RECENT VEDANTA LITERATURE

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THE fame of Gaudapada, the founder and most rigorous advocate of Advaita or "non-dualist" Vedanta, has been overshadowed by that of Shankara, the great popularizer of that doctrine. The publication of three translations of Gaudapada's book, together with a comprehensive study of it, should make this outstanding classic of Indian philosophy better known to Western students.

Gaudapada is usually supposed to have lived about 500 A.D. His *Karika* or *Agamasastra*, a short work of 215 verses, combines the conciseness of a sutra with the clarity of a commentary, thus avoiding both the unintelligibility characteristic of the Hindu sutras and the interminability characteristic of the commentaries. In the first of the four chapters, which is a commentary on, and usually considered part of, the Mandukya Upanishad, the appearance of the Self in the "three states" of waking and dreaming and sleeping is contrasted with its true being in the "fourth state" beyond duality, various theories of creation are rejected, and the meaning of the mystic syllable *Aum* is explained. In the second chapter subjectivism is defended, with its consequence that the objects of waking experience, which constitute the world, are no more real than fairyland or the objects of dreams; really there is no creation and no destruction of things, no bondage and no liberation of the Self. In the third chapter the apparent plurality of selves is compared with the apparent plurality of spaces defined by various containers; just as there is only one real Space, so there is only one real Self; the "highest truth" is that "nothing is born." In the final chapter consciousness is compared to a firebrand, which seems to produce various figures when whirled around, though it does not really produce anything; so consciousness seems to produce various objects when agitated, but when calm it is just the Self.

Gaudapada's doctrine is *ajativada* (non-birth-ism), that nothing comes into being. This sounds like the Eleatic philos-

ophy, but is rather different. Parmenides arrives at his conclusion that nothing comes into being by an analysis of the concept of being, rejecting experience as irrelevant. Gaudapada also refers to the purely logical argument, although briefly ("That which is already existent does not come into being, and that which is non-existent does not also come into being," iv, 4). But Gaudapada and his followers in the Advaita school of Vedanta base their conclusions on three kinds of evidence: the authority of scripture, the rational analysis of ordinary experience, and the intuition of the free self—the second of these being philosophy in the strict sense of the word. All three concur, Gaudapada maintains, in the conclusion that Self is the only reality. It is not necessary to explain creation because there is no creation. Since only Self exists, the world is neither reality nor appearance nor even illusion in the ordinary sense of that word. There isn't any world. From this point of view other Vedantic theories are popular compromises with common sense for the use of persons who cannot think rigorously. Students who approach Vedanta philosophy by gradual steps will come to Gaudapada, if at all, at the end of the journey. As he says (paraphrased in Karmarkar's introduction, p. xi):

> The various theories of creation have their use in gradually making the soul realise the Advaita which is extremely difficult to grasp, especially by people of ordinary intelligence.

Persons however who are prepared to study Vedanta seriously and sympathetically might do well to begin with this book, the earliest, clearest, and strictest account of non-dualist philosophy.

The edition of Gaudapada's book edited by Professor Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya of the University of Calcutta [1] is a fine piece of scholarship. The text, based on a collation of 18 manuscripts, is transliterated in Latin characters. The translation appears to be literal. The verse-by-verse commentary explains difficult passages and shows affinities with other works. The 116-page introduction discusses the author, the work, and its sources. Nine indexes provide various references. Special stress is laid on the

[1] *The Āgamaśāstra of Gaudapāda*, ed. and trans. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya (University of Calcutta, 1943).

striking similarities between many passages in the fourth chapter and the teachings of earlier Buddhist philosophers, especially of the Vignanavada and Madhyamika schools, although it is also shown that the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is the principal source for the work as a whole.

An edition by Swami Nikhilananda of the Vedanta Center in New York, first published in India in 1932, has been revised and republished as part of the swami's edition of the Upanishads,[2] a great work beyond the scope of this review. It includes a translation, a commentary, and a 14-page introduction, but no text. The commentary, although in Nikhilananda's own words, is based on the ancient commentary attributed to Shankara, and so may be said to represent the orthodox interpretation of Gaudapada, although in this connection it should be noted that some scholars doubt that the commentary really is by Shankara. Nikhilananda appears to have used this supposedly authoritative commentary as a guide in making his translation, which in any case differs considerably from Bhattacharya's. The first verse of the third chapter, for example, is rendered by Bhattacharya

> The *dharma* 'duty' relating to *upāsanā* 'worship' arises when Brahman is born, but before birth all is unborn; therefore, that (*dharma*) is regarded as miserable.

and by Nikhilananda

> The jiva, betaking himself to devotional worship, abides in the manifest Brahman. He thinks that before the creation all was of the same nature as the birthless Reality. Therefore he is said to possess a narrow intellect.

One should use discretion in taking a verse out of context to establish any doctrine. For example, verse 93 of the fourth chapter is translated

> The jivas, from the very beginning and by their very nature, are all peace, unborn, and completely free. They are characterized by sameness and non-separateness. The unborn Ātman is always established in sameness and purity.

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[2] *The Upanishads*, trans. Swami Nikhilananda (New York, 1952), Vol. II, pp. 199-369.

At first sight this seems to teach the doctrine of *ekajivavada*, that the *jiva* (individual self, as contrasted with the Atman or absolute Self) is one. But the word *jiva* does not occur in the Sanskrit text of this verse (one of thirteen cases where Nikhilananda has inserted the word *jiva* when it is not in the text).

A still more recent edition by R. D. Karmarkar of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute at Poona[3] includes the text in Devanagari, a literal translation, a commentary (of no utility to non-Sanskritists), and a 52-page introduction. The avowed purpose of this version is to supersede Bhattacharya's translation on the ground that he, misled by his "leanings towards Buddhism," wrongly teaches that "Gaudapada was a Buddhist." To an unprejudiced critic it would seem that Karmarkar rather exaggerates this issue. Bhattacharya never calls Gaudapada a Buddhist but affirms explicitly that he is a Vedantist whose "main source" is the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, while Karmarkar admits that Gaudapada "borrowed several ideas" from his Buddhist predecessors. If there is an issue, it does not concern the doctrine of Gaudapada, which is clear and unambiguous, but involves only the question whether the term "Buddhism" should be extended to include it. The only real issue is the interpretation of the last verse, where Gaudapada says, "This has not been said by Buddha." For Karmarkar this means a rejection of Buddhism, though he does not make clear why Gaudapada felt it necessary to refer to Buddha, who is not mentioned elsewhere in the book, while for Bhattacharya it refers to the Buddha's notorious silence about metaphysical questions. What seems uncontroverted is that Gaudapada was a Vedantist, not a Buddhist, but that as a subjectivist Vedantist he had subjectivist doctrines in common with certain subjectivist Buddhists.

