

श्री यशोविजय
कैन ग्रंथमाला

दादासाहेब, साधनगर.

फोन : ०२७८-२४२५३२२

३००४८४५

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Preface.

The writer of this pamphlet has touched one of the most interesting problems to be found either in the history of India or in the history of religion. One who would make a chronologically accurate estimate of the era of Jainism is at some disadvantage from the first as the oldest authorities of the antiquity of Jainism—the “Purvas” have been destroyed by time. The task of restoring even their outlines is proceeding but slowly. Nevertheless enough remains to demonstrate the extreme antiquity of the venerable system.

It has in itself the true intrinsic evidence of an antique religion. Its ground-work is animism which in one shape or other is found at the thresholds of most old religions. But in Jainism it has a place such as it has secured no where else. It is the very backbone of the creed—an infallible indication

that the system originated very early and that it carries us very far back on the line of the evolution of religions. Animistic principles are however no reproach to a religion. The most modern theories, the so called "religion of science" have a tendency to revive these oldest of opinions.

Nor is this the only argument for its antiquity in general or for its priority to a deliberately matured religion like Buddhism. Its extreme simplicity points to the same view. It is based on a few truths and fundamental ideas. It has not arisen at a time when it could be subject to that corruption of subtle religions—the hankering after dogmatic refinements. Relying on the essential moral truths, its founder eschewed the pitfalls of casuistry—ethics as a science is one matter as an integral portion of a religion another. The speculative creed of certain religious teachers and philosophers delighted in ethical problems while the simpler and more antique Jainism saw the inefficacy of ethical

subtleties in the way of elevating the moral character of its followers.

We see Jainism in the course of its evolution from its ancient sources; while the later system Buddhism we see rising at the bidding of one man in all its formal and logical completeness and consistency. Such mechanical exactness was not to be expected in a system which in all likelihood took its rise before the great systems of Indian philosophy had put on the garb in which we now see them.

There is another argument yet. The Jaina system shows a preference for asceticism (tapas). Herein it presents a great contrast to early Buddhism. For a preference for asceticism is the sign of undoubted antiquity. By the time of Buddha the ascetic principle must have been greatly weakened in India; otherwise his efforts could never have shaken it. By the time Buddha made his appearance in history, the Jains seem to have formed a powerful

organization. Their organization may have lent itself to Buddha for imitation for, "It is evident that Buddha was a head of a monastic order of the same type as that to which Nâtaputta belonged." Nâtaputta indeed stood out against Buddha's preaching as an able representative of the older order, and even the Bhddhists have thought him an important personage and recorded for us some details of his life. As for the Jains, by a strange though significant transference of title they called him a Buddha. "For before Buddha there were heretics and even Buddhas, for the title was Buddha's only by adoption."

In his Hibbert Lectures for 1881 Rhys Davids proposes to deal with two suggestions which militate against Buddha's originality. On the one hand he quotes Prof. Jacobi for the view that "the Buddhist theory of the Buddhas was derived from a corresponding theory of the forerunners of the Jains." The other allegation is that Gotama borrowed

largely from Kapila the reputed founder of the Sankhya system. Against the latter argument he urges the fact that "there is not the slightest evidence that any one of the writings of the six schools of philosophy are Pre-Buddhistic." If this be true of the faith of Buddha it is true a *multa fortiori* of the Jain system. But when he would get rid of the first allegation by saying that the extant books of the Jains are many centuries later than the Pali Pitakas he at once enters into a fallacy. For the chief thing to be noticed is not what books of the Jains are extant now, but which authorities were available in the age of Buddha and his disciples.

"There is one good reason for the treating of Jainism before Buddhism that the former represents a theological mean between Brahmanism and Buddhism." (Hopkins's Religions of India). Thus on the one hand it bears a near enough resemblance to Buddhism to have been considered almost a sect of it by unwary inquirers, while on the

other it has given so little offence to Brahmanism that it was tolerated after Buddhism was chased out of India with relentless hatred. Nay, Brahmans have been found willing to officiate at Jain shrines. For by that time the Jaina system had shown its practical adaptability for the Indian mind, while the Buddhistic system has not only long since lost its hold over India but is observed in other parts of the world only in the shape of a curious parody of its founder's practices.

Again Jainism must have been long and firmly established, centuries before Buddha to have withstood the torrent of Buddhistic missionary zeal which swept away several rivals of Buddhism which started with it. It must have been long enough in India to have become popular and to have incurred no portion of that religious opposition which was let loose against Buddha's faith. While the Buddhist made the East of India his stronghold and had to retire still further

Eastward, the Jainas clung to India and triumphed so far that he holds his own in the very centers of Brahmanism.

It would be curious to inquire how in the popular mind Buddhism and Jainism came to be mixed up. Both in religion and in metaphysics they are widely asunder from each other. A far greater prominence is given to asceticism by Jainism than in Buddhism. It is true that both have "Nirvana" for their object but the Nirvana of the one is by no means the Nirvana of the other. The Jain's Nirvana differs greatly from that of the Buddhist's in its conception of the means of attaining perfect beatitude. The difference between the two systems spans all the interval between Animism and Pantheism. Nevertheless there are resemblances which may well mislead the incautious observer. Both believed in reincarnation and births carrying the man who has begun his religious probation to Nirvana, for both systems the chief founder was the last link

of a chain of 24 prophets. Moreover the words like "Nirvana" and "Buddha" being common to both systems led to much confusion. When the priority in time of Jainism has been generally recognised these common traits will acquire for themselves a new significance in the historical evolution of Indian religions.

Whoever urges that Jainism had no priority in time over Buddha's religion has a heavy case to make out. He must show us who the Niganthas were with whom Buddha held such frequent discussions, he must explain the contrasted dissimilarities of the two systems, he must account for the different stages of religious evolution in which we find Buddhism and Jainism. For in metaphysics as in religion the Jain system differs radically from the Buddhist.

The following pages have not been written in any partisan spirit in order to magnify the antiquarian merits of one system over the other. Mere antiquity is but a poor boast

although with the habitual conservatism of the East a great deal too much has been made out of it. But the clearing of the chronology of religions has its interest for the historical student who cannot understand the meaning of religious changes without being clearly aware of their social surroundings and needs and historical antecedents. These are the best commentaries on the spirit of religions and the time and labour spent on gaining such help will bear ample fruit.

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July 1904.

NOTE.

I am not in a position to judge the opinion put forward by the Jains that Brahminism took its birth in the time of their 8th Jina. The Jains support their view by proving that Saktayana, the learned grammarian mentioned by Panini, was a Jain, and that this Saktayana's name occurs in the Rig Veda and Sulka Yajurveda. But the decision of this moot question any way cannot affect our subject.

I shall confine myself to facts which I can prove and by Jains I shall understand only those who can be proved to be Jains. Even taking the least favourable view, even following the general opinion of European Scholars that Brahminism is earlier than Jainism, I think we are in a position to prove satisfactorily the priority of Jainism over Buddhism. I think it my duty to repeat that when I speak of Jainism as posterior to Brahmanism I confine myself to Jainism as prevailing

during the last two Jinas, I do not allude to Jainism as it is said to have existed during the preceding 22 Jinas.

R. B. P.

THE PRIORITY OF JAINISM OVER BUDDHISM

With a Comparison of their History and Philosophy.

CHAPTER I.

Introductory.

In ancient India men's mind naturally turned to philosophical studies and metaphysical abstractions. Max Muller explains this marked characteristic of 'mystic' India by saying "The necessities of life were abundantly provided by nature, and people with few tastes could live there like the birds in a forest, and soar like birds towards the fresh air of heaven, and the eternal sources of light and truth." India has produced some of the greatest sages that ever lived; it has put forth and developed the highest ideals of philosophy and religion. Almost every philosophy known at present to the Western world, through Greece or Egypt

could be traced to its source in India. In short it has produced a society "in which spiritual interests predominate and throw all material interests into the shade, a world of thinkers, a nation of philosophers." The student who wants to compare the two religions—Buddhism and Jainism—should always bear in mind that it was this India, which gave birth both to Buddhism, "this mighty religion that moulds so many million minds, that trains so many million intellects," and to Jainism, the religion which continues to flourish meekly and unobtrusively in her native soil, from which every vestige save stuppas and pillars of her once glorious and powerful rival has disappeared.

Before entering into any comparison between the dogmas and doctrines of the two religions, we will first establish the identity of Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism; and Vardhamana, known better as Mahavira, not the founder, but the last prophet of the Jains. We shall then show these

two persons contemporaries, examining and comparing some of the chief incidents of their lives, the similarity of some of which led the European scholars for a long time to believe that Buddha and Mahavira were one and the same personage, figuring under different names. After showing Mahavira, a contemporary of Buddha, we shall show that before Mahavira became recognised as a prophet and saint, before he began to organise his order of ascetics, there existed an order known as the Nigantas—the followers of Parshvanath, the Jain prophet immediately preceding Mahavira—who were very analogous to Mahavira's followers, and who in a body joined him, acknowledging him as their prophet. In other words we shall try to show that Mahavira, the contemporary of Buddha was not the founder of the Jain religion, but only its reformer, that is to say Jainism existed in India, before Buddha's time. After examining critically and answering the arguments advanced by some

oriental scholars, tending to show in their opinion the later origin of Jainism, we shall enter into a general comparison of the teachings and doctrines of the two systems, considering carefully what each has to say about the origin of our existence, the cause of human pain and misery, 'Nirvana' the final deliverance offered and the means and ways of acquiring it.



CHAPTER II.

*Mahavira and Buddha**two distinct historical personages.*

Mahavira, the reputed founder of Jainism was the younger son of Sidharta, the rajah of Kundanpura or Kundagrama, and was born in or about 599 B. C. Sidharta was not a great king, the position he held may be fitly compared to that of the semi-independent German princes of the 18th Century. Kundagrama was as Professor Jacobi proves, very likely a suburb of Vaisâli, the capital of Videha (Vaisali is the modern Besarh about 27 miles from Patna). Mahavira's mother Trishala was a sister of Kataka, who may be called the constitutional king of Vaisali, as the Government of Vaisali was vested in a senate of which he was the hereditary president, sharing his authority with a viceroy and a general-in-chief. Through his mother, Mahavira was connected with the ruling dynasty of Magada,

as his cousin (Kataka's daughter) had married Seniya Bimbisara, king of Magada. The influence and support of his powerful relatives were of great use to Mahavira in spreading and propagating his religion. Mahavira lived with his father, till the latter's death, when with the consent of his elder brother, Nandivardhana, who had succeeded to his father's principality, he entered the spiritual career which seemed to offer a good field for the younger sons of nobility. When he became an ascetic he was about 28 years old. For 12 years he practised self-mortification, at the end of which period he was acknowledged to be a Kevalin i. e., a holy and omniscient person. Besides being called Kevalin, the titles of Jina i. e. the spiritual conqueror, (from which word Jain and Jainism are derived) Mahavira i. e. the great Hero and Tirthakara i. e. showing the right path or leader of a School of thought, were given to him. The last thirty years of his life Mahavira spent in teaching his

doctrines and organising his order of the ascetics. In this work, as we have already said he was powerfully assisted by his mother's relatives especially the kings of Videha, Magada and Anga i. e. those of North and South Behar. In this long period of his ministry although he occasionally took long journeys, at times as far north as Sravasti and as far south as the Parasvanath hill, he generally restricted his work within Behar. Mahavira died at the rather advanced age of 72 in 527 B. C. in the small town of Pâpâ or rather Pâwâ in the Patna district.

