument be found to be unmeaning nonsense absolutely devoid of any bearing upon the matter at issue, the failure of understanding on the part of the council and the opponent will not make it unintelligible assertion, just as the utterance of (unmeaning) syllables in succession (is not deemed as a case of the censure called 'unintelligible assertion'). So this 'unintelligible assertion' does not differ from the censure called 'meaningless jargon'.

88. *pūrvāparāsaṅgatapadasamūhaprayogād apratiṣṭhitavākyaṛtham apārthakaṁ nāma nigrasthānaṁ bhavati / yathā daśa dāḍimāni ṣaḍ apūpā ityādi / etad api nirarthakān na bhidyate / yathāiva hi gajāḍadabāḍau varṇānāṁ nairarthakyaṁ tathātra padānāṁ iti / yadi punaḥ padanairarthakyaṁ varṇanairarthakyād anyatvān nigrasthānāntaraṁ tarhi vākyanairarthakyaṣyāpy ābhyāṁ anyatvān nigrasthānāntaratvaṁ syāt padavat paurvāparyeṇāprayujyamānānāṁ vākyaṇāṁ apy anekadhopalabhyāt – “śaṅkhaḥ kadalyāṁ kadaliṁ ca bheryāṁ tasyāṁ ca bheryāṁ sumahad vimānam / tac chaṅkhabherikadalīvimānam unmattagaṅgapratimaṁ babhūva //” ityādivat /*

88. When a series of words without connection between the antecedent and the consequent is pronounced and consequently there is failure of the proposition to establish any meaning (connected judgement), it becomes a case of censure called 'want of syntactical construction'. Such (unconnected statements) as 'ten pomegranates, six cakes' and the like are instances in point.

(Criticism) This variety, too, does not differ from 'meaningless jargon'. Just as the letters e, f, g, h are devoid of meaning and purpose, so are also the words in the instances quoted above. If, on the other hand, the meaninglessness of words be regarded as a different variety of censure on account of its difference from the meaninglessness of letters, then the meaninglessness of sentences (for want of logical connection between the

antecedent and the consequent) should be regarded as a different type of censure on account of its difference from both the aforesaid types. It is frequently found that sentences also are employed without reference to the logical relevancy of the antecedent and the consequent. The following case will serve as an illustration : "The conch was on the banana, the banana was again on the trumpet and in that trumpet again there was the firmament of extraordinary magnitude. These conch, trumpet, banana and firmament became like the Ganges in fury".

89. *yadi punaḥ padanairarthakyam eva vākyanairarthakyam padasamudāyātmakatvāt tasya; tarhi varṇanairarthakyam eva padanairarthakyam syāt varṇasamudāyātmakatvāt tasya / varṇānām sarvatra nirarthakatvāt padasyāpi tatprasāṅgaś cet; tarhi padasyāpi nirarthakatvāt tatsamudāyātmano vākyasyāpi nairarthakyānuṣaṅgaḥ / padasyārthavattve ca padārthāpekṣayā; varṇārthāpekṣayā varṇasyāpi tad astu prakṛtipratyayādivat; na khalu prakṛtiḥ kevalā padam pratyayo vā / nāpy anayor anarthakatvam / abhiviyaktārthābhāvād anarthakatve; padasyāpi tat syāt / yathaiva hi prakṛtyarthah pratyayenābhiviyajyate pratyayārthas ca prakṛtyā tayoh kevalayor aprayogāt tathā Devadattas tiṣṭhatītyādiprayoge syādyantapadārthasya tyādyantapadārthasya ca styādyantapadenābhiviyakteḥ kevalasyāprayogaḥ / padāntarāpekṣasya padasya sārthakatvam prakṛtyapekṣasya pratyayasya tadapekṣasya ca prakṛtyādivarṇasya samānam iti 9 /*

89. Again it might be contended that meaninglessness of a sentence (i.e., a meaningless sentence) is at bottom nothing but meaninglessness of words (i.e., meaningless words) since a sentence is nothing but a collection of words. But in that case meaninglessness of a word (i.e., a meaningless word) would not be anything different from meaninglessness of letters (i.e., meaningless letters) since a word is nothing but a collection of letters. But if that be the case (in other words, if meaninglessness of a word be derived from meaninglessness of letters) a word as such would have to be regarded as meaningless (as a matter of universal necessity) since (its constituent) letters are meaningless in all cases. If so, the contingency of a sentence also being devoid of meaning would be unavoidable since a sentence is nothing but a collection of words, and words by themselves are devoid of meaning. If, on the contrary, a word be regarded as significant in relation to its own

meaning, a letter also should be regarded as significant in relation to its own meaning just as is the case with the base and the suffix. It is a truism that neither a base nor a suffix independently by itself is a completed word, but still they are not regarded as devoid of meaning. If these (constituent elements of a word) be condemned to be meaningless on account of their lack of an independent self-manifest meaning, a word also would be open to such a charge. Just as the meaning of the base is manifested only by the suffix (associated with it) and the meaning of the suffix, on the other hand, is manifested by the base (to which it is added), and (this is evident from the fact) that neither of them can be used by themselves in isolation, so also in the sentence *Devadattas tiṣṭhati* (Devadatta is standing), the meaning of the word ending in suffix *si* (*Devadattaḥ*) is manifested by the word ending in the suffix *ti* (*tiṣṭhati*) and the meaning of the word ending in the suffix *ti* (*tiṣṭhati*) is manifested by the word ending in the suffix *si* (*Devadattaḥ*, as mutually associated). And so it is never found to be the case that these words (as constituent parts of the sentence) are employed by themselves (being incapable of conveying a self-sufficient meaning). The relative significance of a word in reference to another word (with which it is in construction) is in the same position as the relative significance of a suffix in reference to a base, and of a base in reference to a suffix which are (not infrequently found to consist of isolated) letters. (9)

90. *pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanavacanakramam ullaṅghyāvayavaviparyāsenā prayujyamānam anumānavākyam aprāptakālaṁ nāma nigrāhasthānaṁ bhavati, svapratipattivat parapratipatter janane parārthanumāne kramasyāpy aṅgatvāt / etad apy apeśalam, prekṣāvatānṁ pratipattṛṇām avayavakramaniyamaṁ vināpy arthapratipattyupalambhāt / nanu yathāpaśabdāc chrutāc chabdasmarāṇam tato 'rthapratyaya itī śabdād evārthapratyayaḥ paramparayā tathā pratijñādyavayavavyutkramāt tatkrāmasmarāṇam tato vākyārthapratyayo na punas tadvyutkramāt; ity apy asāram, evaṁvidhapratītyabhāvāt / yasmād hi śabdād uccarītāt yatrārthe pratītiḥ sa eva tasya vācako nānyaḥ, anyathā śabdāt tatkrāmāc cāpaśabde tadvyatikrame ca smaraṇam tato 'rthapratītir ity api vaktuṁ śakyeta / evaṁ śabdānvākhyānavaiyarthyaṁ itī cet; naivam, vādino 'niṣṭamātrāpādanāt apaśabde 'pi cānvākhyānasyopalambhāt / saṁskṛtāc chabdāt satyāt dharmo*

*'nyasmād adharmā iti niyame cānyadharmādharmopāyānuṣṭhānavaiyarthyaṁ dharmādharmayoś cāpratiniyamaprasaṅgaḥ, adhārmike ca dhārmike ca tacchabdopalambhāt / bhavatu vā tatkrāmād arthapratītis tathāpy artha-pratyayaḥ krameṇa sthito yena vākyena vyutkramyate tan nirarthakaṁ na tv aprāptakālam iti 10 /*

90. When the sequence of the statement of thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion is violated and the syllogism is stated with the reversal of the order of the members, it becomes a case of censure called 'violation of the temporal order'. Even in a syllogistic argument the sequential order is also a condition of the understanding (of the process of inference) by another person (for whose conviction the argument is made) just as it (i.e., the order) is found to be the case (in the process of) subjective understanding (inference).

(Criticism) This (argument) too is not cogent at all. It is found that persons possessed of (average) intelligence do comprehend the drift of an argument even when the members are stated in opposition to the customary order. It has been contended that where the order of the members of a syllogism, thesis and the rest is reversed, the understanding of the meaning of the propositions is due to their adjustment in the proper order through memory and not due to the improper order (in which the argument is stated), just as it is the case with a corrupted word which as soon as it is heard gives rise to the recollection of the correct word, and then the meaning is understood and thus the understanding of the meaning is really due to the (correct) word (known) through a medium. But this (defence) entirely lacks substance, because the process of understanding does not really occur in this wise. (The analogy of correct word is besides the point). That word alone is the denoter, and not anything else, of the meaning which is understood as soon as a word is uttered. Were it not the case, it might (with equal plausibility) be contended that a correct word helps the recollection of the (so-called) corrupt word (which is the familiar form) and the correct order gives rise to the memory of the so-called incorrect order and the understanding of the meaning is due to this (intermediary process). It may however be urged that this (contention, if true) would make the inculcation of (correct) words (in standard grammatical works) absolutely



nugatory. No, (it is far from our purpose to decry the value of standard grammatical works); what we want to establish is that the position of the advocate (of the conventional order) is liable to lead to such undesirable contingency. Moreover, it is found that so-called corrupt words are also the subject of grammatical treatment (in standard works of Prakrit Grammar and they are shown to be governed by fixed laws and so it is doubtful whether the palm of superiority should be accorded to Sanskrit words or Prakrit words). If it is made the rule that the use of true Sanskrit words gives rise to religious merit and departure from this generates demerit (as has been propounded by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya*), then this would deprive the performance of the ceremonies declared to be means to merit and demerit in other systems of religion of all its value. Not only this, but the necessary determination of merit and demerit would be made impossible since it is not an unusual experience that the appellation of meritorious is applied to the unmeritorious and *vice versa* (and language, Sanskrit or Prakrit, cannot be made the rational criterion of religious merit or demerit). Even taking for granted that understanding of the meaning takes place in that very order, still the statement which violates the order in which meaning is understood should be dubbed 'meaningless jargon' and not a case of 'violation of temporal order'. (10)

91. *pañcāvayave vākye prayuktavye tadanyatamenāpy avayavena hīnaṁ nyūnaṁ nāma nigrasthānaṁ bhavati, sādhanābhāve sādhyasiddher abhāvāt, pratijñādīnāṁ ca pañcānām api sādhanatvāt; ity apy asamīcinam, pañcāvayavaprayogam antareṇāpi sādhyasiddher abhidhānāt pratijñāhetuprayogam antareṇaiva tatsiddher abhāvāt / atas taddhīnam eva nyūnaṁ nigrasthānam iti 11 /*

91. The syllogism to be employed must consist of five members and if it be lacking in any one of the members, it would be a case of censure called 'deficiency'. (The *raison d'être* of this censure lies in the fact that) the conclusion cannot be established if there be lack in the organ of proof and all the five members headed by the thesis constitute the organ.

(Criticism) This, too, is not a sound case. The establishment of conclusion has been shown even to be accomplished without the employment of all the five members. The conclusion cannot be established only

when (the two members)—the thesis and the reason are not stated. (So it is in consonance with the requirements of reason that) only when there is deficiency of anyone of these (two members), it should be regarded as a case of 'deficiency' and not other wise. (11)

92. *ekenaiva hetunodāharaṇena vā pratipādite 'rthe hetvantaram udāharaṇāntaram vā vadato 'dhikam nāma nigrahassthānam bhavati niṣprayojanābhidhānāt / etad apy ayuktam, tathāvidhād vākyaṭ pakṣasiddhau parājayāyogāt / katham caivam pramāṇasaṃplavo 'bhyupagamyate ? abhyupagame vā 'dhikan nigrahāya jāyeta / pratipattidārḍhyasaṃvādasiddhi-prayojanasadbhāvāt na nigrahaḥ; ity anyatrāpi samānam, hetunodāharaṇena vaikena prasādhite 'py arthe dvitīyasya hetor udāharaṇasya vā nānarthakyam, tatprayojanasadbhāvāt / na caivam anavasthā, kasyacit kvacin nirākāṅkṣa-topapatteḥ pramāṇāntaravat / katham cāsya kṛtakatvādau svārthikakapratyayasya vacanam, yat kṛtakam tad anityam iti vyāptau yattadvacanam, vṛttipadaprayogād eva cārthapratipattau vākyaaprayogaḥ adhikativān nigrahassthānam na syāt ? tathāvidhasyāpy asya pratipattiviśeṣopāyatvāt tan neti cet; katham anekasya hetor udāharaṇasya vā tadupāyabhūtasya vacanam nigrahādhikaraṇam ? nirarthakasya tu vacanam nirarthakatvād eva nigrahassthānam nādhikativād iti 12 /*

92. When a conclusion is established by means of one reason or one example, the statement of a second reason or second example constitutes the occasion of a censure called 'superfluity' inasmuch as such statement does not serve any additional purpose.

(Criticism) This also is not supported by reason. If such statements are conducive to the establishment of the position there is no reason why it should be regarded as an occasion of defeat. If such (addition of reason or example be regarded as cases of superfluity) why should you (the Naiyāyika) endorse the possibility of the convergence of different cognitive organs (upon an identical object of knowledge) ? The endorsement (of this possibility) should, on the other hand, be an occasion of the censure of superfluity. If it be not regarded as an occasion of censure on the ground of its fulfilment of a (necessary) purpose in that it (the subsequent cognition) furnishes verification which is conducive to the confirmation of (previous) cognition, then the advantage may be the same in the other case also. When

a fact is established by means of one reason or one example, the addition of a second reason or a second example need not necessarily be superfluous inasmuch as it may fulfil exactly the same purpose. Nor should it be thought to involve a *regressus ad infinitum* since there may be a situation in which further demand (for an additional reason or example) may be set at rest. It is exactly on a par with the case of other cognitive organs (which are not called in request when the conviction has reached the maximum level and so the possibility and necessity of verification by another species of knowledge do not give rise to an infinite regress even according to the Naiyāyikas). [If you Naiyāyika be such a stickler for economy] then why should you make use of such expressions as *kṛtaka* (product) in which suffix *ka* has the same meaning as the base (*kṛta*, and no additional meaning of its own); why again should you state the universal concomitance in the form *yat kṛtakam tad anityam* (that is impermanent which is a product) by insertion of *yat* (which) and *tat* (that) when a compound word (sic. *kṛtakānityam*) would also convey the same meaning ? Why should not employment of a sentence in such a case be an object of censure on the ground of superfluity ? If it be held that such (apparently superfluous expressions) are the necessary means of communication of a special meaning and as such they are not (cases of censure of superfluity), then why should the employment of more than one reason or example which are (equally effective) means of (communication of additional meaning) be an occasion of censure ? As regards the statement (of a reason or an example) which does not serve any additional purpose it becomes an occasion of censure on the ground of its lack of meaning and purpose and not on the ground of superfluity. (12)

93. *śabdārthayoḥ punar vacanaṁ punaruktaṁ nāma nigrahassthānaṁ bhavaty anyatrānuvādāt / śabdapunaruktaṁ nāma yatra sa eva śabdaḥ punar uccāryate / yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ anityaḥ śabda iti / arthapunaruktaṁ tu yatra so 'rthaḥ prathamam anyena śabdenoktaḥ punaḥ paryāyāntareṇocyate / yathā anityaḥ śabdo vināśī dhvanir iti / anuvāde tu paunaruktyam adoṣo yathā "hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punar vacanaṁ nigamanam" [Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.39] iti / atrārthapunaruktaṁ evānupapannaṁ na śabdapunaruktaṁ, arthabhedenā śabdasāmye 'py asyāsambhavāt yathā –*

hasati hasati svāminy uccairudaty atiroditi,  
 kṛtaparikaram svedodgāri pradhāvati dhāvati |  
 guṇasamuditam doṣāpetam praṇindati nindati,  
 dhanalavaparikrītam yantram pranṛtyati nṛtyati ||

[Vādanyāya, p. 111]

ityādi / tataḥ spaṣṭārthavācakaiḥ tair evānyair vā śabdaiḥ sabhyāḥ prati-  
 pādanīyāḥ / tadapratipādakaśabdānāṃ tu sakṛt punaḥ punar vābhidhānaṃ  
 nirarthakaṃ na tu punaruktam iti / yad api arthād āpannasya svaśabdena  
 punarvacanaṃ punaruktam uktam yathā asatsu megheṣu vṛṣṭir na bhavatīty  
 ukte arthād āpadyate satsu bhavatīti tat kaṇṭhena kathyamānaṃ punaruktaṃ  
 bhavati, arthagatyartho hi śabdaprayoge pratīte 'rthe kiṃ teneti ? etad api  
 pratipannārthapratipādatvena vaiyarthīyāt nigrāhasthānaṃ nānyathā /  
 tathā cedam nirarthakāt na viśiṣyeteti 13 /

93. The reiteration of word and meaning except in subsequent reference is an occasion of censure called 'tautology'. Reiteration of the same word (verbal tautology) occurs when the same sound is uttered again. For example, 'Word is not eternal, and word is not eternal'. The reiteration of meaning (material tautology) arises when the same meaning is conveyed first by one expression and again conveyed by a synonymous expression. For example, 'word is not eternal, and sound is perishable'. (The two sentences convey the same meaning only in different language). But in subsequent reference, the reiteration does not constitute a fault, as for example, in the case of the conclusion in which there is restatement of the thesis on the basis of the (re-)statement of the reason.

(Criticism) With reference to these two varieties, it should be understood that it is reiteration of the same meaning and not the reiteration of the same word that is liable to censure. There is no tautology when there is difference of meaning though the language be the same. The following instance (shows that verbal repetition does not involve tautology) : "(What a pity !) the automaton (in the shape of a servant) indentured for a paltry sum of money laughs aloud when the master indulges in laughter; sets up a loud cry when he weeps; begins to run with girded loins and perspiring when he accelerates his walking pace; when he is in a censorious mood it sets about showering abuses (even) on what is possessed of merit and free from fault; and again when he dances, it

begins to cut capers at random.”<sup>1</sup>

The point is that the members of the council are to be enlightened by the same or other verbal expressions provided they are expressive of unambiguous meaning. The employment of words which do not express a clear sense whether once or time and again is a case of ‘meaningless jargon’ and not tautology. Again has it been observed that there is a further case of tautology when one makes an express statement, by means of (expressive) words, of a sense which is known by implication. As for instance, when one asserts ‘There is no rain, if there is no cloud’ and again expressly states in so many words ‘it rains, when there is cloud’ which is obviously understood by implication, it becomes a case of tautology. The use of language is necessitated for the communication of a meaning and what does it serve when the meaning is understood otherwise ?

(Criticism) This variety again becomes a case of censure on the ground of superfluity since it only conveys a sense already understood and not for any other reason (say, tautology). So this also does not differ from ‘meaningless jargon’. (13)

94. *parṣadā viditasya vādinā trir abhihitasyāpi yad apratyuccāraṇaṁ tad ananubhāṣaṇaṁ nāma nigrasthānaṁ bhavati, apratyuccārayan kim āśrayaṁ dūṣaṇaṁ abhidadhīti / atrāpi kiṁ sarvasya vādinoktasyānanubhāṣaṇaṁ uta yannāntarīyikā sādhyasiddhis tasyeti ? tatrādyah pakṣo ’yuktaḥ, paroḥkām aśeṣaṁ apratyuccārayato ’pi dūṣaṇavacanāvyāghātāt / yathā sarvaṁ anityaṁ sattvād ity ukte sattvād ity ayaṁ hetur viruddha iti hetum evocārya viruddhatodbhāvyate kṣaṇakṣayādyekānte sarvathārthakriyāvirodhāt sattvānupapatter iti ca samarthyate / tāvatā ca paroḥkāmhetor dūṣaṇāt kim anyocāraṇena ? ato yannāntarīyikā sādhyasiddhis tasyaivā-*

1. The verse quoted satirises the conduct of a servant who has no independent judgement of his own, but slavishly imitates the movement of his master in order to curry favour with him. The quotation is meant to show that though the same words are repeated in the original, they do not give rise to tautology since there is difference in the shades of meaning. We have not, however, attempted to preserve the sameness of verbal expression, since this would not give out the correct sense. The point of contrast lies in the fact that the same word is used for the servant’s conduct in imitation of that of the master with the addition of adverbial prefixes conveying exaggeration on the servant’s part.

*pratyuccāraṇam ananubhāṣaṇam pratipattavyam / athaivam dūṣayitum asamarthaḥ śāstrārthaparijñānaviśeṣavikalatvāt; tadāyam uttarāpratipatter eva tiskriyate na punar ananubhāṣaṇād iti 14 /*

94. The failure to reproduce (on the part of the opponent the argument), though enunciated by the proponent three times and understood by the council, constitutes the censure called 'failure of reproduction'. The *raison d'être* (of the censure lies in the consideration) that when he fails even to give utterance (to the argument employed), what (part of the argument) can he be expected to assail by way of refutation ?

(Criticism) In this connection, (it may be asked whether 'failure of reproduction' complained of is understood to be constituted by) the non-reproduction of the entire argument propounded by the proponent, or of that part of the argument, without which the conclusion cannot be established (that is to say, of the essential condition which necessarily leads to the establishment of the thesis). Now, the first of these alternatives is untenable, inasmuch as the possibility of refutation is not precluded for a person even though he does not care to reiterate the whole argument propounded by the other party. To take a typical instance, suppose one argues "All is impermanent, because of being existent" and the other party quotes only the reason and shows that it is vitiated by the fallacy of the contradictory reason by asserting the proposition "The reason 'because of being existent' is contradictory", and further vindicates (his argument) by asserting "If things were absolutely momentary, then they would not have any reason to be existent, because exercise of causal efficiency (the only accepted criterion of existence) in every possible way is incompatible (with momentary existence)". What will be the point in the reiteration of the other parts (of the argument) when this much constitutes the sufficient confutation of the reason adduced by the proponent ? So it must be admitted that 'failure of reproduction' is constituted by the non-utterance exclusively of that (part of the argument) without which the conclusion cannot be established. If, on the other hand, the opponent proves unable to refute (the proponent's thesis) on account of the lack of adequate knowledge of the contents of the science (of logic), then he will be liable to be censured for lack of knowledge of the counter-argument and not for 'the failure of reproduction'. (14)

95. *parṣadā vijñātasyāpi vādivākyārthasya prativādinō yad ajñānaṁ tad ajñānaṁ nāma nigrāhasthānaṁ bhavati / aviditottara viṣayo hi kvottaraṁ brūyāt ? na cānanubhāṣaṇam evedam, jñāte 'pi vastuny anubhāṣaṇāsāmarthyadarśanāt / etad apy asāmpratam, pratijñāhānyādinigrāhasthānānāṁ bhedābhāvānuṣaṅgāt, tatrāpy ajñānasyaiva sambhavāt / teṣāṁ tatprabhedaṭve vā nigrāhasthānapratiniyamābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, paroktasyā'rdhā'jñānādi-bhedena nigrāhasthānānekatvaprasaṅgāt 15 /*

95. The censure called 'want of comprehension' is constituted by the failure of the opponent to comprehend the meaning of the propositions asserted by the proponent although the same are comprehended by the council. Unaware of the object of refutation as he is, what can he refute ? It must on no account be confounded with 'failure of reproduction', because it is observed that a person is unable to reproduce (a statement) even though he is aware of its meaning.

(Criticism) This (species of censure) also lacks justification. The censures 'abandonment of the thesis' and the rest will forfeit their title to separate status because in all these cases simple want of comprehension can be found to be operative. If, on the contrary, they are regarded as so many species (of 'want of comprehension'), there will be no ground for adherence to the determinate enumeration of censures, because the number of censures can be indefinitely multiplied on the basis of variant degrees of non-comprehension of the opponent's argument. (15)

96. *parapakṣe gr̥hīte 'py anubhāṣīte 'pi tasminn uttarāpratipattir apratibhā nāma nigrāhasthānaṁ bhavati / eṣāpy ajñānān na bhidyate 16 /*

96. The censure called 'bewilderment' consists in the failure (of the opponent) to realise the argument refutative of the proponent's thesis though it is understood and reproduced (by the said opponent).

(Criticism) This too does not differ from 'want of comprehension'. (16)

97. *"kāryavyāsaṅgāt kathāvicchedo vikṣepaḥ" [Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.19] nāma nigrāhasthānaṁ bhavati / siṣādhayaṣitasāyārthasyāśakyasādhanatām avasāya kathāṁ vicchinatti 'idaṁ me karaṇīyaṁ parihīyate, pīnasena kaṇṭha uparuddhaḥ' ityādy abhidhāya kathāṁ vicchindan vikṣepeṇa parājīyate / etad apy ajñānato nārthāntaram iti 17 /*

97. “The interception of the debate under the pretext of an emergent situation is ‘evasion’” (NS, 5. 2. 19) which is an occasion of censure. Suppose that a person realises the impossibility of establishing the position advocated by him, and seeks to adjourn the debate by making such statements as “I have to attend to this work which will suffer (if neglected)” or “My throat is choked by cold”. The person who cuts off the debate (by making such excuses) is declared to be vanquished on the charge of ‘evasion’.

(Criticism) This too is not anything different from ‘want of comprehension’. (17)

98. *svapakṣe parāpāditadoṣam anuddhṛtya tam eva parapakṣe pratīpaṇi āpādayato matānujñā nāma nigrāhasthānaṁ bhavati / cauro bhavān puruṣatvāt prasiddhacauravad ity ukte bhavān api cauraḥ puruṣatvād iti bruvan ātmanaḥ parāpāditāṁ cauratvadoṣam abhyupagatatvān bhavatīti matānujñayā nigrhyate / idam apy ajñānāt na bhidyate / anaikāntikatā vātra hetoḥ; sa hy ātmīyahetor ātmanaivānaikāntikatām dṛṣṭvā prāha – bhavatpakṣe 'py ayam doṣaḥ samānas tvam api puruṣo 'sīty anaikāntikatvam evodbhāvayatīti 18 /*

98. When a person does not refute the allegation of defect by the opponent against his own position but, on the contrary, makes the counter-allegation of the presence of the same defect in the opponent's position, he makes himself liable to the censure called ‘acceptance of the charge’. Suppose, for instance, the opponent argues “You are a thief, because you are a male, just as notorious thieves are (males)” and the proponent makes the counter-assertion “You too are (then) a thief, being a male (person)”. In the situation, the proponent has accepted the allegation of ‘being a thief’ made by the opponent and is accordingly censured on the ground of ‘acceptance of the charge’.

(Criticism) It also does not differ from ‘want of comprehension’. Or, it may be (construed as the assertion of) the fallacy of inconclusive reason. The proponent himself realises the inconclusiveness of the probans employed by himself (viz., ‘being a male person’ in imitation of the opponent) and only seeks to expose the inconclusiveness of the probans (‘being a male person’) by asserting “The charge will equally hold good even against your



own position, as you too are a male (person).”<sup>1</sup> (18)

99. *nigrahaprāptasyānigrahaḥ paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇam nāma nigrahassthānam bhavati / paryanuyojoyo nāma nigrahopapattyāvaśyam nodanīyaḥ* ‘idaṁ te nigrahassthānam upanataṁ ato nigrhīto ‘si’ ity evaṁ vacanīyas tam upekṣya na nigrhṇāti yaḥ sa paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇena nigrhyate / etac ca ‘kasya nigrahaḥ’ ity anuyuktayā pariśadodbhāvanīyam na tv asāv ātmano doṣam vivṛṇuyāt ‘ahaṁ nigrāhyas tvayopekṣitaḥ’ iti / etad apy ajñānāt na bhidyate 19 /

99. The censure called ‘overlooking the censurable’ arises from the failure to bring home censure against the person who is liable to censure. The term ‘censurable’ stands for the person who ought necessarily to be charged with a defect by the exposure of the point of censure. In other words, he is a person who ought to be confronted with the charge “An occasion of censure\* occurs on your part and so you are defeated.” If the other party overlooks this lapse and fails to convict the opponent of the censurable defect, the former is declared to be vanquished on the charge of ‘overlooking the censurable’. The verdict, however, is to be declared by the council, when pressed with the enquiry ‘Which party is to be adjudged vanquished?’ It cannot be expected that the censurable party should expose his own defect by asserting “Though I am liable to censure, you have overlooked it.”

(Criticism) This too does not differ from ‘want of comprehension’. (19)

100. *“anigrahassthāne nigrahassthānānuyogo niranuyojoyānuyogaḥ”* [Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.22] *nāma nigrahassthānam bhavati / upapannavādinam apramādinam anigrahārham api ‘nigrhīto ‘si’ iti yo brūyāt sa evābhūtadoṣodbāvanāt nigrhyate / etad api nājñānād vyatiricyate 20 /*

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1. It is a case of *tu quoque* argument. What Hemacandra, following Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, seeks to emphasise is that the *tu quoque* argument is not necessarily tantamount to admission of the guilt alleged by the opponent. It may be legitimately interpreted as the statement of the fallacy of inconclusive reason. When the proponent flings back the charge of theft against the opponent by asserting that he too cannot escape the charge if the attribute of ‘being a male person’ be an unfailing criterion of ‘being a thief’, it does not follow that the proponent accepts the truth of the universal proposition ‘All males are thieves.’ What he is interested to prove is that there is no necessary concomitance between ‘being a male’ and ‘being a thief’ and hence the attribute of ‘being a male’ has no bearing upon the

100. The censure called “‘censure of the uncensurable’ arises from the allegation of censure against a position which does not constitute an occasion of censure” (NS, 5. 2.22). When a person assails, by the assertion “You are vanquished”, the opponent who asserts a sound position, and is not guilty of lapse and hence is unworthy of censure, the former is to be declared vanquished on the ground of allegation of a defect which is not true.

(Criticism) This also is not anything separate from ‘want of comprehension.’ (20)

101. “*siddhāntam abhyupetyānīyamāt kathāprasaṅgo ’pasiddhāntaḥ*” [Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.23] *nāma nigrāhasthānaṁ bhavati / yaḥ prathamam kañcit siddhāntam abhyupagamyā kathām upakramate / tatra ca śiṣādha-yiṣitārthasādhanaḥ paropālambhāya vā siddhāntaviruddham abhidhatte so ’pasiddhāntena nigrhyate / etad api pratīvādināḥ pratipakṣasādhane saty eva nigrāhasthānaṁ nānyatheti* 21 /

101. The censure called ‘acceptance of the opposite position’ occurs when the debate is conducted in conflict with the principles involved in the position formerly maintained” (NS, 5.2.23). Suppose that a person first affirms his adherence to a particular philosophical position and sets up a discourse, and in the course (of the debate) makes an assertion which is contradictorily opposed to the position originally advocated in order to refute the opponent or establish a position he is interested to prove, the person concerned is to be declared as vanquished on the charge of acceptance of the opposite position.

(Criticism) This variety can be regarded as an occasion of censure only when the opponent has advanced cogent arguments in support of his position and not otherwise. (21)

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probandum. In other words, this mode of *tu quoque* assertion may be regarded as an effective refutation of the opponent’s argument. Uddyotakara, however, complains that such *tu quoque* assertions are not legitimate ways of exposing a defect in the opponent’s argument. The proponent ought to assert unequivocally that the opponent is guilty of a fallacy. The roundabout course involved in *tu quoque* arguments is rather symptomatic of ignorance of the real defect, and hence is liable to censure. Hemacandra has also asserted prior to this alternative explanation that the *tu quoque* argument does not differ materially from ‘want of comprehension’.

102. “*hetvābhāsās ca yathoktāḥ*” [Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.24] *asiddhaviruddhādayo nigrāhasthānam / atrāpi viruddhahetūdbhāvanena pratipakṣasiddher nigrāhādhikaraṇatvaṃ yuktam, asiddhādyudbhāvane tu prativādinā pratipakṣasādhane kṛte tad yuktam nānyatheti* 22||34||

102. “The fallacies of reason as expounded before” (NS, 5. 2. 24), viz., non-existent, contradictory and the rest constitute an occasion of censure.

(Criticism) Regarding this it is to be observed that it constitutes an appropriate occasion of censure when the opponent brings home the fallacy of the contradictory reason (in the proponent’s argument) and thus succeeds in establishing the opposite thesis. And as regards the exposure of other fallacies such as a non-existent probans, it can be regarded as a legitimate occasion of censure only when the opponent has established the opposite thesis independently, and not otherwise. (22). (34)

103. *tad evam Akṣapādapadiṣṭaṃ parājayādhikaraṇaṃ parīkṣya Saugatāgamitaṃ tat parīkṣyate –*

***nāpy asāadhanāṅgavacanādoṣodbhāvane* ||35||**

103. Having examined the occasions of defeat as propounded by Akṣapāda, the author now proposes to subject the same as formulated by the Buddhists to scrutiny :

(Aph.) **Nor are again the statement of other than an essential condition of inference, asāadhanāṅgavacana, and the exposure of what is not a defect, adoṣodbhāvana, (the legitimate occasions of censure).**

(Alternatively)

(Aph.) **Nor are again the non-statement of what is an essential condition of inference and the non-exposure of what is a defect (the legitimate occasions of censure). (35)**

104. *svapakṣasyāsiddhir eva parājayo ‘na’ ‘asāadhanāṅgavacanam’ ‘adoṣodbhāvanam’ ca / yathāha Dharmakīrtiḥ –*

*“asāadhanāṅgavacanam adoṣodbhāvanam dvayoḥ /  
nigrāhasthānam anyat tu na yuktam iti neṣyate //*

[Vādanyāya, kārīkā 1]

104. Defeat is constituted by the failure to establish one’s thesis and neither by the statement of other than an essential condition of inference, nor

by exposure of what is not a defect – the position asserted by Dharmakīrti in the following terms : “The statement of other than an essential condition of proof, and the exposure of what is not a defect are the occasions of censure (respectively) of the two (the proponent and the opponent). Other cases are not legitimate (occasions of censure) and as such are not admitted (to be occasions of censure)” (VN, v. 1.)

105. *atra hi svapakṣam sādhasya asādhaya vā vā diprativādinor anyataro 'sādhanaṅgavacanād adōṣodbhāvanād vā param nigṛhṇāti ? prathamapakṣe svapakṣasiddhyaivāsya parājayād anyodbhāvanam vyartham / dvitīyapakṣe asādhanaṅgavacanādyudbhāvane 'pi na kasyacij jayaḥ, pakṣasiddher ubhayaor abhāvāt /*

105. (Criticism) Regarding this point (we must ask) whether the party concerned, viz., the proponent or the opponent, inflicts defeat upon his opponent on the ground of ‘the statement of other than an essential condition of proof’ or ‘the exposure of what is not a defect’ *after having established his thesis or not having done so*. On the first alternative, the defeat of the opponent is secured by the establishment of one’s own thesis and exposure of any defect in the opponent’s position is superfluous. On the second alternative, even the exposure of the defects such as ‘the statement of other than an essential condition of proof’ will not lead to the victory of either party since both the parties have failed to establish their respective thesis.

106. *yac cāsya vyākhyānam – sādhanam siddhis tadaṅgam trirūpaṁ liṅgam tasyāvacanam tūṣṇīmbhāvo yatkiñcid bhāṣaṇam vā, sādhanasya vā trirūpaliṅgasyāṅgam samarthanam vipakṣe bādhakapramāṇopadarśanarūpaṁ tasyāvacanam vā dīno nigrāsthānam iti tat pañcāvayavaprayogavā dīno 'pi samānam / śakyam hi tenāpy evam vaktum siddhyaṅgasya pañcāvayavaprayogasyāvacanāt Saugatasya vā dīno nigrāhaḥ / nanu cāsya tadavacane 'pi na nigrāhaḥ, pratijñānigamanayoḥ pakṣadharmopasaṁhārasāmartyena gamyamānatvāt, gamyamānayoś ca vacane punaruktatvānuṣaṅgāt, tatprayoge 'pi hetuprayogam antareṇa sādhyārthāprasiddheḥ; ity apy asat, pakṣadharmopasaṁhārasyāpy evam avacanānuṣaṅgāt / atha sāmartyād gamyamānasyāpi yat sat tat sarvaṁ kṣaṇikam yathā ghaṭaḥ, saṁś ca śabda iti pakṣadharmopasaṁhārasya vacanam hetor apakṣadharma tvenāsiddhatva-vyavacchedārtham; tarhi sādhyādhārasandehāpanodārtham gamyamānāyā*

*api pratijñāyāḥ, pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayānām ekārthatvapradarśa-  
nārtham nigamanasya vacanam kim na syāt ? nahi pratijñādīnām ekārthatvo-  
padarśanam antareṇa saṅgatatvaṁ ghaṭate, bhinnaviṣayapratijñādivat /  
nanu pratijñātaḥ sādhyasiddhau hetvādivacanam anarthakam eva syāt,  
anyathā nāsyāḥ sādhanāṅgatā iti cet; tarhi bhavato 'pi hetutaḥ sādhyasiddhau  
dṛṣṭānto 'narthakaḥ syāt, anyathā nāsyā sādhanāṅgateti samānam / nanu  
sādhyasādhanayor vyāptipradarśanārthatvāt nānarthako dṛṣṭāntaḥ, tatra  
tadapradarśane hetor agamakatvāt; ity apy ayuktam, sarvānityatvasādhane  
sattvāder dṛṣṭāntāsambhavato 'gamakatvānuṣaṅgāt / vipakṣavyāvṛttyā  
sattvāder gamakatve vā sarvatrāpi hetau tathaiva gamakatvaprasaṅgāt  
dṛṣṭānto 'narthaka eva syāt / vipakṣavyāvṛttyā ca hetuṁ samarthayaṇ  
katham pratijñāṁ pratikṣipet ? tasyās cānabhidhāne kva hetuḥ sādhyam vā  
vartate ? gamyamāne pratijñāviṣaya eveti cet; tarhi gamyamānasyaiva hetor  
api samarthanam syān na tūktasya / atha gamyamānasyāpi hetor  
mandamatipratipattyartham vacanam; tathā pratijñāvacane ko 'paritoṣaḥ ?*

106. The following is an interpretation of this (statement of Dharmakīrti) : “*sādhana* (understood in the sense of an act) means proof and *aṅga*, necessary condition, of it is the probans endowed with triple characteristic; and non-statement of it consists either in maintaining silence or statement of any other (irrelevant) matter; and this constitutes an occasion of censure of the proponent. Or, *sādhana* (understood as an instrumental case) is but the probans with the triple characteristic (which is the instrument of proof) and its *aṅga*, necessary condition, is its justification which consists in the demonstration of the proof contradictory of the opposite possibility. The non-statement of this is an occasion of censure of the proponent.” The interpretation may with equal propriety be sponsored by the advocate of five-membered syllogism. He too can assert (taking stand upon this interpretation) that the Buddhist logician is to be adjudged vanquished for non-statement of the five-membered syllogism which is the (sole) condition of proof (of a thesis). It has been contended (by the Buddhist) that the non-statement of this (five-membered syllogism) does not expose him to defeat, since the thesis and the conclusion (the first and last members of Nyāya syllogism) are understood by implication from the statement of the minor premise (in which the probans known to be

concomitant with the probandum is predicated of the subject). The statement again of what (sic. the thesis and the conclusion) are understood (by implication) would involve (useless) tautology, because even the assertion of these (two members) unbacked by the assertion of the probans (in the subject) does not lead to the establishment of the conclusion. But the contention is futile, since this would make the omission of the minor premise an inevitable consequence. It has been maintained that the assertion of the minor premise, in other words, affirmation of the probans in the subject, though understood by implication (of the knowledge-situation), is yet resorted to in such (a typical syllogism) as "All that is existent is momentary, as for instance, a jar, (major premise); sound is existent (minor premise)" for the purpose of rebutting (the apprehension of the fallacy of) 'non-existent reason' arising from the lack (of the knowledge) of the probans in the subject. [If this be a legitimate justification of the obvious tautology involved in the assertion of the minor premise, though the knowledge of the probans invariably carries with it the knowledge of its existence in the subject and thus the assertion of the probans in the subject in the minor premise is a reiteration of a known fact], then why should not the assertion of the thesis, though known by implication, and the assertion of the conclusion be a legitimate procedure particularly when they respectively serve to rebut the doubt of the substratum of the probandum, and to demonstrate the unified meaning of thesis, reason, illustration and application ? Certainly thesis and the remaining propositions cannot be (thought to be) mutually related unless they be shown to express a unified meaning just as thesis and so on relating to a different subject are not. (Q) Well, if the thesis leads to the establishment of the conclusion, the assertion of reason and the rest is perfectly useless. If not, it will not serve as a necessary condition of inference. (A) Then in your case too the statement of reason should suffice for the establishment of the conclusion, and so illustration would be a superfluity. Otherwise it (the statement of reason) will not be a necessary condition of inference. And thus the cases (viz., the logical necessity of thesis and of reason) are equally balanced. It may be urged that illustration serves to demonstrate the necessary concomitance between the probans

and the probandum, and so it is not a superfluity. If, on the contrary, the said (necessary concomitance) were not exhibited in it (the illustration), the probans would fail to prove (the probandum). But the contention is devoid of logic. [If illustration were a necessary condition for securing the cogency of the probans], then one cannot make 'existence' the probans for inferring the impermanence of all entities, since such probans would have no cogency because no external example is available for illustration. If necessary incompatibility with opposite alternatives be put forward as the proof of the cogency of 'existence' and the like attributes, then the same criterion will prove the logical cognecy of every possible probans and so illustration will have no *raison d'être*. Moreover, how can one justify a probans by showing its incompatibility with the opposite and at the same time repudiate (the logical cogency of) the thesis ? If, on the contrary, the thesis were not stated, what could be understood as the locus of the probans and the probandum ? If you answer that they would relate to the subject known antecedently to the thesis supposed to refer to it, then (by parity of reasoning) the logical justification should concern the probans independently implied and not (the probans) expressly stated. If you justify the express statement of the probans, though implicitly known, for helping the understanding of persons of dull intellect, why should the express statement of the thesis incur your displeasure ?

107. *yac cedam asādhanaṅgam ity asya vyākhyānāntaram — sādharma-yeṇa hetor vacane vaidharmyavacanam, vaidharmyeṇa ca prayoge sādharma-vacanam gamyamānatvāt punaruktam ato na sādhanāṅgam; ity apy asāmpratam, yataḥ samyaksādhanasāmarthyena svapakṣam sādhayato vādino nigrahaḥ syāt, asādhayato vā ? prathamapakṣe na sādhyasiddhyapratibandhi-vacanādhikyopālambhamātreṇāsya nigrahaḥ, avirodhāt / nanv evam nāṭa-kāḍighoṣaṇato 'py asya nigraho na syāt; satyam etat, svasādhyaṃ prasādhya nṛtyato 'pi doṣābhāvāl lokavat, anyathā tāmbūlabhakṣaṇa-bhrūkṣepa-khātākṛta-hastāsphālanādibhyo 'pi satyasādhanavādino 'pi nigrahaḥ syāt / atha svapakṣam aprasādhayato 'sya tato nigrahaḥ; nanv atrāpi kim prativādinā svapakṣe sādHITE vādino vacanādhikyopālambho nigraho lakṣyeta, asādhite vā ? prathamapakṣe svapakṣasiddhyaivāsya nigrahād vacanādhikyodbhāvanam anarthakam, tasmīn saty api pakṣasiddhim antareṇa jayāyogāt / dvitīyapakṣe*

tu yugapad vādiप्रतिवāदिनोऽपि parājayaprasaṅgo jayaprasaṅgo vā syāt, svapakṣasiddher abhāvāviśeṣāt /

107. As regards the second interpretation of the expression 'other than an essential condition of inference' given as follows—"The express statement of concomitance in difference subsequent to the statement of the probans with concomitance in agreement, or the express statement of concomitance in agreement subsequent to the statement of concomitance in difference, though one is known by implication from the other, constitutes tautology and hence is not an essential condition of inference" — this too lacks in propriety. Does the proponent expose himself to the defeat when he proves his thesis on the strength of a legitimate probans or when he does not prove it ? On the first alternative, he does not run the risk of defeat simply because one notices a redundant statement which has no necessary bearing upon the deduction of the conclusion, since it does not involve contradiction (of the conclusion independently proved). One may argue : "Then the proponent should not be subject to defeat even if he sets about reciting a dramatic piece (though it has no bearing upon the conclusion to be reached)". It is quite true. We do not see any reason why should offence be taken even if the person dances after having established his conclusion, which is not an unusual occurrence in the world. (If you insist on such unnecessary formality) then the person who adduces a sound probans should also be declared to be vanquished if he indulges in such innocent diversions as chewing beetle, movement of the eyebrows, giving out a mimic cry, or waving of the hands. If, again, the verdict of defeat is to be pronounced upon the proponent for such superfluous activity when he fails to prove his position, it is to be considered whether the defeat of the proponent is adjudged on the basis of superfluous expression which may be rebuked as a lapse, *after* or *before* the opponent has established his own conclusion. On the first alternative, the proponent will be considered defeated by the successful establishment of the thesis by the opponent, and the pressing home of the fault of superfluous expression will be redundant. The reason is there can be no verdict of victory on the basis of such superfluity unless the thesis of the opponent has been established. On the second alternative, both the proponent and the opponent should be awarded



victory or defeat simultaneously, because there is no difference so far as the failure to prove one's thesis is considered.

