

THE QUALITIES OF SĀṆKHYA

*By Johannes Bronkhorst, Lausanne**

1. Bhartṛhari's commentary on the Mahābhāṣya contains, in the first Āhnika, the following remark concerning the Sāṅkhya philosophy (CE IV/23,21–23¹):

*na hīdaṃ sāstraṃ kasya cid ekasya sahāyabhūtaṃ sarvasādhāraṇam |
yathaiṃ sāṅkhyādīnāṃ dravyād eva pratipattiḥ rūpādisamavāyo ghaṭo
'rthāntarabhūto veti yasya yo ghaṭas tasmin ghaṭaśabdaṃ prayuṅkte |*
'For this science [of grammar] is common to all and does not side with anyone. For example, according to the Sāṅkhyas and others the understanding derived from a substance is that a vase is a collection of colour(s) and so on, or something else; [the grammarian] uses the word "vase" with regard to that which constitutes a vase for the [person with whom he is in discussion].'

What interests us in this passage is the passing reference to the Sāṅkhya position, according to which a vase is a collection of colour(s) and so on. A similar statement occurs in the Vākyapadīya (VP III 13,14):

*sarvamūrtyātmabhūtānāṃ śabdādīnāṃ guṇe-guṇe |
trayaḥ sattvādidharmās te sarvatra samavasthitāḥ ||*

'Those three characteristics, *sattva* etc., which are found in each quality from among sound etc. which constitute all corporeal objects, are present everywhere.'

The mention of the 'three characteristics, *sattva* etc.' – i. e., *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* – leaves no doubt that the system of thought referred to is, again, Sāṅkhya².

Bhartṛhari does not stand alone in attributing to Sāṅkhya the position that material objects are collections of the qualities colour, sound, etc. Puṇyarāja's commentary on the second Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya may refer to the same view in the following passage (VPT 63,16f. [*ad* VP II 135]):

* I thank Eli Franco and Albrecht Wezler for useful suggestions.

¹ = AL 28,11–13; SW 33,22–24; MS 9c5–7.

² The commentator Helārāja, interestingly, tries to show that sound etc. only seem to constitute corporeal objects (VPP II/138,21f.): *vyatireke 'pi dravyasya samavāyavaśāt tadātmakam iva*.

*vaiśeṣikeṇāvayavinam pratipādayitum ghaṭaśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ sāṅkhya-
yair guṇasamāhāramātram abhimanyate jainasauḡataiḥ paramāṇusam-
cayamātram iti* ‘The Vaiśeṣika uses the word “vase” to designate the
whole; the Sāṅkhyas think that it is used to designate the collection of
guṇas and nothing else; the Jainas and Buddhists, only a heap of
atoms.’

There is some ambiguity in this statement in as far as the Sāṅkhyas
are concerned: the term *guṇa* does not only mean quality in this
system of thought; it can also refer to the three constituents (*sattva*,
rajas, *tamas*) of primary matter.

No such ambiguity attaches to Dharmapāla’s introductory re-
marks to Āryadeva’s *Catuhśataka* 301 (tr. TILLEMANS 1990: I/135):
“[The Sāṅkhya philosopher] Kapila asserts [the following]: Things
such as vases and cloths are established simply as [visual] forms³ ...
and other such [properties]; the natures . . . , which are the objects of
the sense organs, do really exist”. Siṃhasūri, similarly, ascribes to
Sāṅkhya the view that vases etc. (*ghaṭādi*) are collections of colours
etc. (*rūpādisamūha*)⁴.

All these statements – as well as others from Mallavādin’s *Dvāda-
śāra* Nayacakra and Kaiyaṭa’s commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, to
be considered below – support Bhartṛhari’s claims according to which
the Sāṅkhyas looked upon material objects as being constituted of
‘colour(s) etc.’ (*rūpādi*), or of ‘sound etc.’ (*śabdādi*). It seems moreover
clear that ‘colour(s) etc.’ and ‘sound etc.’ in these statements refer to
the five qualities colour, taste, smell, touch and sound.

