

REMARKS ON THE SARVASARVĀTMAKATVAVĀDA¹

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1. Scholars working in the field of the early history of Indian philosophy only too frequently feel handicapped by the deplorable fact that a large part of the once obviously much more extensive literature of the different schools of thought seems to have been lost for ever. Thirst for knowledge, however, is not easily quenched. Therefore, though the losses have to be accepted, scholars are naturally enough on the look out for a way to bridge the gaps at least partially, that is to say, they search for fragments, quotations or references, preserved in other texts, which might light up, at least to some extent, the surrounding darkness.

Within such testimonial transmission of philosophical ideas of ancient brahmanical thinkers, two groups of works prove especially rewarding, viz. those composed by Buddhists and the philosophical literature of the Jains. As to the first, the situation is, however, complicated by the well known fact that many of the relevant texts have likewise not come down in their original language which was, of course, Sanskrit, but are preserved only in Tibetan translations which, although accurate on the whole, can, nevertheless, not be regarded as having the same rank as the originals. In the case of the philosophical works by Jaina authors no such difficulties arise: whatever has survived the casualties of time is in Sanskrit. Yet not all of them have been published, not to speak of critical editions, and not always can the state of preservation be considered satisfactory.

2. Among the Jaina texts published in the last decades, there is one that is of particular interest not only for those rather few scholars who have specialised in the field of Jaina philosophy

itself, but also for the, of course, larger group of Indologists who are engaged in research on brahmanical systems: what I am referring to is the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* of the *Śvetāmbara* *Mallavādin*, and the edition I have in view is that of the learned Muni *Jambūvijaya*.² The text of this work, too, is, however, not preserved; all that has come to light until now are several manuscripts of a commentary upon it, called *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, written by *Siṃhasūri* (probably 6th century A.D.), "and it is with its help that to a wide extent the reconstruction of *Mallavādi*'s original is made possible".³

The attempt to reconstruct the *mūla*—necessary also for a proper understanding of the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* itself—represents a task which has rightly been characterized by *Frauwallner*⁴ as "difficult and sometimes almost impossible, because as a rule *Siṃhasūri* quotes only the first and last words of the sentence to be explained",⁵ "allows wider space only to more difficult passages and passes quickly over others with the remark 'easily understood' (*sugamam*). If, in spite of all these difficulties, *Mallavādi*'s text, or at least his trends of thought are reconstructed, also *Siṃhasūri*'s text needs reconstruction, as it is faulty and demands numerous corrections. But even then, the comprehension of the text is not easy, as *Mallavādi*'s work in itself is very difficult indeed."

² *Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakram* of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. With the commentary *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa. Ed. with critical notes by Muni Jambūvijaya, Pt. I (1-4 Aras), Bhavnagar 1966, Pt. II (5-8 Aras), Bhavnagar 1976 (Śrī Ātmānand Jain Granthamālā No. 92 and 94). I always quote from this edition (page and line) and without normalizing the orthography.

Regarding the date of *Mallavādin*, I am not yet convinced that *Jambūvijaya* is right in accepting a Jaina tradition according to which in a dispute in 357 A.D. *Mallavādin* defeated Buddhist adversaries. I also hesitate to share his view that the dates of other philosophers whom *Mallavādin* clearly refers to like *Bhartṛhari*, *Dignāga* etc., can be reconciled with such an early date for him (cf. "Prākāśanam", p. 15 f.).

³ Quoted from E. *Frauwallner*'s "Introduction" to *Jambūvijaya*'s edition of the NC p. 1.

⁴ *Frauwallner*'s "Introduction", p. 5.

⁵ This is usually done in the following way....*ityādi yāvat*....(*iti*).

¹ This is essentially a comprehensive English recast of my contribution to the "Studien Zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift für L. Alsdorf" published as No. 23 of the "Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien", Wiesbaden, 1981. With the discussion in the *Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇ. 4.3.155 (cf. p. 180f) I have dealt in the article, "Paralipomena Zum Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda. (I): Mahābhāṣya zu Pāṇ 4.3.155 und seine einheimischen Erklärer", published in WZKS, XXVI (1982), pp. 140-166.