108. *nanu na svapakṣasiddhyasiddhinibandhanau jayaparājayau, taylor jñānājñānanibandhanatvāt/sādhana vādinā hi sādhusādhanam jñātvā vaktavyam, dūṣaṇavādinā ca dūṣaṇam / tatra sādharṇyavacanād vaidharṇyavacanād vā 'rthasya pratipattau tadubhayavacane vādinah prativādinā sabhāyām asādhanāṅgavacanasyodbhāvanāt sādhusādhanājñānasiddheḥ parājayah / prativādinah tu taddūṣaṇājñānanirṇayāj jayah syāt; ity apy avicāritaramaṇīyam, yataḥ sa prativādī satsādhana vādinah sādhanābhāsavādinō vā vacanādhikyadoṣam udbhāvayet ? tatrādyapakṣe vādinah katham sādhusādhanājñānam, tadvacaneyattājñānasyaivābhāvāt ? dvitīyapakṣe tu na prativādinō dūṣaṇājñānam avatiṣṭhate sādhanābhāsasyānubhāvanāt / tadvacanādhikyadoṣasya jñānāt dūṣaṇājñō 'sāv iti cet; sādhanābhāsājñānād adūṣaṇājñō 'pīti naikāntato vādinam jayet, tadadoṣodbhāvanalakṣaṇasya parājayasyāpi nivārayitum aśakteḥ / atha vacanādhikyadoṣodbhāvanād eva prativādinō jayasiddhau sādhanābhāsodbhāvanam anarthakam; nanv evam sādhanābhāsānubhāvanāt tasya parājayasiddhau vacanādhikyodbhāvanam katham jayāya prakalpeta ? atha vacanādhikyam sādhanābhāsam vodbhāvayataḥ prativādinō jayah, katham evam sādharṇyavacane vaidharṇyavacanam vaidharṇyavacane vā sādharṇyavacanam parājayāya prabhavet ? katham caivam vādi prativādinoh pakṣa pratipakṣa parigrahavaiyarthyam na syāt, kvacid ekatrāpi pakṣe sādhanasāmārthyājñānājñānayoḥ sambhavāt ? na khalu śabdādau nityatvasyānityatvasya vā parīkṣāyām ekasya sādhanasāmārthye jñānam anyasya cājñānam jayasya parājayasya vā nibandhanam na bhavati / yugapat sādhanasāmārthyājñāne ca vādi prativādinoh kasya jayah parājayō vā syād aviśeṣāt ? na kasyacid iti cet; tarhi sādhanavādinō vacanādhikyakāriṇah sādhanasāmārthyājñānasiddheḥ prativādināś ca vacanādhikyadoṣodbhāvanāt taddoṣamātrājñānasiddher na kasyaciḥ jayah parājayō vā syāt / na hi yo yaddoṣam vetti sa tadguṇam api, kutaścīn mārāṇasaktau vedane 'pi viśadravyasya kuṣṭhāpanayanaśaktau saṁvedanānūdayāt / tan na tatsāmārthyājñānājñānanibandhanau jayaparājayau vyavasthāpayitum śakyau, yathoktadoṣānuṣaṅgāt / svapakṣasiddhyasiddhinibandhanau tu tau niravadyau pakṣa pratipakṣa parigrahavaiyarthyaḥ sambhavāt / kasyacit kutaścīti svapakṣasiddhau suniścitāyām parasya tatsiddhyabhāvataḥ sakṛj*

jayaparājayaprasaṅgāt /

108. It has been contended that victory and defeat do not depend upon the proof of one's position or the failure of such proof. But they are based upon knowledge and want of knowledge. The proponent who has to propound the probans for establishing his position ought to assert what he knows to be a sound probans, and the opponent who has to make a refutation ought, on the other hand, to assert the refutatory argument (which he knows to be as such). Thus when it is possible to deduce the conclusion either from the statement of the concomitance in agreement or from the statement of the concomitance in difference, but yet the proponent makes both such statements, and in the situation the opponent demonstrates the statement of an unessential condition on the part of the proponent in the council, the latter (the proponent) suffers defeat because his ignorance of what is a sound probans is proved. But the opponent should win victory because he establishes his knowledge of what is a refutation. The contention appears to be plausible so long as it is not subjected to a critical examination. The issue can be decided by the consideration whether the opponent exposes the fault of superfluous statement on the part of the proponent *when he has produced a sound argument, or an unsound one*. On the first alternative, how can the proponent be convicted of the ignorance of a sound probans when (as a matter of fact) he lacks in the knowledge of the requisite number of such reasons ? On the second alternative, the opponent's knowledge of refutatory argument is not established, since he does not expose the fallacy in the reasons advanced (by the proponent). It may be contended that he is aware of what constitutes a refutation when he has proved his knowledge of the fault of redundant statement. But he also proves ignorant of what is refutation because he has shown his ignorance of the fallacious reason. In the circumstances, he cannot be supposed to have vanquished the proponent absolutely because he has proved his inability to ward off the ignominy of defeat involved in the failure to expose the defect present in that (argument of the proponent). It may be contended that the exposure of fallacies of reason is superfluous for the opponent when he establishes his (title to) victory solely by the discovery of the fault of superfluous expression. But it is open to the objection how can the discovery

of superfluous expression contribute to his victory when his defeat is established on the ground of his failure to discover the fallacy of the reason. If you affirm that the victory of the opponent is established when he discovers the superfluity of expression as well as the fallacy of reason, then why should you suppose that the assertion of concomitance in difference after the assertion of concomitance in agreement, or, the assertion of the concomitance in agreement after the assertion of concomitance in difference should be a ground of defeat ? Moreover, (if knowledge and want of knowledge be the criterion of victory and defeat as you assert, we do not find any reason) how should the advocacy of the thesis and the counter-thesis respectively by the proponent and the opponent be exempted from the charge of futility, particularly in view of the fact that there must be present the knowledge or ignorance of the competency of the probans in one position or the other. It is not a fact that the knowledge of the competency of a probans on the part of one party or the ignorance (of the same) on the part of the other party (which transpires) after the examination of (the subject of dispute such, for instance, as) the perishability or imperishability of word, does not serve as the condition of victory or defeat. If, however, both the proponent and the opponent be equally ignorant of the competency of a probans, in that case on whose behalf will victory or defeat be awarded, when there is no difference (between them) ? If you answer "on behalf of neither" then it follows that the proponent who employs a superfluous expression in the formulation of his argument is judged to prove his ignorance of the competency of his probans (supposed to be implied by his addition of a superfluous condition), and the opponent who discovers the fault of superfluous expression is judged to prove his knowledge of this fault alone (and not the competency or otherwise of the probans) and hence in the circumstance neither should be awarded victory or defeat. It does not follow that the person who knows the demerit of anything should also know the merit of it. Thus, for instance, a man who knows that a poisonous substance has fatal power may happen to have no knowledge of its power to heal leprosy. The conclusion irresistibly follows that victory cannot be determined on the basis of knowledge of the competency of the probans, nor defeat on the basis of lack of such knowledge, inasmuch as (both the

alternatives) are exposed to the charges set forth above. But (the position we maintain, viz.,) that victory accrues from the establishment of one's own position and defeat from the failure to do so is free from all blemish, particularly in view of the fact that it does not make the advocacy of a thesis and its counter-thesis a futility. When, however, one party is categorically and unmistakably found to establish his position on some valid ground and the other party fails to establish the position advocated by him, the (undesirable) issue of simultaneous victory or simultaneous defeat of both the parties does not arise.

109. *yac cedam adoṣodbhāvanam ity asya vyākhyānam – prasajya-pratiśedhe doṣodbhāvanābhāvamātram adoṣodbhāvanam, paryudāse tu doṣābhāsānām anyadoṣāṇām codbhāvanam prativādino nigrāhasthānam iti tat vādinā 'doṣavati sādhanē prayukye saty anumātam eva yadi vādī svapakṣam sādhanē nānyathā / vacanādhikyaṁ tu doṣaḥ prāg eva prativihitaḥ / yathaiva hi pañcāvayavaprayoge vacanādhikyaṁ nigrāhasthānam tathā tryavayavaprayoge nyūnatāpi syād viśeṣābhāvāt / pratijñādīni hi pañcāpy anumānāṅgam – “pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ” [Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.32] ity abhidhānāt / teṣāṁ madhye 'nyatamasyāpy anabhidhānē nyūnatākhyo doṣo 'nuśajyata eva “hīnam anyatamenāpi nyūnam” [Nyāyasūtra, 5.2.12] iti vacanāt / tato jayetaravyavasthāyām nānyan nimittam uktāt nimittād ity alarṁ prasaṅgena ||35||*

109. As regards the explication of the phrase *adoṣodbhāvana* given as follows : “If taken as a case of direct negation the phrase *adoṣodbhāvana* means ‘negation of discovery of defect’ and if taken as a case of indirect negation it would mean ‘the exposure of what is (not a real) but an apparent defect and of other (inconsequential) defects’; both these cases are legitimate occasions of censure of the opponent, ” it (the aforesaid interpretation) is accepted by us as appropriate provided the proponent employs a syllogism free from fault and establishes his position, and not otherwise. As for the defeat involved in superfluous statement, it has already been refuted by us. Just as the syllogism of five members is considered to labour under the censure of superfluity, so likewise it may be urged that the syllogism of three members labours under the defect called ‘deficiency,’ inasmuch as there is no ground for discrimination. It must be admitted that all the five members

beginning with thesis are necessary conditions of inference and this will be in conformity with the statement "Thesis, reason, illustration, application and conclusion are the members of a syllogism" (NS, 1.1.32). The non-statement of any one of these (members) would necessarily involve the defect called 'deficiency' and this is in accordance with the statement "That which is devoid of any one (of the members) is 'deficient' " (NS, 5.2.12). It is established that there is no other ground for the adjudication of victory and otherwise (defeat) except the ground set forth by us and further elaboration will be an unnecessary prolixity. (35).

110. *ayaṁ ca prāg uktaś caturaṅgo vādaḥ kadācit patrālabanam apy apekṣate 'tas tallakṣaṇam atrāvaśyābhīdhātavyaṁ yato nāvijñātasvarūpa-syāsyāvalambanaṁ jayāya prabhavati na cāvijñātasvarūpaṁ parapatraṁ bhettuṁ śakyam ity āha*<sup>1</sup> –

110. This Debate which has already been spoken of as resting on four factors is sometimes carried on through the medium of epistles. Hence it is necessary that we should state its definition in this connection, inasmuch as resort to such (medium of debate) with its nature unknown cannot be conducive to victory and also as it is not possible to penetrate into the contents of such an epistle sent by an opponent unless one is fully acquainted with its specific nature. With this object in view the author propounds the following :

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1. The text of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* abruptly ends at this point in all the available manuscripts. This shows that Āc. Hemacandra could not complete the work. (Editor)



**THIRD PART**

**PT. SUKHLALJI'S  
PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES**

Translated by

***K. K. DIXIT***





## PT. SUKHLALJI'S PREFACE

At the time of editing *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* I had written notes on several philosophical technical terms occurring in the text and had added to it a long Introduction by way of preface. Now that these Notes and the Introduction<sup>1</sup> are being published in English I feel obliged to explain, in brief, the aim I had in view while writing them. This, I think, should enable the English reader to adopt a certain approach towards the material in question.

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is an important — though incomplete — writing by Ācārya Hemacandra on Jaina Logic. The available portion of this text discusses, briefly but lucidly, and from the Jaina standpoint, the philosophical concepts like *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *pramātā*, *pramiti*, etc.; here there frequently occurs a mention — and sometimes also a criticism — of the positions adopted by the other systems in this connection. In the course of editing the text and of conducting research work thereon the idea occurred to me that in case it continues to be taught and studied according to the old Indian tradition of teaching and studying prevalent among our Pandit circles, neither the teachers nor the students will be able to grasp the import of the relevant philosophical issues in their proper historical development. It was my own experience of student days that even the most competent and sympathetic teachers of a particular philosophical system would seldom care to look into the order of development undergone by this system and the historical relation in which it stands to the other systems. The result was that a student remained almost ignorant of the historical development and of a comparative estimate of the system he chose to study. And when some exceptionally brilliant student with curiosity unbounded placed even before the ablest of his teachers a query concerning some problem, but from the standpoint of a non-partisan, historical,

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1. This refers to his Introduction printed in the present work as its first part. (Ed.)

comparative study, what usually happened was that the query would be curtly brushed aside.

Doubtless, the *gurus* who taught me the various philosophical systems were most thorough scholars of their respective systems and hearty was their affection for me ; but none of them even hinted to me that one's grasp of various philosophical issues becomes considerably objective when study is undertaken from a historical and comparative standpoint. And my experience was that all who, like me, studied exclusively according to the old style found themselves in a predicament similar to mine. However, I should here also make mention of one special advantage that is enjoyed by those who study exclusively according to the old style. When, on the one hand, a student is brilliant and his curiosity intense, while, on the other, the teacher is a competent authority on the subject-matter concerned, the study, undertaken according to the old style, of this subject-matter invariably throws on its vitals a light that is deep and of a most desirable type.

I had studied philosophy according to the old style of the Pandits and had certainly derived a number of advantages therefrom; nevertheless, when I first undertook the writing and research work and, at the same time, consulted the outstanding works written and edited by the various Indian and foreign scholars, I became conscious of one great shortcoming of mine. The shortcoming was my inability to make out how as a result of mutual discussion and criticism the various philosophical systems of India influenced one another either negatively or positively, by whom and when was this influence exercised, and what was the extent thereof. I even failed to judge correctly as to whether the discussion of a particular issue on the part of more than one philosophical system was a parallel development or a development brought about as a result of mutual influence. A deep consciousness of the shortcoming in question forced me to traverse a new path. The new path consisted in an attempt at first accurately grasping the teachings of the basic texts of the various philosophical systems and then trying my best to determine the historical interconnection between the philosophical issues and to make a comparative study of these issues as discussed by the various philosophical systems. Side by side with this new attempt on my part went on the editing of several Jaina and non-Jaina texts and conducting research

thereon; besides, I undertook some translation work. In the course of all this activity I became firmly convinced that the study of any philosophical system inevitably demands certain prerequisites and that these prerequisites include a fairly accurate understanding of the historical interrelationship obtaining between the various philosophical systems of India.

Impelled by this conviction, I have made, in these Notes and the Introduction, an extremely modest and humble endeavour keeping in view the noble aim that the current studies in Indian philosophy become open-minded and open-hearted — with *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* acting as a pretext.

*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* is a text on Logic written from the Jaina standpoint. It was therefore absolutely necessary to make it clear in the Introduction as to what the Jaina standpoint is. However, unless one knows the distinguishing marks of the standpoints adopted by the different philosophical systems of India he cannot at all understand the particular nature of the Jaina standpoint and the relation in which it stands to the other standpoints. Hence it is that the Introduction first of all states the standpoints adopted by the different philosophical systems of India.

The various philosophical standpoints are rooted in the various views as to the comparative strength of the different organs of knowledge. Therefore, with a view to laying bare the respective spheres of application of the various organs of knowledge a classification has been made of the philosophical views as to the nature of the organs of knowledge. Afterwards, under the title 'The Total Extent of the Knowable Sphere' it has been shown how various views as to the knowable sphere have emerged depending on the various views as to the comparative strength of the different organs of knowledge. In addition, several other more or less important problems have been briefly touched upon in the Introduction.

Notes are many. In *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* there are defined and discussed a number of such concepts which, if they are to be understood properly, demand a delineation of their development from a historical standpoint and of their nature from a logical standpoint. The Notes in question have been written with this understanding in view. It can easily be seen that Notes written from the standpoint above recommended, even when they directly concern the concepts upheld by a particular philosophi-

cal tradition, are, in the final count, of help in understanding the corresponding concepts of all traditions whatsoever. And if this be true, it logically follows that Notes written on the topics covered by *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* can be of considerable help in understanding the corresponding concepts of all traditions whatsoever.

Really speaking, as I have above pointed out, one aim in writing these Notes and the Introduction to *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* has been to pave the way for a broad-based study, in some form or other, of all philosophical traditions.

For thousands of years the currents of philosophical speculation have run their course in India and with the passage of time they gained in logical subtlety; but these have been seldom, if ever, subjected by the Indian scholars to that type of investigation which has come from the pen of the Westerners since the last century or so. For example, the thorough researches of Prof. Jacobi and others in the Jaina scriptures have not been matched by any undertaken by a scholar who is himself an upholder of the Jaina tradition. Similarly, the academic endeavour of no Buddhist monk will stand comparison with that of a scholar like Prof. Stcherbatsky who has thrown a veritable flood of light on Buddhist Logic. Dr. Thibaut, apart from translating into English the *Bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, has offered, in his introductory remarks, a penetrating study of the issues involved, a study which has perhaps not been surpassed by any Śaṅkarite or Rāmānujite scholar however acute. And not even the thoroughest of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars have been able to pursue that marvellous analytical method which Prof. Ingalls of the Harvard University has adopted in presenting the materials for the study of Navya-Nyāya Logic.

On the one hand, we find that the various philosophical traditions of India today include a number of such eminent scholars of extraordinary calibre whose help the Western scholars are eager to seek and who can, if they so desire, throw, in a most competent fashion, very great light on their respective subject-matters; on the other hand, there is no dearth in any philosophical tradition of such important texts which are bound to attract the attention of the philosophical world in case they are supplemented by Introduction, Notes, etc. based on a thorough study of their respective

contents. E.g. *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta, *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila, *Pramāṇavārtika* of Dharmakīrti, *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, *Kusumāñjali* of Udayana, *Tattvārthaślokavārtika* of Vidyānanda, *Syādvādaratnākara* of Vādideva, *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha* of Mādhavācārya are some of the texts which deserve an original, penetrating study and an investigation undertaken from a broad-based, historical standpoint. But in spite of all this the truth remains — and it is a matter for anxious thought — that the same texts which have been edited and translated so admirably by the Western scholars had (or have) come out in so poor a quality when edited and translated by their Indian counterparts. So far as I can see, the explanation of this state of affairs lies in the fact that the old style Indian educational centres are inclined to attach chief importance to the literal meaning of the texts and have therefore become extremely narrow in their vision, while, on the other hand, the Indian colleges and universities undertake studies that are extensive in their sweep but such as seldom enter into the heart of the matter. I am therefore of the view that our style of teaching and studying needs revision. With this aim in view I have attempted these Notes and the Introduction. Of the limitedness of the scope of my attempt as also of the shortcoming vitiating it I am more aware than anyone else, but for the present, sympathetic friends are presenting it before the English reader as it stands.

Ahmedabad

Sukhlal

4. 5. 61.

## TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES

The following Notes do not occur in the body of Panditji's writing in the order we have given them. Hence our ordering needs an explanation. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* being a text on *Pramāṇa-śāstra* (i.e. Logic understood in a broader sense so as to cover all that goes under the title "Epistemology"), it is but natural that most of these Notes should deal with logic and epistemology. But since the problems of logic and epistemology are after all not quite unrelated to those of metaphysics, some of the metaphysical problems too have been raised by Ācārya Hemacandra in his Text, and hence by Panditji in his Notes. Thus we see that the first 27 Notes pertain to the problems of Logic and the last 3 to those of Metaphysics. The Notes on Logic are again subdivided into three groups, viz. (i) those dealing with the problems of knowledge in general, (ii) those dealing with the problems of perception, and (iii) those dealing with the problems of inference.

(i) Coming to the Notes dealing with the problems of knowledge in general, we should first of all make clear to ourselves as to what is the Indian philosopher's word for "knowledge". Indian philosophers make a distinction between *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* (having for its synonyms *bodha*, *upalabdhi*, *paricchitti*, *saṃvitti*, etc.) and they are of the view that *pramāṇa* is but a subspecies of *jñāna*. The distinction between *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* is roughly parallel to that between knowledge and cognition, and just as the precise point of distinction between knowledge and cognition will differ from philosopher to philosopher, the precise point of distinction between *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* differs from philosopher to philosopher. With a view to avoiding participation in the controversy, we have left the word '*pramāṇa*' untranslated, and have translated the word '*jñāna*' as cognition — with the result that the word 'knowledge' occurs very rarely in our translation. However, in Note 2 it became impossible to avoid translating '*pramāṇa*' as valid cognition and in Note 3 to avoid translating '*prāmāṇya*' as validity of a

piece of cognition. This should not mislead one into thinking that all Indian philosophers are of the view that, a piece of cognition denied the appellation 'pramāṇa', is necessarily invalid. Incidentally, we should note that the word 'pramāṇa' means not only a particular type of cognition but also the instrumental cause of this type of cognition, as also that the Jainas understand by the word 'jñāna' just determinate cognition (their word for indeterminate cognition being 'darśana'). In order to acquaint ourselves with the various points that have been raised in the course of this discussion on *jñāna* and *pramāṇa* we should read Notes 1-7. It is to Panditji's credit that the few pages of his writings convince us (i) that none of the discussions into which our philosophers have entered is pointless, and (ii) that none of our philosophers has hesitated to side with a rival of his in case he is convinced that this rival is taking a correct stand on a particular question. Note 8 is a class by itself. It has been included here because our ignorance of Jaina Logic is enormous — almost as enormous as was our ignorance of Buddhist Logic before Stcherbatsky wrote his *magnum opus*. Of course, the points that need clarification in Jaina Logic are of a different sort from those that need clarification in Buddhist Logic, but Panditji's treatment of the former points is as much illuminating as Stcherbatsky's treatment of the latter.

(ii) As dealing with the problems of perception, are included three Notes, viz. 11-13, which might appear to be out of place. For determining the nature of sense-organs, *manas*, and soul is a metaphysical problem (and determining the nature of soul also an ethical problem). We grant all this, and yet feel that things that have been said in these three Notes have an important bearing on the problems of perception as such. For the rest, the Notes of this group can speak for themselves. Only one wishes there was an independent Note on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of perception.

(iii) Notes dealing with the problems of inference are in a way the most important group. For the cut and dried scheme that is offered to us — ever since the days of our Intermediate class-lectures on Logic — in the name of 'Indian Logic', does not really deserve that title. This, in turn, is because Indian Logic is a much more variegated type of study — and a study having a long history behind it — than is generally supposed to be the case. In short, there are four chief schools of Indian Logic, viz. the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣika school, the Buddhist school, the Mīmāṃsā school, and the Jaina school, and each is an independent (though not isolated) growth.<sup>1</sup> To use the terminology of parliamentary democracy, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logician is the Leader of the House, the Buddhist logician the Leader of the Opposition, the Mīmāṃsā and Jaina logicians leaders of two considerably strong Opposition Groups, the former tending to side with the Leader of the House, the latter with the Leader of the Opposition. We are thankful to Panditji that he has enabled us to visualize the serious discussions our ancestors conducted in the field of logical studies.

(iv) Lastly, there is a short group of Notes dealing with some of the most fundamental problems of metaphysics. According to one way of looking at things, the nature of permanence and the nature of change constitute the two most important topics for metaphysical speculation. Panditji subscribes to this line of thought, and his discussion will be thoroughly enjoyed by those who share his belief. But even for others, it should mean enough food for thought.

Distinction between the Age of Scriptures and the Age of Logic is a concept characteristic of Panditji. Without meaning disrespect to either Age, he tells us that the chief preoccupations of the former were spiritual, those of the latter empirical.

Let us try to grasp this distinction as best we can.

— K. K. DIXIT

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1. So far as my reading goes, the idea was first expressed by Mahapandit Rahul Sankrityayan in his English Introduction to *Pramāṇavārtika* published in 1943 from Kitab Mahal, Allahabad.



## PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES

### (i) On Problems of Knowledge in General

#### 1. IS COGNITION SELF-REVELATORY (*sva-prakāśa*) OR NOT-SELF-REVELATORY (*para-prakāśa*) ?

In philosophical circles there has taken place a prolonged and multi-sided discussion on the question whether cognition is self-revelatory or not-self-revelatory. Before we proceed to consider the various views upheld on this question, it is necessary to bear in mind certain general points that will enable us to ascertain the precise idea involved in the concepts 'self-revelatory' and 'not-self-revelatory'.

1. Some philosophers submit that cognition is by nature perceptible (*pratyakṣa-yogya*) while others maintain just the opposite view. Thus according to the latter, cognition is by nature non-perceptible (*parokṣa*), not perceptible (*pratyakṣa*). Thus, positions on the question whether cognition is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) or non-perceptible (*parokṣa*) constitute the cornerstone (*mūlādhāra*) of the discussion whether cognition is self-revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) or not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*).

2. When it is said that cognition is self-revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) what is meant is that a piece of cognition is perceptually revealed by itself, i.e. is perceived by itself (*sva-pratyakṣa*). On the other hand, when it is said that cognition is not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) what is meant is either that a piece of cognition is perceptually revealed by another piece of cognition, i.e. is perceived by the latter (*para-pratyakṣa*) or that a piece of cognition is inferentially revealed by another piece of cognition, i.e. is inferred by the latter (*para-anumeya*).

3. When it is said that cognition is self-perceptible (*sva-pratyakṣa*) it is not meant that a piece of cognition is incapable of being known through inference etc.; what is meant is that a piece of cognition at the time of its

origin is known perceptually by the cognizer concerned and only non-perceptually by others, while at a later time it is known only non-perceptually even by this very cognizer.<sup>1</sup> The same thing applies to the contention that a piece of cognition is not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) in the sense of being perceptible by another piece of cognition (*para-pratyakṣa*); for here also what is meant is that a piece of cognition is perceived by another piece of cognition acquired by the cognizer concerned and acquired simultaneously with (rather just after) the former cognition, that is to say, it is not perceived by a piece of cognition acquired by another cognizer or acquired at a later time.

Buddhists belonging to the Vijñānavāda school (NB. 1.10), Prabhākaraite Mīmāṃsakas<sup>2</sup>, Vedāntists,<sup>3</sup> and Jains are advocates of the self-revelatory character of cognition. However, they are not all unanimous as to the nature of cognition. Thus according to Vijñānavāda, there exist no objects apart from cognition<sup>4</sup> while a particular piece of cognition is possessed of a particular form (*ākāra*). According to Prabhākara, external objects exist (Br., p.74) and are knowable (*saṃvedya*). According to Vedānta, cognition, being essentially (*mukhyatayā*) of the nature of *Brahman*, is eternal. The Jaina, like Prabhākara, posits the existence of external objects and treats cognition as a generated (*janya*) phenomenon. Nevertheless, all these philosophers are unanimous in holding that cognition as such (*jñāna-mātra*) is self-perceptible (*sva-pratyakṣa*), that is, that all cognition, whether acquired through perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*śabda*), or memory (*smṛti*), notices its own nature by way of direct observation (*sākṣātkāra*) while it is called 'inferential', 'verbal',

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1. 'yat tv anubhūteḥ svayaṃprakāśatvam uktam tadviśayaprakāśanavelāyāṃ jñātur ātmanas tathaiva na tu sarveṣāṃ sarvadā tathāiveti niyamo 'sti, parānubhavasya hānopādānādiliṅgakānumānajñānaviśayatvāt svānubhavasyaapy atitasyājñāsisam iti jñānaviśayatvadarsanāc ca /-Śrībhāṣya, p. 24.
  2. sarvavijñānahetūtthā mītau mātari ca pramā / sākṣātkartṛvasāmānyāt pratyakṣatvena sammatā //-PP, p. 56.
  3. Bhāmatī, p. 16. 'seyaṃ svayaṃprakāśānubhūtiḥ'-Śrībhāṣya, p. 18. Citsukhī, p. 9.
  4. 'sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ'-Br. p. 29. 'prakāśamānas tādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakah / yathā prakāśo 'bhimatas tathā dhīr ātmavedinī // -PV, 3.329.

'mnemic', etc. owing to the nature of the object grasped (*grāhya*). In other words, even though differing as regards their respective generating conditions (*sāmagrī*) and pertaining to objects that are differently characterized as 'capable of being perceived' (*pratyakṣa*), 'capable of being inferred' (*anumeya*), 'capable of being recalled' (*smartavya*), etc., the various types of cognition like perception, inference, memory, etc. are, all of them, perceptually cognizant of their own nature (i.e. of themselves).<sup>5</sup>

The Sāṅkhya-Yoga<sup>6</sup> and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika<sup>7</sup> philosophers regard cognition as not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) in the sense of being 'perceptually cognizable by something other than itself' (*para-pratyakṣa*). They hold that cognition is by nature perceptible but that it is not self-perceptible, for according to them the perceptibility of a piece of cognition is due to something other than itself. Thus according to (some of) them, all cognition, whether perceptual, inferential, or mnemic, is perceptually cognized by an after-cognition (*anu-vyavasāya*).<sup>8</sup> However, even while these philosophers agree in maintaining that a piece of cognition is perceived by something other than itself, they differ as to the identity of this 'something other than itself'. For according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, this 'something' is the after-cognition which arises in the wake of a particular piece of cognition and which takes perceptual cognizance of this piece of cognition, while according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, this 'something' is pure consciousness (*caitanya*) which constitutes the essence of *puruṣa* (i.e. soul) and which takes perceptual cognizance of all *buddhi*-modifications-of-the-form-of-cognition (*jñānātmaka buddhi-vṛtti*).

Kumārila alone regards cognition as not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) in the sense of being 'inferentially cognizable by something other than itself' (*para-anumeya*), for according to him, cognition is by nature non-perceptible (*parokṣa*) and is to be known by means of an inference where 'cognizedness produced by the concerned piece of cognition' (*tajjanya*

5. 'sarvaviññānaheṭūthā... yāvatī kācid grahaṇasmarāṇasvarūpā'— PP, p. 56.

6. 'sadā jñātās cittavṛttayas tatprabhoḥ puruṣasyāpariñāmitvāt / na tat svābhāsam dṛśyatvāt /' — Yoga-sūtra, 4. 18–19.

7. 'manogrāhyaṃ sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ icchā dveṣo matiḥ kṛtiḥ'—Kārikāvalī, 57.

8. *Anu-vyavasāya* is knowledge (possibly) arising in the wake of a piece of cognition and taking perceptual cognizance of this piece of cognition.—Tr.

*jñātātā*) acts as probans, that is, by means of an inference of the type where the existence of a cause is inferred from that of its effect (*kārya-hetuka kāraṇa-viśayaka anumāna*) (SD, p.157). None except Kumārila is of the view that cognition can be known only non-perceptually (*atyanta-parokṣa*). Prabhākara also speaks of *jñāna* being inferred from effect-in-the-form-of-cognition (*phala-saṃvitti*), but this is something altogether different from Kumārila's talk of cognition (*jñāna*) being inferred from effect-in-the-form-of-manifestedness (*prākāṭya-rūpa phala*). For according to Kumārila, what we infer from manifestedness (*prākāṭya*) is cognition (*jñāna*) that is an inherent property (*samaveta guṇa*) of soul, while according to Prabhākara, what we infer from effect-in-the-form-of-cognition (*saṃvid-rūpa phala*) is the physical causal aggregate consisting of sense-object contact etc. (*sannikarṣādi jaḍa-sāmagrī*) generative of the property cognition (*jñāna-guṇa-janaka*).<sup>9</sup> This employment of the word '*jñāna*' in the sense of a causal aggregate is to be defended by treating '*jñāna*' as a formation with suffix '*an*' indicative of instrumentality<sup>10</sup> added to the root '*jñā*' 'to cognise'.

It is on account of his acceptance of the traditional Jaina view that cognition as such is self-perceptible, that Ācārya Hemacandra attributes self-determination (*svanirṇayatva*; self-cognizability) to cognition and refutes the doctrine of not-selfrevelatoriness in both its above-stated versions. His arguments in support of his own position and in refutation of his rivals, as also his manner of offering (*upanyāsa*) perceptual and inferential evidences are of a piece with those occurring in texts like *Prakarāṇa-pañcikā* of Śālikanātha, *Śrī-bhāṣya*, etc. He has likewise followed these texts in his consideration of the objections raised against his position by the rival systems.

(*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā Ṭippaṇa* (=PMT) on '*svanirṇaya*' in 1.1.10<sup>10</sup>, pp. 130-32<sup>11</sup>)

9. *saṃvidutpattikāraṇam ātmamanaḥsannikarṣākhyam tad ityavagamya parituṣyatām āyuṣmatā* /-PP, p. 63.

10. Refers to *Adhyāya, Āhnika*, Paragraph.

11. Refers to the pages of Pt. Sukhlalji's edition of *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1939.

## 2. THE LOGICAL TRADITION (*Tārkika Paramparā*) OF DEFINING PRAMĀṆA (*Pramāṇa-lakṣana*)

In the available history of the logical tradition of defining *pramāṇa* (meaning both valid cognition and the instrument of valid cognition) Kaṇāda occupies the first place. Through his aphorism '*aduṣṭam vidyā*' (9.2.12) Kaṇāda has indicated that the general definition of *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) ought to be based on the consideration that the cause of a valid piece of cognition is pure, i.e. free from defects (*kāraṇa-śuddhi-mūlaka*). The lacuna caused by the omission of a general definition of '*pramāṇa*' in the aphorist Akṣapāda's series of definitions was filled by Vātsyāyana<sup>12</sup> with his etymological interpretation (*nirvacana*) of the word '*pramāṇa*'. In this Vātsyāyana did not — as did Kaṇāda — care to note that the *cause* of a valid piece of cognition has to be pure, but, keeping in view just the effect called cognition (*upalabdhi*), he defined '*pramāṇa*' as 'that which causes cognition' (*upalabdhi-hetu*). In the course of meeting objections urged against Vātsyāyana's definition-based-on-etymology, Vācaspatiśrī<sup>13</sup> rendered it complete by inserting in it the word '*artha*' (i. e., object) and by taking the word "cognition" occurring therein to stand for the valid sort of cognition (*pramāṇa-rūpa jñāna-viśeṣa*) rather than cognition as such (*jñāna-sāmānya*); this completed definition (i.e. the definition that '*pramāṇa* is valid cognition of an object'), which Udayanācārya<sup>14</sup> in his *Kuṣumāñjali* characterizes as "one accepted by Gautama's School" (*Gautama-naya-sammata*) and which in its entirety has been paraphrased by him in his own language, is the general definition of *pramāṇa* endorsed by all subsequent Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts. Now three things are particularly noteworthy in this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition of defining *pramāṇa* in general :

1. Indication to the effect that the cause of a valid piece of cognition has to be pure, i.e. free from defects.

12. *upalabdhisāadhanāni pramāṇāni iti samākhyānirvacanasāmarthyāt boddhavyam pramīyate anena iti karaṇārthābhidhāno hi pramāṇaśabdaḥ* /-NBh, 1.1.3.

13. *upalabdhimātrasya arthāvyabhicāriṇaḥ smṛter anyasya pramāśabdena abhidhānāt* / *Tātp.*, p. 21.

14. *yathārthānubhavo mānam anapekṣatayesyate // mitiḥ samyak paricchittis tadvattā ca pramāṭṛtā // tadayogavyavacchedaḥ prāmāṇyaṁ Gautame mate* //—NK, 4. 1. 5.

2. Inclusion in the definition of the word “*artha*” standing for the object-of-cognition (*vaśaya*).

3. Absence in the definition of all mention as to whether a piece of cognition is self-revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) or not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*), as also absence in it of all hint as to whether or not the object of a valid piece of cognition has to be some novel (*apūrvā*) and hitherto-unknown (*anadhigata*) entity.

Although Prabhākara<sup>15</sup> and the Mīmāṃsakas following him treat as *pramāṇa* (i.e. valid cognition) all non-mnemic cognition whatsoever (*anubhūti-mātra*), Kumārila and his school of Mīmāṃsā have formulated such a general definition of *pramāṇa* as draws upon both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist traditions;<sup>16</sup> for the adjective ‘originating from a non-defective cause’ (*aduṣṭa-kāraṇa-ārabdha*) occurring in this (Kumārila) definition indicates in the manner of Kaṇāda that the cause of a valid piece of cognition must be free from all defect, while the adjectives ‘uncontradicted’ (*nirbādhā*) and ‘pertaining to a novel object’ (*apūrvārtha*) occurring in it bring it in line with the Buddhist tradition.<sup>17</sup> The verse

*tatrāpūrvārthavijñānaṃ niścitaṃ bādhavarjitaṃ /  
aduṣṭakāraṇārabdhaṃ pramāṇaṃ lokasammatam //*

is attributed to Kumārila, and two things are particularly noteworthy about it :

1. Inclusion in the definition of the word ‘*apūrvā*’ (meaning hitherto-unknown) in the form of an adjective of the object-of-cognition (*artha*).

2. Absence of all hint as to whether a piece of cognition is self-revelatory or not-self-revelatory.

In the Buddhist tradition Dinnāga<sup>18</sup> has included in his general

15. *anubhūtiś ca naḥ pramāṇam* /-Br, 1. 1. 5.

16. *autpattikagirā doṣaḥ kāraṇasya nivāryate /*

*abādhō 'vyatirekeṇa svatas tena pramāṇatā //*

*sarvasyānupalabdhe 'rthe prāmāṇyaṃ smṛtir anyathā* / -SV, Autp. Sl. 10-11 / ‘*etac ca viśeṣaṇatrayam upādadānena sūtrakāreṇa kāraṇadoṣabādhakajñānarahitam agrhītagrāhi jñānaṃ pramāṇam iti pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ sūcitam*’ /-SD, p. 123. ‘*anadhigatārthagantṛ pramāṇam iti Bhaṭṭa-mīmāṃsakā āhuḥ*’ /-Siddhāntacandrodaya, p. 20.

17. ‘*ajñātārthajñāpakam pramāṇam iti pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam*’ / -PST, p. 11.

18. *svasaṃvittiḥ phalam cātra tadrūpād arthaniścayaḥ /*

*viśayākāra evāsya pramāṇam tena mīyate* // -PS, 1. 10.

definition of *pramāṇa* the word “self-cognition” (*sva-saṃvitti*) in the form of an adjective of the effect (i.e. as standing for the effect of a *pramāṇa*). In the definition given by Dharmakīrti<sup>19</sup> in *Pramāṇa-vārtika* we find the adjective ‘*avisamvādin*’, which resembles the adjective ‘*pravṛtti-samartha*’ (i.e. one leading to successful action) occurring in Vātsyāyana and which is a synonym for ‘*nirbādha*’ occurring in Kumārila and others; in the definition given by him in *Nyāya-bindu* (1.20) we find him speaking of *artha-sārūpya* (i.e. possession of the same form as the object) as being the essence of a *pramāṇa* as had been done by Dinnāga. Śāntarakṣita's definition represents a synthesis of the ideas underlying those of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti; for it runs as follows :

*viṣayādhigatiś cātra pramāṇaphalam iṣyate /*

*svavittir vā pramāṇam tu sārūpyaṃ yogyatāpi vā //* (TSN. k. 1344)<sup>20</sup>

Here also two things are particularly noteworthy :

1. Introduction of the idea of self-cognition (*sva-saṃvedana*) — an idea till now absent in all traditions — and hence indication to the effect that the question whether a piece of cognition is self-revelatory or not-self-revelatory is now on the agenda.

[Asaṅga and Vasubandhu had laid the foundation of Vijñānavāda, but its stout defence came from Dinnāga. And it was in connection with the formulation and defence of Vijñānavāda that there came into prominence the doctrine of self-cognition or self-revelatoriness which, in turn, influenced, in one form or another, other philosophers as well. —See *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 12.]

2. Clear recognition in the manner of the Mīmāṃsaka that cognition pertaining to a hitherto-unknown object is alone *pramāṇa*.<sup>21</sup>

Siddhasena and Samantabhadra<sup>22</sup> — the first logicians of the Śvetāmbara and Digambara Jaina traditions respectively — both included

19. *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ /*

*avisamvādanam śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt //*—PV, 2.1.

20. The meaning of this *kārikā* will become quite clear in Note 4 with the heading ‘THE EFFECT (*phala*) OF PRAMĀṆA’. Tr.

21. See quotation from *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-tīkā* in Footnote 17. Tr.

22. ‘*pramāṇaṃ svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ bādhavivarjitam /*—NA, 1. ‘*tattvajñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ te yugapatsarvabhāsanam /*—AM, 101. ‘*svaparāvabhāsakaṃ yathā pramāṇaṃ bhuvi buddhilakṣaṇam /*—Brhat Svayambhūstotra, 63.

in their respective definitions of *pramāṇa* the adjective “*sva-para-avabhāsaka*” (i.e. revelatory of itself and of a not-self) meaning “*sva-para-prakāśa*” (i.e. that which illumines itself and a not-self). In Siddhasena's definition the word “*bādha-varjita*” (i.e. immune from contradiction) conveys the same idea as ‘*bādha-varjita*’ in the Mīmāṃsā and ‘*avisaṃvādin*’ in Dharmakīrti. Akalaṅka<sup>23</sup> — the systematizer (*prasthāpaka*) of Jaina Logic — has at some places inserted both the adjectives ‘*anadhigatārthaka*’ (i.e. pertaining to a hitherto-unknown object) and ‘*avisaṃvādin*’ (i.e. uncontradicted) while at other places he has also lent support to the use of the adjective ‘*sva-para-avabhāsaka*’. Māṇikyanandin<sup>24</sup> who follows Akalaṅka, by juxtaposing the words ‘*sva*’ (i.e. self) and ‘*apūrvārtha*’ (i.e. hitherto-unknown object) in the same compound, unified the tradition founded by Siddhasena-Samantabhadra and developed by Akalaṅka. Vidyānanda,<sup>25</sup> departing from this tradition of Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin, preserved through the word ‘*svārthavyavasāyātmaka*’ (i.e. that which determines itself and the object) the description given by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra but discarded the words ‘*anadhigata*’ and ‘*apūrva*’ that had occurred in the description given by Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin. In the Jaina tradition of defining *pramāṇa* the word ‘*vyavasāyātmaka*’ (i.e. determinate) appears for the first time in Vidyānanda, but it was already quite familiar in the context of Akṣapāda's definition of ‘perception’.<sup>26</sup> Abhayadeva<sup>27</sup> — the commentator of *Sanmati* — followed Vidyānanda, but he substituted the word ‘*nirṇīti*’ for the latter's ‘*vyavasāya*’. Vāddevasūri<sup>28</sup> has only repeated Vidyānanda. Āc. Hemacandra, after pondering over the proprieties and improprieties involved in the various above-mentioned Jaina and non-Jaina traditions, included in his

23. ‘*pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam, anadhigatārthādhigamalakṣaṇatvāt* /—ASH. AS, p. 175. ‘*uktaṃ ca—“siddhaṃ yan na parāpekṣaṃ siddhau svapararūpayoḥ / tat pramāṇam tato nānyad avikalpam acetanam* //” —NVT, p. 63. The *kārikā* in question occurs in *Siddhiviniścaya* which is definitely a writing by Akalaṅka.

24. ‘*svāpūrvārthavyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam* /—PM, 1. 1.

25. ‘*tatsvārthavyavasāyātmajñānam mānam itīyatā / lakṣaṇena gatārthatvāt vyartham anyad viśeṣaṇam* //—TSV, 1. 10. 77; PPar, p. 53.

26. ‘*indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam* / NS, 1. 1. 4.

27. ‘*pramāṇam svārthanirṇītisvabhāvam jñānam* / SMT, p. 518.

28. ‘*svaparavyavasāyi jñānam pramāṇam* / PNT, 1. 2.



definition just three words, viz. 'samyak' (i.e. right), 'artha' (i.e. object), and 'nirṇaya' (i.e. determination). In view of the above-delineated Jaina tradition it has to be admitted that Āc. Hemacandra arrived at his definition through a series of eliminations and amendments. He discarded the word 'sva' that had been inserted in their definitions by all the Jaina teachers preceding him. He selected Abhayadeva's 'nirṇīti' in preference to 'avabhāsa', 'vyavasāya' etc. of others and then changed it into "nirṇaya". Lastly, he introduced the word 'samyak' which was already available in Umāsvāti, Dharmakīrti, and Bhāsarvīṇa,<sup>29</sup> and thus finalized his definition, viz. 'right determination of object' (*samyagarthanirṇaya*).

Though not differing as regards their essentials, the various general definitions of *pramāṇa* proposed by the different Śvetāmbara and Digambara Jaina teachers exhibit considerable verbal difference. This difference is partly indicative of a real development of thought, but it is also due to the variety of contemporary literature studied by this or that teacher. The difference can be summarily subdivided into four heads :

(i) Firstly, there is the definition of Siddhasena-Samantabhadra which contains the word 'sva-para-avabhāsaka' and which is possibly not free from the influence of the Vijñānavāda Buddhist discussion on self-cognizability and otherwise (of a piece of cognition), for the idea is absent in the earlier Āgamic texts. (ii) Secondly, there is the definition of Akalaṅka-Māṇikyanandin containing the words 'avisamvādin' and 'apūrvā-anadhigata' which are undoubtedly taken from the Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas. (iii) Thirdly, there is the definition of Vidyānanda, Abhayadeva, and Devasūri, which is simply a verbal paraphrase of the one put forth by Siddhasena-Samantabhadra but which has come to acquire a more specific meaning as a result of substituting the word 'vyavasāya' or 'nirṇīti' for 'avabhāsa'. (iv) Lastly, there is the definition of Āc. Hemacandra which had been finalized by eliminating the words 'sva', 'apūrvā', 'anadhigata', etc.

(PMT on 'samyagartha' in 1.1.7, pp. 5-8)

29. *samyagdarśana-jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ* / *Tattvārthasūtra*, 1. 1. 'samyagjñāna-pūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhiḥ' / NB, 1.1. 'samyaganubhavasādhanam pramāṇam' / NSa, p. 1.

### 3. VALIDITY OF COGNITION (*Prāmāṇya*) — IS IT INTRINSIC (*Svataḥ*) OR EXTRINSIC (*Parataḥ*) ?

The discussion as to whether the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are intrinsic or extrinsic is a topic of frequent occurrence in philosophical literature. Historically viewing, the discussion seems to have originated in two schools of thought, one admitting the validity of Vedic testimony (*veda-prāmāṇya*) and the other denying it. When the Jainas, Buddhists, and other (heterodox) thinkers repudiated the validity of Vedic testimony, their Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā counterparts, who were advocates of the validity of Vedic testimony, started offering arguments in support of this validity. It appears that the discussion originally pertained only to verbal testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*) but that once it entered the field of Logic its scope was universalized, and consideration whether the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are intrinsic or extrinsic began to be applied to all cognition without exception.<sup>30</sup>

In this discussion there were at first two chief contending parties, one comprising the Jainas and Buddhists who were proponents of the invalidity of Vedic testimony (*Veda-aprāmāṇyavādin*) and the other comprising the Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc. who were proponents of the validity of Vedic testimony (*Veda-prāmāṇyavādin*). But different proponents of the validity of Vedic testimony argued their case in different ways. Thus the theistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system based its defence of the validity of Vedic testimony on the alleged divine origin of the *Vedas*. And when the validity of Vedic testimony was thus proved to be extrinsic, it was concluded that the validity of the remaining types of cognition, that is, of perception etc., is likewise extrinsic. The same reasoning was in the sequel extended so as to arrive at the conclusion that the invalidity of a piece of cognition is equally extrinsic.<sup>31</sup>

30. 'autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe tat pramāṇam Bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt / Jaiminiśūtra, 1. 1. 5. 'tasmāt tat pramāṇam anapekṣatvāt / na hy evam sati pratyayāntaram apekṣitavyam, puruṣāntaram vāpi; svayaṁ pratyayo hy asau / Śābarabhāṣya, 1. 1. 5; Br. 1. 1. 5. 'sarvavijñānaviśayam idaṁ tāvat pratīkṣyatām / pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ kiṁ parato 'thavā / -SV, Cod., Śl. 33.