2. It is not easy to reconcile the contents of these statements with
classical Sāṅkhya doctrine as presented in the *Yuktidīpikā*, the most
elaborate commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*. There, it
may be recalled, the material world is conceived of as having evolved
out of *prakṛti* through a number of intermediate stages. Material ob-
jects are considered to consist of the five elements: earth, water, fire,
wind and ether. Qualities are not even mentioned among the 25 *tattvas*
which constitute the world. In fact, the elements that do figure among
the 25 *tattvas* possess qualities: ether possesses only sound; wind
possesses sound and touch; fire possesses sound, touch and colour;
water possesses sound, touch, colour and taste; earth, finally, posses-
ses sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

These five elements are believed to have directly evolved out of
five *tanmātras*, which carry the names of the five qualities without

³ TILLEMANS thus translates the Chinese equivalent of skt. *rūpa*, ‘form,
colour’.

⁴ DNC I/266,9. For Siṃhasūri’s interpretation of this statement, see
section 3 below (p. 313f.).

being qualities themselves. The distinction between *tanmātras* and qualities is clear from the following passage (YD 118,14–16):

śabdaguṇāc chabdatanmātrād ākāśam ekaguṇam | śabdasparsāguṇāt sparsātanmātrād dviguṇo vāyuh | śabdasparsārūpaguṇād rūpatanmātrāt triguṇam tejah | śabdasparsārūparasaguṇād rasatanmātrāc caturguṇā āpah | śabdasparsārūparasagandhaguṇād gandhatanmātrāt pañcaguṇā prthivī | ‘From the *tanmātra* [called] “sound”, which has sound as quality, ether [is born], which has [that] one quality. From the *tanmātra* [called] “touch”, which has sound and touch as qualities, wind [is born], which has [these] two qualities. From the *tanmātra* [called] “colour”, which has sound, touch and colour as qualities, fire [is born], which has [these] three qualities. From the *tanmātra* [called] “taste”, which has sound, touch, colour and taste as qualities, water [is born], which has [these] four qualities. From the *tanmātra* [called] “smell”, which has sound, touch, colour, taste and smell as qualities, earth [is born], which has [these] five qualities.’⁵

Interestingly, it is not certain that the *Yuktidīpikā* correctly represents the position of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā in this respect. The Sāṅkhya Kārikā leaves us in doubt whether it distinguishes between the *tanmātras* and the qualities ‘colour’, ‘sound’, ‘smell’, ‘taste’ and ‘touch’. This can be seen as follows.

Recall first that several early texts, such as Aśvaghoṣa’s *Buddhacarita* (XII 18f.) and some portions of the *Mahābhārata* (XII 203,25–29; 294,27–29; 298,10–21; XIV 49,34f.), knew a form of Sāṅkhya in which the five qualities figure among the *tattvas*; they are here among the final evolutes, and derive from the five elements.⁶ Here, then, the qualities do figure among the five fundamental *tattvas*. It is true that they did not occupy the same position as the *tanmātras* in classical Sāṅkhya.⁷ It is yet conceivable (though not provable, as far as I can see) that the five *tanmātras*, at one phase of the development of Sāṅ-

⁵. A similar passage occurs in the *Māṭharavṛtti* (on SK 22 [MV 37,5–9]). The *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* and the commentary translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (see TAKAKUSU 1904) simply derive the elements from one *tanmātra* each, without mentioning qualities. See further n. 9, below.

⁶ This has been known at least since STRAUSS 1913; see also FRAUWALLNER 1927.

⁷ Occasionally one gets the impression that the idea of qualities as constituting the very end of the evolutionary list of *tattvas* is not completely unknown to classical Sāṅkhya. An example is the following line, quoted YD 117,13f.: *upabhogasya śabdādyupalabdhir ādīḥ guṇapurūṣopalabdhir antaḥ*. Interestingly, YD 64,19ff. states that the qualities sound etc. are pervaded (*samanu+gam*) by, or have the same nature as (*°svarūpa*), the three constituents (here called *sukha*, *duḥkha* and *moha*), as does DNC I/265; SK 38, on the other hand, makes a similar observation regarding the elements (*bhūta*), using the terms *sānta*, *ghora* and *mūḍha* (YD 119,20f. adds that the *tanmātras* are not *sānta*, *ghora* and *mūḍha*).

khya, were the five qualities. This possibility is not contradicted by the Sāṅkhya Kārikā. That is to say, this text allows, besides the 'orthodox' interpretation, of an interpretation in which the *tanmātras* are the five qualities.

Consider first SK 28ab: *rūpādiṣu* (v.l. *śabdād*⁸) *pañcānām ālocanamātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ* / 'The function of the five [sense organs] with regard to colour (v.l. sound) etc., is deemed to be mere perception'.