It is precisely these difficulties which the previous editors, Muni Caturvijaya⁶ and Lalacandra B. Gandhi⁷ on the one hand and Vijayalabdhisūri⁸ on the other, could not overcome in a convincing manner. Besides, their editions were based on only a few manuscripts, whereas Jambūvijaya succeeded in collecting a total of 8 codices, among them an "*atidurlabhātiviśiṣṭā ca pratiḥ*" in which he says "*avidyamānā bahavo viśuddhāḥ pāṭhā āsmābhir labdhāḥ*".⁹

Anybody who goes through even the beginning or selected portions of the text in Jambūvijaya's edition will, I think, subscribe to the opinion expressed by Frauwallner in his "Preface" that by it "a stable basis is supplied for further research". For, Frauwallner goes on to say, "his reconstruction of the original makes it possible to follow Mallavādi's trends of thought also in passages where absolute certainty cannot be achieved. It has been carefully considered and deserves our full attention. At any rate, the text of the commentary is reliable and has been made legible by means of various corrections. Above all this text gains greatly by numerous notes and cross-references to related texts, thus aiding in the comprehension of the original itself".¹⁰

3. Regarding the value of the Dvādaśāranayacakra as a source for the history of non-Jaina philosophy—a value often pointed out by Jambūvijaya with particular emphasis—Frauwallner, too, seems to be quite as positive, and it was mainly for this reason that he drew quite early the attention of scholars to this work which "dating back to a time which is extremely lacking in information as to philosophical systems, yields quite a number of news on

⁶ Dvādaśāranayacakra of Śrīmallavādisūri, with the commentary of Śrī Simhasūri. Pt. I of Four Aras. Ed. by Late Muni Caturvijayaṇi (pp. 1-232) and Lalacandra B. Gandhi (pp. 233-314), Baroda 1952 (GOS No. CXVI).—I do not know whether further parts are to be published.

⁷ The Dvādasharanayachakram of Śrī Mallavādi Kshamasramana with the Nyayagamanusarini Commentary by Śrī Sinhasuragani Vadi Kshamasramana. Ed. with Critical Introduction, Index and Vishamapadavivechana by Acharya Vijaya Labdhi Suri. Pt. I-IV, Chhani 1948-1960 (Shri Labdhisurishwar Jain Granthamālā No. 20, 26, 35 and 44).

⁸ Jambūvijaya's "Prākkathanam", p. 9.

⁹ Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 6.

¹⁰ One has to distinguish between the footnotes on the one hand and detailed and most useful annotations on the other (cf. the chapter "*Tippaṇḍanāṃ dvaiyulldhyam*" in Jambūvijaya's "Prākkathanam", p. 38).

authors and works of which we know very little indeed".¹¹ But on the other hand he characterizes Mallavādin not only as "a remarkable", but also as "a somewhat selfwilled thinker"; speaks of his "peculiar but also headstrong way of thinking", "his entirely new way to see things"; attests to him to have tried "to categorize the old doctrine of the Naya or the various ways of considering things in a new and more systematic order, so as to bring about a refutation of all contradicting arguments"; considers his method to be "often reckless, even on the verge of forcefulness" and uses even the expression "polemics (against other systems)".¹²

Under the influence of these rather critical remarks one wonders at first whether there is at all any objectivity to be expected from Mallavādin so as to render his work a reliable source in those parts, too, where he does not quote *verbatim* from other sources. The testimonial value of the [Dvādaśāra-] N[aya-] C[akra] can of course, be finally judged only on the basis of a careful and comprehensive investigation, a task that has yet to be undertaken. Nevertheless it may be pointed out that Frauwallner's remarks, although open to misconstruction, were not intended to suggest that one ought to be rather sceptical as to Mallavādi's trustworthiness. For, as I have already stated above, Frauwallner, too emphasized the testimonial value of the NC, and it was with this in mind that he expressed the wish that "Mallavādi's work... should find the attention it deserves, and its rewarding contents should bear fruit in further research".¹³

In following Frauwallner's suggestion I try to make a modest contribution to the breaking of this new and fascinating ground; and I hope that the results achieved will indeed prove rewarding.

4. In accordance with Mallavādin's systematic arrangement of the twelve world-views the 3rd chapter of the NC is entitled vidhyubhayāra, i.e. "spoke [representing that world-view] which comprises both [affirmation as well as negation] of the [general.] affirmation". The contents of this chapter have been

¹¹ Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 5.

Cf. also Frauwallner's article "The Editions of Mallavādi's Dvādaśāranayacakram" in: WZKSOA I (1957), pp. 147-151.

¹² Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 1 *et passim*.

