THE QUALITIES OF ŚĀṆKHYA

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1. Bhartrhari’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya contains, in the first Āhṇika, the following remark concerning the Śāṅkhya philosophy (CE IV/23,21–23):

na hīdam śāstram kasya cid ekasya sahāyabhūtam sarvasādhāraṇam |
yathaiva sāṅkhyaśddināṁ dravyād eva pratipattih rūpādīsamavāyo ghaṭo |
ṛthāntarabhūto veti yasya yo ghaṭas tasmin ghaṭasabdam prayuṅkte |
‘For this science [of grammar] is common to all and does not side with anyone. For example, according to the Śāṅkhyaśas and others the understanding derived from a substance is that a vase is a collection of colour(s) and so on, or something else; [the grammarian] uses the word “vase” with regard to that which constitutes a vase for the [person with whom he is in discussion].’

What interests us in this passage is the passing reference to the Śāṅkhya position, according to which a vase is a collection of colour(s) and so on. A similar statement occurs in the Vākyapadiya (VP III 13,14):

sargvāṛtyātmabhūtanāṁ sabdādīnāṁ gune-gune |
trayaḥ sattvādīdhamās te sarvatra samavasthitāḥ ||
‘Those three characteristics, sattva etc., which are found in each quality from among sound etc. which constitute all corporeal objects, are present everywhere.’

The mention of the ‘three characteristics, sattva etc.’ – i.e., sattva, rajas, and tāmas – leaves no doubt that the system of thought referred to is, again, Śāṅkhya².

Bhartrhari does not stand alone in attributing to Śāṅkhya the position that material objects are collections of the qualities colour, sound, etc. Puṇyārāja’s commentary on the second Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadiya may refer to the same view in the following passage (VPT 63,16f. [ad VP II 135]):

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* I thank Eli Franco and Albrecht Wezler for useful suggestions.
1 = AL 28,11–13; SW 33,22–24; MS 9c5–7.
2 The commentator Helārāja, interestingly, tries to show that sound etc. only seem to constitute corporeal objects (VPP II/138,21f.): vyatireke ‘pi dravyasya samavayavasāt tadātmakam iva.

WZKS 38 (1994) 309–322
There is some ambiguity in this statement in as far as the Śāṅkhya are concerned: the term ‘guna’ does not only mean quality in this system of thought; it can also refer to the three constituents (sattva, rajas, tamas) of primary matter.

No such ambiguity attaches to Dharmapāla’s introductory remarks to Āryadeva’s Catuhṣatata 301 (tr. Tillemans 1990: I/135): “[The Śāṅkhya philosopher] Kapila asserts [the following]: Things such as vases and cloths are established simply as [visual] forms ... and other such [properties]; the natures ..., which are the objects of the sense organs, do really exist”. Simhasūri, similarly, ascribes to Śāṅkhya the view that vases etc. (ghatādi) are collections of colours etc. (rūpa-disamūha).

All these statements – as well as others from Mallavādi’s Dvādaśāra Nayacakra and Kaiyaṭa’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, to be considered below – support Bhartrihari’s claims according to which the Śāṅkhya looked upon material objects as being constituted of ‘colour(s) etc.’ (rūpādi), or of ‘sound etc.’ (śabdādi). It seems moreover clear that ‘colour(s) etc.’ and ‘sound etc.’ in these statements refer to the five qualities colour, taste, smell, touch and sound.

2. It is not easy to reconcile the contents of these statements with classical Śāṅkhya doctrine as presented in the Yuktidipikā, the most elaborate commentary on Iśvarakṛṣṇa’s Śāṅkhya Kārikā. There, it may be recalled, the material world is conceived of as having evolved out of prakṛti through a number of intermediate stages. Material objects are considered to consist of the five elements: earth, water, fire, wind and ether. Qualities are not even mentioned among the 25 tattvas which constitute the world. In fact, the elements that do figure among the 25 tattvas possess qualities: ether possesses only sound; wind possesses sound and touch; fire possesses sound, touch and colour; water possesses sound, touch, colour and taste; earth, finally, possesses sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.