31. pramāṇato 'rthapratipattaḥ pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam / -NBh, p. 1; Tātp. 1. 1. 1. 'kiṁ vijñānānām pramāṇyam aprāmāṇyam ceti dvayam api svataḥ, uta ubhayam api parataḥ, āhosvid aprāmāṇyam svataḥ prāmāṇyam tu parataḥ, utasvit prāmāṇyam

Being no theist, the Mīmāṃsaka certainly could not derive the validity of Vedic testimony from God's authorship of the *Vedas*. He therefore accepted Vedic testimony to be self-valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*), and, with a view to buttressing this position, demonstrated the self-validity of the remaining types of cognition like perception, etc.<sup>32</sup> However, the invalidity of a piece of cognition remained extrinsic even in the eyes of a Mīmāṃsaka.<sup>33</sup>

The available texts of the Sāṅkhya system give no indication as to what stand it takes on the question under consideration, but the statements of Kumārila, Śāntaraksita, and Mādhavācārya go to suggest that the system regards as intrinsic the validity as well as invalidity of a piece of cognition.<sup>34</sup> May be the old Sāṅkhya literature on the topic has perished. Writings of the above authors also make mention of a viewpoint which is diametrically opposed to the one adopted by the Mīmāṃsaka, that is, of the viewpoint according to which the invalidity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic while its validity is extrinsic. In the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* passage '*Saugatāś caramaṃ svataḥ*' (p. 279), this is no doubt given out as the Buddhist viewpoint, but the Buddhist viewpoint as presented in *Tattvasaṅgraha* is quite different from it. It is possible that the viewpoint attributed by *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* to Buddhists is the viewpoint of some other branch of Buddhism.

Śāntaraksita has elucidated the Buddhist position as follows : "Of the four views, viz. (i) that both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition are intrinsic, (ii) that both its validity and invalidity are extrinsic, (iii) that its validity is intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic, and (iv) that its invalidity is

*svataḥ aprāmāṇyam tu parata iti / tatra parata eva Vedasya prāmāṇyam iti vakṣyāmaḥ / sṭhitam etad arthakriyājñānāt prāmāṇyāniscaya iti / tadidam uktam / pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam iti / tasmād aprāmāṇyam api paroḥṣam ity ato dvayam api parata ity eṣa eva pakṣaḥ śreyān' / NM, pp. 160-74; Kand. 217-20. 'pramāyāḥ paratantratvāt sargapralayasambhavāt / tadanyasminnanāśvāsān na vidhāntarasambhavaḥ' / -NK, 2. 1; Tattvacintāmaṇi, Pratyakṣa. pp. 183-233.*

32. '*svataḥ sarvapramāṇānām prāmāṇyam iti gamyatām / na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate' / -SV, Sū. 2, Śl. 47.*

33. SV, Sū. 3, Śl. 85.

34. '*kecid āhur dvayam svataḥ' / -SV, Sū. 2, Śl. 343; TSN (and TSNP), k. 2811.*

*'pramāṇatvāpramāṇatve svataḥ Sāṅkhyāḥ samāśritāḥ' / Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, Jaiminiya, p. 279.*

intrinsic and validity extrinsic, none is the Buddhist view, for all these views are uniquely regulated (*niyamita*) while Buddhists accept no unique regulation on this point. That is to say, from the Buddhist viewpoint, both the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition can well be intrinsic in one case and extrinsic in another. Thus in the case of repeated acquaintance (*abhyāsa-daśā*) the validity as well as invalidity of a piece of cognition ought to be treated as intrinsic while in the case of first acquaintance (*anabhyāsa-daśā*) they both ought to be treated as extrinsic.”<sup>35</sup>

The Jaina position exactly tallies with the Buddhist case as presented by Śāntaraksita. That is, it too treats the validity as well as invalidity of a piece of cognition as intrinsic in the case of repeated acquaintance, and extrinsic in the case of first acquaintance. This position is clearly stated in the relevant aphorism itself of *Pramāṇanaya-tattvāloka*. Although Āc. Hemacandra, following in the footsteps of the author of *Parīkṣāmukha*, raises in his aphorism the question of intrinsicity and extrinsicity only as regards the validity of a piece of cognition (and not also as regards its invalidity), Devasūri's aphorism is fully representative of the Jaina tradition on this score. Thus we read : *tatprāmāṇyam svataḥ parataś ceti* / PM, 1. 13. *tadubhayam utpattau parata eva jñaptau tu svataḥ parataś ceti* / PNT, 1. 21.

This discussion on intrinsicity versus extrinsicity has gradually developed so much that all philosophical systems consider, invariably and at length, three separate questions enquiring as to whether the origin (*utpatti*), the knowledge (*jñapti*), and the effectivity (*pravṛtti*) of the validity and invalidity of a piece of cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic.<sup>36</sup> And extremely terse (*jaṭila*) works — so full of subtle refinements (*parīkṣārapūrṇa*) — like *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Gādādhara-prāmāṇyavāda*, etc. have come to be written on the subject.

(PMT on *sūtra* 1. 1. 8, pp. 16-18)

35. 'na hi Bauddhair eṣāṃ caturṇām ekatamo 'pi pakṣo 'bhīṣto 'niyamapakṣasyeṣṭatvāt / tathāhi — ubhayam apy etat kiñcit svataḥ kiñcit parataḥ iti pūrvam upavarṇitam / ata eva pakṣacatuṣṭayopanyāso 'py ayuktaḥ / pañcamasyāpy aniyamapakṣasya sambhavāt / — TSNP, k. 3123.

36. PKM, p. 149 ff.

#### 4. THE EFFECT (*phala*) OF A PRAMĀṆA

The discussion as to the nature of *pramāṇa* and of its effect occupies an important place in philosophical speculation. The matter had been given consideration even in the Age of Scriptures (*Śruti-Āgama-Yuga*), that is, in the period preceding the Age of Logic (*Tarka-Yuga*). Thus *Upaniṣads*, *Pitakas*, and (Jaina) *Āgamas* all speak of the effect of knowledge — of right knowledge (*samyak-jñāna*). In this Age, the Vedacist, Buddhist, as well as Jaina traditions are found to submit that the effect of knowledge consists in removal of ignorance (*avidyā-nāśa*) or in cognition of things (*vastu-viṣayaka adhigama*) — but all this was said from a spiritual (*ādhyātmika*) point of view, that is, from the point of view of the attainment of transcendental release (*mokṣa-lābha*). In that Spiritual Age, knowledge was considered to be of use simply because it removes our nescience (*avidyā*) — i.e. ignorance (*ajñāna*), — acquaints us with the real nature of things, and thus ultimately results in our attaining transcendental release.<sup>37</sup> But in the Age of Logic, the question was considered also from an empirical (*vyāvahārika*) point of view. This is why in the discussion conducted on the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect in the Age of Logic, we find exhibited the transcendental (*alaukika*) viewpoint that is characteristic of the Spiritual Age, as also the empirical (*laukika*) viewpoint that is characteristic of the Age of Logic.<sup>38</sup> The discussion from an empirical viewpoint of the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect consists in considering as to what in everyday practice (*vyavahāra*) is accomplished (*siddha*) by a *pramāṇa* directly, and what through intermediary links (*paramparayā*); whether or not a *pramāṇa* ultimately leads to transcendental release is no concern of this viewpoint. For the empirical viewpoint seeks to consider the effect of a *pramāṇa* even in the case of those persons who are unauthorized for transcendental release (*mokṣānadhikārin*).

37. 'so 'vidyāgranthiṃ vikaratīha saumya / — *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, 2. 1. 10; *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, 28. 2, 3; 'tameṭaṃ vuccati — yadā ca ñātvā so dhammaṃ saccāni abhisamessati / tadā avijjūpasamā upasanto carissati /'—*Visuddhimagga*, p. 544.

38. '...tattvajñānān niḥśreyasaṃ /—VS, 1.1.3. '...tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ /—NS, 1.1.1. 'yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānaṃ pramitiḥ, yadā jñānaṃ tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam /—NBh, 1.1.3.

All the three traditions that discuss in the Age of Logic the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect consider two chief points, viz. (i) whether a *pramāṇa* and its effect are mutually distinct or not-distinct, and (ii) what constitutes the effect of a *pramāṇa*. The Vedicist traditions like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, etc. treat the effect of a *pramāṇa* as absolutely distinct from this *pramāṇa*,<sup>39</sup> the Buddhist treats the two as absolutely non-distinct.<sup>40</sup> The Jaina, in line with his general non-absolutistic approach, treats a *pramāṇa* and its effect as partly distinct and partly non-distinct.<sup>41</sup>

As to the nature of the effect of a *pramāṇa*, the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā hold an identical view.<sup>42</sup> Thus according to them all, the chain of activities starting with the functioning (*vyāpāra*) of a sense-organ and culminating in the decision to accept, reject, or ignore the object concerned (*hānopādānopekṣā-buddhi*), consists of links which are of the nature of *pramāṇa* in relation to their respective successors, and of the nature of an effect-of-*pramāṇa* in relation to their respective predecessors. That is to say, on this view, the sense-organ is a *pramāṇa* but no effect-of-a-*pramāṇa* while the decision to accept, reject, or ignore the object is an effect-of-*pramāṇa* but no *pramāṇa*, but the three intermediate stages, viz. sense-object contact (*sannikarṣa*), indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*), and determinate perception (*savikalpaka*), are a *pramāṇa* in relation to their respective successors and an effect-of-*pramāṇa* in relation to their respective predecessors. Here even an effect-of-*pramāṇa* is no doubt called also a *pramāṇa* but it is so only in relation to the succeeding effect which is quite distinct from itself. Thus on this view, a *pramāṇa* and its effect clearly turn out to be mutually distinct. The same sort of distinction has been kept in view by Vācaspati Miśra while elucidating the Sāṅkhya position on the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect.<sup>43</sup>

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39. SV, *Pratyakṣa*, Śl. 74, 75.

40. PS, 1. 9. NBT, 1. 21.

41. 'karaṇasya kriyāyās ca kathaṇcid ekatvaṃ pradīpatamovigamavat nānātvaṃ ca paraśvādivat.' ASH, AS, pp. 283-84.

42. 'yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānam pramitiḥ yadā jñānam tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalam.' NBh, 1.1.3; SV, *Pratyakṣa*, Śl. 59-73; PP, p. 64; Kand, pp. 198-99.

43. Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, k. 4.

In the Buddhist tradition two views are held as to the nature of the effect of a *pramāṇa*. According to one, the effect of a *pramāṇa* consists in cognition of an object (*viṣayādhigama*); according to the other, it consists in self-cognition (*sva-saṃvitti*). Of these two views — both occurring in Dinnāga<sup>44</sup> — the first alone is mentioned and elucidated by Dharmakīrti<sup>45</sup> and his commentator Dharmottara, but Śāntarakṣita gathers together these views, logically justifies (*sayuktika upapādana*) them, and brings out the distinction between the two. Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla clearly state that according to realism (*bāhyārthavāda*) — the doctrine Pārthasārathimīśra characterizes as Sautrāntika — the formal similarity (*sārūpya*) obtaining between a piece of cognition (*jñāna*) and its object (*viṣaya*) is (to be treated as) *pramāṇa* while cognition of the object in question (*viṣayādhigati*) is (to be treated as) the effect of *pramāṇa*, and that according to idealism (*viññānavāda*) — the doctrine Pārthasārathi characterizes as Yogācāra — self-cognition (*sva-saṃvedana*) on the part of a piece of cognition is (to be treated as) the effect of *pramāṇa* while a capacity for the same (*yogyatā*) is (to be treated as) *pramāṇa*.<sup>46</sup> Here we should keep in mind that with the Buddhist a *pramāṇa* and its effect are, both of them, the properties of the concerned piece of cognition, and that the two are said to be non-distinct (*abhinna*) simply because they are not two different entities.<sup>47</sup> Kumārila (in *SV, Pratyakṣa*, Śl. 74 ff.) has assailed this Buddhist thesis of non-distinction (*abheda*) between a *pramāṇa* and its effect, and has lent support to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis of distinction (*bheda*) between the two; Śāntarakṣita, in return, has met Kumārila's objection word by word, and has demonstrated the logical propriety of the Buddhist thesis in question (TSN, k. 1340 ff).

44. PS, 1. 10-12; SV, *Nyāyaratnākaraṭīkā*, pp. 158-59.

45. NB, 1. 18-19.

46. 'viṣayādhigatīś cātra pramāṇaphalam īsyate /

svavittir vā pramāṇaṃ tu sārūpyaṃ yogyatā 'pi vā //—TSN, k. 1344. SV, *Nyāyaratnākara*, pp. 158-59.

47. Thus strictly speaking, for a Buddhist the relation between a *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* is not that of cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇa-sambandha*) but rather that of determinant and determined (*vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka-sambandha*). See NBT, 1. 21.—Tr.

In the Jaina tradition Siddhasena and Samantabhadra are the first logicians to have given consideration to the problem of the effect of a *pramāṇa* also from an empirical viewpoint. On this question the two teachers have expressed similar ideas and in similar words (NA, k. 28; AM, k. 102). According to both, the immediate effect of a *pramāṇa* is removal of ignorance (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) but the remote effect can possibly be the decision-to-accept-or-reject-or-ignore-the-object. Three things are particularly noteworthy in this contention of Siddhasena and Samantabhadra :

1. The mention of removal-of-ignorance as the effect of *pramāṇa*, a mention absent in the Vedicist as well as Buddhist traditions.
2. Absence of the idea — characteristic of the Vedicist tradition — that the intermediary links (lying in between the initial functioning of a sense organ and the final decision to accept etc.) are *pramāṇa* in relation to their respective successors and effect-of-*pramāṇa* in relation to their respective predecessors, an idea absent also in the Buddhist tradition.
3. Absence of the mention as to whether a *pramāṇa* and its effect are mutually distinct or non-distinct.

After Siddhasena and Samantabhadra our attention is chiefly drawn by Akalaṅka who, while accepting all that was said by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra on the question, also expressly takes a stand on the two points left untouched by them, that is to say, Akalaṅka says in so many words that with Jainas the relation between a *pramāṇa* and its effect is one of distinction-cum-non-distinction (*bhedābheda*) (ASh, AS, pp. 283-84) and he also takes clear note of and endorses — in a fashion characteristic of the Jaina — the relativistic Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā position according to which the intermediary links (in the causal chain of a cognitive process) are, each of them, *pramāṇa* as well as effect-of-*pramāṇa*.<sup>48</sup> On the question of *pramāṇa* and its effect, Māṇikyanandin (in PM, 5.1.ff) and Devasūri (in PNT, 6.3 ff) repeated in their respective aphorisms what was said by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra; at the same time, even though they aphorized Akalaṅka's idea that with Jainas the relation between a *pramāṇa* and its effect is one of distinction-cum-non-distinction, they did not do the

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48. 'bahvādyavagrahādyastatvāriṃśat svasaṃvidāṃ /

pūrvapūrvapramāṇatvaṃ phalaṃ syād uttarottaram //—Laghī, 1.6.



same with Akalaṅka's other idea that the intermediary links (in the causal chain of a cognitive process) are, each of them, *pramāṇa* as well as effect-of-*pramāṇa*. Vidyānanda's sharp intellect took note of the concept "removal of ignorance" (*ajñāna-nivṛtti*) and of the phrase "determination (i.e. cognition) of self and of a not-self" (*sva-para-vyavasiti*) (occurring in the definition of *pramāṇa*), and he submitted that to say that the effect of a *pramāṇa* is removal of ignorance, is to say what the Sautrāntika means when he tells us that the effect of a *pramāṇa* is determination-of-a-not-self (*para-vyavasiti*; cognition-of-an-object) and the Yogācāra when he tells us that the effect of a *pramāṇa* is self-determination (*sva-vyavasiti*; self-cognition) (TSV, p. 168; PPar, p. 79); Prabhācandra in his *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa* and Devasūri in his *Syādvādaratnākara* follow Vidyānanda. By now it seems to be the settled view of Jaina logicians that what Siddhasena and Samantabhadra call 'removal of ignorance' is in fact 'determination of self and of a not-self'.

Āc. Hemacandra in his treatment of the topic, no doubt gathered together these views of the Jaina logicians that had preceded him, but he also contributed something new to the discussion. Thus unlike Prabhācandra and Devasūri, he does not identify 'removal of ignorance' with 'determination of self, and of a not-self', but treats the two as two different effects of *pramāṇa*. Though in answering the objections against the doctrine of non-distinction between a *pramāṇa* and its effect — objections that had been urged by Kumārila and met by Dharmottara in his commentary on *Nyāyabindu* and by Śāntarakṣita in *Tattvasaṅgraha* — Āc. Hemacandra simply follows the Buddhist line of defence he has here displayed, in an attractive logical style, his command over Grammar. As on so many others, so also on the question of regarding the intermediary links (in the causal chain of a cognitive process) as *pramāṇa* as well as effect-of-*pramāṇa* Āc. Hemacandra literally follows in his aphorisms the line of argumentation laid down by Akalaṅka. Thus we find in these aphorisms a possible synthesis — undertaken in accordance with the Jaina standpoint — of the Vedicist, Buddhist, and Jaina traditions on the problem of *pramāṇa* and its effect.

### 5. IS MEMORY (*smṛti*) A PRAMĀṆA ?

On the question whether or not memory is *pramāṇa* or *pramā* (both meaning the same thing) there are two traditions — the Jaina and the non-Jaina. The Jaina tradition considers memory to be a *pramāṇa* and classes it under non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇas*; the non-Jaina tradition — be it Vedicist or Buddhist — does not consider memory to be a *pramāṇa*. Of course, even those who do not consider memory to be a *pramāṇa* do not say that it is an *a-pramāṇa*, i.e. an invalid cognition (*mithyā-jñāna*); all that happens is that they do not call memory by the name *pramāṇa*.

The root of the controversy whether the word “*pramāṇa*” should not be employed to denote mnemonic cognition, lies in the history of Scriptures (*dharma-śāstra*). In the Vedicist tradition, the *Vedas* — also called *Śruti* — are alone considered to be valid as the basic Scripture; on the other hand, the *Smṛti* texts like *Manu* etc., even though valid in the form of a Scripture, have their validity dependent on *Śruti*, that is to say, only that *Smṛti* is valid which is based on or uncontradicted by *Śruti*, in other words, a *Smṛti*’s validity (as a Scripture) is not independent but dependent on the *Śruti*’s validity (as a Scripture).<sup>49</sup> This ruling (*vyavasthā*) concerning the validity of a text as a Scripture was being given consideration by the Mīmāṃsā system since very old past. When the question arose of determining the validity of *smṛti* understood (not as certain texts claiming Scriptureship but) as ordinary mnemonic cognition, the Mīmāṃsakas seem to have just generalized the position they had come to adopt on the question of the validity of *smṛti* understood as certain texts claiming Scriptureship, that is to say, they gave the ruling that memory (*smṛti*), since its validity depends on that of the earlier non-mnemonic cognition (*anubhava*) which is its cause, is not an independent *pramāṇa* (just as *Smṛti*, since its validity depends on that of *Śruti*, is not an independent Scripture). This theological-cum-logical ruling (*nirṇaya*) given by the Mīmāṃsā system — so much concerned with Vedic ritualism (*vaidika-dharma-jīvin*) — has, in all probability, influenced the

49. ‘*pāratantryāt svato naiśām pramāṇatvādhāraṇā /  
apramāṇyavikalpaś tu draḍhimnaiva vihanyate //*  
*pūrvavijñānaviśayaṃ vijñānaṃ smṛtir ucyate /  
pūrvajñānād vinā tasyāḥ prāmāṇyaṃ nāvadhāryate //* — *Tantravārtika*, p. 69.

remaining Vedacist systems like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, etc.<sup>50</sup> Hence it is that these systems are unanimous in their view – supported though it might be by different arguments in different cases – that the word “*pramāṇa*” is not to be employed to denote mnemonic cognition.

Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila are of the view that mnemonic cognition, since its sole function lies in making us apprehend something that was grasped by an earlier piece of non-mnemonic cognition, is not the revealer of some novel object (*anapūrvārthaprakāśaka*) and is the cognizer of what has already been cognized (*grhītagrāhin*).<sup>51</sup> Śrīdhara, the follower of Prāśastapāda, basing himself on the Mīmāṃsā line of reasoning, argues (in *Kand.*, p. 257) that memory falls outside the circle of *pramāṇas* because it cognizes what has already been cognized. But Jayanta, the follower of Akṣapāda, pursues another line of reasoning. He thus argues that memory, since it comes into being at a time when the real entity (*artha*) constituting its object (*viśaya*) is absent, is something not born of a real entity (*anarthaja*) and hence a non-*pramāṇa*.<sup>52</sup> Jayanta's present argument has been refuted by Śrīdhara.<sup>53</sup> Vācaspati Miśra, who too is a follower of Akṣapāda, offers a third argument. He submits that memory should not be treated as *pramā* because popular usage (*lokavyavahāra*) is not in favour of calling memory a *pramāṇa* (i.e. *pramā*). Hence it is that in his account of *pramā* (given in *Tātp.*, p. 20) Vācaspatimiśra leaves out memory and considers only the remaining types of cognition. Udayanācārya, after refuting all the arguments offered by these earlier logicians in support of the contention that memory is not a *pramāṇa*, follows the suggestion of Vācaspatimiśra and maintains that non-mnemonic cognition (technically called

50. 'etaduktam bhavati – sarve pramāṇādayo 'nadhigatam arthaṃ sāmānyataḥ prakārato vā 'dhigamayanti, smṛtiḥ punar na pūrvānubhavamaryādām atikrāmati, tadviśayā tadūnaviśayā vā, na tu tadadhikaviśayā, so 'yam vṛttyantarād viśeṣaḥ smṛter iti vim-  
rśati / –Tattvavaiśārādī, 1. 11.

51. 'tatra yat pūrvavijñānam tasya prāmāṇyam iṣyate /

tadupasthānamātreṇa smṛteḥ syāc caritārthatā // –SV, Anu., Śl. 160; PP. p. 42.

52. 'na smṛter apramāṇatvaṃ grhītagrāhitākṛtam /

api tv anarthajanyatvaṃ tadaprāmāṇyakāraṇam // –NM, p. 23.

53. 'ye tv anarthajatvāt smṛter aprāmāṇyam āhuḥ teṣāṃ atītānāgataviśayasyānumānasyā-  
prāmāṇyaṃ syād iti dūṣaṇam / Kand., p. 257.

*anubhava*) should alone be treated as *pramāṇa* because it alone is an independent piece of cognition; thus Udayanācārya thinks that memory is not *pramāṇa* because it is dependent on *anubhava*, and that this train of reasoning of his is in accord with popular usage.<sup>54</sup>

Buddhists too do not consider memory to be a *pramāṇa*, and their argument is akin to that of the Mīmāṃsaka or the Vaiśeṣika, that is, they too argue that memory is not a *pramāṇa* because it cognizes what has already been cognized (*TSNP*, k. 1298). However, we cannot say that in adopting this position the Buddhist was influenced by the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of ritual, as were the systems like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, etc., for the Buddhist was not at all a believer in the validity of Vedic testimony. What is actually the case is that, there arises no question of memory being treated as a *pramāṇa* in a system like Buddhism where all knowledge-involving-thought (*vikalpajñānamātra*) is declared to be no *pramāṇa*.<sup>55</sup>

Jaina logicians criticize all these views which deny to memory the status of a *pramāṇa* on the ground that it cognizes what has already been cognized, that it is not born of a real entity, that popular usage is against calling memory a *pramāṇa*, etc.; and their contention is that memory ought to be treated as a *pramāṇa* because it is true of facts (*saṃvādin*), just as perception etc. are treated as *pramāṇas* because they are true of facts.<sup>56</sup> There is no difference of opinion among the Jainas on this point, and in treating memory as a *pramāṇa* (in *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1.2.3) Āc. Hemacandra has simply followed the established Jaina tradition.

That mnemonic cognition is true of facts is acceptable to all (Indian logicians), and so there is no material difference of opinion on this issue;

54. 'katham tarhi smṛter vyavacchedaḥ ? ananubhavatvenaiva / yathārtho hy anubhavaḥ prameti prāmāṇikāḥ paśyanti / "tattvajñānāt" iti sūtraṇāt / avyabhicāri jñānam iti ca / nanu smṛtiḥ pramāṇa kim na syāt yathārthajñānatvāt pratyakṣādyanubhūtivād iti cet / na, siddhe vyavahāre nimittānusaraṇāt / na ca svecchākālpitena nimittena lokavyavahāranīyamānam, avyavasthaya lokavyavahāravipravaprasaṅgāt / na ca smṛtiḥ tau pramāṇābhīyuktānām maharṣiṇām pramāṇavyavahāro 'sti, pṛthagānupadeśāt /—NK, 4. 1.

55. 'grhītagrahaṇān neṣṭam sāmvrtaṃ ...' (sāmvrtaṃ vikalpajñānam – Manorathanandiṭkā) – PV, 2.5.

56. 'tathā hi – amuṣyā'prāmāṇyaṃ kuto 'yam āviṣkurvīta, kim grhītārthagrahītvāt, paricchittiviseṣābhāvāt, asatyātīte 'rthe pravartamānatvāt, arthād anutpadyamānatvāt, viśaṃvādakatvāt, samāropāvyavacchedakatvāt, prayojanāprasādhakatvāt vā /—SVR, 3.4.

the difference only arises when some agree and others refuse to call memory a *pramāṇa*.

(PMT on 'sā ca pramāṇam' in 1.2.8, pp. 72-74)

## 6. IS CONTINUOUS COGNITION (*dhārāvāhika jñāna*) A PRAMĀṆA ?

Whether memory is or is not a *pramāṇa* is a problem that has been considered by the Indian systems of Logic ever since their inception, but the problem whether continuous cognition (of the same object) is or is not a *pramāṇa* seems to have arisen, for the first time, in the Buddhist system with Dharmakīrti. And once it found footplace in one system of logic the problem became a problem for all the systems : hence arguments and counter-arguments were offered on the question, different views were upheld, and definite traditions established.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers like Vācaspati, Śrīdhara, Jayanta, Udayana, etc.<sup>57</sup> all grant that continuous cognition takes cognizance of what has already been cognized, but they agree to treat such a cognition as *pramāṇa* – and this they do without positing 'awareness of minute divisions of time' (*sūkṣma-kāla-kalā-bhāna*) (as is done by some other philosophers). This is why these philosophers do not define *pramāṇa* as cognition of something hitherto unknown (*anadhigata*).

Among Mīmāṃsakas, both the Kumārīlite and Prabhākarite traditions are in favour of treating continuous cognition as *pramāṇa*, but the two have adopted different lines of defence. Prabhākarite Śālikanātha<sup>58</sup> argues —

57. 'anadhigatārthagantṛtvaṃ ca dhārāvāhikavijñānānām adhigatārthagocarāṇāṃ lokasiddhapramāṇabhāvānām prāmāṇyaṃ vihanṭīti nādrīyāmahe / na ca kālabhedenānadhigatagocaratvaṃ dhārāvāhikānām iti yuktam / paramasūkṣmāṇām kālakalādibhedānām piśītalocanair asmāḍṛsair anākalanāt / na cādyenaiva vijñānenopadarśitatvād arthasya pravartitatvāt puruṣasya prāpitatvāc cottareṣām aprāmāṇyam eva jñānānām iti vācyam / na hi vijñānasyārthaprāpaṇam pravartanād anyat, na ca pravartanam arthapradarśanād anyat / tasmād arthapradarśanamātravyāpāram eva jñānam pravartakam prāpakam ca / pradarśanam ca pūrvavad uttareṣām api vijñānānām abhinnaṃ iti katham pūrvam eva pramāṇam nottarāny api ?' – Tāpt., p. 21.; Kand., p. 61; NM, p. 22; NK, 4.1.

58. 'dhārāvāhikeṣu tarhy uttaravijñānāni smṛtipramoṣād aviśiṣṭāni katham pramāṇāni ? tatrāha – anyonyanirapekṣās tu dhārāvāhikabuddhayaḥ / vyāpriyamāṇe hi pūrvavijñānakāraṇakalāpa uttareṣām apy utpattir iti na pratīta utpattito vā dhārāvāhikavijñānāni parasparasyātīserata iti yuktā sarveṣām api pramāṇatā /' – PP, pp. 42-43; Br. p. 103.

without positing 'awareness of minute divisions of time' — that continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* because it is non-mnemic (*anubhūti*) sort of cognition, and the argument bears a clear imprint of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. On the other hand, Kumārīlite Pārthasārathi<sup>59</sup> posits 'awareness of minute divisions of time' and then goes on to maintain that continuous cognition is *pramāṇa*; for the Kumārīlite tradition, since according to it a *pramāṇa* must have for its object something altogether novel, could not defend the *pramāṇa*-ship of continuous cognition otherwise (i.e. without supposing that newer and newer minute-divisions-of-time are taken note of during the course of a continuous cognition). This Kumārīlite position seems to bear an imprint of the Buddhist and Jaina views.

Coming to the Buddhist tradition, though Dharmottara<sup>60</sup> makes no express mention of continuous cognition, the general tenor of his statements suggests that he was inclined to treat such a cognition as no *pramāṇa*. In his commentary on *Hetubindu*, Arcāṭa<sup>61</sup> has, incidentally but clearly, formulated his view on the question of continuous cognition. He

59. 'nanv evaṃ dhārāvāhikeṣṭtareṣāṃ pūrvagrhitārthaviśayakatvād aprāmāṇyaṃ syāt / tasmāt "anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam" iti pramāṇalakṣaṇam / tasmāt yathārtham agrhitagrāhi jñānaṃ pramāṇam iti vaktavyam / dhārāvāhikeṣv apy uttarottareṣāṃ kālāntarasa-mbandhasyāgrhitasya grahaṇāt yuktaṃ prāmāṇyam / sann api kālabhedo 'tisūkṣmatvān na parāmrśyata iti cet; aho sūkṣmadarśī devānāṃ priyaḥ ! yo hi samānaviśayayā vijñānadhārayā ciraṃ avasthāyoparataḥ so 'nantarakṣaṇasambandhitayārthaṃ smarati / tathā hi – kim atra ghaṭo 'vasthita iti prṣṭaḥ kathayati – asmin kṣaṇe mayopalabdha iti / tathā prātarārabhyaitāvatkālam mayopalabdha iti / kālabhede tv agrhite katham evaṃ vadet ? tasmād asti kālabhedasya parāmarśaḥ / tadādhikyāc ca siddham uttareṣāṃ prāmāṇyam /'—SD, pp. 124-26.

60. 'ata eva anadhigataviśayaṃ pramāṇam / yenaiva hi jñānena prathamam adhigato 'rthaḥ tenaiva pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ tatraivārthe kim anyena jñānena adhikaṃ kāryam / tato 'dhigataviśayam apramāṇam /' NBT, p. 3.

61. 'yadā ekasmin eva nīlādivastuni dhārāvāhīnīndriyajñānāny utpadyate tadā pūrvabhinnayogaḥkṣematvāt uttareṣāṃ indriyajñānānām aprāmāṇyaprasaṅgaḥ / na caivam, ato 'nekanta iti pramāṇasamplavavādī darśayan āha – pūrvapratyakṣakṣaṇena ityādi / etat pariharati – tad yadi pratikṣaṇam kṣaṇavivekadarśino 'dhikṛtyocyate tadā bhinnopayogitayā prthak prāmāṇyāt nānekāntaḥ / atha sarvapadārtheṣv ekatvādhyavasāyinaḥ sāmvyavahārikān puruṣān abhipretyocyate tadā sakalam eva nīlasantānam ekam arthaṃ sthirarūpaṃ tatsādhyāṃ cārthakriyām ekātmikām adhyavasyantīti prāmāṇyam apy uttareṣāṃ anīṣṭam eveti kuto 'nekāntaḥ ?'—Hetubinduṭīkā, p. 37.

there maintains that a *yogin's* continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* because it involves awareness of minute divisions of time while, on the other hand, an ordinary man's continuous cognition is no *pramāṇa* because it involves no such awareness. Thus in the Buddhist tradition continuous cognition has been treated as *pramāṇa* or no *pramāṇa* according as the cognizer concerned is of this or that type (i. e. a *yogin* or an ordinary person).

On the question whether continuous cognition should or should not be regarded as *pramāṇa* the Jaina texts on Logic follow either of the two traditions, the Digambarite and the Śvetāmbarite. According to the Digambara tradition, a continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* only in case it takes note of specialities (*viśeṣa*) like moments (*kṣaṇa*) etc. and thus produces knowledge of newly specialized objects (*viśiṣṭapramā-janaka*) (every moment); on the other hand, if a continuous cognition takes no such note of specialities, it is no *pramāṇa*. Similarly, this tradition further maintains that a continuous cognition, even while producing knowledge of specialized objects (every moment), is no *pramāṇa* so far as the aspect of substance (*dravyāṃśa*) is concerned (because it produces no specialised knowledge concerning this aspect) and is *pramāṇa* so far as the aspect of specialities (*viśeṣāṃśa*) is concerned (because it does produce specialized knowledge concerning this aspect), that is to say, the same piece of cognition is *pramāṇa* as well as no *pramāṇa* according as its object is this or that (i.e. a speciality-of-a-substance or the substance itself). A careful scrutiny (*pūrvāparāvalokana*) of the commentaries of Vidyānanda, the follower of Akalaṅka, and Prabhācandra, the follower of Māṇikyanandin, leads to the present conclusion.<sup>62</sup> For when Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin, who are one with the other Jaina logicians in frankly admitting memory to be a *pramāṇa*, urge, in agreement with the Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka, that a

62. 'grhītam agrhītam vā svārtham yadi vyavasyati / tan na loke na śāstreṣu vijahāti pramāṇatām //'-TVS, 1. 10. 78.; 'pramāntarāgrhītārthaprakāśitvaṃ prapañcataḥ / prāmāṇyam ca grhītārthagrahīte 'pi kathaṅcana //'-TSV, 1. 13. 94.; 'grhītagrahaṇāt tatra na smṛteś cet pramāṇatā / dhārāvāhyakṣavijñānasyaivaṃ labhyeta kena sā // TSV, 1. 13. 15.; 'nanv evam api pramāṇasamplavavāditāvyāghātāḥ pramāṇapratipanne 'rthe pramāṇāntarāpratipattir ity acodyam / arthaparicchittiviśeṣasadbhāve tatpravṛtter apy abhyupagamāt / prathamapramāṇapratipanne hi vastuṇy ākāra-viśeṣam pratipadya-mānaṃ pramāṇāntaram apūrvārtham eva vṛkṣo nyagrodha ityādivat / - PKM, p. 16.

*pramāṇa* must have for its object something hitherto-unknown or novel, their words cannot be interpreted as meaningful except on the above explained stand (as to the nature of continuous cognition), and here it is immaterial as to what was Vidyānanda's or Prabhācandra's own personal view of the matter.

Buddhists<sup>63</sup> consider both thought (*vikalpa*) and memory (*smṛti*) to be no *pramāṇa*, Mīmāṃsakas consider only memory (*smṛti*) to be no *pramāṇa*. Hence the purpose behind their insistence that a *pramāṇa* must have for its object something hitherto-unknown or novel is clear. But that cannot be the purpose behind a Jaina's insistence to the same effect.

Scholars following the Śvetāmbara tradition are unanimous in considering continuous cognition to be *pramāṇa* just like memory. This is why none of them at all maintains that the object of a *pramāṇa* must be something hitherto-unknown or novel. Not only that, they say, in so many words, that a piece of cognition taking cognizance of an already known object (*grhīta-grāhin*) is as much *pramāṇa* as that taking cognizance of a hitherto-unknown one (*agrhīta-grāhin*). Thus since, according to them, a piece of cognition does not cease to be *pramāṇa* in case its object happens to be something already known, they maintain neither that no continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* nor that a continuous cognition is *pramāṇa* in respect of one sort of object and no *pramāṇa* in respect of another sort.

Even among Śvetāmbara teachers, Āc. Hemacandra's position is in a way novel, for – and that is remarkable – he establishes *pramāṇa*-ship of continuous cognition by showing that cognition of an already-cognized-object (*grhīta-grāhi-jñāna*) is on a par with cognition of a to-be-cognized-object (*grahīṣyamāṇa-grāhi-jñāna*) (so that if the former is no *pramāṇa* the latter should follow suit).

(PMT on 'dhārāvāhikajñānānām' 1. 1. 15., pp. 11-14)

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63. 'yad grhītagrāhi jñānam na tat pramāṇam, yathā smṛtiḥ, grhītagrāhi ca pratyakṣa-prṣṭhabhāvī vikalpa iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ' / -TSNP, k, 1298.



## 7. IS RECOGNITION (*pratyabhijñā*) A *PRAMĀṆA* ?

In connection with the problem of recognition philosophers have held divergent views on two points, viz. as to whether it is *pramāṇa* and as to its nature. The Buddhist tradition treats recognition as no *pramāṇa*, for, being an advocate of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*), it dismisses as unreal all permanence (*sthīratva*) which is what is supposed to constitute the object of recognition. On its showing, cognition of (alleged) permanence, being in fact cognition of mere similarity, is illusory.<sup>64</sup> But philosophers belonging to the two non-Buddhist traditions – i.e. Jaina and Vedicist – agree in treating recognition as *pramāṇa*. It is on the basis of *pramāṇa*-ship of recognition that these philosophers refute the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*) and defend (the reality of) permanence (*nityatva*, *sthīratva*). Unlike the Vedicist traditions such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, etc., the Jaina tradition does not believe in the reality of absolute permanence (*ekānta-nityatva*), that is, of permanence-without-change (*kūṭastha-nityatva*); but since it does believe in the reality of permanence-in-the-midst-of-the-successively-emerging(-and-perishing)-states it too is in favour of attributing *pramāṇa*-ship to recognition.

As to the nature of recognition, there are three main views, viz. the Buddhist, the Vedicist, and the Jaina. According to the Buddhist view, what is called “recognition” is not one single piece of cognition but a combination of two pieces of cognition, viz. memory and perception, given one name.<sup>65</sup> [The alleged one object of recognition has an element of ‘that’ and an element of ‘this’. Of these] the element of ‘that’, being something past *atīta* and hence open only to non-perceptual cognition (*parokṣa*), here becomes an object of memory and can never become an object of perception, while, on the other hand, the element of ‘this’, being something present (*vartamāna*), here becomes an object of perception and can never become an object of non-perceptual cognition. As against this Buddhist view according to which recognition is a combination of two pieces of cognition differing from each other in that the object of one of them is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) and that of

64. PV, 3. 501-2; TSN, k. 447.

65. ‘.... *tasmād dve ete jñāne sa iti smaraṇam ayam ity anubhavaḥ* / -NM, p. 449.

the other non-perceptible (*parokṣa*), the Vedicist systems like Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, etc. maintain that recognition is one single piece of cognition of the nature of perception, and not a combination of two pieces of cognition, one perceptual and the other mnemonic. (According to these Vedicist systems), there is no doubt a general rule (*sāmānya niyama*) to the effect that the object of sense-perception must be a present entity, but an exception to this rule has to be allowed when certain particular causal aggregate (*sāmagrī-viśeṣadaśā*) obtains there. Thus while seeking to justify (*upapādana*) the perceptual character of recognition, Vācaspatiśrī says that sense-organs, which (generally) grasp only present entities, succeed in producing recognition, because with impressions (*saṃskāra*) or memory acting as an accessory, they become competent to grasp a present-entity-as-qualified-by-a-past-state (*atītāvasthāviśiṣṭa-vartamānagrāhin*).<sup>66</sup> Jayanta follows this statement of Vācaspati and also adduces a new argument. Thus he says that in the wake of perception had by a sense-organ-assisted-by-memory (*smaraṇa-sahakṛta-indriyajanya pratyakṣa*) there arises a mental cognition (*mānasa jñāna*) which is called 'recognition'.<sup>67</sup> In this statement of Jayanta seems to lie the seed of the later Naiyāyika's thesis on extra-ordinary (*alaukika*) perception.

Jaina logicians do not agree with the Buddhist in maintaining that recognition is but a combination of two (independent) pieces of cognition, nor do they agree with the Naiyāyika etc. in regarding recognition as but a variety of sense-perception. With them recognition is a type of non-perceptual cognition (*parokṣa jñāna*), and they are of the view that in the wake of sense-perception and memory, there arises a mental cognition of a *sui generis* (*vijātīya*) type that takes cognizance of two-entities-as-somewhat-related-to-each-other (*saṅkalanātmaka jñāna*); it is this mental cognition which they call 'recognition'. This ruling of Akalaṅka (given in *Laghī*, 3. 1 ff.), which is essentially akin to Jayanta's thesis on mental cognition, has been accepted by Jaina logicians without a voice of dissent. Admitting recognition to be of the nature that accords with this ruling (of Akalaṅka), Āc. Hemacāndra refutes the rival views and defends his.

66. Tātp., p. 139.

67. 'evaṃ pūrvajñānaviśeṣitasya stambhāder viśeṣaṇam atītakṣaṇaviṣaya iti mānasī pratyabhijñā' -NM. p. 461.

Mīmāṃsakas (SV, Sū. 4, Śl. 232-37), Naiyāyikas (NS, 1.1.6) etc. consider *upamāna* (i.e. Analogy) to be an independent type of *pramāṇa* supposed to take cognizance of similarities and dissimilarities. Again, these philosophers are of the view that many a relationing (*sapratyogika*) cognition – e. g. cognition of longness (*dīrghatva*), shortness (*hrasvatva*), etc. – is but perceptual. Jaina logicians have, unanimously and since the very beginning, treated all these (i.e. similarity, dissimilarity, longness, shortness, etc.) as specific objects of “recognition” which is with them an independent *pramāṇa* and a subspecies of *matijñāna*.<sup>68</sup>

(PMT on ‘*darśanasmarāṇa*’ in 1.2.9, pp. 75-76)

## 8. THE JAINA CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE

The problem of knowledge has been treated in the Jaina tradition in two ways, viz. that based on the Āgamic classification, and that based on the logical classification. The treatment where knowledge is divided into *matī*, *śruta*, etc. is the one based on the Āgamic classification, the treatment where it is divided into *pramāṇas* like perception etc. is the one based on the logical classification. An unmixed instance of the first type of treatment is *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, an unmixed instance of the second type is *Nyāyāvātāra*.

The old and original treatment of knowledge in the Jaina tradition is the one based on the Āgamic classification; it is not yet possible to say with certainty as to who first introduced in this tradition the treatment based on the logical classification. *Sthānāṅga* and *Bhagavatī* are two among the eleven *Aṅgas* supposed to be composed by Gaṇadharas, and they are certainly old also. But even though these texts contain clear mention of the logical classification<sup>69</sup> there seems to be no difficulty in conjecturing that this mention has been inserted there in *Sthānāṅga* and *Bhagavatī* some time after Bhadrabāhu, the author of *Niryuktis*; for *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*, which is supposed to be a composition by Bhadrabāhu and where the very start is

68. *Matijñāna* is the technical name for one of the five types of knowledge admitted by Jaina Āgamas.-Tr

69. ‘*duviheṇāṇepaṇṇatte-taṃ jahā-paccakkhe ceva parokkhe ceva*’-*Sthānāṅgasūtra*, 2, p. 49A. ‘*ahavāheṇā cauvvihe paṇṇaṃ taṃ paccakkhe, aṇumāṇe, ovamme, āgame*’-*Sthānāṅga*, 4, p. 254A. ‘*se kiṃ taṃ pamāṇe ? pamāṇe cauvvihe paṇṇatte, taṃ jahā — paccakkhe ..... jahā Aṇugadāre tahā ñeyavvaṃ*’-*Bhagavatīsūtra*, Ś 5, U 3, Part II, p. 211.

made with a discussion on knowledge, accepts the Āgamic classification but does not even mention the logical classification. It appears that till the time of *Niryuktis* the Jaina teachers discussed the problem of knowledge basing themselves on the Āgamic classification but were not entirely ignorant of the discussion on *pramāṇas* going on in the other traditions. Not only that, as and when occasion arose, they even employed (with amendments if need be) the *pramāṇa* methodology (*pramāṇaśailī*) of those other traditions. Thus in *Daśavaikālika-niryukti* supposed to be a composition of Bhadrabāhu, we get a discussion on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) where the stand taken on the question of the number of steps in an inference-for-others (*parārthānumānāvayava*) is altogether different from that of the other traditions (*Gāthā* 50).

Āryaraṣita, who was Brahmin by birth and had become a Jaina monk after having studied Brahmanical texts, seems to be the first to have adopted, in his *Anuyogadvāra* (p. 211), the fourfold classification of *pramāṇas* into *pratyakṣa* (i.e. perception), *anumāna* (i.e. inference) etc. – a classification already accepted in Gautama's system (*NS*, 1. 1. 3.) It cannot be said with certainty as to whether the twofold classification of *pramāṇas* into *pratyakṣa* (i.e. perceptual knowledge) and *parokṣa* (i.e. non-perceptual knowledge) which Umāsvāti adopts in his *Tattvārthasūtra* (1. 10-12) is his own or one belonging to an earlier teacher. It seems that at the time when Āgamas were edited (*saṅkalanā*) portions containing the fourfold classification of *pramāṇas* as also those containing the twofold classification, found entrance in *Sthānāṅga* and *Bhagavatī*. However, even though both these classifications had found place in the Āgamic texts, the Jaina teachers chiefly gave special thought to the twofold classification. The obvious reason for this is that the fourfold classification really belongs to the Nyāya system – and is therefore referred to by Umāsvāti as a *nayavādāntara* (*Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 1. 6) – while the twofold classification is the Jaina teachers' own. This is why all Jaina texts on Logic base their treatment of *jñāna* and *pramāṇa* on this twofold classification. And that precisely is the reason for Āc. Hemacandra's adoption of the twofold classification.