¹³ Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 6.

briefly analysed by Frauwallner, viz. as follows: "Against this viewpoint", viz. that of the various forms of advaitavāda put forth in the preceding chapter, "stands a third which refutes the vehicle of becoming as the sole principle. It manifests itself in two doctrines: the Sāṃkhya system and the doctrine of a godhead as the creator of all things (Īśvaravādaḥ). And again Mallavādī allows the first of the two doctrines to be contradicted by the second. The viewpoint of the Sāṃkhya system reasons in the following way: it differentiates two forms of being or becoming, being present (sannidhi-bhavanam) and coming about (āpattibhavanam). Only an existent duplicity, however, makes them possible. As concerns being present someone who knows (jñātā) presupposes something that is known (jñeyam), someone who enjoys (bhoktā) presupposes something that is enjoyed (bhogyam) and vice versa. The coming about requires a manifold unity (anekam ekam) which by changing again and again (pariṇāmaḥ) adopts a new form. At the same time it requires a second principle on account of which the change is being brought about. Thus, the two principles of Sāṃkhya, the soul (puruṣaḥ) and original matter (pradhānam) are given. The doctrine of a godhead does away with the differentiation of being present and coming about...."¹⁴

When comparing this analysis with that given by Jambūvijaya,¹⁵ one is struck by a particular divergence regarding the dialectical structure of chapter 3. For according to Jambūvijaya the detailed refutation of central tenets of the Sāṃkhya represents the argumentation of an opponent whom he calls "sarvasarvātmakatvavādin", who, he adds, is only thereafter in his turn criticized by the Īśvaravādin. In addition to asking who this mysterious "sarvasarvātmakatvavādin" might be one cannot but wonder whose is the error or, at least, inaccuracy, Frauwallner's or Jambūvijaya's. In order to solve these problems one has to re-examine the dialectical structure of this chapter of the NC.

¹⁴ Frauwallner's "Introduction", p. 3.

¹⁵ Cf. Jambūvijaya's "Prākkathanam", p. 27 :....

kiṃtu sāmkyena vidhividhinayānusāriṣv advaitavādeṣu ye doṣā udbhāvitās teṣāṃ prakṛtikāraṇavāde 'pi tādavasthyād Vārṣaṇatantravarṇite sāmkyamate sarvasarvātmakatvavādinā vistareṇa niraste tatrāsvāryād Īśvaravādī bhāvya-bhavitṛbhedena Īśvareṣīadvaitavādam upanyasyati....

What Jambūvijaya has in mind is a passage of the Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī (NC 324.7-13)¹⁶ where after summing up the refutation of Sāṃkhya metaphysics, the opponent concludes: *tasmāt sarvasarvātmakatvaparigraha eva nyāyyaḥ*, "therefore (i.e. because your metaphysical positions are by and large unacceptable) the only [remaining] position logically to be accepted is that of the *sarvasarvātmakatva*".

But he, in his turn, is immediately refuted by the Īśvaravādin who starts his criticism by stating that, on the contrary, the acceptance of this view is logically not tenable (*anyaḥ punar ityādi/ na sarva sarvātmakatvaparigraho nyāyyaḥ*).

This does, indeed, allow of no other conclusion but that the opponent who proves Sāṃkhya metaphysics to be unsustainable cannot be identical with the Īśvaravādin. On the other hand, he must, of course, be different also from the exponent of the Sāṃkhya. Thus, the problem to be solved is: who is the person for whom out of the tenets of Sāṃkhya no other view than the *sarvasarvātmakatva* seems acceptable; and what precisely is meant by this term?

5. Fortunately, other passages can be found in the NC itself and its Vṛtti in which this doctrine is mentioned. A closer study of them should be of help in answering these questions.

5.1. To begin with Siṃhasūri's comment on NC 38.3-4. It runs as follows (NC 38.20-23):

sthāvarajaṅgamābhyavahṛtānyonyarasarudhirādīrūpādipariṇāmāpattivaiśvarūpyadarśanāt sarvaṃ sarvātmakam, tata eva sarvaṃ sarvasya kāraṇaṃ kāryaṃ ceti kṛtvā.... "the manifoldness [of the phenomenal world] is an empirical fact; [it comes about by a process in which one thing] through transformation changes [into another] like e.g. [in the case] of vegetal and animal beings which feed on each other whereby [the consumed animal changes] into sap etc., and [the consumed vegetal being changes] into blood etc.. [Because of this fact, easily to be observed] everything consists of everything [else]; for this very reason everything is the [material] cause of everything [else], and [likewise] the product of everything [else]:...."

¹⁶ According to a cross-reference given in footnote 5 on p. 27 of his "Prākkathanam",—This is one of those passages where the superiority of Jambūvijaya's edition becomes obvious.