Now we will speak a little about the immediate disciples of Mahavira. The Jain sacred books seem to attach great importance to the fierce hostility of Gosâla Man-khaliputta towards Mahavira's order. This Gosala was the founder of an order of monks called the Ajivikas or Achelakas. Prof. Jacobi considers this Gosala to be an independent founder of a sect with whom Maha-

vira lived for six years practising great austerities, and from whom he very probably borrowed those rigid rules which were not to be found in the ancient creed as followed by the Niganthas. The other version which is generally believed to be better makes Gosâla one of the 12 disciples of Mahavira, who quarrelling with his master set up a rival order of ascetics under himself. This order seems to have flourished well for some centuries as we find a mention of it, so late as in one of the pillar edicts of Asoka about 234 B. C. The other eleven disciples of Mahavira remained all faithful to him, but only one of them, Sudharman by name, survived him and also left behind spiritual successors.

Knowing the important events in Mahavira's life, we are in a position to compare them with the principal ones in Buddha's life; and thus dispel the suspicion that he is only a mythical personage invented some centuries after his pretended death, by a

younger sect with Buddha as its model. The first similarity between these two persons is to be found in the names of some of their relatives. This fact, if it proves anything, shows only that those certain names were common among the Kshatriyas at that time, as they are even in our days. The other point is that both are represented as descendants of royal Kshatriya families. In answer to this point it is enough to say that one was the son of the king of Kundagrama near Vaisâli, while the other was the son of Suddhadana, a chief of the Sakya tribe, which lived in the fertile region between the lower Hymalayas of Nepal and the middle course of the Rapti, and was born at Kapilavastu, the capital of the Shakhyas. Mahavira's original name was Vardhamana, while Buddha's was Siddhatta. The name of Buddha's mother was Mayadevi and she died soon after his birth, while Mahavira's mother Trishalâ, lived to see him a grown-up man. While Buddha turned an

ascetic during the life time and strongly against the will of his father, who had taken all possible measures to prevent him from being one, Mahavira became an ascetic after his father's death and with the permission of those in power. The other similarity observed is that both of them observed a life of self-mortification and austerities, one for 12 years and the other for six. There is nothing peculiar in this observation of austerities. every one in India at that time, wishing to acquire any extraordinary or superhuman knowledge, lived such a life before he could expect to acquire that knowledge. The other thing to observe in reference to this point is that though both lived the life of self-mortification and penance, the effect on each was diametrically opposite. Buddha not only found these years wasted, but he found the weakened body it produced quite detrimental to his end, while Mahavira was convinced of the necessity of his penances and self-tortures, and continued

to practise them even after acquiring the Kevalinship. The other point of resemblance is that Gosâla Makkhaliputra is represented as an opponent both of Buddha and Mahavira, though not so bitter against the order of Buddha as he was against that of Mahavira. Now there is nothing very strange or particular in Gosâla the head of one of the six monastic orders which had sprung up at that time, bearing animosity against two of the most important rival orders. We shall finish this comparison between Buddha and Mahavira by saying that the latter died in Pawa, while the former died in Kusingara. The European scholars attached undue importance to certain points of resemblance in their lives, forgetting that they were examining the lives of two Indian ascetics which as Prof. Jacobi says 'from the very nature of things must present some conformity.' Even men like Prof. Weber were carried away, by what they fancied to be a strong resem-

blance between the reputed founders of the two religions and Weber refused to give the Jain an origin independent of Buddhism, only allowing them to be one of the oldest sects of Buddhism, saying "the number and importance of co-incidencies in the tradition of either sect regarding their founders is on the whole overwhelming." But the recent discoveries of the Jain literature and the discovery of pillar-edicts and stuppas have put the matter on a very clear basis, and it is now almost unanimously believed that the account given by the Jains themselves of Mahavira, and which is corroborated by the Buddhist sacred books is substantially true ; though some incidents might have been stated in a very exaggerated form. As for Buddha, recent excavations and investigations of the famous pillar edicts of Asoka and the openings of the Topes or 'religious edifices dedicated emphatically to Buddha, and Dhagobas or 'relic shrines', have shed such a light on Buddha and his life that no one

at present thinks of doubting with Prof. H. Wilson, that Buddha was very probably a mythical personage, his own name, the name of his mother Maya, and the place of his birth Kapilavastu being simply allegorical names. Nor are there at present many persons to share the ingenious opinion of Emile Senart, who while acknowledging that Buddhism must have a founder, refuses to believe that the Buddha of whom the Buddhist tradition speaks ever lived. Senart basing his opinion entirely on 'Lalita Vistara' the legendary biography current among the northern Buddhists, sees in the history of Buddha's life only an allegorical representation of the destinies of the Sun-hero. All doubts about the birth place of Buddha have been cleared away entirely by the very recent investigation of Dr. Waddell and Dr. Führer, who were not only able to indentify the city of Kapilavastu, Buddha's birth-place, but also the very garden of Lumbini in which he is said to have been born. Now.

the opinion expressed by Oldenburg, is believed, by almost all to be the true one. "It is evident" says Prof. Oldenburg "that Buddha was a head of the monastic order of the very same type as that to which Nataputta belonged, that he journeyed from town to town in the garb and with all the external circumstances of an ascetic, taught and gathered round himself a band of disciples to whom he gave simple ordinances." Max Muller has expressed himself emphatically against those who consider Buddha to be a mythical personage and not an historical personality. He says ' I can not help thinking that it was Buddha's marked personality far more than his doctrine, that gave him the great influence on his contemporaries, and on so many generations after his death. Whether he existed or not such as he is described in the Suttas, there must have been some one, not a mere name, but a real power in the history of India, a man who made a new epoch in the growth of Indian

philosophy, and still more of Indian religion and ethics. His teachings must have acted like a weir across a swollen river."

The relation between Buddha and Mahavira seems to be one of independence on both sides. The suggestion made by Dr. Hamilton and Major Delemaine, and considered by Colebrooke as very probable, that Gautama Buddha was originally one of the disciples of Mahavira seems to us if not impossible highly improbable. According to these persons' suggestion, which seems to have convinced Cunningham, Gautama Swami or Gautama Indrabhuti, one of the chief disciples of Mahavira is the same personage as Gautama Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist religion. Colebrooke in support of this hypothesis says in his *Essays* "In the Kalpa Sutra and in other books of the Jains the first of Mahavira's disciples is mentioned under the name of Indrabhuti, but in the inscriptions under that of Gautama Swami. The names of the other ten precisely agree,

hence it is to be concluded that Gautama, first of one list is the same with Indrabhuti first of the other.

“ It is certainly probable as remarked by by Dr. Hamilton and Major Delemaine that the Gautama of the Jains and the Buddhists is the same personage, and this leads to further surmise that both these stocks were branches of one stock.” The other argument which Colebrooke puts forth is this. The Jains say that only two of Mahavira’s disciples survived him, Indrabhuti and Sudharma, and out of these two only one, Sudharma left behind him spiritual successors, while the other left no disciple in the Jaina Sect. This according to him can be clearly accounted for by indentifying Indrabhuti the apostate with Gautama who founded the rival order of Buddhism and who thus left no successors in the Jain Sect. Then Colebrooke goes on speaking about the tenets of the Bhuddhists which he finds in many respects analogous to those of the

Jains, with which we are not concerned at present. Though Cunningham is so thoroughly convinced of this identity of the chief disciple of Mahavira with Gautama Buddha, that he does not hesitate to use this theory of Buddha being originally a disciple of Mahavira as one of the grounds for determining the date of Buddha's Nirvana "within one or two years with absolute certainty" we are far from believing this surmise as probable; nothing in the lives of both goes to show that they had ever come in great personal contact with each other.



CHAPTER III.

Mahavira and Buddha contemporaries.

After having shown that Mahavira and Buddha were two distinct historical personages, we shall try to establish their important dates. There is not much controversy about Mahavira's date of birth and death. The concurrent testimony of the Jains in all parts of India has fixed the year 527 B. C. as the year of his death, and as he died at the age of 72, he must have been born in 579 B. C. The dates about the founder of Buddhism are not so definitely and easily determined. The great difficulty of determining the exact date of a founder of a philosophy and religion in ancient India can be easily understood by one who remembers that at that early period, the Indians never thought of writing a biography however short and dry. Ancient India gave the almost unique example of a country in which there is a detailed history of philosophy without having any-

thing like a history of philosophers. Max Muller, speaking on this point in the introductory chapter of "Six systems of Indian Philosophy," says "While in most countries a history of philosophy is inseparable from a history of philosophers, in India we have indeed ample materials for watching the origin and growth of philosophical ideas, but hardly any for studying the lives or characters of those who founded or supported the philosophical systems of that country. Their work has remained and continues to live to the present day, but of the philosophers themselves hardly anything remains to us beyond their names. Not even their dates can be ascertained with any amount of certainty." As for Buddha's birth, from Childers' Dictionary of the Pâli language, we find that according to the Pâli texts, he was born about 622 B. C. and died 543 B. C., but modern researches by eminent European scholars, have almost conclusively shown that these dates put Buddha roughly speaking 100 years

before his real time. The dates given by the modern European scholars for his birth and death are 557 and 477 B. C. respectively. General Alexander Cunningham has treated this question very elaborately and minutely in the preface to the first volume (Inscriptions of Asoka) of his *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*. Cunningham starts by examining critically the date 544 B. C. given by the Pâli texts of Ceylon and Burmah of Buddha's death, and shows by various arguments that there is a mistake of 66 years in this counting, and thus brings down the date of his Nirvana from B. C. 544 to B. C. 478. Cunningham's first argument is based on Chandra Gupta's date of accession. The Pâli chronicles assigned for the accession of Chandra Gupta 162 A. B. (i. e. 162 years after the death of Buddha) that is in (544—162) 382 B. C. Now the date of Chandra Gupta has been determined by proofs independent of the Pâli texts. He has been identified by Sir William Jones

with Sandrokoptus, the ally of Seleukus Nikator, and the date of his accession fixed in B. C. 316. Thus there is a difference of exactly 66 years between the two dates and which could be removed by applying the correction of the same period to Nirvana itself, as the "succession of Buddhist teachers from the death of Buddha to the time of Asoka is natural and unbroken." Cunningham also shows that there would be a mistake of about 66 years in the real date of the accession of Asoka, Chandra Gupta's grandson, and the date given by the Pâli texts, which started by putting Chandra Gupta's accession in 120 A. B. i. e. 382 B. C. Asoka's dates can be fixed in two ways; the first is to start with his grandfather's date of accession (B. C. 316) and to calculate his from that, the second way is to determine it from the dates of the five Greek princes, mentioned by him in one of his pillar edicts as his contemporaries. The date so fixed for his accession is 264 B. C., and for his inauguration which

took place 4 years after, 260 B. C. But if we start by taking the Nirvana in 544 B. C., Asoka's date of accession would be raised to 330 B. C., "just 66 years before Antiochus II. succeeded to the throne of Syria and 58 years before his contemporary Alexander II succeeded to the throne of Epirus." As we have already said the Buddhist line of teachers from Buddha's death to the time of Asoka being natural and unbroken, the date of the Nirvana itself must be shifted down 66 years i. e. it must be brought down from 544 B. C. to 478 B. C.