Here it is possible to take 'colour (v.l. sound) etc.' to be the five qualities of those names. SK 34ab, on the other hand, has: *buddhīndriyāṇi teṣāṃ pañca viśeṣāviśeṣaviśayāṇi* / 'Of the [tenfold external organ] the five sense organs have the *viśeṣas* and the *aviśeṣas* as objects'. The meanings of *viśeṣa* and *aviśeṣa* are explained in SK 38a-c: *tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣās tebhya bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ* / *ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ* 'The *tanmātras* are the *aviśeṣas*. From those five [arise] the five elements; these are known as the *viśeṣas*'.

According to SK 34ab, then, the sense organs have as objects the five elements and the five *tanmātras*.⁸ If it is true that five qualities are the objects (SK 28a, as interpreted above), one might think that the five *tanmātras* are the five qualities. Nothing in the Sāṅkhya Kārikā militates against this view, as far as I can see.⁹

It would be premature to draw far-reaching consequences from the lack of clarity of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā. It is not at all certain that it looked upon the *tanmātras* as qualities. But if it did, this would not be without interest in connection with the various quotations maintaining that in Sāṅkhya material objects are collections of qualities.

3. We must now consider a passage in Mallavādin's Dvādaśāra Naya-cakra which criticizes the Sāṅkhyas. This passage reads, in the reconstruction of Muni JAMBUVIJAYA (DNC I/268,1f.):

⁸ Most of the commentaries hasten to add that the *tanmātras* are not grasped by the sense organs of ordinary mortals (often *asmadādi*). It is here further to be noted that SK does not appear to justify the translation "subtle elements" or the like for *tanmātra*. Stanza 39 rather speaks of a subvariety of the *viśeṣas* that are *sūkṣma* 'subtle'; these *sūkṣma viśeṣas* 'subtle elements' are clearly not *aviśeṣas*, i. e., *tanmātras*.

⁹ FRAUWALLNER (1953: 355f.; also 1927: 2 [= 141]) claims that in early Sāṅkhya the different *tanmātras* each had only one quality (cp. YD 91,7 [*ekarūpāṇi tanmātrāṇīty anye* | *ekottarāṇīti vārṣagaṇyaḥ* |] and 118,12f., also Vācaspati Miśra's Tattvakaumudī on SK 22 [*śabdatanmātrād ākāśaṃ śabdaguṇam* | *śabdatanmātrasahitāt sparśatanmātrād vāyuh śabdasparsāguṇaḥ* | *śabdasparsātanmātrasahitād rūpatanmātrāt tejah śabdasparsārūpaguṇam* | *śabdasparsārūpatanmātrasahitād rasatanmātrād āpah śabdasparsārūparasaguṇaḥ* | *śabdasparsārūparasatanmātrasahitād gandhatanmātrāc chabdasparsārūparasagan-dhaguṇā pṛthivī jāyata iti*] and similar statements in the Candrikā and Jayamañgalā). This position is of course but one step removed from the above tentative suggestion that the five qualities once occupied the place of the *tanmātras*.

*atha katham ekakāraṇatvapratīṣedhānantaram śabdaikaguṇapravṛtti vi-
yat abhyupagamyate | na pravartetaivam asaṃdruteḥ puruṣavad van-
dhyāputravād vā* | 'But how [can the Sāṅkhyas] accept that ether is
produced from the single quality sound, immediately after rejecting
[the possibility] that something has one single cause? It cannot be
produced in this way, because [ether] is not a collection, just as a soul
(*puruṣa*) or the son of a barren woman [is not a collection].'

The commentator Siṃhasūri cites in connection with the term *asaṃ-
druteḥ* 'because [ether] is not a collection', the following phrase from
the Mahābhāṣya: *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam* 'a material object is a collec-
tion of qualities'. We shall pay further attention to this phrase below
(p. 317). Here it is sufficient to note that Siṃhasūri is most probably
correct in attributing to Mallavādin the belief that the Sāṅkhyas
looked upon the material objects as collections of qualities.

WEZLER (1985b: 3ff.) interprets the above passage in the light of
the YD passage cited in section 2 above (p. 317). To quote his own
words (p. 5): "The gist of Mallavādin's counterargument is hence that
ether cannot originate in the manner asserted by the Sāṅkhyas becau-
se it does not correspond to their definition of *dravya*, i. e. because it is
not a *dravya* or rather because its cause, the *śabdaguṇa śabdatanmātra*,
is not a *dravya* just like the soul or the son of a barren woman".