As this is said in the context of a critical discussion of the *satkārya*- and the *asatkārya-vāda*, and the peculiar terminology, too, points in this direction, one feels inclined to assume that the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* cannot but form an integral and specific part of Sāṃkhya.

5.2. This assumption is confirmed by another passage in the Nyāyāgamaṇūsārīṇī where in commenting on NC 107.2-108.2 Sīṃhasūri explains (NC 107.20-23) : . . . *evaṃ hi lakṣaṇādīṣaṇā-tideśaḥ—'sarvaṃ sarvātmakam' ity aviśeṣam icchataḥ sāmṃkhyasyāpi sarvātmakasyaikaṣya vastuno rūparasādibhedena śrōtrādibhedena ca vikalpayitum āśakyatvād viśeṣaikāntavādinā iva nirvikalpaparamārthaparamāṇūsādharmyād avikalpakatvam/. . .*" . . for the [above] : criticism directed against [Dignāga's] definition [of the pramāṇa 'direct perception'] is extended in the following manner [by Mallavādin to be valid also for the definition given by that philosopher who, claiming its absolute validity, holds the view that phenomena are not different from each other (*aviśeṣaikāntavādin*)] : for the exponent of the Sāṃkhya, too, who regards [the phenomenal world] insofar as non-differentiated as everything consists of everything [else], a single thing consisting of everything [else] cannot be differentiated by the differentiation of colour, flavour etc., [on the one hand], and by that of the organ of hearing etc., [on the other] ; therefore [for him, too, a single thing] is without differentiation just as for [Dignāga] who, claiming its absolute validity, holds the view that [all things] are non-different because they have the common peculiarity that they consist of nothing else but atoms which form the undifferentiated ultimate reality. . . ."

Since Sīṃhasūri explicitly refers the *sarvasarvātmakatva* to the exponent of Sāṃkhya there is hardly room for doubt that it does, indeed, belong to that school of thought.

5.3. And further proof, if still necessary, may be adduced from the NC and its Vṛtti. For Sīṃhasūri again explicitly mentions the exponent of Sāṃkhya [cf. NC 11.23.] before outlining the following view (NC 11.24-30) : *sarvam ekam ekaṃ ca sarvam, kasmāt? kāraṇasya vaiśvarūpyāt/yathāha-ṣarvaṃ sarvātmakam/yady evaṃ kasmāt sarvam ekatra nopalabhyate sarvatra caikam iti? ucyate-śeṣakālākāranimittāvabandhāt tu na samānakālam ātmābhivyaktiḥ/te manyāmahe jalabhūmyor apy etad pārīṇamikaṃ rasādivaiśvarūpyaṃ sthāvarasya jaṅgamatām gatasya jaṅgamābhavya-*

hṛtavanaspadyāder jaṅgamaśarīraparīṇāmāpannasya, jaṅgamasyāpi sthāvaratām gatasya sthāvarābhavyahṛtasya tatparīṇatasya, evaṃ sthāvarasya sthāvaratām gatasya jaṅgamasya jaṅgamatām gatasya/śmāt sarvaṃ sarvātmakam/

"All things are one and one, all. Why? Because of the manifoldness of the cause, as, indeed, it has been said : Everything consists of everything [else] ;—If this is true, for what reason are not all things perceived in one, nor one [particular thing] in all? The answer to this [objection] is that individual things do not manifest themselves simultaneously since [their manifestation] is bound by place, time, shape and condition. Therefore we take the view that this [observable] manifoldness of flavour(s) etc., is the result of processes of change which [the elements] water and earth undergo. In the case of a vegetal being that has become an animal, [what has happened is this] : a plant etc., e.g., consumed by an animal, has transformed itself into the body of [that very] animal ; or in case of an animal that has become a vegetal being, [what has happened is this] : after having been consumed by a vegetal being it has transformed itself into it ; [this holds good likewise] for a vegetal being that has become [another] vegetal being, and for an animal that has become [another] animal. Therefore everything consists of everything else".

5.4. There are close parallels to this argumentation not only in the Nyāyāgamaṇūsārīṇī (cf. NC 320. 1-7), but also in the Yogabhāṣya on YS 3.14¹⁷ as well as in the anonymous commentary on Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhyasaptati (called "V₁" by its editor, E. A. Solomon)¹⁸ on kārikā 15. Neither these parallel passages themselves nor the problems they pose, especially regarding their mutual historical dependence, can be taken up for discussion within the framework of the present article.¹⁹

¹⁷ Cf. also Śaṅkara's very interesting explanations, Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇam of Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda, critically ed. with Introduction by Rama Sastri and S. R. Krishnamurtai Sastri, Madras, 1952 (Madras GOS No. XCIV), p. 257 f.