The next argument of Cunningham's need not be entered into, it being based on assuming Buddha to be a disciple of Mahavira.

Cunningham bases his third argument on a Sanskrit inscription discovered by him, at Gaya, which states that the 1st of the waning moon of Karttika 1813 A. B. fell on a Wednesday. The mention of this week day, Wednesday, serves to show that the

Northern Buddhists did not reckon the date of Buddha's death from 544 B. C., because if they had done so, 1813 A. B. would be (1813—544) 1269 A. D., in which year the first of Karttika budi fell on Sunday (27th October) and not on Wednesday. Then Cunningham points out that by adopting his proposed correction of 66 years, the date of the inscription would fall on 4th October 1335 A. D., which day was a Wednesday. The week day given in the inscription is of great use to Cunningham in determining within very narrow limits, the date of Chandra Gupta's accession and hence Buddha's Nirvana. As Dr. Bühler had already shown, the beginning of Chandra Gupta's reign must fall between 321 and 310 B. C., the limiting dates of Buddha's Nirvana which took place. 162 years before, will be (321 + 162) 483 B. C. and (310 + 162) 472 B. C. Cunningham has calculated that between 321 and 310 B. C., there are only three years, B. C. 319, B. C. 316 and 309 B. C.,

which taken as a starting point will give Wednesday for Karttika budi 1, 1813 A. B. Of these three dates the last is certainly too late, as it would place Asoka's inauguration in 253 B. C., and his conversion to Buddhism in 250 B. C. But we know that his conversion to Buddhism, must have taken place at least before 254 B. C. if not before 258 B. C., because the treaties he made, after his conversion to Buddhism, with the Greek Kings must have been made before the death of Alexander II of Epirus (254 B. C.) if not before the death of Majas (258 B. C.) From the two remaining possible dates for Chandra Gupta, 316 and 319 B. C., Cunningham prefers for various reasons, 316 B. C. for the accession of Chandra Gupta. This will give $(316 + 162)$ 478 B. C. for Buddha's death.

This date 478 B. C. is at present believed, as we have already said, as the true date of Buddha's death, by almost all the European scholars, and the theory of Prof. Kern who

places the Nirvana of Buddha in 388 B. C. finds few if any supporters. Kern fixes this date by raising Asoka's accession from 263 to 270 B.C., and by considering the period elapsed between Asoka's accession and Buddha's death to be 100 years, according to one of the two theories prevailing amongst the Northern Buddhists and based on a prediction attributed to Buddha in the Asoka Avadāna, that "100 years after his Nirvana, there would be a king of Pataliputra named Asoka who would distribute his relics."



CHAPTER IV.

The existence of the Jains known as the Niganthas long before Mahavira's time.

After having shown that Mahavira and Buddha were two real historical beings and contemporaries, we shall attempt to show that Mahavira was not in the strict sense of the word, the founder of Jainism but its reformer. In other words we shall show that Jainism or a sect very analogous in its beliefs, and doctrines and even in its mythology to Mahavira's sect, existed in India before Mahavira began to preach his teachings, and long before he founded his order of ascetics.

Mahavira has been often referred to in the Buddhist books under the name of Nâtâputtâ, or the head of the Niganthas, under which name the Jains were originally known, and under which they are mentioned in the pillar edicts of Asoka about 243 B.C. Under the same name the Jains continued to be known for many centuries afterwards,

for Huen Siong, the famous Chinese traveller, knew them, as Dr. Rudolf Hoernle points out, even so late as the seventh century A. D. under no other name. Now we shall examine whether the Niganthas or Nigranthas, who were originally the followers of Parsvanath,—Mahavira's predecessor according to the Kalpa Sutra by about 2 centuries—and who already existed as an important sect at the time when the Buddhist church was founded, and who afterwards went over to Mahavira in a body, had beliefs and doctrines in many respects similar to Mahavira's teachings. From the Anguttara Nikâya quoted by Jacobi in which is found an account of some of the Nigantha doctrines, we learn that the Niganthas believe 'in the annihilation by austerities of the old Karman, and the prevention by inactivity of new Karman.' They believe that when 'Karman ceases misery ceases, when misery ceases perception ceases, when perception ceases every misery would come to end. In

this way a man is saved by annihilation of sin which is really effective.' We shall see afterwards while examining the Jain doctrines that they held the same view about the cause, annihilation and prevention of Karman.

The second important doctrine held in common by the Niganthas and the Jains is the doctrine of Kriyavada as opposed to the doctrine of Akriyavada ; of these two doctrines we shall speak a little more fully when we consider the Jains as believers in Kriyavada as opposed to the Akriyavada Buddhists.

The third point of similarity between the Niganthas and the Jains is that they both consider three kinds of 'Dandas' (sins), the Danda of body, speech and mind ; also they concur in considering the sins of the body more important than those of the mind*,

* The statement that both the Niganthas and the Jains concur in considering the sins of body more important than those of the mind is made here on the authority of the learned Jacobi, though some of the Jain Pandits have assured me that neither the Niganthas nor the Jains made or make any such difference.

'as against the Buddhists who consider the sins of the mind to be heavier, because they rightly think that "it depends on the intention of the man whether a deed of his be a sin or not."

The fourth point to be observed is that the Niganthas hold the opinion that the soul has no colour and it continues to exist after death and is free from ailments. This opinion, the first part of which is in contradiction to the doctrine of Ajivikas, who divide mankind into six classes according to the colour of Atman, is held by the Niganthas in common with the Jains.

The fifth point of similarity is the extreme care, carried almost to an unimaginable extent, of both the Jains and the Niganthas for life in whatever form and in whatever condition. We are told the Niganthas did not use cold water, because it is considered to be possessed of life. We, who know to what an extent the Jains have carried this idea of preservation of life, we, who have

seen them carrying about a broom stick, to clean the ground before sitting over it, a piece of cloth round their mouth whilst in dark for fear of destroying unwittingly some insects, need not be surprised to hear the Niganthas not using cold water.

After having considered the important points of similarity between the Jains and the Niganthas, we shall now examine two other points in which they seem to differ not in quality but only in quantity; the difference being neither fundamental nor essential. The duties of a Nigantha layman during the fast days seem to be far more severe than those of a Jain one. During the fast days all difference between a Nigantha monk and a layman disappears. He has to take off his clothes and pronounce the vow of renunciation similar to that which the monk has to take on entering the order. Now a Jain layman, though during the Uposâtha days, observes fast, gives up all luxury and ornaments, he has not to

take off his clothes, nor has he to take the vow of renunciation, pronouncing the words "I belong to nobody and nobody belongs to me."

The other difference, which may be considered the main difference between the two orders—the Niganthas or the followers of Pârsva and the Jains or the followers of Mahavira—lies in the fact that Pârsva's order had only four vows to take, while Mahavira increased the number and his followers has five vows to take; and further Mahavira required his monks to discard clothes altogether while the Nigantha monks were allowed to wear a piece of cloth for the sake of decency. It was mainly this order of Mahavira's to discard clothes altogether that caused afterwards, the two distinct sects of the Jains; the Svetambaras and Degambaras, or the white clothed and unclothed (naked). This rigid rule of nakedness Mahavira very probably borrowed from Gosala, the son of Makkhali the head of the order of Ajivika

or Akêlakas (i.e. naked) monks. Thus we see that while on one hand the Jains abated somewhat in their rigidity with regard to the duties of laymen their laws for ascetics are more severe than those of the Niganthas. From this discussion it would be clear that the Jains were not a new sect founded by Mahavira, but were the continuation, with some changes of the old Niganthas. At present there does not seem to be any great doubt about Pârsva being a historical person, and about his flourishing a long time, if not 200 years, before Mahavira, as stated by the Jains. The fact of the Niganthas having been already an important sect at the time when Buddhism took its rise, seems to have been clearly proved, from their frequent mention in the Buddhist book as well as from other independent contemporary evidences. Gosâlâ Makkhâlî, who as we saw was the head of the third rival order of ascetics, and a contemporary of Buddha and Mahavira, is said to have, according to Bud-

dhaghôsa divided mankind into six classes, the third class of which contained the Niganthas. As Jacobi points out "Gosâla probably would not have ranked them as a separate i. e. fundamental subdivision of mankind, if they had only recently come into existence." The other proof mentioned by Jacobi is that in the Magghima Nikaya, there is narrated a disputation between Buddha and Sakkaka, the son of a Nigantha, and not a Nigantha himself. From this incident Jacobi rightly argues that 'when a famous controversialist whose father was a Nigantha, was a contemporary of the Buddha, the Niganthas can scarcely have been a sect founded during Buddha's life.'



CHAPTER V.

The examination and refutation of Dr. Bhandarkar's first two arguments against the antiquity of the Jains viz. "1st Some of its ideas resemble those of the Vaiseshikas. 2nd A morbid extravagance characterises its moral discipline etc."

After having shown that Mahavira was a contemporary of Buddha and that a sect very analogous to the Jains prevailed in India before Buddhism was established, we shall examine the opinion of the great living Indian Sanskrit scholar, the venerable Dr. Bhandarkar, who holds a contrary view about the antiquity of the Jains as a religious system. He acknowledges that the "doctrinal differences and differences on minor points are so great that Jainism and Buddhism must be considered as two different systems of religion springing from the same stream of ideas." He even admits that the "Nigantha Nataputha may have

flourished about the time of Buddha." But he admits so far only, and positively asserts, that Jainism is much later than Buddhism, and that "it must have received a definite shape and the sect became compact several centuries later." For this assertion of his—that Jainism is much later than Buddhism—Dr. Bhandarkar puts forth the following three arguments. "1st some of its ideas resemble those of the Vaiseshikas. 2nd a morbid extravagance characterises its moral discipline, while the tone of Buddhism is much more healthy, and 3rd its sacred language is the principal Prâkrit, while that of the Buddhists was originally the Pâli, and the Prakrits were formed in my opinion about the beginning of the Christian era."