Under the influence of the logical systems of philosophy like the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc., the Buddhist monks had long since left the field assigned to them by *Piṭakas* (*piṭakocita-maryādā*) and had entered the arena of debate and of the logical treatment of *pramāṇas* (that goes with debate). Gradually, the Jaina monks too could not remain immune from the influence of this logical treatment undertaken by the Vedacist and Buddhist philosophers. Hence it was that Jaina teachers undertook a classification of *pramāṇas* basing themselves on the classification of *jñāna* that had been handed down to them by their tradition; and on the question of this classification-of-*pramāṇas* of theirs, they even entered into discussion with the teachers of rival persuasions. Although Āryaraksita, in the course of his classification of *pramāṇas*, had already clearly pointed out that *matijñāna* comes under *indriya-pratyakṣa* (i.e. sense-perception) and *śrutajñāna* under *āgama* (i.e. verbal testimony), the Jaina authors on Scriptural and logical topics were constantly faced with the question as to whether *anumāna* (i.e. inference), *upamāna* (i.e. analogy), *arthāpatti* (i.e. implication), etc., which the various other traditions accepted as *pramāṇas*, are or are not *pramāṇas* in the eyes of the Jaina tradition. And if *anumāna* etc. are *pramāṇas* why is it that they are not independently treated (by the Jainas) or shown to be falling under some independently treated *pramāṇa*? To this question an answer seems to have come for the first time from Umāsvāti (*Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 1. 12) who suggested that *anumāna* etc., which are *pramāṇas* according to the other traditions, fall either under *mati* or under *śruta*, that is, under one of the *parokṣa* (i.e. non-perceptual) *pramāṇas*. It is this answer of Umāsvāti that Pūjyapdāda literally adopts (*Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1. 12).

The Jaina tradition had come to specially prefer the twofold classification rather than the fourfold, and this was all for the good. Thus *Nandīsūtra* undertook a detailed treatment of the problem of knowledge basing itself on the twofold classification. However, though the basis of this treatment on the part of the author of *Nandī* was the twofold classification, he incorporated in this treatment two points also from Āryaraksita's treatment based on the fourfold classification. The first point is that sensory knowledge, which is what commonsense understands by *pratyakṣa* and which the non-Jaina logicians treat as *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, is given the

status of *pramāṇa* even in the Jaina tradition, and in doing so *pratyakṣa* is subdivided (*Nandīsūtra*, 3) into two types, one covering (the transcendental perception) *avadhi* etc. which Umāsvāti has treated as independent *pramāṇas* and the other covering sense-perception. The second point taken by the author of *Nandī* from Āryarākṣita is that what the other systems call *āgama pramāṇa* is the same thing as *śrutajñāna* and is a subspecies of the *parokṣa* (i.e. non-perceptual) type of knowledge.

Though the Āgamic treatment of knowledge continued, the tendency to logical argumentation gradually gained ascendancy in the Jaina line of thought. The result of all this is *Nyāyāvatāra*. In it we get a logical treatment of knowledge based on the twofold classification of *pramāṇas*. Its chief aim is to offer an account of inference (*anumāna*, *nyāya*) according to the Jaina way of looking at things. Though the major part of *Nyāyāvatāra* is concerned with the problem of offering an account of the subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa*, we are not here told — as was done in the writings of the later teachers — that these — and no more — are the subspecies of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa, in his voluminous *Bhāṣya*, logically incorporated in the twofold classification of *pramāṇas* the Āgamic fivefold classification of *jñāna*, and by calling sense-perception “*sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*” (*indiyamaṇobhavaṃ jaṃ taṃ saṃvavahārapaccakkhaṃ – Viśeṣā-vaśyaka bhāṣya*, *Gāthā* 95) he also, for the first time, eliminated the discrepancy — pointed out by the anti-Jaina logicians — vitiating the twofold classification — made by Āryarākṣita and accepted by the author of *Nandī* — of *pratyakṣa* into the sensory and the non-sensory. The discrepancy was as follows. When the Jaina system calls only that knowledge *pratyakṣa* which is born of *akṣa* (i.e. *ātman*) alone it becomes self-contradictory for it to call sensory perception *pratyakṣa* (for sense-perception is not born of *ātman* alone). However, Kṣamāśramaṇajī did all this, but did not tell us that these — and no more — are the subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* according to the Jaina tradition.

Thus even though alongside with the Āgamic treatment of knowledge (and with somewhat greater prominence than the Āgamic treatment) the logical treatment of *pramāṇa* was also taking place in the Jaina tradition, the anti-Jaina logicians were pestering the Jaina with the question :

Granting that *anumāna*, *āgama*, etc., which others treat as independent *pramāṇas*, are but subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* according to you, what precisely is the number of the subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* and what the definition of each ?

On the basis of the available literature it can doubtless be said that the question was first answered by Bhaṭṭāraka Akalaṅka, and his answer is extremely clear-cut and definite. Akalaṅka, in his *Laghīyastrayī*,<sup>70</sup> maintained that the five subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* are (i) *anumāna* (i.e. inference), (ii) *pratyabhijñā* (i.e. recognition), (iii) *smaraṇa* (i.e. memory), (iv) *tarka* (i.e. knowledge of invariable concomitance), and (v) *āgama* (i.e. verbal testimony); and he also clearly defined each of these subspecies. We see that this classification offered by Akalaṅka solved all those problems which frequently arose in the course of the Āgamic as well as the logical treatment of knowledge. The result was that all post-Akalaṅka logicians – Digambara as well as Śvetāmbara – followed the path laid down by Akalaṅka, and composed more or less lengthy texts basing themselves on Akalaṅka's very words (or their equivalents) and developing his very ideas in this or that direction. Yaśovijayaājī, the greatest among the Jaina logicians (*Jaina-tārīka-mūrdhanya*), does the same. Here one thing has to be kept in mind. The same Akalaṅka who, by enumerating and defining the subspecies of *parokṣa-pramāṇa*, succeeds in giving a Jaina account of *anumāna*, *arthāpatti*, *upamāna*, etc. which are independent *pramāṇas* according to the other traditions is also the author of *Rājavārtika*; however, in *Rājavārtika*, while showing that these *pramāṇas* accepted by the other traditions fall under the recognized Jaina types, Akalaṅka follows, so to say, not the line of argument of *Laghīyastrayī* but that of *Tattvārthabhāṣya* and *Sarvārthasiddhi*. Even then, Akalaṅka's line is slightly different from that of *Bhāṣya* and *Siddhi* (*Rāja-vārtika*, p. 54). Akalaṅka has seen to it that his fivefold classification of *parokṣa-pramāṇa*, does not go against the synthesis worked out by the earlier teachers like Umāsvāti etc. while, at the same time, a meaning is given to the identification — made in *Āgama*, *Niryuktis*

70. 'jñānam ādyam matiḥ sañjñā cintā cābhinibodhanam / prāñnāmayojanāc cheṣaṁ śrutaṁ śabdānuyojanāt // -Laghī. 3.1., Autocommentary 3. 1. : 'Sūriṇā — Akalaṅkena vārtikakāreṇa.' -*Siddhivinīscayaṭīkā*, p. 254B.

etc. — of *matijñāna* with *smṛti*, *sañjñā*, *cintā*, *abhinibodha*.<sup>71</sup>

All this goes to explain why Akalaṅka's classification of *parokṣa-pramāṇa* and his definition of each subspecies of it is upto this day acceptable to all Jaina logicians. It is this very classification which Āc. Hemacandra adopts in his *Mīmāṃsā* and makes the basis of his treatment of the topic.

(PMT on *sūtras* 1. 1. 9-10, pp. 19-23)

## (ii) On Problems of Perception

### 9. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION IN GENERAL

Before considering other topics connected with the problems of perception we must first be clear in our mind as to what was the definiendum with the ancient sages (*ṛṣi*) when they set to themselves the task of defining 'perception', that is, as to whether they regarded definition as applicable only to the cases of generated (*janya*) perception or — as was the case with the later-day Naiyāyikas — as applicable to the cases of generated as well as of eternal (*nitya*) perception. So far as we can see, no ancient authority — not even any of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors who are certainly no atheists — has offered a definition that applies to generated as well as eternal perception. In all ancient basic texts (*mūlagrantha*) — whether written by theistic philosophers or by the atheistic ones — account has been given only of the generated perception. That eternal perception is a possibility or that God — and He alone — is competent to have eternal perception, is not even indicated (*sūcana*) in any ancient text.<sup>72</sup> As against the Mīmāṃsakas who sought to defend the authoritative character (*prāmāṇya*) of Vedic texts, on the (alleged) ground that these texts are an

71. Akalaṅka treats the set '*smṛti*, *sañjñā*, *cintā*, *abhinibodha*' as synonymous with the set '*smṛti*, *pratyabhijñā*, *tarka*, *anumāna*' / -Tr.

72. VS, 3. 1. 18; *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyāt-makam pratyakṣam* / -NS, 1. 1. 4; '*pratiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*' / -SK, 5; *Sāṅkhya-sūtra*, 1. 89; *Yogabhāṣya*, 1.7; '*satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇām.....*'—*Jaiminisūtra*, 1. 1. 4; '*ātmendriyamanor'thāt sannikarṣāt pravartate* / *vyaktā tadātve yā buddhiḥ pratyakṣam sā nirūpyate* / -*Carakasamhitā*, 11. 20.



impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) composition, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system no doubt argued that Vedic texts, being a verbal composition (*śabdātmaka*), are transient (*anitya*) and that therefore their authority rests not on their being an impersonal composition but on their being a composition by some (competent) person. But none of the ancient Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors clearly mentions God as the author of the Vedas. These authors – adopting a procedure different from that of the Mīmāṃsakas – established the authoritative character of Vedic texts on the ground that these texts are composed by sages who are an authority (on the subject-matter concerned) (*āpta-rṣi-praṇīta*); thus the answer of these authors to Buddhists, Jainas, etc. who disputed the authoritative character of the Vedas (*Vedāpramāṇyavādin*) consisted in arguing that the Vedas are an authoritative text because they are composed by sages who are an authority on the subject-matter concerned.<sup>73</sup> The later interpreters of the Nyāya system conceived God as the creator of the universe, the author of the Vedas, and the possessor of eternal knowledge, but none of the ancient Sūtra-texts belonging to the Vedicist tradition either clearly establishes God's creatorship of the universe and His authorship of the Vedas or anywhere even mentions Him as the possessor of eternal knowledge. It is thus absolutely definite that all ancient definitions of perception are meant to be applicable only to the cases of generated perception. It is certain topics connected with this generated perception that we now proceed to consider :

#### (1) EMPIRICAL (*laukika*) AND TRANSCENDENTAL (*alaukika*) PERCEPTION :

Even though the thing sought to be defined in ancient times was generated perception, the fact remains that all philosophers barring the Cārvākas divided this generated perception into two kinds, viz. empirical and transcendental. All these philosophers treat as empirical perception the perception – had either through sense-organs or through *manas* alone – of a present entity; the transcendental perception is named differently in different systems. Thus in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga,<sup>74</sup> Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.<sup>75</sup> and

73. NS, 1. 1. 7; ibid. 2. 1. 69; VS, 6. 1.1.

74. *Yogasūtra*, 3. 54; SK, 64.

75. VS, 9. 1. 3-15.

Buddhist<sup>76</sup> systems the transcendental perception is named *yogi-pratyakṣa* (i.e. yogic perception) or *yogi-jñāna* (i.e. yogic knowledge) and is supposed to be born as a result of competence acquired through yogic practices (*yogajanya-sāmarthya-janita*). The Mīmāṃsaka too, who is deadly opposed to the idea of omniscience (*sarvajñatva*) — particularly to the idea of perceptibility (lit. direct cognizability) of the transcendental merits and demerits (*dharma-adharma-sākṣātkāra*) — posits as a subsidiary (*aṅga*) to transcendental release (*mokṣa*) a kind of self-cognition (*ātma-jñāna*) which is, really speaking, yogic or transcendental.<sup>77</sup> In Vedānta, it is witness-consciousness-of-the-form-of-God (*Īśvara-sākṣi-caitanya*) that stands for transcendental perception. In Jaina philosophy, the Āgamic tradition insists that transcendental perception alone be treated as perception,<sup>78</sup> for according to this tradition, perception (*pratyakṣa*) is *ex hypothesi* something not born of sense-organs. Thus as a matter of fact, what the other philosophical systems treat as empirical perception is treated by the Āgamic Jaina tradition as a case not of perception (*pratyakṣa*) but of non-perceptual knowledge (*parokṣa*).<sup>79</sup> However, the logical tradition in Jaina philosophy divides perception into two kinds, designating as *sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa* what other systems call empirical perception and as *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* what they call transcendental perception. And the cause of *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* is, according to this tradition, *labdhi*, i.e. special competence of soul (*viśiṣṭa ātma-śakti*), which is, in a way, but the Jaina counterpart of 'competence acquired through yogic powers' (*yogaja dharma*).

## (2) CAN TRANSCENDENTAL PERCEPTION BE INDETERMINATE ?

The question next arises whether transcendental perception is exclusively indeterminate, or exclusively determinate, or both indeterminate and determinate. There is no unanimity in answering this question.

76. NB, 1. 11.

77. 'sarvatraiva hi vijñānaṃ saṃskāratvena gamyate /  
parāṅgaṃ cātmavijñānād anyatrety avadhāraṇāt // -Tantravārtika, p. 240.

78. Tattvārthasūtra, 1. 12.

79. Tattvārthasūtra, 1. 11.

According to the Buddhist logicians and the adherents of Śāṅkarite Vedānta,<sup>80</sup> transcendental perception has to be but indeterminate, and never determinate. Rāmānuja<sup>81</sup> holds diametrically opposite view, viz. that all perception, empirical as well as transcendental, has to be but determinate and never indeterminate.<sup>82</sup> The other Vedacist traditions like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. seem to be of the view that transcendental perception may be either indeterminate or determinate. We say “seem to be” because the staunch Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña (in *NSa*, p. 4) has clearly spoken of the two sorts of yogic perception, viz. indeterminate and determinate, — notwithstanding the fact that old texts like *Kaṇādasūtra* and *Praśastapādabhāṣya* contain no clear indication to that effect. According to the Jaina tradition, transcendental (i.e. *pāramārthika*) perception is of both sorts, indeterminate as well as determinate. For the Jaina's *avadhi-darśana* and *kevaladarśana*, both of which are of the nature of ‘cognition of the general, i.e. of mere existence’ (*sāmānya-bodha*), are indeterminate transcendental perception, while his *avadhi-jñāna*, *manahparyāya-jñāna*, and *kevala-jñāna*, all of which are of the nature of ‘cognition of the specific, i.e. of particulars’ (*viśeṣa-bodha*), are determinate transcendental perception.

### (3) WHAT IS THE DETERMINANT (*niyāmaka*) OF PERCEPTION-SHIP (*pratyakṣatva*)

The question next arises as to what element (*tattva*) is the determinant of perception-ship, that is, as to what is that on account of which a piece of cognition (*bodha*, *jñāna*) is called ‘perception’. This question too has not been answered unanimously. According to neo-Śāṅkarite-Vedānta (*navya-Śāṅkara-Vedānta*), the determinant of perception-ship is that type

80. *Indian Psychology : Perception*, p. 352.

81. *‘ataḥ pratyakṣasya kadācid api na nirviśeṣaviśayatvam /-Śrībhāṣya*, p. 21.

82. As Panditji now recognizes, this formulation needs correction. Rāmānuja posits both the indeterminate and determinate sorts of perception, though he is of the view that the former type takes cognizance of ‘existence’ plus a fewer number of particulars (of the object concerned) while the latter that of ‘existence’ plus a large number of particulars. That is to say, Rāmānuja is not of the view that indeterminate perception takes cognizance of mere ‘existence’ (of the object concerned). This is why in the next Note Rāmānuja is not included among those who deny indeterminate perception.—Tr.

of non-distinction (*abheda*) between consciousness-of-the-form-of-pramāṇa (*pramāṇa-caitanya*) and consciousness-of-the-form-of-object (*viśaya-caitanya*) which *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (p.23) describes in details. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Buddhist, and Mīmāṃsā systems, the determinant of perception-ship is the fact of having been born of a contact (*sannikarṣa*), that is, whatever (cognition) is born of a contact – empirical or transcendental – is perception. In the Jaina system, two things have been regarded as determinant of perception-ship; thus according to the Āgamic tradition this determinant is the fact of being dependent (for its birth) on soul alone (*ātma-mātra-sāpekṣatva*) (*Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1.12.) while according to the logical tradition, an additional determinant is the fact of having been born of sense-organs and *manas* (*indriya-mano-janyatva*) (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1.12). Really speaking, the logical Jaina tradition follows the Vedicist systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc.

#### (4) POSSIBLE TYPES OF PERCEPTION

The question arises as to whether perception is only of the indeterminate type or it can also be of the determinate type. In answer to it the Buddhist submits that perception can be only of the indeterminate type. The remaining systems are, however, of the view that perception can possibly be of both types, indeterminate as well as determinate.<sup>83</sup>

#### (5) A DEFINITION COMMON TO BOTH THE GENERATED AND ETERNAL TYPES OF PERCEPTION

Uptil now, the philosophers, while defining perception, used to keep in view only the cases of generated perception; but in medieval times, i.e. after the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system clearly made room for God in the shape of the creator of the universe and the author of the *Vedas*, Divine perception came to be regarded as an eternal verity, and hence there arose for the theistic philosopher the problem of formulating a definition common to the generated and eternal types of perception. The first attempt at formulating such a common definition seems to have been made by Bhāsarvajña; for he defines perception (*pratyakṣa*) as “right non-indirect (i.e. direct) cognition” (*samyagaparokṣānubhava*) (*NSa*, p.2), a definition applicable to the cases of

83. For a more precise treatment of the problem see the next Note.—Tr.

generated as well as of eternal perception. Likewise, Śālikanātha, the follower of Prabhākara, when he characterized perception as “direct awareness” (*sākṣāt-pratīti*) (PP, p.51), was only offering an alternative definition of perception that will cover the sensuous (*indriya-janya*) perception of external objects as also the non-sensuous (*indriya-ajanya*) perception of soul and of cognition (PP, p.51). Bhāsarvajña's phrase “*aparokṣānubhava*” and Śālikanātha's “*sākṣātpratīti*” were elucidated in a new terminology by the neo-Naiyāyikas when they offered as a definition common to the generated as well as eternal types of perception the phrase “a piece of cognition not having a piece of cognition for its *karaṇa* (i.e. instrumental cause)” (*Muktāvali*, p.52). Jaina logicians too were faced with the problem of formulating a common definition of perception. Of course, since the Jaina is no believer in eternal perception, the problem for him was not one of formulating a definition common to the generated and eternal types of perception; his problem rather was one of formulating a definition common to the empirical (*sāṃvyaavahārika*) and transcendental (*pāra-mārthika*) types of perception. The problem seems to have been tackled for the first time by Siddhasena Divākara, for by characterizing perception as “cognition of a non-indirect (i.e. direct) type” (*aparokṣa jñāna*) he has turned “non-indirect cognizability” into a definition that is common to the empirical as well as transcendental types of perception (NA, 4). We cannot be definite whether Bhāsarvajña's employment of the word “*aparokṣa*” in his definition of perception is or is not influenced by the similar practice on the part of Siddhasena; what is certain is that within the Jaina fold Siddhasena is the founder of the tradition of defining perception in general as “non-indirect cognition.”

## (6) ELIMINATION OF DEFECTS

Siddhasena no doubt defined perception in general as “non-indirect cognition”, but this definition suffers from a defect that cannot remain concealed from an acute-minded logician. The question is : If perception stands for “non-indirect cognition”, what does “indirect cognition” stand for ? To say that indirect cognition stands for non-perceptual (*a-pratyakṣa*, *pratyakṣa-bhinna*) cognition will be to commit the fallacy of ‘mutual depen-

dence' (*anyonyāśraya*).<sup>84</sup> The first attempt in the direction of removing this defect and elucidating the nature of "non-indirectness" (*aparokṣatva*) seems to have been made by Bhaṭṭāraka Akalaṅka. For in crystal-clear words he declared that a cognition which is lucid (*viśada*) is perception (*Laghi*. 1.3). This declaration did two things : it contained a general definition of perception and at the same time it removed the 'mutual dependence' above pointed out. For now perception was not defined in terms of 'non-indirectness' which stands in need of a prior definition of "indirectness". Not only that, Akalaṅka's skill in formulating definitions (*lākṣaṇikatā*) also unfolded (*sphoṭa*) the meaning of the term "*vaiśadya*" (i.e. lucidity) – what is more, a meaning that applies to empirical perception as also to transcendental perception. "*Vaiśadya* (i.e. lucidity)", he says, "consists in generating a type of objective awareness (*pratibhāsa*) that is distinct from that generated by inference etc." (*Laghi*., 1.4). This attempt on Akalaṅka's part at formulating a general definition of perception and at unfolding its meaning found reflection in all Jaina logicians – Śvetāmbara and Digambara – who came after him. Some of them substituted the word "*viśada*" by "*spaṣṭa*" (e.g. *PNT*, 2.2), others retained it (e. g. *PM*, 2.3).

As on so many others, so also on the question of defining perception, Āc. Hemacandra follows Akalaṅka, so much so that he had even retained the latter's word "*viśada*" and his interpretation thereof. The fact of the matter is that Akalaṅka's definition has become so deep-rooted that even the most modern logician Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaṇī, when he defines perception, bases himself on the same.<sup>85</sup>

(*PMT* on '*viśadaḥ*' in 1.1.43, pp. 132-35)

## 10. THE NATURE OF INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION

The three following meanings of the word "*darśana*" are current in all traditions : (i) visual perception (e.g. *ghaṭa-darśana*=visual perception of jar), (ii) direct cognition (e.g. *ātma-darśana*=direct cognition of soul),

84. The idea is that you cannot first define perception as 'non-indirect cognition' and then define indirect cognition as 'non-perceptual cognition'. However, the identification of *parokṣa-jñāna* with *apratyakṣa-jñāna* is not at all invalid, and that is why we have elsewhere translated '*parokṣa-jñāna*' as 'non-perceptual cognition'. –Tr.

85. *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 1.

(iii) a system of philosophy following a particular tradition (e.g. Nyāya-darśana = Nyāya system of philosophy; Sāṅkhya-darśana = Sāṅkhya system of philosophy). But two meanings of this word are peculiar to the Jaina tradition and are to be found in no other; they are (i) faith (*śraddhā*) and (ii) cognition of the general (*sāmānya-bodha*) or bare cognition (*ālocana-mātra*).<sup>86</sup> Thus in Jaina Scriptures faith-in-truth (*tattvaśraddhā*) is called *darśana*; see, for example, *tattvārthasraddhāṇaṃ samyagdarśanam. (Tattvārthasūtra, 1.2)*. Likewise, the cognition (*bodha*) of a thing's bare-existence-without-any-particulars (*nirviśeṣasattāmātra*) is also called *darśana*; see, for example, *Viśaya-viśayisannipātānantarasamudbhūtasattāmātragocara-darśanāt. (PNT, 2.7)*. In this way, there are, in all, five meanings of the word 'darśana', and we presently intend to consider the fifth of these meanings, viz. cognition of the general (*sāmānya-bodha*). Here six points deserve consideration :

### (1) ITS EXISTENCE (*astitva*)

The existence of a type of cognition where a thing's bare-existence (lit. self-nature) – without-any-particulars (*nirviśeṣasvarūpamātra*) is revealed (*bhāsita*) is accepted, under one name or another, by all the traditions except three. That 'cognition of the general' which the Jaina calls 'darśana' is called 'nirvikalpaka' or 'ālocanamātra' by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and the Pūrva as well as Uttara Mīmāṃsā. The Buddhist tradition, too

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86. When we say that the word 'darśana' stands, in the Jaina tradition, for bare cognition or *ālocana* (also called 'anākāra upayoga') we are keeping in view the very much well known stand taken by both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions. Otherwise, the word is used in the two traditions in many other senses as well. For example, on one view, a piece of cognition (*bodha*) arising directly, that is, without requiring a probans (*liṅga*), is *anākāra-bodha* or *darśana* while that arising through the instrumentality of a probans is *sākāra-bodha* or *jñāna*; on another view, a piece of cognition grasping only the present entities (*vartamānamātragrāhin*) is *darśana* while that grasping the present, past, as well as future entities (*traikālikagrāhin*) is *jñāna* (*Tattvārthabhāṣyaṭīkā, 2. 9*); finally, the Digambarite commentary (on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*) *Dhavalā* also adopts the view that a piece of cognition grasping only soul (*ātmanāmātrāvalokana*) is *darśana* while that grasping external objects (*bāhyārthaprakāśa*) is *jñāna*. This third view is mentioned in *Bṛhaddravyasaṅgrahaṭīkā* (*Gāthā, 44*) as also in Abhayacandra's commentary on *Laghī, 1.5*.

adopts for it the name “*nirvikalpaka*”. Thus all these traditions agree in maintaining that all cognitive process (*jñāna-vyāpāra*) invariably (*anivārya-rūpeṇa*) takes its rise in a cognition which grasps the bare existence (*sanmāstrasvarūpa*) of the object concerned, but where nothing is revealed in the form of a qualifier or a qualificand (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-rupeṇa bhāsita*). But the two Vedāntist traditions of Madhva and Vallabha as also a third tradition of Bhartrhari and the grammarians preceding him<sup>87</sup> do not admit the existence of ‘cognition of the general’ anywhere in the course of cognitive process. According to all these three traditions, a piece of cognition that is revelatory of no particulars (*viśeṣa*) and of no relation of a qualifier to its qualificand (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*) is an impossibility; thus on their showing, even in its most initial stage (*prāthamikadaśāpanna*) a piece of cognition brings to light some particular or other even if a mere gross (*sthūla*) one, and from this they conclude that all cognition whatsoever is determinate. And by indeterminate cognition they only understand the cognition which reveals comparatively fewer particulars (and not one which reveals *no* particulars). Of these three traditions which regard all cognition as determinate, the grammarian's seems to be the oldest, and maybe Madhva and Vallabha simply took it up from Bhartrhari.

## (2) ITS DIVISION INTO THE EMPIRICAL AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL (*laukikālaukikatā*)

All the traditions which posit indeterminate cognition agree in admitting the existence of empirical indeterminate cognition, that is of indeterminate cognition born of sense-object contact, but the question is whether they also admit the existence of transcendental indeterminate cognition. Both the Jaina and Buddhist traditions posit a type of indeterminate cognition which arises independently of sense-object contact and on account of *yoga* or special competence of a soul (*viśiṣṭa-ātma-śakti*). Such a transcendental indeterminate cognition is known as *yogi-saṃvedana* in the Buddhist tradition and as *avadhi-darśana* and *kevala-darśana* in the Jaina tradition. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā systems admit the existence of *yogins* of various grades (*vividha kakṣā*) and of

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87. *Indian Psychology : Perception*, pp. 52-54.



a yogic transcendental cognition on their part; hence there seems to be no incongruity (*bādhaka*) in surmising that these systems too admit the existence of transcendental indeterminate cognition. And if this surmise be correct we can say that whichever system has posited indeterminate cognition has maintained that both determinate and indeterminate cognition may be either empirical or transcendental.

### (3) NATURE OF ITS OBJECT (*viśayasvarūpa*)

All advocates of indeterminate cognition hold that indeterminate cognition has bare existence (*sattāmātra*) for its object, but they are not unanimous as to the nature of this existence (*sattā*). Hence it is that different systems happen to hold different views as to the objects (*viśaya*) to be grasped (*grāhya*) by indeterminate cognition. According to the Buddhist tradition, 'existence' (*sattva*) stands for the capacity to perform a function (*arthakriyākāritva*) and can belong only to a momentary particular (*kṣaṇikavyaktimātraparyavasita*), while according to Śāṅkarite Vedānta, it is the continuous (*akhaṇḍa*), ubiquitous (*sarvavyāpaka*) *Brahman*, which is neither limited in space (*deśa-baddha*) nor limited in time (*kāla-baddha*), that is of the nature of existence (*sattva-svarūpa*). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā systems, 'existence' (*sattā*) stands for mere being (*astitva-mātra*) and is of the nature of a universal (*jāti-svarūpa*), that is, something different from the 'existence' posited either in Buddhism or in Vedānta. In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Jaina system, existence (*sattā*) is neither confined to a momentary particular, nor is of the nature of *Brahman* or of the nature of a universal. Since these three traditions preach the doctrine of permanence-in-change (*pariṇāmi-nityatva-vādin*), existence (*sattā*) is, according to them all, of the nature of origin-cum-destruction-cum-permanence (*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyasvarūpa*). Be that as it may, the fact is undisputed that all advocates of indeterminate cognition treat bare existence as the object to be grasped by indeterminate cognition.

### (4) ITS EXCLUSIVELY PERCEPTUAL CHARACTER (*mātrapratyakṣa-rūpa*)

A type of cognition may be either perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) or non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) in character; for example, determinate cognition is of

this type, that is, it is either perceptual or non-perceptual in character. But all advocates of indeterminate cognition are of the view that indeterminate cognition is exclusively perceptual in character. Nobody says that a piece of indeterminate cognition may possibly be non-perceptual in character; for a piece of indeterminate cognition, whether empirical or transcendental, since its origination (*utpatti*) is not mediated by (*vyavahita*; dependent on) another piece of cognition, is a cognition of direct – and hence perceptual – character. However, the Jaina tradition should be taken as maintaining that indeterminate cognition (*darśana*) can possibly be non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) in character; for even though the (later) Jaina logicians have chosen to call the really non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) *mati-jñāna* an “empirically perceptual cognition” (*sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*) and are, to that extent, justified in likewise attributing the name “empirically perceptual cognition” also to that *darśana* (i.e. indeterminate cognition) which constitutes the starting-point of the *mati-jñāna*-process, the fact remains that the old Āgamic tradition – which is innocent of the distinction between a real (*pāramārthika*) and an empirical (*sāṃvyavahārika*) perception, and whose typical representative is *Tattvārthasūtra* 1.11 – treats *mati-jñāna* as exclusively non-perceptual (*parokṣa-mātra*) in character. Thus according to the (old Āgamic) Jaina tradition, sensuous indeterminate cognition (*indriyajanya darśana*) is non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) – and not perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) – in character. To sum up, following a particular (i.e. old Āgamic) convention adopted by the Jaina logicians, one may say that indeterminate cognition (*darśana*) can possibly be either perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) or non-perceptual (*parokṣa*) in character. So far as the *avadhi* and *kevala* types of indeterminate cognition (*darśana*) are concerned, they are exclusively perceptual in character (*mātra-pratyakṣa*); on the other hand, the sensuous type of indeterminate cognition (*indriyajanya darśana*) is (really) non-perceptual but empirically perceptual. Nevertheless, according to the (strict) Āgamic tradition, the sensuous type of indeterminate cognition is exclusively non-perceptual in character (*kevala parokṣa*) while the non-sensuous (*indriya-nirapekṣa*) types of indeterminate cognition, i. e. pieces of indeterminate cognition of the types *avadhi* etc., are exclusively perceptual (*kevala pratyakṣa*).

**(5) ITS CAUSAL AGGREGATE (*utpādaka-sāmagrī*)**

The causal aggregate of the empirical indeterminate cognition (*laukika-nirvikalpaka*) – called *sāṃvyavahārika darśana* in the technical terminology of Jaina Logic – includes sense-object contact as also light etc. (in case needed). But transcendental indeterminate cognition (*alaukika-nirvikalpaka*) – called *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* in the technical terminology of Jaina Logic – originated on account of the special competence of a soul (*viśiṣṭa-ātmaśakti*) and without requiring sense-object contact. Thus on the question of the causal aggregate of indeterminate cognition, there is no difference between the Jaina and non-Jaina traditions. However, there is a peculiarity about the stand adopted by Śāṅkarite Vedānta on this question. For according to it, the impartite (*akhaṇḍa*) cognition-concerning-Brahman (*Brahmabodha*) originating from (the hearing of) the Great Utterances (*Mahāvākyas*) like 'Tat tvam asi' (i. e. That art thou) is also of an indeterminate type. Thus words are here considered to be a possible cause of indeterminate cognition, a position not acceptable to other traditions.

**(6) ITS PRAMĀṆA-SHIP (*prāmāṇya*)**

Even the non-Jaina traditions are not unanimous on the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramāṇa*. The Buddhist and Vedānta systems not only treat indeterminate cognition as a *pramāṇa* but go to the extent of maintaining that it is the chief (*mukhya*) and the real (*pāramārthika*) *pramāṇa*. There is no unanimity within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika fold on the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramāṇa*. According to the old tradition, indeterminate cognition is *pramāṇa* as has been made clear by Śrīdhara (in *Kand.*, p. 198); Viśvanātha too argues (in *Kārikāvalī*, k. 134) that indeterminate cognition is *pramā* because whatever is not a case of illusory cognition (*bhrama-bhinna*) is *pramā*. But according to the new tradition founded by Gaṅgeśa, indeterminate cognition is neither *pramā* nor *apramā* (i.e. no *pramā*). For whether a piece of cognition is *pramā* or no *pramā* is, in this tradition, determined by whether this cognition presents the object concerned as qualified in this way or that (and by similar considerations) (*prakāratādi-ghaṭita pramātvā-apramātvā*), while indeterminate cognition, since it does not at all present its object as

qualified in some way or other (*prakāratādi-śūnya*), is neither *pramā* nor no *pramā* (*Kārikāvali*, k. 135). Since on such matters the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya-Yoga generally follow the lead of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, these former systems should be taken as adopting, on the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramā*, the same type of views as have been adopted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. What particularly deserves notice is the stand maintained by the Jaina tradition on this question.

In the Jaina tradition, the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramā* arose only after the advent of the Age of Logic – and not before. For in the preceding period, its approach to problems (*dṛṣṭi*) was exclusively ethico-spiritual (*mātra āgamic*), and from the ethico-spiritual standpoint the question does not at all arise whether indeterminate cognition (*darśanopayoga*) be called *pramāṇa* or *apramāṇa*. From this ethico-spiritual standpoint, a piece of cognition, whether indeterminate (*darśana*) or determinate (*jñāna*), can be only right (*samyak*) or wrong (*mithyā*). Again, the rightness or wrongness of a cognition is here judged on the basis of spiritual considerations (*ādhyātmikabhāvānusārin*). Thus according to this standpoint, in case a person (*ātman*) has reached at least the Fourth Stage in Spiritual Progress (*caturtha guṇasthāna*), i.e. has attained right-hood (*samyaktva*), all his cognition – whether pertaining to generalities or to particularities – are treated as right (*samyak*) and as conducive to transcendental release (*mokṣamārgarūpa*). Thus from this ethico-spiritual standpoint, the indeterminate cognition of a person who is possessed of right-hood (*samyaktva-yukta ātman*) is right while that of a person who holds a wrong viewpoint (*mithyādrṣṭi-yukta*) is wrong – so that even such indeterminate cognition as is ordinarily (*vyavahāre*) considered to be wrong, illusory, or contradicted, is right in case it occurs to a person-possessed-of-right-hood, while even such indeterminate cognition as is ordinarily considered to be non-illusory and uncontradicted is wrong, in case it occurs to a person-holding-wrong-viewpoint.<sup>88</sup>

The above relativistic account (*āpekṣika varṇana*), presented from the ethico-spiritual standpoint, of rightness and wrongness of indetermi-

88. 'samyagdrṣṭisambandhinām samśayādīnām api jñānatvasya Mahābhāṣyakṛtā paribhāṣitatvāt'—*Jñānabindu*, p. 139B; *Nandīsūtra*, 41.

nate cognition is based on the fact that Abhayadeva – the commentator of *Sanmati* – has treated indeterminate cognition as *pramāṇa*, as also on the fact that Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaājī has told us that even doubt etc. are cases of right cognition when accompanied by a right viewpoint (*samyag-dṛṣṭi-yukta*). Otherwise, the old Āgamic tradition – and one common to Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras – is not of this view, for according to it all indeterminate cognition – whether of the visual (*cakṣu*) type, or the non-visual (*acakṣu*) type, or of the *avadhi* type – is just indeterminate cognition, that is to say, none of these indeterminate cognitions is here called either right or wrong or both right and wrong – unlike the determinate cognition (*jñāna*) of the *mati*, *śruta*, and *avadhi* types which are, each of them, divided into right one and wrong one. From this we are to conclude that indeterminate cognition (*darśana upayoga*), since it is utterly formless (*mātra nirākāra*), cannot be conceived of either as accompanied-by-a-right-viewpoint (*samyag-dṛṣṭi-yukta*) or as accompanied-by-a-wrong-viewpoint (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi-yukta*). That is to say, indeterminate cognition – be it of the visual type, or of the non-visual type, or of the *avadhi* type – is just indeterminate cognition, and should not be called either right indeterminate cognition (*samyag-darśana*) or wrong indeterminate cognition (*mithyā-darśana*). This is why all these types of indeterminate cognition are treated as mere indeterminate cognition in the First Stage of Spiritual Progress as in the Fourth Stage. The idea has been expressed by Gandhahasti Siddhasena as follows : “*atra yathā sākārāddhāyāṃ samyagmithyā-dṛṣṭyor viśeṣaḥ, naivam asti darśane, anākāratve dvayor api tulyatvad ity arthaḥ* /” – *Tattvārthabhāṣyaṭīkā*, 2.9.

This much about the Āgamic (i.e. ethico-spiritual) standpoint according to which Umāsvāti has divided cognitions into right and wrong ones. But with the advent of the Age of Logic there arose the question of *pramā*-ship or otherwise of indeterminate cognition, and thought was given to this question not with spiritual considerations in view (*ādhyātmikabhāvanusārin*) but with objective considerations in view (*viśayānusārin*) – as was already being done by the logicians belonging to the non-Jaina traditions. So now we have to consider the question whether the logical Jaina tradition treats indeterminate cognition as *pramāṇa* or *apramāṇa* or both.

Even from the logical point of view there is no unanimity within the Jaina fold on the question whether indeterminate cognition is *pramā* or otherwise. Generally speaking, all logicians – whether Śvetāmbara or Digambara – place indeterminate cognition outside the sphere of *pramāṇas*. For they all seek to refute the Buddhist contention that indeterminate cognition is *pramāṇa*, and they all insert in their respective definitions of *pramāṇa* some word like ‘*nirṇaya*’ (i. e. determination) or ‘*jñāna*’ – a word standing for ‘cognition of particulars’ (*viśeṣopayoga-bodhaka*) – with a view to indicating that ‘*darśana*’ (i. e. indeterminate cognition), which stands for ‘cognition of the general’ (*sāmānya-upayoga*), falls outside the purview of these definitions.<sup>89</sup> Thus the logical tradition of not treating indeterminate cognition as *pramāṇa* is common to both Śvetāmbara and Digambara texts.

Abhayadeva – the commentator of *Sanmati* – no doubt calls (in *Sanmatitīkā*, p. 457) indeterminate cognition *pramāṇa*, but his statement should not be taken as formulated from the logical point of view. For while commenting on an Āgama-dependent (*āgamānusārin*) text like *Sanmati*, he keeps in view only the Āgamic (i. e. ethico-spiritual) standpoint and agrees to attribute the name ‘*pramāṇa*’ to right, indeterminate cognition (*samyag-darśana*); but that he does not mean to treat indeterminate cognition as *pramāṇa* from the logical point of view, that is, on the basis of objective considerations, becomes clear from the context.

Of course, there appears to be involved a self-contradiction in Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya’s stand on the question of *pramā*-ship or otherwise of indeterminate cognition. Thus at one place he identifies indeterminate cognition with *naiścayika avagraha* that follows in the wake of *vyañjanā-vagraha*,<sup>90</sup> and since it thus becomes a part and parcel of the *mati*-process it becomes a *pramāṇa* like *mati* itself. But at another place, viz. while interpreting Vālidevasūri’s aphorism on the definition of *pramāṇa*, he says that the aphorism contains the word ‘*jñāna*’ with a view to excluding *darśana* (i.e. indeterminate cognition) from the purview of *pramāṇas* (*Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 1). Thus at one place his statement suggests that indeterminate cognition falls totally outside the sphere of *pramāṇas*, while at

89. *Laghī*. 1.3; *PKM*, p. 8; *PNT*, 1. 2.

90. *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 5; *Jñānabindu*, p. 138.

another place it suggests that indeterminate cognition, being of the nature of *avagraha*, somehow falls within the sphere of *pramāṇas*. To us it appears that his intention is somewhat different in this latter statement. For maybe he intends to say that *naiścayika avagraha* – which is no doubt a part and parcel of *mati* – is incapable of impelling-to-or-restraining-from-action (*pravṛtti-nivṛtti-vyavahāra-akṣama*) and is therefore not to be counted as a *pramāṇa*. And with this intention in mind he can maintain, without involving himself in a self-contradiction, that indeterminate cognition falls outside the sphere of *pramāṇas*.

In *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* Āc. Hemacandra has, incidentally and three, expressed his views concerning indeterminate cognition. Thus while explaining the nature of *avagraha* he says that *darśana*, which is of the form of an indeterminate (*avikalpaka*) cognition, is not identical with *avagraha* but the material cause (*pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*; lit. 'cause that persists in the midst of changes') thereof and it is born after the sense-object contact but before *avagraha*. (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 1.1.26). Again, while dismissing as *apramāṇa* the indeterminate cognition posited (as *pramāṇa*) by the Buddhist he says that such a cognition is not *pramāṇa* because it is not-of-the-form-of-a-determination (*anadhyavasāyasvarūpa*) while cognition that is of the form of determination (*adhyavasāya, nirṇaya*) is alone *pramāṇa*. (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 1.1.6). Lastly, while explaining the meaning of the term '*nirṇaya*' he says that it stands for the cognition which is not indeterminate (*anadhyavasāya, avikalpaka*) and is not of the form of doubt (*saṃśaya*). (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, p. 3). All these statements of the Ācārya go to suggest that he considers to be identical with one another what the Jaina tradition calls '*darśana*' and what the Buddhist tradition calls '*nirvikalpaka*', and that he refuses to treat *darśana* as *pramāṇa* on the ground that it is of the form of an indeterminate cognition (*anirṇayasvarūpa*), a refusal made from the logical and not from the ethico-spiritual point of view – as was also the case with all other Jaina logicians barring Abhayadeva.

And what Āc. Hemacandra calls the material cause (*pariṇāmi-kāraṇa*) of *avagraha* should be taken to be identical with what Upādhyāyaji has called '*naiścayika avagraha*'.

(PMT on '*darśana*' in benedictory verse 1, pp. 125-30)

## 11. THE NATURE OF SENSE-ORGANS

In connection with consideration of the nature of sense-organs the following topics are found to have been discussed by the philosophical systems :

Etymological derivation (*nirukti*) of the word “*indriya*”, the material cause (*kāraṇa*) of sense-organs, their number (*saṅkhyā*), their respective objects (*viṣaya*), their form (*ākāra*), their mutual distinction and non-distinction (*pārasparika bhedābheda*), their species (*prakāra*), their capacity or otherwise to grasp a substance as well as its qualities (*dravya-guṇa-grāhitva-viveka*).

A perusal of the literature available to us has led us to opine that the earliest case of writing down an etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*” occurs in an aphorism of Pāṇini.<sup>91</sup> Though the available *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali contains no comments on the Pāṇinian aphorism offering the derivation in question, it is likely that some older Commentary or Commentaries did comment on this aphorism. Be that as it may, it seems clear that the occurrence in the Buddhist and Jaina texts of the Pāṇinian derivation of the word “*indriya*” is due to some sort of tradition (current among the Buddhist and Jaina circles) of studying Pāṇini's Grammar. And once this derivation found place in so venerated (*pratiṣṭhita*) a Buddhist text as *Visuddhimagga*<sup>92</sup> and in so venerated a Jaina text as *Tattvārthabhāṣya*<sup>93</sup> it

91. ‘*indriyam indraliṅgam indradr̥ṣṭam indrasr̥ṣṭam indrajusṭam indradattam iti vā*’/-5.1.93.

92. ‘*ko pana nesam indriyaṭṭho nāmāti ? indaliṅgaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; indadesitaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; indadiṭṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; indasiṭṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; indajutṭhaṭṭho indriyaṭṭho; so sabbopi idha yathāyogaṃ yujjati / Bhagavā hi sammāsambuddho paramissariya-bhāvato indo, kusalākusalaṃ ca kammaṃ kammesu kassaci issariyābhāvato / tenevettha kammasañjanitāni tāva indriyāni kusalākusalakammaṃ ulliṅgenti / tena ca siṭṭhānīti indaliṅgaṭṭhena indasiṭṭhaṭṭhena ca indriyāni / sabbāneva panetāni Bhagavatā yathā bhūtato pakāsītāni abhisambuddhāni cāti indadesitaṭṭhena indadiṭṭhaṭṭhena ca indriyāni / teneva Bhagavatā munīdena kānici gocarāsevanāya, kānici bhāvanāsevanāya sevītānīti indajutṭhaṭṭhenāpi indriyāni / api ca ādhipaccasaṃkhātena issariyaṭṭhenāpi etāni indriyāni / cakkhuviññāṇādippavattiyaṃ hi cakkhādīnaṃ siddhaṃ ādhipaccaṃ, tasmīṃ tikkhe tikkhattā, mande mandattā ti / ayaṃ tāvettha atthato vinicchayo*’/-*Visuddhimagga* p. 491.

93. *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, 2. 15; *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1. 14.



became a fit topic for all important philosophical texts that were subsequently composed in the Buddhist and Jaina traditions.

In this history of the etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*” two things are noteworthy. Firstly, the Buddhist grammarians – both those who wrote independently and those who commented on Pāṇini – have given this derivation a comparatively greater prominence in their writings; the independent Jaina grammarian Ācārya Hemacandra<sup>94</sup> has likewise given it a very great prominence in his aphoristic text on grammar and in his own commentary thereon. Secondly, leaving aside the case of some very late commentaries on *Pāṇinisūtras*, we do not come across the derivation in question in a philosophical text belonging to the Vedicist tradition as we do in those belonging to the Buddhist and Jaina traditions. As has happened in so many other cases, here also it seems that an etymological derivation offered by the grammarian found place in some philosophical texts of the Buddhists and Jains and thus became a topic for discussion also for philosophers.

