The Role of *dṛṣṭānta* in Dignāga's Logic
Shoryu Katsura, Hiroshima University

0.   Dignāga discusses *dṛṣṭānta* (example) and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* (pseudo-example) in the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (=PSV) Chapter IV.[1] Most of his discussions in the *svamata* section can be traced back to his earlier work, the *Nyāyamukha*. In the *paramata* section he criticizes the views presented in the *Vādavidhi* attributed to Vasubandhu as well as those of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.[2] The aim of this paper is to present a summary of Dignāga's discussions on *dṛṣṭānta* in the *svamata* section, from which we will be able to draw some conclusions about the role of *dṛṣṭānta* in Dignāga's logic.[3]

---

[1]   The first part of my presentation at the panel in Lausanne, 1999, which dealt with Dignāga's theory of *trairūpya*, has appeared under the title of "Dignāga on *trairūpya* Reconsidered: A Reply to Prof. Oetke," in Festschrift for Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki, *Indo no Bunka to Ronri* (Culture and Logic in India), ed. by Akihiko Akamatsu, University Press of Kyushu, Oct. 2000, pp. 241-266.

[2]   A synopsis of PS/PSV/PST Chapter IV:

1 Dignāga's own views (*svamata*) on *dṛṣṭānta* and *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*

1.1 Dignāga's own views on *dṛṣṭānta* (Derge8b4-9a4/60a2-63a3/212b3-226b3)

1.1.1 *dṛṣṭānta* statement expresses the second and third characteristics of a valid reason (*hetu*)

1.1.2 Two kinds of *dṛṣṭānta* and their proper formulations

·1.1.3 Necessity of the two kinds of *dṛṣṭānta* in a single proof

1.1.4 Purpose of *dṛṣṭānta*; components of a proof: reason, pervasion (*vyāpti*)& a proposition to be proved (*sādhya*)

1.1.5 Independent status of *dṛṣṭānta* from a reason

1.1.6 Relation between a reason and *dṛṣṭānta*

1.1.7 Critique of the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.34

1.1.8 Critique of the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.35

1.1.9 Necessity of pervasion to be expressed in *dṛṣṭānta* statement

1.2. Dignāga's own views on *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa* (Derge 9a5/63a3-b1/226b3-227b3)

2 Dignāga's critique of the views held by other schools (*paramata*)

2.1 The *Vādavidhi* views (Derge 9a5-9b1/63b1-64a5/227b3-229a5)

2.2 The Naiyāyika views (Derge 9b1-3/64a5-66a3/229a5-236b6)

2.3 The Vaiśeṣika views (Derge 9b3-4/66a3-7/236b6-237b3)

[3]   This portion of PSV has been thoroughly studied by Hidenori Kitagawa in Kitagawa (1965). He edited two versions of Tibetan translations of PS and PSV and tranlsated them into Japanese wtih detailed annotations. Muni Jambuvijaya restored Sanskrit texts of the beginning portions of PS and PSV Chapter IV in Jambuvijaya (1966). He translated into Sanskrit the

1.   Introducing PS IV.6, Dignāga assumes the following process of 'inferece for oneself' (svārthānumāna, 'inference' in short):

(1) First we ascertain the presence of an inferential mark (liṅga, e.g. a piece of smoke) in the object to be inferred (anumeya, e.g. at the top of a mountain); this is the confirmation of the first of the three characteritics (trirūpa) of a valid inferential mark, i.e., pakṣadharmatva.

(2) Next we recall that we previoiusly experienced elsewhere presence of the inferential mark in what is similar to the object to be inferred (tattulya, e.g. a kitchen) and its absence in the absence of the property to be inferred (asat, e.g., a lake); this is the confirmation of the second and the third characteristics, viz., anvaya (a positive concomitance) and vyatireka (a negative concomitance).

(3) Then, we can have an ascertainment (niścaya) that the property to be inferred exists in the object to be inferred, as e.g., that there must be a fire, though imperceptible, hidden at the top of the moutain.[4]

In short, an inferential mark possessing the three characteristics (pakṣadharmatva, anvaya and vyatireka) can produce an ascertainment of a certain state of affairs regarding an object to be inferred.[5] He then states PS IV.6 as follows:

"[In 'inference for others' (parārthānumāna, 'proof' in short), on the other hand,] with a desire to produce for others the same ascertainment (niścaya) as we ourselves have obtained, we refer to (1) [a reason(hetu)'s] being a property

relevant portions of PST in its footnotes. Furthermore he did the same for the Vaiśeṣika section of this chapter in Jambuvijaya (1961). Most recently Waso Harada translated the beginning portions of PS and PSV Chapter IV (vv.1-5) in the footnote (13) of Harada (1999). I would like to acknowledge my indebtness to those previous studies. I briefly discussed Dignāga's treatment of dṛṣṭānta in Katsura (1984). I would also like to thank Prof. E. Steinkellner and his staff at the Austrian Academy of Science for their great help in recovering the fragments of PS and PSV Chapter IV.

[4] PSV[K] 150b5-7: rjes su dpag pa la yang tshul 'di yin par mthong ste / gal te rtags 'di rjes su dpag par bya ba la nges par bzung na / gzhan du de dang rigs mthun pa la yod pa nyid dang / med pa la med pa nyid dran par byed pa de'i phyir 'di'i nges pa bskyed par yin no // Cf. PSV[V] 61b5-, Kitagawa (1965: 521); PST (Derge) 223a6: rjes su dpag pa la yang zhes rang gi don rjes su dpag pa la'o //; NMukh §5.5, Katsura (1981: 73ff.).

[5] Cf. PS II.1 ab: anumānaṃ dvidhā; svārtham trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadṛk /

of the topic (*pakṣa*) of a proposition (*pakṣadharmatva*), (2) [its inseparable] relation (*sambandha*) [with that which is to be proved] and (3) the [proposition] to be proved (*sādhya*). Other items should be excluded [from the members of a proof]." [6]

Thus the purpose of a logical proof (*parārthānumāna*) is to produce in the opponent the same kind of ascertainement that is obtained by the proponent through an inference (*svārthānumāna*). That indicates a close parallelism between an inference and a proof.

Commenting upon the above verse, Dignāga clarifies the roles of the three members (*avayava*) of his logical proof, viz., 'proposition/thesis' (*pakṣa*), 'reason' (*hetu*) and 'example' (*dṛṣṭānta*) in the following manner:

(1) The statement of a proposition (*pakṣa-vacana*) is made in order to indicate the state of affairs to be inferred (*anumeya*).

(2) The statement of a reason (*hetu-vacana*) is made in order to indicate that the reason is a property of the topic under discussion (*pakṣadharmatva*).

(3) The statement of an example (*dṛṣṭānta-vacana*) is made in order to indicate that the reason is inseparably related (*avinābhāva*) to the property to be inferred (*anumeya*).

Then he excludes 'desire to know' (*jijñāsā*), 'application' (*upanaya*), 'conclusion' (*nigamana*) and others from the members of a proof and concludes that there are no members of a proof other than the above three. [7]

---

[6]   *svaniścayavad   anyeṣāṃ   niścayotpādanecchayā   /   pakṣadharmatva-sambandhasādhyokter anyvarjanam //* = NMukh v. 13: 如自決定已 [希]他決定生 說宗法相應 所立餘 遠離. Quoted in PVA (487); *padas* cd in VNṬ (64) and NV (130).