These five elements are believed to have directly evolved out of five tanmātras, which carry the names of the five qualities without

3 Tillemans thus translates the Chinese equivalent of skt. rūpa, ‘form, colour’.

4 DNC I/266.9. For Simhasūri’s interpretation of this statement, see section 3 below (p. 313f.).
being qualities themselves. The distinction between tanmātras and qualities is clear from the following passage (YD 118,14–16):

śabdagnāc chadbatañmārād ākāśam ekagunaṁ | śabdasparśagnāt sparsatānmatrād dviguno vāyuḥ | śabdasparśarūpagnād rūpatañmārāt trigunaṁ tejah | śabdasparśarūparasagunād rasatañmārāc caturgyānā āpāḥ | śabdasparśarūparasagandhagnād gandhatañmārāt paṅcagunā prthivī | “From the tanmātra [called] “sound”, which has sound as quality, ether [is born], which has [that] one quality. From the tanmātra [called] “touch”, which has sound and touch as qualities, wind [is born], which has [these] two qualities. From the tanmātra [called] “colour”, which has sound, touch and colour as qualities, fire [is born], which has [these] three qualities. From the tanmātra [called] “taste”, which has sound, touch, colour and taste as qualities, water [is born], which has [these] four qualities. From the tanmātra [called] “smell”, which has sound, touch, colour, taste and smell as qualities, earth [is born], which has [these] five qualities.”

Interestingly, it is not certain that the Yuktiḍīpika correctly represents the position of the Sāṅkhya Kārikā in this respect. The Sāṅkhya Kārikā leaves us in doubt whether it distinguishes between the tanmātras and the qualities ‘colour’, ‘sound’, ‘smell’, ‘taste’ and ‘touch’. This can be seen as follows.

Recall first that several early texts, such as Aśvaghosa’s Buddhacarita (XII 18f.) and some portions of the Mahābhārata (XII 203,25–29; 294,27–29; 298,10–21; XIV 49,34f.), knew a form of Sāṅkhya in which the five qualities figure among the tattvas; they are here among the final evolutes, and derive from the five elements. Here, then, the qualities do figure among the five fundamental tattvas. It is true that they did not occupy the same position as the tanmātras in classical Sāṅkhya. It is yet conceivable (though not provable, as far as I can see) that the five tanmātras, at one phase of the development of Sān-

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5. A similar passage occurs in the Mātharavṛtti (on SK 22 [MV 37,5–9]). The Gaudapādabhāṣya and the commentary translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (see Takakusu 1904) simply derive the elements from one tanmātra each, without mentioning qualities. See further n. 9, below.

6. This has been known at least since Strauss 1913; see also Frauwallner 1927.

7. Occasionally one gets the impression that the idea of qualities as constituting the very end of the evolutionary list of tattvas is not completely unknown to classical Sāṅkhya. An example is the following line, quoted YD 117,13f.: upabhogasya śabdādyaupalabdhir ādīḥ guṇapuruṣopalabdhir antah. Interestingly, YD 64,19ff. states that the qualities sound etc. are pervaded (samanu+gam) by, or have the same nature as (śvarūpa), the three constituents (here called sukha, dukkha and moha), as does DNC I/265; SK 38, on the other hand, makes a similar observation regarding the elements (bhūta), using the terms śānta, ghora and mūḍha (YD 119,20f. adds that the tanmātras are not śānta, ghora and mūḍha).
khya, were the five qualities. This possibility is not contradicted
by the Sānkhya Kārikā. That is to say, this text allows, besides the
‘orthodox’ interpretation, of an interpretation in which the tanmātras
are the five qualities.
Consider first SK 28ab: rūpādiṣu (v.l. śabdād) pañcānām ālocanamā-
tram āṣyate vṛttih / ‘The function of the five [sense organs] with regard
to colour (v.l. sound) etc., is deemed to be mere perception’.
Here it is possible to tāke ‘colour (v.l. sound) etc.’ to be the five
qualities of those names. SK 34ab, on the other hand, has: buddhin-
driyāni teśam paṅca viśeṣāviśeṣāviśayāni / ‘Of the [tenfold external
organ] the five sense organs have the viśēṣas and the aviśēṣas as ob-
jects’. The meanings of viśeṣa and aviśeṣa are explained in SK 38a–c:
tanmātrāny aviśeṣās teḥkho bhūtāni paṅca pañcabhyah / ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ
‘The tanmātras are the aviśēṣas. From those five [arise] the five ele-
ments; these are known as the viśēṣas’.
According to SK 34ab, then, the sense organs have as objects the five
elements and the five tanmātras. ⁸ If it is true that five qualities are
the objects (SK 28a, as interpreted above), one might think that the
five tanmātras are the five qualities. Nothing in the Sānkhya Kārikā
militates against this view, as far as I can see.⁹
It would be premature to draw far-reaching consequences from the
lack of clarity of the Sānkhya Kārikā. It is not at all certain that it
looked upon the tanmātras as qualities. But if it did, this would not
be without interest in connection with the various quotations main-
taining that in Sānkhya material objects are collections of qualities.