An old Vedicist philosophical text like *Mātharavṛtti*<sup>95</sup> no doubt contains an etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*”, but this derivation is peculiar (*vilakṣaṇa*) and is very different from that found in the Pāṇinan aphorism and in the Buddhist and Jaina philosophical texts.

It appears that in those old days the offering of an etymological derivation (of the important words employed) was considered to be so necessary a task that no intelligent (*buddhimān*) author could afford to neglect it. And while offering etymological derivations the authors would make ample exhibition of their ingenuity (*svatantra kalpanā*). This was done not only in the case of Prakrit and Pali words but also in that of Sanskrit words. Etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*” is an instance in point.

An interesting point is that when the etymological derivation of the word “*indriya*” – a derivation no more confined to the field of grammar – entered the field of philosophical speculation it began to bear a sectarian (*sāmpradāyika*) stamp. Thus Buddhaghosa, who otherwise follows Pāṇini in his derivation of the word “*indriya*”, understands the word “*indra*” to mean Sugata (i.e. Buddha) and thus seeks to justify his derivation. Jaina

94. ‘*indriyam*’–*Haimaśabdānuśāsana*, 7. 1. 174.

95. ‘*in iti viṣayāṇām nāma, tān inah viṣayān prati dravantīti indriyāṇi*’–*Mātharavṛtti*, k. 26.

teachers, on the other hand, have understood the word “*indra*” to mean just a *jīva* or *ātman* (i.e. soul); thus unlike Buddhaghōṣa, they have not interpreted the word to mean a Spiritual Guide (*tīrhaṅkara*) they hold in veneration. Had the derivation in question been adopted by a Vedicist philosopher like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who believes in God's creatorship of the world (*īśvarakartṛtvavādin*), he might have even interpreted the word “*indra*” to mean God and thus justified his derivation !

According to the Sāṅkhya system, the material cause (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) of sense-organs is *abhimāna* which is a kind of subtle substance (*sūkṣma-dravya*) born of *Prakṛti* (*prakṛti-janya*) – (SK, k. 25). The same is the Vedānta position. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the material cause of sense-organs are the five *bhūtas* like earth etc. which are all physical substances (*jaḍa-dravya*) – (NS, 1.1.12). The same is the Pūrva-mīmāṃsaka's position. According to the Buddhist system, the five well-known sense-organs, since they are born of *rūpa*, are of the nature of *rūpa* which is a particular kind of physical substance (*jaḍa-dravya-viśeṣa*). The Jaina system likewise maintains that the material cause of sense-organs is a particular kind of *pudgala*, i.e. a particular kind of physical substance (*jaḍa-dravya-viśeṣa*).

The five visible forms (*bāhya ākāra*) – viz. ear-drum (*kaṇa-śaṣkulī*), eye-ball (*akṣigolaka-kṛṣṇasāra*), nose-cavity (*tripuṭikā*), tongue (*jihvā*), and skin (*carman*) – which are popularly considered to be the auditory, the visual, the olfactory, the gustatory, and the tactile sense-organ respectively, are, according to all the philosophical systems, merely the locii (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of these various sense-organs and not the sense-organs themselves.<sup>96</sup> As for sense-organs, they are supposed to be certain supersensuous entities – whether born of *bhūta* (as according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc.) or born of *ahaṅkāra* (as according to the Sāṅkhya etc.) – residing in the visible forms in question. The Jaina system, by attributing the name “*dravyendriya*” to these physical locii of sense-organs, seeks to suggest this very idea, viz. that these locii are not themselves sense-organs. For according to the Jaina system as well, sense-organs are supersensuous; however, they are not of the form of certain physical substances – of the *bhautika* or

96. NM, p. 477.

*āhaṅkārika* type – but of the form of certain capacities of the conscious type (*cetana-śakti-viśeṣa-rūpa*) technically called “*bhāvendriya*” or “*mukhyendriya*”. Over and above these, a sixth sense-organ (*indriya*) – of the form of an internal sense-organ (*antarindriya*, *antaḥkaraṇa*) – has been posited by all the systems under the name “*manas*”. These six cognitive sense-organs (*buddhīndriya*) may thus be regarded as a concept common to all the systems – except for the fact that the Sāṅkhya system makes the total eleven by positing five additional (sense)-organs like speech (*vāk*), hands (*pāṇi*), feet (*pāda*), etc. under the common name “*karmendriya*” (i.e. conative sense-organ) – (SK, k. 24). Just as Vācaspati and Jayanta<sup>97</sup> have argued against the Sāṅkhya idea of regarding the so-called “*karmendriyas*” as sense-organs, so also does Āc. Hemacandra who, on this point, simply follows the earlier Jaina teachers like Pūjyapāda etc.<sup>98</sup>

Now here arises a question : When the ancient Jaina teachers like Pūjyapāda and the modern scholars like Vācaspati, Jayanta etc. offer a powerful refutation against the Sāṅkhya thesis of eleven sense-organs, why do they – or someone else – not refute – or even mention – the Buddhist *Abhidharma* thesis<sup>99</sup> of twenty-two sense-organs ? There is no ground for the supposition that these authors were not conversant with any Sanskrit *Abhidharma* text. What seems to have occurred to these authors is that since it is a routine custom (*sādhāraṇa prathā*) with the *Abhidharma* tradition to call a mental capacity (*mānasa śakti*) a sense-organ, it is no use mentioning or refuting this tradition (on the question of sense-organs).

That each of the six sense-organs has for its object (*grāhya viṣaya*) one fixed (*pratiniyata*) quality (or a group of qualities – as in the case of *manas*) from among sound, colour, smell, taste, touch, etc. is a view common to all the systems, but on the question of the perceptibility of a

97. Tātp., p. 531; NM, p. 483.

98. Tattvārthabhāṣya, 2. 15; Sarvārthasiddhi, 2. 15.

99. *katamāni dvāviṃśatiḥ / cakṣurindriyaṃ śrotrendriyaṃ ghrāṇendriyaṃ jihvendriyaṃ kāyendriyaṃ mana-indriyaṃ strīndriyaṃ puruṣendriyaṃ jīvitendriyaṃ sukhendriyaṃ duḥkhendriyaṃ saumanasyendriyaṃ daurmanasyendriyaṃ upekṣendriyaṃ śraddhendriyaṃ vīryendriyaṃ smṛtīndriyaṃ samādhīndriyaṃ prajñendriyaṃ anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriyaṃ ajñendriyaṃ ajñātāvīndriyaṃ /* – *Sphuṭārthā*, p. 95; *Visuddhimagga*, p. 491.

substance (*dravya*) the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system differs from others. The other systems, while admitting that different qualities are perceived by different sense-organs, further argue that since a quality is non-distinct from the substance of which it is a quality, all the sense-organs are competent to perceive qualities as well as substances; this, however, is not the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-mīmāṃsā systems, according to both of which the visual sense-organ and the tactile sense-organ are alone competent to perceive substances (*Muktāvali*, ks. 53-56). It is this difference of opinion which Āc. Hemacandra, following the earlier Jaina teachers, brings out by offering a twofold etymological derivation of the words “*sparsā*” etc. – one derivation, viz. *bhāva-pradhāna vyutpatti*, making these words stand for the qualities ‘touch’ etc., and the other, viz. *karma-pradhāna vyutpatti*, making them stand for the substances ‘touched’ etc.

The discussion whether there is only one sense-organ or there are many of them is very old in philosophical traditions – (NS, 3.1.52). Some are of the view that there is only one sense-organ, and they defend their position by suggesting that this one sense-organ undertakes different functions (*kārya*) from different seats (*sthāna*); this view is opposed by those who believe in the plurality of sense-organs and who therefore insist that sense-organs are many and nothing but many. Āc. Hemacandra, adopting a non-absolutistic approach characteristic of the Jaina mode of argumentation and following the tradition laid down by the old Jaina teachers, works out a synthesis of the view that the different sense-organs are absolutely different from one another and the view that they are absolutely identical with one another; he also answers the objections that these extremist views urge against each other.

The question as to what number of sense-organs are possessed by this or that species of living beings (*svāmitva-cintā*) is also considered by the philosophical systems, but no other system discusses this question in so great details as does the Jaina. The Buddhist system discusses the question – but in lesser details than the Jaina. Āc. Hemacandra presents the entire Jaina stand on this question by quoting verbatim from *Tattvārthasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya* (both following the eleven *Āṅgas*).

(PMT on *sūtra* 1. 1. 21, pp. 38-41)

## 12. THE NATURE OF MANAS

Philosophers hold different views as to the nature (*svarūpa*), material cause (*kāraṇa*), function (*kārya*), attributes (*dharma*), locus (*sthāna*), etc. of *manas*, and these views are, in short, as follows. Vaiśeṣikas (VS, 7.1.23), Naiyāyikas (NS, 3.2.61), and Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas – who follow the former two (PP, p. 151) — are of the view that *manas* is atomic in size and hence eternal and causeless. According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Vedānta (which follows the Sāṅkhya-Yoga), *manas* is not atomic (*paramāṇu*) but quite small (*aṇu*) in size and is a produced (*janya*) entity born either out of the *prākṛtika* element *ahaṅkāra* or out of nescience (*avidyā*).<sup>100</sup> According to the Buddhist and Jaina traditions, *manas* is neither ubiquitous nor atomic in size; they regard it as medium-sized (*madhyama-parimāṇavat*) and a produced entity. According to the Buddhist tradition,<sup>101</sup> *manas* is of the nature of cognition (*viññāna*) and in the form of the cognition of one particular moment it is a peculiar type of cause (technically called '*samanantara kāraṇa*') of the cognition of the succeeding moment. According to the Jaina tradition, *paudgalika manas* is born of the extremely subtle physical substance called '*manovargaṇā*' and it, like body, undergoes change every moment; on the other hand, '*bhāva-manas*', since it is of the nature of cognitive potency (*jñāna-śakti*) and cognition (*jñāna*), is born of the conscious substance (*cetana-dravya-janya*).

According to all the systems, it is the function of *manas* to produce qualities like desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, etc. and the experience of these qualities – even though these qualities belong to *ātman* according to the systems like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Jaina, etc., to *antaḥkaraṇa*

100. 'yasmāt karmendriyāṇi buddhīndriyāṇi ca sātत्वikād ahaṅkārad utpadyante mano 'pi tasmād eva utpadyate' /—Mātharavṛtti, k. 27.

101. 'viññānaṃ prativijñaptiḥ mana āyatanam ca tat / ṣaṇṇāṃ anantarātītaṃ viññānaṃ yaddhi tan manaḥ' /—Abhidharmakośa, 1. 16, 17; TSN, k. 631.

'yat yatsamanantaraniruddhaṃ viññānaṃ tat tanmanodhātur iti / tadyathā sa eva putro 'nyasya pitṛākhyāṃ labhate tad eva phalam anyasya bījākhyāṃ / tatthehāpi sa eva cakṣurādivijñānadhātur anyasyāśraya iti manodhātvākhyāṃ labhate / ya eva ṣaḍ vijñānadhātavaḥ sa eva manodhātuḥ / ya eva ca manodhātus ta eva ṣaḍ vijñānadhātava itītaretarāntarbhāvaḥ ....Yogācāra-darśanena tu ṣaḍvijñānavyatirikto 'py asti manodhātuḥ' /—Sphuṭārthā, p. 40, 41.

according to the systems like Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Vedānta, etc.,<sup>102</sup> and to *manas* itself according to the Buddhist system. *Manas* has a role to play in the generation of (lit. is a *nimitta* of) cognition-through-an-external-sense-organ (e.g. cognition of colour etc.) as also in the generation of cognition-without-an-external-sense-organ (e.g. cognition of desire etc.) and of similar (i.e. psychological) qualities. No system except the Buddhist maintains that desire, aversion, cognition, pleasure, pain, impression, etc. are the qualities of *manas*. For according to the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Jaina systems, these are the qualities of *ātman* (i.e. soul), while according to the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Vedānta systems, they are the qualities of *antaḥkaraṇa*; on the other hand, the Buddhist system, since it posits no *ātman* apart from *manas* (technically called *nāma*), maintains that desire, aversion, cognition, impression, etc. (which, according to the other systems, are the qualities of *ātman* or of *antaḥkaraṇa*) are the qualities of *manas* itself.

Some philosophical traditions – e.g. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist<sup>103</sup> – treat *manas* as located inside the heart (*hṛdaya-pradeśa-vartin*). But the traditions like Sāṅkhya-Yoga cannot treat *manas* as located inside the heart; for according to them, *manas* is a part and parcel of subtle body (technically called *liṅga-śarīra*) composed of eighteen elements, and since it seems proper to suppose that the subtle body occupies the entire gross body it should follow that according to the traditions in question, *manas* occupies the entire gross body. As for the Jaina tradition, it is unanimous that *bhāva-manas* is located inside the *ātman*, but there is difference of opinion as to the location of *dravya-manas*. Thus *dravya-manas* is located inside the heart according to the Digambara tradition, while we come across no mention of any such position in the Śvetāmbara tradition. It appears that the Śvetāmbara tradition is of the view that *dravya-manas* occupies the entire gross body.

(PMT on *sūtra* 1.1.24, pp. 42-43).

102. 'tasmiṇ cittaśya dharmā vṛttayo nātmanah' /–*Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha*, *Pātañjala*., p. 352.

103. 'Tāmraparṇīyā api hṛdayavastu manovijñānadhātor āśrayaṃ kalpayanti' /–*Sphuṭārthā*, p. 41.

## 13. THE NATURE OF ĀTMAN AND THE MODE OF ITS REVELATION

[1]

All the systems which believe in transmigration (*punarjanma*) and transcendental release (*mokṣa*) posit an element *ātman* (i.e. soul) apart from the physical entities like body etc. This *ātman* may be regarded as ubiquitous by some and as non-ubiquitous by others, as one by some and as many by others, as momentary by some and as eternal by others, but all have to posit nescience (*ajñāna*) or something of the sort as the causal factor responsible for transmigration. Hence all philosophers have to face the following questions : When did the causal factor responsible for transmigration come to be related with *ātman*, and what is the nature of this relation ? If this relation is beginningless, how can it come to an end ? Once this relation is ended, what prevents it from being established again ? And these questions have been answered in an essentially identical fashion though in different technical languages by all the different systems which posit transcendental release in the form of cessation of the transmigratory cycle (*apunarāvṛttirūpa mokṣa*).

All are unanimous in maintaining that the relation with *ātman* of the causal factor responsible for transmigration is beginningless; for all of them are of the view that it is impossible to determine the time when this relation originated, if at all. *Ajñāna*, *avidyā*, *karma*, or whatever be the name given to the causal factor responsible for transmigration, all have to posit such a relation of the non-physical element (*amūrta-tattva*) *ātman* with some subtlest physical element (*sūkṣmatama mūtra-tattva*) as continues so long – and only so long – as *avidyā* or *ajñāna* (i.e. nescience) lasts. There is therefore no dispute among the dualist (*dvaitavādin*) systems as to there taking place a relation between the physical and the non-physical. And just as *ajñāna*, even if beginningless, comes to an end, so also does this relation (between the physical and the non-physical) come to an end – after knowledge (*jñāna*) has destroyed *ajñāna*. And since no defect whatsoever – and hence no *ajñāna* etc. – can possibly arise after the acquisition of complete knowledge (*pūrṇa jñāna*), the general relation between the physical and the non-physical (i.e. their bare existence by the side of one another), which is no doubt there even in the state of transcendental release but is now not born of *ajñāna*, results in no transmigration (after

the attainment of transcendental release). That is to say, the relation between the physical and the non-physical is born of *ajñāna* in the state of transmigration and is not so born in the state of transmigratory release.

*Ātman*, while in transmigratory state, is, in a peculiar way, associated with *prakṛti* according to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, with atoms according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, with *avidyā* or *māyā* according to Vedānta, with *rūpa* according to the Buddhist, and with *karmic* atoms (*karmāṇu*) according to the Jaina (the technical name for *ātman* being '*puruṣa*' in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga system and '*nāma*' in the Buddhist). All these views have arisen in the course of reflection on transmigration and transcendental release.

(PMT on '*atha prakāśasvabhāvatve*' in 1.1.50, pp. 34-35)

[2]

With Indian philosophers *ātman* has always been the chief and the final topic of contemplation; the rest of their concepts have arisen during the course of their investigation into (the nature of) *ātman*. This explains why a good number of views – quite contradictory of one another – as to the existence and nature of *ātman* have made their appearance in the philosophical literature since very old past. In the pre-Upaniṣadic times we already come across systems which posit an absolutely permanent (*sarvathā nitya*), i.e. permanent-devoid-of-change (*kūṭastha*), *ātman* and which are known as *Aupaniṣada*, *Sāṅkhya*, etc. The Buddhist idea of an absolutely momentary soul (technically called '*citta*' or '*nama*') is at least as old as Gautama Buddha. An intermediary trend between the extremist doctrines (*ekānta*) of absolute eternity (*sarvathā-nityatva-vāda*) and absolute momentariness (*sarvathā-kṣaṇikatva-vāda*) – a trend synthesizing these two – is the doctrine of permanence-in-change (*nityānityatvavāda*) which has found a clear-cut application to the teaching on *ātman* at the hands of Mahāvīra in the (Jaina) Āgamas – (*Bhagavatī*, Ś. 7; *Uttarādhyayana*, 2). An extremely lucid and logical defence of the Jaina thesis on *ātman*'s permanence-in-change comes from Kumārila – that prince of the Mīmāṃsakas (*Mīmāṃsaka-dhurīṇa*) – (*SV*, *Ātma*. Śl. 28 ff.) in the same fashion as is found in the Jaina texts on Logic. In this connection Āc. Hemacandra has corroborated the Jaina view-point by a verbatim quotation of verses from *Tattvasaṅgraha*, but these verses, being in fact a summary of the corresponding verses of



Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika*, represent the Mīmāṃsā viewpoint itself.

Rudiments (*bīja*) of the views as to whether cognition and *ātman* are self-revelatory (*sva-prakāśa*) or not-self-revelatory (*para-prakāśa*) are to be met with also in the literature of the Age of Scriptures,<sup>104</sup> but the elucidation and corroboration of these views chiefly took place in the Age of Logic. Only from the viewpoint of Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila, according to whom a piece of cognition is unknowable-through-perception (*jñāna-parokṣavādin*), has it been proved that cognition as well as *ātman* – an entity which is non-different (*abhinna*) from cognition – are unknowable-through-perception (*parokṣa*), that is, are exclusively not-self-revelatory (*mātra parāvabhāsin*). On the other hand, from the view-point of Yogācāra Buddhism, it turns out that since there exists nothing apart from consciousness (*viññāna*; cognition) and since consciousness is self-cognizable (*sva-saṃvidita*) cognition as well as *ātman* – an entity which is of the nature of cognition (*jñānarūpa*) – are exclusively self-revelatory (*mātra svāvabhāsin*). Here also the Jaina system adopts a position that is in conformity with its non-absolutistic nature. Thus Siddhasena is the first among Jaina logicians to have frankly declared that cognition as well as *ātman* are self-revelatory (*svāvabhāsin*) as well as not-self-revelatory (*parāvabhāsin*) (NA, 31). Āc. Hemacandra has merely repeated Siddhasena.

One of the adjectives through which Devasūri has sought to distinguish the Jaina view of *ātman* from the non-Jaina views is 'body-sizedness' (*dehavyāpitva*) (PNT, 7.54,55). Āc. Hemacandra has not included this adjective in his aphorism laying down the Jaina view of *ātman*. As a result of this omission there arises (in view of the already existing identity between the Jaina and Kumārīlite views on *ātman*'s permanence-in-change) the danger of the Jaina view of *ātman*'s size being confused with the Kumārīlite view of the same. With a view to obviating this danger, Āc. Hemacandra pointedly remarks that he subscribes to the doctrine of a body-sized soul but that, unlike other Jaina teachers, he has made no mention to that effect in the aphorism because that would serve no purpose in the present context.

(PMT on *sūtra* 1. 1. 42, pp. 70-71)

104. 'tasya bhāsā sarvaṃ idaṃ vibhāti / taṃ eva bhāntaṃ anubhāti sarvaṃ /'—Kaṭhopanīṣad, 5. 15.

## [3]

In the aphorism Āc. Hemacandra has characterized *ātman* as self-revelatory (*svāvabhāsin*) as well as not-self-revelatory (*parāvabhāsin*). We have already made brief remarks on these two adjectives : the following comments are being added because it is necessary to view the issue from another possible angle.

The word “*svāvabhāsin*” (i.e. self-revelatory) may mean either ‘that which reveals itself’ or ‘that which is revealed by itself’, but there is no material difference between these two meanings. For both seek to convey the idea of “self-luminosity” (i.e. *svaprakāśatva*) which, in its turn, stands for self-perceptibility (*sva-pratyakṣatva*). But the two meanings yielded by the word “*parāvabhāsin*” (i.e. not-self-revelatory) are by no means identical. ‘That which reveals a not-self, i.e. something other than itself’ is the first meaning and one which is mentioned by Āc. Hemacandra himself in the commentary; ‘that which is revealed by a not-self, i. e. by something other than itself’ is the second meaning. These two meanings seek to convey two different ideas; for the first indicates that *ātman* is by nature an illuminator of other things (*svabhāvataḥ para-prakāśaka*), the second that *ātman* itself is by nature illuminable only by something other than itself (*svabhāvataḥ para-prakāśya*). Here it has to be understood that the second of these meanings (viz. ‘that which is revealed by something other than itself’) is intended to stand for the *ātman*’s being perceived by something other than itself; the first meaning (viz. ‘that which reveals something other than itself’), on the other hand, is intended to stand for the *ātman*’s being just a revealer of other things – be this revelation perceptual or non-perceptual. Now all those systems which posit entities other than *ātman* do treat *ātman* as the revealer of thing other than itself (i. e. *parāvabhāsin* in the first meaning); and on all these views, just as *ātman* is revealer of things other than itself, be the revelation perceptual or non-perceptual, so also it is, somehow or other, revealer of itself as well. Hence the difference of opinion among philosophers centres around the question whether *ātman* is or is not its own perceiver (i.e. not around the question whether *ātman* is or is not its own revealer).

Only those systems can be the advocates of *ātman*’s self-perceptibility which are of the view that cognition is self-perceptible and that it is

identical – totally or partly – with *ātman*. Thus the Śāṅkarite and Rāmānujite schools of Vedānta, the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems, the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism, and the Jaina system are of the view that *ātman* is self-perceptible (*sva-pratyakṣa*) – even though some of these systems maintain that *ātman* is of the nature of pure and eternal consciousness (*śuddha nitya caitanya*), others that it is of the nature of generated cognition (*janya jñāna*), still others that it is of the nature of consciousness as well as cognition; for all these systems are of the view that *ātman* is (somehow) identical with cognition while all cognition is self-perceptible. Kumārila is the only philosopher who is of the view that cognition is non-perceptible (*parokṣa*) but that (as in Vedānta) *ātman* is self-perceptible (*sva-pratyakṣa*). The reason seems to be that Kumārila (unconditionally) accepts the scriptural account of *ātman*'s nature, while the scriptures are categorical in preaching the self-revelatory character of *ātman*. This explains why Kumārila,<sup>105</sup> in spite of his advocacy of the non-perceptibility of cognition, is left with no alternative but to treat *ātman* as self-perceptible.<sup>106</sup>

The view that *ātman* is perceived by something other than itself (*para-pratyakṣa*) can be maintained only by those systems which treat cognition as somehow different from *ātman* but a quality thereof, be this cognition self-perceptible (as according to Prabhākara) or not-self-perceptible (as according to the Naiyāyika). Thus, according to Prabhākara, *ātman* is perceptually revealed (*pratyakṣarūpeṇa bhāsita*) in all cognition (*saṃvit*) whatsoever, be this cognition perceptual, inferential, or of any other type. There is a difference of opinion in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. The system's adherents, old as well as new, are unanimous in preaching that *ātman* is perceptible by something other than itself (*para-pratyakṣa*) so far as the case of a *yogin* is concerned; for all of them are of the view that *ātman* is directly observed (*sākṣātkāra*) in yogic perception.<sup>107</sup> They however hold divergent views on the question so far as it concerns the case of an ordinary mortal

105. 'ātmanaiva prakāśyo 'yam ātmā jyotir iti īritam /-SV, *Ātma*, Śl. 142.

106. In the light of this, we should correct the earlier formulation where it was said that both cognition and *ātman* are, according to Kumārila, exclusively not-self-revelatory.-Tr.

107. 'yuñjānasya yogasamādhijam ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣa iti /-NBh, 1.1.3; 'ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam /-VS, 9.1.11.

(*asmadādi arvāgdarsin*). The old Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika teachers treat an ordinary mortal's *ātman* as an object of inference (*anumeya*)<sup>108</sup> – and not at all of perception, while the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika teachers, by treating such an *ātman* as an object of mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*),<sup>109</sup> bring it under the category “perceptible by something other than itself” (*para-pratyakṣa*).

Those who regard cognition as something different from *ātman* are bound to maintain that no cognition, yogic or otherwise, being present in the state of transcendental release (*mokṣa*), an *ātman*, while in that state, is neither a direct observer (*sākṣātkartā*) nor an object of direct observation (*sākṣātkāra-viṣaya*). There is a vast variety of views on this question which is, however, here out of context.

(PMT on *sūtra* 1.1.42, pp. 136-37)

#### 14. THE BUDDHIST DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

In Buddhist Logic there are two traditions of defining ‘perception’ — one which does not include the word “non-illusory” (*abhrānta*) in the definition, the other which does. The first tradition is initiated by Dinnāga, the second by Dharmakīrti. Thus the definition and description given in *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (1.3) and *Nyāyapraveśa* (p.7) follow the first tradition, those given in *Nyāyabindu* (1.4) and its commentary by Dharmottara etc. the second. Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* (k.1214) lends support to the second, i.e. Dharmakīrti's, tradition. It seems that by the time of Śāntarakṣita the Buddhist logicians had already been grouped in two camps, of which one, taking the definition of perception to be complete without the inclusion of the word “non-illusory”, sought to apply Dinnāga's definition even to the cases of (illusory) perception of yellow conch-shell etc. (*TSN*, k.1324). Śāntarakṣita answers this group (of Buddhist logicians) in such a manner that justice is done to Dinnāga's definition-without-the-word-“non-illusory” while at the same time a real value (*vāstavikatva*) is

108. ‘*ātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na grhyate*’ /-NBh, 1.1.10; ‘*tatrātmā ca manas cāpratyakṣe*’-VS, 8.1.2.

109. ‘*tad evaṃ ahaṃpratyaya viṣayatvād ātmā tāvat pratyakṣaḥ*’-NV, p. 342; ‘*ahaṅkārasyāśrayo ’yaṃ manomātrasya gocaraḥ*’ /-Kārikāvalī, k. 50.

attached to Dharmakīrti's tradition of including the word "non-illusory" in the same definition. In the eyes of Śāntarākṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla, Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti deserved equal honour, and that is why they sought to harmonize the two mutually contradictory traditions current among the Buddhist logicians.

In the non-Buddhist texts on Logic both these Buddhist traditions are sought to be assailed. In Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṅkāra* (5.6,p.32) and Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-vārtika* (1.1.4,p.41) mention is made of Diñnāga's definition of perception, while in the writings of all the post-Uddyotakara Vedicist authors – e.g. Vācaspati (*Tātp.*,p.154), Jayanta (*NM*,p.52), Śrīdhara (*Kand.*,p.190), and Śālikanātha (*PP*,p.47) it is Dharmakīrti's definition that is put forth as a *prima facie* view.

In the course of their refutation of the Buddhist definition of perception, the Jaina teachers have made mention of and argued against both the Diñnāgite and the Dharmakīrtian traditions. In *Nyāyāvatāra* — supposed to be written by Siddhasena Divākara – the definition of *pramāṇa* formulated according to the Jaina tradition includes the word "*bādhavarjita*" (i.e. immune from contradiction), and the question is worthy of consideration whether it is a reflection (*pratibimba*) of the word "*avyabhicārin*" occurring in Akṣapāda's definition of perception (*NS*, 1.1.4), or an imitation (*anukṛti*) of the word "*bādhavarjita*" occurring in the definition (of *pramāṇa*) – attributed to Kumārila – *tatrāpūrvārthavijñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ bādhavarjitam*, or a paraphrase (*rūpāntara*) of the word "*abhrānta*" occurring in Dharmakīrti (*NB*,1.4), or an original idea (*maulika udbhāvana*) of Divākara himself. In any case, it is definite that Āc. Hemacandra's refutation of the Buddhist definition of perception keeps in view the Dharmakīrtian and not the Diñnāgite tradition. (*Pramāṇa-nūmāṃsā*,p.23).

On the question of interpreting the word "*kalpanā*" – a constituent of the phrase "*kalpanāpoḍha*" (i.e. free from *kalpanā*) – occurring in the Buddhist definition of perception several different views were current among the Buddhist logicians, a situation, of which some idea can be formed from Śāntarākṣita's detailed discussion of the matter (*TSN*,k.1214 ff). The refutation of the Buddhist position undertaken in the Vedicist and Jaina texts on Logic – a refutation so full of consideration of the various pros and cons

(*ūhāpohātmaka*) – is also a testimony to the fact that different meanings were being attached to the word “*kalpanā*”.<sup>110</sup> Particularly, when we glance at that exclusively refutative (*kevala khaṇḍana-pradhāna*) text *Tattvopaplava* (p.41) we have before our eyes a huge collection of almost all the current and possible meanings of the word “*kalpanā*” and of almost all the possible views held on the question.

Notwithstanding all this, Āc. Hemacandra mentions in his text not all but just one of the views on the nature of *kalpanā* – the one which is offered by Dharmakīrti (NB, 1.5) and is accepted and defended also by Śāntarakṣita (TSN, k. 1214).

(PMT on ‘*Saugatās tu*’ in 1.1.110, pp. 50-51)

### 15. THE MĪMĀṂSĀ DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

In the Mīmāṃsā system the first indication as to the nature of *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* (i.e. perceptual knowledge) is to be found in Jaimini’s aphorism (1.1.4). On this aphorism, interpretations and comments – other than what we find in Śābara’s *Bhāṣya* – were offered. Among these, Bhavadāsa’s interpretation was to the effect that in the aphorism in question a definition of perception is newly formulated (*pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-vidhāyaka*) (SV, *Nyāyaratnākaratīkā*, *Pratyakṣa.*, Śl. 1); on the other hand, according to another interpretation, a definition of perception is here only recapitulated (*pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-anuvādaka* SV, *Pratyakṣa*, Śl. 16). Besides, there was a commentary (*Śābarabhāṣya*, 1.1.5) which read the aphorism differently by introducing in its word-order a change to the effect that the words ‘*taṭ*’ and ‘*saṭ*’ should exchange their places.

Kumārila had refuted the view that in the aphorism a definition of perception is newly formulated, as also the view that in it a definition of perception is only recapitulated, but finally he lends support, in a novel fashion, to the view that in the aphorism a definition of perception is only recapitulated. Again, Kumārila has refuted – as has also been done by Prabhākara in *Bṛhatī* – the view according to which the word-order of the aphorism needs a change (SV, *Pratyakṣa* Śl 1-39). This Jaimini’s aphorism on the definition of perception has been refuted by all non-Mīmāṃsā

110. NV, p. 41; *Tātp.*, p. 153; *Kand.*, p. 191; NM, pp. 92-95; TSV. p. 185; PKM, p. 18. B.

logicians – Vedicist, Buddhist, as well as Jaina. In the Buddhist tradition it seems to have been refuted for the first time by Diñnāga (PS, 1.37), and Śāntarakṣita etc. have followed suit. In the Vedicist tradition it seems to have been refuted for the first time by Uddyotakara (NV, p. 43). Vācaspati simply comments on Uddyotakara (Tātp. p. 155), but Jayanta (NM, p. 100) has elaborated this refutation and quite independently. In the Jaina tradition the first refutation of the definition in question seems to have come from either Akalaṅka or Vidyānanda (TSV, p. 187, Śl. 37) whom Abhayadeva (SMT, p. 53) etc. follow. The way Āc. Hemacandra has followed the earlier Jaina logicians on the question of refuting Jaimini's aphorism is but a reflection of Jayanta's corresponding performance in *Mañjarī* (p. 100), as is also the case with other Jaina texts on Logic (SVR, p. 381).

In the course of his refutation Āc. Hemacandra refers to Kumārila's manner of maintaining that in the aphorism the word "perception" is predicated of a definition, as also to that suggestion for introducing a change in the word-order of the aphorism.

(PMT on 'Jaiminiyās tu' in 1.1.111, pp. 51-52)

## 16. THE SĀṆKHYA DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

In the Sāṅkhya tradition there are three ways of defining perception : the first is Vindhyavāsin's definition which Vācaspati (Tātp. p. 155) quotes under the name of Vārṣaganya, the second is Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition (SK, k. 5), and the third the definition given in *Sāṅkhyasūtra* (1. 89).

The Buddhists, Jainas as well as Naiyāyikas have refuted the Sāṅkhya definition of perception. But the noteworthy thing is that the definition of Vindhyavāsin has been refuted by all, that of so old a teacher as Īśvarakṛṣṇa by Jayanta alone (NM, p. 119), while that given in *Sāṅkhyasūtra* by not even a single ancient teacher.

The first Buddhist critic of the definition in question seems to be Diñnāga (PS, 1. 27), the first Naiyāyika critic Uddyotakara (NV, p. 43), and the first Jaina critic Akalaṅka (*Nyāyaviniścaya*, 1. 165).

Āc Hemacandra in his refutation of the Sāṅkhya definition follows the earlier teachers, but this refutation particularly resembles that of Jayanta (NM, p. 109). For it was Jayanta alone who refuted Vindhyavāsin's

way of defining perception as also Īśvarakṛṣṇa's, and Āc. Hemacandra simply repeats Jayanta's words in his refutation of the two definitions.

(PMT on 'śrotrādivṛttiḥ' in 1.1.114, pp. 52-53).

### (iii) On Problems of Inference

## 17. THE NATURE OF INFERENCE AND THE HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT IN INDIAN LOGIC

The word "*anumāna*" (i.e. inference) means two things, viz. inferential cognition (*anumiti*) and the instrument of inferential cognition (*anumiti-karaṇa*). Thus when the word stands for an abstraction (*bhāvaavācin*) it means inferential cognition, when it stands for an instrument (*karaṇavācin*) it means instrument of inferential cognition.

The word "*anumāna*" consists of two parts, viz "*anu*" and "*māna*". "*Anu*" means 'after' and "*māna*" means 'cognition', so that "*anumāna*" means 'a cognition taking place after some other cognition'. But this other cognition has to be a particular type of cognition, a type which alone acts as the cause of inferential cognition; and 'cognition of pervasion' (*vyāptijñāna*; cognition of invariable concomitance), otherwise known as 'consideration of the probans' (*liṅgaparāmarśa*), is the type in question. One outstanding difference between perceptual cognition and inferential cognition is that the former is not necessarily caused by another cognition while the latter is necessarily so caused; it is this idea that is conveyed by the part "*anu*" present in the word "*anumāna*". Although there are certain types of non-perceptual cognition – e.g. cognition through analogy (*upamiti*), cognition through verbal testimony (*śābda*), and cognition through implication (*arthāpatti*) – which are generally not treated as the cases of inferential cognition, the fact of the matter is – and the Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist systems recognize it – that *pramāṇas* are of only two types, perceptual and inferential. As for the remaining types of non-perceptual *pramāṇa*, they can all be somehow treated as cases of inferential *pramāṇa* – as has been done by the two systems just referred to.

Whatever be the object of a piece of inferential cognition and whatever the type of probans causing it, it is definite that all such cognition



must have a piece of perceptual cognition somewhere at its basis. For an inferential cognition having no perceptual cognition somewhere at its basis is an impossibility. Thus while perceptual cognition comes into existence without at all depending on inferential cognition, inferential cognition comes into existence only in dependence on perceptual cognition. It is this idea that has been expressed by the Sage (ṛṣi) Gotama through the phrase “*tatpūrvakam*” (i.e. preceded by it, that is, by perceptual cognition) occurring in the definition of inferential cognition given by him in *Nyāya-sūtra* (1.1.5).<sup>111</sup> And the idea has been incorporated in the definition of inferential cognition given in *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (k. 5) etc.

The philosophical development (*dārśanika vikāsa*) of the account given of the nature, classification, etc. of inferential cognition can be best followed if it (i.e. this development) is divided into three periods, viz. the Vedicist Period, the Buddhist Period, and the Navya-Nyāya Period.

## I. VEDICIST PERIOD

On consideration it appears that the task of defining inferential cognition and of offering a systematic account (*śāstrīya nirūpaṇa*) thereof was first undertaken in the Vedicist tradition, an undertaking variously developed by the different branches of this tradition. When, where, and by whom was the task first undertaken ? How much time was taken by its initial development ? What were the fields covered by it ? – are the questions which will, perhaps, ever remain unanswered. However, here also it is definite that the initial stages of the development in question are found recorded in the other (i.e. non-philosophical) ancient texts of the Vedicist tradition.

This stage of development should be called Vedicist also because the Jaina and Buddhist traditions not only had no part in the initiation of this development but had, in the beginning, literally adopted from the Vedicist

111. Just as the phrase ‘*tatpūrvakam*’ is indicative of the relation of antecedence and consequence (*paurvāparya*) between perception and inference, so also in the Jaina tradition we come across the phrase ‘*maipuvvaṃ jeṇa suyam*’ (*Nandīsūtra*, 24) which is indicative of the relation of antecedence and consequence between *mati* (standing for perceptual cognition) and *śruta* (standing for non-perceptual cognition). See *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, *Gāthās* 86, 105, 106.

tradition the systematic account under consideration. Two slightly different accounts of inference – both belonging to the Vedicist period – are to be found in two Vedicist traditions :

(i) The first is the tradition of the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā systems. The texts which are at present with us in the form of unmistaken (*spaṣṭa*) representatives of this tradition are the two *Bhāṣyas* of Praśastapāda and Śābara. Both these texts mention just two types of inference,<sup>112</sup> a mention indicative of some identical tradition of thought (*vicāra-paramparā*) being at the root of the two. Personally speaking, I am also of the view that the Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika traditions were initially identical (*abhinna*)<sup>113</sup> and that the two got separated into two different paths of development only in the course of time.

(ii) The other Vedicist tradition includes the systems of Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, and Caraka; it mentions and describes three types of inference.<sup>114</sup> The words by which the Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā systems designate the two types of inference accepted by the two are virtually identical, while the words by which the three systems – viz. Nyāya, etc. — belonging to the other tradition designate the three types of inference accepted by the three are actually identical. However, the examples quoted by the different systems (by way of elucidating the nature of the types of inference accepted by them) are not identical.

In the Jaina tradition, the first mention of the three types of inference is found in *Anuyogadvārasūtra* – a text belonging to the first Century A. D.;<sup>115</sup> and the words by which these three types are here

112. 'tat tu dvividham – pratyakṣato dṛṣṭasambandham sāmānyato dṛṣṭasambandham ca /– Śābarabhāṣya, 1.1.5; 'tat tu dvividham – dṛṣṭam sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ca /–Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, p. 205.

113. The Mīmāṃsā system with "athāto dharmajijñāsā" as its first aphorism starts with an account of *dharma* and so also does the Vaiśeṣika system with "athāto dharmam vyākhyāsyāmaḥ" as its first aphorism. Again, the aphorism "codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah" (of the Mīmāṃsā system) conveys the same idea as the aphorism "tadvacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam" (of the Vaiśeṣika system).

114. 'pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭam ca /–NS, 1.1.5; Mātharavṛtti, k. 5; Carakasamhitā, Sūtrasthāna, Śl. 28-29.

115. 'tvihe pañṇatte taṃ jahā – puvvavaṃ, sesavaṃ, dīṭṭhasāhammavaṃ /–Anuyogadvāra, p. 212A.

designated are literally the same as in the Nyāya system. However, one peculiarity of the examples quoted in *Anuyogadvāra* of the three types of inference is that through their division and subdivision they succeed in incorporating also the Vaiśeṣika-cum-Mīmāṃsā tradition of accepting only two types of inference.

The Buddhist tradition contains an account only of the three types of inference accepted in *Nyāya-sūtra*, an account so far found recorded in just one text *Upāyahṛdaya* (p. 13). Even if *Upāyahṛdaya* is not a writing of Nāgārjuna – as is generally understood – it must be a pre-Diñnāga text. Thus we see that as late as the 4th or 5th Century A. D. the Jaina and Buddhist texts simply adopted the account of inference as given in the two above-stated traditions of the Vedicist period; that is to say, until this period the Buddhist and Jaina traditions simply follow the Vedicist ones on the question of *pramāṇa* in general and inference in particular.

## II. BUDDHIST PERIOD

The Buddhist period (in the development of the account of inference) starts with 5th Century A. D. We call it the Buddhist period because the till now current treatment of inference – a treatment worked out on the lines laid down by the Vedicist tradition – was most forcefully opposed by Diñnāga who, in addition, offered a new definition – and a new classification – of inference from his own Buddhist standpoint.<sup>116</sup> This new understanding (*prasthāna*) of inference on the part of Diñnāga was accepted by all later Buddhist teachers<sup>117</sup> who, following Diñnāga, refuted those very definition, classification, etc. of inference recognized in the Vedicist traditions like Nyāya etc. which the eminent Buddhist logicians of the earlier period had themselves adopted.<sup>118</sup> Now onwards, the Vedicist and Buddhist logicians were arrayed in two hostile camps from where attacks were hurled at the rival, and one's own position defended. Commentators and subcommentators of *Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya*, like Uddyotakara, Vācaspatiśra, etc., vigorously refuted the definitions of inference offered by the Buddhist

116. PS, 2.1; *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 236.

117. 'anumānam liṅgād arthadarśanam'-*Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 7; NB. 2. 3; TSN, k. 1362.

118. PS, pari. 2; TSN, k. 1442; *Tātp.*, p. 180.

logicians like Vasubandhu, Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti, etc.,<sup>119</sup> a refutation replied back by the Buddhist logicians who arose in succession.

The Buddhist period influenced the Jaina tradition as well. On seeing that the definition, classification, etc. of inference recognized in the Vedicist tradition were being assailed by the Buddhist logicians, the Jaina logicians like Siddhasena<sup>120</sup> too offered an independent definition (of inference) from their own standpoint. Bhaṭṭāraka Akalaṅka did not rest content with that definition offered by Siddhasena, for he, following the pattern set by the Buddhist logicians, also clearly initiated the process of refuting the classification etc. (of inference) recognized in the Vedicist tradition,<sup>121</sup> a process detailed and developed by the later Digambara logicians like Vidyānanda etc.<sup>122</sup>

There are two outstanding features of this new Buddhist period : firstly, independent formulation of definition etc. of inference in the Buddhist and Jaina traditions, and refutation by them of those very definition etc. recognized in the Vedicist tradition which were once adopted by the teachers belonging to these traditions themselves; secondly, refutation on the part of the Vedicist scholars of the Buddhist account of inference and defence on their part of the account offered by the earlier teachers belonging to their own (i.e. Vedicist) tradition. About the second feature one thing – though of minor importance – is noteworthy, and it is that the definition of inference offered by a Vedicist scholar like Bhāsarvajña was to an extent influenced also by the Buddhist definition,<sup>123</sup> a characteristic that was constantly marking the Jaina logician's definition ever since the beginning of the Buddhist period.<sup>124</sup>

### III. NAVYA-NYĀYA PERIOD

The Navya-Nyāya period starts with Upādhyāya Gaṅgeśa, who, while

119. NV, p. 49; *Tātp.*, p. 180.

120. 'sādhyāvinābhūto liṅgāt sādhyaniścāyakam smṛtam / anumānam...'–NA, 5.

121. *Nyāyaviniścaya*, 2. 171, 172.

122. TSV, p. 205; PMK, p. 105.

123. 'samyagavinābhāvena parokṣānubhavasāadhanam anumānam'–NSa, p. 5.

124. NA, 5; *Nyāyaviniścaya*, 2.1; PPar, p. 70; PM, 3. 14.

retaining the definition of inference offered by the earlier Vedacist teachers, introduced in it such subtle refinements (*sūkṣma pariṣkāra*)<sup>125</sup> as were honoured in later times not by the Navya-Naiyāyikas alone, but by all the Vedacists who took to refining (the definition of inference). By the time of this new refinement the Buddhist logicians had almost disappeared from the Indian scene; hence there arises no question of this refinement being accepted or rejected in the Buddhist texts. This was, however, not the case with the Jaina tradition which has continued to flourish in India in the post-Navya-Nyāya period as in the earlier. Nor can it be said that there had been no Jaina logician who had mastery over the vitals (*marmajñā*) of (the literature of) the Navya-Nyāya period; for the Jaina tradition has produced, in the person of Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaḥ (for example), an acute-minded logician who was a keen student of the Navya-Nyāya texts like *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, *Āloka*, etc. However, not even in Upādhyāyaḥ's writings like *Tarkabhāṣā* etc. do we come across an acceptance or refutation of the refined definition of inference the Navya-Nyāya period offered. For *Tarkabhāṣā* – Upādhyāyaḥ's chief work dealing with *pramāṇas* – retains the same definition of inference as had been accepted by the earlier Śvetāmbara and Digambara logicians.

The definition of inference offered by Āc. Hemacandra is the same as was established and defended by the old Jaina logicians like Siddhasena and Akalaṅka; he inserts no amendment in it, nor deletes anything from it, nor adds anything to it. However, one thing is noteworthy about Āc. Hemacandra's account of inference. He omitted that passionate refutation of the threefold classification of inference recognized in Vedacist tradition which had become customary with all the earlier Jaina logicians – not excluding the Śvetāmbaras like Abhayadeva, Vālidevasūri, etc.<sup>126</sup> We cannot say whether Āc. Hemacandra did so because he wanted to be brief or because he saw an inconsistency in such a refutation. At any rate, the omission on Āc. Hemacandra's part of the refutation of the threefold

125. 'atītānāgatadhūmadījñāne 'py anumitidarśanāt na liṅgaṃ taddhetuḥ vyāpārapūrvavar-  
titayor abhāvāt... kintu vyāptijñānaṃ karaṇaṃ parāmarśo vyāpāraḥ / – *Tattvacintā-  
maṇi*, *Parāmarśa.*, pp. 536-50.