Cf. also *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti, ed. by Steinkellner (Wien: 1967) 6: *svaniścayavad anyeṣām api niścayotpādanāya ca sādhanam ucyate /*; *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, ed. by L. de La Vallee Poussin (St. Petersburg: 1903-13) 19: *yo hi yam arthaṃ pratijānīte, tena svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanecchayā yayopapattyāsāv artho 'dhigataḥ saivopapattiḥ parasmāy upadeṣṭavyā /*; *Nyāyāvatāra* of Siddhasena Divākara (ed. by X) v. 10: *svaniścayavad anyeṣāṃ niścayotpādanaṃ buddhaiḥ/ parārthaṃ mānam ākhyātaṃ vākyaṃ tadupacārataḥ //*

[7] PSV[K] 150b8-151a2: *gang gi phyir phyogs kyi chos nyid bstan pa'i don du gtan tshigs brjod pa dang / yang de'i rjes su dpag par bya ba dang med na mi 'byung ba'i don du dpe brjod pa dang / rjes su dpag par bya ba yin pa'i don du phyogs brjod pa ste rjes su dpag pa'i yan lag gzhan yod pa ma yin no // de'i phyir gzhan dag ni shes pa la sogs pa rnams dang nye bar sbyor ba dang mjug bsdu ba dag 'dir spangs pa yin no //* Cf. PSV[V] 61b7-62a1, Kitagawa (1965: 521-522); NMukh §5.5, Katsura (1981: 73ff.).

The statement of a proposition is actually a re-statement of the ascertainment obtained by one who has inferred for himself , while the statement of a reason corresponds to the ascertainment of the first characteristic (i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*) of a valid mark in an inferential process. The ʔ the statement of an example, which expresses an inseparable relation (*sambandha/avinābhāva*), must correspond to the recollection of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. It is true because, as I investigated elsewhere, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* with *eva*-restriction represent such an inseparable realtion between a logical mark and the property to be inferred, in short, pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the former by the latter.[8] Thus it is clear that there exists an apparent parallelism between an inference and a proof.

In any case, according to Dignāga the role of the statement of an example (*dṛṣtānta-vacana*) in a proof is to present the relation (*sambandha*) called 'inseparable' (*avinābhāva*) between a reason (*hetu*, i.e., a proving property, *sādhana-dharma*) and a property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*), namely, the relation in which the former does not exist (*a-bhāva*) without (*vinā*) the latter, for example, a piece of smoke does not exist without a fire. The same kind of relation holds between a valid logical mark (*liṅga*) and the marked (*liṅgin*, i.e., that which is to be inferred) in the case of an inference.[9] It is called 'restriction' (*niyama*), · 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*), 'concomitance' (*anubandha*), etc. It is to be noted that such a relation ascertains the second and the third characteristics (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) of a valid reason and an inferential mark.

2.   With the theory of the 'inseparable relation' or 'pevasion' as the foundation of his system of logic, Dignāga is much concerned with the problem of how to formulate each member of a proof, especially, that of 'example' (*dṛṣtānta*). In PS IV.1 he states as follows:

"It has been said that a valid reason (*hetu*) possesses the three characteristics (*trirūpa*). According to the convention (*rūḍhi*), however, it (i.e., reason) is established as a property of the topic of ι proposition (*pakṣadharma*) only.

_____

[8] See my article mentioned in the footnote 1.

[9] See PS II.21: *liṅge liṅgī bhavaty eva liṅginy evetarat punaḥ / niyamasya viparyāse 'sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ //* Quoted in *Hetubinduṭīkā* of Arcaṭa (ed. by Sanghavi, Baroda: 19xx) 18.

The reamining two characteristics [of a valid reason] are [to be] presented by an example[-statement] (*dṛṣṭānta*)."[10]

Here Dignāga seems to be criticizing some unsatisfactory formulation of a proof given by other Indian logicians of his time. In this conection, I suppose that he is presupposing, as for example, the following formulaiton:

[proposition]	"*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*"
[reason]	"*kṛtakatvāt*"
[example]	"*kṛtako ghaṭo 'nityo dṛṣṭaḥ*"
[application]	"*tathā ca kṛtakaḥ śabdaḥ*"
[conclusion]	"*tasmāt kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ*" [Proof 1]

According to Dignāga, the first characteristic of a valid reason, i.e., *pakṣadharmatva*, is implicitly stated in the statement of a reason of the above Proof 1 because the word '*śabdasya*' is understood there and the statement becomes "*śabdasya kṛtakatvāt*". The second and the third characteristics (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*), however, are not mentioned at all in the entire proof and they must be formulated in the statement of an example in a valid proof. Thus it is clear that in a proof of Dignāga, the statement of a reason expresses the first characteristic (*pakṣadharmatva*) and that the statement of an example expresses the second and the third characterisitcs (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*).

Furthermore, Dignaga states in PS IV.2 as follows:

"An example is that [object] in which a reason (*hetu*) is shown to be followed by a property to be proved (*sādhya*) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved; it is of two kinds: 'similar' (*sādharmya*) and another (i.e. 'dissimilar' *vaidharmya*).[11]

---

[10] *trirūpo hetur ity uktaṃ pakṣadharme tu saṃsthitaḥ / rūḍhe rūpadvayaṃ śeṣaṃ dṛṣṭāntena pradarśyate //* Quoted in VNṬ (88) with a variant reading.

[11] *sādhyenānugamo hetoḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāstitā / khyāpyate yatra dṛṣṭāntaḥ sa sādharmyetaro dvidhā //* = NMukh v. 11 説因宗所隨 宗無因不有 此二名譬喩 餘皆此相似 Quoted in

In this connection it is to be noted that Dignāga uses the same word *'dṛṣṭānta'* in two distinct meanings, viz. an object (*artha*) as an example for a proof in PS IV.2 and a statement (*vacana*) whch presents an example together with a general law (i.e., an inseparable relation or pervasion between a reason and a property to be proved) in PS IV.1. That is clear from his own comment that *'yatra'* in PS IV.2c refers to an object to be referred to (*abhidheya*).[12] Jinendrabuddhi justifies Dignāga's usage by means of 'superimposition of identity' (*abhedopacāra*) between the expression (*abhidhāna*) and the expressed (*abhidheya*). Thus the name *'dṛṣṭānta'*, which means an example-object (*artha*, i.e. *abhidheya*), is metaphorically applied to a statement of an example (*vacana*, i.e., *abhidhāna*).[13]

The *Nyāyasūtra* (= NS), on the other hand, distinguishes an example (*dṛṣṭānta*)' from exemplification (*udāharaṇa*), i.e., the third member (*avayava*) of their five-membered proof.[14] It may be a weak point in Dignāga's system of logic

Daśavaikālikasūtrahāribhadrīvṛrri 34B mentioned in Jambuvijaya (1966 Appendix: 133); cf. NMukh v. 4 = PS III.15 mentioned in footnote 23.