Now we shall try to examine critically the first of the learned doctor's three arguments. It is true that the Vaiseshika system as taught in the Sutras or succinct aphorisms of Cānāde as Colebrooke spells

his name, or Kanada as it is usually spelt, are of a late origin. Max Muller has pointed out that no reference whatsoever is to be found about Kanada in the Upanishads. Max Muller by examining the work of Haribhadra, a Brahman converted to Jainism and who died in 528 A.D., comes to the conclusion that the Vaiseshika system of philosophy formed with the Nyaya, Sankhya, and Purva-Mimamsa, the subject of scientific study amongst the Jains early in the sixth century A. D. Though Max Muller does not think it improbable that the Vaiseshika school might have existed in the first century A. D., according to the Tebetan writers, he believes more proofs are necessary before we can admit the existence of the Vaiseshika school at that time. From this it would be clear that even according to the most favourable statement the Vaiseshika philosophy was of a late origin. But it is necessary to remember that Kanada's Vaiseshika system

as well as its sister system—Gautama’s Nyaya system,—were not any new philosophies; all that these two persons did was to collect together and put in a systematic form the Sutras, taken from various sources. As Jacobi says “The Vaiseshika philosophy may be briefly described as a philosophical treatment and systematical arrangement of those general concepts and ideas which were incorporated in the language, and formed the mental property of all who knew or spoke Sanskrit.” Now it is far more probable and undoubtedly more just to believe that the borrowings of which the Jains are rightly or wrongly accused were made not from the Vaiseshika system but from those early systems of philosophies from which the Vaiseshikas had collected their own system. This statement would appear quite clear, when by a critical examination of some of the important doctrines of the two systems, we shall show that they resemble only in those doctrines which are not

the characteristic marks of either, but which are to be found in many other philosophies ; while in those points which may be called the characteristic or differentiating marks, they are as different as any two systems can be. We will begin by examining the points of similarity between Jainism and Vaiseishism. The first point is that both maintain the doctrine of Kriyâvâda i.e. they maintain that the soul is directly affected and acted upon by passions and actions ; that is to say the soul is not in its nature unchangeable but “capable of development and modifications.” But as we have already said, this doctrine was held by the Jains even a long time before Mahavira, this was one of the main doctrines of the Niganthas, whose doctrines Mahavira continued. We may also observe that it was this doctrine which served to distinguish them from the Akriyâvâda Buddhists. The second point is that both are said to advocate the doctrine of Asatkârya, (i.e. the product is different

from its material cause) unlike the Sankhya and Vedânta, according to which, cause and effect are the same. The Satkârya doctrine of the Sankhya and Vedânta, Max Muller explains thus "No real effect would be possible, without the continuation of its cause. Though different in appearance or phenominally, both are the same substantially. An effect is not something newly produced or created, it is a new manifestation only, the cause being never destroyed but rendered invisible only." The difference may be given shortly in Dr. Bhandarkar's words. The doctrine of Satkârya maintains "that an effect is the same as its material cause or pre-exists in that cause and is made manifest by the operation which that cause undergoes"; while the advocates of Asatkârya maintain "that the effect which is produced is something new and did not exist before." After understanding the difference between 'Satkârya' and 'Asatkârya,' we are in a position to understand the Jain

opinion on this point, from which we will see that their doctrine is neither Satkàrya like that of the Sankhya and Vedànta, nor Asatkarya like the Vaiseshikas and Nyayas and we may add like the Buddhists. The Jains maintain that in one sense an effect pre-exists in the cause, and in another sense is a new thing, i. e. in one sense they are Satkàryas and in another Asatkàryas. The fact is that they have their own seven modes of expressing existence or non-existence of a thing. The meaning of these seven modes of speaking about the same thing is explained as follows by Mr. Virchand Ghandi, in a paper read by him before the World's Parliament of Religion, held at Chicago. "What is meant by these seven modes is that a thing should not be considered as existing everywhere at all times, in all ways, and in the form of everything. It may exist in one place and not in another at one time. All that is implied is that every assertion which is true is true only

under certain conditions of substance, space, time, etc.’

Now we will examine the third point in which they are said to resemble, namely that they both distinguish ‘gunas’ (quality) from ‘dravya’ (substance). We will see that this seeming resemblance between Jainism and Vaiseshika instead of proving the late origin of Jainism goes to prove its early origin. In Jainism we find that this difference between ‘Quality’ and ‘Substance’ is not clearly or consistently observed. Things which are at present recognised as qualities are constantly mistaken and mixed up with substances, as pointed out by Jacobi. This shows that the categories of qualities and substances were in the beginning of Jainism but dimly conceived, and the first just evolving from the second. In the Vaiseshika philosophy, on the contrary, the categories of quality and substance have been clearly distinguished from each other; the two terms being regarded correlative—substance

as the substratum of qualities, and quality as that which is inherent in substance. The Vaiseshika system does not consider, dharma and adharma (*or merit and demerit*) as substances, but considers them as qualities, unlike the Jains, and on Oldenburg's authority unlike the primitive conception of the Vedic Hindoos, who treat dharma and adharma, "as kind of substances with which the soul comes into contact." From this it is quite clear that if Jainism had adopted its notions of quality and substance from the highly developed Vaiseshika philosophy they would certainly not have been so confused and indistinct.

We have dwelt rather long and have gone into details in refuting the first argument of Dr. Bhandarkar's, not only because we have to go against the opinion of a man, recognised to be a great authority in these matters, but also because it gave us an opportunity to discuss some of the Jain doctrines.

Now we shall speak about Dr. Bhandarkar's second argument, a morbid extravagance characterising its moral discipline, unlike the Buddhist tone which is more healthy. No doubt the rules for Jain ascetics are very harsh, especially in the beginning when Mahavira went to the length of requiring his followers to observe absolute nudity; but this would be accounted for, if one remembers that Mahavira considered an austere life and torturing of self, quite essential for obtaining Nirvana, while Buddha considered on the contrary a healthy body necessary for a healthy mind and for right actions. We acknowledge, that in some matters especially in its respect for life, Jainism went to a very great extent, but while thus partially admitting the morbid extravagance of Jainism, we refuse to consider it as a sign of its late origin. It is quite natural, that in the beginning of a movement, in the frenzy of the moment, men are apt to be carried away to extremes,

but after the lapse of some time, by the natural reaction from overtension, they will come to see the right course. In our opinion, therefore, if the morbid extravagance prevailing in the moral tone of Jainism, proves anything, it indicates an origin older and not later than Buddhism.



CHAPTER VI.

The examination and refutation of Dr. Bhandarkar's third argument based on the sacred languages of the two religions.

Now we shall go to Dr. Bhandarkar's third and last argument, viz. that Prakrit, the sacred language of the Jains was formed in the beginning of the Christian era, while that of the Buddhists was originally Pâli. Dr. Bhandarkar, in common with some European Scholars like Barth, seems to hold that the Jain doctrines as gathered from their earliest written works are quite different in many points from the doctrines taught by Mahavira, that in the long time which is said to have elapsed between the teaching of those doctrines and the redaction of their canon, the Siddhanta, many of the original doctrines must have been forgotten or neglected, and their place supplied by many dogmas, which if not hostile were at least foreign to primitive Jainism. In ans-

wer to this, we shall say that the Jains were far from having only a confused idea of their creeds and doctrines previous to the redaction of their sacred books. How strictly they followed their doctrines could be easily imagined from the great number of persons who were considered by them as heretics and founders of new schisms, for differing from them in some comparatively unimportant details of belief. In the Council of Valabhi held about 454 A. D., and in which Devarddhi presided, the redaction of the Jain Cannon or the Siddhanta took place. With regard to this redaction it is necessary to remember that Devarddhi only 'probably arranged the already existing Mss, in a canon, taking down from the mouth of learned theologians only such works of which Mss were not available' Devarddhi's edition of the Siddhanta is therefore as Jacobi puts it "only a redaction of the sacred books which existed before his time in nearly the same form." Jacobi after comparing the oldest

Jain Prakrit, with the Prakrit of Hâla, Setubanda etc., on one side, and the Pâli on the other, concludes that the Jain Prakrit approaches more the Pali than the later Prakrit. This fact coupled with some metrical tests, based on observing the metres employed in the Jain sacred books, such as the Vaitâtiya metre, which is to be found in the Jain Sutrakritânga Sutra, and in the Dhammapada and other sacred books of the southern Buddhists, and the Trish-tubh metre, enable Jacobi to come to the conclusion that "the chronological position of the oldest part of the Jain literature is intermediate between the Pâli literature and the composition of the Lalita Vistara," and further that the beginning of the Jain literature should be placed nearer the time of the Pali literature, rather than that of the Northern Buddhists. The truth of this statement is clearly attested by a tradition prevailing amongst the Svetambara section of the Jains. In the reign of Chandra Gupta

a very severe famine lasting about 12 years, visited Magadha, the stronghold of the Jains. At this time that is about 310 B. C. Bhadrabâhu who was the head of the then yet undivided Jains, emigrated with a portion of his people to Southern India. Towards the end of the famine, Sithulibhadra who had become the head of the remaining portion of the Jains, during the absence of Bhadrabahu, called a meeting of the Sangha at Pâtaliputra, the modern Patna. It was this council which collected the Jain sacred books, consisting of 11 Angas and 14 Purvas, the latter collectively put into the additional Angas, thus making up altogether 12 Angas. The Jain monks who had remained in Magadha during the famine had been compelled by the exigencies of the time, to give up the habit which they had of going about in entire nudity, and to adopt the white dress. But the monks, who had voluntarily exiled themselves, were extremely dissatisfied, on their return to Ma

gadha, with this change and they refused to hold any connection with the white-robed monks; and consequently refused to acknowledge the collection of the sacred books made by the Council of Pataliputra during their absence, declaring that for them the Purvas and Angas were lost. This was the main cause of the division of the Jains into 2 sections, the Digambaras, the naked ones, and the Svetambaras, the white-robed ones. From this, we can see that the Svetambara Jains had their sacred books collected as far back as the end of the fourth century or the beginning of the third century B.C., that is to say about two centuries after Mahavira's death. But we are not to think from this that the Jains had no sacred writings for two centuries after Mahavira's death. The very fact that their sacred writings were collected in about 300 B. C., shows that they must have existed for a long time, for such a long time that a need was felt to collect them and re-arrange them. We see, therefore, no

reason to disbelieve the Jain tradition which says that Mahavira himself taught the Purvas to his immediate disciples the Ganadharas, who in their turn composed the Angas. The very name Purvas (earlier) shows that they were composed before the Angas.

Thus we have not only refuted Dr. Bhandarkar's argument for the late origin of the Jains, based on their literatures but by tracing the Jain sacred literature to its source, we have, we think, once for all shown the authenticity of the Jain sacred books.



CHAPTER VII.

The condition of India in the 5th century B. C.

The teachings of the two great schools of philosophy—the Vedanta and the Sankhya including the Yoga.

After having shown that the Jain system as taught by Mahavira and the Buddhist system as given out by Buddha were contemporaneous movements, we shall pass over to the examination of some of their important doctrines. But before entering upon the doctrinal differences or similarities it is necessary to consider the condition of India in the fifth century B. C. The fertile soil of India made the struggle for existence almost unknown to the ancient Indians, and gave to its people ample time to speculate over non-materialistic problems. Philosophical discussions and metaphysical topics ever engrossed the minds of the Indians. Kings and nobles venerated sages and philosophers, and held meetings in which deep metaphysical problems were argued. The life they led

was not a struggle for power and dominion, for wealth and enjoyment, but a life devoted with all its intellectual vigour to meditate on the one absorbing subject of religion and philosophy; they strove to know whence they came and where they were going. Schools of various thoughts had risen and flourished side by side without any hostility, at least, if not very amicably. This would give, we think, some idea of life in ancient India, but to understand clearly the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, it is necessary to know something about the two great systems of philosophy prevailing in India in the fifth century B. C., namely the Vedanta School and the Sankhya School of Kapila including the Yoga or theistical School of Patangali. We shall now look into the principal doctrines of the Vedanta School, as gathered mainly from MaxMuller's "Theosophy or Psychological Religion" and 'The six systems of Indian Philosophy' by the same author. The first and the fundamental doctrine of the Vedanta

philosophy is that ‘God is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the existence, continuance and dissolution of the universe. Creation is an act of his will, he is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.’ The Vedanta ‘Sutras, as Max Muller says, have worked out in details ‘these Eleatic ideas—namely that there is and there can be only One Absolute Being infinite, unchangeable, without a second, without parts and passions.’ The self, âtman or soul, cannot be different from Brahman, because Brahman comprehends all reality, and nothing that really is can therefore, be different from Brahman. The soul, therefore, is also infinite, immortal, intelligent, sentient and true.’ The âtman is always the same, there is no real difference between the individual soul and the supreme soul, the apparent difference being caused by Nescience or wrong knowledge, so when the Nescience vanishes the individual soul is found to be essentially the same as the supreme soul. We need not

enter here minutely into the difference between the two views, the Satyabhedavâda, and Bhedabhedavâda. Both these views admit that the individual and the supreme soul are essentially one, but they differ on the question whether the individual soul in its state of nescience is not something independent of and different from the supreme soul. The Bhedabhedavada taught that a soul before it arrives at the knowledge of its true nature, may be regarded neither as absolutely different from Brahma, nor as absolutely non-different from Brahma arguing that individual souls are like sparks issuing from a fire, which are neither absolutely different from the fire as they participate in the nature of fire, nor are they absolutely non-different, as they are distinguishable both from the fire and each other. On the other hand the Satyabhedavada view maintained that up to the moment of emancipation being reached, the individual soul and the supreme soul are different, explaining that

when the Upanishads speak of them as non-different, they transfer a future state of non-difference to that when difference still actually exists.