The first comprehensive exposition of Gaudapada's philosophy in English is the work of a distinguished scholar and convinced Advaitin well known both in India and America, T. M. P. Mahadevan of the University of Madras.[4] The first chapter of this book

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[3] *Gaudapāda-Kārikā*, ed. Raghunath Damodar Karmarkar (Poona, 1953).

[4] T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Gaudapāda, a Study in Early Advaita* (University of Madras, 1952).

discusses Gaudapada himself, although nothing is known about him. The second chapter, on his sources, shows that the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad is the main source of Gaudapada's philosophy, and concludes that his "sole purpose is to expound the central teaching of the Upanishads." The third discusses the relation between reason and revelation, a basic problem in Vedanta, as in Christian, philosophy. Revelation, according to Mahadevan's interpretation of Gaudapada, is necessary because reason cannot comprehend the ultimate reality, since "thought must needs create division where there is unity in order that it may function," but the appeal to the authority of scripture "means no more and no less" than taking "into account the realization of the sages," and the final test of truth can only be experience. It is by reason that we interpret the scripture, rejecting as figurative whatever is irrational, and it is by reason that we infer the truths of Advaita from the facts of experience. In the fourth chapter Mahadevan compares Gaudapada's discussion of the states of consciousness with that found in other Vedanta works, and concludes that all teach the same truth, that the "fourth state" is the non-dual Brahman, remaining constant as the three states of waking, dreaming, and sleeping pass away. The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters deal with Gaudapada's basic principles—non-dualism (*advaita*), non-origination (*ajativada*), and illusion (*maya*). The eighth, on practical philosophy, while stressing the Advaita doctrine that release from the bondage of ignorance is attained not by any kind of behavior but only by knowledge (especially through meditation on the syllable *Aum*), also makes clear that this release is itself, like the bondage, only illusory. In the ninth chapter Mahadevan examines and vigorously rejects the theory that Gaudapada is really a Buddhist, and in the tenth he evaluates his position as the first known systematic exponent of Advaita Vedanta. A bibliography, glossary, and index are substantial additions to the book's value and utility.

Philosophers of the Advaita school of Vedanta agree on the three basic principles that Brahman is the only reality, the world is illusion, and the self is Brahman, but they disagree in their detailed interpretations of these principles. In the problem of the subjectivity or objectivity of the world, the problem of creation,

and the problem of the oneness or manyness of the individual self, there is a radically monistic and subjectivistic view and there is a more common-sense pluralistic and realistic view. The latter is characteristic of Shankara, the great popularizer of this philosophy. Mahadevan interprets Gaudapada as a consistent advocate of the more common-sense interpretation. He states explicitly (p. 231):

> Doctrinally, there is no difference whatsoever between what is taught by Gaudapāda in the Kārikā and what is expounded by Sankara in his extensive works.

He illustrates this in the chapters on non-dualism, non-origination, and illusion.

Advaita or non-dualism means that Brahman, the absolute reality, is not the first or greatest or most real among things but the only real thing, "one without a second." This is established both by revelation and by reason. Revelation, to be sure, also states the contrary, but such statements are rejected as figurative. Reason, Gaudapada maintains, shows that the objects of ordinary experience have no being apart from their being perceived by us and so are no different ontologically from the objects of dreams. How this radical subjectivism has "no difference whatsoever" from the doctrine of Shankara is not clear to me, unless I am wrong in supposing that Shankara taught that the phenomenal world, while not real, is an illusion created by God objectively and perceived by us realistically, unlike the individual illusions of dreams. Gaudapada says (ii, 31; Bhattacharya's trans., p. 38):

> As dreams and illusions are seen, and as is the town of Gandharvas, so is seen all this universe by those who are well-versed in the Vedāntas.

Mahadevan elaborates on this and concludes (p. 120):

> Though there is the aforesaid difference between dream and waking, from the metaphysical point of view both are the same.

But Shankara says (*Vedantasutrabhasya*, II, ii, 29; Thibaut's trans., Vol. I, p. 425):

> The visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness; and the distinc-

> tion between remembrance and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by everyone as being founded on the absence or presence of the object.

A similar remark applies to the problem of creation. Shankara says (ibid., II, i, 33; p. 357):

> Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited.

But Gaudapada says (i, 9; Bhattacharya's trans., p. 4):

> Some (say) that the creation is for the sake of (his) enjoyment, while others (are of opinion) that it is for the sake of his sport. It is, however, the nature of the Shining One, for how can desire be in one for whom every object of desire is (already) secured.

Karmarkar interprets this verse differently (p. 3):

> Creation (is) for the sake of enjoyment (of the Lord)—so (say) others; for the sake of sport—so (say) still others. This again (is) the (very) nature of God (the shining one)—(so say others, arguing) 'What (possible) desire (can there be in the case) of (the Lord) whose cravings are (already) fulfilled?'

Karmarkar (also Mahadevan, p. 152) interprets the latter part of the verse as meaning that creation is the nature of God (here called "the Shining One"), one of the theories to be rejected. Bhattacharya interprets it as meaning that the world is the very nature of Brahman ("the Shining One," identified with the "Fourth," that is, Brahman, in the following verse), the true theory opposed to all theories which make the world other than Brahman. Both translations are compatible with the conclusion that all theories of creation are false, since there is no creation—Gaudapada's principal thesis, constantly repeated; and both seem incompatible with Shankara's theory of creation as God's play. But Mahadevan states (p. 33) that Shankara in the passage cited "is evidently referring to this passage" of Gaudapada. This is very confusing. A person ignorant of this literature and even this language can hardly judge these difficult matters, and I am sure that Professor Mahadevan understands them better than I do, yet one might expect an exposition of Gaudapada in English to clarify the issues

for English-speaking readers. This issue of creation is not a trivial one, and on it depends the problem of realism versus subjectivism discussed above. Belief in creation may be compatible with subjectivism, as one may argue that creation and Creator are all parts of the subjective illusion, but denial of any creation and so of an objective world can hardly be compatible with realism. At first sight it would appear that Shankara is the father of those who teach that the world, created by God, although not real still is not unreal, but like a magician's illusion exists objectively and is perceived realistically, while Gaudapada is the father of those who teach that the world is not created, not objective, and not in any sense real, but a mere figment of the imagination. If this is not so, one would like to have it explained more clearly.

