rNgog lotsāba on the sahopolambhaniyama proof in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya

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Although rNgog lotsāba Blo Idan shes rab alias Blo Idan bzang po (1059-1109) was one of the principal exponents of the later phase of the pre-classical period of the development of tshad ma in Tibet, from among the huge number of his works only a few have come down to us. A brief topical outline or summary (bsdus don) of the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra was published in 1985; editions of his commentaries to the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Abhisamayālāṃkāra with an introduction by David Jackson are now under preparation. Thus, information on rNgog lotsāba and his followers, the representatives of the so called rNgog lugs, has been available only from secondary sources. Many of these materials have been collected in Leonard van der Kuijpp’s pioneer study of the early period of Tibetan epistemology and have been supplemented by David Jackson. From among his works on tshad ma, only two seem to have survived: a commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya (rNam nges kyi tī ka), and his Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka’ gnas rnam par bshad pa, “Explanation of the difficult points in the Pramāṇaviniścaya”. The publication of the latter text

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1 Cf. van der Kuijpp 1983 p. 31.
2 For this periodization cf. van der Kuijpp 1989 p. 8-18.
3 A list of his work is to be found in van der Kuijpp 1983 pp. 34 & 57.
5 Cf. van der Kuijpp 1983, Chapter 1 «Rngog lo-tsā-ba Blo-Idan shes-rab and the Rngog-lugs of epistemology.»
7 Both texts are kept in the Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities (CPN); cf. Ernst Steinkellner, “Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (nges byed kyi tshad ma)”. In: Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the In-
has been announced for the near future. The work consists of three chapters on pratyakṣa, svārtha- and parārthānumāna and covers 124 folios made up of 8 lines; folio no.1 is missing. The manuscript is written in a legible dbu med script sometimes preserving an old orthography, so that in most cases – but not always – we find a subscribed y in front of the palatal vowels such as myed pa for med pa, or dmyigs pa for dmigs pa. Instead of snang ba, snang pa is mostly written and the term dam bca’ ba’i don also occurs in the variants dam bcas pa’i don, dam bewa’ ba’i don and dam bewa ba’i don. In some instances the genitive i such as in pa’i is separated from the preceding consonant by a tsheg so that we read pa ’i. Moreover, the post-post-fixed d (da drag) is used as in gyurd pa. The initial consonant of final particles and the like is quite often omitted, e.g. thalo for that lo, or ’thade for ’thad de. The use of abbreviations seems to be restricted to thamd for thams cad. Finally, it should be mentioned that units of the text belonging together are separated from each other by writing two or three dots in vertical order between a double shad. Smaller units are separated by using two dots either before or after the shad. This method, however, is not consequently applied. From this manuscript I shall reproduce a small portion, namely rNgog lotsāba’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s sahopolambhānyāma proof as propounded in his Pramāṇaviniścaya, in order to gain some insight into his style, into the development of textual analysis, the so called sa bead technique, and, of course, into his way of understanding the theme and his appropriation of the ideas of his Indian predecessors.

The last section in the pratyakṣapariccheda of the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVIN I 78,12-100,26) is devoted to the distinction between a means of cognition and its effect (pramāṇaphala) in order to prove that any cognition (jñāna) bears two aspects, one grasping or subjective (grāhaka) and one to be grasped or objective (grāhya). The equivalent to this in the Pramāṇavārttika is to be found in the pratyakṣa chapter vv. 301-366 and vv. 388-391. Having first explained what should be known as pramāṇa

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8 The entire section has been translated into English in GEORGE DREYFUS & CHRISTIAN LINDTNER, “The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti”. Studies in Central & East Asian Religions 2, 1989 pp. 27-52.
9 VETTER in his edition of PVIN I refers to the respective parallels.
10 Cf. IWATA I 15ff.
and its phala in accordance with the doctrine that an external object exists (bāhyārthavāda) and that in the end it is not necessary to assume the existence of an object external to cognition (PVin I 78, 12-90, 16), Dharmakīrti proceeds to establish their difference without assuming an external object. In this context he presents two proofs according to the teaching that everything is just cognition (vijñaptimātra). The first of these two proofs runs as follows.12

sahopalambhaniyamād abheda nīlataddhiyōḥ [v.55ab
(lhan cīg dmigs pa nges pa’i phyir | sngo dang de blo gzhan ma yin |)
...dvicandrādivat (zla ba gñis la sogs pa bzhin no). PVin I 94,22f

The passage is normally translated as: «Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together ...like the two moons (seen by one suffering from a timira eye disease).»13

According to rNgog lotsāba who was quite familiar with this topic – he not only cooperated in the translation of the Pramāṇaviniścaya but also in that of Dharmottara’s Ţikā and Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārtti-kālaṃkāra – there are two points to be dealt with in this proof: (§1.) the subject of the thesis (dam bca’ ba’i don, pratijñārtha), and (§2.) the faults of the reason (gtan tshigs kyi skyon, hetudoṣa) as criticized by the opponents. Because with regard to the hetudoṣas rNgog lotsāba does not provide us with any new information, but only disproves the criticism of Śubhagupta as formulated in his Bāhyārtha-siddhi-kārika which is refuted in the epistemological tradition of Dharmakīrti with more or less the same arguments, I will not discuss them here.

11Cf. the introduction of this sub-section in PVin I 94, 14: ‘di rrnam par rig pa tsam nīd yin na ...

12This proof as well as the second one (rig pa zhes bya ba yang de’i bdag nīd yin pa’i phyir de ltar gsal ba’o | | PVin I 98, 71) are the subject of Iwata’s study on sahopalambhaniyama (cf. Iwata I, II), in which the commentators’ interpretations are considered as well. On Śubhagupta’s criticism of the sahopalamabhahniyama proof in his Bāhyārtha-siddhi-kārika together with the reaction on it in the Tattvasaṅgraha, in Kamalaśīla’s Pañjikā, and in Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṣṭikā and on Haribhadraśūri’s refutation of this proof in his Anekāntajayapatākā, cf. Matsumoto 1980.

13Apart from the interpretation of saka the various translations do not in essence differ: «[Ferner] gibt es keine Verschiedenheit zwischen Blau und seiner Erkenntnis, weil sie notwendig gleichzeitig wahrgenommen werden.» Vetter transl. of PVin I 95; «Blue and the cognition of blue are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together.» Matsumoto 1980 p. 2; «There [really] is no difference between something blue and the idea of the [blue thing] because [the “two”] must be perceived simultaneously.» Dreypus/Lindtner 1989 p. 46 (cf. fn. 8); «Das Blaue und die Erkenntnis davon sind nicht verschieden, weil sie ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden.» Iwata I 15.
Concerning the subject of the thesis in this proof, rNgog lotsāba distinguishes (§1.1.) the locus of properties (chos can, dharmin) and (§1.2.) the property to be proved (bsgrub bya’i chos, sādhyadharma). The dharmin is determined to be made up only by the objective aspect consisting of something blue etc. He stresses the point that the subjective aspect should not be regarded as dharmin, for the grāhakākāra in this proof is different from the grāhyākāra. This is due to the fact that the grāhakākāra has to be understood as being real (bden pa, satya) while the grāhyākāra is said to be unreal or false (brdzun pa, aliṅka).

The property to be proved, i.e. abheda, is interpreted as being of the nature of a non-implicative negation (myed par dgag pa, prasajyapratīṣedha) and he dispels the assumption of its being an implicative negation (ma yin par dgag pa, paryudāsapratiṣedha). This means that by the negation in the term “abheda” only “the being different” is negated, but it should not be understood in the sense that Dharmaṅkīrti intended the identity of the two aspects.

The determination of the sādhyadharma now is a point where the difference between Dharmaṅkīrti’s commentators regarding the interpretation of this proof most clearly finds expression. This in part applies to the locus of the properties as well, but the dharmin was not a theme of their discussions and thus their views can be understood only by implication. In order to see the impact of the Indian tradition on rNgog lotsāba we first have to look at the respective interpretations. In roughly presenting the commentators’ explanations I will make use of the results of Iwata’s study on the topic and more details can be found there. Except for the concepts of Dharmottara who comments on the PVIN and those of Śākyabuddhi and Kamalāśila who explicitly relate their statements to the passage of the PVIN under consideration, the interpretations of the other commentators are comparable with those of rNgog lotsāba only to a certain degree, for the contexts in which this argument is applied and explained may differ.