[12] PSV[K] 148a7: *gang la zhes brjod par bya ba la thams cad la 'gro ba ni rjes su 'gro ba'o // PSV[V] D60a4: rjes su 'gro ba thams cad du 'gro 'o // gang zhes pa ni brjod par bya'o //* (*sarvatra gamo 'nugamaḥ / yatreti abhidheye /*)

[13] PST D212b2-4: *de'i phyir de'i don du dpe brjod par bya ba'o zhes pa dang / dpe yis rab tu gsal bar byed // ces kyang ngo // rjod par byed pa dang brjod par bya ba dag tha mi dad par nye bar btags pa la 'di skad ces brjod do // gzhan du na gang la zhes pa brjod par bya ba la zhes pa'i tshig las don kho na dpe nyid de / don gyis gsal bar byed pa yang ma yin no zhes pas 'di mi rigs par 'gyur ro // de'i phyir tha mi dad pa nye bar btags pa las dpe rjod par byed pa'i ngang tshul can gyi tshig ni 'dir dpe'i sgras brjod do //* (*atas tadartham dṛṣṭānta ucyatām iti dṛṣṭāntena prakāśyata iti ca / abhidhānābhidheyayor abhedopacārād evam uktam / anyathā yatrety abhidheya iti vacanād arthasyaiva dṛṣṭāntatā / na cārthena prakāśyata ity ayuktam etat syāt / tasmād abhedopacārād dṛṣṭāntābhidhāyivacanam atra dṛṣṭāntaśabadenoktam /*)

PST D213a1-2: *gang la zhes pa brjod par bya ba la zhes pa 'dis don dpe nyid gsungs so // tshig ni de'i rjod par byed pa nyid kyi phyir nye bar btags pa'i dpe'o // 'di yang / dpe yis rab tu bstan par bya // zhes pa 'dis sngar nyid rig par byas zin to //* (*yatrety abhidheya ity anenārthasya dṛṣṭāntatām āha / vacanam tu tadabhidhāyitvād upacāreṇa dṛṣṭāntaḥ / etac ca dṛṣṭāntena pradarśyata ity anena prāg evaveditam /*)

[14] See NS 1.1.25: *laukikaparīkṣakāṇām yasminn arthe buddhisāmyam sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ //*, and NS1.1.36: *sādhyasādharmyāt . taddharmabhāvī dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam //* Uddyotakara certainly notices this distinction. See NV ad NS1.1.36: *nanu ca karaṇakārakaparigrahāt vacanam udāharaṇam, dṛṣṭāntaś cārthaḥ; na cānayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam yujayte, na hi viṣāṇādimad ity abhidhānam gavā samānādhikaraṇam bahvati / naiṣa doṣaḥ, vacanaviśeṣaṇatvena dṛṣṭāntasyopādānāt, na svatantro dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam / ......* For details, see Prets's article in this volume.

that he uses one and the same technical term in more than one meanings. For example, he applies *'paksa'* to both a content of a proposition to be proved and a statement of such a proposition in a proof formulation; the latter (i.e., the first member of a proof) is called *'pratijñā'* in NS.

It is to be noted in passing that Dignāga clearly states that the main purpose of an example-statement is to indicate an external object (*bāhyārtha*) as an example.[15] This seems to suggest that as long as he is discussing logic and epistemology, he is assuming external reality. Furthermore, it is most likely Dignāga who classified examples into two types and named them accordingly; i.e., 'a similar example' (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) and 'a dissimilar example' (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*). His convention was generally followed by Indian logicians after him.

2.1.   Now let us see how Dignāga formulates his example-statement. He seems to assume the following formulation as a valid proof:

[proposition] *"anityaḥ śabdaḥ"*

[reason]   *"prayatnānatarīyakatvāt"*

[similar ex.]   *"yat prayatnānantarīyakam tad anityam dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭaḥ"*

[dissimilar ex.] *"(yan) nityam (tad) aprayatnānantarīyakam dṛṣṭam yathākāśam"*   [Proof 2][16]

When we compare the two Proofs quoted above, it is clear that the difference lies in the statement of an example (*dṛṣṭānta*), besides the absence of the statements of application and conclusion in Proof 2. Proof 1 simply refers to an object, i.e., a pot, which is both 'produced' (*kṛtaka*) and 'non-eternal', in other words, possesses both a proving property (*sādhanadharma/hetu*)and a property to

---

[15] PSV[K] 148b6: *phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no (bāhyārtha-pradarśanam hi nidarśye pradhānam).*

[16] PSV[K] 148a7-8: *re zhig chos mthun pas ni sgra mi rtag ste rtsol ba las byung ba'i phyir ro // gang rtsol ba las byung ba de ni mi rtag par mthong ste dper na bum pa bzhin zhes bya ba dang / chos mi mthun pas rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin par mthong ste nam mkha' bzhin zhes bya ba lta bu'o // (sādharmyeṇa tāvad anityaḥ śabdaḥ prayatnāntarīyakatvāt / yad dhi prayatnānatrīyakam tad anityam dṛṣṭam yathā ghaṭa iti / vaidharmyeṇa nityam aprayatnānatrīyakam dṛṣṭam yathākāśam iti /)*

be proved (*sādhyadharma*). As Dignāga criticizes, it does not mention any relation (*sambandha*) between the two properties. Proof 2, on the other hand, mentions such a relation; namely "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-eternal" (or whatever is P is Q) in a similar example and "Whatever is eternal (i.e., not non-eternal) is not produced by a human effort" (or whatever is not Q is not P) in a dissimilar example. It is to be noted that those two statements are logically equivalent because they are in contraposition. In any case an example-statement of Dignāga, whether similar or dissimilar, expresses the relation of pervasion (*vyāpti*) of a proving property by a property to be proven.[17]

We should not ignore the fact that the word '*dṛṣṭa*' (observed) qualifies those apparently universal relations mentioned in the example-statements of Proof 2, so that they amount to mean: It is observed that whatever is P is Q , or it is observed that whatever is not Q is not P. This suggests that Dignāga's statement of pervasion does not neccessary imply a universal law but a general law derived from our observations or experiences; in other words, it is a kind of hypothetical proposition derived by induction.[18] In order to justify such an inductive process

---

[17] Pakṣilasvāmin/Vātsyāyana, who must have been active before Dignāga, gives the two parallel proofs which he seems to regard as independent, though both prove the same proposition by the same reason. Dignāga appears to have incorporated the two proofs into one by adopting both similar and dissimilar examples in one proof. See Prets's article in this volume. Nyāyabhāṣya ad NS 1.1.39:

[proposition]	"*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*"	
[reason]	"*utpattidharmakatvāt*"	
[exemplification]	"*utpattidharmakaṃ sthālyādi dravyaṃ nityaṃ dṛṣṭam*"	
[application]	"*na ca tathānutpattidharmakaḥ śabdaḥ, kiṃ tarhi utpattidharmakaḥ*"	
[conclusion]	"*tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ*"	[Proof a]

[proposition]	"*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*"	
[reason]	"*utpattidharmakatvāt*"	
[exemplification]	" *anutpattidharmakam ātmādi dravyam anityam* "	
[application]	"*tathā cotpattidharmakaḥ śabdaḥ*"	
[conclusion]	"*tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ*"	[Proof b]

[18] I would like to suggest an etymology of the word *dṛṣṭānta*, which is 'the end' or the culminating point (*anta*) of 'observation' (*dṛṣṭa*). It fits well with the inductive nature of Indian

Dignāga needed to present both positive and negative examples in one set of a proof. Thus, I think, Dignāga's presentation of example-statements clearly indicate the inductive nature of his logic.

2.2. Now let us go back to PS IV.2: "An example is that [object] in which a reason (*hetu*) is shown to be followed by a property to be proved (*sādhya*) or to be absent in the absence of a property to be proved." This contains Dignāga's suggestion of how to formulate similar and dissimilar examples. Namely, a similar example should be formulated by a reason being followed by a property to be proved (*hetoḥ sādhyena anugamaḥ*), and a dissimilar example by a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve hetos nāstitā*). Their formulations may be called *anvaya* (continued presence) and *vyatireka* (continued absence) respectively , for they can be put into the following formulae:

"When a reason (P) is present, a property to be proved (Q) is present."

"When a property to be proved (Q) is absent, a reason (P) is absent."

Since P is a reason and Q is a property to be proved by that reason, you can rephrase and symbolize the above formulae in the following manner:

If x is P, then x is Q.	$Px \supset Qx$
If x is not Q, then x is not P.	$-Qx \supset -Px$

Let us compare the above formulae with *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the *trairūpya* formulae. PS II.5cd reads:" [A valid inferential mark (*liṅga*)'s presence in what is similar to the [object to be inferred] and its absence in the absence [of the property to be inferred)" ([*liṅgasya*] *tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati*).[19] If we assume that 'what is similar to the object to be inferred (*anumeya*)' and 'the absence of the property to be inferred' in PS II.5cd respectively correspond to the traditional concepts of a set of similar examples (*sapakṣa*) and that of dissimilar logic.