The theory that there is only one *jiva* or individual soul (*eka-jiva-vada*) is opposed to the theory that there are many, with its consequence that some may be freed while others are still bound by illusion. Shankara seems to teach the latter, for example when he says (ibid., II, ii, 42; p. 439):

> From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from the samsara.

So does Gaudapada, according to Mahadevan, who says (p. 160):

> Though some Advaitins have held the view that there is only one jiva, their number is small. And without any doubt, Gaudapada is not among them. As we have already remarked, his view is ekatma-vada and not eka-jiva-vada.

But Gaudapada does not say so explicitly. Of course he teaches "ekatma-vada" (that there is only one absolute Self), as do all Advaitins. And of course he teaches the apparent plurality of individual souls, as in his simile of the plural spaces determined by vessels, as this apparent plurality is obvious. The problem is whether there is, intermediate between the absolutely real Self and the empirically many apparent souls, a single soul which is the immediate subject of illusory appearance. Gaudapada appears to suggest this when he says (ii, 16; Bhattacharya's trans., p. 26):

> First one imagines a personal soul (*jiva*), and then various things, external and internal.

But it would seem more correct to say that the problem does not arise for Gaudapada, who is concerned not with the one-ness or many-ness of the *jiva* but with denying that there is any *jiva*. Here as in the other cases, the special flavor of Gaudapada's thought is dulled by its attempted reduction to the system of his famous successor.

As a whole, however, Professor Mahadevan's book provides an excellent introduction to Advaita Vedanta, just because it is based on Gaudapada and therefore omits those detailed discussions which sometimes obscure the basic principles in the writings of more verbose Vedantists.

Professor Mahadevan's own interpretation of Advaita Vedanta is given in a little book, *Time and the Timeless*,[5] which takes its title from the declaration of the Maitri Upanishad, "There are two forms of Brahman: time and the timeless." Since freedom (*moksha*) is essentially freedom from individuality, he argues, no individual can ever be free. Release from illusory individuality to the "more abundant life" of spiritual freedom is "the common goal of all beings" not individually but collectively, the goal for society and for the world. The individual cannot attain freedom, for it is the essence of the individual to be bound, but the world can attain freedom, for it need not exist in the form of individuals, indeed never does really, for such existence is only illusory. World history, consequently, has a significance and a purpose, with cosmic freedom as its goal.

This purpose is developed in time. Time, to be sure, is unreal —a Vedantic thesis confirmed by an examination of the obscure accounts of time given by various Western physicists, psychologists, and philosophers. But it is the gateway to reality. We attain eternity not by rejecting time but by passing through and beyond time to the timeless Brahman. History is the record of this progress, "the progressive realization of the eternal Self," and its goal is "the age of truth, peace, and harmony" which Hindus call the *Satya-yuga*.

In this short but striking exposition of the importance of time in Advaita Vedanta, Professor Mahadevan has accomplished an

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[5] T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Time and the Timeless: Principal Miller Lectures, 1953* (Madras, 1954).

unusual rapprochement between Vedanta and Christian philosophy. In Christian philosophy history is all important; in Vedanta it is usually ignored. But for Christianity no less than for Vedanta the goal of our endeavor is eternal. And for Vedanta no less than for Christianity, so Mahadevan maintains, the significant progress by which this goal is attained is the history of the world in time.

A cursory summary of Vedanta thought from ancient times to the present is given by Professor P. T. Raju of the University of Rajputana at Jodhpur in his *Idealistic Thought of India.*[6] This historical survey of Indian philosophy is restricted to the idealistic schools because idealism is the true philosophy or, as he puts it in the preface, "idealism can be avoided, it seems to the author, only if we forbear to carry our thought to its logical extreme." And idealism is most highly developed in India, for "the idealistic systems in the West have not carried to the end their lines of argument" (p. 13). Indian idealism means Vedanta and Buddhism. There are two chapters (idealism as "theory of reality" and "theory of value") which define idealism as understood in Western philosophy, two on the various schools of Vedanta, two on the schools of Buddhism, and two on contemporary Indian idealists.

It is not clear what sort of reader Professor Raju had in mind when writing this book, for the accounts of the Vedanta and Buddhist schools are too brief to be of value to a reader with much knowledge of the subject and too vague to be of value to a reader without any such knowledge. The chapters on contemporary idealists are perhaps the most valuable. This discussion attempts to be comprehensive. He says (p. 19), "All contemporary thinkers, particularly the academical, have been critically examined"—a claim which may cause some soul searching among professors of philosophy not included, and even those who are included may have their gratification tempered by the author's reference (p. 25) to "the present philosophical stagnation in India." These philosophers (Gandhi, Aurobindo, Krishnamurti, Bhagavan Das, Tagore, Radhakrishnan, Hiralal Haldar, K. C. Bhattacharya, and Iqbal) were contemporary when the book was being

[6] P. T. Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

written, but only three (Krishnamurti, Das, Radhakrishnan) are still alive today. The longest section is 21 pages on K. C. Bhattacharya (1875-1949). Concerning him Raju states (p. 354) that "what he has written is not easy to read, and he makes little attempt to make his ideas understandable," and "yet one who has the patience and perseverance to read and understand them will find that his ideas are not without value and importance"—both statements certainly true. Raju's discussion, however, consists entirely of a summary of Bhattacharya's article "The Concept of Philosophy"[7] (if "summary" is the right word for an exposition slightly longer than the work summarized), to the neglect of his many other works. While it seems inadequate as a general account of this outstanding philosopher, it does provide an excellent commentary on this one difficult but important work.

This same article by K. C. Bhattacharya is reflected in a systematic study of the Advaita theory of knowledge recently published by G. R. Malkani, director of the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner.[8] Professor Malkani has been an outstanding contemporary advocate of that extreme non-dualism, based on rigorous and uncompromising logic, which Gaudapada taught in ancient times—one expounding it in Sanskrit and Hindu categories of thought, the other in English and Western categories, both with brevity and profundity. In this book, however, he attempts to incorporate the Vedantic yet strikingly original thought of K. C. Bhattacharya, especially his distinction of four "grades of theoretic consciousness" (empirical, objective, spiritual, transcendental) with their distinct types of content (fact, object, reality, truth). Malkani, like all Indian philosophers with whom I am acquainted, has great respect for the profundity and subtlety of Bhattacharya's works.[9] The attempt to incorporate this original work is sincere, but it is a failure. However much he employs Bhattacharya's terms, distinctions, and methods of approach, the

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[7] *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (London, 1952), pp. 105-125.

[8] Ghanshamdas Rattanmal Malkani, *Vedantic Epistemology* (Amalner, 1953).