Summing up the Vedanta philosophy, we find it teaches that the only highest and eternal intelligent reality is the one Supreme Being, and secondly that the individual soul or self is never substantially and essentially anything but the Highest Self, and that our believing that anything else can exist beside it, arises from Avidya or Nescience, and that it is our ignorance only which makes us see phenomenal world and a phenomenal God.

Now we shall pass over to the Sankhya philosophy as taught by Kapila, and shall show its relation to Vedantism on some important doctrines. The Sankhya philosophy is unlike the Vedanta, dualistic. It starts with the doctrine that "there can not be the production of something out of nothing." The production of what does not already exist is impossible, because production is only

manifestation of what previously existed. It accepts the whole objective universe as real and calls it Prakriti. It is extremely difficult to define exactly the word 'Prakriti' Max Muller defines Prakriti as "the undeveloped matter or Urstoff containing in itself the possibilities of all things" Monier Williams calls it "an original primordial 'tattva' (that-ness), translating the word 'tattva' by 'essence', 'entity' and in some cases even by 'substance.' Colebrooke defines it "as the root or plastic origin of all: the universal material cause, identified by the cosmogony of the Puranas (in several of which Sankhya philosophy is followed) with Maya or illusion, and by mythologists with Brahmi, the power or energy of Brahma. It is eternal matter, indiscreet, undistinguishable, as destitute of parts, inferrible from its effects: being productive but no production." This original Prakriti is often called Mula-prakriti (root principle). It is also known as Amûlam-mûlam (rootless root) : Pradhana (chief one);

Avyakta (unevolved evolver); etc. This Prakriti under the eye of a Purusha develops into or produces 'Buddhi' or intellectual perception. This perception requires a new development before it can serve for conscious intellectual work. This third production is Aham-kara literally meaning the 'I making faculty or Egoism' but which is taken in the wider sense of self-consciousness or the sense of individuality, or as Max Muller puts it 'that which produces the sense of subject and in consequence of object also.' This Aham-kara produces the next five principles called Tanmâtres, 'subtile particles, rudiments or atoms' perceptible to beings of a superior order but unapprehended by the grosser senses of mankind. Next come eleven organs of sense and action, produced by Ahamkara. They are five organs of sense or perception,—the ear, the eye, the nose, the tongue and the skin—five organs of action—the hand, the foot, the larynx, the excretory

and generative organs, and lastly the mind, (Manas) standing between two sets and serving both for sense and action, being an internal organ for preception, volition and action. The Tanmâtres produce the five grosser elements (called Maha-bhuta) namely Akasa, Vayu, Tejas, Apas and Prithvi or Bhumi. The twenty-fifth entity is Purusha, the soul, which is neither producer nor produced, but eternal like Prakriti. It is as Colebrooke says ‘ multitudinous individual sensitive, eternal, unalterable immaterial ’ Here we may point out one of the main differences between the Sankhya and Yoga philosophy or between the atheistical and the theistical Sankhya. According to the Sankhya of Kapila there are ‘ many Purushas, as many as there are divine, human, animal and vegetable souls, and their plurality is conceived as eternal and not as phenomenal only.’ The theistical Sankhya or the Yoga-sastra of Patanjali, though believing in the individual Purushas or souls,

believes also in one supreme soul. They are almost like the Vedantists in this point, they believe the individual souls to exist only phenomenally, and admit of Iswara the supreme eternal soul. The Kapila philosophy appeared to Patanjali to involve a self-contradiction. The Purusha being considered by Kapila "as eternal, immortal and unconditioned, the plurality of such a Purusha would involve its being limited and would render the character of it self-contradictory."

The Prakriti though considered as a primordial essence is regarded as consisting of three constituent principles in a state of equipoise called Gunas. The Gunas are, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas meaning respectively 'goodness or purity, passion or activity darkness or ignorance.' Although they are called Gunas, these constituents are elementary substances possessing certain qualities, rather than qualities, themselves. These three 'Gunas' are like a triple cord by which the soul like an animal is

bound. These Gunas as they are the ingredients of Prakriti, they are also the ingredients of the whole world of sense evolved out of Prakriti, but in every other thing except in Prakriti, they are not in a state of equipoise. Every development or production of Prakriti which we have described would remain without consciousness, unless it attracts the attention of some Purusha, solely for whose benefit all its performances are. It is, therefore only the Purusha becoming conscious "of Prakriti and all its works, that produces what is the only reality of which we have any conception the phenomenal reality of a self-conscious soul."

Thus the Sankhya philosophy explains the creation by the temporary union between Purusha and Prakriti, which is compared to a lame man mounted on a blind man's shoulders. This union which is only temporary arises from a want of discrimination (Aviveka). Thus as Max Muller

says “the creation of the phenomenal world and our position in the phenomenal world are due to nescience (Avidya) with the Vedantist, but to a want of discrimination (Aviveka) with the Sankhya philosopher.....in the end both Vedanta and Sankhya look upon what we call reality, as the result of a temporary error, call it nescience, illusion, want of discrimination or anything else.” The object of the Sankhya was to do away with that want of discrimination which caused the union between Prakriti and Purusha in other words to free Purusha from all Prakritic bonds, whether ignorance or knowledge joy or sorrow. Just as there is a state of Nirvana in the Vedanta philosophy, and as we shall see also in both Buddhism and Jainism, Purusha, freed from the fetters of Prakriti “would be what he alone can be, unrestricted, not interfered with, free and independent”, and would reach the state of Nirvana promised by the Sankhya philosophy. We shall end the examination of the San-

khya philosophy with a quotation from Sir Monier Monier—Williams. “Obviously too its view of all existing things is even more atheistical than that of the earliest Naiyayikas. For if the creation produced by the evolver, Prakriti, has an existence of its own, independent of all connection with the particular Purusha to which it is joined, there can be no need for an intelligent Creator of the world or even of any superintending power.”

We have treated rather at length the Sankhya philosophy;—the doctrines of which have been gathered mainly from Sir Monier Monier—Williams’ ‘Indian Wisdom;’ F. Max Muller’s ‘Six Systems of Indian philosophy’ and Colebrooke’s ‘Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindoos’—and also the Vedanta philosophy, because we think it quite essential for a student of Buddhism and Jainism to grasp clearly the main doctrines of these two great philosophical schools with which India was saturated in those days.

CHAPTER VIII.

The comparison of some minor points of similarity between Jainism and Buddhism.

Now we shall pass on to the comparison of some of the Buddhist and Jain doctrines the similarity of which has struck so many European scholars, and from which some of them, like Lassen and Barth, have argued that Jainism has branched off from Buddhism. The first point of similarity that strikes one is that both sects know their prophets by the same epithets or titles, such as Jina, Araht, Mahavira, Tathagata, Buddha, Sambuddha, Mukta, etc. Although all these names occur more or less frequently in the writings of both sects, (with the exception of Jina) each sect seems to give preference to distinct sets of title; Buddha Tathugata and Sambuddha are commonly and generally applied to the founder of Buddhism, while Vira and Mahavira form the titles of Vardhamâna. We may observe

that the word Tirtakhara which means a prophet with the Jains, means a founder of heretical sect with the Buddhists. If we can force any conclusion from this fact, it is as Jacobi points out that ‘the Buddhists at the time when they formed their terminology were opponents of the Jains but not vice versa.’

The second point of similarity is that both sects worship their prophets, like gods, and erect statues of them in their temples. This worship had nothing to do with original Buddhism and Jainism, but was introduced gradually by laymen, and was the result “of the perpetual and irresistible influence of the religious development of the people in India.”

The third point of resemblance is that they both measure the history of the world by such fabulously enormous periods of time, as to be always beyond even our imagination. In this matter the Jains seem to have out done both the Buddhists and the Brahmans.

The Jains divide time into Avasarpini and Utsarpini; and consider the whole period completed in twenty cötes of cötes of Sagara or 2,000,000,000,000,000 oceans of years. The Buddhists seem to have derived their four great and eighty smaller kalpas from the Yugas and kalpas of the Brahmans.



CHAPTER IX.

The Jain and Buddhist monastic orders.

Upto now we have considered only some minor points of similarity between the two sects, now we will touch upon an important one, namely the great similarity that exists between the vows of the Jain and Buddhist ascetics. The five important precepts for the Buddhists are the following. (Quoted by Jacobi in his introduction to the Jain Suttas Part I.)

1. I take the vow not to destroy life.
2. I take the vow not to steal.
3. I take the vow to abstain from impurity.
4. I take the vow not to lie.
5. I take the vow to abstain from intoxicating drinks, which hinder progress and virtue.

Now we shall look at the five vows of the Jain ascetics, also given by Jacobi, which

will show the resemblance between the two sets of vows. They are:—

1. Not to destroy life.
2. Not to lie.
3. Not to take that which is not given.
4. To abstain from sexual intercourse.
5. To renounce interest in worldly things, especially to call nothing one's own.

From these two lists we can see at a glance, the first four vows of each sect entirely agree with one another, though not in the same order. The fifth vow of the Jains though not dissimilar to the fifth one of the Buddhists, is far more comprehensive.

The close similarity of the two sets of vows may lead one to think, that one sect has borrowed from the other, but the fact is quite different. Neither the Jains nor the Buddhists can claim originality in this matter as will be seen from the following five main vows of the Brahman Samnyasis.

1. Abstention from injuring living beings.

2. Truthfulness.
3. Abstention from appropriating the property of others.
4. Continence.
5. Liberality.

We see, from this, that the from first vows of the Jains and the Buddhists agree with those of the Brahmans; the Jainas even having their vows in the same order as the Brahmans. The fifth vow of each of the three sects is different, perhaps because the fifth Brahmanic vow of Liberality could not be enjoined on the Jain and Buddhist ascetics, as they were strictly forbidden to accept or possess silver or gold, or even to treasure them for the order. We may here observe that the Jains before the time of Mahavira had only four vows, but Mahavira had brought them upto five.