This interpretation is not, however, free from difficulties. First of all,
the words *śabdaikaguṇapravṛtti viyat* in the above passage translate
most naturally as 'ether is produced from the single quality sound'.
The alternative translation 'ether is produced from [the *śabdatanmātra*]
which has sound as its only quality' is decidedly more artificial. Moreo-
ver, if the latter interpretation had been intended by Mallavādin, his
remark 'immediately after rejecting [the possibility] that something
may have one single cause' (*ekakāraṇatvapratīṣedhānantaram*) would
be besides the point. As can be seen from the YD passage cited above
(p. 311), each of the elements, not only ether, is there presented as
deriving from a single cause, viz., from the corresponding *tanmātra*.

It will hardly be necessary to point out that Mallavādin's passage
allows of an interpretation in the light of what we have discussed in
section 1 above. The material world is constituted of the qualities
sound etc.; these qualities are accordingly the causes of all material
objects. Ether has but one quality, sound, and therefore but one cause.
This, however, goes against the rule that every product must have
more than one single cause.

WEZLER's interpretation of Mallavādin's passage can, in view of the
above, be replaced by one that does more justice to its precise wording.
Interestingly, WEZLER's interpretation appears to coincide with the
one offered by Mallavādin's commentator Siṃhasūri. This can be de-
duced from some phrases in the latter's Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī.

Consider first the following passage (DNC I/268,4–6): *yady anekāt-makaikakāraṇatvam iṣyate evam ekakāraṇatvapratīṣedhānantaram ... katham śabdaikaguṇappravṛtti viyad abhyupagamyate*. The difficulty connected with *ekakāraṇatvapratīṣedhānantaram*, pointed out above, is here avoided by superimposing a different interpretation on this term. The ‘rejection of [the possibility] that something may have a single cause’ becomes here the requirement that something has a single cause which has a multiple nature. This requirement fits, of course, the different *tanmātras* which are single causes of the corresponding elements, but have several qualities.

Simhasūri is equally careful to avoid the difficulty presented by the word *śabdaikaguṇappravṛtti*. He cites an unfindable Dhātupāṭha¹⁰ in order to interpret the problematic °*guṇa*° as “number”. The aim of this procedure seems, once again, to force the orthodox version of Sāṅkhya upon a recalcitrant text.

It appears, then, possible that Simhasūri, unlike Mallavādin, is acquainted with a form of Sāṅkhya in which *tanmātras*, and not qualities (*guṇa*), figure in the list of evolutes, or perhaps one in which *tanmātras* and *guṇas* had come to be differentiated. Be it noted that another passage of his Nyāyāgamānusārinī (II/470,13) enumerates *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and the *tanmātras*, three evolutes which succeed each other in classical Sāṅkhya.

If our interpretations of Mallavādin and Simhasūri are correct, we have stumbled upon an interesting difference between these two authors. Mallavādin, it appears, was not yet acquainted with Sāṅkhya in its ‘classical’ form. Simhasūri, on the other hand, was no longer aware of the earlier form of Sāṅkhya known to Mallavādin, and felt obliged to reinterpret the latter’s words so as to arrive at an understanding that was in agreement with the form of Sāṅkhya that he knew.

4. The conclusion we have to draw from the preceding sections is that a number of classical authors appear to have known the Sāṅkhya system of thought in a form which was in at least some points different from the classical system as it has been handed down to us. The Sāṅkhya known to Bhartṛhari, Mallavādin and others had, we have been led to believe, the qualities sound, colour, taste, touch and smell among its evolutes. Interestingly, this position is primarily known to us through texts that were no school-texts of the Sāṅkhyas, most notably a number of passages in the Mahābhārata. We have seen, however, that the Sāṅkhya Kārikā itself may have held a similar position.

¹⁰ See DNC I/268n. 3 and WEZLER 1985b: 27n. 14.

It seems probable that Bhartr̥hari and the other authors we have discussed found the position they attributed to the Sāṅkhyas in one or more texts belonging to that school. And there can hardly be any doubt that that text – or one of those texts – is the one called *vārṣa-gaṇa tantra* by Siṃhasūri, and which FRAUWALLNER (1958: 94 [= 233]) identifies as the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vṛṣagaṇa¹¹. This text was known to Dignāga and Mallavādin, as FRAUWALLNER has shown. If indeed Bhartr̥hari was acquainted with it, its date of composition must precede him, too.