[9] His complete works, a project beyond the scope of this review, are now being published under the title *Studies in Philosophy* (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers).

unyielding pressure of logic leads relentlessly away from Bhattacharya's original and colorful conclusions to the old truth of strict non-dualism. Bhattacharya's most striking speculation, the theory of alternative absolutes, is not even mentioned. Malkani says (p. viii):

> It has always been my practice to read an author, then forget what he has written, and then rethink the same problem for myself. The same is true in this case. In particular, I may mention here that there is no clear indication, in the paper referred to, of what Prof. Bhattacharya meant to convey by the most important level of knowledge, namely the knowledge of truth. I have no misgivings on that point myself; and so I have put forward what I consider to be the Vedantic point of view on the subject, which I accept.

The book is written in a singularly clear and lucid style, so that the difficulty of the thought is not aggravated by any difficulty of language. But the author also tries to make the thought itself easy to comprehend. He says (p. vi):

> Without subscribing to the doctrine of degrees of truth and error, I have thought it advisable to make the approach to truth less arduous and less upsetting to our common truth-values. I have so to say upgraded the knowledge, sugared the pill, and made error appear less erroneous, till we come to the concluding phase, where no compromise between truth and error is possible. We rise gradually to truth, step by step, till we reach the top and are able to kick the ladder by which we got there.

This book provides an excellent introduction to Vedanta for persons who approach it from the point of view of philosophy, rather than from that of history or literature.

The book begins with a summary of its conclusions (p. xvi):

> Vedantic epistemology seeks to establish that our knowledge of the objective world, whether physical or mental, is erroneous; that there are levels of knowledge, so that the negation of one level leads directly to the one above it; that the only true knowledge is the knowledge of a super-sensible or metaphysical reality; that this reality is not a distant or an unknowable reality, but that it is our very Self; and lastly, that the Self is self-revealing, and therefore the only reality that is fit to be known for what it truly is.

These conclusions are established by an analysis of common experience , with no reference to any uncommon or mystic experience.

The "great initial step" is to draw "a clear-cut line between our intuition of the self and our intuition of the not-self." Besides the external reality given through the senses or in introspection there is another kind of reality, the self. "The whole of Vedanta," Malkani says, "is merely the development of the full significance of this only non-empirical form of reality intuited by all."

The first four chapters (Importance of Epistemology, Perception, Body and Soul, Substance versus Process) discuss these basic problems. Epistemology does not explain how knowledge arises but analyzes the knowledge we actually have. Since both perception and thought distort reality, we can know reality in itself only by freeing it from these subjective influences. The appearance of the Self as joined to a body "is our primal ignorance, and the cause of all our ills." Reality cannot be mere process but must be substance really existing.

The last four chapters (Our Knowledge of Logical Form, of Metaphysical Reality, of Spirit, of Truth) follow the pattern of K. C. Bhattacharya's article "The Concept of Philosophy," but the content is very different. Bhattacharya's perceived *fact*, formulable as a judgment and literally thinkable, essentially knowable though perhaps actually unknown, is replaced by Malkani's *logical form*, theoretically imperfect, valid only pragmatically. Bhattacharya's *self-subsistent object*, constituted by being spoken but not dependent on any mind, known by contemplation, is replaced by Malkani's *metaphysical reality*, indescribable, known only by revelation. Bhattacharya's *reality*, the subject *I*, enjoyed psychologically as embodied, morally as related to others, or religiously in communion with God, is replaced by Malkani's *spirit*, the speaking I, unreservedly revealing its whole self for what it is. Bhattacharya's *truth*, expressible only by the negation of *I*, self-revealing, is replaced by Malkani's *truth*, which is the Self.

The book, consequently, is a criticism and rejection of the article which inspired it. The basic issue between these two philosophers seems to be the validity of the law of excluded middle. For Bhattacharya there are many levels of truth and four planes of reality, besides coordinate alternatives on the same plane. For most Vedantists, including Shankara, the phenomenal world is neither real nor unreal, but something intermediate. But Malkani,

like Gaudapada, has a two-valued logic and a two-valued metaphysics. What is not true is false, and what is not real is unreal. All knowledge other than that of absolute reality is error, with neither theoretical nor practical value. At best it has pragmatic value, like the knowledge of things in a dream, which has no reference to reality and no real utility. Ordinary experience is not something intermediate between truth and error, from which we rise to a higher level. It is a mixture of absolute truth and absolute error, which we purge by negating the error and preserving the truth. Truth is not something to be attained but something to be attended to. The only steps are psychological steps in this process.

A less comprehensive but more detailed study of Advaita Vedanta is found in two books by A. K. R. Chaudhuri of Calcutta. The first of these[10] is a study of the concept of illusion (*maya*), the concept by which Advaitins, who deny the reality of the world, explain its appearance. The scholastic style of this book makes it unsuitable for beginners, and the frequent use of untranslated Sanskrit terms, and occasionally whole passages, offers a difficulty to non-Sanskritists. The thorough way in which the subject is developed, however, should make it of interest to students who wish to pursue this problem in detail. The doctrine of *maya* is analyzed, its various proofs are expounded, objections are refuted, consequences are indicated, and analogous concepts in other philosophies are compared. The doctrine presented is that of Shankara, who, it is said, "gives the most consistent account of the teachings of the upanishads" by means of his doctrine of *maya*, but it is restated in new words. "It is extremely difficult," Chaudhuri confesses (p. i), "to understand and interpret the subtle speculations of the master minds of India. The difficulty of interpretation greatly increases when one tries to explain them through the medium of an alien language."

The unreal cannot be perceived, and the real cannot be sublated. Objects of illusion are perceived, and so are not unreal, but are later sublated, and so are not real. The source of this illusion is ignorance. The theory of ignorance occupies the same central

[10] Anil Kumar Ray Chaudhuri, *The Doctrine of Maya*, 2nd ed. revised and enlarged (Calcutta, 1950).

position in Vedanta philosophy which the theory of knowledge occupies in Western philosophy. To understand ignorance is to understand the world, not in order to accept it but in order to reject it.

Ignorance has the twofold power of concealing truth and creating error. "The real nature of Brahman is concealed and the world is projected" (p. 84). The concealment of Brahman has no beginning and so has no cause, yet it has a "logical ground" in ignorance. An error, however, has a beginning and so must have a cause. The cause of the world is "Brahman associated with maya" (p. 136). How this is so, and how we can know it to be so, the book endeavors to show.

Dr. Chaudhuri's second book[11] discusses two concepts, the self and falsity, from the point of view of the sixteenth-century Vedanta classic *Advaitasiddhi*, and compares the orthodox Advaita doctrine concerning these concepts with various other views. The importance of revelation in Vedanta is clearly acknowledged.

