

rNgog lotsāba on the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*

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Although rNgog lotsāba Blo ldan shes rab *alias* Blo ldan bzang po¹ (1059-1109) was one of the principal exponents of the later phase of the pre-classical period of the development of *tshad ma* in Tibet,² from among the huge number of his works³ only a few have come down to us. A brief topical outline or summary (*bsdus don*) of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* was published in 1985; editions of his commentaries to the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*⁴ with an introduction by David Jackson are now under preparation. Thus, information on rNgog lotsāba and his followers, the representatives of the so called *rNgog lugs*, has been available only from secondary sources. Many of these materials have been collected in Leonard van der Kuijp's pioneer study of the early period of Tibetan epistemology⁵ and have been supplemented by David Jackson.⁶ From among his works on *tshad ma*, only two seem to have survived: a commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (*rNam nges kyi tī ka*), and his *Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa*, "Explanation of the difficult points in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*".⁷ The publication of the latter text

¹Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983 p. 31.

²For this periodization cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1989 p. 8-18.

³A list of his work is to be found in VAN DER KUIJP 1983 pp. 34&57.

⁴For references cf. JACKSON 1987 p. 148⁸.

⁵Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983, Chapter 1 «Rngog lo-tsa-ba Blo-ldan shes-rab and the *Rngog-lugs* of epistemology.»

⁶Cf. JACKSON 1987 pp. 127-131 & 165-169, and DAVID JACKSON, "An Early Biography of rNog lotsaba Blo ldan shes rab". In: *Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies. Fagernes 1992*. PER KVAERNE (ed.). Vol. I. Oslo 1994, 372-392.

⁷Both texts are kept in the Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities (CPN); cf. ERNST STEINKELLNER, "Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (*nges byed kyi tshad ma*)". In: *Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the In-*

has been announced for the near future. The work consists of three chapters on *pratyakṣa*, *svārtha*- and *parārthānumāna* and covers 124 *folios* made up of 8 lines; *folio* no.1 is missing. The manuscript is written in a legible *dbu med* script sometimes preserving an old orthography, so that in most cases – but not always – we find a subscribed *y* in front of the palatal vowels such as *myed pa* for *med pa*, or *dmyigs pa* for *dmigs pa*. Instead of *snang ba*, *snang pa* is mostly written and the term *dam bca' ba'i don* also occurs in the variants *dam bcas pa'i don*, *dam bcwa' ba'i don* and *dam bcwa ba'i don*. In some instances the genitive *i* such as in *pa'i* is separated from the preceding consonant by a *tsheg* so that we read *pa 'i*. Moreover, the post-post-fixed *d* (*da drag*) is used as in *gyurd pa*. The initial consonant of final particles and the like is quite often omitted, e.g. *thalo* for *thal lo*, or *'thade* for *'thad de*. The use of abbreviations seems to be restricted to *thaṃd* for *thams cad*. Finally, it should be mentioned that units of the text belonging together are separated from each other by writing two or three dots in vertical order between a double *shad*. Smaller units are separated by using two dots either before or after the *shad*. This method, however, is not consequently applied. From this manuscript I shall reproduce a small portion, namely rNgog lotsāba's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* proof as propounded in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, in order to gain some insight into his style, into the development of textual analysis, the so called *sa bcad* technique, and, of course, into his way of understanding the theme and his appropriation of the ideas of his Indian predecessors.

The last section in the *pratyakṣapariccheda* of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVIN I 78,12-100,26)⁸ is devoted to the distinction between a means of cognition and its effect (*pramāṇaphala*) in order to prove that any cognition (*jñāna*) bears two aspects, one grasping or subjective (*grāhaka*) and one to be grasped or objective (*grāhya*). The equivalent to this in the *Pramāṇavārttika* is to be found in the *pratyakṣa* chapter vv. 301-366⁹ and vv. 388-391¹⁰. Having first explained what should be known as *pramāṇa*

*ternational Association for Tibetan Studies. Narita 1989. SHÖREN IHARA and ZUICHŌ YAMAGUCHI (eds.). Narita 1992 [257-273] p. 264⁵¹. The *Lo chen gyi mdzad pa'i rnam nges t'i ka* (CPN no. 5139[1]) is incomplete and consists of 132 *folios*; the last portion is missing; cf. LEONARD VAN DER KUIJP, "On Some Early Tibetan *Pramāṇavāda* Texts of the China Nationalities Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities in Beijing" (unpublished).*

⁸The entire section has been translated into English in GEORGE DREYFUS & CHRISTIAN LINDTNER, "The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti". *Studies in Central & East Asian Religions* 2, 1989 pp. 27-52.

⁹VETTER in his edition of PVIN I refers to the respective parallels.

¹⁰Cf. IWATA I 15ff.

and its *phala* in accordance with the doctrine that an external object exists (*bāhyārthavāda*) and that in the end it is not necessary to assume the existence of an object external to cognition (PVIN I 78, 12-90, 16), Dharmakīrti proceeds to establish their difference without assuming an external object. In this context he presents two proofs according to the teaching that everything is just cognition (*viññaptimātra*).¹¹ The first of these two proofs runs as follows:¹²

sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ |v.55ab

(*lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir* | *sngo dang de blo gzhan ma yin* |)

... *dvicandrādivat* (*zla ba gñis la sogs pa bzhin no*). PVIN I 94,22f

The passage is normally translated as: «Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together ... like the two moons (seen by one suffering from a *timira* eye disease).»¹³

According to rNgog lotsāba who was quite familiar with this topic – he not only cooperated in the translation of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* but also in that of Dharmottara's *Ṭīkā* and Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* – there are two points to be dealt with in this proof: (§1.) the subject of the thesis (*dam bca' ba'i don, pratijñārtha*), and (§2.) the faults of the reason (*gtan tshigs kyi skyon, hetudoṣa*) as criticized by the opponents. Because with regard to the *hetudoṣas* rNgog lotsāba does not provide us with any new information, but only disproves the criticism of Śubhagupta as formulated in his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* which is refuted in the epistemological tradition of Dharmakīrti with more or less the same arguments, I will not discuss them here.

¹¹Cf. the introduction of this sub-section in PVIN I 94, 14: '*di rnam par rig pa tsam ñid yin na* ...

¹²This proof as well as the second one (*rig pa zhes bya ba yang de'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir, de ltar gsal ba'o* | | PVIN I 98, 7f) are the subject of Iwata's study on *sahopalambhaniyama* (cf. IWATA I, II), in which the commentators' interpretations are considered as well. On Śubhagupta's criticism of the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof in his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* together with the reaction on it in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, and in Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* and on Haribhadraśūri's refutation of this proof in his *Anekāntajayapatākā*, cf. MATSUMOTO 1980.

¹³Apart from the interpretation of *saha* the various translations do not in essence differ: «[Ferner] gibt es keine Verschiedenheit zwischen Blau und seiner Erkenntnis, weil sie notwendig gleichzeitig wahrgenommen werden.» VETTER transl. of PVIN I 95; «Blue and the cognition of blue are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together.» MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 2; «There [really] is no difference between something blue and the idea of the [blue thing] because [the "two"] must be perceived simultaneously.» DREYFUS/LINDTNER 1989 p. 46 (cf. fn. 8); «Das Blaue und die Erkenntnis davon sind nicht verschieden, weil sie ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden.» IWATA I 15.

Concerning the subject of the thesis in this proof, rNgog lotsāba distinguishes (§1.1.) the locus of properties (*chos can*, *dharmin*) and (§1.2.) the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya'i chos*, *sādhya**dharma*). The *dharmin* is determined to be made up only by the objective aspect consisting of something blue etc. He stresses the point that the subjective aspect should not be regarded as *dharmin*, for the *grāhakākāra* in this proof is different from the *grāhyākāra*. This is due to the fact that the *grāhakākāra* has to be understood as being real (*bden pa*, *satya*) while the *grāhyākāra* is said to be unreal or false (*brdzun pa*, *alīka*).

The property to be proved, i.e. *abheda*, is interpreted as being of the nature of a non-implicative negation (*myed par dgag pa*, *prasajyapratiṣedha*) and he dispels the assumption of its being an implicative negation (*ma yin par dgag pa*, *paryudāsapratiṣedha*). This means that by the negation in the term “*abheda*” only “the being different” is negated, but it should not be understood in the sense that Dharmakīrti intended the identity of the two aspects.

The determination of the *sādhya**dharma* now is a point where the difference between Dharmakīrti's commentators regarding the interpretation of this proof most clearly finds expression. This in part applies to the locus of the properties as well, but the *dharmin* was not a theme of their discussions and thus their views can be understood only by implication. In order to see the impact of the Indian tradition on rNgog lotsāba we first have to look at the respective interpretations. In roughly presenting the commentators' explanations I will make use of the results of Iwata's study on the topic and more details can be found there. Except for the concepts of Dharmottara who comments on the PVIN and those of Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla who explicitly relate their statements to the passage of the PVIN under consideration, the interpretations of the other commentators are comparable with those of rNgog lotsāba only to a certain degree, for the contexts in which this argument is applied and explained may differ.