How is it possible that Siṃhasūri who, like Mallavādin, knew the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, gives evidence of being acquainted with a different version of Sāṅkhya? FRAUWALLNER 1958 may provide the elements for an answer. Already Dignāga's commentator Jinendrabuddhi, FRAUWALLNER argues (p. 109 [= 248] and 113 [= 252]), knew at least two, possibly three commentaries on the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. It is not impossible that one of these commentators was, or was close to, the author of the *Yoga Bhāṣya* (p. 114f. [= 253f.]).

It is not our task at present to take position with regard to FRAUWALLNER's conclusions, which contain inevitably a speculative element. Be it however noted that Siṃhasūri's deviation from Mallavādin in the interpretation of Sāṅkhya doctrine fits in very well with the assumption that Sāṅkhya philosophy evolved – and therefore changed – through the reinterpretation(s) by its commentators of its classical text, which may have been called *ṣaṣṭitantra*. This assumption would, of course, agree very well with the hypothesis presented in section 2 above, according to which the Sāṅkhya *Kārikā* would still precede the modification which finds expression in its commentaries.

5. The above reflections suggest that a major change took place in Sāṅkhya doctrine, perhaps some time in the 5th century of our era. What could possibly have been the reason of this change? Why should Sāṅkhya abandon the idea that material objects are nothing but collections of qualities?

These questions do not, at present, allow of a certain and indubitable answer. There are simply no texts from the period that might provide such an answer. It is yet very tempting to suspect a connection with the *satkāryavāda*, the doctrine according to which effects (or products) pre-exist in their causes. This doctrine of classical Sāṅkhya

¹¹ For the authorship of this text, see OBERHAMMER-16. The name of its author may rather have been Vārṣagaṇa; see CHAKRAVARTI 1951:137f., LARSON 1987: 624n. 21 and WEZLER 1985a: 14n. 6.

is already known to Āryadeva¹² and Mallavādin (DNC I/271).¹³ It must therefore have co-existed with the view that material objects are nothing but collections of qualities for at least some time. Yet the two are strange bedfellows.

In order to accomodate the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, classical Sāṅkhya views the world as a continuous series of modifications (*pariṇāma*) of substrates which do not lose their essence.¹⁴ The Yuktidīpikā defines *pariṇāma* in the following stanza (YD 75,6f.):

*jāhad dharmāntaram pūrvam upādatte yadā param /
tattvād apracyuto dharmī pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate ||*

‘When the substrate (*dharmī*), without abandoning its essence, drops the earlier property (*dharmā*) and accepts the next one, that is called modification (*pariṇāma*).’

Essential in this definition is that the substrate remains in each modification, without abandoning its essence. That is to say, material objects are more than mere collections of properties; there is necessarily something more to them, viz. the all-important substrate.¹⁵

¹² E.g., Catuḥśataka XI (LANG 1986, esp. p. 106f.); see further HONDA 1974.

¹³ Several authors (FRANCO 1991: 127; JOHNSTON 1937: 25; LARSON 1969: 165; LIEBENTHAL 1934: 9n. 11) have drawn attention to the fact that *satkāryavāda* is without clear precedents in the earlier literature, and must be a relatively late development in Sāṅkhya. Regarding the origin of this doctrine we may recall LIEBENTHAL’s question, “ob nicht vielleicht satkārya selbst nur ein Aspekt einer Diskussion mit Mādhyamika-Buddhisten ist” (1934: 4).

¹⁴ The ultimate substrate is, of course, known by the name *prakṛti* or *pradhāna*.