[19] For a detailed discussion of the *trairūpya* formulae of Dignāga, please see my article mentioned in the footnote 1.

ones (*asapakṣa/vipakṣa*), they can be reformulated in the following manner:

"When a property to be proved (Q) is present, an inferential mark (P) is present."

"When a property to be proved (Q) is not present, an inferential mark (P) is not present."

(N.B.: an inferential mark is equivalent to a reason of a proof.)

When we compare them with the formulae of the two examples mentioned above, the difference lies in *anvaya* formula; namely, the order of P and Q are reversed. As a matter of fact, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* of *trairūpya*, rather than those of the examples, represents more orthodox formulation of 'Indian Principle of Inductive Reasoning' named by George Cardona: X → Y and -X → -Y.

anvaya and *vyatireka* of the *trairūpya* formulae show how a valid inferential mark is distributed in our Induction Domain (*a la* Richard Hayes) consisting of a set of similar examples and that of dissimilar examples. If P is found in the domain of Q and not in the domain of -Q, we can assume a certain relation between P and Q. For example, P (e.g., smoke) is a result of Q (e.g., a fire). In the case of *trairūpya*, P is discovered to be a valid logical mark (*liṅga*) of a property to be proved, Q. In this connection, following Vasubandhu's lead, Dignāga considered that a valid mark/reason (P) is inseparably related (*nāntarīyaka/avinābhāvin*) to a property to be proved (Q). In other words, in order to be a valid mark/reason, the domain of P should be restricted to and included in the domain of Q. He named such a relation 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*) of P by Q and successfully formulated it by introducing the restrictive particle *eva* into the formulae of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the following manner:

"Only (*eva*) when a property to be proved (Q) is present, an inferential mark (P) is present."

"When a property to be proved (Q) is not present, an inferential mark (P) is never (*naiva*) present."

It is to be noted that the above formulae present not a logical but ontological

relation between two items P and Q, though we can easily derive from such a relation a kind of general law that whatever is P is Q. The puropse of Dignāga's example statements is precisely to formulate such a general law; that is why the order of P and Q is reversed there in order to present it in a logically proper way. In order to avoid a confusion, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* expressed in the two examples are by later authors called *anvaya-vyāpti* (a positive pervasion) and *vyatireka-vyāpti* (a negative pervasion) respectively.

It is to be noted in passing that Dignāga does not give any argument for justifying the introduction of *eva* restriction; in other words, he never tried to justify the very foundation of his theory of *vyāpti*. Consdiering Dignāga's allusion to *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in PSV chapter V, I am inclined to think that he proposed *vyāpti* ora general law solely on the basis that no counter-example is so far observed (*adarśanamātreṇa*) in the domain of dissimilar examples.[20] It suggests the hypothetical nature of deductive part of Dignāga's logic.

2.3. Let us see again how Dignāga actually formulates a logical relation or *vyāpti* in the example statements of Proof 2.

[similar ex.] "*yat prayatnānantarīyakaṃ tad anityaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathā ghaṭaḥ*"

[dissimilar ex.]"*yan nityam tad aprayatnānantarīyakaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ yathākāsam*"

It is clear that he uses the relative pronouns *yad* and *tad* in order to express a kind of universal relation: Whatever is P is Q, or whatever is not Q is not P. He also indicates that the same relation can be expressed by inserting the restrictive particle *eva* in an appropriate place.[21] For example,

[similar ex.] "*anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakaṃ yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca*"

[dissimilar ex.]"*aprayatnānantarīyakam eva nityaṃ yathākāsam*"

In this context the restrictive particle *eva* is behaving almost like a 'universal

---

[20] Please see my article.

[21] See PSV[K] 148b8-149a3, which is to be discussed later.

quantifier'. Generally speaking, Dignāga admits the following two ways in order to express a logical relation or *vyāpti* in Sanskrit:

(1) *yad* P *tad* Q /   &   *yad* -Q *tad* -P /

(2) Q *eva* P /   &   -P *eva* -Q /

    Dignāga is very much concerned with the problem of how to formulate a logical proof in a proper way. We can now present his formulation in a formal manner. 'a' stands for a topic of a proposition (*pakṣa*) or an object of inference (*anumeya*); P stands for a proving property (*sādhana-dharma*), a reason (*hetu*), or an inferential mark (*liṅga*); Q stands for a property to be proved (*sādhya-dharma*); s stands for a similar example (*sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) or a member of a set of similar examples (*sapakṣa*); and v stands for a dissimiar example (*vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta*) or a member of a set of dissimilar examples (*vipakṣa*). It is to be noted that in Dignāga's system of logic a, being a topic under examination,.is not a part of our Induction Domain which consists of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Furthermore, the underlying structure of an Indian proof statement is: "A property-possessor (*dharmin*) a possesses a property (*dharma*) P"; the notion of 'possession' is expressed by the Genitive or the Locative case ending or by the suffixes of possession, i.e., -*mat* and -*vat*, or even by the convention of elision of those suffixes (*matup-lopa*).

[proposition] "a possesses Q."

[reason]   "Because a possesses P."

[similar ex.]   "It is observed that whatever possesses P possesses Q as e.g. s."

[dissimilar ex.] "It is observed that whatever does not possess Q does not possess P as e.g. v."

    We can somehow translate the above formulae into the following standard symbolism but it is impossible to convey the sense of 'it is observed that ...' without introducing some device of Modal Logic:

[proposition] Qa

[reason]   Pa

[similar ex.]   (x)(Px ⊃ Qx) & (Ex)(Px & Qx) & (x ≠ a)

[dissimilar ex.] (x)(-Qx ⊃ -Px) & (Ex)(-Px & -Qx) & (x ≠ a)

Based on his conviction that a valid proof should be formulated in the way discussed above, Dignāga criticizes what he regards as the wrong formulations of a proof given by rival schools. For example, he picks up the following anonymous proof:[22]

[proposition] *"nityaḥ śabdaḥ"* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason]   *"sarvasya anityatvāt"* (Because everything is non-eternal.)

[Proof 3]

On the first sight, the proposition and the reason of Proof 5 appear to be incompatible with each other (*viruddha*). However, if you take into an account that the topic of a proposition is not included in our Induction Domain in the traditional Indian logic, Proof 5 makes sense by interpreting its reason in the sense that everything except for sound (i.e., the topic of the proposition) is non-eternal. In this connection, Dignāga points out that the reason of Proof 5 does not really express the reason but actually expresses the dissimilar example. Then he proposes the following formulation:

[proposition] *"nityaḥ śabdaḥ"* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason]   *" (śabdasya) asarvatvāt "* (Because sound is not everything.)

[dissimilar ex.] *"sarvam anityam yathā ghaṭaḥ"* (Everything is non-eternal as
              e.g. a pot.)   [Proof 4]

Having criticized the above reason from various points of view, Dingāga

---

[22] NMukh §1.4, Katsura (197x: xx) . and PS III. 6: *hetupratijñāvyāghāte pratijñādoṣa ity asat / sa hi dṛṣṭānta evôkto vaidharmyeṇâsuśikṣitaiḥ* // Quoted in PVA: 563; and PSV ad PS III.6.

proposes to re-formulate the dissimilar example, by following the basic structure discussed above; namely, the absence of a property to be proved (i.e. *nityatva*) should be followed by the absence of a reason (*asarvatva*). Thus, we obtain the following formulation:

[proposition] *"nityaḥ śabdaḥ"* (Sound is eternal.)