Now we shall try to examine the two monastic orders, comparing them as far as possible to the Brahmanic monastic order, which seems to have served as a model. We

have already shown the similarity of their vows. The opinion that the Buddhist monastic order has taken the Brahman ascetic for its model, has been distinctly supported by scholars like Max Muller, Kern, and Bühler. Max Muller after showing that the very word Bhikkhu or Bhiksu, applied to the members of the Buddhist fraternity is derived from Bhikshâkâryâ, the technical term for the begging of a Brahman ascetic; and after saying that many of the technical terms of the Buddhists could have come from the same source only, observes that it has been rightly said "without Brahmanism no Buddhism." We have already referred to some points of similarity between the Brahmanic, Jain and Buddhist monastic orders, we shall now look into some more rules regarding the lives of the ascetics of these three orders. The institution of the Vasso, or not changing the residence during the rainy season which prevails among the Buddhist and Jain monks, has its prototype in the

Brahmanic custom of retreating during the rainy season (Varshâs).

The Brahmanic rule for dress is that the ascetic "shall wear a cloth to cover his nakedness." We have seen that the Jain rule on this point was somewhat different, but we must remember that the rule requiring utter nudity in the ascetics was given out by Mahavira, and did not exist originally, and moreover that this rule was not carried out to any great extent. The Buddhists on the contrary always wore a dress, and that too clean and decent. Another rule for the Brahmanic ascetic is that "he shall avoid the destruction of seeds." This rule is to be found included in the Ahimsâ rule of the Jains and the Buddhists. But the Jains have carried this doctrine—care for life—to an extremely great length. In them, in common with the philosophy of the primitive nations, prevails the animistic theory "that nearly everything is possessed of a soul, not only have plants their own souls

but particles of earth, cold water, fire and wind" have also souls.

Another point is the striking similarity in the outfit of the monks of the three orders. The outfit consists in "sticks, a rope, a cloth for straining water, a water-vessel and an alms-bowl." In addition to these things, which all the three have in common, the Jains have a filter for the month (mukhavastrika).

The rule, that the Brahman ascetic should 'eat food given without asking regarding which nothing has been settled beforehand' applies equally to the Jains. This rule forms a part of the Jain rule for begging, which says that for food to be considered 'pure and acceptable, it must have been obtained without asking, and nothing should have been settled before hand for it.' The Buddhists also follow this rule but not very strictly; we find Buddha with his disciples accepting the invitations of his admirers and going to dine with them. The first part of

the rule—not asking for food—seems to have been followed with greater exactness. Oldenburg says “in the days when his reputation stood at its highest point and his name was named throughout India, among the foremost names, one might day by day see that man before whom kings bowed themselves, walking about, alms bowl in hand through streets and alleys, from house to house, and without uttering any request, with downcast look, stand silently wating until a morsel of food was thrown into his bowl.”

We shall close this comparison with some general remarks, about the monastic orders founded by Buddha and Mahavira. During the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries B.C., the ordinary tendency of the Indian mind for metaphysical questions was greatly intensified. The exclusiveness of Brahmans, the claims they made to be the necessary mediators between man and his Creator, had caused many men to devise some means of attaining Nirvana without the help of the Brah-

mans. Many monastic orders had risen, during these 3 centuries all of which promised to show a truer and easier path to salvation. These monastic orders were not a protest against the caste system but against the exclusive claims made by Brahmans, such as they and they alone can pass through all the four Asramas. The prevalent opinion that they represented a revolt against the tyranny of caste seems to be groundless. Not only were the chains of caste not broken, but caste as existing outside their orders was fully acknowledged. Although admission to these orders was thrown open to all, we find that the first followers of Buddha and Mahavira were taken almost entirely from the higher classes. Jainism and Buddhism, refusing to believe the Vedas to be divine, sought to teach man his independence of Brahmans and Vedas; showing that it was in his own power to work out his salvation. As Mrs. Frederika Macdonald, in her lectures on Bud-

dha and Buddhism delivered at South Place Institute says 'If you will not find in Buddhism the promise of miraculous consolations that only a supernatural religion can venture to hold out, you will find the encouraging and ennobling faith that man has within himself a strength and virtue that can render him independent of all such consolations. Buddhism as I have said, stands out as the one religion that bids man *trust himself*, that calls upon him to raise himself by his own strength, to govern and control and form himself; that assures him that there is no strength outside of himself to help him, but also none that can prevail against him, if he conquer and hold the sovereignty over himself.' We need not add here that what Mrs. Macdonald has said about Buddhism applies equally to Jainism.

In concluding this comparison of the two orders we shall mention a marked point of difference, pointed out by Dr. A. F. Rudolf Hoernle. The Jain monastic order included

four classes of persons, monks, nuns, lay-brothers and lay sisters ; the Buddhist had only two classes, monks and nuns. Though the Buddhist monastic order like all monastic orders, depended for its maintenance mainly on the secular part of the community, the treatment it gave to its lay-supportors was quite different from what Jainism gave to its lay-adherents. We shall give the different policy observed by the two orders towards their lay-adherents in Dr. Hoernle's own words. "With the Buddhists they had no part and parcel in the monastic organisation. They were not formally admitted into communion with the order ; they had not to take any vows ; there were no rules to regulate their position or conduct, no regular devotional services were held for them, neither was there any formal exclusion of any unworthy lay person, in fact the position of the lay-adherents was so loose and informal that a lay adherent of the Buddhistic order, might at the same

time be also an adherent of another order, there were no rules prohibiting such an anomalous position..... Very different was the case of the Jain lay-adherent. His position was exactly the reverse in all the points just enumerated. He formed an integral part of the organisation and thus was made to feel that his interests were bound with those of his order." Hoernle rightly considers this mistaken policy of the Buddhist order towards its lay-adherents one of the main causes of the disappearance of Buddhism from the land of its birth. He says the lay-followers of Buddhism having lost their monks to whom no paramount interest bound them, by a most natural process, relapsed into Brahmanism, in which they again found, as they had done before the advent of Buddhism not only their priests but also their spiritual directors.

CHAPTER X.

Nirvana—Its significance in Jainism and Buddhism.

Before entering into the particular doctrines of Buddhism or Jainism, we will discuss one point which seems to be common to all the six systems of Indian philosophy. The professed object of all these philosophical systems was to lead their followers to a state of Nirvana ; the difference between the different systems mainly lying in the difference of the means necessary to attain Nirvana. Before proceeding further it is necessary to understand clearly what was this state of Nirvana so universally sought after in ancient India. It is extremely difficult to define exactly what this Nirvana was. As Max Muller says “Nirvana in its highest sense is a name and a thought, but nothing can be predicated of it. It is ‘ what no eye has seen and what has not entered into the mind of man.’ We know that it is, but no one can say what it is.” We can say this much with

certainty of Nirvana, that it was the final goal, the *Summum Bonum* of all the six philosophies. Its nature might be approximately understood by examining the various synonymous words used for it. Mukti and Moksha, deliverance; Amrita, immortality; apavarga, delivery, conclusion; Nihasreyasa, which Max Muller explains by *Non plus ultra*, and Colebrooke as assured excellence, perfection; Karvalya isolation or detachment; Ananda, bliss; these are some of the words used to describe the final state of deliverance. We have seen the sense in which the word Nirvana is used by the Vedantists, as that state in which the individual soul identifies itself with the Highest Soul; we also saw how the Sankhya philosophers used it, as the perfect state of rest and bliss, the state of beatitude which the Purusha freed from the fetters of Prakriti enjoys. Now we will consider what this Nirvana meant with the Buddhists and the Jains. With them, as well as with the

Sankhya philosophy the object was to teach the end of all suffering and pain; therefore the Nirvanana of these three philosophies must be not only a state in which there is no pain or suffering, but it also must not contain within itself any element which might in the long run give rise to pain or suffering. To know what this negative element should be, we must consider the origin of misery and pain, according to these three philosophies. "From ignorance come confirmations (Sankhara), from confirmations comes consciousness (vinnâna); from consciousness come name and corporeal form, from name and corporeal form come the six senses and their objects, from this comes contact, from contact, sensation, from sensation, thirst or desire, from thirst clinging (to existence); from clinging comes being; from being, birth; from birth come old age and death, pain and lamentation, suffering anxiety and despair." From this we see that the origin of all suffering and

pain, is to be found in desires, and consequently for the complete removal of death and rebirth, pain and misery, a complete extinction of all desires is essential. Now we are in a position to define the negative element in the state of Nirvana. It must be without desire, fear or hope, without decay or death. Nirvana is in other words 'a happy state of imperturbable apathy' Nirvana of the Buddhists and Jains, this unfathomable bliss was not the 'paradisial happiness painted in the most brilliant and even senscious colours,' it represented to the truly enlightened "tranquility (Santi) perfect rest and self satisfaction." Now two important questions rise with regard to Nirvana. 1st Is it possible to acquire Nirvana during life or death must precede its attainment? 2nd Does Nirvana imply the destruction or annihilation of the Ego? As to the first question it seems that death is essential to enter Nirvana proper. It is possible that an enlightened man, one 'who

is without desire, free from desire, whose desires have been fulfilled," may obtain Givan-Mukti i. e. mukti or deliverance while living, but yet he cannot enter Nirvana, because the last fetters or Upadhis remain, which death alone can remove. These last Upadhis though they do no more fetter the mind "remain like broken chains hanging heavy on the mortal body." Both Givan-Mukti and Nirvana are states of perfect spiritual freedom, the only difference being that in the first the soul though free is still in the body. These living freed souls enjoy perfect happiness and rest, though still imprisoned in the body. They have obtained Nirvana, that is freedom from passion and immunity from being born again. Now we shall go to the second and more important question, does the Nirvana imply total extinction, or as Oldenburg puts it, 'Is it the Nothing which receives the dying Perfect one into its dominion?' The word Nirvana etymologically ('va' to blow as

wind, 'nir', the negative preposition) considered means calm and unruffled. Max Muller says that according to Pānini, the right form would be Nirvāhah. Colebrooke says 'In its ordinary acceptaion as an adjective it signifies extinct, as a fire which is gone out, set as a luminary which has gone down, defunct as a saint who has passed away.' Max Muller seems strongly to be of opinion that Nirvana does not mean the extinction of being but as the completion of being. Speaking of the Nirvana of the Vedantists, he says that the Vedantist does not admit the Nirvana to be either absorption or annihilation; 'the new knowledge adds nothing to what the soul always was, *nor does it take away anything* except that nescience which for a time darkened the self-knowledge of the soul.' About the Buddhistic Nirvana, he emphatically says that it does not "mean in the early Buddhistic writings the complete blowing out of the individual soul, but rather the blowing out and subduing of

all human passions and the peace and quietness which result from it." Beal the greatest authority on Chinese Buddhism says 'The earliest idea of Nirvana seems to have included in it no more than the enjoyment of a state of rest, consequent on the extinction of all causes of sorrow.' Hargrave Jennings in his book called 'The Indian Religions' sums up thus the meaning of Nirvana. "It is the rigid mathematical demonstrations of Spinoza carried out and summed. It is the conclusion and result of Hobbes' search, vain search for soul in the relics of the senses. It is the 'form' or 'number' or 'show' of Pythagoras. It is the Emptied Heaven of the Platonists. It is the exhausted dream-world of mystics; the quietism of the Quakers."

The following beautiful lines from Edwin Arnold's 'Light of Asia' on the being who has attained Nirvana will we think go a great way in giving the reader a correct idea of Nirvana as well as of the great difficulty

whether Nirvana is completion or annihilation, not because he himself did not know these things, but because in his opinion the knowledge of these things “does not conduce to progress in holiness, because it does not contribute to peace and enlightenment.” Buddha having revealed all that contributes to peace and enlightenment such as the truth and origin of suffering, the path that leads to Nirvana, expressly asked his disciples to let all that has not been revealed by him remain unrevealed. As M. Barth says “The two characteristics which strike us at once in primitive Buddhism and which certainly belong to the teaching of the master are the absence of every theological element and a conspicuous aversion to pure speculation.”