126. *SMT*, p. 559; *SVR*, p. 527.

classification of inference recognized in the Vedicist tradition eliminated one inconsistency that had cropped up in the Jaina texts – particularly in those belonging to the Śvetāmbara tradition. The credit for eliminating this inconsistency certainly goes to Āc. Hemacandra. And here was the inconsistency. An author like Āryarakṣita – supposed to be a *Pūrvadhara* and an *Āgamadhara* (i.e. one well-versed in the scriptural texts called ‘*Pūrvā*’ and ‘*Āgama*’) – had accepted and defended in great details the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Nyāya system, while the same classification was passionately refuted by the Śvetāmbara logicians like Abhayadeva etc. who were successors of the same Āryarakṣita. The Digambara tradition may be said to suffer from no such inconsistency, for this tradition does not at all regard Āryarakṣita’s *Anuyogadvāra* as an authoritative text. Hence if the Digambara logicians like Akalaṅka etc. refuted the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Nyāya system, they could not be charged with going counter to the path laid down by their own earlier teachers. But this does not hold true of the Śvetāmbara tradition. For the Śvetāmbara logicians like Abhayadeva etc., who refuted the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Nyāya system, were the followers of Āryarakṣita who had earlier defended the same classification; hence this refutation on their part was glaringly out of tune with that defence offered by their own earlier teacher.

Āc. Hemacandra perhaps realized that, as a result of following the Digambara logicians like Akalaṅka etc., the Śvetāmbara logicians had involved themselves in a contradiction with their own tradition. And this realization seems to be responsible for the omission, in his Commentary, of the refutation of the threefold classification of inference. Maybe, it was in deference to this Hemacandrian elimination of inconsistency that Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaḥ did not undertake, in his *Tarkabhāṣā*, a refutation of the threefold classification of inference recognized in the Vedicist tradition, even though he did undertake a refutation of the fivefold characterization (of probans) (*hetu-pāñcarūpya*) recognized in the Nyāya system.

(PMT on *sūtra* 1.2.7, pp. 138-42)

## 18. IS TARKA A PRAMĀṆA ?

Centuries before the time of Lord Mahāvīra, Buddha, and Upaniṣads, the verbal roots 'ūh' (R̥gveda, 10.131.10) and 'tarka' (Rāmāyaṇa, 3.25.12) — as also various formations derived therefrom — were current in Sanskrit and Prakrit languages.<sup>127</sup> In the Āgamas, Piṭakas, and philosophical sūtras these words have been used in various contexts — and in various meanings that slightly differ from one another.<sup>128</sup> However, one element is common to all these meanings, and it is the element indicative of a cognitive process of the form of ratiocination (*vicārātmaka jñāna-vyāpāra*). In Jaimini's aphorism and in the commentaries of Śābara etc.<sup>129</sup> thereon the idea is expressed by the word 'ūha' and Jayanta in his *Nyāya-mañjarī* (p. 588) refutes the same, taking it to stand for inferential (*anumānātmaka*) or verbal (*śabdātmaka*) cognition. *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.40 offers a definition of *tarka*, which contains the word 'ūha', and the purport of the definition is that ratiocination of the form of *tarka* is not itself a *pramāṇa* but merely a mental process (*manovyāpāra*) favourable to *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇānukūla*). Later Naiyāyikas have attributed one fixed meaning to the word "tarka" and have elucidated it. Their ruling (*nirṇaya*) is that *traka* is not a cognition of the nature of *pramāṇa* but a temporarily entertained cognition (*āhārya-jñāna*) of the nature of "supposition of the presence of a probans (which is actually absent) necessitating the supposition of the presence of the probandum (whose presence is an obvious absurdity)" (*vyāpyāropa-pūrvaka-vyāpakāropa-svarūpa*),<sup>130</sup> a cognition which, by removing the doubt that a proposed probans is irrelevant (*aprayojakatva-śaṅkā-nirāsa*) or that a proposed relation of invariable concomitance is a case of non-invariable concomitance (*vyabhicāra-śaṅkā-nirāsa*), acts as an auxiliary (*sahakārin*) and an aid (*upayogin*) in formulating a relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti-nirṇaya*) (*Cintāmaṇi*, *Anumāna*, p. 210; *Nyāya-sūtra*—

127. 'upasargāddhṛasva ūhateḥ / Pāṇinisūtra, 7.4.23; 'naiṣa tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā / Kaṭhapaniṣad, 2.9.

128. 'takka jāttha na vijjai / Ācārāṅgasūtra, 170; 'vihimsā vitakka / Majjhimanikāya, Savvāsavasutta, 2. 6; 'tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt / Brahmasūtra, 2. 1. 11; NS, 1. 1. 40.

129. 'trividhaś ca ūhaḥ / mantrasāmasaṃskāraviśayaḥ / Śābarabhāṣya, 9. 1. 1; Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvistara, Adhikaraṇa 9. 1. 1.

130. Roughly speaking, *tarka* can be equated with *reductio ad absurdum*. Tr.

*vr̥tti*, 1.1.40). Since old times the Nyāya system has refused to treat *tarka* as a *pramāṇa*.<sup>131</sup> And with the development of the system, plenty of clarification has been offered as to the meaning of the word “*tarka*” and as to the utility of *tarka*, a fact attested by the subtler and subtler texts that have been composed on the subject ever since the time of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya.

Buddhist logicians (*Hetubinduṭīkā*, p. 17), too, though granting that thought in the form of *tarka* (*tarkātmaka vikalpajñāna*) is of value in formulating a relation of invariable concomitance, do not treat *tarka* as a *pramāṇa*. Thus we have the Mīmāṃsā tradition which treats *tarka* as a *pramāṇa* and the Nyāya-cum-Buddhist tradition which treats *tarka* as *apramāṇa*-though-an-aid-to-*pramāṇa* (*apramāṇarūpa, pramāṇānugrahaka*).

In the Jaina tradition, the second among the types of *matijñāna* — which is a *pramāṇa* — is called ‘*īhā*’ which, in fact, stands for ‘a cognitive process of the form of consideration of the pros and cons’ (*guṇa-doṣa-vicārātmaka jñāna-vyāpāra*); and Umāsvāti has used the words “*ūha*” and “*tarka*” as synonyms for this “*īhā*” (*Tattvārtha-sūtra*, 1.15). After the Jaina tradition had assumed the task of offering definition, classification, etc. of *pramāṇas* from the logicians’ standpoint, Akalaṅka seems to be the first to determine the nature, object, and utility of *tarka* (*Laghī*, Auto-commentary, 3. 2), and he has been followed by all later Jaina logicians. The Jaina tradition is one with the Mīmāṃsaka in treating *tarka* as a cognition of the nature of *pramāṇa*. According to the Jaina logicians, the word “*tarka*” or “*ūha*” stands for ‘cognition of a relation of invariable concomitance’ (*vyāptijñāna*). Thus the word “*ūha*” or “*tarka*”, which was known to the Aryan tradition (*Āryaparampārā*) since long past, was attributed by Akalaṅka to a subspecies of non-perceptual *pramāṇa* (*parokṣa-pramāṇa*). Hence it is that while the Naiyāyikas like Vācaspatimiśra<sup>132</sup> sometimes suggest that the ‘cognition of invariable concomitance’ (*vyāptijñāna*) is a mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*), sometimes that it is an ordinary perception (*laukika-pratyakṣa*), sometimes that it is an inferential cognition (*anumiti*), and so on and so forth, the Jaina logicians always urged that ‘cognition of invariable concomitance’ is of but one nature and that this nature is grasped

131. NS, 1. 2. 1.

132. *Tātp.* pp. 159-67; NM, p. 123.



by what they call “*tarka*.” Āc. Hemacandra simply endorses this old tradition.

(PMT on *sūtra* 1. 2. 5, pp. 76-77)

## 19. THE NATURE OF VYĀPTI

### (i.e. RELATION OF INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE)

In *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* 1.2.10 is offered a definition of *avinābhāva* (i.e. non-presence [of probans] in the absence of [probandum]). Now the question arises why Āc. Hemacandra, after having defined *tarka*, seeks to define *vyāpti* which was (in the course of discussion on *tarka*) given out as the object to be grasped by *tarka* (*tarka-viṣaya*). The answer to this question is as follows. In his commentary on *Hetubindu*, Arcāṭa, in order to bring into prominence certain particular aspects of the problem, gives a very attractive account of what he calls ‘*vyāpti* understood as a character of the probans’ (*vyāpya-dharmarūpa vyāpti*) and ‘*vyāpti* understood as a character of the probandum’ (*vyāpaka-dharmarūpa-vyāpti*). And Āc. Hemacandra, with an eye to making handsome selection from all possible sources (*cakora-drṣṭi*), could not resist the temptation of assimilating this account of Arcāṭa. As a result, we find him incorporating it verbatim in his aphorism and the commentary thereon.

The question before Arcāṭa was : If *vyāpti* is, like conjunction (*saṃyoga*), a relation obtaining between two entities (*dviṣṭha-sambandha*), why is it not the case that just as the proposition ‘X is in conjunction with Y’ is not different from ‘Y is in conjunction with X’ the proposition ‘X is the probans and Y its probandum’ is not different from ‘Y is the probans and X its probandum’, that is to say, in case X is a probans and Y its probandum why is it also not the case that Y is a probans and X its probandum ? Arcāṭa tells us that this question was raised by some logician having “Ācārya” for his pen-name. And Arcāṭa answers it by maintaining that *vyāpti* is not a symmetrical relation (*ekarūpa sambanbha*) but a non-symmetrical relation where the relata concerned, viz. *vyāpya* (i.e. probans) and *vyāpaka* (i.e. probandum) exhibit two mutually different types of characteristics (*vibhinna svarūpa*), which, in turn, explains why we can infer from the existence of probans — the possessor of one particular type of characteristic — the

existence of probandum — the possessor of another particular type of characteristic, but not *vice versa*. In other words, the relation of probans and probandum (*gamyagamakabhāva*) is not always symmetrical (*sarvatra aniyata*), just as the relation of substratum and superstratum (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) is not.<sup>133</sup>

In those olden days, the contingency of the relation of probans and probandum turning out to be a symmetrical relation was sought to be obviated by logicians like Arcāṭa, through maintaining that *vyāpti* is of two sorts (i.e. that *vyāpti* characterizing the probans is of a different sort from that characterizing the probandum). But with the maturing of the science of Logic, another – and more satisfactory – manner of meeting the contingency in question was found out. Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya-Nyāya, has considered in his *Cintāmaṇi* (*Gādādhari*, pp. 141-390) a number of definitions – *prima facie* as well as final – of *vyāpti*. The *prima facie* definitions (*pūrvapakṣa-vyāpti*) seek to present, in a refined form, the nature of *avyabhicaritatva* (i.e. absence of absence-of-invariable-concomitance)<sup>134</sup> which is but another name for *avinābhāva* or for what Arcāṭa calls ‘*vyāpti* understood as a character of the probans’ (*vyāpya-dharmarūpa vyāpti*). On the other hand, the final definition of *vyāpti* (*siddhānta-vyāpti*) presents, in a refined form, the typical characteristic of a probandum (*vyāpakatva*),<sup>135</sup> a characteristic which Arcāṭa calls “*vyāpti* understood as a character of the probandum” (i.e. *vyāpakadharmarūpa vyāpti*). That is to say, while Arcāṭa granted that *vyāpti* can be understood as a (typical) characteristic of the probandum, though he went on to add that the existence of the entity characterized by *vyāpti* of this sort, i.e. the existence of the probandum, cannot enable us to infer the existence of something else (say, of the probans), Gaṅgeśa, refusing to attribute the name ‘*vyāpti*’ to the typical characteristic of a probandum, calls this characteristic just ‘*vyāpakatva*’

133. Here the words “symmetrical” and “non-symmetrical” mean roughly the same thing as they do in Russell and his school of Mathematical Logic. Tr.

134. ‘*na tāvad avyabhicaritatvaṃ taddhi na sādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvaṃ, sādhyavadbhinnasādhyābhāvavadavṛttitvaṃ...sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvaṃ vā* / *Cintāmaṇi-Gādādhari*, p. 141.

135. ‘*pratiyogyaśamānādhikaraṇayatsamānādhikaraṇāntyantābhāvapratiyogitāvacchedakāvacchinnaṃ yan na bhavati* / *Gādādhari*, p. 391.

and goes on to add that 'vyāpti' stands for "coexistence (*sāmānādhikarāṇya*) (of the probans) with an entity characterized by *vyāpakatva* thus understood".<sup>136</sup> This account offered by Gaṅgeśa is particularly subtle. And had Āc. Hemacandra come across the account of *vyāpakatva*, *avyabhicāritatva*, etc. offered by the logicians like Gaṅgeśa, he must have made use of it in the present context.

In the texts on Logic "vyāpti", "avinābhāva", and "niyatasāhacarya" (i.e. invariable concomitance) are well known as synonymous words. The nature of *vyāpti*-understood-as-*avinābhāva* has been treated by the entire lot of Jaina logicians like Māṇikyanandin (*PM*, 3.17,18) etc., but the new idea suggested by Arcaṭa has been incorporated, perhaps, in no other Jaina text on Logic.

(PMT on *sūtra* 1.2.6, pp. 78-79)

## 20. THE NUMBER OF STEPS (*avayava*) IN AN INFERENCE-FOR-OTHERS (*parārthānumāna*)

There is diversity of views as to the technique of presenting (*prayoga-paripāṭi*) an inference-for-the-sake-of-others (*parārthānumāna*). Thus Sāṅkhya logicians are of the view that an inference-for-others requires just three steps in the form of *pratijñā* (i.e. statement of the thesis sought to be established), *hetu* (i.e. showing that the subject of the thesis is possessed of the probans concerned), and *dṛṣṭāna* (i.e. formulating the concerned relation-of-invariable-concomitance or *vyāpti* and illustrating the same). The Mīmāṃsakas too, according to Vādidevasūri, (*SVR*, p. 559) admit the necessity of just three steps, but Āc. Hemacandra and Anantavīrya tell us that the Mīmāṃsakas admit the necessity of four steps (*Prameyaratnamālā*, 3.37). Śālikanātha – the follower of Prabhākara – in his *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (pp. 83-85) and Pārthasārathimīśra in his commentary on *Śloka-vārtika* (*Anumāna*, Śl. 54) make mention of just three steps. Thus the statement of Vādideva accords – and that of Āc. Hemacandra and Anantavīrya does not with what Śālikanātha and Pārthasārathi say. Hence if the statement of Āc. Hemacandra and Anantavīrya as to the Mīmāṃsaka's acceptance of four steps is not a mis-statement, we have to understand that they had before

136. 'tena samam tasya sāmānādhikarāṇyaṃ vyāptiḥ / Gādādhari, p. 391.

them – and hence mentioned it – some Mīmāṃsā tradition which accepted four steps. The Naiyāyikas admit the necessity of five steps (NS, 1.1.32). According to the Buddhist logicians, the maximum number of steps is two – viz. *hetu* and *dr̥ṣṭānta* – (PV, 1.28; SVR, p. 559) while the minimum necessary step is *hetu* (PV, 1.28). In the midst of this diversity of views, the Jaina logicians have, since the time of *Niryuktis*,<sup>137</sup> adopted on this question – as on many others – a position that is in conformity with their non-absolutistic standpoint. All Jaina teachers – Digambara as well as Śvetāmbara – are of the view that the number of steps (requisite in an inference-for-others) is not fixed but may be more or less according as the hearer concerned is less or more competent.

Mānikyanandin recognizes (PM, 3.37-46) *pratijñā* and *hetu* as the two minimum necessary steps, but he concedes that one or more of the remaining three steps – viz. *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *upanaya* (i.e. pointing out that the case under consideration is a case falling under the *vyāpti* formulated in *dr̥ṣṭānta*), and *nigamana* (i.e. reiteration of the thesis as conclusively established) – may also be required in dealing with certain types of hearers. The words of Āc. Hemacandra's present aphorisms and of his commentary thereon go to indicate that the view expressed in Mānikyanandin's aphorism and in its commentary by Prabhācandra etc. is also his view, that is to say, Āc. Hemacandra too is of the view that *pratijñā* and *hetu* are two minimum necessary steps while three, four, or five steps may be required in special cases. However, Vādideva's view is different, for he, in his own commentary on the text touching upon the subject (SVR, p. 548), goes to the extent of granting that in dealing with a particular type of hearers one single step, viz. *hetu*, might alone suffice, a position already granted by Buddhists. As for the remaining types of hearers, Vādideva says that some of them may require two steps, viz. *pratijñā* and *hetu*, some three, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, and *dr̥ṣṭānta*, some four, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dr̥ṣṭānta*, and *upanaya*, and some five, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *upanaya*, and *nigamana* (SVR, p. 564).

137. 'jīṇavayaṇaṃ siddhaṃ ceva bhaṇṇae katthaṃ udāharaṇaṃ / āsajja u soyāraṃ heṃ vi kahiñci bhaṇṇejjā // katthai pañcāvayaṇaṃ dasahā vā savvahā na paṭisiddhaṃ / na ya puṇa savvaṃ bhaṇṇāṃ haṃdī saviāramakkhāyaṃ / Daśavaikālika-niryukti, Gāthās 49, 50.

Here one historically important speciality of the Śvetāmbara tradition as distinct from the Digambara is worth noting. No Digambara teacher has even taken note of the ten steps<sup>138</sup> – different from the ten steps spoken of by Vātsyāyana<sup>139</sup> – which are mentioned and described in that *Niryukti* ascribed to the very ancient Bhadrabāhu, while, on the other hand, all Śvetāmbara logicians (SVR, p. 556), having granted that in certain particular cases even more than five steps may be required, go on to name and describe the ten steps precisely after the manner of the *Niryukti* in question. The root of this divergence seems to lie in the rejection on the part of the Digambara tradition of the ancient literature like *Āgama* etc.

Māṇikyanandin says in his aphorism one thing that seems remarkable. Thus he tells us that two steps and five steps are required in two different types of spheres, that is to say, two is the number of steps to be employed in the course of a debate (*vāda-pradeśa*) but either two or five steps may be employed (keeping in view the competence of the hearer concerned) in the course of a systematic exposition (*śāstra-pradeśa*). And what is to be remembered about Vādideva's stand is that he, like Buddhists, grants that *hetu* is the only step required when the hearer happens to be specially learned (*viśiṣṭa vidvān*) (i.e. expert in the subject-matter under consideration). But to neither of these effects has Āc. Hemacandra made any clear mention.

(PMT on *sūtras* 2.1.9-10, pp. 94-96)

## 21. THE ASPECTS OF THE NATURE OF A PROBANS (*hetu-rūpa*)

As to the aspects of the nature of a probans, the following four traditions are current among philosophers :

(1) the Vaiśeṣika-cum-Sāṅkhya-cum-Buddhist tradition, (2) the Nyāya tradition, (3) one anonymous tradition, and (4) the Jaina tradition.

According to the first tradition, the nature of a probans has got three aspects, viz. (i) presence in the subject (of the thesis sought to be

138. 'te u painnavibhattī heuvibhattī vivakkhapaḍiseho dīṭṭhato āsaṅkā tappadiseho niga-maṇam ca // Daśavaikālika, G. 137.

139. 'daśāvayavān eke Naiyāyikā vākye saṅcakṣate — jijñāsā saṁśayaḥ śakyaprāptiḥ prayojanaṁ saṁśayavyudāsa iti // NBh. 1.1.32.

established), (*pakṣa-sattva*), (ii) presence in a homologue (*sapakṣa-sattva*), and (iii) absence from heterologues (*vipakṣa-vyāvṛtti*). The adherents of this tradition are the Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṅkhyas, and Buddhists, of whom the Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṅkhyas seem to be older. The Buddhist logicians are obviously influenced by Kaṇāda's twofold division of *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇa-dvaividhya*) into perception and inference, and it appears that they have likewise been influenced by the Vaiśeṣika thesis of the threefold nature of a probans (*hetu-trairūpya*).<sup>140</sup> In the course of his account of the nature of a probans, Praśastapāda himself quotes a *kārikā* which mentions the doctrine of the threefold nature of a probans as the doctrine upheld by Kāśyapa.<sup>141</sup> The same three aspects of the nature of a probans are mentioned by Māṭhara in his *Vṛtti* (*Māṭharavṛtti*, k. 5). The Buddhist texts like *Abhidharmakośa*, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, *Nyāyapraveśa* (p. 1), *Nyāyabindu* (2.5 ff), *Hetubindu* (p. 4), *Tattvasaṅgraha* (k. 1362), etc. have all taken these three aspects to constitute the definition of probans and have accordingly defended the doctrine of the threefold nature of a probans. The delineation of the three aspects of the nature of a probans and the defence of the doctrine of the threefold nature along with a refutation of the rival doctrines have been undertaken in the Buddhist texts on a much larger scale than in any exclusively Vaiśeṣika or Sāṅkhya text.

The Naiyāyikas admit, in addition to the above three, two more aspects of the nature of a probans, viz. (i) absence of cancellation-of-the-thesis(-on-the-part-of-another-*pramāṇa*) (*abādhitaviśayatva*) and (ii) absence of a counterbalancing probans (*asatpratipakṣatva*); they thus advocate the doctrine of the fivefold nature. It cannot be said with certainty as to who first started this advocacy, but may be Uddyotakara is the person – (NV, 1.1.5). Arcāṭa, the commentator of *Hetubindu* (p. 205), and

140. Prof. Stcherbatsky is, however, of the view that it is the Vaiśeṣikas who have been influenced by the Buddhists in their acceptance of the doctrine of the threefold nature of a probans. See *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, p. 244.

141. 'yad anumeyena sambaddham prasiddham ca tadavivāde / tadabhāve ca nāsty eva talliṅgam anumāpakam // viparītam ato yat syād ekenā dvitayena vā / viruddhā-siddhasandigdham alīṅgam Kāśyapo 'bravīt // –Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 200; Kand, p. 203.

Śrīdhara, the follower of Praśastapāda, have sought to cover within (the scope of) the doctrine of the threefold nature (the scope of) the doctrine of the fivefold nature. And though this doctrine of the fivefold nature has been described and defended by all later Naiyāyikas like Vācaspati (Tātp., 1.1.5), Jayanta (NM, p. 110), etc., it has not remained static (*sthira*) like a dead organism (*mṛtaka-muṣṭi*; lit. the fist of a corpse). For Naiyāyikas like Gadādhara, through their stand – laid down in the texts on *Avayava* etc. – that *vyāpti* (i.e. its invariable concomitance with the probandum) and *pakṣa-dharmatā* (i.e. its characterizing the subject of the thesis) are the two features needed by a probans in order to enable us to infer the probandum concerned (*gamakatopayogi-rūpa*), have implicitly suggested (*saṃsūcana*) that the essential aspects of the nature of a probans are but three (rather than five). Thus the early Naiyāyika's rigid insistence in favour of the fivefold nature got loosened so as to permit an acceptance of the doctrine of the threefold nature.

Besides the tradition which accepted the doctrine of the fivefold nature, there was also a tradition – mentioned and refuted by Arcaṭa<sup>142</sup> and attributed by him, in a general fashion, to “Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, etc.” — which accepted the doctrine of the sixfold nature, that is, a tradition which accepted an additional aspect in the form of “knownness” (*jñātatva*). The old Nyāya view that a probans-as-being-known (*jñāyamāna liṅga*) is the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of inferential cognition (*anumiti*) – a view sought to be refuted in the later Nyāya texts (*jñāyamānaṃ liṅgaṃ tu karaṇaṃ nahi* — *Muktāvali*, k. 67) – was perhaps rooted in this tradition upholding the doctrine of the sixfold nature.

The Jaina tradition maintains that a probans has but unitary nature, viz. ‘absence in the absence of the probandum’ (*avinābhāva*). This tradition

142. ‘śaḍlakṣaṇo hetur ity apare Naiyāyika-Mīmāṃsakādayo manyante / kāṇi punaḥ śaḍrūpāṇi  
‘hetos tair iṣyante ity āha...trīṇi caitāṇi pakṣadharmānavayavyatirekākhyaṇi, tathā  
abādhitaviśayatvaṃ caturthaṃ rūpam,...tathā vivakṣitaikasaṅkhyatvaṃ rūpāntaram —  
ekā saṅkhyā yasya hetudravyasya tad ekasaṅkhyam...yady ekasaṅkhyāvacchinnāyāṃ  
pratihatrahitaṭyāṃ hetuvyaktau hetutvaṃ bhavati tadā gamakatvaṃ na tu  
pratihetusahitaṭyāṃ api dvitvasaṅkhyāyuktāyāṃ...tathā jñātatvaṃ ca jñānaviśayatvaṃ  
ca, na hy ajñāto hetuḥ svasattāmātreṇa gamako yukta iti /—Hetubinduṭīkā, p. 205.

does not say that the three or five or any number of aspects pointed out by others are (always) non-existent (*asat*) there in a probans, but it submits that since it is sometimes possible to draw a finally conclusive inference (*nirvivāda sadanumāna*) even in the absence of these aspects numbering three, five, etc., it is not easy to determine the common nature of all probantia except by admitting that they are all absent in the absence of their respective probanda. Thus the three or five aspects are but details (*prapañcamātra*) of certain possible cases of 'absence in the absence of the probandum.' Though Siddhasena in his *Nyāyavatāra* has characterized probans as 'absent in the absence of the probandum' (*sādhyaavinābhāvin*), Pātrasvāmin is, perhaps, the first defender of the position that 'absence in the absence of the probandum' is the sole nature (*ekamātra rūpa*) of a probans. This Jaina position that 'absence in the absence of the probandum' is the sole nature of a probans has been presented – and refuted – as Pātrasvāmin's position by Śāntarakṣita in *Tattvasaṅgraha*.<sup>143</sup> It appears that Jaina logicians of the earlier period simply maintained that the nature of a probans consists in 'absence in the absence of the probandum', while the logical defence of the position along with a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of the threefold nature came, first of all, from Pātrasvāmin.

The following *kārikā* refutative of the Buddhist doctrine of the threefold nature has been quoted by Akalaṅka (*Nyāyaviniścaya*, p. 177), Vidyānanda (*P.Par*, p. 72), etc. :

*anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim /*

*nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim //*,

and this ought to be Pātrasvāmin's composition. It is the refutation of the rival doctrine of the threefold nature which Pātrasvāmin first undertook in the Jaina tradition that has become model for all subsequent Jaina logicians – Śvetāmbara as well as Digambara – like Akalaṅka (*Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, p. 66A) etc. In due course, a refutation of the doctrine of the fivefold nature was added to this refutation of the doctrine of the threefold nature. Thus we find in the later Digambara and Śvetāmbara texts on Logic – e.g. in the writings of Vidyānanda (*P.Par*, p. 72), Prabhācandra

143. 'anyathetyādīnā Pātrasvāmimatam āśaṅkate – nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim / anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim //' TSN, ks. 1364-69.



(PKM, p. 103), Vādidēvasūri (SVR, p. 521), etc – a detailed refutation of the doctrine of the threefold nature as well as of the doctrine of the fivefold nature.

Following this tradition (of the earlier Jaina logicians), Āc. Hemacandra refutes the doctrine of the threefold nature as also the doctrine of the fivefold nature. So far as its content is concerned, Āc. Hemacandra's refutation is similar to that of the earlier teachers like Vidyānanda etc., but verbally it stands particularly closer to the one we find in *Prameyaratnamālā* of Anantavīrya. Here also – as in many other cases – Āc. Hemacandra betrays a feature which, in a way, distinguishes him from the preceding Jaina logicians; the feature consists in merely acquainting (*saṅgrāhakamātra*) – however briefly – the Jaina tradition with a new (i.e. non-Jaina) idea. Thus we see that while presenting the *prima facie* Buddhist case in support of the doctrine of the threefold nature, Āc. Hemacandra quotes a lengthy passage from Dharmottara's commentary on *Nyāyabindu*, a quotation not to be found in another earlier text on Jaina Logic. Though the passage in question is from a Buddhist logician, students of Jaina Logic ought to pay particular attention to it – even if in the form of the presentation of a *prima facie* view.

The *kārikā* “*anyathānupapannatvam* etc.” quoted above is doubtless valid and is therefore (deservedly) honoured in the entire Jaina tradition — so much so that Vidyānanda has, in imitation, composed another *kārikā* containing only a slight variation and seeking to refute the doctrine of the fivefold nature (*P.Par*, p. 72). Now this *kārikā* ought to have been honoured only on logical grounds and only in the field of Logic, but its non-logician devotees (*atārkika bhakta*) were so much overwhelmed by it that they sought to enhance its prestige with the help of sheer cock-and-bull-stories. And this tendency grew so wildly that even authors on Logic became its victim. Some said that the original author (*kartā*) and bestower (*dātā*) of the *kārikā* was the Tīrthaṅkara named Sīmandharasvāmin; others said that the goddess named Padmāvatī brought it from Sīmandharasvāmin and handed it over to Pātrakesarisvāmin. Thus a *kārikā* which is fully capable of coming from the mouth of any logically-minded person had to be born, on account of the attitude of blind worship (*andha-bhakti*) developed

towards it, in the mouth of Sīmandharasvāmin – (SMT, p. 569). Be that as it may, Āc. Hemacandra makes use of the *kārikā*. However, it seems almost certain that Pātrasvāmin, the probable author of this *kārikā*, belonged to the Digambara tradition; for those cock-and-bull stories concerning it – stories concocted out of an attitude of blind worship – are current only within the Digambara tradition.

(PMT on 'nanu cāsiddha' in 1.2.32, pp. 80-83)

## 22 TYPES (*prakāra*) OF PROBANS

In the Jaina tradition we find Akalaṅka's writings (*Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, pp. 67-68) to contain an account of the types of probantia, but a clear-cut classification of probantia – classification based on the consideration whether a probans enables us to infer a positive entity (*vidhisādhaka*) or it enables us to infer an absence (*niṣedhasādhaka*) – is to be found only in the writings of (the later authors like) Māṇikyanandin, Vidyānanda, etc. Particularly worthy of note is the classification undertaken by Māṇikyanandin, Vidyānanda, Devasūri, and Āc. Hemacandra. The classification of probantia into types that we find in the Jaina texts is mainly based on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (9.2.1) and Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* (2.12). In *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* a clear mention is made of five types of probantia, viz. probans that is an effect (of the probandum) (*kārya*), one that is a cause (of the probandum) (*kāraṇa*), one that is in conjunction (with the probandum) (*saṃyogin*), one that resides-by-*samavāya*-relation (in the probandum) (*samavāyin*), and one that is contradictory (of the probandum – rather of that whose absence is the probandum) (*virodhin*). In *Nyāyabindu* (2.12) probantia are said to be of three types, viz. probans that is a sub-class – or an equivalent class – (of the probandum) (*svabhāva*), one that is an effect (of the probandum) (*kārya*), and one that is non-cognition (of the probandum – rather of that whose absence is the probandum) (*anupalabdhi*); again, non-cognition is here subdivided into eleven types,<sup>144</sup> but each is treated as capable of enabling us to infer an

144. "svabhāvānupalabdhir yathā nātra dhūma upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasyānupalabdher iti / kāryānupalabdhir yathā nehāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni santi dhūmābhāvāt / vyāpakānupalabdhir yathā nātra śiṃśapā vrkṣābhāvāt / svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhir yathā nātra śītasparśo 'gner iti / viruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā nātra

absence and none as capable of enabling us to infer a positive entity. Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin accepted this 'non-cognition' posited in *Nyāyabindu*, but they introduced much amendment and addition in the idea. By "non-cognition" Dharmakīrti understood all such non-cognitions (*anupalabdhi*) and cognitions (*upalabdhi*) as enable us to infer an absence – and it alone; but non-cognition, according to Māṇikyanandin, enables us to infer an absence as well as a positive entity. Not only that, Māṇikyanandin is also of the view that even cognition enables us to infer an absence as well as a positive entity.<sup>145</sup> Vidyānanda's classification is based on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. For in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* we are told that either (i) an absence (*abhūta*) enables us to infer a positive entity (*bhūta*), or (ii) a positive entity (*bhūta*) enables us to infer an absence (*abhūta*), or (iii) a positive entity (*bhūta*) enables us to infer another positive entity (*bhūta*).<sup>146</sup> To these three Vidyānanda adds the fourth alternative, viz. an absence (*abhūta*) enables us to infer another absence (*abhūta*), and thus he gives us an exhaustive catalogue of the non-cognitions as well as cognitions which enable us to infer a positive entity as also of those which enable us to infer an absence–(*P.Par*, pp. 72-74). After thus making the *Vaiśeṣika* classification exhaustive, Vidyānanda goes on to determine the exact number of types and subtypes of probantia, and in this connection he has quoted a set of mnemonic *kārikās*<sup>147</sup> attributed to certain earlier teachers; thus Vidyānanda seems to suggest that in his present

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*sītasparso dhūmād iti / viruddhavyāptopalabdhir yathā na dhruvabhāvī bhūtasypāpi bhāvasya vināśo hetvantarāpekṣaṇāt / kāryaviruddhopalabdhir yathā nehāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni sītakāraṇāni santi agner iti / vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā nātra tuṣārasparśo 'gner iti / kāraṇānupalabdhir yathā nātra dhūmo 'gnyabhāvāt / kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhir yathā nāsyā romaharṣādiviśeṣāḥ sannihitadahanaśeṣatvād iti / kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā na romaharṣādiviśeṣayuktapuruṣavān ayaṃ pradeśo dhūmād iti /*—NBT, 2. 32-42.

145. PM, 3.57-59, 78, 86

146. 'virodhyabhūtaṃ bhūtasya / bhūtaṃ abhūtasya / bhūto 'bhūtasya'—VS, 3. 11.-13.

147. 'atra saṅgrahaślokaḥ – syāt kāryaṃ kāraṇavyāpyaṃ prākṣahottaracāri ca / liṅgaṃ tallakṣaṇavyāpter bhūtaṃ bhūtasya sādhakam // śoḍhā viruddhakāryādi sākṣaḥ evopavarṇitam / liṅgaṃ bhūtaṃ abhūtasya liṅgalakṣaṇayogataḥ // pārampariyāt tu kāryaṃ syāt kāraṇaṃ vyāpyam eva ca / saḥacāri ca nirdiṣṭaṃ pratyekaṃ tac caturvidham / kāraṇād dviṣṭhakāryādibhedenodāhṛtaṃ purā / yathā śoḍaśabhedam syāt dvāvīṃśatividham tataḥ // liṅgaṃ samuditam jñeyam anyathānupapattimat / tathā bhūtaṃ abhūtasypy ūhyam anyad apīdrśam // abhūtaṃ bhūtam unnītam

classification he has based himself not only on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* but also either on some Jaina logician like Akalaṅka and Māṇikyanandin or on some Buddhist logician.

Devasūri seems to have based his classification on that of *Parīkṣāmukha*, but he has introduced the following changes :

While according to *Parīkṣāmukha* six types of cognition (3. 59) and three types of non-cognition (3. 86) enable us to infer positive entities, according to *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* six types of cognition (3. 64) and five types of non-cognition (3.99) do the same; again, while according to *Parīkṣāmukha*, six types of cognition (3. 71) and seven types of non-cognition (3.78) enable us to infer absences, according to *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*, seven types of cognition (3.79) and seven types of non-cognition (3.90) do the same.

Like Vidyānanda, Āc. Hemacandra bases his classification on both *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and *Nyāyabindu*, but in one respect he differs from the former. Āc. Hemacandra does not treat a non-cognition as capable of enabling us to infer positive entities, that is to say, he accepts the *Nyāyabindu* position that a non-cognition enables us to infer only absences. However, these various classifications, even though they somehow differ from one another and even though the resulting number of the types and subtypes of probantia is different in different cases, do not differ as to their essentials. Vācaspatimiśra (*Tātp.*, pp. 158-64) has refuted not only the classification accepted by the Buddhists but also the one accepted in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*.

(PMT on *sūtra* 1.2.12, pp. 83-85)

### 23. WHETHER EFFECT ALONE OR CAUSE ALSO IS A PROPER PROBANS AND SOME ALLIED PROBLEMS

All logicians are agreed that an effect is a proper probans (for inferring the cause concerned) (*kāryaliṅgaka anumāna*), but they differ as to whether a cause is a proper probans (for inferring the effect concerned) (*kāraṇaliṅgaka*

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*bhūtasyānekadhā budhaiḥ / tathā 'bhūtam abhūtasya yathāyogyam udāharet //*  
*bahudhāpy evam ākhyātaṁ saṅkṣepaṇa caturvidham / atisaṅkṣepato dvedhopalambhā-*  
*nupalambhabhṛt //* PPar, pp. 74-75.

*anumāna*). Buddhist logicians – particularly Dharmakīrti – nowhere concede the possibility of an inference-with-a-cause-as-probans (*kāraṇaliṅgaka anumāna*), but the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas have always been of the view that such an inference is possible. Āc. Hemacandra, following in the footsteps of the earlier Jaina logicians, defends, with a good amount of fanfare, the possibility of an inference-with-a-cause-as-probans. By means of the epithet “*Nyāyavādin*” Āc. Hemacandra here refers to Dharmakīrti, and though he refutes the view upheld by the latter he has great regard for him, a regard expressed through the phrase “even by so subtle an observer (*sūkṣmadarsīnāpi*) (as *Nyāyavādin*).”

As to the possibility of an inference-with-an-effect-as-probans (*kāryaliṅgaka anumāna*), there is no difference of opinion. But there is difference of opinion as to the admissibility of certain instances of it. Thus the proposed inference “A living body possesses an *ātman*, because it possesses life etc.” (*jīvaccharīraṃ sātmakaṃ prāṇādīmativāt*) is treated by Buddhists not as a valid inference (*sadanumāna*) but as an invalid one (*mithyānumāna*); that is why “life etc.” (occurring as probans in the inference in question) is quoted by them as a case of pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*) (NB, 3.99). Unlike other philosophers, Buddhists do not believe in an eternal *ātman* residing in a living body; hence in their eyes it is not valid to infer the existence of *ātman* from the existence of life etc. On the other hand, philosophers like Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Jainas etc., that is, all those philosophers who believe in the existence of a separate (and eternal) *ātman*, are of the view that it is valid to infer the existence of *ātman* from the existence of life etc. Hence it is that philosophers believing in the existence of *ātman* do not consider “*sapakṣavṛttitva*” (i.e. presence in a homologue) to be an indispensable aspect of the nature (*anivārya rūpa*) of a valid probans. Thus according to these philosophers, a probans, which is just absent from all heterologues (*kevalavyatirekin*) is a valid probans – irrespective of whether it is or is not also present in a homologue; on this understanding, life etc. become a valid probans for inferring *ātman*.<sup>148</sup> This

148. ‘*kevalavyatirekiṇaṃ tv idṛśaṃ ātmādīprasādhane paramaṃ astraṃ upekṣitum na śaknuma ity ayathābhāṣyam api vyākhyānaṃ śreyah*’ /-NM, p. 578; *Tātp.*, p. 283; *Kand.*, p. 204.

position has been defended in great details by the Naiyāyikas and Jaina logicians alike.

Āc. Hemacandra follows the same procedure and argues that since a probans can possibly remain a valid probans even in the absence of “presence in a homologue” “presence in a homologue” is not an (indispensable) aspect of the nature of a (valid) probans. Thus while refuting the Buddhist thesis – particularly as presented by Dharmakīrti – that doubt as to whether a proposed probans is or is not present in a homologue (*anvayasandeha*) makes this probans a pseudo-probans of the *anaikāntika* type, Āc. Hemacandra says that pseudo-probantia of both the *anaikāntika* and *viruddha* types are due only to “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues” (*vyatirekābhāva*) (i.e. neither is due to “absence of presence-in-a-homologue” (*anvayābhāva*)). In *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti has maintained that a pseudo-probans of the *anaikāntika* type may be due either to “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues” (*vyatirekābhāva*) or to “doubt as to presence-in-a-homologue” (*anvayasandeha*),<sup>149</sup> a position Āc. Hemacandra seeks to refute. But contrary to what Āc. Hemacandra tells us, Dharmakīrti nowhere maintains that pseudo-probantia of both the *anaikāntika* and *viruddha* types and of the *anaikāntika* type in both its subspecies are due only to “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues.” Thus Āc. Hemacandra’s contention “*Nyāyavādināpi vyatirekābhāvād eva hetvābhāsāv uktau*” stands contradicted. Under these conditions, until we come across a passage in Dharmakīrti which corroborates Āc. Hemacandra’s report, we are forced to stretch a bit the meaning of the Ācārya’s words and make them to mean : ‘Even though *Nyāyavādin* too recognizes the two types of pseudo-probantia, what the two are due to is “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues” as is admitted by us Jains, that is to say, both these types of pseudo-probantia ought to be regarded as being due to “absence of absence-in-all-heterologues” about which there is no dispute among the logicians and neither should be regarded as being due to “doubt as to presence-in-a-homologue” (about which there is a difference of opinion).’

In this connection let us make one point clear. While defending their thesis on the threefold nature of a probans, the Buddhists treat “presence-in-a-homologue” as one of the three aspects of the nature of a probans, for

149. ‘*anayor eva dvayo rūpayoḥ sandehe 'naikāntikaḥ /-NB, 3.98.*

they think that you cannot say "this probans is absent from all heterologues" unless you at the same time say "this probans is present only in homologues". Thus on their showing, it is only on account of "presence-in-homologues" that "absence-in-all-heterologues" can be ascertained, be the heterologue concerned with something real (*vastu*) or imaginary (*avastu*); hence in case it is impossible to speak of "presence-in-a homologue" it is equally impossible to speak of "absence-in-all-heterologues". But even while "presence-in-a-homologue" and "absence-in-all-heterologues" are so closely dependent on one another they are, according to Buddhists, mutually different; hence it is that they lay equal emphasis on the two. This, however, is not the view accepted in the Jaina tradition; for according to this tradition, the essential nature of a probans consists in "absence-in-all-heterologues" (*vipakṣavyāvṛtti*), of which nature '*anvaya*' and '*vyatireka*' are but two names. Following this line of thought, Āc. Hemacandra finally submits that if *anvaya* means "presence only in the homologues" (*sapakṣe eva sattvam*) it is but another name for *vyatireka* which the Jaina describes as "inexplicability otherwise" (*anyathānupapatti*) (i.e. absence unless the probandum is present). In short, what the Buddhist logicians view as two different though mutually dependent aspects of the nature of a probans, the Jaina logicians view as but (the negative aspect) 'inexplicability otherwise' or 'absence-in-all-heterologues', thus ignoring the positive aspect (viz. 'presence-in-homologues').

(PMT on '*sūkṣmadarsīnāpi*' in 1.2.42 and also on '*tathā cetanāni vinā*' in 1.2.46, pp. 85-87)

## 24. THE NATURE OF PAKṢA

In connection with *pakṣa*, four questions deserve consideration : (1) What is the definition – i.e. essence – of *pakṣa*? (2) What do the different adjectives occurring in the definition seek to exclude from the purview of this definition? (3) What are the forms (*ākāra*) of *pakṣa*? and (4) What are the types (*prakāra*) of *pakṣa*?

(1) In the field of speculation it was almost established long since as to what the nature of *pakṣa* is, but a clear picture of the concept was offered by Praśastapāda in the course of his definition of *pratijñā* (i. e.

thesis sought to be established through inference).<sup>150</sup>

In *Nyāyapraveśa*<sup>151</sup> and *Nyāyabindu*<sup>152</sup> the language of the definition was so much well established that all subsequent Jaina logicians — Śvetāmbara and Digambara — have adopted in their texts the Buddhist definition without any variation whatsoever and in those very words (or their verbal equivalents).

(2) The three adjectives – viz. desired (*iṣṭa*), hitherto unestablished (*asiddha*), and uncontradicted (*abādhitā*) – have not been, all of them, interpreted either in *Praśastapāda* or in *Nyāyapraveśa*, but these texts clearly state as to what the word ‘*abādhitā*’ (i.e. uncontradicted) seeks to exclude from the purview of the definition in question.<sup>153</sup> *Nyāyabindu* does the same for all the three adjectives.<sup>154</sup> The Jaina texts, likewise, tell us as

150. ‘*pratipipādayiṣṭadharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇo ’padeśaviṣayam āpādayitum uddeśamātram pratijñā.... avirodhigrahaṇāt pratyakṣānumānābhyupagatasvaśāstrasvavacanavirodhino nirastā bhavanti / Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 234.

151. ‘*tatra pakṣaḥ prasiddho dharmī prasiddhaviśeṣeṇa viśiṣṭatayā svayam sādhyatvenepsita / pratyakṣādyaviruddha iti vākyaśeṣaḥ / tadyathā nityaḥ śabdo ’nityo veti /—Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 1.

152. ‘*svarūpeṇaiva svayam iṣṭo ’nirākṛtaḥ pakṣa iti /—NB*, 3. 40.

153. ‘*yathā ’nuṣṇo ’gnir iti pratyakṣavirodhī, ghanam aṃbaram iti anumānavirodhī, Brāhmaṇeṇa surā peyety āgamavirodhī, Vaiśeṣikasya satkāryam iti bruvataḥ svaśāstravirodhī, na śabdo ’rthapratyāyaka iti svavacanavirodhī.*—*Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 234; ‘*sādhayitum iṣṭo ’pi pratyakṣādiviruddhaḥ pakṣābhāsaḥ / tadyathā — pratyakṣaviruddhaḥ, anumānaviruddhaḥ, āgamaviruddhaḥ, lokaviruddhaḥ, svavacanaviruddhaḥ, aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇaḥ, aprasiddhaviśeṣyaḥ, aprasiddhobhayaḥ, aprasiddhasambandhaś ceti /—Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 2.