Devendrabuddhi in his commentary on PV III 388 deduces from the reason “being necessarily perceived together” the identity (*ekatva*) of blue and its cognition.¹⁴ Thus the *dharmin* consists in the subjective and objective aspect and the *sādhya**dharma* is their identity. Śākyabuddhi shares this opinion. He quotes PVIN I 55ab and blames an opponent who takes

¹⁴Cf. IWATA I 113 (transl.) & II 93¹²: «PVP [P No. 5717(b)] 276b1: *sngon po la sogs pa dang de nams su myong ba dag ni lhan cig dmigs pa'i phyir tha dad par snang ba can nīd yin na yang gcig yin no zhes bya ba'i don to |*» = «Although blue etc. and the awareness of it appear to be different, they are identical because they are perceived together.»

the *sādhya*dharma to be a mere negation of the difference (*bhedapratiṣedhamātra*) for his ignorance regarding the intention of Dharmakīrti.¹⁵ Śāntarakṣita's position is not clear.¹⁶ Kamalaśīla, however, explicitly determines that the *dharmin* consists of the blue and its cognition and that the *sādhya*dharma is their non-difference.¹⁷ In Prajñākaragupta's *Alaṃkāra* there are several passages which indicate that he understands the term "*abhedha*" in the meaning of "identity". He explains, for example, that in the *drṣṭānta* used by Dharmakīrti, *dvicandrādivat*, the two moons seen by one suffering from a *timira* eye disease are identical (*ekatā*).¹⁸ In the same way, Ravigupta claims the identity of blue and its cognition.¹⁹ Finally, we should have a look at Dharmottara's comments in his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, the text of which was translated by rNgog lotsāba and on which he wrote a topical summary (*bsdus don*).²⁰

In the PVINṬ there is no passage where Dharmottara identifies the *dharmin*. However, as he explains that in Dharmakīrti's verse *abhedah*

¹⁵ Cf. ... *cig car dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir | sngon po de blo tha dad med* (PVIN I 55ab) *ces bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa yin no | | tha dad pa dgag pa tsam de bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi tha dad pa med do zhes bya ba* (P; D: *zhes pa*) *ni ma yin te | de yang bshad na bstan bcos mdzad pa mi mkhas par ston par 'gyur ro | |* PVṬ P (5718 *Ñe*) 255b1f (D [4220 *Ñe*] 207a2f) = «If one explains that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but not the "non-difference"¹⁾ [as formulated by Dharmakīrti] one demonstrates that the *śāstrakāra* is not learned.» Cf. IWATA I 141f & II 107⁷⁵.

¹⁾ As *bhedapratiṣedhamātra* here probably is to be interpreted as *prasajyapratishedha*, the term *tha dad pa med (pa)* may be understood in the meaning of "identity".

¹⁶ Cf. IWATA I 184ff.

¹⁷ Cf. *dharmy atra nīlākārataddhiyau. taylor abhinnatvaṃ sādhyadharmāḥ. yathoktaḥ sahopalambhaniyamāro hetuḥ. idrśa evācārīye sahopalambhaniyamāt* (PVIN I v. 55ab) *ityādaḥ prayoge hetvartho 'bhipretaḥ*. TSP 691,23-25. = «The locus of the property in this (proof) are the blue aspect and its cognition. Their not being different is the property to be proved. The reason, as it is stated [by Śāntarakṣita], is the being necessarily perceived together. Such a meaning of the reason is intended in the formulation as applied by the teacher: "because they are necessarily perceived together" etc.»

¹⁸ Cf. *ayam eva bhedahetur yad uta bhinnayogakṣematā. indudvayapratibhāsasya tu bhinnayogakṣemābhāvāt ekatāiva*. PVBH 410,11f = «Only the fact of having a different fate [i.e. cause and effect] is cause of a difference. The two moons that appear, however, do not have a different fate. Therefore they are merely identical.» Cf. also *abhinnayogakṣematvād ekatvam arthasya jñānena durvāram* ... PVBH 430,32 = «The object's identity with cognition cannot be denied, for it does not have a different fate.» These and some other passages are referred to in IWATA I 145.

¹⁹ PVṬ (P 5722) 167a3: *de'i phyir tha dad par snang yang lhan cig par dmigs pa'i phyir don dang shes pa dag gcig nīd yin no | |* = «Although they therefore appear to be different, blue and its cognition are identical because they are perceived together.» Cf. IWATA II 47 & II 111⁸⁸.

²⁰ Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983 p. 34.

has to be construed with *nīlataddhiyoḥ*,²¹ meaning that blue and its cognition are not different from each other, the *dharmīn* can be understood as consisting of the blue and its cognition, as was clearly stated by Kamalaśīla who seems to rely on Dharmottara in this point. In determining the *sādhya* *dharmā* Dharmottara does not use the terms *prasajya*- and *paryudāsapraṭiṣedha* applied by rNgog lotsāba, but only speaks of a mere negation (*pratiṣedhamātra*) of difference. However, that *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* is intended can be seen from his denial that the property to be proved is identity.²² Moreover, he specifies the subjective aspect to be real (*vastu*)²³ and the objective aspect to be unreal (*asatya*)²⁴.

²¹ Cf. *sngo* (D: *sngon* P) *dang de'i blo dag gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba ni tha dad pa med pa'o* || *bsgrub par bya ba'i cha 'dir bstan pa'i phyir gsungs pa ni | gang gi phyir* (PVIN I 94,20) *zhes bya ba'o* || PVINṬ P 182b6-7 (D 157a3-4) = «Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, i.e. non-different. In order to show the part to be proved he said “for”.»

²² *don gzhan pa'i rang bzhin nīd ma yin te* (PVIN I 94,21) *zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba ston pa'o* || *'di skad du 'di dag gcig par ni bsgrub par bya ba ma yin gyi | 'on kyang tha dad bdag*¹⁾ *dgag pa tsam yin no zhes ston pa yin no | | ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi | gcig nīd du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra* | ... P 182b8-183a2 (D 157a5-6) = «[The formulation:] “It is not of the nature of an other thing” (*na ... arhāntararūpatvaṃ*) shows (the property) to be proved. It shows that it is not to be proved that the two are identical, but the mere negation of the being of different nature [is to be proved]. [Question:] Why do you say that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but not their identity? ...»

¹⁾ The reading of *bdag* is problematical. Derge reads either *bdag* or *pa dag*. Peking reads only *dag*. The variant *tha dad (pa) dag dgag pa* would be equivalent to *bhinnayor pratiṣedhaḥ* which does not make sense. *tha dad bdag dgag pa* could translate a Sanskrit *bhinnātma(tva)pratiṣedha* meaning «negation of their being of different nature». Perhaps the correct reading is, as in the following *pūrvapakṣa*, just *tha dad pa dgag pa*. IWATA II 122¹³⁹ and MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 18f both interpret *tha dad (pa) dag dgag pa* in the sense of *bhedapraṭiṣedha*.

²³ *rnam par shes pa mi* (P: *ni* D) *bden pa gsal* (D: *bsal* P) *bar nus pa ma rig pa'i bdag nīd can ni dngos po yin gyi brtags* (P: *brtag* D) *pa ni ma yin no* || sc PVINṬ P 177b2f (D 152b2) = «The cognition which is capable of illuminating something unreal (*asatya*) (and) which is of the nature of ignorance (*avidyā*) is real (*vastu*), but it is not imagined (*kalpita*).» (cf. IWATA I 179 & II 126¹⁶⁵). Cf. also ... *mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i rang bzhin yang rdzun pa ni ma yin no* || PVINṬ P 177b5f (D 152b6) = «... and the aspect which illuminates something unreal is not false (*alīka*).»

²⁴ *gang gi phyir gang ji sñed snang ba de kho na ltar thams cad bden pa ni ma yin te | 'khrul pas med pa yang snang ba'i phyir ro* || PVINṬ P 182b8 (D 157b5) = «For not everything is real in just that way as it appears [in cognition], because due to an error [consisting of *avidyā*]¹⁾ something non-existing also appears [in cognition].»

¹⁾ Cf. *de'i phyir ma rig pa'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i shes pa mi bden pa'i rang bzhin gsal ba'i byed pa yin pa'i phyir ma rig pa'i dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod pa la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no* || PVINṬ 184b6f (D 158b5f) quoted in *Syādvādaratnākara* 170,17-19 (identified in IWATA II 123¹⁴⁴, transl. in I 174): *etena Dharmottareṇa yad abhidhadhe*

As can be easily seen, from among the interpretations of the Indian commentators that of rNgog lotsāba is quite close to the perception of Dharmottara. rNgog lotsāba as well as Dharmottara understand the property to be proved to be of the nature of a *prasajyapratishedha* and both consider the subjective aspect to be real and the objective one to be unreal or false. In determining the locus of property, however, they differ insofar as Dharmottara regards both aspects to constitute the *dharmin* while rNgog lotsāba denies the *grāhakākāra*'s being part of it. The reasons for this interpretation put forward by rNgog lotsāba are that in this argument the subjective aspect must be different from the objective one and that the negation of difference is an activity towards the objective aspect. But what does he mean by this? The purpose of this section of the PVIN is, as already mentioned, to establish that any cognition (*jñāna*) bears two aspects²⁵ according to the *viññaptimātratā*-theorem.²⁶ It must be added that Dharmakīrti is still arguing on the level of *sāṃvyaavahārikapramāṇa*.²⁷ This means, as rNgog lotsāba explains afterwards (§1.2.1.), that on this level the subjective aspect is said to be existent (*yod pa, sat*), for it is not only experienced as being illuminated but it is also reliable (*mi slu ba, avisamvādin*). Thus it is real (*bden pa, satya*). The objective aspect is, although experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for its reliability is invalidated by a correct or valid cognition (*tshad mas gnod pa, pramāṇabādhitā*)²⁸ and thus it is false (*brdzun pa, alika*). This constitutes the difference between them.²⁹ Moreover, the objective aspect cannot be real, for then neither of the two kinds of connections (*'brel pa, pratibandha*)

– *tasmād avidyāśaktiyuktaṃ jñānam asatya rūpam ādarśayatīty avidyāvaśāt prakāśata ity ucyata ity anavadyam iti* = «Therefore a cognition that is connected with ignorance shows an unreal form. Thus it is no fault to state that [cognition] by force of ignorance illuminates [an unreal form].»