> Philosophy begins with experience or the common view of things. It proposes to solve the queries that naturally arise in the human mind. The questions that Philosophy sets to itself are generally suggested by the given facts. But the problems cannot all be satisfactorily solved by experience . . . . Doubt, thus, assails the mind and we cannot solve the problem of the self only from the given facts, because the notions derived from experience are not all free from logical inconsistency . . . . We should then resort to the scriptures for the final solution of the problem. Seers and sages are pure in mind and their intelligence is free from turbidity. The eternal verities appear before their settled vision in unsullied form (pp. 40-41).

Normal experience, however, has indications which point to the same truths taught by scripture. A careful study of normal experience, in its three states of waking, dream, and dreamless sleep, will lead us to the scriptural truth that self is the only reality, "undifferenced consciousness and bliss." Falsity, which is both apprehended and negated, is distinguished from being, which is not negated, and non-being, which is not apprehended (pp. 118-119). The world-appearance is knowable, is non-intelligent, and is

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[11] Anil Kumar Ray Chaudhuri, *Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedanta, with an Appendix on Theories of Reality in Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1955).

limited in space, time, and content—all which attributes point toward the conclusion that it is false (pp. 119-120). First we apprehend the world, then we understand Brahman to be its source, finally we negate the world in Brahman (p. 210).

These doctrines are developed in considerable detail. The English style of this book is better than that of the earlier one; the difficulty is with the content. Readers sympathetic to tenuous argumentation will find the arguments subtle; others may consider them quibbles. They appeal to the same sort of mind which delights in the fine spun logic of the medieval scholastics and their modern disciples. Chaudhuri is a sort of Indian neo-scholastic.

All the books so far reviewed have set forth, in various ways, the orthodox doctrine of Advaita Vedanta. A book by Professor Kalidas Bhattacharya of Visvabharati University[12] is very different. While still within the general Vedanta tradition, it is a strikingly original treatment of fundamental philosophical problems and as such is a significant contribution to the philosophical thought of this generation.

The preface states the author's conviction that such originality is necessary. The subjectivism of Kant, the absolutism of Hegel, and the objectivism of modern realists have revealed "deeper and deeper fundamentals" in philosophy, he says, yet philosophy still "stands suspect." We must go beyond these three "standpoints" to something still more fundamental. This does not mean the discovery of some fourth standpoint. It means, first, a thorough understanding of the three standpoints, and second, an understanding of their alternative validity.

The basic problem of epistemology, according to Bhattacharya, is how knowledge is possible—not only synthetic knowledge *a priori* but any knowledge. Knowledge is always of some object, but knowledge and object are so opposed that their union is a contradiction. Nevertheless they *are* united, not merely conjoined but united in the "close unity" indicated by the phrase "knowledge *of* object." Knowledge, object, and their unity seem equally certain. In the first chapter this point is developed by elaborate arguments and illustrated by various historical systems

[12] Kalidas Bhattacharya, *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* (Calcutta, 1953).

Indian and Western. In the outward objective attitude "object is apprehended as other than subjectivity and referred to by it." In the inward subjective attitude knowledge is apprehended as "the centre from which all reference starts" and over against which stands the object. Difficulty arises when these two opposed attitudes, each of which rejects the other, are united, but this union is just what experience, which is knowledge of object, requires.

The opposition between them is analyzed in the second chapter. Knowledge and object cannot be united conjunctively, but they can be united disjunctively, disjunctive unity of alternatives being itself a form of unity. Either alternative rejects the other as false, but in different ways. There are two types of falsity, illustrated by perceptual correction, where a false appearance is rejected as illusion, and inferential correction, where the false appearance persists in immediate feeling but is dismissed from the social world as error. Knowledge *rejects* object, but object merely *ignores* knowledge. Subjective and objective philosophies are equally adequate, but mutually inconsistent, and so are alternatively valid. Besides conjunctive and disjunctive unity, however, there is another sort of unity, dialectical unity, which means negation of one alternative not as rejected or ignored but in such a way that the other alternative "regains itself in an enriched form." There are thus three possible, though mutually incompatible, attitudes—subjective, objective, and dialectical. As there is no transcendental reason for preferring one to the others, there is absolute alternation between them.

This logical study of the alternative standpoints is continued by a psychological study in the third chapter, where the "three fundamentals of psychology"—cognition, feeling, and conation—are analyzed. There are three levels of *cognition*—perception, imagination, and thought. Each stage is more subjective than the preceding, with a progressive rejection of objectivity. The ideal of cognition, perhaps never actually attained, is to enjoy self-revealing subjectivity through complete rejection of object. Cognition, then, is identical with the subjective attitude. *Feeling* also has three levels—emotion (including pleasure and pain), aesthetic creation, and aesthetic appreciation. Here the levels are increasingly objective, with progressive ignoring of the subject, and the

ideal is total absence of subjectivity. "The peculiar serenity of aesthesis consists precisely in de-subjectivising whatever emotion arises in the mind" (p. 248). Feeling can thus be identified with the objective attitude. The levels of *conation* are instinctive and other unreflective activity, voluntary will, and moral will. Each reveals a gradual perfection of the dialectical process, the ideal being that perfect morality in which the world is neither rejected nor ignored but conquered. Conation is the dialectical attitude. Provisionally each attitude tolerates the others as subordinate, but ultimately each denies the others absolutely. "Cognition *demands* ultimate rejection of object, feeling *demands* complete indifference to subjectivity, and conation *demands* ultimate absorption of negative objectivity in a richer subjectivity" (p. 339).

The final chapter shows the association of the three standpoints with the traditional three ways of Hindu religion (knowledge, devotion, and action), and concludes by raising the problem of the relation between the three alternative philosophies and the reality to which they claim to refer. This problem also has three alternative solutions. It may be that there is no reality beyond the philosophies, which are therefore ultimate. It may be that the very nature of reality itself is to be alternative. It may be that there is a transcendent reality which the alternative philosophies represent in various inadequate ways. These hypotheses are characteristic of Buddhism, Jainism, and Vedanta respectively. Each judges the others as false, but there is no higher philosophy from which all can be judged. The very realization of the alternation, however, is a sort of higher philosophy, although without content, and Bhattacharya, a Vedantist at heart, concludes with the statement that perhaps the Upanishads "are speaking of the very fact of the alternation."