[reason] *" (śabdasya) asarvatvāt "* (Because sound is not everything.)

[dissimilar ex.] *" yad anityam tat sarvam yathā ghaṭaḥ"* (Whatever is not eternal is everyhting as e.g. a pot.) [Proof 5]

Further Dignāga criticizes the formulation of the folloowing proof:[23]

[proposition] *"anityaḥ śabdaḥ"/*

[reason] *"kṛtakasya anityatvāt, nityasya akṛtakatvāc ca"* [Proof 6]

According to Dignāga, this apparently correct proof should be re-formulated, for the two reasons mentioned in Proof 6 actually represent the similar and dissimilar examples. Thus we obtain the following formulation:

[proposition] *"anityaḥ śabdaḥ"*

[reason] *"kṛtakatvāt"*

[similar ex.] *"yat kṛtakam tad anityam, yathā ghaṭaḥ"*

[dissimilar ex.] *"yan nityam tad akṛtakam, yathākāśam"* [Proof 7]

Unlike Dignāga's theory of pervasion (*vyāpti*) which was accepted by the post-Dignāga Indian logicians on the whole, whether they were Buddhist or not, Dignāga's rigid formulation of a logical proof does not seem to have gained much popularity. Most non-Buddhist logicians sticked to the traditional five-membered

---

[23] NMukh §2.8, Katsura (19xx:xx). NMukh v. 4: （説因宗所随　宗無因不有　依第五顕喩 由合故知因） =PS III. 15:*hetoḥ sādhyānvayo yatrâbhāve 'bhāvś ca kathyate /pañcamyā(m) dṛṣṭānto hetus tûpanayān mataḥ //* (Quoted in PVA: 647; Cf. VNṬ: 82)

proof fromulation, while Dharmakīrti, as is well known, adopted a new proof formulation which consists of the statements of pervsion (*vyāpti*) and a reason's being a property of the topic of a proposition (*pakṣadharmatā*) and which was adopted by the post-Dharmakīrti Buddhist logicians. Here is a sample of Dharmakīrti's formulation.

[*vyāpti*]	"*yat sat kṛtakaṃ vā, tat sarvam anityam, yathā ghaṭādiḥ*"	
[*pakṣadharmatā*]	"*san kṛtako vā śabda*"[24]	[Proof 8]

3. In PS IV.3 and its Vṛtti Dignāga tries to characterize the two examples by similarity (*sādharmya*) and dissimilarity (*vaidharmya*) or by implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) and simple negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*).

> "In [the presence of] a proving property (*sādhana*, i.e. a reason) a property to be proved (*sādhya*) should be presented affimatively and [a reason should be shown to be] absent when a property to be proved is absent. Such being a case, an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*) [of a similar example] and a simple negation (*niṣedha*) [of a dissimilar example] are of different characteristics."[25]

The first half of the verse repeats the same formulation of the two examples, i.e., *annvaya* and *vyatireka*, as presented in PS IV.2. When Dignāga refers to the two kinds of negation in the second half, he must have in his mind the two kinds of examples in Proof 2 quoted above and the negative phrases, such as '*a-nityam*' in the similar example and '*na anityam*', which is actually expressed as '*nityam*' by considering the double negation, in the dissimilar example. According to Dignāga, the negative particle '*a-*' of '*a-nityam*' (non-etenal) in the similar example should be interpreted as an implicative negation (*paryudāsa*), so that the negation of eternal things (*nitya*) implies/affirms the existence of non-eternal (*anitya*) things. The negative particle (*na*) of '*na anityam*' (not non-etenal, i.e., eternal) in the

---

[24] *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti, ed. by M.T. Much, Vienna, 19xx: 1.

[25] PS[K] IV.3: *bsgrub bya bsgrub las sgrub pa yis // bstan bya bsgrub bya med la med // de lta yin na ma yin par // dgag pa mthsan nyid mi mthun no // (vidhinā sādhane sādhyaṃ khyāpyaṃ sādhye 'sati tv asat / evaṃ sati paryudāso niṣedhaś ca vilakṣaṇau //)* PSV[K] 148a8-b3; PSV[V] D60a6-7; Kitagawa (19xx: 514-5).

dissimilar example, on the other hand, should be interpreted as a simple negation (*prasajyapratiṣedha*), so that the negation of non-eternal things does not imply/affirm the existence of eternal things, such as ether (*ākāśa*).

Thus Dignāga concludes that the dissimilare example of Proof 2 is meaningful even for those who do not acknowledge the existence of eternal things, such as the Sautrāntikas.[26] This implies that for Dignāga the dissimilar example does not necessarily need an objective support in reality, provided that there is an objective support for the similar example.

3.1. A question arises: Why the two examples are formulated in the way explained in PS IV.2 and 3? In other words, if a similar example is formulated by "A reason is followed by a property to be proved (*hetoḥ sādhyenānugamaḥ*)" or "Px ⊃ Qx", why a dissimilar example is formulated by "In the absence of a property to be proved a reson is absent (*sādhyābhāve hetor nāstitā*)" or "-Qx ⊃ -Px", not by "In the absence of a reason, a property to be proved is absents (*hetvabhāve sādhyasya nāstitā*) or "-Px ⊃ -Qx"? It is apparent that the law of contraposition was not known to the opponents and it is perhaps Dignāga who for the first time among Indian logicians came to realize that such a law should be applied to the formulations of similar and dissimilar examples; unfortunately, however, he does not give either name or definition of such a law.

In any case Dignāga answers to the above question: Only in that way, not in the reversed way (*na viparyayāt*), we can show that a reason under consideration possesses 'the second and the third characteritics of a valid reason; namely, "A reason's presence in a set of similar instances only (*hetoḥ sapakṣa eva sattvam*)" and "Its definite absence in the absence of a property to be proved (*sādhyabhāve cāsattvam eva*)".[27] Here again we see the definitive role played by the restrictive

---

[26] PSV[K] 148b2-3: *de lta na snga ma la ni ma yin pa yin la phyi ma la ni med par dgag pa yin no zhes smras pa yin no // de ltar na rtag pa khas ma blangs kyang chos mi mthun pa'i dpe grub pa yin no //* (*evaṃ ca pūrvatra paryudāsaḥ uttaratra tu prasajyapratiṣedha ity uktaḥ / evaṃ ca nityānabhyupagamasyāpi vaidharmaydṛṣṭāntaḥ siddhaḥ*) Cf. Kitagawa (19   )

[27] PSV [K] 148b3-4: *gal te gcig la ni gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro bar bshad la / gnyis pa la ni bsgrub bya med na gtan tshigs med pa yin gyi gtan tshigs med na bsgrub bya med pa ma yin no zhes bya ba la rgyu ci zhig yod ce na / de lta na gtan tshigs mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod pa dang / bsgrub bya med pa la med pa nyid bstan par nus pa yin gyi bzlog pas ni ma yin no //* (*kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam ekatra sādhyānugamo hetoḥ ukto dvitīye tu sādhyābhāve hetor nāstitā, na hetvabhāve sādhyasya nāstiteti / evaṃ hi hetoḥ sapakṣa eva sattvaṃ sādhyābhāve cāsattvam*

particle *eva* to equate the *trairūpya* formulae with the formulation of the two examples.

An objection arises: In that case an actual object like a pot cannot be regarded as a part of an example formulation because with reference to an actual object we see that a reason is followed by a property to be proved and *vice versa*.