²⁵Cf. *des na blo ni tshul gn̄is pa* | v. 59c *de'i phyir yul dang shes pa'i rang bzhin dag gis blo tshul gn̄is su grub pa yin no* || PVIN I 100,4-6 = «Thus, mind is two-fold. Therefore it is established that mind by way of the form of the object and that of cognition is two-fold.»

²⁶Cf. above fn. 11.

²⁷Cf. *sāṃvyaavahārikasyaitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam*. PVIN I 100,20 = «What we have explained is the nature of a valid cognition of everyday life.»

²⁸For the translation of the term *tshad ma*, *pramāṇa* as “valid cognition” which I adopt in the following, cf. TOM J.F. TILLEMANS, *Persons of Authority. The sTon pa tshad ma'i skyes bur sgrub pa'i gtam of A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar* ... Stuttgart 1993 pp. v-vi.

²⁹Cf. §1.2.1. *lan ni 'dzin pa ni myong pa dang myi slu ba yod pas* | *de yod par brjod kyi* | *bzung pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de* | *des na gsal bar tshor bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pa'i myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo* ||

would be possible. A causal connection, *tadutpatti*, contradicts their existence at the same time,³⁰ and identity, *tādātmya*, of two really existing entities is not possible by definition.³¹ These seem to be the main reasons for rNgog lotsāba's position.

What does this explanation mean for Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* proof? According to this interpretation the verse (*sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ* | v. 55ab) should be translated as follows:

«Because blue and its cognition are necessarily perceived together, [blue] is not different [from its cognition].»

If we now look at rNgog lotsāba's own translation of this passage *lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir | sngo dang de blo gzhan ma yin* | such an interpretation is, as is the case with the Sanskrit version, neither supported nor contradicted, although one is inclined to understand *nīlataddhiyoḥ* as referring to both, *sahopalambhaniyamād* and *abhedo*. However, this understanding obviously contradicts a later formulation of Dharmakīrti in verse 59ab where he says that even in the case that an external object exists, blue and its cognition are not different from each other. This he explains as follows: «By the two [reasons explained above, namely] “being perceived together” and “consciousness” it is established that the manifestation of blue and the like [in cognition] and its consciousness are not different from each other even in the case that an external object exists.»³² In this statement the *dharmīn* definitely is not the objective aspect alone but consists of the blue and its cognition. Did rNgog lotsāba consciously deviate from Dharmakīrti or is it possible that he overlooked this statement?

I do not think either is the case, for rNgog lotsāba's interpretation exactly follows Dharmakīrti's own explanation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof which says: «For blue is not of the nature of a thing that is different from (its) awareness, although it appears to be different because the two are necessarily perceived together, like the two moons (seen by one

³⁰This means that rNgog lotsāba understands *saha-* in the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof as meaning “at the same time”. On the different interpretations of *saha-* cf. IWATA I 66-103.

³¹Cf. §1.2.1. *gzhan yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang mā yin te | bden pa dang 'brel pas myi 'thad pas ste | dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la 'brel pa gñis ga 'gal ba'i phyir dang | gsum pa yang myi srid pa'i phyir ro |*

³²<¹ *de phyir snang don blo de dag | phyi don yod kyang tha dad min* |¹> v. 59ab *lhan cig dmigs pa dang rig pa dag gis phyi rol gyi don yod kyang sngon po la sogs pa snang ba dang de rig pa dag tha dad med par grub bo |* | PVIN I 98,29-100,3.

<¹> Quoted in *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛttivimarsinī* III 32,14: *bāhye 'py arthe tato 'bhedo bhāsamānārthatadvidoḥ* |; identified in ELLIOT M. STERN, “Additional Fragments of Pramāṇaviniścaya I-II.” WZKS 35, 1991 [151-168] p. 161.

suffering from a *timira* eye disease).»³³ Here Dharmakīrti only speaks of the non-difference of the blue from its awareness, but not of their being mutually not different. Thus, in this passage, the *dharmin* consists of the blue and its non-difference from its awareness is the property to be proved (*sādhya*dharmā). Further, in the whole following section up to the second proof by means of consciousness (*rig pa*) (PVIN I 97,7), there is not a single remark which could be understood in the sense that the cognition's non-difference from the blue is intended. In the same way, in the explanation of the second proof, Dharmakīrti only states that the blue is not a thing that is different from its awareness.³⁴ As we now should not assume that Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in prose formulates a new idea different from that in the verse, the verse has to be understood in the very same way.

The contradiction to the passage mentioned above (PVIN I 98,29-100,3) can be explained in such a manner that the argument expressed in the verse has to be formulated in two different ways. When formulated from the standpoint of the *viññaptimātratā*, only the non-difference of the blue is intended and it is only the blue that constitutes the *dharmin*. And when it is applied assuming an external object (*bāhyārtha*), the presuppositions are different and the mutual non-difference of blue and its cognition is to be proved. This also seems to be the reason why rNgog lotsāba translated the verse in such a way that it may be applied according to both views.

We now have seen that rNgog lotsāba in his interpretation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof, with one exception, follows Dharmottara's explanation and that he ignores the comments of the other Indian predecessors. In determining the *dharmin* of this proof on the *viññaptimātratā* level he is more precise when he regards it to consist of the *grāhyākāra* alone. At other occasions in his dKa' gnas rnam bshad, however, he does not follow Dharmottara at all but refutes his views.³⁵ These facts corroborate Śākya mchog ldan's account of rNgog lotsāba's assimilation of Dharmottara's ideas, for

³³ gang gi phyir tha dad par snang ba ñid yin yang sngon po ni ñams su myong ba las don gzhan pa'i rang bzhin ñid ma yin te | de dag lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir | zla ba gñis la sogs pa bzhin no || = na hi bhinnāvabhāsīṭve 'py arthāntararūpatvaṃ nīlasyānubhāvāt, tayoh sahopalambhaniyamād, dvicandrādivat PVIN I 94,20-21.

³⁴ sngon po la sogs pa myong ba las don gzhan ma yin na ni de'i bdag ñid du gyur pa de ltar gsal ba'i phyir sngon po la sogs pa myong bar 'gyur ro || PVIN I 98,9-12 = anarthāntaratve tu nīlāḍer anubhavāt tadātmabhūtaḥ prakāśate tathā nīlāḍyanubhavaḥ syāt. Kāśikā II 100,4f; identified in STERN 1991 p. 161 (cf. fn. 32).

³⁵ Cf. 'di la slob dpon chos mchog ñid na re | zhe'o | 'di yang bden pa ma yin te | ... dKa' gnas rnam bshad 44a8 and slob dpon chos mchog na re zhe'o | | de ni ma yin te | ... 44b1f.

he reported that rNgog lotsāba «refuted many points in the exposition of Dharmottara that he took to be unacceptable, having retained as they were those [passages] he thought were acceptable.»³⁶

Regarding his *sa bcad* technique one can see by the paragraph numbers which I added that the text was well organized according to this method, although we do not always find the beginning of a paragraph indicated by a *dang po* or *gñis pa*. However, the text under consideration does not allow a statement as to the extent to which the imposition of a logical structure upon a text commented on by means of topical outlines was developed by rNgog lotsāba, for the *dKa' gnas rnam bshad* is, as the title already indicates, not a detailed explanation of all the points of the PVIN, but only of the difficult ones. The topical outlines we find here seem to indicate the main points that rNgog lotsāba considered to be essential for his teaching of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the different opinions of his Indian predecessors concerning some specific subjects. For he not only refers to Śubhagupta's comments, although without mentioning his name (§2.), or to Dharmottara's view,³⁷ but in other parts of his *rNam bshad* he also refutes the opinions of Prajñākaragupta, Śāntabhadra and others.³⁸

As to rNgog lotsāba's style, one may say that his remarks are very short and in many cases only comprehensible after having understood the detailed discussion in Dharmottara's PVINṬ which he quite often summarizes in a few words.

Regarding the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, he finally provides us with a new interpretation that is not to be found in the Indian tradition and which accords well with Dharmakīrti's formulations.

Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa
on *sahopalambhaniyama* (PVIN I 94,18-98,6)

Additions in the manuscript are indicated by <xxx>; my additions to the ms. by (xxx); my corrections by xxx [corr. : yyy]; variant readings such as *gzung - bzung ba - pa*, *kyi - gyi*, *ste - te*, *cig - gcig* and the like are not corrected. Omissions of an

³⁶ ... *chos mchog gi bshad pa las thugs yul du 'thad pa rnams thad sor bzhag nas mi 'thad pa la dgag pa mang du bshad do* || Sākya mchog ldan, *Tshad ma'i mdo* ... (Collected Works Vol. 19 pp. 1-137) pp. 29,3-30,4; transl. JACKSON 1987 p. 167. A longer portion of this text dealing with rNgog lotsāba together with a translation is given in VAN DER KUIJP 1983 pp. 49-56.

³⁷ Cf. above fn. 35.