¹⁸ Sāṃkhya-Saptati-Vṛtti (VI). Ed. by Esther A. Solomon, Ahmedabad 1973.

¹⁹ This I have done in the above (fn. 1) mentioned article on p. 374 ff. Cf. also the "Sūmhaty" added to it.

5.5. The concept of *sarvasarvātmakatva* was associated with the Sāṃkhya also by Prajñākaragupta. For in his *Pramāṇavārttika-bhāṣya*²⁰ he remarks (180.21) :

Sāṃkhyamatam avalambya sarvaṃ sarvatra vidyate, "if one takes as support the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya, everything is found in everything else (or : everywhere)"; and according to Yamāri's (alias Jamāri's) undoubtedly correct explanation²¹ Prajñākaragupta has this very school of thought in mind also when he says in a verse on PV 2.331 :

*vipramoṣaḥ smṛter iṣṭaḥ kaṣṭit tu viparītacit/
asatkhyātīḥ parair anyaiḥ sarvaṃ sarvatra vidyate//.*

Interestingly enough, he refers to this doctrine in the context of different theories of error. It is, of course, possible to follow up his indication and reconstruct tentatively a theory of error developed on the basis of the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* : so-called error consists in cognizing in one thing something else, and this is possible precisely because it contains all things : taking a pearl-oyster for silver is possible because a *śukti* does in fact also contain *rajata* : and this cognition would have to be explained by taking recourse to the concept of similarity.

The lack of even allusions to this theory of error in older texts, however, suggests rather that it does neither represent the specific theory of error the exponents of Sāṃkhya adhered to, nor a further development to be attributed to Sāṃkhya philosophers themselves. One feels induced to assume that it originated in theistic circles, perhaps influenced by tenets of the Sāṃkhya (cf. Prajñākaragupta's expression "*sāṃkhyamatam avalambya...*").

This assumption is corroborated by Rāmānuja who—again in connection with the problem of error—starts the exposition of a

²⁰ *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam* or *Vārttikālāṅkāraḥ* of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*), deciphered and ed. by R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (=Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. I), Patna 1953.

²¹ Cf. Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Peking) B 132-170-3.5 :

*dran pa brjod (recte : brjed) pa ni dran pa ṇams pa ste/'od byed pa
rnam kyī'o/log par rig pa ni g'zon nu ma len pa rnam kyī'o/med pa
snañ ba ni rigs pa can la sogṣ pa rnam kyī'o/thams cad thams cad la
yod 'dod ces bya ba ni grañs can pa rnam kyī'o/.*

theory he himself apparently looks upon as a plausible alternative ; he says :²² *athayā* -

*yathārthaṃ sarvavijñānam iti vedavidāṃ matam/
śrutismṛtibhyaḥ sarvasya sarvātmavapratītiḥ//
'bahu syām' iti saṅkalpapūrvasṛṣṭyādyupakrame/
'tāsāṃ trivṛtam ekaikām' iti śrutyaiḥ coditam//
trivṛtkaraṇam evaṃ hi pratyakṣeṇopalabhyate/
yad agneḥ rohiṭaṃ rūpaṃ tejasas tad apām api/
śuklaṃ kṛṣṇaṃ pṛthivyāś cety agnāv eva trirūpatā/
śrutyaiḥ darśitā tasmāt sarve sarvatra saṃgatāḥ//*²³

Since a mere fortuitous coincidence is highly improbable in this case, one would decide in favour of the alternative that Rāmānuja, too, refers to the same theistic circles as Prajñākaragupta, viz. those which on the basis of the doctrine that everything is contained in everything else have made a very peculiar and interesting contribution to the discussion on the nature of error. For according to them there is no error at all, every cognition being a right cognition.

6. To sum up : the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* is time and again spoken of in the relevant portions as belonging to the Sāṃkhya. At the same time, however, one must also take into account certain circumstances which point to its not forming an element of the Sāṃkhya only.

Yet, in order to be able to answer the initial question of the dialectical structure of chapter 3 of the NC, i.e. the now even more puzzling question of the identity of him who has been named "*sarvasarvātmakatvavādin*" by Jambūvijaya, one has to look a bit closer at this *vāda* and to analyse it both as to its essential philosophical

²² Bhagavad Badarayana's *Brahma Sutra* or *Sariraka* with Sri Bhashya by Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja and its commentary named *Bhashyārtha Darpana* by Sri Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya, Pt. I, Madras 1963, p. 132 f.