The importance of this book as an original work of philosophy goes beyond the theory of knowledge with which it is chiefly concerned. It represents a new approach to philosophy involving a new kind of logic. The logic of alternation based on disjunction (two contradictories alternatively true) differs from the traditional logic based on contradiction (one contradictory true, the other false) and also from the Hegelian logic based on conjunction (both contradictories true in a higher synthesis). This way of thinking,

which has many applications, avoids the dogmatism which insists that one view is right and all others wrong. It also avoids the superficial liberalism which compromises various views by having each sacrifice something to the others, the hierarchical liberalism which would have different philosophies true at different levels, and the sentimental liberalism which seeks to harmonize views really incompatible. Bhattacharya says (p. 154):

> The best form of reconciliation is our Alternative Absolutism. Let everyone develop his doctrine from his base-point, let him attack and reject the views of others as he must, but let him realise that the standpoints of others are also *alternatively correct*, that while he is understanding the world in one language there are equally other alternative languages, and that each such language is *alternatively* final.

It is curious that the book contains no acknowledgment of its principal source, perhaps because the author thought this indebtedness would be so obvious to his Indian readers as to need no mention. The principal source of Bhattacharya's philosophy is the teaching of his own father, K. C. Bhattacharya, who was mentioned above as one of the outstanding philosophers of modern India. His theory of alternative absolutes (truth, freedom, value) is set forth most completely in a 1934 article "Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms," which differs considerably, however, from his son's book. K. C. Bhattacharya was, at least in this article, a realist in epistemology (Kalidas a subjectivist), and he associated knowing, willing, and feeling with the objective, subjective, and dialectical attitudes respectively (Kalidas with the subjective, dialectical, and objective). "I never agreed with my father about that," he said in a conversation when I remarked on this discrepancy. Between his retirement in 1938 and his death in 1949 K. C. Bhattacharya spent a great deal of time with his son, and it was during these conversations that the logic of alternation was developed into a system. The book under review was actually written in 1945, during this period. Kalidas does not consider his own philosophical thought to be an original system influenced by his father's but rather to be a continuation of his father's, organically one with it.

It is unfortunate that a book so substantial in content and so clearly written should be marred by occasional digressions and

carelessness in style. I take it that the superfluous references to obscure British philosophers are due to the fact that the book was a Ph. D. thesis at Calcutta, where such evidence of wide reading is expected. He says in a note to the preface (p. vii):

> It was my first, and therefore a bold, attempt at presenting my thoughts in a systematic way. But now when it is coming through the press I find in it many inaccuracies and not a few points which ought to have been established with greater rigour of logic . . . . I hope to publish another volume later where my claims will be more modest and logical.

When this promised volume appears it should be of interest not only to Indians but to philosophers everywhere who are concerned with the perennial problem of reconciling the presumed unity of truth with the notorious diversity of philosophies.

All the books so far considered, even the last, in spite of its originality, are in the general context of non-dualist Vedanta. But this is only one school of Vedanta. Besides non-dualism there are also qualified non-dualism, dualistic non-dualism, and dualism (Advaita, Visishtadvaita, Dvaitadvaita, Dvaita). Comprehensive expositions of qualified non-dualism and dualistic non-dualism are given in two books by P. N. Srinivasachari, formerly principal and professor of philosophy at Pachaiyappa's College in Madras.

The philosophy of Visishtadvaita[13] is set forth with clarity, scholarship, enthusiasm, and literary elegance. The author does not call Visishtadvaita "qualified non-dualism," as it is usually translated, and he repeatedly protests against the word "pantheism," by which it is sometimes described. He retains the Sanskrit word, which he translates in the glossary as "panorganismal monism." But whatever he calls it, he makes abundantly clear what it is.

Visishtadvaita, as the philosophy of the widespread Vaishnava religion, is probably the most popular philosophy of India, and in it the distinction between philosophy and religion becomes blurred. The phrase "qualified non-dualism" suggests that it differs only slightly from non-dualism, but actually the two philos-

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[13] P. N. Srinivasachari, *The Philosophy of Viśistādvaita*, 2nd ed. (Madras, 1946).

ophies are poles apart. According to non-dualism only Brahman is real, all empirical things being unreal, and salvation is attained, or rather recognized as eternally possessed, only by knowledge of this truth. According to Visishtadvaita all things are real, permeated by the Brahman which is their essence, and salvation is attained by all the ways of action, knowledge, and love. For Visishtadvaita matter, spirit, and Absolute are equally real (p. 139), and in it the epistemological values of absolutism and the ethical values of theism are reconciled (p. 142). Visishtadvaita is a "yes philosophy" which affirms everything and denies nothing (p. 230).

For Visishtadvaita, as for all schools of Vedanta, Brahman is the absolute reality. The description of Brahman (which Advaitins exhaust in three words—being, consciousness, bliss) covers 189 pages. Brahman is the sustainer, ruler, redeemer, goal, beauty, and substance of all things. One chapter is devoted to each of these six aspects. Only this comprehensive understanding of Brahman can satisfy all the demands of our metaphysical, moral, and aesthetic consciousness (p. 94). Brahman is immanent Self, trancendent God, and absolute Reality. It is the Brahman of the Upanishads, the Overself of the Gita, the Lord of the Bhagavata, the idol of the temples (p. 163). The deity exists transcendentally in its essence, infinitely in the cosmos, immanently in the soul, historically in its incarnations, permanently in its images (p. 204). The categories of philosophy are the qualities of God (p. 224). The problem of philosophy formulated in the Upanishad, "What is that by knowing which everything else is known?" is answered by Brahman (p. 235).

Visishtadvaita is above all a philosophy of religion. It identifies the Absolute of philosophy with the God of religion. The discovery that God is the real subject of all action gives a new orientation to moral and spiritual life (p. 145). Both right action and true knowledge are necessary for salvation, indeed they are inseparable, for ignorance is caused by wrong action (p. 152). Knowledge requires both faith and reason (p. 429). The performances of the Mimamsa school, the rationalism of the Advaita school, and the faith of the Dvaita school are equally inadequate without the others. But most important is loving devotion to

God, as exemplified by Hanuman in the Ramayana, the great "text-book of practical religion" (p. 395). Duty, illumination, and love (*karma*, *jnana*, *bhakti*) are the steps in the path to perfection (p. 317). The philosophy of love, mediating between non-dualist metaphysics and dualist ethics (p. 598), coordinates the metaphysical, moral, and religious aspects of our experience (p. 430). Love of God leads to mysticism, and according to Srinivasachari, Visishtadvaita is the only "appropriate and fit system for mysticism to flourish in" (p. 437). It culminates, but only after release from the body (p. 463), in the ecstasy of unitive consciousness (p. 490).