³⁸ Cf. *slob dpon shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa dang | zhi ba bzang po. la sogs pa na re | zhe'o || de ni myi 'thad de | ... 46b4-6; ... des na kha cig ... thal ba 'dir 'gyur ro zhe'o || de ni thal ba ma yin te | ... 43b7f; kha cig na re zhes zer ro || de ni myi thad de | ... 44a6; gzhan na re | zhe'o || de 'ang myi thad de | ... 44a7.*

initial consonant of final particles etc., e.g. *thalo* instead of *thal lo*, are indicated by *thal-lo* etc.; *thamd* is the abbreviation used in the ms. for *thams cad*. It also should be noted that the *tsheg* before a *shad* never is omitted, but always written.

[45a6] *lhan cig dmyigs pa nges pa'i* (PVIN I v.55a) *gtan tshigs ni* |
 1. *dam bcas pa'i don dang* |: 2. *gtan tshigs kyi skyon spang pa gñis kyis shes par bya'o* |:

1. | *de la dam bca' ba'i don yang* 1.1. *chos can kyi rang bzhin dang* :|
 1.2. *bsgrub bya'i chos dpyad pa* [corr. : *spyad pa*] *gñis so* |:
- 1.1. | *de la chos can ni 'dir sngon po la sogs pa gzung 7 pa'i rnam pa kho na yin gyi* | *'dzin pa ni ma yin te* | *'dzin pa ni gzung pa las tha dad par sgrub pa'i skabs yin pa'i phyir ro* | *tha dad pa ldog pa yin pas gzung pa myed pa las tha dad par 'thad do* | *des na tha dad pa dgag pa ni gzung pa'i rnam pa la bya ba yin gyi* | *'dzin pa la ni ma yin no* |
- 1.2. | *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos ni 'dir myed par dgag pa'i rang bzhin yin gyi 8 ma yin par dgag pa ni ma yin no* | | *de yang* 1.2.1. *myed par dgag pa la gnod pa spang pa dang* | 1.2.2. *ma yin pa la gnod pa bsgrub pa gñis kyis nges par bya'o* |
- 1.2.1. | *dang po ni gal te gzung pa'i rnam pa gsal bar tshor ba myed na 'dzin pa yang yod par myi 'grub pas thams cad 'jig par thal ba dang* | *gzhan myed pa(r) dgag pa shes pa'i rang bzhin ma yin pa gsal na* [45b] *phyi rol gyi don nam* | *shes pa gzhan tha dad par yang gsal bar thal bas gzung 'dzin grub par thal lo* | | *de lta na 'dzin pa myi 'grub pa dang gzung pa gzhan bden par thal lo zhe na* |: *lan ni 'dzin pa ni myong pa dang myi slu ba yod pas* | *de yod par brjod kyi* | *bzung pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de* | *des na gsal bar tshor 2 bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pa'i myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo* | | *gzhan yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang ma yin te* | *bden pa dang 'brel pas myi 'thad pas ste* | *dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la 'brel pa gñis ga 'gal ba'i phyir dang* | *gsum pa yang myi srid pa'i 3 phyir ro* | | *de ni myed pa(r) dgag pa'i phyogs la gnod pa spang pa'o* |:
- 1.2.2. | *ma yin pa la gnod pa sgrub pa la gñis ste* | 1.2.2.1. *rnam pa rnams shes pa cig gi rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa dang* | 1.2.2.2. *du ma'i rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa'o* |
- 1.2.2.1. | *dang po* [corr. : *dang pa*] *ni rnam pa bzhis rig par bya ste* |
 1.2.2.1.1. *yan lag can bzhin du shes pa yang cha du mas cig pa 'gal ba dang* | 1.2.2.1.2. *kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur 4 ba yang shes pa'i*

rags pa la myi ldog pa dang | cha <tha> dad pa tsam gyis cig dgag par myi nus na kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur bas kyang myi nus pa dang | 1.2.2.1.3. des cig dgag par nus kyang cha tha dad pas myi nus na yan lag can dgag par myi nus pa'o | 1.2.2.1.4. tha ma ni gal te cha tha dad par snang pa 'gog byed ma yin na de'i tshe kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba'i gnas skabs su ₅ cig ma yin mod | gzhan gyi tshe skad cig gzhan kyi mtshan ñid go ci ste cig ma yin te | des na yan lag can 'thad do zhes bya ba'o | |

- 1.2.2.2. | | du ma'i phyogs la gnod pa la rnam pa lngas shes par bya ste |
 1.2.2.2.1. rdul phra rab kyi spyad pa shes pa'i snang pa phra rab la yang 'dra ba dang | snang pa thams cad bden par yod na rags pa snang ba 'gal (ba) dang | 1.2.2.2.2. rags pa snang ba myi bden na rdul phra ₆ rab du snang pa brtag par myi nus shing brtags pa don myed pa dang | 1.2.2.2.3. rags par snang pa rnam rtog yin na gsal bar snang pa 'gal ba dang | 1.2.2.2.4. rang gi rnam pa mthar thug pa gñis kyis rnam par rtog pa ñid la rags par snang pa myi 'thad pa dang | de la rags pa snang pa khas blangs kyang myed pa gsal bar 'grub pa'o | 1.2.2.2.5. | tha ma ni gal te rnam par rtog pa don myed pa la don du zhen pas de ltar ₇ snang pa myi 'gal lo zhes brjod na | don myed par rang gsal ba 'gal ba dang | gzhan gyis gsal na rnam par shes pa'i myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa grub pa dang | ma rig pas [corr. : rang rig pas] gsal na de myed par 'gal ba dang | yod na shes pa'i myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa 'grub pa dang | myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa khas myi len na 'khrul pa myed par thal-lo | dam bca'i don to |
2. | gtan ₈ tshigs kyi skyon spang pa ni 2.1. ma grub pa dang | 2.2. 'gal ba dang | 2.3. thun mong gi ma nges pa dang | 2.4. ldog pa la the tshom za ba'i ñes pa ste bzhi spang pa'o |
- 2.1. | dang po ni gzhan na re | 'di ni ma grub ste | 'di ltar lhan cig dmyigs pa nges pa'i gtan tshigs kyi don ni shes pa ma dmyigs par shes bya dmyigs pa myed pas shes bya dmyigs pa shes pa dmyigs pas khyab pa'i don [46a] yin la de yang khyab byed 'gal ba dmyigs par 'dod pa yin na | zla ba dang gyad la lta ba ni shes pa ma dmyigs kyang shes bya 'ba' zhig dmyigs pas | lhan cig dmyigs pa ñid ma grub bo |
- 2.2. | yang na 'gal ba yin te | lhan cig gi sgra ni tha dad par brjod pa yin no | des na tha dad pa'i khyad par can du dmyigs pa'i phyir tha dad pa yin no zhes bya bar 'gyur na de ni zlog pas ₂ khyab pas 'gal ba'i phyir ro |
- 2.3. | yang na thun mong gi ma nges pa yin te | sangs rgyas kyi thugs dang de'i shes bya dag lhan cig dmyigs kyang shes bya rgyud gzhan ni

*shes pa dang tha myi dad pa ma yin pas sam | sems dang sems las
byung ba dag lhan cig du mtshungs par dmyigs kyang tha dad pa myed
pa ma yin pas so | | yang na snang pa dang gzugs kyis ma nges so |*

2.4. | *gal te thun mong gi* ₃ *ma nges pa ma yin du chug kyang ldog pa
la the tshom za ba ni bzlog par myi nus ste | tha dad pa la lhan cig
dmyigs pa myed pas khyab pa 'am | lhan cig dmyigs pa dang 'gal ba
grub pa myed pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba ni rtsod pa rnam pa bzhi'o |*

2.1.a. | *'di la lan ni ma grub pa ni ma yin te | zla ba dang gyad la lta ba
na yang shes pa'i khyad par tha dad pas de ma dmyigs kyang de'i shes
bya dmyigs* ₄ *mod kyi | 'on kyang shes pa tsam myed pa ma dmyigs-
so | de lta na ni shes pa'i khyad par dang don tha myi dad pa ni myi
sgrub kyi 'on kyang spyi dang yin no | | gang las tha myi dad myed
par sgrub par bya ba'i spyi de la ltos te ni lhan cig dmyigs pa yod pa
yin te | shes pa tsam dang bral ba'i zla ba dang gyad ni mthong pa
myed pa'i phyir ro | | des na ma grub pa ma yin no |*

[2.2.a.] [The refutation of this *pūrvapakṣa* is lacking]

2.3.a. | *tham d mkhyen pa'i shes bya yang de'i mkhyen* ₅ *pa ma dmyigs
'kyang rgyud gzhan la rang rig pas dmyigs pa'i phyir ro | rnal 'byor pa
can gyis rgyud gzhan de ma bzung par thams cad mkhyen pa ni thugs
'ba' zhig 'dzin pa'i phyir ro |*

| *sems dang sems las byung pa ni lhan cig dmyigs pa tsam yang myed
na nges pa la ga la yod |*

*gzugs dang snang pa ni 'og nas spong ngo | des na thun mong gi ma
nges pa ma yin no |*

2.4.a. | *ldog* ₆ *pa la the tshom za ba ni khyab pa sgrub pa'i tshad ma ston
pas 'gog par 'gyur ro | |*

Translation³⁹

The reason “being necessarily perceived together” (*sahopalambhaniyama*) is to be understood through 1. [an examination of] the subject of the thesis (*pratijñārtha*), and 2. through the exclusion of the faults of the reason (*hetuḍoṣa*).