3. We must now consider a passage in Mallavādin’s Dvādaśāra Naya-
cakra which criticizes the Sānkhyas. This passage reads, in the recon-
struction of Muni Jambuvijayā (DNC I/268,1f.):

⁸ Most of the commentators hasten to add that the tanmātras are not
grasped by the sense organs of ordinary mortals (often asmadādī). It is here
further to be noted that SK does not appear to justify the translation “subtle
elements” or the like for tanmātra. Stanza 39 rather speaks of a subvariety of
the viśeṣas that are sūkṣma ‘subtle’; these sūkṣma viśeṣas ‘subtle elements’ are
clearly not aviśeṣas, i.e., tanmātras.

⁹ FRAUWALLNER (1953: 355ff.; also 1927: 2 [= 141]) claims that in early
Sānkhya the different tanmātras each had only one quality (cp. YD 91,7
[ekarūpāṇi tanmātrāṇity anye | ekottarāṇī vāṣaganyah |] and 118,12f., also
Vācaspati Mīśrā’s Tattvakoamudī on SK 22 [śabadatmanmātrakāśam śabda-
gunam | śabadatmanmātrasahitād sparātmanmātrakā bhūyāḥ śabadasparsagunah | sa-
dasparsatmanmātrasahitād rūpatanmātrakā tejah śabadasparsarūpagnunam | sa-
dasparskāpurmanmātrasahitād rāsatanmātrakā āpah śabadasparsarūpagnunah | sa-
dasparskāpuraso-rasatanmātrasahitād gandhatanmātrakā chadbasparsarūpagnu-
dhagunā prthivī jāyata iti] and similar statements in the Cāndrikā and Jayamang-
galā). This position is of course but one step removed from the above tentative
suggestion that the five qualities once occupied the place of the tanmātras.
The Qualities of Śāṅkhya

The commentator Simhasūri cites in connection with the term _asam- druteḥ_ 'because [ether] is not a collection', the following phrase from the Mahābhāṣya: _gunasaradrēvo dravyam_ 'a material object is a collection of qualities'. We shall pay further attention to this phrase below (p. 317). Here it is sufficient to note that Simhasūri is most probably correct in attributing to Mallavadin the belief that the Śāṅkhya looked upon the material objects as collections of qualities.

Wezler (1985b: 3ff.) interprets the above passage in the light of the YD passage cited in section 2 above (p. 317). To quote his own words (p. 5): "The gist of Mallavadin's counterargument is hence that ether cannot originate in the manner asserted by the Śāṅkhya because it does not correspond to their definition of _dravya_, i.e. because it is not a _dravya_ or rather because its cause, the _śabdaikagaṇapraṇāṣṭhitam_ is not a _dravya_ just like the soul or the son of a barren woman".

This interpretation is not, however, free from difficulties. First of all, the words _śabdaikagaṇapraṇāṣṭhitam_ in the above passage translate most naturally as 'ether is produced from the single quality sound'. The alternative translation 'ether is produced from [the _śabdata mítra_] which has sound as its only quality' is decidedly more artificial. Moreover, if the latter interpretation had been intended by Mallavadin, his remark 'immediately after rejecting [the possibility] that something may have one single cause' (_ekakāraṇatvarpratīṣṭhitam_ would be besides the point. As can be seen from the YD passage cited above (p. 311), each of the elements, not only ether, is there presented as deriving from a single cause, viz., from the corresponding _tanmātra_.