Devendrabuddhi in his commentary on PV III 388 deduces from the reason “being necessarily perceived together” the identity (ekatva) of blue and its cognition.14 Thus the dharmin consists in the subjective and objective aspect and the sādhyadharma is their identity. Śākyabuddhi shares this opinion. He quotes PVIN I 55ab and blames an opponent who takes

14 Cf. IWATA I 113 (transl.) & II 9312: (PVP [P No. 5717(b)] 276b1: sgon po la sogs pa dang de näms su myong brag ni lhan cig dmigs pa’i phyir tha dad par snga’i can thid yin na yang gcig yin no zhes bya’i don to | | = «Although blue etc. and the awareness of it appear to be different, they are identical because they are perceived together.»
the sadhyadharma to be a mere negation of the difference (bhedapratisedhamatra) for his ignorance regarding the intention of Dharmakirti.\(^{15}\) Sāntaraksita’s position is not clear.\(^{16}\) Kamalaśīla, however, explicitly determines that the dharmin consists of the blue and its cognition and that the sadhyadharma is their non-difference.\(^{17}\) In Prajñākaragupta’s Alamkāra there are several passages which indicate that he understands the term “abheda” in the meaning of “identity”. He explains, for example, that in the drṣṭānta used by Dharmakirti, dvicandrādīvat, the two moons seen by one suffering from a timira eye disease are identical (ekatā).\(^{18}\) In the same way, Ravigupta claims the identity of blue and its cognition.\(^{19}\) Finally, we should have a look at Dharmottara’s comments in his Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, the text of which was translated by rNgog lotsāba and on which he wrote a topical summary (bsdus don).\(^{20}\)

In the PVīnT there is no passage where Dharmottara identifies the dharmin. However, as he explains that in Dharmakirti’s verse abhedah

\(^{15}\) Cf. ... cīg car dmigs pa nges pa’i phyir | sngon po de blo tha dad med (PVīn I 55ab) ces bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa yin no | | tha dad pa dgag pa tsam de bsgrub par bya ba yin gi th[a dad pa med do zhes bya ba (P; D: zhes pa) ni ma yin te | de yang bshad na bstan bcos mdzad pa mi mkhas par ston par ‘gyur ro | | PVT P (5718 Ne) 255b1f (D [4220 Ne] 207a2f) = “If one explains that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but not the “non-difference”\(^{11}\) [as formulated by Dharmakirti] one demonstrates that the sāstraṇāra is not learned.” Cf. IWATA I 141f & II 10775.

\(^{16}\) Cf. IWATA I 184ff.

\(^{17}\) Cf. dharmy atra nilākaraṇadhyau. tayor abhinnatvam sadhyadharmah. yathoktaḥ sahopalambhanyam hetuḥ. idṛṣa evaśārīyey sahopalambhanyamāt (PVīn I v. 55ab) ittyādau prayogā hetvarto bhipreṭāḥ. TSP 691,23-25. = “The locus of the property in this (proof) are the blue aspect and its cognition. Their not being different is the property to be proved. The reason, as it is stated [by Śāntaraksita], is the being necessarily perceived together. Such a meaning of the reason is intended in the formulation as applied by the teacher: “because they are necessarily perceived together” etc.”

\(^{18}\) Cf. ayam eva bhedaheṭur yad uta bhinnayogakṣemātā. induvayapratisbhasasya tu bhinnayogakṣemābhavat ekataiva. PVBH 410,11ff = “Only the fact of having a different fate [i.e. cause and effect] is cause of a difference. The two moons that appear, however, do not have a different fate. Therefore they are merely identical.” Cf. also abhinnayogakṣematvād ekatvam arthasya jñānena durvāram ... PVBH 430,32 = “The object’s identity with cognition cannot be denied, for it does not have a different fate.” These and some other passages are referred to in IWATA I 145.

\(^{19}\) PVT (P 5722) 167a3: de’i phyir tha dad par snang yang chan cīg car dmigs pa’i phyir don dang shes pa dag cīg niid yin no | | = “Although they therefore appear to be different, blue and its cognition are identical because they are perceived together.” Cf. IWATA I 147 & II 11148.

\(^{20}\) Cf. van der Kuij p. 34.
has to be construed with nilataddhiyoh, meaning that blue and its cognition are not different from each other, the dharmin can be understood as consisting of the blue and its cognition, as was clearly stated by Kamalaśila who seems to rely on Dharmottara in this point. In determining the sādhya-dharma Dharmottara does not use the terms prasajya- and paryudāsapratiśedha applied by rNgog lotsāba, but only speaks of a mere negation (pratīṣedhamātra) of difference. However, that prasajyapratiśedha is intended can be seen from his denial that the property to be proved is identity. Moreover, he specifies the subjective aspect to be real (vastu) and the objective aspect to be unreal (asatya).

21 Cf. sngo (D: sngon P) dang de'i blo dag gzhlan ma yin zhes bya ba ni tha dad pa med pa'o || bsgrub par bya ba'i cha 'dir bstan pa'i phyir gsums pa ni || gang gi phyir (P Vin I 94,20) zhes bya ba'o || P VinṬ P 182b6-7 (D 157a3-4) = «Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, i.e. non-different. In order to show the part to be proved he said “for”».

22 don gzhlan pa'i rang bzhin ŋid ma yin te (P Vin I 94,21) zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba ston pa'o || 'di skad du 'di dag gcig par ni bsgrub par bya ba ma yin gyi || on kyang tha dad bdag1) dpa gtsam yin no zhes ston pa yin no || ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgya pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi || gcig ŋid du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra || ... P 182b8-183a2 (D 157a5-6) = «The formulation: “It is not of the nature of an other thing” (na ... arthāntararūpataṃ) shows (the property) to be proved. It shows that it is not to be proved that the two are identical, but the mere negation of the being of different nature [is to be proved]. [Question:] Why do you say that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but not their identity? ...»

1) The reading of bdag is problematical. Derge reads either bdag or pa dag. Peking reads only dag. The variant tha dad (pa) dag dga pa would be equivalent to bhinnayor pratiśedha which does not make sense. tha dad bdag dga pa could translate a Sanskrit bhinnātma(tva)pratīṣedha meaning «negation of their being of different nature». Perhaps the correct reading is, as in the following pūrvapakṣa, just tha dad pa dga pa. Iwata II 122139 and Matsunoto 1980 p. 18f both interpret tha dad (pa) dag dga pa in the sense of bhedapratiśedha.

23 rnam par yin pa ni (P: ni D) bden pa gsal (D: bsal P) bar nus pa ma rig pa'i bdag ŋid con ni dngos po yin gyi brtags (P: brtags D) pa ni ma yin no || sc P VinṬ P 177b2f (D 152b2) = «The The concept which is capable of illuminating something unreal (asatya) (and) which is of the nature of ignorance (avidya) is real (vastu), but it is not imagined (kalpita).» (cf. Iwata I 179 & II 126165). Cf. also ... mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i rang bzhin yang rdzun pa ni ma yin no || P VinṬ P 177b5f (D 152b6) = «...and the aspect which illuminates something unreal is not false (alikta).»

24 gang gi phyir gang gi sied snang ba de kho na ltar thams cad bden pa ni ma yin te | 'khrul pas med pa yin stong ba'i phyir ro || P VinṬ P 182b8 (D 157b5) = «For not everything is real in just that way as it appears [in cognition], because due to an error [consisting of avidya]1) something non-existing also appears [in cognition].»

1) Cf. de'i phyir ma rig pa'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i shes pa ni bden pa'i rang bzhin gsal ba'i byed pa yin pa'i phyir ma rig pa'i dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod pa la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no || P VinṬ P 184b6f (D 158b5f) quoted in Syādvādāratnākara 170,17-19 (identified in Iwata II 123144, transl. in I 174): etena Dharmottareṇa yad abhidadhe
As can be easily seen, from among the interpretations of the Indian commentators that of rNgog lotsāba is quite close to the perception of Dharmottara. rNgog lotsāba as well as Dharmottara understand the property to be proved to be of the nature of a prasajyapratīṣedha and both consider the subjective aspect to be real and the objective one to be unreal or false. In determining the locus of property, however, they differ insofar as Dharmottara regards both aspects to constitute the dharmin while rNgog lotsāba denies the grāhakākāra’s being part of it. The reasons for this interpretation put forward by rNgog lotsāba are that in this argument the subjective aspect must be different from the objective one and that the negation of difference is an activity towards the objective aspect. But what does he mean by this? The purpose of this section of the PVIn is, as already mentioned, to establish that any cognition (jñāna) bears two aspects according to the vijñaptimātratā-theorem. It must be added that Dharmakirti is still arguing on the level of sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa. This means, as rNgog lotsāba explains afterwards (§1.2.1.), that on this level the subjective aspect is said to be existent (yod pa, sat), for it is not only experienced as being illuminated but it is also reliable (mi slu ba, aвисuɲvādin). Thus it is real (bden pa, satya). The objective aspect is, although experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for its reliability is invalidated by a correct or valid cognition (tshad mas gnod pa, pramāṇabādhita) and thus it is false (brdzun pa, alika). This constitutes the difference between them. Moreover, the objective aspect cannot be real, for then neither of the two kinds of connections (‘brel pa, pratibandha)

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25 Cf. des na blo ni tshul gnis pa | v. 59c de ’i phyir yul dang shes pa’i rang bzhiṅ dag gis blo tshul giṅs su grub pa yin no || PVIn I 100,4-6 = «Thus, mind is two-fold. Therefore it is established that mind by way of the form of the object and that of cognition is two-fold.»