²³ The first *pāda* strongly reminds one of the beginning of the third *Prakaraṇa* (called "Nayavīthi") in Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (*yathārthaṃ sarvaṃ eveha vijñānam iti siddhaye/prabhākaraḥ guror bhāvaḥ samīcīnaḥ prakāśyate//*). Although most probably not a mere coincidence, this correspondence does by no means permit the conclusion that Rāmānuja by "*vedavidāṃ*" refers to Prabhākara or his disciples. For there are neither indications nor is there even any probability that Prabhākara has made use of the ontological position stated in the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* in order to prove his view that every cognition is right cognition.

content as also the relation it bears to other central tenets of the Sāṃkhya. But before doing so I should like to emphasize that the passages in which this *vāda* is mentioned, and that some of the terms used, are not explicit enough to allow by themselves to draw a distinct and complete picture, and that the exegete is, therefore, thrown back upon his own understanding and his own endeavour to think along the lines of the Sāṃkhya. Thus, the result cannot but be hypothetical in part.

6.1. Starting from the observation that the sentence *sarvaṃ sarvātmakam* is paraphrased in the texts by the sentences *sarvaṃ ekam ekaṃ ca sarvaṃ* and *sarvaṃ sarvatra* [*vidyate/astī*], this ontological statement can be shown to mean that every necessarily material phenomenon contains in itself at least one representative of each and every species of things. Yet it should not be overlooked that this *vāda* is always exemplified or proved by explicitly referring to what nowadays would be called the 'alimentary chain'. The fact, easily to be observed, that animal and vegetal life are mutually dependent, has obviously been interpreted by Sāṃkhya philosophers on the assumption that e.g. a particular animal contains in itself the matter of all those other animals and/or plants it consumes. The peculiarity of this their conception consists in that they suppose that all the individuals who have been consumed are nevertheless still existent as such. On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that the statement *sarvaṃ sarvātmakam* does not imply that every phenomenon consists only of all the others, i.e. is not at the same time also this very thing by itself. Likewise it is conspicuous that the validity of this *vāda* extends to the inanimate evolutes of the *prakṛti*, too.

In connection with this latter question a fragment, assigned to the *Vārṣaṅgāhī* by the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* and dealt with among others also by Frauwallner,²⁴ should be taken up for re-examination. It runs thus (YD, ed. R. C. Pandey, 57.6-7) :

*tad etat trailokyam vyakter apaiti na sattvād, apetaṃ apy
asti vināśapratishedhāt/ asaṃsargāc cāśya saukṣmyam,
saukṣmyāc cānupalabdhis tasmād vyaktyapagamo vināśaḥ/
sa tu dvividhaḥ/ āsargapralayāt tattvānām, kiṃcitkālān-
tarāvasthānād itareṣām*

²⁴ Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, p. 352 and fn. 195.

The first part of this quotation has been rendered by Frauwallner as follows²⁵ : "These three worlds pass out of being visible, because it has been taught that they are not eternal. But they do not exist also after disappearing, because it has been taught that they are not annihilated. Because of their dissolution a subtle state results and because of this subtle state they are not visible. What is called annihilation is therefore nothing but a passing out of being visible".

That is to say, Frauwallner inadvertently contaminates the version of the fragment as given in the YD with that attested to by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana in his Bhāṣya on NS 1.2.6,²⁶ where we read *nityatvapratishedhāt* in the place of *na sattvād*; and he reads *saṃsargāc* with the *editio princeps* of the YD;²⁷ This reading can in fact be shown to be the only [one] acceptable, but Frauwallner has nevertheless misunderstood this term. For with the help of some passages of Śaṅkara's *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇa*²⁸ it can be conclusively demonstrated that the expression *saṃsarga* as a specific element of Sāṃkhya-Yoga terminology is used here to denote the rejoining of a phenomenon with its cause(s) after having been manifest for some time, whereas the opposite process is called *visarga*.

The remaining part of the fragment quoted above cannot but be interpreted as follows : "This [passing out of being visible], however, is of two kinds : the [23] principles [have passed out of being visible] before the evolution [of the phenomenal world] and after [its] dissolution; the other [minor evolutes, i.e. the individual, animate as well as inanimate things, have passed out of being visible.] before they subsist for some time and after having subsisted for a [more or less limited] period of time."

The *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* was obviously attacked quite early, and the argument was that if it were true, everything would then be visible everywhere or in everything else. As to the answer of the exponents of Sāṃkhya, some of the relevant passages say that they took recourse to their peculiar concept of *abhivyakti*, i.e. they

²⁵ Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, p. 352.—The English translation is mine.