Man's love for God is only half of the relation between them. The other half, coordinate and symmetrical with it, is God's love for man. The philosophy of Visishtadvaita is complemented by the religion of Vaishnavism. Philosophy explains the quest of reality by the self; religion, the quest of the self by the Redeemer (p. 154). "The sinner seeks God and is saved, and God seeks the sinner and is satisfied" (p. 390). According to Visishtadvaita God is love (pp. 447, 590). This love is manifested constantly by the working of God's grace, extraordinarily by the periodic incarnations of God as man, and ultimately by God's cyclical reabsorption of the universe into himself (p. 155). The problem of grace and freedom is a paradox for the intellect (p. 174). Theologians argue as to whether divine grace is like the mother monkey saving the babies who cling to her fur or like the mother cat saving her kittens with no cooperation from them (p. 398), but the best simile is the reciprocal secretion and sucking of milk (p. 403). Narayana (God as masculine) rules the world by law, but Sri (God as feminine) rules the world by love (pp. 166, 191).

The systematic exposition is supplemented by a historical sketch. The greatest teacher of the school was Ramanuja, who combined "the heart of Buddha, the head of Shankara, and the apostolic fervour of the Semitic religions" (p. 519). The most serious schism in the school is between those who recognize Sri as mediatrix between man and God and those who consider her a coredemptrix (p. 535). In the concluding chapters Srinivasachari elaborates on the catholicity and all-comprehensiveness of

Visishtadvaita, and asserts the claim of Vaishnavism to be a world religion.

The wide span of the book reflects the vast scope of the philosophy it describes. Morality, metaphysics, and mysticism are all harmonized in the love of God and in our love for him. The actual experience of a Vaishnava mystic may be the same as that of a Christian mystic, but the former, possessing the richer resources of Hindu theology, psychology, and mythology, can give it a fuller expression. Visishtadvaita should attract those who are repelled by the austere intellectuality and alleged amorality of Advaita. The fine style of this book makes it an excellent introduction to the subject.

Professor Srinivasachari's other book[14] is shorter and rather different. The former work is a loving account of the philosophy in which he believes. This one is an attempt, a very successful one, to give a fair, sympathetic, and scholarly account of a philosophy in which he does not believe.

Dvaitadvaita (literally, "dualistic non-dualism") is also called Bhedabheda (literally, "distinctive non-distinction," that is, unity in difference). Scholars may distinguish between Dvaitadvaita and Bhedabheda, but the distinction is a subtle one, and the two terms are substantially synonymous. Srinivasachari uses the word "Bhedabheda," and he describes this philosophy through the doctrine of its most eminent advocate, the ninth-century philosopher Bhaskara. Both chronologically and philosophically Bhaskara is intermediate between Shankara, the great teacher of Advaita, and Ramanuja, the great teacher of Visishtadvaita.

The basic doctrine of this school is that reality is both one and many, so that the monistic and pluralistic ways of apprehending it are equally valid and mutually complementary. The basic principles of Shankara's Advaita are that the absolute is without qualities, that the world is an illusory appearance, that salvation is attained by knowledge, and that such knowledge is possible in this life (*nirguna Brahman, vivartavada, jnana, jivanmukti*). The basic principles of Ramanuja's Visishtadvaita are that the absolute has qualities, phenomena pre-exist in their causes, salvation

[14] P. N. Srinivasachari, *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda*, 2nd ed. (Madras, 1950).

is attained by love, and it is possible only after this life (*saguna Brahman, satkaryavada, bhakti, videhamukti*). "There is thus," says Srinivasachari (p. 176), "an unbridgeable gulf between the monistic systems of Shankara and Ramanuja." In general Bhaskara agrees with Ramanuja on the metaphysical issues, but with a greater emphasis on the validity of the monistic view and a lesser emphasis on the religious and emotional overtones which are a distinctive feature of Visishtadvaita. The "corner stones" of his system are "the law of identity in difference, the reality of Brahman possessed of attributes, the acceptance of the principle of God evolving into the world, the recognition of the means of attaining salvation or *mukti* as a co-ordination of both knowledge and action, and the possibility of obtaining release or *mukti* only after death" (p. 7).

Advaita explains things by the epistemological law of ignorance; Visishtadvaita explains things by the moral law of karma; but Bhedabheda explains things by the metaphysical law of causality (p. 17). Beyond the world of causally related things are the eternal universal forms (p. 44), and beyond them is the infinite which "finitises itself" (p. 13). But that which is beyond is also within (p. 39). "Brahman is both static and dynamic" (p. 157). God is necessary to the world and the world is necessary to God (p. 50). For Advaita reality is God; for Visishtadvaita it is God-in-the-world; for Dvaita it is God and the world; for Bhedabheda it is God-and-the-world (p. 69). The individual person is a self-limitation of reality, neither different from nor identical with God (p. 74). The psychophysical organism is a complex of logical, moral, and aesthetic limitations—hence its three states of cognition, conation, and feeling (p. 77). The end of life is self-expansion (p. 128), by which we renounce these limitations, retrace the steps by which we became finite, and realize our oneness with Brahman (p. 105).

After analyzing Bhaskara's system Srinivasachari proceeds to a comparative study of several other philosophers of this school. The intellectual austerity of Bhaskara is greatly modified in the more emotional system of Nimbarka (the recent three-volume study of whom, by Roma Bose Chaudhury, is beyond the scope of this

review), and it is completely overcome in the exclusively emotional teaching of Caitanya.

The book concludes with a criticism of this philosophy and a consideration of Western parallels. The author discusses Plotinus, Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley, Royce, Bosanquet, Fichte, and Schelling. He omits, however, the system which would seem to be the closest Western analogue of the philosophy under discussion, that namely of Bhaskara's contemporary, Scotus Erigena.[15] The omission is understandable, since his work is not available in English and consequently little known in India. Erigena's great synthesis is characterized by an insistence on the equal reality of nature as one and nature as many, the mutual necessity of each for the other, and the correlative processes of the eternal division of the one into the many and the eternal resolution of the many into the one. This is just the principle of dualistic non-dualism, or pluralistic monism, if I understand it correctly. The whole of reality is found neither in the unity of Brahman nor in the plurality of individuals but in the eternal dynamic process by which each becomes the other.

Vedantic pluralism (Dvaita, literally "dualism") is explained and vigorously defended in a book by Naga Raja Sarma of Madras.[16] This formidable work of 695 closely printed pages is hardly for beginners, but it is a thorough introduction to the subject. A person desiring only a cursory glimpse may get it by reading the 338-word concluding sentence. But this sentence is not typical, and the style of the book is clear and easy enough. It is not improved, however, by the author's carping criticisms of other schools; and his sarcastic references to the best known contemporary popularizer of Indian philosophy (whom he never calls by name) can only detract from the merits of the book even for readers who would agree with him on the issues involved.