1. From among these [the examination of] the subject of the thesis also consists of two examinations: 1.1. that of the nature of the locus of properties (*dharmin*), and 1.2. that of the property to be proved (*sādhya*dharma).
- 1.1. From among these here [in this proof] the locus of properties is only the objective aspect (*grāhyākāra*) consisting of blue etc., but it is not the subjective one (*grāhaka*), for [this] is the section (*skabs, prastāva*) in which the difference of the subjective (aspect) from the objective one is affirmed (*sgrub pa, vidhi*). As [the subjective/objective aspect?] consists of the exclusion (*ldog pa, vyāvṛtti*) of that which is different, it is reasonable that it is different from that which is not an objective (aspect) (*gzung pa myed pa, agrāhya*).⁴⁰ Thus the negation of difference is an activity towards the objective aspect, but not towards the subjective one.
- 1.2. The property to be proved here is of the nature of a non-implicative negation (*myed par dgag pa, prasajyapratīṣedha*), but not an implicative negation (*ma yin par dgag pa, paryudāsapratīṣedha*). And this is to be ascertained through 1.2.1. the exclusion of [a valid cognition] that invalidates (*bādhaka*) the non-implicative negation, and through 1.2.2. the proof of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the implicative (negation).
- 1.2.1. Objection:⁴¹ If the objective aspect is not experienced as being illuminated (*gsal ba, pravṛkkās*), the subjective one is also not estab-

³⁹In the following notes I quote passages of Dharmottara’s PVINṬ on which rNgog lotsāba’s explanations are based. However, as these passages are often quite long and space here is limited, I shall translate only the shorter ones and of the longer ones only those parts which are necessary for understanding rNgog lotsāba’s enigmatic formulations. Passages which are translated in IWATA I, II and MATSUMOTO 1980 are not translated, but are referred to in the footnotes. Finally, Sanskrit equivalents of several Tibetan terms have been supplied for the sake of convenience and easier understanding.

⁴⁰Or: «As the difference consists of an exclusion (*ldog pa, vyāvṛtti*), it is reasonable that [the subjective/objective aspect?] is different from that which is not an objective (aspect)». The meaning of this argument is not clear!

⁴¹The idea of the following objection is to be found in PVIN I 96,8f: *viṣayasya jñāna*hetutayopanidheḥ prāg upalambhaḥ paścāt samvedanam iti cet. Much parallel material is collected in IWATA II 155¹¹. In this discussion an opponent wants to establish

lished to be existent (*sat*). Thus, it would follow that all (aspects) are abandoned. And if a non-implicative negation [of being something] different which is not of the nature of cognition is illuminated, it follows that an external object or something else that is cognized is illuminated as being different as well.⁴² Thus, it follows that the objective [as well as] the subjective (aspect) are established. In this way it follows that the subjective (aspect) which is not established [as long as the objective one is not experienced] and the objective (aspect) which is different [from it] are real.

Answer: As the subjective (aspect) is experienced and reliable (*avisaṃvādin*), it is said to be existent (*sat*). However, the objective (aspect) is, although it is experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for it is invalidated by a valid cognition (*pramāṇabādhita*). Therefore, although [the two] are not different, insofar as [both of them] are experienced as being illuminated, that one whose reliability is established to be without an invalidating [cognition] is real (*satya*), while the (other one) without [such a reliability] is false (*brdzun pa*, *alīka*).⁴³ Thus the difference is established. Moreover, it does not follow either that the objective (aspect) is illuminated as being real, for – being connected with the real [subjective aspect] – it is not reasonable. [This is so] because the two [kinds of] connection [i.e. *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*] contradict [their] having the same time (*ekakāla*) and not being of one and the same nature (*anekarūpa*), and because another kind [of connection] is not possible.⁴⁴ This was the exclusion of [a valid cognition]

that cognition of the object is different from the cognition of that cognition, because it is the condition for the latter. Thus the reason “*sahopalambhaniyama*” would not be established.

⁴² This argument is not clear to me!

⁴³ rNgog lotsāba's answer is based on the following passage of Dharmottara: *ñams su myong ba nges pa'i rang bzhin mi slu ba ni spang bar nus pa ma yin te | de ni khas blang bar bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro | | yang gang ñams su myong yang gnod par byed pa mthong pa'i phyir slu ba de ni spang bar bya ba yin te | dper na zla ba gñis kyi rang bzhin lta bu'o | | gnod par byed pa med pa'i phyir 'khrul pa mi 'grub po zhes¹⁾ gang 'chad par 'gyur ro | | de bzhin du rnam 'grel las kyang | gnod byed rig pa dam pa ni | med na ñams myong spang bya min²⁾*

zhes so | | dga' ba la sogs pa'i rang bzhin yang dag pa'i rig pa ni spang bar bya ba ma yin te | gnod par byed pa med pa'i phyir ro | | des na gcig ma yin no zhes bya bar gnas so | | PVINT P 185a2-5 (D 159a2-4); the passage is translated in IWATA I 180.

¹⁾ = PVIN II 45,19f: *gnod par byed pa med pas 'khrul pa mi grub pa'i phyir ro | |*

(= *bādhakābhāvād bhrāntyasiddheḥ* PVSV 16,4f)

²⁾ not identified.

⁴⁴ Cf. *mi bden pa'i rang bzhin ñid ma rig pa'i dbang gis ston par byed kyi bden pa ni*

that invalidates the assumption of a non-implicative negation.

- 1.2.2. In [the subsection of] the proof of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the implicative (negation) there are two [proofs]:⁴⁵ 1.2.2.1. [one that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates [the fact] that (manifold) forms are the nature of a unitary (*eka*) cognition, and 1.2.2.2. [one that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates [the fact] that they are the nature of a manifold cognition.

- 1.2.2.1.⁴⁶ The first one is to be known through four alternatives: 1.2.2.1.1.

ma yin te | bden pa dang lhan cig 'brel pa nges pa med pa'i phyir ro | | PVINT P 185a2 (D 159a1f) = «By force of ignorance (*avidyā*) [cognition] shows something of an unreal nature, but not something real. For [two] connected (things), that are real and together [at the same time] (*saha*) are not ascertained.» A more detailed refutation of the two kinds of connection is to be found in Kamalaśīla's TSP 694,23-695,12.

⁴⁵In the following refutation rNgog lotsāba makes use of the arguments applied by Dharmakīrti in PVIN I 84,12-86,10 in order to prove that cognition does not resemble its object.

⁴⁶This paragraph has its equivalent in PVINT P 183a2-183b3 (D 157a6-157b5): <¹ *ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi | gcig ñid du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra | gcig tu ni (ni D: om. P) 'thad pa yin (yin D: ma yin P) te | gang gi phyir gal te gzung ba'i rnam pa gsal ba yang mi bden na | rig pa yang bden pa ñid du gang gis rtogs (P: rtog D) par byed* |^{1>} *yang gal te rnam par shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed na bden par yang gsal bar byed de | bden pas ni ñes ba cung zad kyang bya pa med pa'i phyir ro |*

[§1.2.2.1.1.] *gal te de ltar gzung ba'i rnam pa de gal te gcig gi ngo bo yin na ni phyogs chas byas pa'i 'gal ba'i chos dang ldan pa mi 'thad do | | phyogs cha tha dad pa de yang gcig ñid yin na ni yan lag can gyi rdzas gcig ci'i phyir mi 'dod de khyad par ci yod |*

[§1.2.2.1.2.] *yan lag can gyi rdzas la ni kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba yod pa'i phyir 'gal gyi | blo la ni ma yin pa'i phyir 'di ñid khyad par yin no zhe na | shes pa ma yin pa'i rags pa gcig ma shes pa yang rung ste khyad par ci yod de | blo'i rang bzhin ñid ni rags pa'i ñes pa ñams pa ma yin no |*

[§1.2.2.1.3.] *gzhan yang kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba la sogs pa dang ldan pa kho na ni 'gal ba ma yin gyi | 'on kyang phyogs cha tha dad pa yang yin no zhes mang du bshad zin to | | de'i phyogs cha tha dad pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis kyang 'gal ba na | gal te rnam par shes pa gcig yin na ni yan lag can yang gcig ñid yin la | 'di du ma ñid yin na ni khyad par med pa'i phyir shes pa'i rags pa yang du ma ñid do |*

[§1.2.2.1.4.] *gzhan yang rgyu can ces bya ba ni don dam par yod pa ma yin no | | skad cig ma'i rdzas la ni gang du kha bsgyur ba dang | g.yo ba dang bsgrigs pa yod pa dang med pas byas pa'i tha dad pa ma mthong ba de ñid rdzas gcig tu 'gyur ro | | g.yo ba la sogs pas byas pa'i tha dad pa'i gnas skabs su tha dad pa mthong bas gzhan du yang rjes su 'jug par byas pa ni ma yin pas tshad ma , 'ga' zhig yod pa yin no | | de'i phyir rags pa thams cad la phyogs gzhan dang 'brel pas cha shas yongs su bcad pa las gyur pa'i 'gal ba'i chos 'du bar mthong bas tha dad pa med pa spang bar bya ba yin no zhes rigs pa yin no ||*

<^{1>} This passage is translated in IWATA I 181 (text: II 128¹⁷¹) and MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 18. Both of them understand it in such a way that the *pūrvapakṣa* ends with *zhes smra* and that the following sentence already is part of the answer. Consequently, they prefer the reading of Peking (*gcig tu ni 'thad pa ma yin te*). To my understanding,

like a composite whole (*avayavin*) cognition too would contradict (its) unity through (its) many parts;⁴⁷ 1.2.2.1.2. coloured (*rakta*) as well as uncoloured [parts] are not excluded in case of the gross (form) (*sthūla*) in cognition;⁴⁸ if the [cognition's] unity cannot be negated by the different parts alone, it cannot [be negated] by the coloured and uncoloured ones either; 1.2.2.1.3. if, although the unity can be negated by these [coloured and uncoloured parts], it cannot [be negated] by the different parts [alone], a composite whole cannot be negated. 1.2.2.1.4. Finally, [if one asks:] [The gross form] may not be an unity in the state of being coloured and uncoloured at the time when it is not denied that it manifests as having different parts, [then] however, due to which circumstances (*go ci ste*) should [the gross form] at another time being characterized by another phase (*kṣaṇa*) not be an unity? [If this were the case] then a composite whole [too] would be reasonable.