²⁶ This passage together with others has been discussed by O. Strauss in his contribution to : Festgabe H. Jacobi, Bonn 1926, pp. 358-368.

²⁷ Yuktidīpikā. Critically ed. for the first time from Original Manuscripts by P. Chakravarti, Calcutta 1938 (=The Calcutta SS. No. XXIII).

²⁸ Cf. p. 248 of the edition mentioned in fn. 17.

accounted for the empirical fact that a particular thing is perceived as this and only as this, and not everywhere, by referring to place, time, shape etc., as conditioning its manifestation.

6.2. But there are still more fundamental problems connected with this *vāda*. Frauwallner has made the interesting and important observation that the origination of a given doctrine lies elsewhere than in the reasons adduced for it, and that the reasons are, on the contrary, adduced only later in order to prove the doctrine, of which the origin lies in immediate observation and perception of things.²⁹

From this it would follow that the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* is posterior in relation to the doctrine of *prakṛti*, which, together with other reasons, it serves to justify, both according to the testimony of Siṃhasūri³⁰ as well as of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.³¹ Since it cannot have been solely deduced from empirical facts nor have itself been derived from the concept of primary matter, it is more likely that it is later merely in the sense that it was later used as one of the proofs for the existence of *prakṛti*. In quest of the origin of this *vāda* one has, therefore, to take into account the fact that it is closely related to the *satkāryavāda*, i.e. that it forms an integral constituent part of the special theory of causation the Sāṃkhya adheres to and propound: according to the latter *vāda*, a product already exists before it becomes manifest, and according to the former it is all the same still existent after it has disappeared! And both these *vādas* cannot be delinked from the peculiar Sāṃkhya concept of being which was formulated by the Vārṣaganyāḥ, as is clear from a fragment thus preserved by Vasubandhu in his *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:³² *yad asti asty eva tad/ yan nāsti nāsty eva tad/ asato nāsti sambhavaḥ/ sato nāsti vināśaḥ/*.

Now, regarding the *satkāryavāda* Frauwallner seems to have taken the view that it was developed secondarily only, viz. in order to meet adverse criticism directed against the reasons brought forward by Sāṃkhya authors who wanted to prove the existence of

²⁹ Cf. *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, p. 385.

³⁰ Cf. NC 320. 1-7.

³¹ Cf. Kārikā 15 of the *Sāṃkhyasaptati*.

³² *Abhidharma-Kośa-Bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu, ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna 1967, p. 301.2.

primary matter.³³ Thus, if Frauwallner were right, it would mean that the peculiar Sāṃkhya concept of being, too, is of later origin,—a consequence altogether improbable! Against Frauwallner, as also against the implications his ideas about this part of the historical development of the Sāṃkhya school of thought have, I should like to state that the whole problem stands in need of a thorough and critical reconsideration which may well lead to quite different results.

The resulting new picture would, to be sure, likewise have the character of a hypothesis; yet, I think it would be a stronger one. It has, of course, yet to be drawn in full detail; my own attempt given in what follows is but a rough sketch. It starts from the assumption that the Sāṃkhya concept of being has arisen, among other *śruti* passages, out of Chānd. Up. 6.2.1 f.:

sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvītiyam/ tad dhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam evādvītiyam/ tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata//

kutas tu khalu somyaivaṃ syād iti hovāca/ katham asataḥ saj jāyeta/ sat tv eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvītiyam//

"This universe, friend, was, indeed, in the beginning something existent [and neither something non-existent nor something that neither existed nor did not exist], something all alone [and hence] something that was without another. As to this some say: 'This universe was, indeed, in the beginning something non-existent, something all alone [and hence] something that was without another. Then from this that was non-existent something existent was born.' But how, friend, could that be so, he (i.e. Uddālaka Āruṇi) said. How could something existent be born from something non-existent? Rather this universe, friend, was, indeed, in the beginning something existent [and neither something non-existent nor something that neither existed nor did not exist], something all alone [and hence] something that was without another."

Though still in terms of rather cosmological than ontological thought, as has been rightly observed by P. Hacker,³⁴ Uddālaka Āruṇi clearly states that a *sat* can only have originated out of a *sat*. And it was this very idea of the *ur-sat* that led to the peculiar

³³ *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Bd. I, Salzburg 1953, p. 385.

³⁴ *Kleine Schriften*, hrsg. von L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978, p. 293.

concept of being, developed in the Sāṃkhya and echoed, to be sure, also in the well known verse Bhagavadgītā 2.16 ab :

nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ/.