26 Cf. above fn. 11.

27 Cf. sāṃvyavahārikasyaitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam. PVIn I 100,20 = «What we have explained is the nature of a valid cognition of everyday life.»

28 For the translation of the term tshad ma, pramāṇa as “valid cognition” which I adopt in the following, cf. TOM J.F. TILLEMANS, Persons of Authority. The sTon pa tshad ma’i skyes bur sgrub pa’i glm of A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar ... Stuttgart 1993 pp. v-vi.

29 Cf. §1.2.1. lan ni ’dzin pa ni myong pa dang myi slu ba yod pas | de yod par brjod kyi | bzun pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de | des na gsal bar tshor bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pa’i myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo ||
would be possible. A causal connection, *tadutpatti*, contradicts their existence at the same time, and identity, *tādātmya*, of two really existing entities is not possible by definition. These seem to be the main reasons for rNgog lotsāba’s position.

What does this explanation mean for Dharmakirti’s *sahopalambhaniyama* proof? According to this interpretation the verse (*sahopalambhaniyama-mād abheda nilataddhiyoh* | v. 55ab) should be translated as follows:

«Because blue and its cognition are necessarily perceived together, [blue] is not different [from its cognition].»

If we now look at rNgog lotsāba’s own translation of this passage *lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa’i phyir | sngo dang de blo gzhana ma yin |* such an interpretation is, as is the case with the Sanskrit version, neither supported nor contradicted, although one is inclined to understand *nilataddhiyoh* as referring to both, *sahopalambhaniyamād* and *abheda*. However, this understanding obviously contradicts a later formulation of Dharmakirti in verse 59ab where he says that even in the case that an external object exists, blue and its cognition are not different from each other. This he explains as follows: «By the two [reasons explained above, namely] “being perceived together” and “consciousness” it is established that the manifestation of blue and the like [in cognition] and its consciousness are not different from each other even in the case that an external object exists.»

In this statement the *dharmin* definitely is not the objective aspect alone but consists of the blue and its cognition. Did rNgog lotsāba consciously deviate from Dharmakirti or is it possible that he overlooked this statement?

I do not think either is the case, for rNgog lotsāba’s interpretation exactly follows Dharmakirti’s own explanation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof which says: «For blue is not of the nature of a thing that is different from (its) awareness, although it appears to be different because the two are necessarily perceived together, like the two moons (seen by one

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30 This means that rNgog lotsāba understands *saha* in the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof as meaning “at the same time”. On the different interpretations of *saha* cf. IWATA I 66-103.

31 Cf. §1.2.1. *gzhana yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang ma yin te | bden pa dang ’brel pas myi ’thad pas ste | dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la ’brel pa gnis ga ’gal ba’i phyir dang | gsum pa yang myi srid pa’i phyir ro || |

32<1> *de phyir snang don blo de dag | phyi don yod kyang tha dad min |* v. 59ab *lhan cig dmigs pa dang rig pa dag gis phyi rol gyi don yod kyang sangon po la sogs pa snang ba dang de rig pa dag tha dad med par grub bo || PViN I 98,29-100,3.

suffering from a *timirá* eye disease)." Here Dharmakīrti only speaks of the non-difference of the blue from its awareness, but not of their being mutually not different. Thus, in this passage, the *dharmin* consists of the blue and its non-difference from its awareness is the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*). Further, in the whole following section up to the second proof by means of consciousness (*rig pa*) (PVIN I 97,7), there is not a single remark which could be understood in the sense that the cognition’s non-difference from the blue is intended. In the same way, in the explanation of the second proof, Dharmakīrti only states that the blue is not a thing that is different from its awareness. As we now should not assume that Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in prose formulates a new idea different from that in the verse, the verse has to be understood in the very same way.

The contradiction to the passage mentioned above (PVIN I 98,29-100,3) can be explained in such a manner that the argument expressed in the verse has to be formulated in two different ways. When formulated from the standpoint of the *vijñaptimātratā*, only the non-difference of the blue is intended and it is only the blue that constitutes the *dharmin*. And when it is applied assuming an external object (*bāhyārtha*), the presuppositions are different and the mutual non-difference of blue and its cognition is to be proved. This also seems to be the reason why rNgog lotsāba translated the verse in such a way that it may be applied according to both views.

We now have seen that rNgog lotsāba in his interpretation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof, with one exception, follows Dharmottara’s explanation and that he ignores the comments of the other Indian predecessors. In determining the *dharmin* of this proof on the *vijñaptimātratā* level he is more precise when he regards it to consist of the *grāhyākāra* alone. At other occasions in his dKa’ gnas rnam bshad, however, he does not follow Dharmottara at all but refutes his views. These facts corroborate Śākya mchog ldan’s account of rNgog lotsāba’s assimilation of Dharmottara’s ideas, for

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33 *gang gi phyir tha dad par snang ba ŋid yin yang sngon po ni ŋams su myong ba las don gshan pa’i rang bzhin ŋid ma yin te | de dag lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa’i phyir | zla ba ēnis la sogs pa bzhin no || na hi bhinnāvabhāsīte ‘py arthāntarātapatvaṃ nilasyānubhāvāt, tayoḥ sahopalambhaniyamād, devicandrādi vat PVIN I 94,20-21.

34 *sngon po la sogs pa myong ba las don gshan ma yin na ni de’i bdag ŋid du gyur pa de llar gsol ba’i phyir sngon po la sogs pa myong bar ‘gyur re | | PVIN I 98,9-12 = anarthāntarate tu nilāder anubhavat tadātmabhūtaḥ prakāśate tathā nilādyanubhavah sātya. Kaśikā II 100,4f, identified in STERN 1991 p. 161 (cf. fn. 32).

35 Cf. ‘di la slob dpon chos mchog ŋid na re | ... zhe’o | ‘di yang bden pa ma yin te | ... dKa’ gnas rnam bshad 44a8 and slob dpon chos mchog na re ... zhe’o | | de ni ma yin te | ... 44b1f.
he reported that rNgog lotsāba «refuted many points in the exposition of Dharmottara that he took to be unacceptable, having retained as they were those [passages] he thought were acceptable.» 36

Regarding his sa bcead technique one can see by the paragraph numbers which I added that the text was well organized according to this method, although we do not always find the beginning of a paragraph indicated by a dang po or gnis pa. However, the text under consideration does not allow a statement as to the extent to which the imposition of a logical structure upon a text commented on by means of topical outlines was developed by rNgog lotsāba, for the dKa' gnas rnam bshad is, as the title already indicates, not a detailed explanation of all the points of the PVIN, but only of the difficult ones. The topical outlines we find here seem to indicate the main points that rNgog lotsāba considered to be essential for his teaching of the Pramāṇaviniścaya and the different opinions of his Indian predecessors concerning some specific subjects. For he not only refers to Śubhagupta’s comments, although without mentioning his name (§2.), or to Dharmottara’s view, 37 but in other parts of his rNam bshad he also refutes the opinions of Prajinākaragupta, Śaṅtabhadra and others. 38

As to rNgog lotsāba’s style, one may say that his remarks are very short and in many cases only comprehensible after having understood the detailed discussion in Dharmottara’s PVIN which he quite often summarizes in a few words.

Regarding the sahopalambhaniyama proof in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, he finally provides us with a new interpretation that is not to be found in the Indian tradition and which accords well with Dharmakīrti’s formulations.

**Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa**
on sahopalambhaniyama (PVIN I 94,18-98,6)

Additions in the manuscript are indicated by <zzz>; my additions to the ms. by (zzz); my corrections by zzz [corr. : yyy]; variant readings such as gzung - bzung ba - pa, kyi - gyi, ste - te, cig - gcig and the like are not corrected. Omissions of an

36...chos mchog gi bshad pa las thugs yul du 'thad pa rnam s thad sor bzhag nas mi 'thad pa la dgag pa mang du bshad do || Śākya mchog ldan, Tshad ma'i mdo... (Collected Works Vol. 19 pp. 1-137) pp. 29,3-30,4; transl. JACKSON 1987 p. 167. A longer portion of this text dealing with rNgog lotsāba together with a translation is given in VAN DER KULP 1983 pp. 49-56.