1.2.2.2.⁴⁹ [The proof that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates

however, this part still belongs to the *pūrvapakṣa* which ends with *med pa'i phyir ro*. My translation: «[Objection:] Why do you say that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but that (they) are not to be proved to be identical? For (*ni = hi*) it is reasonable that (they) are identical. Because, if the objective aspect is not real although it is illuminated, how could consciousness in turn be known to be real? Further, if cognition illuminates something unreal (*asatya*), it illuminates [the objective aspect] when it is real as well, because by something real not the slightest fault is undertaken. [Answer:] If that objective aspect – given that it might be so (*gal te de ltar = yady evam*) – were a unitary thing, it would not be reasonable to be endowed with contradictory properties that are due to its parts. And if those different parts are a unit, why do you not assume a substance that is a composite whole? What is the difference (between them)? ...»

⁴⁷Cf. *yan lag can 'gog pa'i ñes pa de ñid ni du ma'i thun mong gcig gi rang bzhin gyi ñes par yang blta bar bya'o* || PVINT P 166b8 (D 143b2) = «The very same fault that negates a composite whole is also to be seen as the fault of a unitary nature that is common to a manifold (object).»

⁴⁸It is possible that the text *shes pa'i rags pa la* should be corrected to *shes pa'i rags pa las*.

⁴⁹This paragraph corresponds to PVINT 183b3-185a2 (D 158a6-159a2): *gal te de lta na gzung ba'i rnam pa'i rang bzhin du ma yin no zhe na* |

[§1.2.2.2.1.] 'di la yang ji ltar rdul phra rab rnams drug gis (P: gi D) cig car sbyar bas dngos po med pa de bzhin du shes pa'i rdul phra rab rnams la yang thal bar 'gyur ro || lus can ñid la skyon 'dir 'gyur gyi lus can ma yin pa la ni ma yin pa ma yin nam | lus can zhes bya ba rwa zed de ba ni med kyi | 'on kyang tshad chung (D: tshung P) ngu mang po rnams phan tshun gyi rang bzhin gyi yul yongs su spangs nas skyes (D: skyed P) pa'i phyir yul rgyas pa dang ldan par gyur pa (P: 'gyur ba D) ni lus can yin la | de ni rnam par shes pa la yang bye brag med pa'i phyir kun rdzob tu yod par mtshungs par thal bas de ni du mar yang rigs pa ma yin no || gzhan yang rnam par shes pa'i rdul

phra rab nams su myong bar gyur pa rnam la | rags pa'i rnam pa nams su myong ba ni bzlog par nus pa ma yin no | | rnam par shes pa'i bdag n̄id gcig la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin zhing | rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab mang po rnam kyang so sor rags pa'i rang bzhin ma yin no | | ji ltar phyi rol gyi rdul phra rab shes pa gcig la snang ba rnam kyi so sor snang ba'i chos rags pa yin pa de bzhin du | 'dir yang shes pa gcig la snang ba'i phyir rags pa n̄id du snang bar 'gyur ba yang ma yin te | du ma rnam gzhan 'ga' zhig gis kyang ma bzung ba'i phyir ro | | de'i phyir nams su myong ba'i rjes su 'brangs pa na rags pa gsal bar snang bar nams su myong bar mi 'gyur ba zhig na nams su myong ste | de'i phyir gang dang ldan pas yod pa ma yin pas rags pa'i bdag n̄id la ston par byed pa shes pa'i med pa gsal bar byed nus pa yang yod pa n̄id do | |

[§1.2.2.2.2.] rags pa'i rnam pa med na rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab gzhan ci zhig lus la | de brtag pas kyang ci zhig bya ste | gang gi phyir rags pa'i rnam pa 'di n̄id de kho na n̄id ma yin par mi 'gyur ba dang | rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa dang ldan par mi 'gyur bar bya ba'i phyir gzung ba'i rnam pa rnam par shes pa'i bdag n̄id du brtags pa yin na gzung ba'i rnam pa mi bden pa dang rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa dang ldan par khas blangs na | rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab rtog pa ni don dam pa yin no | |

[§1.2.2.2.3.] rags par snang ba rnam par rtog pas sprul pa yang rigs pa ma yin te | gsal bar snang ba'i phyir dang | rnam par rtog pa rnam ni gsal bar snang ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro | |

[§1.2.2.2.4.] ji ltar smig rgyu dag la chur rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang, bzhin du rags par rnam par rtog pa yang yin no zhes ni brjod (D: rjod P) par mi nus te | gang gi phyir smig rgyu'i rang gi mtshan n̄id 'dzin pa'i rnam par shes pa dang dus gcig tu 'jug pa'i chu'i rnam par rtog pa snang ba dang rnam par rtog pa dag gcig tu byed pa'i phyir gsal bar snang bar nges par 'gyur na | 'dir ni gang zhig dang (dang D: om. P) lhan cig rgyu ba las rags pa'i rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang bar rtog (P: rtogs D) par 'gyur ba rags pa nams su myong ba gsal bar snang ba ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no | | gzhan yang rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa yang bdag n̄id kyi rang bzhin gang yin pa de kho na nams su myong bar 'gyur ba yin na | de la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin te | de'i phyir snang bar mi 'gyur ro | |

[§1.2.2.2.5.] rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa ni rang gi bdag n̄id don med pa la don du lhag par zhen nas 'jug pa yin no zhe na | don med pa ston pa ni nges par brtags pa na med pa gsal bar byed pa n̄id du gnas pa yin te | gang gi phyir don med pa gsal ba na bdag n̄id gsal bar byed pa 'am | gzhan gsal bar byed par 'gyur te | rnam pa gzhan ni mi srid pa'i phyir ro | | re zhig (D: shig P) bdag n̄id ni gsal bar byed pa ma yin te | rnam par shes pa n̄id gsal ba'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir dang | don med pa ni dngos po ma yin pa'i yang phyir ro | | gzhan gyis gsal bar byed na yang de gsal bar byed pa ni shes pa'i bdag n̄id de n̄id mi bden pa gsal bar byed par skyes pa yin no | |

'di sñam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de ltar gsal ba yin no sñam na | gal te ma rig pa de dngos po med pa yin na dngos po med pas dngos po med pa gsal bar byed do zhes bya ba'i tshig gi tshul 'di cir yang mi rung ngo | | ci ste dngos po yin pa de lta na yang de ni rnam par shes pa'i rang bzhin n̄id yin na de las kyang dngos po med pa ji ltar gsal te | dngos po dang dngos po med pa dag la ni 'brel pa 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no | | ^{<1} de'i phyir ma rig pa'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i shes pa mi bden pa'i rang bzhin gsal ba'i byed pa yin pa'i phyir ma rig pa'i dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod pa la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no | | ^{>1} de'i phyir de ltar don med par 'dzin pa'i shes pa thams cad mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i ma rig pa'i bdag n̄id du blta bar bya'o | | ^{<2} thams cad du gal te snang ba gang yin pa de thams cad yod pa yin na tshangs pas kyang shes pa 'ga'

the assumption that [the manifold forms are of the nature] of a manifold [cognition] is to be understood through five alternatives:

- 1.2.2.2.1. If the mode of existence (*spyad pa*, *caraṇa*)⁵⁰ of the [external] atoms (*paramāṇu*) is the same also in case of the subtle (*sūkṣma*) manifestation of cognition, and if everything that manifests is really existent, [then] the gross (form) (*sthūla*) that manifests [in cognition] is contradictory.⁵¹
- 1.2.2.2.2. If [under the previous conditions] the gross (form) that manifests is not real, [it follows that] that which is conceptualized (*kalpita*) is not the object (*anartha*), insofar as that which manifests in form of the atoms (*paramāṇutvena*) cannot be conceptualized.
- 1.2.2.2.3. If the manifestation in a gross (form) is conception (*vikalpa*), the manifestation in a clear (form) would be contradictory.⁵²
- 1.2.2.2.4. It is not reasonable that [the conceptual cognition's] own form manifests in a gross (form) just in conceptual cognition due to the two ends [i.e. the two kinds of cognition it relies on] (*mthar thug pa gñis kyis*).⁵³ And even in the case that one assumes that a gross

(P: 'ba' D) *zhig kyang 'khrul par brtag par mi nus so || ci ste mi bden pa yang yod na ni brgya byin gyis kyang shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa bsñon par mi nus so || 'dod du zin kyang ñams su myong ba thams cad bden pa yin par ni sus kyang gzhaq par nus pa ma yin pa'i phyir shes pa'i mi bden pa gsal ba'i nus pa las 'da' bar bya ba ma yin no |* ^{[2>} *mi bden pa'i rang bzhin ñid ma rig pa'i dbang gis ston par byed kyī* (P: pa'i D) *bden pa ni ma yin te | bden pa dang lhan cig 'brel pa nges pa med pa'i phyir ro |* [The text of the immediately following passage PVINT 185a2-5 is quoted in n. 43.]