It will hardly be necessary to point out that Mallavadin's passage allows of an interpretation in the light of what we have discussed in section 1 above. The material world is constituted of the qualities sound etc.; these qualities are accordingly the causes of all material objects. Ether has but one quality, sound, and therefore but one cause. This, however, goes against the rule that every product must have more than one single cause.

Wezler's interpretation of Mallavadin's passage can, in view of the above, be replaced by one that does more justice to its precise wording. Interestingly, Wezler's interpretation appears to coincide with the one offered by Mallavadin's commentator Simhasūri. This can be deduced from some phrases in the latter's Nyāyagamānusārīnī.
Consider first the following passage (DNC I/268,4–6): \emph{yady anekāt-
makākaikākāranaṇavatvam iṣyate evam ekakāranaṇavapratiṣedhānantaṛam ...}
\emph{kathāṃ śabdaikagunāparvṛtti viyad abhyupagamyate.} The difficulty
connected with \emph{ekakāranaṇavapratiṣedhānantaṛam}, pointed out above,
is here avoided by superimposing a different interpretation on this
term. The ‘rejection of [the possibility] that something may have a
single cause’ becomes here the requirement that something has a single
cause which has a multiple nature. This requirement fits, of course, the
different \emph{tanmātras} which are single causes of the corresponding ele-
ments, but have several qualities.

Śimhasūri is equally careful to avoid the difficulty presented by the
word \emph{śabdaikagunāparvṛtti}. He cites an unfindable Dhatupāṭha\textsuperscript{10} in
order to interpret the problematic \textit{“guna”} as “number”. The aim of this
procedure seems, once again, to force the orthodox version of Sāṅkhya
upon a recalcitrant text.

It appears, then, possible that Śimhasūri, unlike Mallavādin, is
acquainted with a form of Sāṅkhya in which \emph{tanmātras}, and not quali-
ties (\emph{guna}), figure in the list of evolutes, or perhaps one in which
\emph{tanmātras} and \emph{guna}s had come to be differentiated. Be it noted that
another passage of his Nyāyagamāṇusārinī (II/470,13) enumerates
\emph{mahat, ahamkāra} and the \emph{tanmātras}, three evolutes which succeed each
other in classical Sāṅkhya.

If our interpretations of Mallavādin and Śimhasūri are correct, we
have stumbled upon an interesting difference between these two au-
thors. Mallavādin, it appears, was not yet acquainted with Sāṅkhya in
its ‘classical’ form. Śimhasūri, on the other hand, was no longer aware
of the earlier form of Sāṅkhya known to Mallavādin, and felt obliged
to reinterpret the latter’s words so as to arrive at an understanding
that was in agreement with the form of Sāṅkhya that he knew.

4. The conclusion we have to draw from the preceding sections is that
a number of classical authors appear to have known the Sāṅkhya
system of thought in a form which was in at least some points different
from the classical system as it has been handed down to us. The
Sāṅkhya known to Bhartṛhari, Mallavādin and others had, we have
been led to believe, the qualities sound, colour, taste, touch and smell
among its evolutes. Interestingly, this position is primarily known to
us through texts that were no school-texts of the Sāṅkhyas, most
notably a number of passages in the Mahābhārata. We have seen,
however, that the Sāṅkhya Kārikā itself may have held a similar
position.

\textsuperscript{10} See DNC I/268n. 3 and WEZLER 1985b: 27n. 14.
The Qualities of Śāṅkhyā

It seems probable that Bhārtṛhari and the other authors we have discussed found the position they attributed to the Śāṅkhyas in one or more texts belonging to that school. And there can hardly be any doubt that that text – or one of those texts – is the one called vārṣagaṇa tantra by Simhasūri, and which Frauwallner (1958: 94 [= 233]) identifies as the Śaṭṭitantra of Vṛṣagana\(^\text{11}\). This text was known to Dignāga and Mallavādin, as Frauwallner has shown. If indeed Bhārtṛhari was acquainted with it, its date of composition must precede him, too.

How is it possible that Simhasūri who, like Mallavādin, knew the Śaṭṭitantra, gives evidence of being acquainted with a different version of Śāṅkhyā? Frauwallner 1958 may provide the elements for an answer. Already Dignāga’s commentator Jīnendrabuddhi, Frauwallner argues (p. 109 [= 248] and 113 [= 252]), knew at least two, possibly three commentaries on the Śaṭṭitantra. It is not impossible that one of these commentators was, or was close to, the author of the Yoga Bhāṣya (p. 114f. [= 253f.]).