Indeed, Rāmānuja, too, refers to the very same Chānd. Up. passage as the central śruti proof for the *sarvasarvātmakatva*, though for obvious reasons he quotes only the beginning of 6.2.3. But since he in doing so cannot have intended the exponents of Sāṃkhya (cf. his expression "*vedavidām*"), what seems plausible is that this peculiar concept of being was also shared by the forerunners of that specific theistic school which later used it in its surprising theory of error. Both schools could have had this concept of being in common, but should have greatly differed from each other as regards their respective "*Weltanschauung*", a dualistic and non-theistic one in the case of (Proto-) Sāṃkhya and a theistic and perhaps also monistic one in the case of the others. That is to say, we should assume that the tradition going back to this teaching of Uddālaka Āruṇi's evolved into two views when some thinkers interpreted the concept of *sat* in Chānd Up. 6.2. 1 f. as unintelligent *materia prima* and basis (*prakṛti*) of the phenomenal world, and others took it to mean a personal god out of whom this world emanates.

In other words, there were theistic thinkers for whom the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* was also characteristic, only that they did not, of course, accept the metaphysical "superstructure" the Sāṃkhyas had erected upon it. And the evidence suggests that it is these thinkers whom Mallavādin has in view as refuting central tenets of the Sāṃkhya. Thus Mallavādin leaves us in no doubt whatsoever as to the actual existence of this peculiar theistic school, an exponent of which may rightly be called *sarvasarvātmakatvavādin*. And, again, he reveals remarkable empathy when he subsequently makes a thinker appear on the stage whose philosophical positions are likewise to a certain extent similar to those of the adversary he attacks ; the *Īśvaravādin* who believes in a godhead, too, but conceives it as creating the world out of matter.

6.3. Regarding the antiquity of the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* and the plausibility of its having developed out of Chānd. Up. 6.2., a passage of the Mahābhāṣya proves extraordinarily instructive, one that seems to have eluded scholars' attention until now. What I am referring to is the final sentence of the discussion on Pāṇ. 4.3.155 (Mahābhāṣya ed. F. Kielhorn II 325.18) : *atha matam*

etat prakṛtyanvayā vikārā bhavantīti hāpi na doṣo bhavati//. This is meant to answer the question preceding (II 325.16-17) : *atha yō'sāv ādyaḥ kapotaḥ salomakaḥ sapakṣo na ca saṃprati prāṇīti katham tatra prāṇīśabdo vartata iti/*. "the feathered, winged pigeon that was at the beginning, now (i.e. after having been killed) does not breathe anymore. How is it that with reference to it (i.e. the plucked dead bird) a word is, nevertheless, used that [primarily] denotes a breathing being (i.e. a living pigeon)?"

Although Kaiyaṭa and Nāgajibhaṭṭa³⁶ understand Patañjali's answer as referring to words denoting the product of a process of transformation, one cannot fail to observe that Patañjali, on the contrary, aims at explaining a linguistic fact by taking recourse to a philosophical view he knew and considered apt to solve the question under discussion. It was simply their unawareness of this philosophical view that led Kaiyaṭa and Nāgajibhaṭṭa to misunderstand this passage which, to be sure, refers to extralinguistic facts. What Patañjali in fact says is this : "If one takes the view that the original [which undergoes a process of change] is existent in its transformation(s), there is no room for any objection in this case, too, (i.e. as regards the use e.g. of the word *kapota* to denote a dead pigeon as it is a *vikāra* of the original living bird)."

Patañjali does not refer here, as H. Scharfe³⁷ has asserted, to the *satkāryavāda*, but obviously to a teaching that is intended to meet the question as to what happens to the *prakṛti* when a *vikāra* has manifested itself. And this teaching cannot but be the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda*, according to which everything that represents a *prakṛti*, whatever the position it occupies in a given causal chain, does not cease to exist as such when it passes out of being visible : The individual pigeon as a living being does, indeed, still exist when it has been killed ; and it is precisely this ontological "fact" that accounts for the linguistic observation that a *prāṇīśabda* can also be used to denote that very animal, even when deprived of breathing !

Thus the *sarvasarvātmakatvavāda* can be traced back to the 2nd century B.C.

³⁶ Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya with Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa and Nāgeśa's Uddyota, Vol. IV, ed. by Pt. Bh. Joshi Śāstrācārya, Bombay 1942, 227 a 1 ff.

³⁷ Die Logik im Mahābhāṣya, Berlin 1961, p. 155.