154. ‘*svarūpeṇeti sādhyatvenēṣṭaḥ / svarūpeṇaiveti sādhyatvenēṣṭo na sādhanatvenāpi / yathā śabdasyānityatve sādhye cākṣuṣatvaṃ hetuḥ, śabde ’siddhatvāt sādhyam, na punas tad iha sādhyatvenēṣṭam sādhanatvenāpy abhidhānāt / svayam iti vādinā / yas tadā sādhanam āha / etena yady api kvacic chāstre sthitaḥ sādhanam āha, tac chāstrakāreṇa tasmin dharmiṇy anekadharmābhyupagame ’pi, yas tadā tena vādinā, dharmāḥ svayam sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ sa eva sādhyo netara ity uktaṃ bhavati / iṣṭa iti yatrārthe vivādena sādhanam upanyastam tasya siddhim icchatā so ’nukto ’pi vacanena sādhyāḥ / tadadhikaraṇatvād vivādasya / yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātātvac chayanāsanādivad iti, atrātmārthā ity anuktāv apy ātmārthatā sādhyā, anena noktamātram eva sādhyam ity uktaṃ bhavati / anirākṛta iti etallakṣaṇayoge ’pi yaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭo ’py arthaḥ pratyakṣānumānapratītiḥsvavacanair nirākṛiyate na sa pakṣa iti pradarśanārtham /—NBT*, 3. 41-50.



to what these three words seek to exclude from the purview of the definition. The only difference is that while Māṇikyanandin (*PM*, 3.20) and Devasūri (*PNT*, 3.14-17) mention all the three adjectives in the aphorism itself, Āc. Hemacandra mentions *abādhitatva* in the aphorism and the remaining two in the Commentary. Praśastapāda has enumerated the following five types of contradicted theses (*bādhita pakṣa*) : (i) that which goes against a perception (*pratyakṣa-viruddha*), (ii) that which goes against an inference (*anumāna-viruddha*), (iii) that which goes against Scriptures (*āgama-viruddha*), (iv) that which goes against one's own system of philosophy (*svaśāstra-viruddha*), and (v) that which goes against one's own utterance (*svavacana-viruddha*). *Nyāyapraveśa* too speaks of the five types of contradicted theses, but it replaces “*svaśāstra-viruddha*” by “*loka-viruddha*” (i.e. that which goes against the established social convention). In *Nyāyabindu* there occurs neither the adjective “*āgama-viruddha*” nor “*loka-viruddha*” and the two are replaced by “*pratīti-viruddha*” (i.e. that which goes against the established convention concerning the meaning of a word); thus *Nyāyabindu* admits, in all, four types of contradicted theses, viz. *pratyakṣa-viruddha*, *anumāna-viruddha*, *svavacana-viruddha*, and *pratīti-viruddha*. It seems that Dharmakīrti has eliminated the adjective “*āgama-viruddha*” keeping in view the fact that the Buddhist tradition does not recognize ‘*āgama*’ (i.e. Scriptures) as a *pramāṇa*. On this question, Māṇikyanandin has followed not *Nyāyabindu* but *Nyāyapraveśa* whose fivefold classification has been accepted also by Devasūri. However, even while following *Nyāyapraveśa* and Māṇikyanandin, Devasūri inserted the word etc. “(*adi*)” in his aphorism (*PNT*, 6.40), an insertion which enabled him to speak in *Ratnākara* of two additional types of contradicted theses, viz. *smaraṇa-viruddha* (i.e. that which goes against memory) and *tarka-viruddha* (i.e. that which goes against *tarka* as understood in Jaina Logic). Āc. Hemacandra accepts in his aphorism the adjective ‘*pratīti-viruddha*’ occurring in *Nyāyabindu* and the remaining five occurring in *Nyāyapraveśa* and Māṇikyanandin, thus making the total six. Māṭhara – who is probably older than *Nyāyapraveśa* – says (*k.5*) that pseudo-*pakṣas* (*pakṣābhāsa*) are of nine types but he gives no instances of these types while *Nyāyapraveśa* mentions and illustrates the nine types of pseudo-*pakṣas*.

(3) Āc. Hemacandra informs us – as was already done by Māṇikyanandin (*PM*, 3. 25, 26, 32) and Devasūri (3.16-18) – that *pakṣa* is of two possible forms (*ākāra*), viz. the object possessing the characteristic-acting-as-probandum (*sādhya dharmaviśiṣṭa dharmin*) and merely the characteristic-acting-as-probandum (*sādhya dharmamātra*). In his aphorism (2.8) Dharmakīrti speaks of just one form of *pakṣa*, but Dharmottara, in his commentary on this aphorism, enumerates three forms, viz. merely the object (denoted by the subject of the thesis concerned) (*kevala dharmin*), merely the characteristic-acting-as-probandum (*kevala dharma*), and a combination of the object and the characteristic-acting-as-probandum (*dharma-dharmi-samudāya*). Dharmottara also describes as to what are the different occasions for employing these three different forms of *pakṣa*, a description which is unprecedented (*apūrva*). Vātsyāyana (*NBh*, 1.1.36) no doubt speaks of “object possessing the characteristic” (*dharma viśiṣṭa dharmin*) and “characteristic possessed by the object” (*dharma viśiṣṭa dharma*) as two possible forms of *pakṣa* but no text earlier than Dharmottara’s commentary in question, details the different occasions when the different forms of *pakṣa* are to be employed. Dharmottara’s present account was incorporated by Māṇikyanandin – and later on by Devasūri – in the aphorism itself. Āc. Hemacandra follows these two earlier teachers, but incorporates the account in question in the Commentary rather than aphorism. (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1.2.13-17).

(4) Like other Jaina logicians Āc. Hemacandra accepts three types of *pakṣa* (understood as the object denoted by the subject of the thesis concerned), viz. that which is established through a *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-siddha*), that which is imagined (*vikalpa-siddha*),<sup>155</sup> and that which is partly established through a *pramāṇa* and partly imagined (*ubhaya-siddha*). There is no difference of opinion about the first type, but there is no unanimity about the remaining two. So far as our information goes, Dharmakīrti seems to be the first logician to have raised objection against the imagined and the partly imagined *pakṣas*. It cannot be said with certainty as to whether Dharmakīrti’s objection was directed against the Mīmāṃsaka or against the Jaina or against both. But one thing is certain. The detailed

155. By “imagined *pakṣa*” is meant *pakṣa* whose claim for reality is under dispute.–Tr.

answer to Dharmakīrti's objection is to be found in Jaina texts on Logic and nowhere else, and in the course of their answer all these texts quote that verse (PV, 1.192) from Dharmakīrti where the objection in question is set forth.

It was physically impossible for Āc. Hemacandra to incorporate in his discussion that final and subtlest account of *pakṣatā* which was offered by Gaṅgeśa, the author of *Maṇi (Maṇikāra)*; <sup>156</sup> but a comparative study of the various old and new definitions of *pakṣa* certainly justifies the assertion that the refined concept of Gaṅgeśa is present – even though in an old terminology and in an old fashion – in all the Nyāya, Buddhist, and Jaina texts of the earlier period.

(PMT on *sūtras* 1.2.13-17, pp. 87-90)

## 25. NATURE OF DRṢṬĀNTA

In connection with *drṣṭānta* the following questions deserve consideration : 1. Is it a part and parcel of inference (*anumānāṅgatva*) ? 2. What is its definition (*lakṣaṇa*) ? and 3. What is the occasion for its use (*upayoga*) ?

1. Dharmakīrti includes *drṣṭānta* (i.e. the offering of an instance by way of illustrating the concerned relation of invariable concomitance) in the process called “pointing out the three aspects of the nature of the probans” (*hetutairūpya-kathana*) – a process also known as “substantiation of the probans” (*hetu-samarthana*). Hence insofar as *drṣṭānta* is a part and parcel of “*hetusamarthana*” it is a part and parcel of inference (*hetusamarthana* being a part and parcel of inference); however, it is so only for a novice (*avidvān*) while experts (*vidvān*) do not require a *drṣṭānta* because they do not at all require *hetusamarthana*, which, in turn, is because they follow the inference as soon as the probans is merely stated (PV, 1.28). Thus *drṣṭānta* is not a part and parcel of inference for experts (though it is so for a novice). Now Māṇikyanandin (3.37-42), Devasūri (PNT, 3. 28, 34-38), and Āc.

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156. *ucyate – śiṣādhayaṣāvirahasahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo yatrāsti sa pakṣaḥ, tena śiṣādhayaṣāvirahasahakṛtaṁ sādhakapramāṇam yatrāsti sa na pakṣaḥ, yatra sādhakapramāṇe saty asati vā śiṣādhayaṣā yatra vobhayābhāvas tatra viśiṣṭābhāvāt pakṣatvam / – Anumānagādādhārī*, pp. 431-32.

Hemacandra (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 1.2.18) are all of the view that *dr̥ṣṭānta* is not a part of inference, and they have urged various difficulties against its being regarded as useful in an inference; however, at the same time, they all concede (*PNT*, 3.42; *PM*, 3.46) that *dr̥ṣṭānta* serves as a reminder-of-the-*vyāpti* (*vyāpti-smāraka*) for the dull-witted disciples to whom an inference is being offered. Hence the question arises as to what these teachers mean when they deny that *dr̥ṣṭānta* is a part of inference. And the only possible answer is that they merely seek to suggest that *dr̥ṣṭānta* is not a part of all inference whatsoever (that is to say, they do not seek to suggest that *dr̥ṣṭānta* is not a part of any inference whatsoever). It is this idea that Siddhasena briefly expresses (*NA*, 20). Thus on reflection there appears to be no material difference between the Buddhist and Jaina stands on the question.

2. A general definition of *dr̥ṣṭānta* is given in *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.25) but in no Buddhist text. Māṇikyanandin too, like Siddhasena, offered no general definition of *dr̥ṣṭānta*, but Devasūri (*PNT*, 3.40) and Āc. Hemacandra do so. The Nyāya definition of *dr̥ṣṭānta* is so wide that it applies even to the dealings of a general type (*sāmānya vyavahāra*) and not to inference alone; on the other hand, the Jaina definition of *dr̥ṣṭānta* applies only to the cases of inference. The twofold classification of *dr̥ṣṭāntas* into those based on similarity (*sādharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*) and those based on dissimilarity (*vaidharmya-dr̥ṣṭānta*) – along with a definition of each of these classes – is to be found in an identical form in the old texts like *Nyāyapraveśa* (pp. 1,2) and *Nyāyāvatāra* (ks. 17, 18) and the later texts like *Parīkṣāmukha* (3. 47 ff.) and *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* (3. 41).

3. As to the occasion for the use of *dr̥ṣṭānta*, the Jaina stand is not absolutistic (*aikāntika*). For Jaina logicians are of the view that in the case of inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) *dr̥ṣṭānta* is of use only when the hearer is a non-expert (*avyutpanna*) while in the case of inference-for-oneself (*svārthānumāna*) it is of use only when the cognizer concerned had forgotten the *vyāpti* and needs a reminder (*SVR*, 3.42).

(*PMT* on *sūtras* 1.2. 18-23, pp. 90-91)

## 26. THE NATURE OF PSEUDO-PROBANS (*hetvābhāsa*)

[1]

As to the general classification of pseudo-probantia logicians hold divergent views. Akṣapāda<sup>157</sup> admits and gives an account of five types of pseudo-probantia. Kaṇāda's aphorism<sup>158</sup> makes clear mention of three types, but Praśastapāda,<sup>159</sup> while laying bare the idea underlying this aphorism, makes a fourfold classification. *Asiddha*, *viruddha*, and *anaikāntika* are the types included also among the five admitted by Akṣapāda, but *anadhyavasita* – the fourth type recognized by Praśastapāda — is not to be found in *Nyāyasūtra*. Bhāsarvajña,<sup>160</sup> who follows both Akṣapāda and Kaṇāda enumerates six types which constitute a set consisting all the types accepted by the old Nyāya tradition as also all those accepted by the old Vaiśeṣika tradition.

*Nyāyapraveśa*<sup>161</sup> – a text attributed to Dinnāga – makes mention of just three types of pseudo-probantia, viz *asiddha*, *viruddha*, and *anaikāntika*, a position endorsed and elucidated by all subsequent Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti etc. The old Sāṅkhya teacher Māṭhara,<sup>162</sup> too, makes express mention of these very three types. On the question of the number of types of pseudo-probantia Sāṅkhya and Kaṇāda seem to have followed an identical tradition.

The Jaina tradition in fact admits just three types of pseudo-probantia – as do the traditions of Kaṇāda, Sāṅkhya, and Buddhists. Thus Siddhasena<sup>163</sup> and Vādideva (*PNT*, 6. 47) give an account of all the three types, viz. *asiddha* etc., and Āc. Hemacandra follows their example. Āc. Hemacandra refutes the two additional types, viz. *kālātīta* and *prakaraṇasama*, recognized in *Nyāyasūtra*, but he does not refute the additional type,

157. NS, 1. 2. 4.

158. 'aprasiddho 'napadeśo 'san sandigdhas cānapadeśaḥ /'-VS, 3. 1. 15.

159. 'etenāsiddhviruddhasandigdhanadhyavasitavacanānām anapadeśatvam uktaṃ bhavati /'-Praśastapāda., p. 238.

160. 'asiddhviruddhānaikāntikānadhavasitakālātyayāpadiṣṭaprakaraṇasamāḥ /'-NSa, p. 7.

161. 'asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhā hetvābhāsāḥ /'-Nyāyapraveśa, p. 3.

162. 'anye hetvābhāsāḥ caturdaśa asiddhānaikāntikaviruddhādayaḥ /'-Māṭharavṛtti, 5.

163. 'asiddhas tv apratīto yo yo 'nyathaivopapadyate / viruddho yo 'nyathāpy atra yukto 'naikāntikaḥ sa tu /'-NA, k. 23.

viz. *anadhyavasita*, recognized by Praśastapāda and Bhāsarvajña. On this point there is a divergence of opinion in the Jaina tradition, and it is as follows. Akalaṅka and the Digambara logicians like Māṇikyanandin etc. who follow him admit four types of pseudo-probantia,<sup>164</sup> of which three are those *asiddha* etc. and the fourth a new type called '*akiñcitkara*', a type mentioned nowhere else. But here we should recall that Jayanta<sup>165</sup> has mentioned a *prima facie* view according to which "*aprayojaka*" (also called "*anyathāsiddha*") is an additional type of pseudo-probans, and the view seems to be older than Jayanta. "*Aprayojaka*" and "*akiñcitkara*" are no doubt two different words, but it appears as if their meaning is the same. However, *aprayojaka* as explained by Jayanta is quite different from *akiñcitkara* as explained by Prabhācandra,<sup>166</sup> the follower of Māṇikyanandin; it is therefore not easy to say that '*aprayojaka*' and '*akiñcitkara*' are the expressions of a basically identical idea. Even then one question arises : When no earlier text on Logic – either Buddhist or Jaina – even mentions '*akiñcitkara*' where does Akalaṅka bring it from ? The possibility is that it was on the basis of some older text on Logic which accepted *aprayojaka* or *anyathāsiddha* as an additional type of pseudo-probans that Akalaṅka proposed, in his own fashion, an altogether new type of pseudo-probans called '*akiñcitkara*'. A refutation of this type called "*akiñcitkara*" occurs only in Vādidevasūri's autocommentary on his aphorism (SVR, p. 1230).

Now these various traditions as to the number of the types of pseudo-probantia differ from one another only on the question of their number and not on that of the essence of a pseudo-probans. Thus if one tradition gives a particular name to the probantia suffering from a

164. '*asiddhas cākṣuṣatvādih śabdānityatvasādhane / anyathāsambhavābhāvabhedāt sa bahudhā smṛtaḥ // viruddhāsiddhasandigdhair akiñcitkaravistaraiḥ //*'-Nyāyaviniścaya, 2. 195-96; PM, 6. 21.

165. '*anye tu anyathāsiddhatvaṃ nāma tadbhedam udāharanti yasya hetor dharminī vṛttir bhavanti api sādhyadharmaprayuktā na bhavati so 'nyathāsiddho, yathā anityā manahparamāṇavo mūrtatvād ghaṭavad iti... sa cātra prayojyaprayojakabhāvo nāstīty ata evāyam anyathāsiddho 'prayojaka iti kathyate / katham punar asyāprayojakatvam avagatam ?*'-NM, p. 607.

166. '*siddhe nirñāte pramāṇāntarāt sādhye pratyakṣādibādhite ca hetur na kiñcitkaroti iti akiñcitkaro 'narthakaḥ /*' PKM, p. 193A.

particular type of defect and if another tradition is convinced that these probantia are really defective, this latter tradition will not refuse to treat the inferences concerned as cases of invalid inference; all that it might possibly do is that it will either include these cases under another type (or subtype) of pseudo-probantia recognized by itself, or it will treat them as cases of pseudo-pakṣa etc. (rather than those of pseudo-probans).

Āc. Hemacandra points out (*Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*, 2.1.16) the impropriety of the employment of the word “*hetvābhāsa*” but defends its employment in the sense of “*sādhanābhāsa*”.<sup>167</sup> He thus kills two birds in one shot, for while seeing the wisdom of following the older teachers he at the same time points out a mistake committed by these teachers. The same sort of wisdom was displayed by Māṇikyanandin. Again, Āc. Hemacandra gave an account of the type called ‘*akiñcitkara*’ which Akalaṅka – whom he held in esteem – had accepted, but when he saw no reason for treating it as an independent type he composed an aphorism that would lend support to the type in question but would at the same time indicate the impropriety of treating it as an independent type. (*lakṣaṇa evāsau doṣo vyutpanna-prayogasya pakṣadoṣeṇaiva duṣṭatvāt*’ (*PM*, 6. 39).

## [2]

### I. ASIDDHA HETVĀBHĀSA

In *Nyāyasūtra* (1.2.8) the name for ‘*asiddha*’ is “*sādhyasama*”. And *Nyāyasūtra* differs from other texts not only on the question of name but also in some other respect. Thus while other texts give an account of a greater or fewer number of subtypes of *asiddha*, *Nyāyasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya* rest content simply with a definition of *asiddha* in general.

Praśastapāda and *Nyāyapraveśa* give a clear – and almost similar — account of four subtypes of *asiddha*.<sup>168</sup> Māṭhara (*k.* 5) too speaks of four

167. There is a subtle distinction involved here. “*Sādhana*” stands for the thing acting as probans, while “*hetu*” for the word expressing this thing. And it is Āc. Hemacandra’s contention that a defective probans is in fact a *sādhanābhāsa* rather than *hetvābhāsa*. Tr.

168. ‘*ubhayāsiddho ’nyatarāsiddhaḥ tadbhāvāsiddho ’numeyāsiddhaś ceti*’ /—*Praśastapāda.*, p. 238; ‘*ubhayāsiddho ’nyatarāsiddhaḥ sandigdhasiddhaḥ āśrayāsiddhaś ceti*’ /—*Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 3.

subtypes of *asiddha*, and he probably had in mind these very four subtypes. Dharmakīrti, in *Nyāyabindu*, describes the four subtypes accepted by Praśastapāda etc., but, instead of following Praśastapāda and *Nyāyapraveśa* in quoting just one instance of *āśrayāsiddha*, he quotes two instances thereof, thus further classifying into two the fourth subtype (viz. *āśrayāsiddha*). Really speaking, Dharmakīrti's description is but a slightly amended version of the account given in Praśastapāda and *Nyāyapraveśa* (NB, 3. 58-67).

*Nyāyasāra* (p. 8) mentions and illustrates fourteen subtypes of *asiddha*, and *Nyāyamañjarī* (p. 606) formulates a number of subtypes in a similar fashion. In his account of *asiddha* Māṇikyanandin (PM, 6. 22-28) simply follows Dharmakīrti, though he changes the latter's terminology. In his commentary *Mārtaṇḍa* (p. 191A) on *Parīkṣāmukha*, Prabhācandra mentions and illustrates a number of such subtypes of *asiddha* as do not occur in the original aphorism, but all of these are taken from *Nyāyasāra*. Āc. Hemacandra's aphorism on *asiddha* follows *Nyāyabindu* and *Parīkṣāmukha*, and his series of illustrations literally follows *Nyāyasāra*. Vādideva's general definition of *asiddha* (PNT, 6.49), since it does not follow Dharmakīrti and *Parīkṣāmukha* literally, appears to be more refined than that of Āc. Hemacandra. The series of illustrations given in the commentary *Ratnākarāvatārikā* on Vādideva's aphorisms in question is a literal collection of the illustrations occurring in *Nyāyasāra* and *Nyāyamañjarī*; however in some of these illustrations the arrangement (*vastuvinyāsa*) is Vādideva's own.

## II. VIRUDDHA HETVĀBHĀSA

Just as Praśastapāda contains only a general account of *viruddha* and does not divide it into subtypes, so also do *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Bhāṣya* thereon. But in spite of this much similarity, the fact remains that the account and illustrations given in Praśastapāda are clearly different from those given in *Nyāyasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya*.<sup>169</sup> It appears that on the question

169. 'siddhāntam abhyupetya tadvirodhī viruddhaḥ /-NS, 1. 2. 6; 'yathā so 'yam vikāro vyakter apaiti nityatvapratīṣedhāt, apeto 'py asti vināśapratīṣedhāt, na nityo vikāro upapadyate ity evaṃ hetuḥ - "vyakter apeto 'pi vikāro 'sti" ity anena svasiddhāntena



of *viruddha*, *Prāśastapāda* and *Nyāyasūtra* do not follow one common tradition.

*Nyāyapraveśa* (p.5) mentions and illustrates four subtypes of *viruddha*, and *Māthara* (k. 5) seems to accept these very four. *Nyāyabindu* (3. 83-88) exhausts its division of *viruddha* in just two illustrations; afterwards (3. 89-94), it seeks to remove the doubt that “*iṣṭavighātakṛt*” might possibly be an additional, i.e. third, subtype of *viruddha*, and this it does by showing that the alleged cases of “*iṣṭavighātakṛt*” are covered by the two subtypes already recognized. The name ‘*iṣṭavighātakṛt*’ does not occur in *Nyāyapraveśa*, but the instance quoted in *Nyāyabindu* (3.90) as illustrating it does occur there (p.5). It appears that the subtype of *viruddha* which in *Nyāyapraveśa* is illustrated by “*parārthāḥ cakṣurādayaḥ*” and which is there called ‘*dharmaviśeṣaviruddha*’ was given the name ‘*iṣṭavighātakṛt*’ by certain circles; it is this latter convention that Dharmakīrti takes note of while seeking to bring the subtype in question under other subtypes. Jayanta (NM, pp. 600-1) in the course of commenting on Gautama’s aphorism clearly refutes a view which subdivides *viruddha* into *dharmaviśeṣaviruddha* and *dharmiviśeṣaviruddha*, a refutation which seems to be directed against that tradition of *Nyāyapraveśa*. The most exhaustive and most complicated subdivision of *viruddha* occurs in *Nyāyasāra* (p. 9); there we get eight subtypes, four covering the cases where a homologue exists and four covering those where no homologue exists, and these very eight subtypes (along with their respective illustrations) which occur in *Nyāyasāra* also occur in the commentary on *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* (PNT, 652-53). In the commentary *Mārtaṇḍa* on *Parīkṣāmukha* (p. 192A), again, there occur these very eight subtypes recognized in *Nyāyasāra*, but the illustrations given here are in some cases slightly different. Āc. Hemacandra, following the practice adopted in the commentary on *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*, literally adopted the account of the subtypes in question (along with their

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*virudhyate / yad asti na tad ātmalābhāt pracyavate, astitvaṃ cātmalābhāt pracyutir iti viruddhāv etau dharmau na saha sambhavata iti / so 'yaṃ hetur yaṃ siddhāntam āśritya pravartate tam eva vyāhanti iti / NBh, 1.2.6; 'yo hy anumeye 'vidyamāno 'pi tatsamānajātīye sarvasmin nāsti tadviparīte cāsti sa viparīta-sāadhanād viruddhaḥ yathā yasmād viśāṇī tasmād aśva iti.'-Prāśastapāda., p. 238.*

respective illustrations) as given in *Nyāyasāra*. He is also convinced by the arguments – offered in *Nyāyamañjarī* and *Nyāyasāra* – in support of the position that four of these subtypes fall under *viruddha* as well as *asiddha*.

### III. ANAIKĀNTIKA HETVĀBHĀSA

About the name of that type of pseudo-probans which later on came to be known as '*anaikāntika*' there are two old traditions, one that of Gautama and the other that of Kaṇāda. What Gautama in his *Nyāya* aphorism (1.2.5) calls '*savyabhicāra*' Kaṇāda in his *Vaiśeṣika* aphorism (3.1.15) calls '*sandigdha*'. That this difference in nomenclature is somewhat significant becomes clear from later commentaries. This is how matters stand. According to one (i.e. Gautama's) tradition the '*anaikāntikatā*' (i.e. *anaikāntika*-ship) of a pseudo-probans lies in its "coexistence with the probandum as well as with the absence of probandum" (*sādhya-tadabhāva-sahacaritatva*) and not in its giving rise to a doubt (*saṁśaya-janakatva*), while according to the other (i.e. Kaṇāda's) tradition, the '*anaikāntikatā*' of a pseudo-probans lies in its giving rise to a doubt and not in its "coexistence with the probandum as well as with the absence of probandum". This difference of opinion as to the determinant (*niyāmaka*) of *anaikāntikatā* results in a difference of opinion as to the illustrations (i.e. classification) of the *anaikāntika* type of pseudo-probantia. For example, in Gautama's tradition there can be no place for the subtypes "*asādhāraṇa*" and "*viruddhāvyabhicārin*", for a pseudo-probans belonging to either of these subtypes does not coexist with the absence of probandum. These two viewpoints which originally gave two significantly different names for the type of pseudo-probans in question, continued even in later times, but in all subsequent literature on Logic – be it Vedicist, Buddhist, or Jaina – the name that was adopted (for this type) was "*anaikāntika*" – a name originating in Gautama's tradition – while the name "*sandigdha*" proposed by Kaṇāda went completely out of use.

As for *Prāśastapāda* and *Nyāyapraveśa*, it has not yet been finally decided as to which of them is earlier; as a result, it is difficult to be certain as to which of them has influenced the other. However, one thing is worthy of note, and it is that *Prāśastapāda* and *Nyāyapraveśa* pursue an identical

line of thought but differ on the question of attaching relative importance to the various subtypes of the type in question. In *Nyāyapraveśa* the type in question is called “*anaikāntika*” – and not “*sandigdha*” (as it is in *Praśastapāda*), but the determinant of *anaikāntikatā* is, according to *Nyāyapraveśa* – as it is according to *Praśastapāda* – the generation of a doubt (on the part of a pseudo-probans) (*saṁśayajanakatva*). Thus while classifying the type *anaikāntika* into six subtypes, the author of *Nyāyapraveśa* makes it quite clear that ‘generation of a doubt’ is the common function of all these subtypes.<sup>170</sup> *Praśastapāda*, like *Nyāyapraveśa*, considers ‘generation of a doubt’ to be the determinant of *anaikāntikatā*, but he refuses to treat as cases of *sandigdha* two subtypes, viz. *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, recognized in *Nyāyapraveśa*; and his objection is based on the ground that the subtypes in question are generative of no doubt.<sup>171</sup> Until we are in possession of such a pre-*Praśastapāda* Vaiśeṣika text or a pre-*Praśastapāda* Buddhist text other than *Nyāyapraveśa* as maintains the position here criticised by *Praśastapāda*, we are, perhaps, justified in saying that *Praśastapāda* is here criticizing *Nyāyapraveśa*. In any case, it is quite certain that *Praśastapāda* has refused to treat *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* as subtypes of *sandigdha* or *anaikāntika*. But then arises the question : “Are *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* no pseudo-probantia ?”, and to this *Praśastapāda*’s answer is highly intelligent. For he says that *asādhāraṇa* is no doubt a pseudo-probans but that since it is generative of no doubt it is not a subtype of *anaikāntika* but an independent type called ‘*anadhyavasita*’; as for *viruddhāvyabhicārin*, he says that it should be treated either as a case of *anadhyavasita* (which is *Praśastapāda*’s equivalent for *asādhāraṇa*) or as a subtype of *viruddha* – (*ayaṁ tu viruddhabheda eva — Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 239). Thus even while

170. ‘*tatra sādharmaṇaḥ — śabdaḥ prameyatvān nitya iti / taddhi nityānityapakṣayoḥ sādharmaṇatvād anaikāntikam / kiṁ ghaṭavat prameyatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ āhosvid ākāśavat prameyatvān nitya iti /*’ etc. *Nyāyapraveśa*, p. 3.

171. ‘*asādhāraṇaḥ — śrāvaṇatvān nitya iti / taddhi nityānityapakṣābhyāṁ vyāvṛttatvān nityānityavinirmuktasya cānyasyāsambhavāt saṁśayahetuḥ kimbhūtasyāśya śrāvaṇatvam iti / ... viruddhāvyabhicārī yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat; nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavad iti / ubhayoḥ saṁśayahetutvāt dvāv apy etāv eko ’naikāntikaḥ samuditān eva /*’—*Nyāyapraveśa*, pp. 3, 4. ‘*ekasmiṁś ca dvayor hetvor*

refusing to grant that *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* are generative of a doubt, *Praśastapāda* does bring them under some type of pseudo-probans or other. In connection with this discussion two more points are noteworthy in *Praśastapāda* : firstly, that he posits an independent type of pseudo-probans in the form of *anadhyavasita*, and, secondly, that while entering into the controversy as to whether *viruddhāvyabhicārin* is or is not generative of a doubt he considers illustrations which do not occur in *Nyāyapraveśa*. As for the first point, it cannot be said with certainty whether the word '*anadhyavasita*' – absent in *Kaṇāda* – was first employed by *Praśastapāda* or was even earlier in vogue in the sense of an independent type of pseudo-probans. As for the second point, let us note that the illustration of *viruddhāvyabhicārin* given in *Nyāyapraveśa* is "*nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt, śabdatvavat; anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt, ghaṭavat*" (i. e. Word is eternal, because it is grasped through auditory perception, like word-ness; Word is transient, because it is a produced entity, like a jar), while the one given in *Praśastapāda* is "*manaḥ mūrtaṃ kriyāvattvāt; manaḥ amūrtaṃ asparśavattvāt*" (i.e. *Manas* is a *mūrta* entity, because it undertakes motion; *Manas* is an *amūrta* entity, because it is not grasped through touch). Now *Praśastapāda*'s illustration is certainly based on *Vaiśeṣika* (ontological) positions, but it is surprising that the illustration given in a Buddhist text like *Nyāyapraveśa* is based not on Buddhist (ontological) positions but on a position which is in a way Vedicist (not Buddhist); for Buddhist philosophers do not at all consider *śabdatva* (i.e. word-ness) to be an eternal universal (*jāti*) as do the Vedicist philosophers like *Vaiśeṣika* etc. Be that as it may, the controversy continued even in later times.

The master logician (*tārkikapravara*) *Dharmakīrti* based his investigation into pseudo-probontia on the Buddhist doctrine of the threefold nature of a probans (*hetutairūpya*),<sup>172</sup> a procedure not to be found in any

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*yathoktalakṣaṇayor viruddhayoḥ sannipāte sati saṃśayadarśanād ayam anyañ sandigdha iti kecit, yathā mūrtaṭvāmūrtaṭvaṃ prati manasaḥ kriyāvattvāsparsāvattvayor iti / nanv ayam asādhāraṇa evācāksuṣatvapratyakṣatvavat saṃhatayor anyatarapakṣa-sambhavāt tātaś cānadhyavasita iti vakṣyāmaḥ /- Praśastapāda., pp. 238, 239.*

172. '*tatra trayāṇāṃ rūpāṇāṃ ekasyāpi rūpasyānuktau sādhanābhāsaḥ / uktāv apy asiddhau sandeḥe tva pratipādyapratipādakayoḥ / ekasya rūpasya*' ...etc.–NBT, 3.57 ff.

Buddhist text of the earlier period. Dharmakīrti appears to have always had in his mind Praśastapāda's criticism on the question of *anaikāntika*. He defended *Nyāyapraveśa* by answering Praśastapāda's criticism. With Dharmakīrti the determinant of *anaikāntikatā* was *vyābhicāra* (i.e. coexistence of the probans with the probandum as well as with the absence of probandum) as it was with the author of *Nyāyasūtra*, but he also granted the position – exclusively maintained by Praśastapāda and *Nyāyapraveśa* – that 'generation of a doubt' is a determinant of *anaikāntikatā*. The *Nyāyapraveśa* position that *asādhāraṇa* is a subtype of *anaikāntika* was criticized by Praśastapāda on the ground that *asādhāraṇa* is generative of no doubt; Dharmakīrti answered this criticism by offering an illustration different from that given in *Nyāyapraveśa* and by pointing out that the probans in this (new) illustration is generative of a doubt, thus concluding that *asādhāraṇa* is a subtype of *anaikāntika*.<sup>173</sup> Dharmakīrti did not rest content with this much but made another attempt to redeem the prestige of the tradition of Dīnnāga whom he held in esteem. While accepting the argument advanced by Praśastapāda by way of criticizing *viruddhāvyābhicārin* Dharmakīrti met the criticism in question and defended *viruddhāvyābhicārin* – in such a manner that Praśastapāda was answered and Dīnnāga's honour saved. In the course of doing so, Dharmakīrti offered an illustration which is different from both that of *Nyāyapraveśa* and that of Praśastapāda, but since it is based on Vaiśeṣika (ontological) positions it cannot be unacceptable to Praśastapāda.<sup>174</sup> This prolonged discussion between the Buddhist and Vedicist logicians seems to have culminated in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*. Jayanta sided with the earlier teachers belonging

173. 'anayor eva dvayo rūpayoḥ sandehe 'naikāntikaḥ / yathā sātmaṇi jīvac charīraṇi prāṇādīmativād iti / ... ata evānvayavyatirekayoḥ sandehād anaikāntikaḥ / sādhyetarayor ato niścayābhāvāt / NBT, 3. 98-110.

174. 'viruddhāvyābhicāry api saṁśayahetur uktaḥ / sa iha kasmān noktaḥ / ...atrodāharaṇaṁ yat sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhir yugapad abhisambadhyate tat sarvagataṁ yathā "kāśaṁ, abhisambadhyate sarvadeśāvasthitaiḥ svasambandhibhir yugapat sāmānyam iti / ... dvitīyo 'pi prayogo yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṁ san nopalabhyate na tat tatrāsti / tadyathā kvacid avidyamāno ghaṭaḥ / nopalabhyate copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṁ sāmānyam vyaktyantarāleṣv iti / ayam anupalambhaprayogaḥ svabhāvas ca parasparaviruddhārthasāadhanād ekaṭra saṁśayaṁ janayataḥ / –NBT, 3. 112-121.

to his own camp and faced Nyāyapraveśa and Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu. He defended in great details Praśastapāda's view that *asādhāraṇa* and *viruddhāvyabhicārin* are no subtypes of *anaikāntika*, but he at the same time refuses to treat 'generation of a doubt' as the determinant of *anaikāntikatā* (a refusal that goes against Praśastapāda).<sup>175</sup>

Bhāsarvajña takes no note of the controversy going on between the Buddhist and Vedicist logicians, but simply offers eight illustrations (i.e. subtypes) of the type *anaikāntika* (NSa, p. 10). Again, he nowhere speaks of 'generation of a doubt' and seems to be a follower of Gautama's tradition.

In the Jaina tradition there occur both the names '*anaikāntika*' and '*sandigdha*'. Akalaṅka (*Nyāyaviniścaya*, 2.196) employs the word '*sandigdha*' while '*anaikāntika*' is the word employed by the other Jaina logicians like Siddhasena (NA, 23) etc. Māṇikyanandin's aphorism on *anaikāntika* – like Āc. Hemacandra's aphorism on the same – is in fact a miniature version (*saṅkṣipta pravicchāyā*) of the corresponding Nyāyabindu aphorism. In this connection, the wording of Vādideva's aphorism does not appear to be so refined as that of the aphorisms of Māṇikyanandin and Āc. Hemacandra; for the word "*sandihyate*" occurring in Vādideva's aphorism is redundant. Be that as it may, the procedure adopted by Prabhācandra, Vādideva, and Āc. Hemacandra is identical insofar as they all adopt in their respective works Bhāsarvajña's eightfold classification of the type *anaikāntika* and seek to bring the eight subtypes in question under *anaikāntika* as understood by themselves. The others have taken even their illustrations from Nyāyasāra, but Prabhācandra (PKM, p. 192) changes some of them.

Here we should remember that no Jaina teacher has taken up the question – discussed in Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika writings – as to whether 'generation of a doubt' or 'coexistence of the probans with the probandum as well as with the absence of probandum' is the determinant of *anaikāntikatā*.

(PMT on 2.1.34-47, pp. 96-103)

175. '*asādhāraṇaviruddhāvyabhicāriṇau tu na saṁsta eva hetvābhāsāv iti na vyākhyāyete / ... api ca saṁśayajananaṁ anaikāntikalakṣaṇaṁ ucyate cet kāmam asādhāraṇasya viruddhāvyabhicāriṇo vā yathā tathā saṁśayahetutām adhiropya kathyatām anaikāntikatā na tu saṁśayajanakatvaṁ tallakṣaṇam, ... api tu pakṣadvayavṛttitvaṁ anaikāntikalakṣaṇam.....*'-NM, pp. 598-99.

## 27. THE NATURE OF PSEUDO-DRṢṬĀNTA (drṣṭāntābhāsa)

In connection with inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) the nature of pseudo-probans (*hetvābhāsa*) has been discussed since very old time; thus a clear and detailed discussion on the subject occurs in *Kaṇādasūtra* (3.1.15) as well as *Nyāyasūtra* (1.2.4-9). But discussion on the nature of pseudo-*drṣṭānta* does not appear to be that much old; for had this discussion been as old as that on pseudo-probans it must have found at least some mention in *Kaṇādasūtra* or *Nyāyasūtra*. At any rate, it is clear that the concepts of pseudo-*drṣṭānta*, pseudo-*pakṣa*, etc. were formulated – and became topics for discussion – in later times after the analogy of the concept of pseudo-probans. Whether Vedicist or Buddhist logicians started discussion on these new concepts cannot be said with certainty.

In *Nyāyapraveśa* – attributed to Dinnāga – there are mentioned, in all, ten types of pseudo-*drṣṭāntas*, five types where illustration is grounded in a similarity (*sādharmya*), five where it is grounded in a dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*).<sup>176</sup> But since the type called '*ubhayāsiddha*' is there further classified into two subtypes, we there really have twelve types of pseudo-*drṣṭāntas*, six where illustration is grounded in a similarity, six where it is grounded in a dissimilarity. *Praśastapāda* too gives an account of these very twelve types, six in each group.<sup>177</sup> The account and classification of pseudo-*drṣṭānta* occurring in *Nyāyapraveśa* are identical with those occurring in *Praśastapāda*, but the two texts give two different names to the defect in question. Thus *Praśastapāda* uses the word '*nidarśanābhāsa*' instead of

176. '*drṣṭāntābhāso dvividhaḥ sādharmaṇa vaidharmaṇa ca...tatra sādharmaṇa... tadyathā sādhanadharmāsiddhaḥ sādhyadharmāsiddhaḥ ubhayadharmāsiddhaḥ ananvayaḥ viparītānvayaś ceti /...vaidharmaṇāpi drṣṭāntābhāsaḥ pañcaprakāraḥ tadyathā sādhyāvyāvṛttaḥ sādhanāvyāvṛttaḥ ubhayāvyāvṛttaḥ avyātirekaḥ viparītavyātirekaś ceti.../*–*Nyāyapraveśa*, pp. 5-6.

177. '*anena nidarśanābhāsā nirastā bhavanti / tadyathā nityaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvāt yad amūrtam drṣṭam tan nityam yathā paramāṇur yathā karma yathā sthālī yathā tamaḥ ambaravad iti yad dravyam tat kriyāvad drṣṭam iti ca līṅgānumeyobhayaśrayāsiddhānanugataviparītānugatāḥ sādharmanidarśanābhāsāḥ / yad anityam tan mūrtam drṣṭam yathā karma yathā paramāṇur yathākāśam yathā tamaḥ ghaṭavat yan niṣkriyam tad adravyam ceti līṅgānumeyobhayaśrayāsiddhāvyāvṛtta-viparītavyāvṛttā vaidharmanidarśanābhāsā iti /*–*Praśastapāda*... p. 247.

'*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*', and it is so because that step (*avayava*) in an inference-for-others which is elsewhere called "*dr̥ṣṭānta*" is called "*nidarśana*" in *Praśastapāda*. Just as the names occurring in *Nyāyapraveśa* and *Praśastapāda* for *dr̥ṣṭānta* in general are but synonyms, so also are the names occurring in these two texts for the various types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭānta*. Māṭhara (k. 5) too prefers the word '*nidarśanābhāsa*', and he seems to be a follower (on this question) of *Praśastapāda*. Though the total number of types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭānta* recognized by *Praśastapāda* is twelve and that of those recognized by Māṭhara ten, the reason for this discrepancy is simple, viz. that Māṭhara does not admit *āśrayāsiddha* (of two types, one belonging to the first group and the other to the second) as a separate type of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭānta*.

Jayanta (NM, p. 580), while commenting on the relevant Nyāya aphorism, realized the deficiency resulting from the absence of an account of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭānta* in *Nyāyasūtra* – an account present in the texts of Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas, etc.; he therefore accepted the types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* occurring in *Nyāyapraveśa* and thus eliminated the deficiency vitiating the Master's (*mānya ṛṣi*) account – in that spirit of devotion (*bhakti*) which is so typical of the Indian commentator-disciples (*ṭikākāra śiṣya*). In *Nyāyasāra* (p. 13) we get – under the title '*udāharaṇābhāsa*' – those very twelve types, six in each group, which we do in *Praśastapāda*. Besides, *Nyāyasāra* enumerates eight types of doubtful (*sandigdha*) pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, four where similarity is in doubt and four where dissimilarity is in doubt.<sup>178</sup> The concept of 'doubtful pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭānta*' seems to be of a later origin than *Nyāyapraveśa* and *Praśastapāda*. Dharmakīrti has given a detailed account of eighteen types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, nine belonging to each group. It seems that Dharmakīrti amended some earlier tradition of admitting eight types of doubtful pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* – a tradition followed in *Nyāyasāra* – and replaced it by his admission of six types of doubtful pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, three belonging to each group. As to the number of types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, their

178. '*anye tu sandehadvāreṇāparān aṣṭāv udāharaṇābhāsān varṇayanti / sandigdhasādhyāḥ... sandigdhasādhanāḥ... sandigdhobhayaḥ... sandigdhāśrayaḥ... sandigdhasādhyāvyāvṛttaḥ... sandigdhasādhanāvyāvṛttaḥ... sandigdhobhayāvyāvṛttaḥ... sandigdhāśrayaḥ.../*'-NSa, pp. 13-14.



illustrations (some of them exhibiting a sectarian bias), etc., various gradually developing views continued to be held even after Dharmakīrti.

In the Jaina tradition Siddhasena is the first to give an account of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*. He adopts the word “*dr̥ṣṭāntābhāsa*” of the Buddhist and not the word “*nidarśanābhāsa*” or “*udāharaṇābhāsa*” of the Vedicist tradition. Though in his brief account Siddhasena<sup>179</sup> makes no mention of the total number (of the types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*) he seems to maintain, like Dharmakīrti, that there are eighteen types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, nine belonging to each group. Māṇikyanandin (*PM*, 6.40-45) abbreviated all the earlier traditions and recognized just eight types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, four belonging to each group; he also replaces some old illustrations by new ones. Vādidevasūri, though following Māṇikyanandin on the question of illustrations, literally accepts Dharmakīrti's classification, names, etc. of the types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*. However, Vādideva did one new thing in this connection. Dharmakīrti had, in some of his illustrations, belittled the Vedicist ṛṣis and Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras, and Vādideva paid Dharmakīrti in his own coin by belittling Tathāgata Buddha in alternative illustrations. Vādideva could not stand the attack made by Dharmakīrti – in the course of his treatment of Logic – on the personalities whom he (i.e. Vādideva) held in esteem; he therefore came out with a retort against Dharmakīrti in the course of a treatise on Logic itself.<sup>180</sup>

179. ‘sādharmyeṇātra dr̥ṣṭāntadoṣā nyāyavidīritāḥ / apalakṣaṇahetūtthāḥ sādhyādivikalādayaḥ // vaidharmyeṇātra dr̥ṣṭāntadoṣā nyāyavidīritāḥ / sādhyasāadhanayuginānām anivṛtteś ca saṁśayaḥ //’-NA. 24-25.