It is not our task at present to take position with regard to Frauwallner’s conclusions, which contain inevitably a speculative element. Be it however noted that Simhasūri’s deviation from Mallavādin in the interpretation of Śāṅkhyā doctrine fits in very well with the assumption that Śāṅkhyā philosophy evolved – and therefore changed – through the reinterpretation(s) by its commentators of its classical text, which may have been called śaṭṭitantra. This assumption would, of course, agree very well with the hypothesis presented in section 2 above, according to which the Śāṅkhyā Kārikā would still precede the modification which finds expression in its commentaries.

5. The above reflections suggest that a major change took place in Śāṅkhyā doctrine, perhaps some time in the 5\(^{\text{th}}\) century of our era. What could possibly have been the reason of this change? Why should Śāṅkhyā abandon the idea that material objects are nothing but collections of qualities?

These questions do not, at present, allow of a certain and indubitable answer. There are simply no texts from the period that might provide such an answer. It is yet very tempting to suspect a connection with the satkāryavāda, the doctrine according to which effects (or products) pre-exist in their causes. This doctrine of classical Śāṅkhyā

\(^{11}\) For the authorship of this text, see Oberhammer-16. The name of its author may rather have been Vārṣaganyā; see Chakravarti 1951:137f., Larson 1987: 624n. 21 and Wezler 1985a: 14n. 6.
is already known to Āryadeva\textsuperscript{12} and Mallavādin (DNC I/271).\textsuperscript{13} It must therefore have co-existed with the view that material objects are nothing but collections of qualities for at least some time. Yet the two are strange bedfellows.

In order to accommodate the doctrine of satkāryavāda, classical Sāṅkhya views the world as a continuous series of modifications (parināma) of substrates which do not lose their essence.\textsuperscript{14} The Yuktidīpikā defines parināma in the following stanza (YD 75,6f.):

\begin{quote}
\textit{jahad dharmāntaram pūrvam upādatte yadā param /
\hspace{1cm} tattvād apracyuto dharmi parināmaḥ sa ucyate //}
\end{quote}

‘When the substrate (dharmin), without abandoning its essence, drops the earlier property (dharma) and accepts the next one, that is called modification (parināma).’

Essential in this definition is that the substrate remains in each modification, without abandoning its essence. That is to say, material objects are more than mere collections of properties; there is necessarily something more to them, viz. the all-important substrate.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} E.g., Catuḥśataka XI (Lang 1986, esp. p. 106f.); see further Honda 1974.

\textsuperscript{13} Several authors (Franco 1991: 127; Johnston 1937: 25; Larson 1969: 165; Liebenthal 1934: 9n. 11) have drawn attention to the fact that satkāryavāda is without clear precedents in the earlier literature, and must be a relatively late development in Sāṅkhya. Regarding the origin of this doctrine we may recall Liebenthal’s question, “ob nicht vielleicht satkārya selbst nur ein Aspekt einer Diskussion mit Mādhyamika-Buddhisten ist” (1934: 4).

\textsuperscript{14} The ultimate substrate is, of course, known by the name prakṛti or pradhāna.