¹⁵ This is how we must read YD 51,17f.: *asmākan tu kāraṇamātrasyaiva saṃghātād ākāraṇtaraparigrahād vā kriyāguṇānām pracitir vyaktiviśeṣo bhavātīti bruvatām adōṣaḥ* | “But [this] reproach is not valid for us because what we teach is that a particular manifest thing originates as the accumulation of movements and qualities on account of the cause and nothing but the cause having coagulated or having assumed another shape” (WEZLER 1985b: 22). This passage occurs in a discussion about the question whether the effect pre-exists in its cause, the famous *satkāryavāda*. The opponent argues that if the effect were there, it should be observable, which it is not; and if it is not observable, one should be able to infer it on the basis of its movements and qualities, which, again, is not the case. Here the author of the Yuktidīpikā responds that one can only search for the movements and qualities of an effect as distinct from those of the cause, if one assumes that cause and effect themselves are distinct, which Sāṅkhya denies; cf. YD 51,15–17: *kāryakāraṇaprthaktvavādināḥ tatkrīyāguṇānām prthaktvam anumātuṃ yuktaṃ ity atas tantvavasthāne paṭakrīyāguṇagrahaṇād anumānābhāva ity ayam upālambhaḥ sāvakāśaḥ syāt* | ‘For him who holds that effect and cause are separate, it is appropriate to infer that their movements and qualities are separate. For this reason the reproach can be made that, in the state of a [mere] thread (and no cloth), no [cloth can] be inferred on the basis of the observation of the movements and qualities of [that] cloth (precisely because

The Yoga Bhāṣya offers a similar definition of *pariṇāma* at the very end of its commentary on YS III 13 (Ybh. 255,7f.): *avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāma iti* || ‘*pariṇāma* is the production of a new property in a substance which remains the same, while the earlier property is destroyed’. It is true that the Yuktidīpikā finds fault with this definition, but its criticism concerns the use of the terms ‘production’ (*utpatti*) and ‘destruction’ (*nivṛtti*)¹⁶, certainly not the part which states that the substance remains the same. Is it conceivable that Sāṅkhya changed its view about the nature of material objects under pressure from the *satkāryavāda*?

6. To conclude this article we have to consider two statements that occur in the Mahābhāṣya. This text, whose author is called Patañjali, is one of the very few texts of early India that can rather precisely be dated: it belongs almost certainly to the middle of the second century B.C.E.

The first statement that interests us is *guṇasaṃdrāvo dravyam* (Mbh. II/366,26); the second one reads *guṇasamudāyo dravyam* (II/200,13f.). Both phrases are practically synonymous, and state that material objects are collections of qualities. There is no reason to believe that they express the opinion of the author of the Mahābhāṣya, yet they prove that this view existed in his days. Mbh. II/198,5 specifies what is meant by *guṇas*: sound (*śabda*), touch (*sparsa*), colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), and smell (*gandha*). There is no reason to think that the *guṇas* that constitute material objects are different from these five.

Can we conclude from these two phrases that some form of Sāṅkhya was known to the author of the Mahābhāṣya? This would not be without danger, the more so since the Mahābhāṣya contains, to my knowledge, no clear indications to that effect. What is more, the view of matter as a collection of qualities was not the exclusive property of

these latter are not observed)’ (or, reading with WEZLER [1985b: 21] *paṭa-kriyāguṇāgrah*°, ‘no [cloth can] be inferred because no movements and qualities of [that] cloth are observed’). Our phrase follows immediately after this remark. – It will be clear that there is no question anywhere in this discussion of objects being nothing but accumulations of movements and qualities. Movements and qualities come in because they distinguish the effect from its cause, not because they constitute either or both of the two. Essentially effect and cause are not distinct, precisely because they are not made up of movements and qualities. Note, to conclude, that the Yuktidīpikā cites a stanza which describes bodies, as well as vases, etc., as nothing but collections of *sattva* etc. (YD 133,1f.): *tasmāt saṃghātamātratvāt sattvādīnām ghaṭādivat / ā brahmaṇaḥ pariṇāya dehānām anavasthitim* ||.

¹⁶ See HALBFASS 1992: 200f.

the Sāṅkhyas: the Sarvāstivādins held similar views, as has been correctly pointed out by WEZLER (1985b: 32n. 82). And whereas the Mahābhāṣya contains no clear indication that its author knew the Sāṅkhya doctrine, there is reason to believe that he was acquainted with the teachings of the early Sarvāstivādins¹⁷. This is not, however, the place to discuss this question in further detail.