^{<1>} quoted in *Syādvādaratnākara* 170,17-19; cf. above fn. 24.

^{<2>} This passage is translated in IWATA I 174.

⁵⁰It is also possible that *spyad pa* should be corrected to *dpyad pa* (*vicāra*): «If the analysis of the atoms also in case of the subtle manifestation of cognition is the same [as in case of the external atoms], and if ...»

⁵¹Cf. *dbang po'i* (D: po P) *rnam par shes pa la gnas pa'i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni cha shas dang bcas pa dang | rdul phra rab gcig la ni cha shas yod pa ma yin pa des na rdul phra rab kyī rang bzhin dang | shes pa la gnas pa'i snang ba 'di 'gal ba'i phyir rnam pa 'di de'i yin no zhes brjod par nus pa ma yin no ||* PVINT P 165b7-166a1 (D 142b3f). = «That form which is situated in sense-cognition is endowed with parts, and in a single atom parts do not exist. Therefore the nature of an atom and this manifestation which is situated in cognition are contradictory. Thus one cannot say that this form [in cognition is the form] of that (atom).»

⁵²This is the case because the gross form manifests clearly and conceptions are by their nature unclear; cf. n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.3].

⁵³This enigmatic formulation becomes clearer with the help of the passage of PVINT it relies on, cf. n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.4.], which says: «One cannot say: «Like the conceptual cognition [which ascertains] sun rays to be water manifests itself in a clear way, also the conceptual cognition [which ascertains atoms to be gross] manifests itself in a gross

(form) manifests in that (conceptual cognition), it is established that [cognition] illuminates something non-existent.

1.2.2.2.5. Finally, if one says that the manifestation in such a way [i.e. in a gross form] is not contradictory because it is [only] conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*) that ascertains [its own nature which is] not the object (*anartha*) as [being the] object,⁵⁴ it follows that it would be contradictory that [conceptual cognition], not being the object, illuminates itself; if it is illuminated by something else [i.e. cognition], the cognition's capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; if it is illuminated by ignorance (*avidyā*)⁵⁵, this (ignorance) being non-existent is contradictory, and if [this ignorance] is existent, the cognition's capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; and [finally] if we do not assume the capability of illuminating something non-existent, there would not exist any erroneous cognition (*bhrānti*) (at all). [This was the examination of] the subject of the thesis (*pratijñārtha*).

2. The exclusion of the faults of the reason (*hetuḍoṣa*) consists of the exclusions of four (faults): 2.1. [the reason] is not established (*asiddha*); 2.2. it is contradictory (*viruddha*); 2.3. it is inconclusive for being too general (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*); 2.4. it has the fault that its being absent [from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*)] is doubtful (*vyatirekasamśaya*).

2.1. Regarding the first, some others say: «This (reason) is not established, for if the reason “being necessarily perceived together” means that perception (*upalabdhi*) of the object of cognition (*jñeya*) is pervaded (*vyāpta*) by perception of cognition, because there is no per-

way.” [This is] because [of the following:] [The conceptual cognition which ascertains sun rays to be water] is determined to manifest clearly due to the fact that the cognition which grasps the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the sun rays, the conceptual cognition of water which occurs at the same time (and) which manifests, and the two conceptual cognitions [of them] are unified [i.e. identified with each other]. However, in the case under consideration there is no conceptual cognition of a gross (form) at all which, due to the co-occurrence (*sahacāritvāt*) with any [other cognition], could be conceptualized to manifest clearly, which experiences a gross (form), and which manifests clearly. Moreover, as the cognition of the conceptual cognition experiences only that which is of its own nature, there does not exist a gross (form). Therefore it would not manifest.»

⁵⁴This idea is based on PVIN II 2,8f: *rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du mngon par zhen nas 'jug pa'i phyir ... svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt ...*

⁵⁵Without correcting *rang rig pa* (*svasamvedana*) to *ma rig pa* (*avidyā*) the text does not make sense. The correction is based on the equivalent discussion found in the PVINṬ passage quoted above (n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.5.]), which is introduced by the following *pūrvapakṣa*: *'di sñam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de ltar gsal ba yin no sñam na |*

ception of the object of cognition without perception of cognition, and if this (reason) moreover is assumed to consist of a perception of that which contradicts the pervading (property) (*vyāpakaviruddhopa-labdhi*),⁵⁶ then, in case that [many people] watch the moon or wrestlers (*gyad, malla*), the object of cognition alone is perceived, although the cognitions [of the other persons] are not perceived. Thus, the (reason) “being necessarily perceived together” is not established.»⁵⁷

2.2. Moreover, [the reason] is contradictory, because it is contradictory due to the fact that it is pervaded by [the property that is] the opposite (*zlog pa, viparyaya*) [of the property to be proved]. [This is the case] under the presupposition that (*zhes bya bar 'gyur na*) they are different, because the word “together” denotes their being different (and) therefore they are perceived to possess the characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*) of difference.⁵⁸

2.3. Moreover, [the reason] is inconclusive for being too general, because it is the case that, although the cognition (*thugs*) of Buddha and

⁵⁶ *gang zhig gang dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa de ni de las tha dad pa ma yin te | dper na zla ba gcig las gñis pa bzhin no | | sngon po la sogs pa'i gzung ba'i rnam pa yang shes pa dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin no | | tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin te | 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro | | de dang 'gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te | des na khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pas tha dad pa bkag pa yin no | |* PVINṬ P 189b7-190a1 (D 163a1-3) = *yad yena niyatasahopalambham, tat tato na vyatiricyate, yathaikasmāc candramaso dvitīyaḥ. niyatasahopalambhaś ca jñānena saha grāhyākāro nīlādir ity ... bhedaḥ sahopalambhāniyamena vyāptaḥ, pratibandhābhā-vāt. tasya viruddhaḥ sahopalambhaniyamah, tena vyāpakaviruddhena bhedo nirākriyate.* JAMBŪVIJAYA 1981 p. 137 (P. 110); translated in IWATA I 181f.

⁵⁷ This objection reflects the opinion of Śubhagupta as formulated in his *Bāhyārtha-siddhikārikā*. The following objections as well, namely that the reason is contradictory (*viruddha*), inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) and doubtful (*sandigdha*), are based on BASK. This *pūrvapakṣa* corresponds to BASK vv. 72-74 (text and transl. in MATSUMOTO 1980 pp. 3, 5), whereas *rNgog lotsāba* has reformulated the first part in accordance with the passages of the PVINṬ quoted in n. 56 & n. 62 and shortened the second part. More detailed it is available in TSP 692,11-16: *punaḥ sa [= Śubhagupta] evāha – yadi sahaśabda ekārthaḥ, tadā hetur asiddhaḥ. tathā hi naṭacandramallaprekṣāsu na hy ekenaivopalambho nīlādeḥ. nāpi nīlatadupalambhayor ekenaivopalambhaḥ. tathā hi nīlopalambhe 'pi tadupalambhānām anyasantānagatānām anupalambhāt. yadā ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtām sarve cittakṣaṇāḥ sarvajñenāvasīyante, tadā katham ekenaivopalambhaḥ siddhaḥ syāt. kiñca anyopalambhaniṣedhe saty ekopalambhaniyamah sidhyati. na cānyopalambhapraṭiṣedhasambhavaḥ, svabhāvaviprakṣṭasya vidhipraṭiṣedhāyogāt.* The passage is summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also his notes in II 78⁷⁰⁻⁷².

⁵⁸ This corresponds to BASK v. 71: *tatra bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha - sahaśabdaś ca loke 'smin naivānyena vinā kvacit | viruddho 'yaṁ tato hetur yady asti saḥavedanam |* quoted in TSP 692,2-3; text and transl. in MATSUMOTO 1980 pp. 3, 5; summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also II 167⁴⁵.

its object (*jñeya*) are perceived together, another (person's) [mind]-continuum (*santānāntara*), which serves as object of [Buddha's] cognition, is [by its nature] cognition [of the person] and is (nevertheless) not non-different [from Buddha's cognition]. Or [it is inconclusive] because the mind (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caitta*) are not non-different, although they are perceived together as if they were the same (*mtshungs par*).⁵⁹ Moreover, [the reason] is inconclusive because of light (*snang pa*, *āloka*) and colour-form (*rūpa*).⁶⁰

2.4. Even if [the reason] may be one that is not inconclusive for being too general, [it is inconclusive because] doubt regarding (its) absence (*vyatireka*) [from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*)] cannot be eliminated.⁶¹ [This is the case] because neither the being pervaded of the difference by not being perceived together nor something that contradicts the being perceived together is established. These are the four kinds of objections.