Dignāga rejects that objection: Just as in the statement of a reason a particular property, such as 'being a product', is not intended, similarly in the statement of an example a particular object, such as a pot, is not meant to be followed by a property to be proved, such as 'non-eternity'; thus, the objection is irrelevant. Further, he states that the main purpose of referring to a particular object like a pot is to indicate some positive support in the external reality.[28]

3.2.   In PS IV.4 Dignāga points out what kind of undesirable consequences result if, as suggested by the above question, both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated in the same manner; namely, "Px ⊃ Qx" and "-Px ⊃ -Qx" or "Qx ⊃ Px" and "-Qx ⊃ -Px".

> "In this connection, if [both similar and dissimilar examples are formulated] in the same way of concomitance, even if unmentioned [as a property to be proved], 'eternnity' (*nityatā*) would be proved (*kṛta*) by means of a property of 'not being a product' (*akṛtakatva*), and a property of being a result (*kāryatā*, i.e., a product) by means of a property of 'cessation' (*nāśitva*, i.e., non-eternity); and [that which does] not pervade [the domain of a property to be proved] would not be accepted [as a valid reason]."[29]

eva śakyaṃ darśayituṃ na viparyayāt /) The latter half is quoted in VNṬ 8. Cf. PSV [V] D60a7-b1; Kitagawa (19   )

[28] PSV[K] 148b4-6: 'on te de ltar na bum pa dper mi bya ste / de la ni ci ltar gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba de bzhin du / bsgrub bya yang gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba yin no zhe na /ma yin te byas pa'i khyad par gtan tshigs su brjod par 'dod pa ma yin pa bzhin du bum pa la bsgrub bya rjes su 'gor ba brjod pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro // phyi rol gyi don la bstan pa ni dpe la gtso bo yin no // (evaṃ tarhi ghaṭo 'nudāharaṃm / tatra hi yathā hetoḥ sādhyœānuugamas tathā sādhyasyāpi hetvanugama iti cet / na, kṛtakatvaviśeṣo 'vivakṣitahetur iva ghaṭe sādhyānugamasyāvivakṣitatvāt / bāhyārthapradarśanaṃ hi nidarśye pradhānam /) Cf. PSV[V] D60b1-3; Kitagawa (19   ).

[29] nityatākṛtakatvena, nāśitvād vā'tra kāryatā / syād anuktā kṛtāvyāpiny aniṣṭaṃ ca samānvaye // Quoted in VNṬ: 8 with variant readings. =NMukh v.12: 應以非作證其常 或以無常成 所作 若爾應成非所説 不遍非樂等合離.

He presupposes the following proof formulae which corresponds to Hetucakra No. 2:

[proposition] *"anityaḥ śabdaḥ"*

[reason] *"kṛtakatvāt"*

[similar ex.] *"yat kṛtakaṃ tad anityam yathā ghaṭaḥ"*

[dissimilar ex.] *"yan nityaṃ tad akṛtakaṃ yathākāśam"* [Proof 8]

Dignāga points out that if the dissimilar example of Proof 8 were formulated in the reversed way as *"yad akṛtatakaṃ tan nityam"* , then instead of 'non-eternity' (*anityatā*) 'eternity' would be proved by the property of 'not being a product', which is absurd. If, on the other hand, the similar example were formulated in the reversed way as *"yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam"*, then instead of 'non-eternity' a property of 'being a product' would be proved by 'non-eternity', which is absurd.[30]

Then he examines Hetucakra No. 8 whose 'reason' (*hetu*) does not pervade the whole domain of a property to be proved or the set of similar instances (*sapakṣa*) unlike in the above case. It runs as follows:

[proposition] *"anityaḥ śabdaḥ"*

[reason] *"prayatnānantarīyakatvāt"*

[similar ex.] *"yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca"*

[dissimilar ex.] *"yathākāśam"* [Proof 9]

Dignāga sees the problems if two examples are not properly formulated. If a similar example is formulated as "Whatever is no-eternal is produced by a human effort" (*anityaṃ prayatnānantarīyakam eva*) and a dissimilar example as

---

[30] PSV[K] 148b7-8: *gal te chos mthun pa'i dbang gis gang ma byas pa de rtag go zhes brjod na / ma byas pa'i phyir dam ma bcas pa nyid kyi rtag pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro // ci ste chos mi mthun pa'i dbang gis gang <mi> rtag pa de ni bya ba'o zhes de ltar yang brjod na mi rtag pa'i phyir byas pa bsgrub par 'gyur ro //* (*yadi sādharmyavaśena yad akṛtakaṃ tad anityam ity ucyate/akṛtakatvenāpratijñātam eva nityatvaṃ sādhitaṃ syāt / atha viadharmyavaśena yad anityaṃ tat kṛtakam ity evam apy ucyate / anityatvena kṛtakatvaṃ sadhitaṃ syāt /)* Cf. PSV {V] D 60b3-4; Kitagawa (19).

"Whatever is not produced by a human effort is eternal" (*aprayatnānantarīyakaṃ nityam eva*), then one of the similar examples, i.e., lightening (*vidyut*), which is non-eternal but not produced by a human effort, should be regarded as eternal as well as being produced by a human effort, which is absurd. In order to avoid such an absurd consequence, Dingāga suggests the following formulation:[31]

[proposition]   "*anityaḥ śabdaḥ*"

[reason]   "*prayatnānantarīyakatvāt*"

[similar ex.]   "*anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam, yathā ghaṭo vidyuc ca*"

[dissimilar ex.]   "*aprayatnānantarīyakaṃ eva nityam, yathākāśam*" [Proof 10]

There may arise an objection: If the domain of a reason should be restricted to the domain of a property to be proved as in Hetucakra No. 8 (=Proof 10), then the other type of reason (in Hetucakra No. 2=Proof 8), whose domain is co-extensive with that of a property to be proved, would not be a proper reason because there is no restriction of a reason (*hetvavadhāraṇa*). Dignāga answers by saying that the restriction (*avadhāraṇa*) is made in accordance with a speaker's intention (*vaktrabhiprāyavaśāt*); in other words, a speaker chooses which property to be restricted, so that it can become a reason. So in Hetucakra No. 2, not a property of being non-eternal (*anityatva*) but a propety of being a product (*kṛtakatva*) is chosen to be restricted as a proper reason, though their domains are theoretically co-extensive.[32]

---

[31] PSV[K] 148b8-149a3: *ma khyab pa la yang rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyi gtan tshigs la nyes pa 'di yod de / glog la sogs pa rnams rtag pa nyid dang / rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyi nyes pa yod do // rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin pa ni rtag pa nyid yin la mi rtag pa yang rtsol ba las byung ba nyid yin no zhes gal te de ltar nges par gzung na skyon 'dir 'gyur ba yin na / gang gi tshe rtsol ba las byung ba ma yin pa nyid ni rtag ces nges par gzung ba yin gyi / rtsol ba las byung ba'o zhes ma yin pa de'i tshe nyes pa med pa yin te / de ltar na rtag pa ni rtsol ba las byung ba la med par brjod pa yin no // de bzhin du mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba las zhes bya ba* (*avyāpiny api prayatnānantarīyakatve hetāv asty ayaṃ doṣaḥ / vidyudādīnāṃ nityatvaṃ prayatnānantarīyakatvaṃ ca prasajyata iti doṣo 'sti / asty ayaṃ doṣaḥ yady evam avadhāryeta aprayatnānatarīyakam nityam evety anityaṃ ca prayatnānantarīyakam eveti / yadā tv evam avadhāryate aprayatnnānantarīyakam eva nityṃ na prayatnānatīyakam iti tadā nāsti kaścid doṣaḥ / evaṃ nityatvasya prayatnānatarīyake abhāva ukto bhavati / tathā anityam eva prayatnānatarīyakam iti /*) Cf. PSV[V] D60b3-5); Kitagawa (19).