180. ‘yathā nityaḥ śabdaḥ ’mūrtatvāt, karmavat paramāṇuvad ghaṭavad iti sādhyasāadhanadharmobhayavikalāḥ / tathā sandigdhasādhyadharmādayaś ca, yathā rāgādīmān ayaṁ vacanād rathyāpuruṣavat, maraṇadharmaḥ yaṁ puruṣo rāgādīmattvād rathyāpuruṣavat, asarvajñaḥ yaṁ rāgādīmattvād rathyāpuruṣavat iti / ananvayo ’pradarśitānvayaś ca, yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādīmān iṣṭapuruṣavat, anityaḥ śabdāḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavat iti / tathā viparītānvayaḥ, yad anityaṁ tat kṛtakam iti / sādharmaṇa / vaidharmyeṇāpi, paramāṇuvad karmavad ākāśavad iti sādhyādyavyatirekiṇaḥ / tathā sandigdhasādhyavyatirekādayaḥ, yathā ’sarvajñaḥ Kapilādayo ’nāptā vā, avidyā-mānasarvajñatāptatālīṅgabhūtapramāṇātīśayaśāsanatvād iti, atra vaidharmyodāharaṇam, yaḥ sarvajñaḥ āpto vā sa jyotirjñānādikam upadiṣṭavān, tadyathā RṣabhaVardhamānādir iti tatrāsarvajñatānāptatayoḥ sādhyadharmayoḥ sandigdho vyatirekaḥ / sandigdhasāadhanavyatireko yathā na trayīvidā Brāhmaṇena grāhyavacanāḥ

Āc. Hemacandra prefers the name 'dṛṣṭāntābhāsa' to 'udāharaṇābhāsa' and also offers a logical justification for his preference.<sup>181</sup> There are three

*kaścit puruṣo rāgādimattvād iti, atra vaidharṇyodāharaṇam ye grāhyavacanā na te rāgādimantaḥ tadyathā Gautamādayo dharmasāstrāṇāṃ praṇetāra iti, Gautamādibhyo rāgādimattvasya sādhanadharmasya vyāvṛttiḥ sandigdḥ / sandigdghobhayavyatireko yathā, avītarāgāḥ Kapilādayaḥ parigrahāgrahayogād iti, atra vaidharṇyodāharaṇam, yo vītarāgo na tasya parigrahāgraho yathā Ṛṣabhāder iti, Ṛṣabhāder avītarāgatvaparigrahāgrahayogayoḥ sādhyasādhanadharmayoḥ sandigdho vyatirekaḥ / avyatireko yathā, avītarāgo vaktṛtvāt, vaidharṇyodāharaṇam, yatrāvītarāgatvam nāsti na sa vaktā, yathopalakhaṇḍa iti, yady apy upalakhaṇḍād ubhayaṃ vyāvṛttau yo sarvo vītarāgo na vakteti vyāptyā vyatirekāśiddher avyatirekaḥ / apradarśitavyatireko yathā, anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ākāśavad iti / viparītavyatireko yathā, yad akṛtakam tan nityam bhavātīti /-NBT. 3. 125-36.*

*'tatṛpauruṣeyaḥ śabdo 'mūrtatvād duḥkhavad iti sādhyadharmavikala iti / tasyām eva pratijñāyām tasminn eva hetau paramāṇuvad iti sādhanadharmavikala iti / kalaśavad iti ubhayadharmavikala iti / rāgādinān ayaṃ vaktṛtvāt Devadattavad iti sandigdhasādhyadharmeti / maraṇadharmo 'yaṃ rāgādimattvān Maitravād iti sandigdhasādhana-dharmeti / nā'yaṃ sarvadarśī sarāgatvān muniviśeṣavad iti sandigdghobhayadharmeti / rāgādimān vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo vaktṛtvād iṣṭapurūṣavad iti ananvayaḥ / anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad ity apradarśitānvaya iti / anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād yad anityam tat kṛtakam ghaṭavad iti viparītānvaya iti / vaidharṇyenāpi ...teṣu bhrāntam anumānam pramāṇatvāt yat punar bhrāntam na bhavati na tat pramāṇam, yathā svapnajñānam ity asiddhasādhyavyatirekaḥ svapnajñānāt bhrāntatvasyānivr̥tter iti / nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam pramāṇatvāt, yat tu savikalpakaṃ na tat pramāṇam, yathā laṅgikam ity asiddhasādhanaavyatirekaḥ laṅgikāt pramāṇatvasyānivr̥tteḥ / nityānityaḥ śabdaḥ sattvāt yas tu na nityānityaḥ sa na san tadyathā stambha ity asiddghobhayavyatirekaḥ, stambhān nityānityatvasya cāvyāvṛtter iti / asarvajño 'nāpto vā Kapilaḥ akṣaṇikaikāntavāditvāt, yaḥ sarvajña āpto vā sa kṣaṇikaikāntavādī yathā Sugata iti sandigdhasādhyavyatirekaḥ Sugate 'sarvajñatānāptatayoḥ sādhyadharmayor vyāvṛtteḥ sandehād iti / anādeyavacanaḥ kaścīd vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo rāgādimattvāt yaḥ punar ādeyavacanaḥ sa vītarāgaḥ tadyathā Śauddhodanir iti sandigdhasādhanaavyatirekaḥ Śauddhodane rāgādimattvasya nivr̥tteḥ saṃśayād iti / na vītarāgaḥ Kapilaḥ karuṇāspadeṣv api paramakṛpayā 'narpitanijapiśītaśakalatvāt, yas tu vītarāgaḥ sa karuṇāspadeṣu paramakṛpayā samarpitanijapiśītaśakalas tadyathā tapanabandhur iti sandigdghobhayavyatireka iti tapanabandhau vītarāgatvābhāvasya karuṇāspadeṣv api paramakṛpayā 'narpitanija-piśītaśakalatvasya ca vyāvṛtteḥ sandehād iti / na vītarāgaḥ kaścīd vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo vaktṛtvāt, yaḥ punar vītarāgo na sa vaktā yathopalakhaṇḍa ity avyatireka iti / anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ākāśavad ity apradrśitavyatireka iti / anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt yad akṛtakam tan nityam yathākāśam iti viparītavyatireka iti /-PNT, 6. 60-79.*

181. 'parārthānumānaprastāvād udāharaṇadoṣā evaite dṛṣṭāntaprabhavatvāt tu dṛṣṭāntadoṣā ity ucyante /-Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā, 2. 1. 22.

noteworthy features – all indicative of the author's genius – in Āc. Hemacandra's account of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭānta* : (i) Though in the wording of his aphorism and in his illustrations etc. Dharmakīrti is his model, Āc. Hemacandra, unlike Vāḍideva, does not blindly follow Dharmakīrti and introduces a slight but intelligent change in the latter's account. Thus Āc. Hemacandra rejects the two (out of the eighteen) types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, viz. *ananvaya* and *avyatireka*, recognized by Dharmakīrti, and maintains that the eight types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* belonging to the first group are all of them the cases of *ananvaya* while the eight types belonging to the second group are all of them the cases of *avyatireka*. And Āc. Hemacandra is in the right. (ii) Āc. Hemacandra accepted Dharmakīrti's names '*apradarśitānvaya*' and '*apradarśitavyatireka*' for two of his sixteen types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* (2.1.27), but he gave further consideration to – and amended – the illustrations of the same. Dharmakīrti had borrowed the two types *ananvaya* and *avyatireka* from *Nyāyapraveśa* etc.,<sup>182</sup> but gave them new – and significant – titles '*apradarśitānvaya*' and '*apradarśitavyatireka*';<sup>183</sup> however, Dharmakīrti also retained the titles '*ananvaya*' and '*avyatireka*' for two independent types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, and formulated for these types appropriate illustrations<sup>184</sup> that would suit their respective titles but were absent in *Nyāyapraveśa* etc. Adopting the reformist's standpoint – as was done by Dharmakīrti – Āc. Hemacandra told the earlier teachers like Dinnāga, Praśastapāda, and even Dharmakīrti that the fault with the two types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas*, viz. *apradarśitānvaya* and *apradarśitavyatireka*, is that they altogether lack a valid *vyāpi* and not that the words '*yat*' and '*tat*' are not repeated in the *vyāpti* or any such thing; that is to say, according to

182. '*ananvayo yatra vinānvayena sādhyasāadhanayoḥ sahabhāvaḥ pradarśyate / yathā ghaṭe kṛtakatvam anityatvaṃ ca dr̥ṣṭam iti / avyatireko yatra vinā sādhyasāadhananivṛtṭyā tadvipakṣabhāvo nidarśyate / yathā ghaṭe mūrtatvam anityatvaṃ ca dr̥ṣṭam iti /*' –*Nyāyapraveśa*, pp. 6-7. '*nityaḥ śabdaḥ mūrtatvāt...ambaravad iti... ananugata ...ghaṭavat ...avyāvṛtta...*' –*Praśastapāda*, p. 247.

183. '*apradarśitānvayaḥ... anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat iti / apradarśitavyatireko yathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ākāśavad iti /*' –*NBT*, 3. 127, 135.

184. '*ananvayo...yathā yo vaktā sa rāgādimān iṣṭapurūṣavat / avyatireko yathā avītarāgo vaktrtvāt, vaidharmyodāharaṇam, yatrāvītarāgatvaṃ nāsti na sa vaktā, yathopalakhaṇḍa iti /*' –*NBT*, 3. 127, 134.

Āc. Hemacandra, the determinant (*niyāmaka*) of these two types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* is non-formulation of *vyāpti* (*dr̥ṣṭānta-apradarśana*) and not non-repetition (of the words 'yat' and 'tat') etc. All the earlier teachers were of the view that in the case of these two types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* an instance – e.g. “like *ākāśa*”, “like a jar” — must be quoted, but Āc. Hemacandra denies the necessity of any such offering of an instance (expressed in Sanskrit by the suffix 'vat' added to the word standing for a homologue or a heterologue – as the case may be). It is this idea that Āc. Hemacandra expresses in the following words of his Commentary (2.1.27) : “*etau ca pramāṇasya anupadarśanād bhavato na tu vīpsāsarvādvadhāraṇa-padānām aprayogāt, satsv api teṣv asati pramāṇe tayoḥ asiddher iti.*” (iii) The third noteworthy feature of Āc. Hemacandra's account is important in many respects. In those days of sectarianism (*sāmpradāyikatā*) when Dharmakīrti had acutely hurt the sentiments of the Vedicists and Jainas and when Vādideva – whom Āc. Hemacandra himself held in esteem – had adopted in relation to Dharmakīrti the policy of 'tit for tat', Āc. Hemacandra displayed intelligent liberalism and sought to mitigate the evil of sectarianism. This seems to be the result of Āc. Hemacandra's liberal desire to make his work on Logic – as he had already sought to make his work on Grammar – a 'favourite of all'<sup>185</sup> (*sarva-pārṣada*). Realizing that the type of taunts Dharmakīrti had hurled against Ṛṣabha, Vardhamāna, etc. and the type of counter-taunts Vādideva had hurled against Sugata are highly improper in Logic and are in extremely bad taste, Āc. Hemacandra formulated such illustrations<sup>186</sup> as would serve the purpose (of Logic) but would hurt none.

In this connection, another point – of historical importance – also deserves notice. Dharmakīrti illustrates some of his types of pseudo-*dr̥ṣṭāntas* by – and considers the nature of probans occurring in – inferences where Kapila etc. are sought to be proved to be lacking in omniscience and authoritativeness; this indicates that Dharmakīrti must have had before him some texts of the nature of Siddhasena's *Sanmati* and Samantabhadra's

185. 'sarvapārṣadatvāc ca śabdānuśāsanasya sakaladarśanasamūhātmatmakasyādvādasamāśrayaṇam atiramaṇīyam /—Haimaśabdānuśāsaṇa, 1. 1. 2.

186. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 2. 1. 25.

Āptamīmāṃsā where Jaina logicians sought to refute omniscience and authoritativeness in the case of Kapila etc.

(PMT on Sūtras 2.1.22-27, pp. 103–8)

#### (iv) On Metaphysical Problems

### 28. THE OBJECT (viṣaya) OF A PRAMĀṆA

Speculation as to the nature of the universe is older even than *Rgveda*.<sup>187</sup> As a result of this speculation there came into existence and developed a number of philosophical systems which can broadly be divided into five classes, viz. (1) Doctrine of Absolute Permanence (*kevalanitya-tvavāda*), (2) Doctrine of Absolute Change (*kevala-anityatvavāda*), (3) Doctrine of a Changing Permanent (*pariṇāmīnityatvavāda*), (4) Doctrine of the Changing and the Permanent (*nityānitya-ubhayavāda*), and (5) Doctrine of Permanence-Coupled-With-Change (*nityānityātmakavāda*). The Brahmvādin Vedāntists alone represent first doctrine, for according to them, all change (*anityatva*) is but apparent (*ābhāsamātra*).

The Buddhists, since they are momentarists (*kṣaṇikavādin*), represent the second doctrine. Systems like Sāṅkhya, Yoga, etc., since they maintain that everything apart from conscious elements is a changing permanent, represent the third doctrine. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc., since according to them certain entities are absolutely permanent and certain others absolutely changing, represent the fourth doctrine. The Jaina system, since according to it everything whatsoever is permanent-as-well-as-changing, represents the fifth doctrine.<sup>188</sup> These various philosophical views on permanence and change are found clearly described even in the respective Scriptural texts of the philosophers concerned, texts which also contain some amount of refutation of the rival views – See *Sūtrakṛtāṅga-sūtra*, 1. 1. 15-18. Thus even before the Age of Logic, various views as to

187. 'ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti.'-*Rgveda*, 2. 3. 23. 46.; *Nāsadiyasūkta*, *Rgveda* 10. 129; *Hiraṇyagarbhasūkta*, *Rgveda* 10. 121.

188. There is no difference between the third and fifth groups on the question of permanence and change – except that the former treats soul as an exception to the general rule. This is why in the Note after next we get just four groups.-Tr.

the nature of the universe had come into being and a relation of mutual antagonism established among them.

Ever since the advent of the Age of Logic, that is, for the last two thousand years, the various philosophical systems, basing themselves on the positions and counter-positions adopted in the earlier period (i.e. in the Age of Scriptures), have been defending their respective positions and refuting those of their rivals with the help of logical arguments. As a result of this battle in the field of Logic, it has become necessary for a philosopher to make clear, after giving an account of *pramāṇas*, as to what according to him constitutes the object of a *pramāṇa*, that is to say, it has become necessary for him first to offer a criterion of objectivity, then to demonstrate that this criterion applies to his own view of reality which is therefore a valid view, and finally to demonstrate that the criterion in question does not apply to the rival views of reality which are therefore invalid views.

Following this procedure current in the Age of Logic, Āc. Hemacandra, in four aphorisms (1.1.30-33), first gives out as the nature of the object of a *pramāṇa* what the Jaina considers to be the nature of the universe (i.e. reality) in general, then offers a criterion of reality, and finally demonstrates that this criterion is satisfied only if we accept the Jaina view of reality in general. That a real entity is of the form of a substance and its modes (*dravyaparyāyātmaka*), of the form of something permanent as well as changing (*nityānityātmaka*), of the form of something existent as well as non-existent (*sadasadātmaka*), etc. is asserted in *Āgamas* but without adducing any particular arguments and without offering a criterion of reality; Āc. Hemacandra makes the same assertion on the basis of logic and arguments. In the Age of Logic, there were current several criteria of reality – e.g. the Nyāya criterion of ‘association with existent-ness’ (*sattāyoga*), the Sāṅkhya criterion of ‘being an object of *pramāṇa*’ (*pramāṇa-viṣayatva*), the Buddhist criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ (*arthakriyākāritva*); of these, Āc. Hemacandra accepts the criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’, a criterion that seems to have been first formulated by Buddhist logicians (*PV*, 3. 3). The same criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ applying which the Buddhists had proved the momentary character of every real entity and had refuted – on the basis of

a massive consideration of the logical pros and cons – the doctrine of absolute permanence (TSN, k. 394 ff.) as well as the Jaina doctrine of permanence-coupled-with-change (TSN, k. 1738 ff.) was applied by Āc. Hemacandra with a view to logically defending his own Jaina doctrine of permanence-coupled-with-change, that is, the doctrine of a substance and its modes; and it was with the help of this very criterion that the Ācārya sharply criticized the doctrine of absolute permanence upheld by Vedānta etc., as well as the doctrine of absolute change upheld by Buddhists.

(PMT on *Sūtras* 1. 1. 30-33, pp. 53-54)

### 29. DRAVYA (SUBSTANCE), GUṆA (QUALITY), AND PARYĀYA (MODE)

The Prakrit-Pali word “*dabba*” and its Sanskrit equivalent “*dravya*” are very old. And the various meanings in which the word is used in everyday parlance, in poetry, in grammatical texts, in medical texts, in philosophical texts, etc. appear to have been conventionally fixed long, long ago. This extensive employment of the word has led Pāṇini to assign it a place in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and offer a twofold etymological derivation of the same, a procedure followed by all subsequent grammarians. Apart from the two aphorisms of the ‘*Taddhita* Section’ (5.3.104; 4.3.161) where the formation of the word “*dravya*” is explained, Pāṇini has composed a third aphorism in the ‘*Kṛt* Section’ in order to explain the same formation once again. The first derivation according to the *Taddhita* explanation is : *dru* (i.e. a tree or a piece of wood) + *ya* = a modification (*vikāra*) or a constituent-element (*avayava*) of a tree or of a piece of wood; the second derivation is : *dru* (i.e. a piece of wood) + *ya* = like a piece of wood, the meaning being that just as a straight and clean piece of wood can be given, with an effort, any desirable form, so also a prince or the like, when subjected to education etc., becomes possessed of any number of good qualities, that is to say, the prince or the like, who is capable of becoming possessed of good qualities is to be characterized as ‘*dravya*’; [on a similar explanation, money is to be called “*dravya*” because it is capable of doing you a number of good things (just as a piece of wood is capable of being given any desirable form)]. According to the *Kṛdanta* explanation the word “*dravya*” is formed by adding the suffix-

denoting-object (*karmārthaka pratyaya*) 'ya' to the root 'dru' (meaning motion or attainment); thus on this explanation, "dravya" means 'capable of attaining', i. e. 'that which is capable of attaining various states'. These three derivations offered by the grammarian enable the word somehow to cover almost all the meanings in which it is employed in everyday parlance or in systematic treatises.

Though even in the Jaina literature the word "dravya" is used in almost those very meanings which are enumerated above, there are many respects in which the Jaina usage of the word is different from that found in the other systems. For example, when the Jaina divides 'nikṣepas' into 'nāma', 'sthāpanā', 'dravya', 'bhāva', etc. (*Tattvārthasūtra*, 1.5), when he speaks of aspects like 'dravya', 'kṣetra', 'kāla', 'bhāva', etc. (*Bhagavatīsūtra*, 3.19), when he divides 'nayas' into 'dravyārthika' and 'paryāyārthika' (*Tattvārthasūtra*, 5.31), when he speaks of 'dravyācārya', 'bhāvācārya', etc. (*Pañcāśaka*, 6), and when he speaks of 'dravyakarma', 'bhāvakarma', etc., he uses the word "dravya" in a different sense in each different case; however, the sense is in all cases very near to the one yielded by that *Taddhita* explanation according to which a *dravya* is 'that which is capable of becoming this or that' (*bhavya*), that is to say, the different senses of the word 'dravya' are but different ways of conveying the idea of 'capacity to become this or that'. In Jaina philosophy, the word 'dravya' is also used in the sense of 'basic types of entities (*maulika padārtha*) found in the universe' - e.g. when it is said that 'jīva', 'pudgala', etc. are six *dravyas*.

In Vaiśeṣika philosophy (VS, 1.1.15), the word 'dravya' stands for the 'substratum of qualities and actions' (*guṇa-karma-ādhāra*); thus earth etc. are nine *dravyas* according to the system. When the old *Āgamas* like *Uttarādhyayana* (28.6) put forward the Jaina thesis on six *dravyas* they too understand the word 'dravya' in this very sense. Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, has, at several different occasions (e.g. *Mahābhāṣya*, p. 58), spoken of the meaning of the word 'dravya'. Thus at one place he says : "We can break a jar and make a bowl instead, or *vice versa*, and we can break a bangle and make an ear-ring instead, or *vice versa*. But in the first case what persists in the midst of the changing forms like jar, bowl, etc. is clay, and in the second case what persists in the midst of the changing forms like bangle,



ear-ring etc. is gold. It is what persists in the midst of change, that is, clay in the first case and gold in the second, that is called 'dravya'. This interpretation of the word 'dravya' occurs in an identical fashion in Vyāsa's commentary on *Yoga-sūtra* (3.13) and it has been adopted also by Kumārila (SV, *Vanavāda*, Sl. 21-22). At some other places (*Mahābhāṣya*, 4.1.3, 5.1.119) Patañjali understands the word 'dravya' to mean an aggregate of qualities (*guṇa-samudāya*) or a stream of qualities (*guṇa-sandrāva*); this interpretation is particularly suited to the Buddhist line of thought. "That whose basical character (*maulikātva*) remains unimpaired even in the midst of the emergence of newer and newer qualities (*guṇas* – or, as Jainas will technically put it, *pariyāyas*)" – this brief definition of the word 'dravya' is also given in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (5.1.119). All these interpretations of the word 'dravya' – interpretations first made current by *Pātañjala Mahābhāṣya* and later on adopted by *Vyāsabhāṣya*, *Śloka-vārtika*, etc. – are, for the first time, gathered together in the Jaina tradition by Umāsvāti in his aphorisms (5.29, 30, 37) and the commentary thereon. Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa, in his *Bhāṣya* (*Viśeṣāvaśyaka*, *Gāthā* 28), has made a veritable catalogue of all the interpretations of the word 'dravya' that had become current by his time and has thus explained the etymology of the word.

Āc. Hemacandra, while enunciating the nature of 'object of a *pramāṇa*' in the words of Akalaṅka (*Laghī*, 2.1), employs the word 'dravya' in the sense of something permanent or static (*dhruva*, *śāśvata*, *sthira*), a sense also given to it by the Āgamas, the grammatical texts, and the texts of other philosophical systems. And the etymological derivation which he suggests in this connection is the one that has been offered in the 'Kṛt Section', viz. 'dru' + the suffix 'ya' – (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 1.1.30).

In connection with the enunciation of the nature of 'object of a *pramāṇa*' the word '*pariyāya*' is also used along with the word 'dravya'. The word '*pariyāya*' is very old and quite well-known to the scriptural languages (*śāstrīya bhāṣā*) like Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Pali, but the technical meaning attributed to this word in the Jaina system of philosophy is to be found in no other system.

Those properties (*dharma*), peculiarities (*viśeṣa*), and states (*avasthā*) of a substance which originate and perish, emerge and vanish are called in

the Jaina system of philosophy “*paryāyas*” or “*pariṇāmas*”, for which the equivalent word in the systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. is “*guṇa*”. Āc. Hemacandra uses the word “*paryāya*” in the sense of all the properties like qualities, actions, etc of a substance.

In the comparatively older Āgamas like *Bhagavatī* etc., both the words ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*paryāya*’ are used. In the *Uttarādhyaṇa* (28.13) the two words have clearly distinct meanings; Kundakunda, Umāsvāti (*Tattvārthasūtra*. 5.37), and Pūjyapāda adopt these very meanings and defend this adoption of meaning on their part. Vidyānanda offers logical arguments in support of the distinction in question, but Akalaṅka, who preceded him, maintains that there is an identity-as-well-as-distinction (*bhedābheda*) between the meanings of the words “*guṇa*” and “*paryāya*”, a position followed by Amṛtacandra as also by Siddhasena in his commentary on *Tattvārthabhāṣya*. On this question, a new line of thinking was initiated by Siddhasena Divākara who maintained that the two words ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*paryāya*’ are but synonyms, that is, they have one and the same meaning; Divākara's argument in support of his position is that had there been a difference of meaning between the words ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*paryāya*’, Lord Mahāvīra would have spoken of a third standpoint, viz. “*guṇārthika*” standpoint, along with the two well-known standpoints, viz. “*dravyārthika*” and “*paryāyārthika*” standpoints. This argument seems to have influenced Haribhadra who too accepted the thesis of identity (of meaning between the words ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*paryāya*’). And though Devasūri (*PNT*, 5.7, 8) has tried to make out a distinction between the meanings of the two words ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*paryāya*’ he also seems to be under the influence of the thesis of identity. Āc. Hemacandra did not at all insert the word ‘*guṇa*’ in his aphorism on ‘object of a *pramāṇa*’, nor did he raise the discussion as to whether the words ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*paryāya*’ are identical or different in meaning. From this his own position on the question becomes clear, for it means that he too accepts the thesis of identity. The same thesis is accepted also by Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaṇī. On the basis of this prolonged history it can at any rate be said that in the old Age of Scriptures both the words ‘*guṇa*’ and ‘*paryāya*’ were used while with the advent of the Age of Logic there started a discussion as to whether the two words are identical or different in meaning, and the discussion went on. As a result, different

teachers adopted and defended different standpoints on the question.<sup>189</sup>

Like the discussion as to whether the words 'guṇa' and 'paryāya' are identical or different in meaning, the discussion as to whether *guṇa* and *paryāya* on the one hand and *dravya* on the other are identical with or different from one another also deserves notice. The systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. are, since the very beginning, advocates of difference (*bhedavādin*), and hence they are of the view that the qualities and actions of a substance are different from this substance; on the other hand, the advocates of identity (*abhedavādin*) like Sāṅkhya, Vedānta, etc. are of the view that the qualities and actions of a substance are identical with this substance. These 'doctrine of identity' and 'doctrine of difference' are very old, for even Patañjali, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, carries on an interesting and detailed discussion on the question. Thus he raises the question whether a *dravya* is identical with or different from the qualities like sound, touch, etc.; and after elucidating the two rival standpoints on the question he finally supports the thesis of identity-cum-difference.<sup>190</sup>

There is also another particularly noteworthy point. That very thesis of identity-cum-difference between *guṇa* and *dravya* or between *guṇa* and *paryāya* which was so strenuously sought to be established by the Jaina logicians like Siddhasena, Samantabhadra, etc. was also defended by Kumārila – that titan among the Mīmāṃsakas – most clearly and most logically. (SV, *Ākṛti.*, Śl. 4-64; Vana., Śl. 21-80).

189. For the entire array of arguments on this question, see *Sanmatīṭikā*, p. 631, Foot-note 4.

190. *kiṃ punar dravyaṃ ke punaḥ guṇāḥ / śabdasparsārūparasagandhā guṇās tato 'nyad dravyam / kiṃ punar anyac chaddādibhyo dravyam āhosvid ananyat / guṇasyāyaṃ bhāvāt dravye śabdaniveśaṃ kurvan khyāpayaty anyac chaddādibhyo dravyam iti / ananyac chaddādibhyo dravyam / na hy anyad upalabhyate / paśoḥ khalv api viśasitasya parṇasate nyastasya nānyac chaddādibhya upalabhyate / anyac chaddādibhyo dravyam / tat tv anumānagamya / tadyathā / oṣadhi vanaspatīnāṃ vṛddhihrāsau / jyotiṣāṃ gatiḥ iti / ko 'sāv anumānaḥ / iha samāne varṣmaṇi pariṇāhe ca anyat tulāgrāṃ bhavati lohasya anyat kārpaśānāṃ yatkrto viśeṣas tad dravyam / tathā kaścid ekenaiva prahāreṇa vyapavargaṃ karoti kaścid dvābhyāṃ api na karoti / yatkrto viśeṣas tad dravyam / athavā yasya guṇāntareṣv api prādurbhavatsu tattvaṃ na vihanyate tad dravyam / kim punas tattvaṃ ? tadbhāvas tattvaṃ / tadyathā / āmalakādīnāṃ phalānāṃ raktādayaḥ pītādayaś ca guṇāḥ prādurbhavanti / āmalakaṃ badaram ity eva bhavati / anvarthaṃ khalu nirvacanaṃ – guṇasandrāvo dravyam iti.*—Pātañjala *Mahābhāṣya*. 5. 1. 119.

Āc. Hemacandra, like the other Jaina teachers, supports the thesis of identity-cum-difference between *dravya* and *paryāya*.

(PMT on 'dravati' in 1.1.118, pp. 54-57)

### 30. THE CRITERION OF REALITY (*vastutva*)

The four doctrines of Indian philosophy – viz. (1) the doctrine of absolute permanence (*kevala-nityatvavāda*), (2) the doctrine of absolute change (*kevala-anityatvavāda*), (3) the doctrine of both (absolute) permanence and (absolute) change (*nityānitya-ubhayavāda*), and (4) the doctrine of permanence-in-change (*pariṇāminityatvavāda*) – are to be detected in a rudimentary form even in the period preceding Lords Mahāvīra and Buddha; however, a clear-cut formulation of these doctrines and a logical defence of this formulation are not present there in the literature of that much old period. The idea of impermanence – an idea already in vogue – was so much emphasized by Buddha that it gave rise to two developments in the field of philosophical speculation. Firstly, all the rival doctrines rose against the doctrine of impermanence (or momentarism) which they all vigorously sought to refute by establishing their respective positions in their respective manners. Secondly, in the Buddhist tradition itself, the idea of momentarism – which was originally an idea conducive to detachment (*vairāgya-poṣaka bhāvanā*) and hence an ethical or moral idea – developed into an all-comprehensive metaphysical doctrine; thus the idea of momentariness became, in the eyes of its defenders as well as of its critics, one among the topics of metaphysical speculations.

For centuries after the time of Buddha and Mahāvīra, we find that, in the field of philosophical speculation, the only criterion for judging the validity of a doctrine has been its capacity to account for (transcendental) bondage and release (*bandha-mokṣa-vyavasthā*) and for the mechanism of an action yielding its fruit to the actor concerned (*karṭṛtva-phala-bhokṭṛtva-vyavasthā*).<sup>191</sup> Buddhists – the advocates of the doctrine of absolute impermanence – defended their position by arguing that in case *ātman* is

191. 'tadevaṃ sattvabhede kṛtāhānam akṛtābhyāgamaḥ prasajyate – sati ca sattvotpāde sattvanirodhe ca akarmanimittaḥ sattvasargaḥ prāpnoti tatra muktyartho brahmacaryavāso na syāt' /-NBh. 3. 1. 4.

regarded as permanent it becomes impossible either to account for (transcendental) bondage and release or to demonstrate how the doer of action is also the enjoyer of the fruit of this action. And the same was the criticism levelled against the Buddhist by the advocates of absolute permanence like Upaniṣadists etc. (*Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.2.19). Similarly, Jainas, the advocates of permanence-in-change, urged against both the doctrine of absolute permanence and the doctrine of absolute impermanence that, on either of these doctrines, it becomes impossible to explain how (transcendental) bondage and release take place, how the doer of an action (and nobody else) enjoys the fruit of this action, how performance of meritorious acts like charity etc. and resort to ceremonies like initiation (*dīkṣopādāna*) etc. are means to transcendental release.<sup>192</sup>

All rise (*utthāna*) of metaphysical speculation (*tāttvika cintā*) on the part of Indian systems of philosophy – and more particularly, the nourishment (*poṣaṇa*) and development (*vikāsa*) of this speculation – has been due to (a belief in) the doctrine of *karma* and to a desire (*bhāvanā*) to get rid of the transmigratory cycle (*saṃsāra-nivṛtti*) and thus attain (transcendental) release. It was therefore but natural that, in the initial stages, every system of philosophy should argue, in support of its position and against those of his rivals, in the name of these very “doctrine of *karma*” etc. But when tendency to logical argumentation (*tarkavāda*) started gaining greater and greater prominence in this basically spiritual field of philosophical speculation (*adhyātmamūlaka dārśanika-kṣetra*) – a phenomenon which, in a way, ultimately rendered spiritualism secondary in relation to the tendency to pure logical argumentation – the criterion for judging the validity of the ‘doctrine of absolute permanence’ etc. became different (from what it was in the pre-Logic period). Logic asserted that nothing else but only that thing can be real which is capable of performing a function (*arthakriyākārin*). It seems that the credit for advancing this logical criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’

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192. ‘*davvaṭṭhiyassa jo ceva kuṇai so ceva veyae ṇiyamā / aṇṇo kareṇi aṇṇo paribhūṃjajī pajjayaṇayassa //*–*Sanmati*. 1. 52 :  
‘*na bandhamokṣau kṣaṇikaikasaṃsthau na saṃvṛtiḥ sāpi mṛṣāsvabhāvā / mukhyād ṛte gaṇavidhir na dṛṣṭo vibhṛāntadṛṣṭis tava dṛṣṭito ’nyā //*–*Yuktyanuśāsana*, k. 15.

goes to the Buddhist tradition; it was therefore but natural that the Buddhists should apply this criterion with a view to establishing the doctrine of momentariness and refuting the rival doctrines, and this is what we actually find to have happened. Buddhists argued that nothing that is not momentary can perform a function while nothing that cannot perform a function is real (*sat, pāramārthika*); basing themselves on this sort of *vyāpti* (i.e. relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum), these Buddhists sought to prove that a permanent entity (i.e. an entity lasting for more than one moment) cannot perform a function and hence cannot be real; and with this end in view they considered – and refuted – in a highly elaborate fashion, the two possible alternatives, viz. (i) that a permanent entity can perform a function all at once (*yugapad arthakriyākārin*), and (ii) that a permanent entity can perform a function in the course of several moments (*kramaśaḥ arthakriyākārin*)—(*Vādanyāya*, p. 6). The same criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ – i.e. a criterion with whose help the doctrine of absolute permanence was thus refuted (*TSN*, k. 394) – was employed by the Buddhists also to refute the Jaina doctrine of permanence-in-change, i.e. the ‘doctrine of substance and modes’ or ‘doctrine of the twofold nature of a real entity’ (*TSN*, k. 1738). For Buddhists argued that one and the same thing cannot be both real and unreal because the same thing cannot be both performer of a function and performer of no function. Thus the philosophical systems rival to the Buddhist may be divided into two camps, viz. Vedicist and Jaina.

The first Vedicist philosophers to refute the Buddhist criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ seem to be Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta. Though the final objective of both Vācaspati and Jayanta is the same, viz. to demonstrate the reality of non-momentary and permanent entities, they adopt different lines of argumentation by way of showing that the Buddhist criterion of ‘capacity to perform a function’ – a criterion with whose help the Buddhist had refuted the doctrine of absolute permanence – does not apply to a momentary entity itself (i.e. on the Buddhist's own criterion, a momentary entity ought to be unreal). That a momentary entity is unreal is proved by Vācaspati (*Tātp*, pp. 354-56) after considering the two alternatives, viz. that a momentary entity can perform a function without

depending on anything else and that a momentary entity can perform a function depending on other things (*sāpekṣa-anapekṣa vikalpa*); Jayanta (NM, pp. 453, 564) does the same after considering the two alternatives – suggested by the Buddhist himself – viz. that a momentary entity can perform a function all at once and that a momentary entity can perform a function in the course of several moments (*kramayaugapadyavikalpa*). Likewise, Bhadanta Yogasena, mentioned as a rival by Kamalaśīla in *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, seeks to refute the Buddhist doctrine of momentarism by considering the two alternatives – suggested by Buddhist himself – viz. that a momentary entity can perform a function all at once, and that a momentary entity can perform a function in the course of several moments (TSN, k. 428 ff). Here the title '*Bhadanta*' tends to suggest that this Yogasena was a Buddhist, but until we have a definite proof that somebody within the Buddhist tradition supported the doctrine of permanence (*nityatva, sthiratva*)<sup>193</sup>, it will be more proper to surmise that our Yogasena was either a Jaina, or an Ājīvaka, or a Sāṅkhya mendicant. At any rate, it is certain that the Buddhist doctrine of momentarism was sought to be refuted by the Vedicist philosophers on the basis of the Buddhist's own criterion of 'capacity to perform a function'.

The other staunch opponents of momentarism were Jainas. In the Age of Logic, they too refuted the doctrine of momentarism by basing themselves on the logical criterion advanced by the Buddhist himself. So far as our knowledge goes, in the Jaina tradition Akalaṅka<sup>194</sup> is the first to refute momentarism on the basis of this criterion. On the basis of this criterion Akalaṅka has refuted the Vedicist doctrine of absolute permanence precisely as did the Buddhists, but at the same time, he has applied this criterion to

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193. We know that thinkers of the Buddhist *Sarvāstivāda* school accepted some sort of permanence; study the four theories propounded by *sarvāstivādin* thinkers – *bhāvānya-thātvavāda* by Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, *lakṣaṇānyathātvavāda* by Bhadanta Ghoṣaka, *avasthānyathātvavāda* by Bhadanta Vasumitra and *anyathānyathikatavavāda* by Bhadanta Buddhadeva. One may compare these four theories with Sāṅkhya *pariṇāmavāda*, particularly with Yogabhāṣyakāra Vyāsa's threefold *pariṇāma*, viz. *dharma-pariṇāma*, *lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma* and *avasthā-pariṇāma*. (3. 13). Editor

194. '*arthakriyā na yujyeta nityakṣaṇikapakṣayoḥ / kramākramābhyaṃ bhāvānāṃ sāmānyatayā matā //*'-Laghī. 2. 1.

refute the Buddhist doctrine of absolute momentarism precisely as did Bhadanta Yogasena and Jayanta. In this connection we should remember that though in the Age of Logic the criterion of 'capacity to perform a function' (along with the various accompanying alternatives) came to be accepted as the criterion for refuting and for supporting the doctrines like momentarism etc., the old criterion for doing so – i.e., the criterion of 'capacity to account for (transcendental) bondage and release' etc. – was not altogether discarded but only became secondary in importance.

The doctrine of the twofold nature of a real entity, that is, the doctrine that a real entity is a substance as well as its modes, something existent as well as non-existent, something permanent as well as transient – a doctrine accepted by Jainas, Jaimini-ites etc. – was refuted by Buddhists (TSN, ks. 222, 311, 312), and Jaina teachers like Akalaṅka etc. answered back this refutation basing themselves on the consideration of the criterion of 'capacity to perform a function' and of the various alternatives resulting from the application of this criterion, a procedure followed by all subsequent Jaina logicians. Āc. Hemacandra does the same by first refuting the doctrine of absolute permanence in the words of Buddhists, and then refuting the doctrine of absolute momentarism in the words of Bhadanta Yogasena, Jayanta, etc.; at the same time, he applies the very criterion of 'capacity to perform a function' in order to prove the Jaina doctrine of substance-and-modes, and he does so by showing that a real entity as conceived by the Jaina is alone capable of performing a function.

(PMT on '*tatra dravyaika-rūpo*' in 1.1.124, pp. 57-60)





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<i>PNT Pramāṇanayatattvāloka</i> (of Vādidevasūri)	Yashovijay Granthamala, Kashi
<i>PPar Pramāṇaparīkṣā</i> (of Vidyānanda)	
<i>Pramāṇasaṅgraha</i> (of Akalaṅka)	
<i>PKM Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa</i> (of Prabhācandra)	Nirnayasagar
<i>Prameyaratnamālā</i> (of Anantavīrya)	
<i>Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya</i> (of Amṛtacandra)	Parama Śruta Prabhāvaka Mandal Bombay

- Ratnākarāvatārikā* (of Ratnaprabha)  
*Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*  
*Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa*  
 (of Siddhasena Divākara)  
*SMT Sanmatitarkaṭikā* (of Abhayadeva)  
*Sarvārthasiddhi* (of Pūjyapāda)  
*Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* (of Haribhadra)  
*Śāstravārtāsamuccaya-ṭikā* (of Yaśovijaya)  
*Siddhiviniścayaṭikā* (of Anantavīrya)  
*Sthānāṅgasūtra*  
*Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra*  
*Syādvādamāñjarī* (of Malliṣeṇa)  
*SVR Syādvādaratnākara*  
 (of Vādidevasūri)  
*Tarkabhāṣā* (of Yaśovijaya)  
*Tattvārtharājavārtika* (of Akalaṅka)  
*TSV Tattvārthaslokavārtika*  
 (of Vidyānanda)  
*Tattvārthasūtra* (of Umāsvāti)  
*Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣya* (of Umāsvāti)  
*Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣyaṭikā*  
 (of Siddhasena)  
*Uttarādhyayanasūtra*  
*Vādadvātrīṁśikā* (of Yaśovijaya)  
*Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*  
 (of Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa)  
*Yuktyanuśāsana* (of Samantabhadra)
- Atmananda Sabha, Bhavnagar  
 Gujarat Vidyapith  
 Gujarat Vidyapith  
 Gujarat Vidyapith  
 Agamodaya  
 Agamodaya  
 Bombay Sanskrit Series  
 Arhat Mata Prabhākara, Poona  
 Singhi Series  
 Gandhi Natharang, Bombay  
 Arhat Mata Prabhākara  
 Arhat Mata Prabhākara  
 Agamodaya  
 Yashovijay Granthamala  
 Manikchand Granthamala

#### IV. Buddhist Texts

- Abhidhammatthasaṁgaho*  
*Abhidharmakośa* (of Vasubandhu)  
*Bodhicaryāvatāra* (of Śāntideva)  
*Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*  
*Hetubinduṭikā* (of Arcaṭa)
- Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmedabad  
 Kashi Vidyapith, Kashi  
 Asiatic Society, Calcutta  
 Asiatic Society, Calcutta  
 GOS

<i>Mādhyamikakārikā-vṛtti</i> (of Sthiramati)	Bibliotheca Buddhica
<i>Mahāvagga</i>	Pali Text Society
<i>Majjhimanikāya</i>	Pali Text Society
<i>Milindapañha</i>	
<i>NB Nyāyabindu</i> (of Dharmakīrti)	Bibliotheca Buddhica
<i>NBT Nyāyabinduṭīkā</i> (of Dharmottara)	Bibliotheca Buddhica
<i>Nyāyapraveśa</i> (of Diñnāga ?)	GOS
<i>PS Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> (of Diñnāga)	Mysore University
<i>PST Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā</i> (of Jinendrabuddhi)	Mysore University
<i>PV Pramāṇavārtika</i> (of Dharmakīrti)	
<i>Pramāṇavārtika-Manorathanandīṭīkā</i>	
<i>Samyutta-Nikāya</i>	
<i>Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā</i> (of Yaśomitra)	Bibliotheca Buddhica
<i>TSN Tattvasaṅgraha</i> (of Śāntarakṣita)	GOS
<i>TSNP Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā</i> (of Kamalaśīla)	GOS
<i>Upāyahrdaya</i> (of Nāgārjuna ?)	GOS
<i>Vādanyāya</i> (of Dharmakīrti)	Mahabodhi Society, Benaras
<i>Visuddhimagga</i> (of Buddhaghosa)	Pali Text Society
<b>V. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Texts</b>	
<i>Dinakarī</i> (of Dinakara Bhaṭṭa)	Nirnayasagar, Bombay
<i>Gādādhārī</i> (of Gadādhara)	Chowkhamba
<i>Kand. Kandalī</i> (of Śrīdhara)	Vizianagaram Series, Benaras
<i>Kārikāvalī</i> (of Viśvanātha)	Nirnayasagar
<i>NBh Nyāyabhāṣya</i> (of Vātsyāyana)	Chowkhamba, Benaras
<i>NK Nyāyakusumāñjali</i> (of Udayana)	Chowkhamba
<i>NM Nyāyamañjarī</i> (of Jayanta)	Vizianagaram
<i>NSa Nyāyasāra</i> (of Bhāsarvajña)	Asiatic Society, Calcutta
<i>Nyāyasāratātparyadīpikā</i>	Asiatic Society, Calcutta
<i>Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī</i> (of Viśvanātha)	Nirnayasagar
<i>NS Nyāyasūtra</i> (of Gautama)	Chowkhamba

<i>Nyāyasūtravṛtti</i> (of Viśvanātha)	Chowkhamba
<i>NV Nyāyavārtika</i> (of Uddyotakara)	Chowkhamba
<i>Praśastapādabhāṣya</i> (of Praśastapāda)	Vizianagaram
<i>Tarkadīpikā-gaṅgāṭikā</i>	Benaras
<i>Tarkasaṅgrahadīpikā</i> (of Annambhaṭṭa)	Channulal Gyanchand, Benaras
<i>Tātp. Tātparyāṭikā</i> (of Vācaspati)	Chowkhamba
<i>Tattvacintāmaṇi</i> (of Gaṅgeśa)	
<i>VS Vaiśeṣikasūtra</i> (of Kaṇāda)	
<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra-Upaskāraṭikā</i>	

### VI. Mīmāṃsā Texts

<i>Br Brhatī</i> (of Prabhākara)	Madras University
<i>Jaiminisūtra</i> (of Jaimini)	
<i>Jaininīyanyāyamālāvistara</i> (of Mādhava)	
<i>PP Prakaraṇapañcikā</i> (of Śālikanātha)	Chowkhamba
<i>Śābarabhāṣya</i> (of Śabara)	Chowkhamba
<i>SD Śāstradīpikā</i> (of Pārthasārathi)	Chowkhamba
<i>SV Ślokaṽrtika</i> (of Kumāṛila)	Chowkhamba
<i>Ślokaṽrtika-Nyāyaratnākarāṭikā</i> (of Pārthasārathi)	Chowkhamba
<i>Tantravārtika</i> (of Kumāṛila)	Chowkhamba
<i>Vidhiviveka-nyāyakaṇikā</i> (of Vācaspati)	Chowkhamba

### VII. Sāṅkhya-Yoga Texts

<i>Māṭharavṛtti</i> (of Māṭhara)	Chowkhamba
<i>SK Sāṅkhyakārikā</i> (of Īśvarakṛṣṇa)	Chowkhamba
<i>Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya</i> (of Vijñānabhikṣu)	Chowkhamba
<i>Sāṅkhyasūtra</i>	Chowkhamba
<i>Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī</i> (of Vācaspati)	Chowkhamba
<i>Tattvavaiśārādī</i> (of Vācaspati)	Chowkhamba
<i>Yogabhāṣya</i> (of Vyāsa)	Chowkhamba
<i>Yogasūtra</i> (of Patañjali)	Chowkhamba

**VIII. Vedānta Texts**

<i>Bhāmatī</i> (of Vācaspati)	Nirnayasagar
<i>Brahmasūtra</i> (of Bādarāyaṇa)	Nirnayasagar
<i>Brahmasūtra-śāṅkarabhāṣya</i>	Nirnayasagar
<i>Citsukhī</i> (of Citsukha)	Nirnayasagar
<i>Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā</i> (of Śrīharṣa)	Lajarasa, Kashi
<i>Siddhāntabindu</i> (of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī)	Kumbhakonam
<i>Śrībhāṣya</i> (of Rāmānuja)	
<i>Vedāntaparibhāṣā</i> (of Dharmarājādharīndra)	Chowkhamba
<i>Vedāntasāra</i> (of Sadānanda)	Nirnayasagar, Bombay





Magin J. Shah, a renowned Sanskritist and eminent scholar of Indian philosophy, has edited the present work. His first work *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy—a Study*, published in 1966, was widely acclaimed by scholars all over the world. At present he has several brilliant works to his credit. The following are the works in English : *Essays in Indian Philosophy*, *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā—Critique of an Authority*, *A Study of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī—a Mature Sanskrit Work on Indian Logic* (in three parts). And the following works are in Gujarati: *Sāṅkhya-Yoga*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *Bhāratīya Tattvajñāna*, *Śāṅkara Vedānta—Avidyā*, *Bauddha Dharma-Darśana*. He has also given an excellent English translation of Muni Nyayavijayaji's voluminous important Gujarati work *Jaina-Darśana* (English title: *Jaina Philosophy and Religion*). Moreover, he has edited, from the old original manuscripts, the unpublished *Nyāyamañjarī-Granthibhaṅga*. Again he has edited *Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth*.

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