37Cf. above fn. 35.

38Cf. slob dpod shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa dang | zhi ba bzang po la sogs pa na re | ... zhe'o | | de ni myi 'thad de | ... 46b4-6; ... des na kha cig ... thal ba 'dir 'gyur ro zhe'o | | de ni thal ba ma yin te | ... 43b7f; kha cig na re ... zhes zer ro | | de ni myi thad de | ... 44a6; gzhan na re | ... zhe'o | | de 'lang myi thad de | ... 44a7.
initial consonant of final particles etc., e.g. \textit{thalo} instead of \textit{thal lo}, are indicated by \textit{thal-lo} etc.; \textit{tham\textbar{d}} is the abbreviation used in the ms. for \textit{thams cad}. It also should be noted that the \textit{tsheg} before a \textit{shad} never is omitted, but always written.

\begin{itemize}
\item [45a6] \textit{lh\textbar{n} cig dmyigs pa nges pa\textbar{i} (PVIN I v.55a) gtan tshigs ni |}
\item 1. \textit{dam bcas pa\textbar{i} don dang |} 2. \textit{gtan tshigs kyi skyon spang pa gn\textbar{is} kyi\textbar{s} shes par bya\textbar{\textbar{o}o |}}:
\begin{itemize}
\item 1. | \textit{de la dam bca\textbar{} ba\textbar{i} don yang 1.1. chos can kyi rang bzhin dang |}
\item 1.2. \textit{bsgrub bya\textbar{i} chos dp\textbar{yad pa [corr. : spyad pa] gn\textbar{is} so |}:
\begin{itemize}
\item 1.1. | \textit{de la chos can ni 'dir sngon po la sog\textbar{s} pa gzun\textbar{g} r pa\textbar{i} rnam pa kho na yin gyi | 'dzin pa ni ma yin te | 'dzin pa ni gzun\textbar{g} pa las th\textbar{a} dad par sgrub pa\textbar{i} sk\textbar{a}bs yin pa\textbar{i} phyir ro | th\textbar{a} dad pa ldog pa yin pas gzun\textbar{g} pa myed pa las th\textbar{a} dad par 'thad do | des na th\textbar{a} dad pa dgag pa ni gzun\textbar{g} pa\textbar{i} rnam pa la bya ba yin gyi | 'dzin pa la ni ma yin no |}
\item 1.2. | \textit{bsgrub par bya ba\textbar{i} chos ni 'dir myed par dgag pa\textbar{i} rang bzhin g\textbar{y}i s ma yin par dgag pa ni ma yin no |} 1.2.1. \textit{myed par dgag pa la gnod pa spang pa dang |} 1.2.2. \textit{ma yin pa la gnod pa bsgrub pa gn\textbar{is} kyi\textbar{s} nges par bya\textbar{\textbar{o}o |}}:
\begin{itemize}
\item 1.2.1. | \textit{dang po ni gal te gzun\textbar{g} pa\textbar{i} rnam pa gs\textbar{a}l bar tshor ba myed na 'dzin pa yang yod par myi 'grub pas thams cad 'jig par thal ba dang | gzhan myed pa(r) dgag pa shes pa\textbar{i} rang bzhin ma yin pa gs\textbar{a}l na [45b] phyir ro gyi don nam | shes pa gzhan th\textbar{a} dad par ying gs\textbar{a}l bar thal bas gzun\textbar{g} 'dzin grub par thal lo | | de lta na 'dzin pa myi 'grub par dang gzun\textbar{g} pa gzhan bden par thal lo zhe na |: lan ni 'dzin pa ni myon\textbar{g} pa dang myi slu ba yod pas | de yod par brj\textbar{od} kyi | bzun\textbar{g} pa ni gs\textbar{a}l bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de | des na gs\textbar{a}l bar tshor 2 bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pa\textbar{i} myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo | | gzhan yang bzun\textbar{g} pa bden par gs\textbar{a}l bar thal ba yang ma yin te | bden pa dang 'bre\textbar{l} pas myi 'thad pas ste | dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la 'bre\textbar{l} pa gn\textbar{is} ga 'gal ba\textbar{i} phyir dang | gsum pa yang myi srid pa\textbar{i} 3 phyir ro | | de ni myed pa(r) dgag pa\textbar{i} phyogs la gnod pa spang pa\textbar{o |}:
\item 1.2.2. | \textit{ma yin pa la gnod pa sgrub pa la gn\textbar{is} ste | 1.2.2.1. rnam pa rnam\textbar{m} shes pa cig gi rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa dang | 1.2.2.2. du ma\textbar{i} rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa\textbar{o |}:
\item 1.2.2.1. | \textit{dang po [corr. : dang pa] ni rnam pa bzhis rig par bya ste |}
\item 1.2.2.1.1. \textit{yan lag can bzhin du shes pa yang cha du mas cig pa 'gal ba dang | 1.2.2.1.2. kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur 4 ba yang shes pa\textbar{i}
rags pa la myi ldog pa dang | cha <tha> dad pa tsam gyis cig dgag par myi nus na kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur bas kyang myi nus pa dang | 1.2.2.1.3. des cig dgag par nus kyang cha tha dad pas myi nus na yan lag can dgag par myi nus pa’o | 1.2.2.1.4. tha ma ni gal te cha tha dad par snang pa ‘gog byed ma yin na de’i tshe kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba’i gnas skabs su 5 cig ma yin mod | gzhan gyi tshe skad cig gzhan kyi mtshan ŋid go ci ste cig ma yin te | des na yan lag can ’thad do zhes bya ba’o |

1.2.2.2.  | 1.2.2.2.1.  | rdul phra rab kyi spyad pa shes pa’i snang pa phra rab la yang ’dra ba dang | snang pa thams cad bden par yod na rags pa snang ba ’gal (ba) dang | 1.2.2.2.2. rags pa snang ba myi bden na rdul phra 6 rab du snang pa brtag par myi nus shing brtags pa don myed pa dang | 1.2.2.2.3. rags par snang pa rnam rtog yin na gsal bar snang pa ’gal ba dang | 1.2.2.2.4. rang gi rnam pa mtmar thug pa gnis kyi kyi rnam par rtog pa ŋid la rags pa snang pa myi ’thad pa dang | de la rags pa snang pa khas blangs kyang myed pa gsal bar ’grub pa’o | 1.2.2.2.5.  | tha ma ni gal te rnam par rtog pa don myed pa la don du zhen pas de ltar 7 snang pa myi ’gal lo zhes brjod na | don myed par rang gsal ba ’gal ba dang | gzhan gyis gsal na rnam par shes pa’i myed pa gsal ba’i nus pa grub pa dang | ma rig pas [corr. : rang rig pas] gsal na de myed par ’gal ba dang | yod na shes pa’i myed pa gsal ba’i nus pa ’grub pa dang | myed pa gsal ba’i nus pa khas myi len na ’khrul pa myed par thal-lo | dam bca’i don to |

2. | gtan 8 tshigs kyi skyon spang pa ni 2.1. ma grub pa dang | 2.2. ’gal ba dang | 2.3. thun mong gi ma nges pa dang | 2.4. ldog pa la the tshom za ba’i ŋes pa ste bzhi spang pa’o |

2.1. | dang po ni gzhan na re | ’di ni ma grub ste | ’di ltar lhan cig dmyigs pa nges pa’i gtan tshigs kyi don ni shes pa ma dmyigs par shes bya dmyigs pa myed pas shes bya dmyigs pa shes pa dmyigs pas khyab pa’i don [46a] yin la de yang khyab byed ’gal ba dmyigs par ’dod pa yin na | zla ba dang gyad la lta ba ni shes pa ma dmyigs kyang shes bya ’ba’ zhig dmyigs pas | lhan cig dmyigs pa ŋid ma grub bo |

2.2. | yang na ’gal ba yin te | lhan cig gi sgra ni tha dad par brjod pa yin no | des na tha dad pa’i khyad par can du dmyigs pa’i phyir tha dad pa yin no zhes bya bar ’gyur na de ni zlog pas 2 khyab pas ’gal ba’i phyir ro |

2.3. | yang na thun mong gi ma nges pa yin te | sangs rgyas kyi thugs dang de’i shes bya dag lhan cig dmyigs kyang shes bya rgyud gzhan ni
shes pa dang tha myi dad pa ma yin pas sam | sms dang sms las byung ba dag lhan cig du mtshungs par dmyigs kyang tha dad pa myed pa ma yin pas so | | yam na snang pa dang gzugs kyis ma nges so |