[32] PSV[K] 149a3-4: *'dir / gal te yang gtan tshigs nges par gzung ba'i phyir don gzhan med par 'gyur ba ; de lta na brjod pa po'i bsam pa'i dbang gis nges par bzung ba'i phyir* </>

Another objection: Just as non-eternity is inferred from the absence of a property of being produced by a human effort (i.e., a reason) in eternal things (i.e., a set of dissimilar instances), similarly a property of not being produced by a human effort can be inferred from the absence of eternity in those which are produced by a human effort, which is absurd because the uninteded proposition would be proved as a result. Dingāga points out that in order to avoid such a confusion we should formulate a dissimilar example in the form of absense of a reason only (*eva*) in the absence of a property to be proved (*hetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāvaḥ*).[33]

4.   Enough for the proper formulation of example statements. Now Dignāga discusses an important topic of whether we really need both similar and dissimilar examples in one proof.

A question arises: If a dissimilar example is formulated by means of the absolute absence of a reason in the absence of a property to be porved (*sādhyābhāve hetor abhāva eva*), then there is no error at all in a similar example, such as "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-eternal" (*anityam eva prayatnānantarīyakam*), which implies that there is no need to formulate a similar example, as long as a dissimilar example is properly formulated.

To this Dignāga answers: If so, the notorious erroneous reason called 'unique and inconclusive' (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) would become a valid reason. For example, the following is an example of a proof based on the unique and incoclusive reason:

---

rtsol ba las byung ba nyid la rtag pa nyid med par brjod do zhe na / (*atra yady api hetvavadhāranāt hetvantarābhāvaḥ prāptaḥ / tathāpi vaktrabhiprāyavaśād avadhāranaṃ tasmat prayatnānantarīyakatvasyaiva nitye 'bhāva ucyate* /). No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).

[33] PSV[K] 149a4-6: *mi mthun pa bkod pa yin te / de lta na yin na ji ltar rtag pa la rtsol las byung ba med pa'i phyir mi rtag pa nyid rjes su dpog pa de bzhin du rtsol ba las byung ba <la> rtag pa nyid med pa'i phyir rtsol ba las ma byung ba rjes su dpog pa'i phyir dam ma bca' ba bsgrub pa de nyid yin no // de'i phyir gtan tshigs 'tho na bsgrub bya med pa la med par bstan par bya'o //* (*visamopanyāsaḥ / tathā hi yuthā nitye prayatnānantarīyakatvābhāvād anityatvānumānam evaṃ prayatnānantarīyake nityatvābhāvād aprayatnānantarīyakatvānumānaṃ iti tad evāpratijñātārthasādhanam / tasmād dhetor eva sādhyābhāve 'bhāva upadarśyaḥ* /) No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).

[proposition] *"nityaḥ śabdaḥ"* (Sound is eternal)

[reason]   *"śrāvaṇatvāt"* (Because it is audible)   [Proof 11]

Since the reason 'audibility' is the unique property of sound, topic of the proposition, it is regarded as 'unique' to or being not shared by both eternal and non-eternal things in the world with the exception of sound. Therefore, it is traditionally considered to be an inconclusive reason. Although it does not possess the second characteristic of a valid reason (*anvaya*), it certainly possesses the third charcteristic (*vyatireka*), for it is true that whatever is not eternal is not audible and there are many instances which are neither eternal nor audible, such as a pot. In fact we can formulate a dissimilar example for Proof 11, namely, "Whatever is not eternal is not audible as e.g. a pot" (*yad anityam tad aśrāvaṇam yathā ghaṭaḥ*), though we cannot formulate a similar example, namely, "Whatever is audible is eternal" (*yac chrāvaṇam tan nityam*), with an actual example. Now if, as the opponent argues, there is no need for a similar example as long as a dissimialr example is properly formulated, then we have a problem; namely, the unique and inconclusive reason, such as 'audibility', should be a valid reason, which is absurd.[34] In other words, in order to avoid such an undesirable consequence, we should formulate both similar and dissimlar examples properly.

The opponent counters: Usually we can deduce a similar example from a dissimilar example by means of 'implication' (*arthāpatti*); for example, from "Whatever is not non-eternal is not produced by a human effort" we obtain: "Whatever is produced by a human effort is non-eternal." However, it is not the case with a unique and inconclusive reason, for from "Whatever is not eternal is not audible" we cannot obtain "Whatever is audible is eternal" because there is nothing in the world which is both audible and non-eternal except for sound; in other words there is no external support.

Dignāga answers: We also admit that by means of implication (*arthāpatti*) we obtain both examples; or either one of the two examples can indicate both by

---

[34] PSV[K] 149a6-7: *'on te 'dir bsgrub bya med na med pa nyid nye bar bstan na /* <u>mi rtag</u> <u>pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o</u> *zhes bya ba 'di la nyes pa ci zhig yod ce na / dper na rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya ba yin te / mi rtag pa la med pa'i phyir thun mong ma yin pa yang rtag pa nyid la gtan tshigs su 'gyur ro //* (*atheha sādhyābhāve 'bhāva evopadarśitaḥ / anityam eva prayatnānatarīyakam iti atra hi na kaścid doṣa iti cet / yathā nityam eva śrāvaṇam, vinaśvare 'bhāvād asādhāraṇam api nityatve hetuḥ syāt /*) No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).

means of implication.[35] *Dignāga is still holding his position that the two examples are necessary, though they are not necessarily explicitly stated; either one of them can imply the other or both.*

So far Dignāga insisted on the necessity of a similar example beside a dissimilar example; now he argues for the necessity of a dissimilar example. An opponent points out: if 'pervasion' (*vyāpti*) is expressed in the form of a reason's being followed by a property to be proved (*hetoḥ sādhyānugamaḥ*), then it is not necessary to state its absence in the absence of a property to be proved (*sādhyābhāve nāstitā*); hence there is no necessity to formulate a dissimilar example. Please note very well that Dignāga uses the word 'pervasion' for the first time in a technical sense in this particular portion of PSV.[36]

The opponent further remarks that it may be meaningful to formulate a dissimilar example, provided that a mere existence of a reason in a set of similar instances (*sapakṣe hetoḥ sadbhāvamātram*) is intended by Dignāga in the formulation of a similar example; in that case, however, it is meaning less to refer to an external object as an actual example; consequently, 'pervasion' shoulde be expressed in a similar example.[37]

---

[35] PSV[K] 149a7-b1: *gal te nyes pa 'di med de dper na* <u>*mi rtag pa nyid ni rtsol ba las byung ba'o*</u> *zhes bya ba 'dir shugs kyis bsgrub bya <mi> rtag pa la sgrub pa rnyed pa nyid yin pa de ltar* <u>*rtag pa nyid ni mnyan par bya'o*</u> *zhes rtag pa la mnyan par bya ba nyid bstan par ni nus pa ma yin no zhe na / gal te shugs kyis gnyi ga rnyed pa yin na de kho bo cag mngon par 'dod pa nyid yin te shugs kyis sam gang yang rung bas gnyi ga rab tu bstan pa'i phyir ro* // (*naiṣa doṣah / yathānityam eva prayatnānantariyakam ity atra arthāpattyā sādhye 'nitye sādhanaṃ labdhaṃ bhavati, evam nityam eva śrāvanam iti nitye śrāvaṇatvam darśayituṃ na śakyata iti cet / yadi tarhy arthāpattyobhayaṃ labdham tad asmābhir anujñātam eva, arthāpattyā vā anyatareṇobhayapradarśanāt* //) The last phrase corresponds to NMukh (Katsura 19xx:) 或由義 准一能顯二, which is quoted in *Pramāṇavārttika-Svavṛtti* (ed. by Gnoli, Rome, 19xx): 18. No corresponding PS[V]; Cf. Kitagawa (19...).