The title, *Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy*, indicates

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[15] In suggesting that Erigena is a Western equivalent of dualistic non-dualism I retract the suggestion, proposed in my paper "The Christian Non-Dualism of Scotus Erigena" (*Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1953, pp. 149-154), that he should be considered a Western equivalent of non-dualism, a suggestion based on an inadequate knowledge of the Vedanta schools.

[16] R. Naga Raja Sarma, *Reign of Realism in Indian Philosophy* (Madras, 1937).

the close connection between pluralism in metaphysics and realism in epistemology. The book is based on the teaching of the twelfth-century philosopher Madhva, the most famous champion of this school, whose own works are not available in English. The basic principles of this philosophy are empiricism, realism, pluralism, and theism.

Like all Vedantists the dualists accept the Veda as infallible revelation (p. 562) but reserve the right to interpret it. It should be interpreted in accordance with reason and especially with experience, which is the surest ground of truth (p. 564). Non-dualists emphasize the famous Vedic paradox *tat-twam-asi* ("Thou art That"). But Sanskrit writing is not divided unambiguously into words and sentences, and the syllables of the text in question, Madhva points out (p. 325), can equally well be grouped as *a-tat-twam-asi* ("Thou art *not* That"), an interpretation which accords better with reason and experience. Consideration of the merits of this suggestion must be left to the Sanskritists, but it serves to alert non-Sanskritists to the sort of hazards involved in that wonderful but difficult language.

Like all Vedantists the dualists acknowledge Brahman or God as the highest reality, but they deny that it is the only reality. God, finite self, and matter are all real, and in the same sense (p. 566). Perception is not illusion but the apprehension of objectively real things.

The essence of reality is difference (p. 586). There are five basic kinds of difference: things differ from God, from soul, and from each other, and souls differ from God and from each other (p. 598). Radical pluralism is given in experience and confirmed by reason. Monism, far from being "the only fashionable philosophy of life" (p. 635), is fantastic and impractical (p. 8). "Unity-mongering is the bane of philosophy" (p. 581).

Dualistic theology has a Christian-style God, complete with heaven, hell, and predestination (p. 644). We cannot know God adequately (p. 594), but the partial similarity (not identity) between God and man (p. 601) makes possible some knowledge of the Supreme Self who is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of all things (p. 589). This theism is the basis of dualistic ethics. "Life is to be spent in devotional worship of God and service to

fellowmen" (p. 653). Meditation on God leads finally, though only after many lives, to eternal bliss (p. 616). The aspirant (to quote a passage typical of Sarma's grumpy style) "should continue along the lines taught to him by his Gurus—spiritual preceptors, not the commercial-minded teachers and professors in modern educational institutions" (p. 616). The highest good is heaven, an eternal life of activity and freedom (p. 619).

Professor Sarma maintains that this realistic pluralism, well known in India but ignored by Western and Westernized interpreters of Indian philosophy, is the only sound basis for morality, is in accord with common sense, experience, and reason, is taught by the scriptures when correctly understood, and is true.

A conciliation of all points of view is attempted in a book of essays,[17] all written for special occasions and most previously published, by Professor P. R. Damle of Wadia College in Poona. These simple essays, written in a popular style, can be read by persons with no training in philosophy. But their sound good sense and penetrating insight show the maturity and intelligence of their author. "They are," as he says, "genuine attempts to think for one's self on problems of philosophical significance" (p. vii). The twenty-four essays deal with all sorts of philosophical problems. But Professor Damle's treatment of them is invariably the same. In all controversial problems he maintains that both sides are right. Here we have the spirit of dualistic non-dualism, but the non-technical language makes clear that the author does not wish to be associated with this or any other school of philosophy. The value of the book is in the firmness with which all exclusive views are refuted and the simple reasonableness with which these all-inclusive views are defended as the adequate expression of self-conscious experience.

The boundlessness of Professor Damle's tolerance is shown by the fact that he even has a good word to say for Charvaka. Charvaka is radically empirical, atheistic, and hedonistic materialism. Opposition to it is the one thing which all Indian philosophers (except Damle) seem to have in common. In India it is customary to begin any philosophical work by refuting Char-

[17] P. R. Damle, *Philosophical Essays* (Bombay and Calcutta, 1954).

vaka. It is always included among the schools of Indian philosophy, but if this school ever had any members, their works and names have been long lost. But Damle defends it as a reasonable attempt "to explain everything by reference to natural or non-spiritual processes" (p. 178). Criticizing the one-sided enthusiasm of contemporary idealists, he says, "There is at least equal truth and much greater need for emphasizing the distinctive and characteristic contribution made towards realism and materialism and for encouraging the young modern students of Indian Philosophy to aspire to the dizzy heights" of this speculation (p. 178). Materialism and sensationalism cannot be refuted, and even if they cannot be proved they still have value for the logical rigor which disciplines the intellect and purges it of idealistic excesses. The first steps in a future development of Indian philosophy, Damle maintains, should be "through the revival and constructive exposition of non-monistic and non-idealistic systems of thought" (p. 198).

It is often said that Indian philosophies and religions differ from Western ones in their mutual tolerance. This notion is quickly dispelled by an acquaintance with Indian philosophy, which yields to none in acuteness of polemical controversy. Professor Damle, however, seems to fit the supposed pattern. For this reason he is far from typical of Indian philosophers. I would not consider his book a natural introduction to Indian thought, or recommend it for that purpose. But I would consider it a good book of philosophy, and recommend it for its unprejudiced appreciation and dispassionate discussion of many views which are usually either defended or rejected as exclusively right or wrong.

This selective review of recent Vedanta literature is in no way comprehensive. Obviously limited to books with which I happen to be acquainted, it is also deliberately limited to books in the Vedanta tradition, which is only one of the philosophical schools of India, to relatively short books,[18] and to books which in my opinion are of special philosophical value. Its purpose is to show that Indian philosophy is not exclusively ancient and me-

[18] Important longer works by Swami Nikhilananda, K. C. Bhattacharya, and R.B. Chaudhury have been mentioned above.

dieval. At the present day there is a flourishing philosophical literature, written in English, the language of scholarship in modern India, including both historical and systematic works, some elaborating on traditional doctrine and some strikingly original, a literature which reveals the twentieth century as an important period of Indian philosophy and India as an important center of twentieth century philosophy.

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