2.4. | gal te thun mong gi ʒ ma nges pa ma yin du chug kyang ldog pa la the tshom za ba ni bzlog par myi nus ste | tha dad pa la lhan cig dmyigs pa myed pas khyab pa 'am | lhan cig dmyigs pa dang 'gal ba grub pa myed pa'i phyir ro zhés bya ba ni rtsod pa rnam pa bzhi'o |

2.1.a. | 'di la lan ni ma grub pa ni ma yin te | zla ba dang gyad la lla ba na yang shes pa'i khyad par tha dad pas de ma dmyigs kyang de'i shes bya dmyigs 4 mod kyi | 'on kyang shes pa tsam myed pa ma dmyigs-so | de lla na ni shes pa'i khyad par dang don tha myi dad pa ni myi sgrub kyi 'on kyang spyi dang yin no | | gang las tha myi dad myed par sgrub par bya ba'i spyi de la ltos te ni lhan cig dmyigs pa yod pa yin te | shes pa tsam dang bral ba'i zla ba dang gyad ni mthong pa myed pa'i phyir ro | | des na ma grub pa ma yin no |

[2.2.a.] [The refutation of this pūrvapakṣa is lacking]

2.3.a. | tham bd mkhyen pa'i shes bya yang de'i mkhyen ʒ pa ma dmyigs kyang rgyud gzhan la rang rig pas dmyigs pa'i phyir ro | rnal 'byor pa can gyis rgyud gzhan de ma bzung par thams cad mkhyen pa ni thugs 'ba' zhiq 'dzin pa'i phyir ro |
| sms dang sms las byung pa ni lhan cig dmyigs pa tsam yang myed na nges pa la ga la yod |
| gzugs dang snang pa ni 'og nas spong ngo | des na thun mong gi ma nges pa ma yin no |

2.4.a. | ldog ʒ pa la the tshom za ba ni khyab pa sgrub pa'i tshad ma ston pas 'gog par 'gyur ro | |
Translation

The reason “being necessarily perceived together” (sahopalambhāniyama) is to be understood through 1. [an examination of] the subject of the thesis (pratijñārtha), and 2. through the exclusion of the faults of the reason (hetudosā).

1. From among these [the examination of] the subject of the thesis also consists of two examinations: 1.1. that of the nature of the locus of properties (dharmin), and 1.2. that of the property to be proved (sādhyaadharma).

1.1. From among these here [in this proof] the locus of properties is only the objective aspect (grāhyākāra) consisting of blue etc., but it is not the subjective one (grāhaka), for [this] is the section (skabs, prastāva) in which the difference of the subjective (aspect) from the objective one is affirmed (sgrub pa, vidhi). As [the subjective/objective aspect?] consists of the exclusion (ldog pa, vyāvṛtti) of that which is different, it is reasonable that it is different from that which is not an objective (aspect) (gzung pa myed pa, agrāhya). Thus the negation of difference is an activity towards the objective aspect, but not towards the subjective one.

1.2. The property to be proved here is of the nature of a non-implicative negation (myed par dgag pa, prasajyapratīṣṭedha), but not an implicative negation (ma yin par dgag pa, paryūḍaśapratīṣṭedha). And this is to be ascertained through 1.2.1. the exclusion of [a valid cognition] that invalidates (bādhaka) the non-implicative negation, and through 1.2.2. the proof of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the implicative (negation).

1.2.1. Objection: If the objective aspect is not experienced as being illuminated (gsal ba, praśākāś), the subjective one is also not estab-

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39 In the following notes I quote passages of Dharmottara’s PVīnt on which rNgog lotsāba’s explanations are based. However, as these passages are often quite long and space here is limited, I shall translate only the shorter ones and of the longer ones only those parts which are necessary for understanding rNgog lotsāba’s enigmatic formulations. Passages which are translated in IWATA I, II and MATSUMOTO 1980 are not translated, but are referred to in the footnotes. Finally, Sanskrit equivalents of several Tibetan terms have been supplied for the sake of convenience and easier understanding.

40 Or: «As the difference consists of an exclusion (ldog pa, vyāvṛtti), it is reasonable that [the subjective/objective aspect?] is different from that which is not an objective (aspect)». The meaning of this argument is not clear!

41 The idea of the following objection is to be found in PVīn I 96,8f: visaysya jñānahetutayopaniḍheḥ prāga upalambhah paścāti samvedanam iti cet. Much parallel material is collected in IWATA II 155. In this discussion an opponent wants to establish
lished to be existent (sat). Thus, it would follow that all (aspects) are abandoned. And if a non-implicative negation [of being something] different which is not of the nature of cognition is illuminated, it follows that an external object or something else that is cognized is illuminated as being different as well.42 Thus, it follows that the objective [as well as] the subjective (aspect) are established. In this way it follows that the subjective (aspect) which is not established [as long as the objective one is not experienced] and the objective (aspect) which is different [from it] are real.

Answer: As the subjective (aspect) is experienced and reliable (avisa-mvādin), it is said to be existent (sat). However, the objective (aspect) is, although it is experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for it is invalidated by a valid cognition (pramāṇabādhita). Therefore, although [the two] are not different, insofar as [both of them] are experienced as being illuminated, that one whose reliability is established to be without an invalidating [cognition] is real (satya), while the (other one) without [such a reliability] is false (brdzun pa, alika).43 Thus the difference is established. Moreover, it does not follow either that the objective (aspect) is illuminated as being real, for – being connected with the real [subjective aspect] – it is not reasonable. [This is so] because the two [kinds of] connection [i.e. tādātmya and tadupatti] contradict [their] having the same time (ekakāla) and not being of one and the same nature (anekarūpa), and because another kind [of connection] is not possible.44 This was the exclusion of [a valid cognition]

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42 This argument is not clear to me!
43 rNgog lotsāba’s answer is based on the following passage of Dharmottara: ņams su myong ba nges pa’i rang bzhin mi slu ba ni spang bar nus pa ma yin te | de ni khas blang bar bya ba yin pa’i phyir ro || yang gang ņams su myong yang gnod par byed pa mthong pa’i phyir slu ba de ni spang bar bya ba yin te | dper na zla ba gnis kyi rang bzhin lta bu’o || gnod par byed pa med pa’i phyir ’khrul pa mi ’grub po zhes1) gang ’chad par ’gyur ro || de bzhin du rnam ’grel las kyang | gnod byed rig pa dam pa ni | med na ņams myong spang bya min2)

1) = PVN II 45,19f: gnod par byed pa med pas ’khrul pa mi ’grub pa’i phyir ro || (= bādhakābbhāvā bhāntyasiddheḥ PVSV 16,4f)  
2) not identified.
44 Cf. mi bden pa’i rang bzhin ņid ma rig pa’i dbang gis ston par byed kyi bden pa ni
that invalidates the assumption of a non-implicative negation.

1.2.2. In [the subsection of] the proof of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the implicative (negation) there are two [proofs]:

1.2.2.1. [one that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates [the fact] that (manifold) forms are the nature of a unitary (eka) cognition, and 1.2.2.2. [one that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates [the fact] that they are the nature of a manifold cognition.

1.2.2.1. The first one is to be known through four alternatives: 1.2.2.1.1.

ma yin te | bden pa dang lhan cig 'brel pa nges pa med pa'i phyir ro | | PVIN'T P 185a2 (D 159a1f) = «By force of ignorance (avidya) [cognition] shows something of an unreal nature, but not something real. For [two] connected (things), that are real and together [at the same time] (saha) are not ascertained.» A more detailed refutation of the two kinds of connection is to be found in Kamalaśila's TSP 694,23-695,12.

In the following refutation Ngöp lotṣāba makes use of the arguments applied by Dharmakīrti in PVIN I 84,12-86,10 in order to prove that cognition does not resemble its object.