Dr. Oldenburg thinks that the claims of strict dialectic sequence support the hypothesis that the Buddhist Nirvana signifies extinction. He bases his argument on the fact that “a doctrine which contemplates a

future of eternal perfection behind transitory being can not possibly admit of the kingdom of the eternal first beginning only at the point where the world of transient ends, can not conjure it up immediately, as it were out of the Nothing.....The finite world bears in itself no traces which point to its connection with a world of the eternal” In conclusion, he says ‘ If we follow the dialectic consequence only, it is impossible on the basis of this theory of life to conceive how where a series of conditions has run out, annihilating itself, any thing else is to be recognised as remaining but a vacuum.’ It is Oldenburg’s opinion that Buddhism actually admits of this proposition, but the official teaching of the church taking advantage of Buddha’s silence on these questions, drew, “a well-meant veil over the picture of the truth, the sight of which threatens the destruction of the unprepared.” Oldenburg seems to defend and justify this policy by saying “There were enough and more

than enough of hopes and wishes from which he who desired to follow the Sakya's son had to sever his heart. Why present to the weak the keen edge of the truth : the victor's prize of the delivered is the Nothing ? Barth is of the same opinion as Oldenburg on this point. Buddhism having taught that " one's individuality is only a form, an empty appearance, (that) everything is only a flux of aggregates, which are interminably uniting and disuniting ; " from this, and ' from all that it (Buddhism) insists on, and from all that it ignores,' Barth concludes " that the way (to Nirvana) conducts to total extinction, and that perfection consists in ceasing to exist " Though Barth says, that Buddhism resolves into pure nihilism' that it becomes the ' Cûnyavada' the system of the void, he has to confess that this was not the teaching of Buddha, but only its direct continuance.

We think that what has been said above about Nirvana, would be sufficient to give

one an idea of Nirvana, as it was understood in the early Buddhistic period, and as it is understood at present by some of the most eminent European Oriental scholars. We, for one, are of opinion, that in both Buddhism and Jainism, Nirvana, does not imply the annihilation or destruction but it signifies a state of eternal beatitude. We may add here that though Jainism and Buddhism differ as to the means by which Nirvana could be attained, in both the term signifies almost the same thing; their Nirvana resembling most the Nirvana of the Sankhya philosophy of Kapila. We may further observe, that there is no doubt whatesover that the Nirvana of Jainism does not mean annihilation. In Jain doctrines there is nothing contradictory to the eternal existence of ego in Nirvana. According to them "all beings are divided into two classes, animate and inanimate. All animate bodies are composed of a soul and a body, and their souls being radically distinct from matter

are eternal. This is one of the very few essential points in which the doctrinal system of Jainism deviates from that of Buddhism.” From this it would be clear the controversy whether the ego continues to exist in Nirvana, is only in reference to Buddhism, about Jainism, there being no doubt that it does continue to exist.



CHAPTER XI.

The Tri-Ratna of the Jains. The Jain Theory of the World and the Doctrine of Karma.

Now we shall consider the different means taught by the two systems to reach Nirvana. We shall first consider the Jain means. They are summed up in their Tri-ratna, or 'three jewels.' The three jewels are Right Faith (Samyagdarsana); Right Knowledge (Jñâna) and Right Conduct (Châritra).

The first jewel Right Faith, means absolute faith in the founder of their religion, and also in the truth of the doctrine taught by him.

The second jewel Right Knowledge means the right understanding of the Jain theory of the world. This theory is an atheistical one, in the sense, that it does not believe in an 'Isvara' as the creator or ruling providence; according to it, the world exists by itself and is eternal. The four elements—

earth, water, fire and air—recognised by it are considered as “modified compounds of homogeneous atoms.” All substances (Dravya) are divided into two main classes—animate (Jiva) and inanimate (Ajiva); the animate substances being Jiva endued with body formed by one or more of the four elements, singly or in various combinations. Ajiva comprehends all ‘that is not a living soul, that is the whole of inanimate and un sentient substance, Ajiva is of five kinds—Pudgala (matter); Kala (time); Dharma (right conduct or merit); Adharma (unrighteousness or wrong conduct or demerit); and Akasa (space). Akasa is of two kinds, Loka and Aloka (void). We may observe here that the word Ajiva is often used in a restricted sense for Pudgala. About Dharma and Adharma, it is important to remember that they are considered as Dravyas (substances) and not as Gunas (qualities), as in Vaiseshika philosophy. These confused ideas of Dravyas and Gunas tend to point

to the early origin of Jainism. Of these six substances, Jiva and the five subdivisions of **Ajiva**—all are **Amurta** i.e. not perceptible by the senses, except **Pudgala** (matter) which is **Murta** (perceptible by the senses.)

The Jain texts generally speak of **Dravyas** or substances and their development or modifications (**paryayas**), at times they also speak of **Gunas** (qualities), but as **Jacobi** has pointed out there “seems to be no room for an independent quality,” since **paryaya**, is the state in which a thing, **dravya** is at any moment of its existence, and this must therefore exclude qualities.” This theory of the Jains “that the developed condition of any object is for the time that condition lasts, the object itself,” has important results. According to the Jain theory, **Jiva** is capable of development and change. **Merit** (**dharma**) or **demerit** may be induced in it, and it may become **Subha** (meritorious) or **Asubha** (full of demerit). From this it follows that the Jains, like the **Vaisesheka**

and Nyaya philosophies believe in the doctrine of Kriyavada, which teaches that the soul acts or is affected by acts. We may here say that the opposite doctrine of Akriyavada is believed by the Buddhist, Sankhya and Yoga philosophies.

The soul which is knowing or intelligent and sentient (chaitana) is considered by the Jains as big as the body it animates. This theory that the soul and body agree in dimension, is selected by the Vedantist as showing the weakness of Jain system. "A Jiva or âtma in a worldly condition has four kinds of Prana or living powers. The four kinds of Prana are the effects of Pudgala, and the Jiva having delusion desire and hatred developed in it becomes tied down to the karman which Pudgala generates and to the Pranas, and thus experiences the fruit of the karman and while so experiencing contracts the ties of other karmans,..... Karman arises from Pudgala, but it operates

as fetter to the atman ; because he is capable of seeing and knowing the properties of Pudgala and conceiving a desire or hatred for the objects created by Pudgala.” (Dr. Bhandarkar’s report on the search for Sanskrit Manuscripts, 1883-84). Such is the technical explanation of Karman given by Dr. Bhandarkar, we shall now try to understand it, free from technicalities. The doctrine of Karman is simply an application of the law of cause and effect to soul: what a man sows he must reap. According to Manu XII. 3 quoted by Monier-Williams. “ An act either mental, verbal or corporeal bears good or evil fruit, the various transmigration of men through the highest, middle and lowest stages are produced by acts.” From this we see that our lot in life is what we ourselves have made it, and we must bear the result good or bad of our acts. To work out completely the consequences of our act, “ it is not enough that the personal spirit goes to heaven or hell,” but it is

necessary that the spirit “leave heaven or hell and return to corporeal existence.” Not only are bad Karman (acts) punished but the good ones rewarded; not only have we to suffer the evil result of our acts, but also we have to enjoy the good fruit of our meritorious acts, thus under all cases it is necessary to be born i. e. to take up corporeal form. If the sum—total of our good acts predominates over our bad acts, after death we shall be transferred to a higher stage, if the contrary predominates to a lower stage. As Monier—Williams puts it. ‘Thus it (spirit) has to pass through innumerable bodies migrating into higher intermediate or lower forms, from a god to a demon, man, animal or plant or even a stone according to its various shades of merit or demerit. ‘Thus we see that even the gods themselves were not above this inexorable law of cause and effect.’

Here we may mention the eight divisions into which Jainism divides Karman, four of

which are bad or disabling (called Ghatin) leading to a degraded form of transmigration, the other four called Aghatins i. e. ‘ not injurious or favourable or of use to enable one to know the truth.’ The eight Karmans are as follows, the first four being Ghâtins, and the next four Aghatins.

1. “Jnanavaraniya, that which acts as an impediment to the knowledge of the truth.

2. Darsanavaraniya that which acts as an impediment to the belief in the efficacy of the Jain dispensation.

3. Mohaniya, that which produces bewilderment and disability to choose between the various dispensations promulgated by different teachers.

4. Antarya, that which prevents one’s entrance into the path that leads to eternal bliss.

5. Vedaniya i. e. the belief that there is something which one has to know.

6. Namika i. e. the belief that I am a person bearing such and such a name.

7. Gotrika i. e. the knowledge that I now belong to the family of the pupils of the worshipful Arhat.

8. Yushka i. e. actions necessary for the preservation of life." (Dr. Bhandarkar, Report 1883-84.)

This theory of reaping what one has sown clearly accounts for the inequality we see existing in the world. Some are born rich, some born poor ; some born dumb and deaf, some blind, some of weak health and some of strong ; these differences the doctrine of Karman explains, by saying that the different conditions in which we find ourselves, are owing to our own acts in past life, and that in our present life we are working out the consequences of our acts in past life, as well as by our new acts, preparing our lot in the life to come. As Max Muller says "we are what we have made ourselves, we suffer what we have done, we reap what we have sown."

Hence we see that whenever there is an actual act done, or even if there is a desire to act that is to say even if there is only a mental act, we will have to assume corporeal form to work out its consequences, good or bad; that is we will have to be born again, and to live a corporeal life. Now corporeal life is full of pain and misery. Buddha says "Birth is suffering, old age is suffering, sickness is suffering, to be united with the unloved is suffering, to be separated from the loved is suffering, not to obtain one desires is suffering, in short the five-fold clinging to the earthly is suffering." Thus the cause of our pain and misery is birth in the corporeal life, which is the result of our actions, which are the consequences of our desires. To destroy, therefore, all pain and suffering, we must stop our re-birth, and to prevent re-birth all acts must cease, for stopping all acts, a complete annihilation of desires is essential. The ultimate

cause of all pain and misery, is thus to be found in our desires.

In the first two Ratnas or jewels, we have seen the two out of the three essentials for reaching Nirvana, namely right faith and right knowledge. Now we shall go to the third and the last jewel, right conduct. The five vows, which as we saw a Jain ascetic has to take, form, we may say, only the negative element of right conduct. Besides the five vratas or vows, he has to observe five Samitis for the preservation of the vows ; and has to restrain his five senses. Besides these he has to realize the three Guptis. Dr. Bhandarkar says “Gupti means the protection of the soul, from desire, hatred, delusion which tie him to the Sansara. They are three :—Manogupti or preventing the mind from wandering in the forest of sensual pleasures, by employing it in contemplation study etc. ; 2. Vaggupti i. e. preventing the tongue from saying bad things by a vow of silence etc. ; 3 Kayagupti i.e. putting the

body in an immoveable posture as in the case of Kayatsarga." We have already seen how Mahavira imposed the order on the ascetics not to wear any clothes. Dr. Hoernle sums up the 'Right conduct;' of Jain ascetics as follows; "Besides these negative vows, Right Conduct includes positive rules enjoining ascetic self-discipline such as penitence and confession, humility and obedience, religious study and contemplation, and especially various kinds of self-mortification, tapas culminating in religious suicide by starvation." We may here observe that while in Mahavira's order, self-torture and self-mortification played a very important part, quite the contrary was the case in Buddha's order. Buddha not only disbelieved in the efficacy of self-torture, but he believed it to be, on the contrary injurious to the attainment of the final deliverance. Religious suicide was to him far from being meritorious, it was worse than useless, it was a great mistake, nay almost

a crime. Instead of self-torture Buddha taught self-sacrifice.