Appendix

A solution to our problem of early Sāṅkhya has been suggested by Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, author of the Uddyota, a subcommentary on the Mahābhāṣya. It occurs in his comments on Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa on the Mahābhāṣya on P. IV 1,3. Kaiyaṭa states (MP III/447):

sattvaraṣṭamāṃsi guṇāḥ | tatpariṇāmarūpās ca tadātmakā eva śabdādayaḥ pañca guṇāḥ | tatsaṃghātarūpaṃ ca ghaṭādi na tu tadvyatiriktaṃ avayavidravayam astīti sāṅkhyānām siddhāntaḥ | 'The doctrine of the Sāṅkhyas is [as follows]: The *guṇas* are *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*; the [so-called] five *guṇas*, [viz.] sound etc., are modifications of those [three *guṇas*] and [therefore] identical with these; and vases etc. are collections of those [five *guṇas*], not material wholes different from those [five *guṇas*]'.

This statement repeats the position also expressed by Bhārtrihari and the other authors studied above. Nāgeśa comments as follows on the word *sāṅkhyānām* (ib.):

sāṅkhyānām iti | seśvarasāṅkhyānām ācāryasya patañjaler ity arthaḥ ! guṇasamūho dravyam iti patañjalir iti yogabhāṣye spaṣṭam | "Of the Sāṅkhyas" means: of Patañjali, a teacher belonging to the Sāṅkhyas with God. It is clear in the Yoga Bhāṣya that according to Patañjali a material object is a collection of *guṇas*'.

The reference is to the Yoga Bhāṣya on YS III 44, which reads (Ybh. 299,6): *ayutasiddhāvayavabhedānugataḥ samūho dravyam iti patañjaliḥ* | 'According to Patañjali¹⁸, a material object is an aggregate of different component parts which do not exist separately'. Nāgeśa interprets this to mean that a material object is a collection of *guṇas*. Is this correct? And what does he mean by *guṇa*?

The statement from the Yoga Bhāṣya must be read in context. It is preceded by a discussion, the most important points of which (for our present purposes) are:

¹⁷ See BRONKHORST 1987: 56ff.

¹⁸ According to HALBFASS (1992: 106n. 8), the reference is to the grammarian Patañjali. This seems doubtful, and is indeed not the opinion of Nāgeśa, as we have seen.

A material object is a collection of *sāmānya*(s) and *viśeṣa*(s)¹⁹. What are *sāmānyas* and *viśeṣas*? The *viśeṣas* are sound etc. – belonging to earth etc. – together with their properties, shape etc.²⁰. The *sāmānyas* are corporeality (which is earth), viscosity (which is water), heat (which is fire), moving forward (which is wind)²¹, and going everywhere (which is ether)²². The text adds that sound etc. are the *viśeṣas* of a *sāmānya*.

There can be little doubt that both *sāmānyas* and *viśeṣas* are qualities of some sort²³; we may speak, with DASGUPTA (1924: 168), of generic and specific qualities. Material objects are, therefore, aggregates or collections of qualities, which are, moreover, inseparable. We may assume that we have to do here with a development of the pre-classical form of Sāṅkhya outlined above²⁴.

Does this mean that we have to believe, following the lead of Nāgeśa, that Bhartṛhari and the other authors cited at the beginning of this article referred to the Yoga Bhāṣya, or perhaps to a work by the mysterious Patañjali mentioned there? It seems doubtful. The *sāmānyas* in the Yoga Bhāṣya are never referred to as *guṇas*²⁵; yet Bhartṛhari uses this term in connection with ‘sound etc.’.

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¹⁹ Ybh. 298,6 *sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāyo 'tra dravyam* |.

²⁰ Ybh. 297,8 *pārthivādyāḥ śabdādayo viśeṣāḥ sahākārādibhir dharmaiḥ*.

²¹ FRAUWALLNER (1953: 357, 404) translates *praṇāmitā* as “Vorwärtsbewegung”.

²² Ybh. 298,2f. *svasāmānyam mūrtir bhūmih sneho jalam vahnir uṣṇatā vāyuh pranāmī sarvatogatir ākāśah*. Ybh. 339,4ff. (ad YS IV 14) enumerates the same *sāmānyas* as *mūrti*, *sneha*, *auṣṇya*, *praṇāmitva* and *avakāśadāna*.

²³ Some of the *sāmānyas* of the Yoga Bhāṣya figure among the *dharma*s of the elements enumerated at YD 118,21f.

²⁴ Buddhist influence cannot be ruled out either; cf. Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya I 12: *kharah prthivīdhātuh | sneho 'bdhātuh | uṣṇatā tejodhātuh | īraṇā vāyudhātuh* |, the similarity of which with the Yoga Bhāṣya is undeniable.

²⁵ Except, of course, by Nāgeśa in the passage cited above.

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