This paragraph has its equivalent in PVIN'T P 183a2-183b3 (D 157a6-157b5): <1 ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgyag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi | geig niid du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra | geig tu ni (ni D: om. P | 'thad pa yin (yin D: ma yin P) te | gang gi phyir gal te gzung ba'i rnam pa gsal ba yang mi bden na | rig pa yang bden pa niid du gang gis rtogs (P: rtog D) par byed |12> yang gal te rnam par shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed na bden par yang gsal bar byed de | bden pas ni ries ba cung zad kyang bya pa med pa'i phyir ro | |

[1.2.2.1.1.] gal te de llar gzung ba'i rnam pa de gal te geig gi ngo bo yin na ni phyogs chas byas pa'i 'gal ba'i chos dang ldan pa mi 'thad do | | phyogs cha tha dad pa de yang geig niid yin na ni yan lag can gyi rdzas geig ci'i phyir mi 'dod de khyad par ci yod | |

[1.2.2.1.2.] yan lag can gyi rdzas la ni kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba yod pa'i phyir 'gal gyi | blo la ni ma yin pa'i phyir 'di niid khyad par yin no zhe na | shes pa ma yin pa'i rags pa geig ma shes pa yang rung ste khyad par ci yod de | blo'i rang bzhin niid ni rags pa'i rias pa niams pa ma yin no | |

[1.2.2.1.3.] gzhon yang kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba la sogs pa dang ldan pa kho na ni 'gal ba ma yin gyi | 'on kyang phyogs cha tha dad pa yang yin no zhes mang du bshad zin to | | de'i phyogs cha tha dad pa'i rgyu mthsan gis kyang 'gal ba na | gal te rnam par shes pa geig yin na ni yan lag can yang geig niid yin la | 'di du ma niid yin na ni khyad par med pa'i phyogs shes pa'i rags pa yang du ma niid do | |

[1.2.2.1.4.] gzhon yang rgyu can ces bya ba ni don dam par yod pa ma yin no | | skad cia' ri dzas la ni gang du bsgyur ba dang | g.yo ba dang bsgrigs pa yod pa dang med pas byas pa'i tha dad pa ma mthong ba de niid rdzas geig tu 'gyur ro | | g.yo ba la sogs pas byas pa'i tha dad pa'i gnas skabs su tha dad pa mthong bas gzhon du yang rjes su 'jug par byas pa ni ma yin pas tshad ma , 'ga' zhiq yod pa yin no | | de'i phyir rags pa thams cad la bsgyur gzhon dang 'brel pas cha shas yongs su bcad pa las gur pa'i 'gal ba'i chos 'du bar mthong bas tha dad pa med pa spang bar bya ba yin no zhes rigs pa yin no |

<11> This passage is translated in IWATA I 181 (text: II 128172) and MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 18. Both of them understand it in such a way that the pūrvapakṣa ends with zhes smra and that the following sentence already is part of the answer. Consequently, they prefer the reading of Peking (geig tu ni 'thad pa ma yin te). To my understanding,
like a composite whole (avayavin) cognition too would contradict (its) unity through (its) many parts;\(^{47}\) 1.2.2.1.2. coloured (rakta) as well as uncoloured [parts] are not excluded in case of the gross (form) (sthūla) in cognition;\(^{48}\) if the [cognition’s] unity cannot be negated by the different parts alone, it cannot [be negated] by the coloured and uncoloured ones either; 1.2.2.1.3. if, although the unity can be negated by these [coloured and uncoloured parts], it cannot [be negated] by the different parts [alone], a composite whole cannot be negated. 1.2.2.1.4. Finally, [if one asks:] [The gross form] may not be an unity in the state of being coloured and uncoloured at the time when it is not denied that it manifests as having different parts, [then] however, due to which circumstances (go ci ste) should [the gross form] at another time being characterized by another phase (ksana) not be an unity? [If this were the case] then a composite whole [too] would be reasonable.

1.2.2.2.\(^{49}\) [The proof that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates

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47 Cf. yan lag con ‘gog pa’i ņes pa de ņid ni du ma’i thun mong gcig gi rang bzhin gyi ņes par yang bīla bar bya’o | | PVNT T 166b8 (D 143b2) = “The very same fault that negates a composite whole is also to be seen as the fault of a unitary nature that is common to a manifold (object).”

48 It is possible that the text shes pa’i rags pa la should be corrected to shes pa’i rags pa las.

49 This paragraph corresponds to PVNT 183b3-185a2 (D 158a6-159a2): gal te de lta na gzung ba’i rnam pa’i rang bzhin du ma yin no zhe na |

[§1.2.2.2.1.] ‘di la yang ji ltar rdul phra rab rnams drug gis (P: gi D) cig car sbyar bas dngos po ma de bzhin du shes pa’i rdul phra rab rnams la yang thal bar ’gyur ro || lus can ņid la skyon ‘dir ’gyur gyi lus can ma yin pa la ni ma yin na ma yin nam | lus can shes bya ba rua zed de ba ni med kyi | ’on kyang tshad chung (D: tshung P) ngu mang po rnams phan tshun gyi rang bzhin gyi yul yongs su spangs nas skyes (D: skyed P) pa’i phyir yul rgyas pa dang ldan par gyur pa (P: ‘gyur ba D) ni lus can yin la | de ni rnam par shes pa la yang bye brag med pa’i phyir kun rdzob tu yod par mtshungs par thal bas de ni du mar yang rigs pa ma yin no | | gzhan yang rnam par shes pa’i rdul
phra rab ŋams su myong bar gyur pa rnams la | rags pa'i rnam pa ŋams su myong ba ni bdag par nus pa ma yin no | | rnam par shes pa'i bdag ŋid geig la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin zhiug | rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab mang po rnams kyang so sor rags pa'i rang bzhin ma yin no | | ji ldar phyi rol gyi rdul phra rab shes pa geig la snang ba rnams kyi so sor snang ba'i chos rags pa yan pa de bzhin du | 'dir yang shes pa geig la snang ba'i phyir rags pa ŋid du snang bar 'gyur ba yang ma yin te | du ma rnams gshan 'ga' zhig gis kyang ma bzang ba'i phyir ro | | de'i phyir ŋams su myong ba'i rjes su 'brangs pa na rags pa gsal bar snang bar ŋams su myong bar mi 'gyur ba zhig na ŋams su myong ste | de'i phyir gang dang ldan pas yod pa ma yin pas rags pa'i bdag ŋid la ston par byed pa shes pa'i med pa gsal bar byed nus pa yang yod pa ŋid do | | [§1.2.2.2.2.] rags pa'i rnam pa med na rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab gshan ci zhig lus la | de btags pas kyang ci zhig bya ste | gang gi phyir rags pa'i rnam pa 'di ŋid de kho na ŋid ma yin par mi 'gyur ba dang | rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa dang ldan par mi 'gyur bar bya ba'i phyir gzung ba'i rnam pa rnam par shes pa'i bdag ŋid du btags pa yan na gzung ba'i rnam pa mi bden pa dang rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa dang ldan par khas bhangs na | rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab rtog pa ni don dam pa yin no | | [§1.2.2.2.3.] rags par snang ba rnam par rtog pas sprul pa yang rigs pa ma yin te | gsal bar snang ba'i phyir dang | rnam par rtog pa rnam ni gsal bar snang ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro | | [§1.2.2.2.4.] ji ldar smig rgyu dag la chur rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang bzhin du rags par rnam par rtog pa yang yin no zhes ni brjod (D: rjod P) par mi nus te | gang gi phyir smig rgyu'i rang gi mtshan ŋid 'dzin pa'i rnam par shes pa dang dus geig tu 'jug pa'i chu'i rnam par rtog pa snang ba dang rnam par rtog pa dag geig tu byed pa'i phyir gsal bar snang bar nges pa 'gyur na | 'dir ni gang zhiug dang (dang D: om. P) lhun cig rgyu ba las rags pa'i rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang bar rtog (P: rtogs D) par 'gyur ba rags pa ŋams su myong ba gsal bar snang ba ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no | | gshan yang rnam par rtog pa'rnam par shes pa yang bdag ŋid kyi rang bzhin gang yin pa de kho na ŋams su myong bar 'gyur ba yin na | de la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin te | de'i phyir snang bar mi 'gyur ro | | [§1.2.2.2.5.] rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa ni rang gi bdag ŋid don med pa la don du lhag par zhen nas 'jug pa yin no zhe na | don med pa ston pa ni nges par bttags pa na med pa gsal bar byed pa ni ŋid du gnas pa yin te | gang gi phyir don med pa gsal ba na bdag ŋid gsal bar byed pa'am | gshan gsal bar byed par 'gyur te | rnam pa gshan ni mi srid pa'i phyir ro | | re zhiug (D: shig P) bdag ŋid ni gsal bar byed pa ma yin te | rnam par shes pa ŋid gsal ba'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir dang | don med pa ni dnogs po ma yin pa'i yang phyir ro | | gshan gyis gsal bar byed na yang de gsal bar byed pa ni shes pa'i bdag ŋid de ŋid mi bden pa gsal bar byed par skyes pa yin no | | 'di sìam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de ldar gsal ba yin no sìam na | gal te ma rig pa de dnogs po med pa yin na dnogs po med pas dnogs po med pa gsal bar byed do zhes bya ba'i tshig gi tshul 'di cir yang ma ring nyo | | ci ste dnogs po yin pa de lta na yang de ni rnam pa shes pa'i rang bzhin ŋid yin na de las kyang dnogs po med pa ji ldar gsal te | dnogs po dang dnogs po med pa dag la ni 'brela pa 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no | | <1> de'i phyir ma rig pa'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i shes pa mi bden pa'i rang bzhin gsal ba'i byed pa yin pa'i phyir ma rig pa'i dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no | | <1> de'i phyir de ldar don med pa 'dzin pa'i shes pa thams cad mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i ma rig pa'i bdag ŋid du bta bar bya'o | | <2> thams cad du gal te snang ba gang yin pa de thams cad yod pa yin na tshangs pas kyang shes pa 'ga'
the assumption that [the manifold forms are of the nature] of a manifold [cognition] is to be understood through five alternatives:

1.2.2.2.1. If the mode of existence (spyad pa, caraña) of the [external] atoms (paramāṇu) is the same also in case of the subtle (sūkṣma) manifestation of cognition, and if everything that manifests is really existent, [then] the gross (form) (sthūla) that manifests [in cognition] is contradictory.