To attain the Nirvana, we may observe it is necessary for the Jain ascetic to be perfected simultaneously in Darsana, Jñana and Charitra or Right Faith, Right Knowledge and Right Conduct.



CHAPTER XII.

*The Holy triad of Buddhism—Buddha,
Dharma and Sangha.*

Corresponding to the three jewels of Jainism we have the holy triad of Buddhism. Buddha, Dharma and Sangha i.e. Buddha, Law and Order. It is rather interesting to mark the different significations attached to these mottoes, as pointed out by Dr. Hoernle. "That of the Buddhists refers to concrete, that of the Jains to abstract things. The former shows that Buddhism was animated by a practical and active spirit, while the latter shows Jainism to have been speculative and unenterprising. The history of the two orders proves this inference."

The first Buddhist jewel Buddha, corresponds to the Jain Jewel 'Right Faith.' It means perfect faith in Buddha the exalted, the holy, the supreme, the blessed; Buddha, the teacher of gods and men.

The second is Dharma or law or doctrine, i. e. faith in and knowledge of the doctrines taught by Buddha. Here we shall not enter into details, but only point out some of the important differences between Buddhistic and Jain doctrines. The first thing that strikes one in Buddhism is the absence of all pure speculation. Buddha never entered into theological discussions, because he did not think the knowledge of these questions favourable to human progress or happiness. The Buddhists acknowledge the four elements, not recognising the fifth one, akâsa. They do not believe in a permanent soul. To them everything is only an aggregate of the atoms which form the four elements. They admit that within the body dwells 'intelligence' possessing individual consciousness. It is this intelligence that apprehends objects. According to the Buddhist doctrine nothing is real or lasting, everything is a result of the 'Skandha' or the aggregates. The five Skandhas of the Buddhists are thus given

by Colebrooke :—1st Rupa, comprehending organs of sense and their objects considered in relation to the person ; or the sensitive and intelligent faculty which is occupied with them. 2nd Vignyana consists in intelligence which is same with self and knowledge. It is consciousness of sensation or continuous course and flow of cognition and sentiment. There is not any other agent nor being which acts and enjoys, nor is there an eternal soul, but merely succession of thought, attended with individual consciousness abiding within body. 3rd Védaná (sensations), comprises sentiments excited in the mind by pleasing or displeasing objects. 4th Sanjnya (notions, abstract ideas) intends the knowledge or belief arising from names or words ; or from indications or signs. 5th Sanskara, includes passion, together with illusion, virtue, vice, and every other modification of the fancy or imagination.”

Thus for the Buddhist there is no real world. There is nothing real or eternal in

the world; for them the apparent and illusory existence of a material world has, if at all any, only one real substance, the Karman. Quite unlike the Jains, they maintain that there is nothing like eternal atman; soul to them is only individual consciousness. The objects we perceive have no reality. As Barth puts it "Our individuality is only a form, an empty appearance. Everything is only a flux of aggregates which are interminably uniting and disuniting, an immense flood of which we do not seek to know the beginning and from which we can escape only by Nirvana." According to this view the only thing that continues to exist after an individual's death is his karman. "The influence of its karman alone, of its acts, survives it, and through the formation of a new group of Skandhas is immediately effected, a new individual rises into existence.....and in some degree continues the first."

Now we will look into the four great truths which Buddhism taught. The first

truth is that to exist is to suffer. Edwin Arnold says in 'The Light of Asia,' Bk VIII ;

"The First Truth is of Sorrow. Be not
mocked ;

Life which ye prize is long drawn agony
Only its pains abide, its pleasures are
As birds which light and fly."

The second is the cause of the pain, which as we saw is owing entirely to our desires, and which increases with the gratification. Arnold says :

"The second Truth is Sorrow's Cause. What
grief
Springs of itself and springs not of desire ?"

The third is the cessation of pain, which ceases when desires are extinguished. Arnold thus puts it

"The Third is Sorrow's Ceasing. This is
peace

To conquer love of self and lust of life,
To tear deep-rooted passion from the breast
To still the inward strife.

Then Sorrow ends, for Life and Death have
 ceased ;
 How should lamps flicker when their oil is
 spent ?
 The old sad count is clear, the new is clean ;
 Thus hath a man content."

The fourth truth is the way which lead to Nirvana. The perfect way he taught, the noble Eight-fold Path he preached leading to Nirvana, 'to peace and refuge,' was a mean between mortification and self-indulgence, it required Buddha's disciples to lead a chaste, simple and moderate life, a life full of love and compassion for the suffering, erring humanity. In his preaching of the Path, Buddha may be said to have aimed a fatal blow at 'the heresy of self.' His own life gives a very exalted and noble example of self sacrifices, he sacrificed for a time his right to enter the Nirvana, and worked in a corporeal life, to teach the true doctrine and law. In short we might say

that a life of self-sacrifice and pure morality was the corner-stone of Buddhist philosophy. This life was a means to an end, "in the lower degree, the means to the humble end of happy life here on earth, and in the forms of being yet to come; in the higher degree the means to the supreme and absolute end of happy deliverance." Now we shall see what is this noble eightfold middle path "which enlightens the eye and enlightens the Spirit, which leads to rest, to knowledge, to enlightenment to Nirvana" and which is equally removed from the two extremes, i.e. which is neither a "life of pleasure devoted to desire and enjoyment that is base, unspiritual, unworthy and unreal;" nor a life of mortification "which is gloomy, unworthy and unreal."

The following are the eight Stages of Noble Path with Rhys-David's comment on them.

1. **Right Faith or views free from superstition or delusion.**

2. **Right Resolve** or aims, high and worthy of intelligent and earnest men.
- 3 **Right Speech** i.e. kindly, open, truthful.
4. **Right Action** or peaceful, honest, pure (conduct).
5. **Right Living** i. e. livelihood, bringing hurt or danger to no living thing.
6. **Right Effort** in self-training and self-control.
7. **Right Thought** or mindfulness i. e. the active watchful mind.
8. **Right Self-concentration** or rapture i. e. earnest thought on the deep mysteries of life.

Earnest meditation of the body, senses and ideas, and earnest efforts to prevent error from rising and to destroy false notions which have already risen, coupled with efforts to produce and develop goodness form the basis of Buddhist self-discipline.

CHAPTER XIII.

Divisions of the Jains and the Buddhist.

We shall end this historical and philosophical comparison of the two religions, by considering one more point of similarity. We have seen in the early history of the Jains, that they were divided into two important divisions, the Svetambras and the Digambras. These divisions of the Jains have a counter part in the great and little vehicle of Buddhism. As we have already traced the Jain literature to its source, and have also shown the important reason of its division into two sects, we shall here confine ourselves to trace the circumstances that led to the division of Buddhism into two important subdivisions.

Shortly after Buddha's death there seems to have risen some doctrinal disputes; to settle these disputes the first great Buddhist council was called together at Rajagriha near Magadha. In it Kasyapa (the most

learned of Buddha's disciples) recited the Metaphysics of the doctrine. Upali, the oldest disciple, repeated the laws or rules of discipline, and lastly Ananda, the St. John of Buddhism repeated the parables and sermons of Buddha. These were collected together and formed the Three Pitakas (baskets) of Buddhism, and were known respectively as the Abidharma, Vinaya and Sutra Pitakas. About a century after the first council, it was found necessary to call a second council at Vaisali, as the discipline had become very lax, owing to a system of 'Indulgences' having come into use. This council condemned the system of 10 indulgences, which ultimately led to the separation of the Buddhists into 2 distinct parties. The third great Buddhist council was convened at Patna by Asoka in 244 B. C. This council did much to put down heretical doctrines which had sprung up, and thus made the distinction between the more and less strict school, sharper and clearer. It must

be remembered that Asoka not only wanted to promulgate widely the Buddhist religion but he wanted also to spread it in its pristine beauty. He was strongly against the innovations introduced into Buddhism, and as a jealous patron of orthodox Buddhism, he by a number of edicts spread its cardinal doctrines. Not resting satisfied with this, Asoka ordered an authoritative version of the Buddhist doctrines. This has formed the canon of the southern Buddhists. The canon of the southern Buddhists called the Hinayana or small vehicle at present prevails in Burmah, Pegu, Siam and Ceylon. If there is any place where the prevailing Buddhism reminds one most of the Old Buddhist religion taught by Buddha, it is Ceylon, where it was first introduced by Mahinda and Sanghamitta, son and daughter of the great Asoka. Turning to the canon of the Buddhists of the North, or as they proudly call it the Mahayana, the great vehicle, we find it is based on the fourth great Buddhist

council. This council was called in the 1st century A. D., by Kanishka, the famous Saka conqueror who ruled over North Western India. This council of Kanishka drew up the three commentaries which formed the basis of the Northern canon. This canon which contains many corruptions and innovations introduced into the original Buddhism, prevails in China, Japan, Nepal and Tibet. The Northern canon is written in Sanskrit "which had become by that time, the accepted literary vehicle of the learned throughout India"; while the Southern canon is written in Magadha dialect.

From this, we shall be able to see that not only were Jainism and Buddhism both divided into 2 sects, but the main and primary reason for this division, was in both cases to be found in a tendency in certain portions of the community to look with disfavour on the strict discipline enjoined on them.

CHAPTER XIV.

Charge of Atheism examined.

After stating and comparing the various doctrines and theories of the two systems, we are now in a position to examine the charge that is laid against them of being atheistical. There is not the slightest doubt that the Jains and Buddhists do not believe in Isvara or the personal God, they do not believe in God as the creator, preserver or dissolver of the universe ; in other words they do not believe in a Supreme Being, who is "both the efficient and the material cause of all that exists, and is likewise the Lord and Ruler of the world." In this respect they agree with the Sankhya philosophy of Kapila, who thinks that there is no proof to believe in the existence of supreme personal God. According to him if there is a supreme Being, he must be free from all desires and anxieties, and therefore he could have no wish to create a world ;

and if 'he were bound by desires of any kind, he would then be under bondage and therefore deficient in power.' We, who have examined their various doctrines, especially the doctrine of Karman with its corollary the law of cause and effect, can clearly see that in the Jain and Buddhist philosophy, there is no room for a personal God, for an extra cosmic creator. With them no one is above this law of cause and effect, even gods have to submit themselves to it. • The only sense in which these two sects may not be called atheistical is their belief in perfect liberated souls; Jinas and Buddhas. But here also they differ from the ordinary conception of God. Their Jinas and Buddhas are liberated souls, implying a former state of bondage, while God is free from and for ever. Moreover the liberated souls may be more than one, an idea incompatible with monotheism. We find that the Jains and the Buddhists especially those of the North, have tried to engraft on their sys-

tems atheism quiet foreign to and inconsistent which their original doctrines. Like the Northern Buddhists who seem to believe in the Adibuddha “the primordial and sovereign Buddha akin to the Brahma of the Vedanta”, the Jains have their Jinapati the supreme Jina.