\textsuperscript{15} This is how we must read YD 51,17f.: \textit{asmākan tu kāranamātrayaiva samghātād ākārintaraparigrahād va kriyāgūnānām prācitir vyaktivideśo bhava-tīti bruatām adōsāḥ | “But [this] reproach is not valid for us because what we teach is that a particular manifest thing originates as the accumulation of movements and qualities on account of the cause and nothing but the cause having coagulated or having assumed another shape” (Wezler 1985b: 22). This passage occurs in a discussion about the question whether the effect pre-exists in its cause, the famous satkāryavāda. The opponent argues that if the effect were there, it should be observable, which it is not; and if it is not observable, one should be able to infer it on the basis of its movements and qualities, which, again, is not the case. Here the author of the Yuktidīpikā responds that one can only search for the movements and qualities of an effect as distinct from those of the cause, if one assumes that cause and effect themselves are distinct, which Sāṅkhya denies; cf. YD 51,15–17: \textit{kāryakāranaprthaktvāvādinas tatkriyāgūnānām prthaktvam anumātum yuktam ity atas tantvavasthāne patakriyāgūnagrahaḥ anumānābhāva ity ayam upālambhāḥ sāvakaśāḥ syāt | ‘For him who holds that effect and cause are separate, it is appropriate to infer that their movements and qualities are separate. For this reason the reproach can be made that, in the state of a [mere] thread (and no cloth), no [cloth can] be inferred on the basis of the observation of the movements and qualities of [that] cloth (precisely because
The Yoga Bṛāṣya offers a similar definition of pariṇāma at the very end of its commentary on YS III 13 (Ybh. 255,7f.): avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarotpattī pariṇāma iti || ‘pariṇāma is the production of a new property in a substance which remains the same, while the earlier property is destroyed’. It is true that the Yuktidīpika finds fault with this definition, but its criticism concerns the use of the terms ‘production’ (utpatti) and ‘destruction’ (nivṛtti)16, certainly not the part which states that the substance remains the same. Is it conceivable that Sāṅkhya changed its view about the nature of material objects under pressure from the satkāryavāda?

6. To conclude this article we have to consider two statements that occur in the Mahābhāṣya. This text, whose author is called Patañjali, is one of the very few texts of early India that can rather precisely be dated: it belongs almost certainly to the middle of the second century B.C.E.

The first statement that interests us is gunasadṛāvo dravyam (Mbh. II/366,26); the second one reads gunasamudāyo dravyam (II/200,13f.). Both phrases are practically synonymous, and state that material objects are collections of qualities. There is no reason to believe that they express the opinion of the author of the Mahābhāṣya, yet they prove that this view existed in his days. Mbh. II/198,5 specifies what is meant by gunas: sound (śabda), touch (sparśa), colour (rūpa), taste (rasa), and smell (gandha). There is no reason to think that the gunas that constitute material objects are different from these five.

Can we conclude from these two phrases that some form of Sāṅkhya was known to the author of the Mahābhāṣya? This would not be without danger, the more so since the Mahābhāṣya contains, to my knowledge, no clear indications to that effect. What is more, the view of matter as a collection of qualities was not the exclusive property of

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the Sāṅkhyaś: the Sarvāstivādins held similar views, as has been correctly pointed out by Wezler (1985b: 32n. 82). And whereas the Mahābhāṣya contains no clear indication that its author knew the Sāṅkhyā doctrine, there is reason to believe that he was acquainted with the teachings of the early Sarvāstivādins\(^\text{17}\). This is not, however, the place to discuss this question in further detail.

Appendix

A solution to our problem of early Sāṅkhya has been suggested by Nāgęṣa Bhaṭṭa, author of the Uddyota, a subcommentary on the Mahābhāṣya. It occurs in his comments on Kaiyata’s Pradīpa on the Mahābhāṣya on P. IV 1.3. Kaiyata states (MP III/447):

\[
\text{satvavajastamāṃsē gunāḥ | tatparināmarūpās ca tadātmakā eva śab-
dādayaḥ paśca gunāḥ | tatsamghātarūpam ca ghaṭādī na tu tadvayātrik-
tam avayavidravyam astīti sāṅkhyaṇām siddhāntaḥ.}
\]

‘The doctrine of the Sāṅkhyaś is [as follows]: The \textit{gunaś} are \textit{satva}, \textit{rajas} and \textit{tamas}; the [so-called] five \textit{gunaś}, [viz.] sound etc., are modifications of those [three \textit{gunaś}] and [therefore] identical with these; and vases etc. are collections of those [five \textit{gunaś}], not material wholes different from those [five \textit{gunaś}]’.

This statement repeats the position also expressed by Bhātrīhari and the other authors studied above. Nāgęṣa comments as follows on the word \textit{sāṅkhyaṇām} (ib.):

\[
\text{sāṅkhyaṇām iti | seśvarasāṅkhyaṇām ācāryasya pataṇjaler ity arthah | \textit{gunaś}\textit{amūko dravyam iti pataṇjalir iti yogabhāṣye spaś\textit{tam} |}
\]

‘“Of the Sāṅkhyaś” means: of Pataṇjali, a teacher belonging to the Sāṅkhyaś with God. It is clear in the Yoga Bhāṣya that according to Pataṇjali a material object is a collection of \textit{gunaś}.