1.2.2.2.2. If [under the previous conditions] the gross (form) that manifests is not real, [it follows that] that which is conceptualized (kalpita) is not the object (anartha), insofar as that which manifests in form of the atoms (paramāṇutvena) cannot be conceptualized.

1.2.2.2.3. If the manifestation in a gross (form) is conception (vikalpa), the manifestation in a clear (form) would be contradictory.

1.2.2.2.4. It is not reasonable that [the conceptual cognition’s] own form manifests in a gross (form) just in conceptual cognition due to the two ends [i.e. the two kinds of cognition it relies on] (mthar thug pa gnis kyis). And even in the case that one assumes that a gross

(P: 'ba’ D) zhig kyang 'khrul par brtag par mi nus so || ci ste mi bden pa yang yod na ni brgya byin gyis kyang shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa bsñon par mi nus so || 'dod du zin kyang 'nams su myong ba thams cad bden pa yin par ni sus kyang gzhag par nus pa ma yin pa'i phyir shes pa'i mi bden pa gsal ba'i nus pa las 'da' bar bya ba ma yin no || [The text of the immediately following passage PVlnT 185a2-5 is quoted in n. 43.]

<1> quoted in Syādvādaśatākara 170, 17-19; cf. above fn. 24.
<2> This passage is translated in IWATA I 174.

50 It is also possible that spyad pa should be corrected to dpjad pa (vicāra): «If the analysis of the atoms also in case of the subtle manifestation of cognition is the same [as in case of the external atoms], and if . . .»

51 Cf. dbang po’i (D: po P) rnam par shes pa la gnas pa’i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni cha shas dang bcas pa dang | rdul phra rab gcig la ni cha shas yod pa ma yin pa des na rdul phra rab kyi rang bzhin dang | shes pa la gnas pa’i snang ba ’di ’gal ba’i phyir rnam pa ‘di de’i yin no zhes brjod par nus pa ma yin no || PVlnT P 165b7-166a1 (D 142b3f).

= «That form which is situated in sense-cognition is endowed with parts, and in a single atom parts do not exist. Therefore the nature of an atom and this manifestation of cognition which is situated in cognition are contradictory. Thus one cannot say that this form [in cognition is the form] of that (atom).»

52 This is the case because the gross form manifests clearly and conceptions are by their nature unclear; cf. n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.3].

53 This enigmatic formulation becomes clearer with the help of the passage of PVlnT it relies on, cf. n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.4.], which says: «One cannot say: “Like the conceptual cognition [which ascertains] sun rays to be water manifests itself in a clear way, also the conceptual cognition [which ascertains atoms to be gross] manifests itself in a gross
(form) manifests in that (conceptual cognition), it is established that [cognition] illuminates something non-existent.

1.2.2.2.5. Finally, if one says that the manifestation in such a way [i.e. in a gross form] is not contradictory because it is [only] conceptual cognition (vikalpa) that ascertains [its own nature which is] not the object (anartha) as [being the] object, it follows that it would be contradictory that [conceptual cognition], not being the object, illuminates itself; if it is illuminated by something else [i.e. cognition], the cognition’s capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; if it is illuminated by ignorance (avidya), this (ignorance) being non-existent is contradictory, and if [this ignorance] is existent, the cognition’s capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; and [finally] if we do not assume the capability of illuminating something non-existent, there would not exist any erroneous cognition (bhrānti) (at all). [This was the examination of] the subject of the thesis (pratijñārtha).

2. The exclusion of the faults of the reason (hetudoṣa) consists of the exclusions of four (faults): 2.1. [the reason] is not established (asiddha); 2.2. it is contradictory (viruddha); 2.3. it is inconclusive for being too general (sādhāraṇānaikāntika); 2.4. it has the fault that its being absent [from the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa)] is doubtful (vyatirekasamśaya).

2.1. Regarding the first, some others say: «This (reason) is not established, for if the reason “being necessarily perceived together” means that perception (upalabdhi) of the object of cognition (jñeya) is pervaded (vyāpta) by perception of cognition, because there is no per-

—way.” [This is] because [of the following:] [The conceptual cognition which ascertains sun rays to be water] is determined to manifest clearly due to the fact that the cognition which grasps the individual (svašaṣṇa) of the sun rays, the conceptual cognition of water which occurs at the same time (and) which manifests, and the two conceptual cognitions [of them] are unified [i.e. identified with each other]. However, in the case under consideration there is no conceptual cognition of a gross (form) at all which, due to the co-occurrence (sahācāritvāt) with any [other cognition], could be conceptualized to manifest clearly, which experiences a gross (form), and which manifests clearly. Moreover, as the cognition of the conceptual cognition experiences only that which is of its own nature, there does not exist a gross (form). Therefore it would not manifest.>>

54 This idea is based on PVIN II 2,8f: rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du mngon par zhen nas 'jug pa'i phyir... svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādiyavasāyena pravartanāt... 55 Without correcting rang rig pa (svasamvedana) to ma rig pa (avidyā) the text does not make sense. The correction is based on the equivalent discussion found in the PVIN'T passage quoted above (n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.5.]), which is introduced by the following pārvapakṣa: 'di sīnam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de ltar gsal ba yin no sīnam na |
ception of the object of cognition without perception of cognition, and if this (reason) moreover is assumed to consist of a perception of that which contradicts the pervading (property) (vyāpakaviruddhopalabdi),56 then, in case that [many people] watch the moon or wrestlers (gyad, malla), the object of cognition alone is perceived, although the cognitions [of the other persons] are not perceived. Thus, the (reason) “being necessarily perceived together” is not established.»57

2.2. Moreover, [the reason] is contradictory, because it is contradictory due to the fact that it is pervaded by [the property that is] the opposite (zlog pa, viparyaya) [of the property to be proved]. [This is the case] under the presupposition that (zhes bya bar ’gyur na) they are different, because the word “together” denotes their being different (and) therefore they are perceived to possess the characteristic (viśeṣaṇa) of difference.58

2.3. Moreover, [the reason] is inconclusive for being too general, because it is the case that, although the cognition (thugs) of Buddha and

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56 gang zhig gang dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa de ni de las tha dad pa ma yin te | dper na sla ba gcig las gnis pa bzhin no || sngon po la sogs pa’i gzung ba’i rnam pa yang shes pa dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin no || tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pa khyab pa yin te | ’brel pa med pa’i phyir ro || de dang ’gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te | des na khyab par byed pa ’gal ba dmigs pas tha dad pa btags pa yin no || PVIN⁷ P 189b7-190a1 (D 163a1-3) = yad yena niyatasahopalambham, tat tato na vyatiricyate, yathaivasamtec candramasado dotityah. niyatasahopalambhaṣ ca jñānena saha grāhyākāro nilādir ity . . . bhedah sahopalambhānyamena vyāptah, pratibandhābhāvāt. tasya viruddhah sahopalambhānyah, tena vyāpakaviruddhāna bheda nirākriyate. JAMBUDVIJAYA 1981 p. 137 (P. 110); translated in IWATA I 181f.