2.1.a. The answer to this [is as follows]: [The reason] is not unestablished. For, even in the case that [many persons] watch the moon or wrestlers, it may be that the object of their cognition is perceived, although the particular cognitions (*jñānaviśeṣa*) [of the other persons] are not perceived due to their difference [from one's own cognition]. However, the absence of cognition as such (*mātra*) is not perceived. Although it is not established in this way that the particular cogni-

⁵⁹This opinion corresponds to BASK v. 68 and to a probable commentary on it by Śubhagupta which is not available and which seems to be the source of the following quotation by Kamalaśīla: *atha sahaśabda ekakālavivakṣayā, tadā buddhaviññeyacittena cittacaittais ca sarvathā | anaikāntikatā hetor ekakālavivakṣayā* | (BASK 68) *yathā kila bhuddhasya bhagavato yad vijñeyam santānāntaracittam, tasya buddhajñānasya ca sahopalambhaniyamo 'py asty eva ca nānātvam, tathā cittacaittānām saty api sahopalambhe naikatvam ity ato 'naikāntiko hetur iti* TSP 692,17-21; the verse is translated in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 4f; summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also the references in II 79⁶².

⁶⁰The reason is therefore assumed to be inconclusive, because light and colour are perceived together but are obviously different. The case of *āloka* and *rūpa* is already discussed by Dharmakīrti (PVin I 94,25ff).

⁶¹This objection summarizes the opinion expressed in BASK vv. 65-67 and 81 which is also to be found in TSP 694,9-20. Cf. the section «(b) inconclusiveness II (kk 65-67, 81)» in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 7 and p. 27f¹⁵.

The formulation of this *pūrvapakṣa* by rNgog lotsāva shows a great similarity to the passage of Dharmottara already quoted above (n. 56): *tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin te | 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro | | de dang 'gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te | = bhedah sahopalambhāniyamena vyāptah, pratibandhābhāvāt. tasya viruddhah sahopalambhaniyamaḥ*. In the objection, however, *khyab pa* has to be understood in the sense of *vyāpti*, for otherwise it cannot be construed with *tha dad pa la*.

tion and the object which is not different [are perceived together], it is [established that cognition] in general ([*jñāna*]*sāmānya*) and [the object are perceived together]. With regard to that [cognition] in general from which [the object] is to be proved not to be different there exists [the property of] being perceived together, because a moon or wrestlers being without cognition as such are not observed. Therefore [the reason] is not unestablished.⁶²

[2.2.a.] [The refutation of this *pūrvapakṣa* is lacking]

2.3.a. [The reason is not inconclusive for being too general either.]⁶³

Because the object of the cognition of the all-knowing (Buddha) too [i.e. the other person's mind-continuum], although his cognition is not perceived [by the other person], is perceived in the other (person's) [mind-]continuum through self-consciousness.⁶⁴

[It is also not inconclusive] because the all-knowing (Buddha) grasps only mind insofar as one abiding in Yoga (*yogavāhin*) does not grasp

⁶²The answer is similar to those of Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla: *gar dang gyad la lta ba la sogs pa rnams la gang shes bya dmigs par mi 'gyur ba'i shes pa ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no || de bas na* (D: ni P) *shes bya mi dmigs par shes pa* (dmigs par shes pa P: om. D) *dmigs pa 'am | shes pa mi dmigs par shes bya dmigs pa ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no zhes rnam pa gzhan ñid 'gog pa yin gyi | dmigs pa thams cad la tha dad pa ñid 'gog pa ni ma yin no ||* PVINT P 185b3-5 (D 159b1f); *na ca naṭacandramallaprekṣāsu kaścij jñānopalambho 'sti yo na jñeyopalambhaḥ, jñeyopalambho vā na jñānopalambhaka iti kuto 'siddhatā*. TSP 693,1-3; cf. MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 21.

⁶³One is forced to add such an introductory statement, for otherwise the following formulation of the reason cannot be construed. As the immediately preceding part, the refutation of §2.2., is also missing, one might think of a scribal error. However, *rNgog lotsāba* adds another proof for the reason's not being inconclusive which also lacks the predicate to be proved and which is not connected with the first formulation by a conjunctive or-disjunctive particle such as *dang* or *'am*. Therefore and also because the remaining part of the refutation is quite short, it is also possible that *rNgog lotsāba* for some reason wanted to finish this section very quickly and just noted the most important points without formulating full sentences.

⁶⁴Similar Dharmottara's refutation which is preserved in Sanskrit in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*: *gang yang bcom ldan 'das kyi* (P: *kyis* D) *shes bya dang thugs* (D: *thug* P) *la lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yod kyang | tha dad pa med pa ni ma yin no zhes smras pa de ni mi rigs te | gang gi phyir de la ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa ñid med de | tha dad pa ñid du rgyud gzhan gyis rang gi sems dmigs pa'i phyir ro || de ñid kyi phyir sems dang sems las byung bas kyang 'khrul par 'gyur ba ma yin te | de dag rnams kyang so sor bdag ñid yang dag par rig pa'i phyir ro ||* PVINT 185b5-7 (D 159b2-4); [*nāpi buddhavijñeyacittanānaikāntiko hetuḥ*], *na hi tatraikopalambhaniyamo 'sti, prthak prthak sarvair eva cittasya saṃvedanāt. ata eva na*¹⁾ *cittacaittair vyabhicārah, teṣāṃ api pratyekam ātmana eva saṃvedanāt*. TSP 693,19-21; cf. MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 21.

¹⁾ cf. TSP_{lib} [Peking, vol. 139, No. 5765] 160b8 ... *'khrul pa ma yin te |*

another (person's) continuum.⁶⁵

As it is not the case that the mind and the mental factors are only perceived together, which [arguments] could there be for a necessity (*niyama*) [of being perceived together]?⁶⁶

[The objection] regarding light and colour-form will be refuted later [by Dharmakīrti himself].⁶⁷

Therefore [the reason] is not inconclusive for being too general.

- 2.4.a. Doubt regarding [the reason's] absence (*vyatireka*) [from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*)] is eliminated by showing a valid cognition that establishes the pervasion (*vyāpti*).

Abbreviations

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| IWATA I, II | TAKASHI IWATA, <i>Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, daß Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit</i> . Teil I – Studie; Teil II – Anmerkungen. Stuttgart 1991. |
| JACKSON 1987 | DAVID P. JACKSON, <i>The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III). Sa-skye Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of pramāṇa and Philosophical Debate</i> . [2 vols.] Wien. |
| MATSUMOTO 1980 | SHIRŌ MATSUMOTO, <i>Sahôpalambhaniyama. Sotōshū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō</i> 12, 1980, pp. 1-34 (=298-265). |

⁶⁵This means that the Buddha, being without defilements, is free of the dichotomy of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*. This idea is expressed in a more detailed fashion in TSP 693,6-13. The first part (693,6-8) is translated in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 13; cf. also his note p.31³⁸.

⁶⁶As for Dharmottara's and Kamalaśīla's explanations, cf. n.64.

⁶⁷That is PVIN I 94,25-96,7; cf. PVIN P 186b1f (D 160a5f): *gzugs dang snang ba dag gis 'khrul par dogs pa la | bshad pa | gzugs dang snang ba dag la ni de'i shes pa skyed par rung ba gang yin pa de thob pa'i mtshan ñid dam* (=PVIN I 94,25f) *ste | ngo bo gang yin pa'o |*. Kamalaśīla's refutation: *ata eva na rūpālokair vyabhicārah, <sup>1>kevalasyāpy ālokadarśanāt. rūpasyāpy ālokarahitasya kaiścīt prāṇiviśeṣair upalambhāt.*^{1>} *tasmād vipakṣe bhāvāsambhavān nānaikāntiko hetuḥ*. TSP 694,6-8.

^{<1>} = PVIN I 96,2-4: *snang ba 'ba' zhig kyang mthong ba'i phyir dang | snang ba med pa'i gzugs kyang srog chags kyi bye brag 'ga' zhig gis mthong ba yin pa'i phyir ...* (no Skt. equivalent for *dang*).

- PVBH *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* or *Vārttikālaṃkāra* of Prajñākaragupta, edited by R. SĀṆKṚTYĀYANA. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 1. Patna, 1953. Tib. P 5719.
- PVIN I TILMANN VETTER, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 1.Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung.* Wien 1966.
- PVINṬ Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara): P 5727 (*Dse*), D 4229.
- TSP Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (Kamalaśīla): *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla.* Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri [2 vols.]. Varanasi 1981/82.
- VAN DER KUIJP 1983 LEONARD W.J. VAN DER KUIJP, *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century.* Wiesbaden.
- VAN DER KUIJP 1989 LEONARD W.J. VAN DER KUIJP, An Introduction to Gtsang-nag-pa's *Tshad-ma rnam-par nges-pa'i ṭi-ka legs-bshad bsdu pa*. An Ancient Commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, Otani University Collection No. 13971. (Otani University Tibetan Work Series, Vol. II) Kyoto, pp. 1-33.

Abbreviations

<i>ALB</i>	<i>The Adyar Library Bulletin</i>
<i>BHSD</i>	<i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary</i> , by Franklin Edgerton, vol. II: Dictionary, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, First Edition 1953, Reprint 1985
<i>D</i>	sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon
<i>IJ</i>	<i>Indo-Iranian Journal</i>
<i>JAOS</i>	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
<i>JIABS</i>	<i>Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies</i>
<i>JRAS</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland</i>
<i>JIPH</i>	<i>Journal of Indian Philosophy</i>
<i>P</i>	Peking edition of Tibetan canon
<i>T</i>	<i>Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō</i> , The Tripitaka in Chinese
<i>WSTB</i>	<i>Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde</i>
<i>WZKS(Ö)</i>	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost)-asiens</i>
<i>ZDMG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i>