The reference is to the Yoga Bhāṣya on YS III 44, which reads (Ybh. 299,6):

\[
\text{ayutāsiddhāvayavabhedānugataḥ samūho dravya iti pataṇjalir |}
\]

‘According to Pataṇjali\(^\text{18}\), a material object is an aggregate of different component parts which do not exist separately’. Nāgęṣa interprets this to mean that a material object is a collection of \textit{gunaś}. Is this correct? And what does he mean by \textit{guna}? The statement from the Yoga Bhāṣya must be read in context. It is preceded by a discussion, the most important points of which (for present purposes) are:

\(^{17}\) See Bronkhorst 1987: 56ff.

\(^{18}\) According to Halbfass (1992: 106n. 8), the reference is to the grammarian Pataṇjali. This seems doubtful, and is indeed not the opinion of Nāgęṣa, as we have seen.
A material object is a collection of sāmānyas and viśeṣas. What are sāmānyas and viśeṣas? The viśeṣas are sound etc. — belonging to earth etc. — together with their properties, shape etc. The sāmānyas are corporeality (which is earth), viscosity (which is water), heat (which is fire), moving forward (which is wind), and going everywhere (which is ether). The text adds that sound etc. are the viśeṣas of a sāmānya.

There can be little doubt that both sāmānyas and viśeṣas are qualities of some sort, we may speak, with Dasgupta (1924: 168), of generic and specific qualities. Material objects are, therefore, aggregates or collections of qualities, which are, moreover, inseparable. We may assume that we have to do here with a development of the pre-classical form of Sāṅkhya outlined above.

Does this mean that we have to believe, following the lead of Nāgêśa, that Bhartṛhari and the other authors cited at the beginning of this article referred to the Yoga Bhāṣya, or perhaps to a work by the mysterious Patañjali mentioned there? It seems doubtful. The sāmānyas in the Yoga Bhāṣya are never referred to as guṇas; yet Bhartṛhari uses this term in connection with ‘sound etc.’.

Bibliography and Abbreviations


19 Ybh. 298,6 sāmānyaviśeśasamudāyo ‘tra dravyam |.
20 Ybh. 297,8 pārhivadāyāḥ sabdādayo viśeṣāḥ sahākārādibhir dharmaih.
21 Frauwallner (1953: 357, 404) translates pranāmitā as “Vorwärtsbewegung”.
22 Ybh. 298,2f. svāsāmānyam mūrtir bhūmiḥ sneho jalam vahnir uṣṇatā vāyuḥ pranāmī sarvatoqatīr akāśaḥ. Ybh. 339,4ff. (ad YS IV 14) enumerates the same sāmānyas as mūrti, sneha, auṣṇya, pranāmita and avakāśadāna.
23 Some of the sāmānyas of the Yoga Bhāṣya figure among the dharmas of the elements enumerated at YD 118,21f.
24 Buddhist influence cannot be ruled out either; cf. Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya I 12: kharah prthividhātah | sneho bdhātuh | uṣṇatā tejodhātuh | tranā vāyuḥdātuh |, the similarity of which with the Yoga Bhāṣya is undeniable.
25 Except, of course, by Nāgêśa in the passage cited above.
CE IV


Chakravarti 1951


Dasgupta 1924


DNC I


Franco 1991


Frauwallner 1927


Frauwallner 1953


Frauwallner 1958


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Walter Liebenthal, Satkārya in der Darstellung seiner buddhistischen Gegner. Die prakṛti-pariksā im Tatvāsvamgraha des Sāntiraksita zusammen mit der Pañjikā des Kamalaśīla übersetzt und ausführlich interpre-
The Qualities of Śāṅkhya


Mbh.

MP

MS

MV

P.
Pāṇinian Sūtra

SK
Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Śāṅkhya Kārikā: see MV and YD.

Strauss 1913

SW

Takakusu 1904

Tillemans 1990

VP

VPP II

VPT

Wezler 1985a
Albrecht Wezler, A Note on Vārṣaganyā and the Yo-
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