57 This objection reflects the opinion of Šubhagupta as formulated in his Bāhyarthasaiddhiśārikā. The following objections as well, namely that the reason is contradictory (viruddha), inconclusive (anaikāntika) and doubtful (sandīdha), are based on BASK. This pūrvapakṣa corresponds to BASK vv. 72-74 (text and transl. in MATSUMOTO 1980 pp.3, 5), whereas rNgog lotsāba has reformulated the first part in accordance with the passages of the PVIN'T quoted in n. 56 & n. 62 and shortened the second part. More detailed it is available in TSP 692,11-16: punah sa [Śubhagupta] evāha – yadi sahasabdha ekārthaḥ, tadā hetu asiddhaḥ. tathā hi natācandramallaprekṣaḥ na hy ekaṇaivopalambhaḥ nilādeḥ. nāpi niłatadupalambhayor ekaṇaivopalambhaḥ. tathā hi niłopalambhe ’pi tadupalambhāṇāṃ anyasaśantanaṇām anyupalambhāt. yadā ca svarapraṇābhiṣṭāṃ sarve cittaśaṇāḥ sarvajñāṇaṃāvastyaṃ, tadā katham ekaṇaivopalambhaḥ. siddhaḥ syāt. kiśca anyopalambhaṇisedhe saty ekopalambhaniyaḥ sidhyati. na cānyaopalambhaṇipratиеḥṣaṃbhavaḥ, svabhāvaiprakṛṣṭaṣya viddhipratieṣhāyogāt. The passage is summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also his notes in II 78f.70–72.

58 This corresponds to BASK v. 71: tatra bhadantaśubhaguptas tu aha - sahasabdhaḥ ca loke 'smin naivāṇyena vinā kucit | viruddho 'yam tato hetu yady asti sahavedanam | quoted in TSP 692,2-3; text and transl. in MATSUMOTO 1980 pp. 3, 5; summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also II 167f.45.
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its object (jñeya) are perceived together, another (person's) [mind-]continuum (santānāntara), which serves as object of [Buddha's] cognition, is [by its nature] cognition [of the person] and is (nevertheless) not non-different [from Buddha's cognition]. Or [it is inconclusive] because the mind (citta) and the mental factors (caitīta) are not non-different, although they are perceived together as if they were the same (mtshungs par).59 Moreover, [the reason] is inconclusive because of light (snang pa, āloka) and colour-form (rūpa).60

2.4. Even if [the reason] may be one that is not inconclusive for being too general, [it is inconclusive because] doubt regarding (its) absence (vyatireka) [from the dissimilar instances (vipakṣa)] cannot be eliminated.61 [This is the case] because neither the being pervaded of the difference by not being perceived together nor something that contradicts the being perceived together is established. These are the four kinds of objections.

2.1.a. The answer to this [is as follows]: [The reason] is not unestablished. For, even in the case that [many persons] watch the moon or wrestlers, it may be that the object of their cognition is perceived, although the particular cognitions (jñānaviśeṣa) [of the other persons] are not perceived due to their difference [from one’s own cognition]. However, the absence of cognition as such (mātra) is not perceived. Although it is not established in this way that the particular cogni-

59 This opinion corresponds to BASK v. 68 and to a probable commentary on it by Subhagupta which is not available and which seems to be the source of the following quotation by Kamalaśīla: atha sahaśādo ekakālaivivakṣayā, tadda buddhavijñeyacittena cittacaitītai ca sarvathā | anaiṅkāntikatā hetor ekakālaivivakṣayā | (BASK 68) yathā kila bhuddhasya bhagavato yad vyajñeyam santānāntaracittam, tasya buddhajñānasya ca sāhopalambhāniyamo 'py asty eva ca nānātavam, tathā cittacaitītānam saty api sahopalambhe naiṅkavitva ity ato 'naikāntiko hetur iti TSP 692,17-21; the verse is translated in Matsumoto 1980 p. 4f; summarized in Iwata I 88; cf. also the references in II 7.962.

60 The reason is therefore assumed to be inconclusive, because light and colour are perceived together but are obviously different. The case of āloka and rūpa is already discussed by Dharmakīrti (PvIn I 94,25ff).

61 This objection summarized in the opinion expressed in BASK vv. 65-67 and 81 which is also to be found in TSP 694,9-20. Cf. the section «(b) inconclusiveness II (kk 65-67, 81)» in Matsumoto 1980 p. 7 and p. 27f65.

The formulation of this püraṇapakṣa by rNgog lotsāva shows a great similarity to the passage of Dharmottara already quoted above (n. 56): tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin te | 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro | [de dang 'gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te | = bhedāh sahopalambhāniyamena vṛāptāh, pratibandhābhāvāt. tasya viruddhāh sahopalambhāniyamāh. In the objection, however, khyab pa has to be understood in the sense of vyāpti, for otherwise it cannot be construed with tha dad pa la.
tion and the object which is not different [are perceived together], it is [established that cognition] in general ([jñāna]sāmānyā) and [the object are perceived together]. With regard to that [cognition] in general from which [the object] is to be proved not to be different there exists [the property of] being perceived together, because a moon or wrestlers being without cognition as such are not observed. Therefore [the reason] is not unestablished.62

[2.2.a.] [The refutation of this pūrva-pakṣa is lacking]

2.3.a. [The reason is not inconclusive for being too general either.]63 Because the object of the cognition of the all-knowing (Buddha) too [i.e. the other person’s mind-continuum], although his cognition is not perceived [by the other person], is perceived in the other (person’s) [mind-]continuum through self-consciousness.64

[It is also not inconclusive] because the all-knowing (Buddha) grasps only mind insofar as one abiding in Yoga (yogavāhin) does not grasp...
another (person’s) continuum. 65
As it is not the case that the mind and the mental factors are only
perceived together, which [arguments] could there be for a necessity
(niyama) [of being perceived together]? 66
[The objection] regarding light and colour-form will be refuted later
[by Dharmakīrti himself]. 67
Therefore [the reason] is not inconclusive for being too general.

2.4.a. Doubt regarding [the reason’s] absence (vyatireka) [from the dis-
similar instances (vipakṣa)] is eliminated by showing a valid cognition
that establishes the pervasion (vyāpti).

Abbreviations

IWATA I, II
TAKASHI IWATA, Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tat-
sache, daß Erkenntnis und Gegenstand aus-
schließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf
deren Nichtverschiedenheit. Teil I – Studie; Teil II –

JACKSON 1987
DAVID P. JACKSON, The Entrance Gate for the
Wise (Section III). Sa-skya Paṇḍita on Indian and
Tibetan Traditions of pramāṇa and Philosophical

MATSUMOTO 1980
SHIRŌ MATSUMOTO, Sahopalambhaniyama. Sotō-
shū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō 12, 1980,
pp. 1-34 (=298-265).

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65 This means that the Buddha, being without defeitures, is free of the dichotomy of
grahyā and grāhaka. This idea is expressed in a more detailed fashion in TSP 693,6-13.
The first part (693,6-8) is translated in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 13; cf. also his note p.31.
66 As for Dharmottara’s and Kāmalāśīla’s explanations, cf. n.64.
67 That is PVIN I 94,25-96,7; cf. PVIN'T P 186b1f (D 160a5f): gzugs dang snang ba
dag gis ’khrul par dogs pa la | bshad pa | gzugs dang snang ba dag la ni de’i shes
pa skyed par rung ba gang yin pa de thob pa’i mtschan ŉid dam (=PVIN I 94,25f)
stel | ngo bo gang yin pa’o | |. Kāmalāśīla’s refutation: ata eva na rūpālokaṁ vyāb-
hicāraṁ, <1> kevalasyāpy ālokadarśanāt. rūpaṣyāpy ālokaraḥhitasya kaiścit prāṇīvedyagair
upalambhāt. 12 tasmād vipakṣe bhāvāsambhavān nānaikāntiko hetuḥ. TSP 694,6-8.
<1> = PVIN I 96,2-4: snang ba ’ba’ zhiṅ kyang mthong ba’i phyir dang | snang ba med
pa’i gzugs kyang srog chags kyi bye brag ’ga’ zhiṅ gis mthong ba yin pa’i phyir . . .
(no Skt. equivalent for dang).
PVAR


PVIN I


PVIN T

Pramāṇaviniścayāṭīkā (Dharmottara): P 5727 (Dse), D 4229.

TSP


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Abbreviations

**ALB**
*The Adyar Library Bulletin*

**BHSD**

**D**
sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon

**IIJ**
*Indo-Iranian Jurnal*

**JAOS**
*Journal of the American Oriental Society*

**JIABS**
*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*

**JRAS**
*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*

**JIPH**
*Journal of Indian Philosophy*

**P**
Peking edition of Tibetan canon

**T.**
*Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, The Tripitaka in Chinese

**WSTB**
*Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde*

**WZKS(Ö)**
*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost)-asiens*

**ZDMG**
*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*