[36] PSV[K] 149b1-2: *gal te* <u>*gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba khyab pa*</u> *rab tu bstan par bya ba yin na / de ni mi rtag pa las gzhan la med pa'i phyir* <u>*bsgrub bya med na med do*</u> *zhes brjod par mi bya ba dang /* (*yadi tu hetoḥ sādhyānugama vyāptiḥ darśitāḥ, tasyānityād anyatrābhāvāt, sadhyābhave ca nāstiteti na vaktavyam /*) Cf. PSV[V] D60b5-6: Kitagawa (19...).

[37] PSV[K] 149b2-4: *ci ste yod pa tsam yin na rtsol ba las byung ba nyid kyang med na bum pa'i <mi> rtag pa nyid kyang med pa'i phyir phyi rol gyi don la blots pa 'di ni dpe yin no // zhes brjod par mi bya'o zhes bya ba'i nyes pa 'di ni yod do* (*zhe na*)* / khyab pa nyid kyi gtang tshigs ni bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro bar brjoḥ par bya ste /* (*atha sadbhāvamātram, prayatnānararīyakatvenāpi ghaṭe 'nityatvasyāpy avinābhāvitvāt, bāhyārthāpekṣam idaṃ nidarśanam iti na vaktavyam ity asty eṣa doṣa iti / vyāptir eva hetoḥ sādhyānugamena vaktavyā /*) * *zhe na* should be deleted by following PST. Cf. PSV[V] D60b6; Kitagawa (19...).

In this conection, Dignāga seems to accept the opponent's criticism. Namely, he admits that when a pervasion is explicitly expressed in a similar example, a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved is shown by implication (*arthāpattyā*), which makes it unnecessary to formulate a dissimilar example. However, he also maintains that when two examples are to be formulated, a similar example shows a reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, while a dissimilar example shows a pervasion (*vyāpti*) in the form of a reason's absence in the absence of a property to be proved.[38] In any case, Dignāga seems to be conceding that it is not absolutely necessary to formulate both examples as long as the pervasion is expressed in one ot the two examples.

An objection arises: If it is enough for a similar example to state a reason's mere presence in a set of similar instances, then there is no need to define it in terms of a reason's being followed by a property to be proved (*sadhyenānugamo hetoḥ*) as in PS IV-2a. It is to be noted that '*anugama*' is equivalent of '*vyāpti*' in this context. To this Dignāga replies: The purpose of formulating a similar example in that way is to reject the reversed formulation, namely, a property to be proved being followed by a reason (*sādhyasya hetunānugamaḥ*).[39]

In order to justify the rejection of the reversed formulation, Dignāga presents a rather complicated argument. First he refers back to PS III.22 where he defined a valid reason (*hetu*).

"Of the [nine reasons mentioned in PS III.21=NMukh v.6][40] the valid reason is that which is either present [wholly] or in two ways [i.e., present and

---

[38] PSV[K] 149b4-5: *gnas skabs 'di la shugs nyid kyis bsgrub bya med pa la gtan tshigs med par bstan pa'i phyir chos mi mthun pa'i dpe sbyar bar mi bya'o // gang gi tshe dpe gnyi ga sbyar bar bya (149b5) ba de'i tshe mthun pa'i phyogs la yod pa tsam bstan par bya ba yin la / khyab pa ni bsgrub bya med na med pa ston pas yin no //* (*asyāṃ cāvasthāyām arthāpattyā sādhyābhāve hetor abhāvaḥ pradarśita iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭānto na prayoktavyaḥ / yadā tu dṛṣṭāntadvauaṃ prayoktavyaṃ tadā sapakṣe sanmātraṃ pradarśyam, vyāpteḥ sādhyābhāve 'bhāvena pradarśitatvāt /*) Cf. PSV[V] D60b6-61a1; Kitagawa (19...).

[39] PSV[K] 149b5-6: *'on te de ltar na gtan tshigs bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro ba ni chos mthun pas rab tu stan to zhes bya ba 'di brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhe na / 'di yang bsgrub bya gtan tshigs kyi rjes su 'gro ba bkag pa'i don du 'gyur ro //* (*na tarhi vaktavyam idaṃ hetoḥ sādhyānugamah sādharmyeṇa pradarśita iti / etat punaḥ sādhyasya hetunānugamapratiṣedhārtham syāt /*) Cf. PSV[V] D61a1; Kitagawa (19...).

[40] *prameyakṛtakānityakṛtaśrāvaṇayatnajāḥ / anityayatnajāsparśā nityatvādiṣu te nava //* (= 常無常勤勇 恒住堅牢性 非勤遷不變 由所量等九) Quoted in *Nyāyavārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā, loc. cit.*

absent] in the similar instances (*sajātīya*) and which is absent in the absence of the [similar instances]; the reversed is 'incompatible' (*viruddha*) [reason] and the rest is 'indeterminate' (*aniścita*) [reason]."[41]

As is well known, of the nine types of reasons in his Hetucakra, Dignāga accepts only two as valid reasons, namely, No. 2 'a property of being produced' (*kṛtakatva*) and No. 8 'a property of being produced by a human effort' (*yatnaja*). The difference between the two valid reasons lies in the fact that the former pervades the whole domain of similar instances (*sapakṣa*), while the latter is present only in part of it. He then points out that in order to include the latter under the valid reason, the second characteritic of a valid reason shoulde be restricted in the following manner: "It is present only in the similar instances" (*sajātīya eva san*). He also notes that the two example statements present the second and the third characteristics of a valid reason (*anvaya* & *vyatireka*), while the reason statement presént the first characterisitic, i.e., a reason's being a property of the topic of a proposition (*pakṣadharmatva*). [42]

Now by rejecting the reversed formulation of a similar example, Dingāga seems to think that a reason is properly restricted to the domain of a property to be proved and, consequently, that the second characteristic of a valid reason is shown by a similar example. Therefore, it is meaningful to formulate a similar example. The above remark has been made in order to include Hetucakra No. 8 as a valid reason, for the reversed formulation of a similar example is possible at least theoretically in the case of Hetucakra No. 2.

Dignāga admits that by restricting a reason to the similar instances (*sajātīya eva san*), one can assume the negation of its presence in the dissimilar instances (*vijātīye sattvam*), which may suggest that it is unnecesary to formulate a dissimilar

---

[41] *tatra yaḥ san sajātīye dvedhā(/dvidhā) cāsaṃs tadatyaye / sa hetur viparīto 'smād viruddho 'nyas tv aniścitaḥ / /*=NMukh v. 7(於同有及二 在異無是因 翻此名相違 所餘皆 不定) Quoted in *Nyāyavārttika-Tātparyaṭīkā* (ed. by A. Thakur, New Delhi, 1996): 247.

[42] PSV[K] 149b6-8: *'on te bkag pa ni don med pa yin te </ ma yin te /> mthun pa'i phyogs la yang rnam pa gnyis zhes brjod pa'i phyir ro // phyogs kyi chos ni gtan tshigs kyis brjod pa'i phyir 'dir ni gtan tshigs lhag ma bstan par bya ba yin te / de la gdon mi za bar rigs mthun pa kho na la yod zhes nges par gzung bar bya'o (zhe na) / (atha nārthas tatpratiṣedhe, na, san dvidhā ceti vacanāt / hetuśeṣaś cātra pradarśitavyaḥ pakṣadharmatvasya hetunaivoktatvāt / tatrāvaśyaṃ sajātīya eva sann ity avadhāryam eva /)* Cf. PSV[V] D61a1-2; Kitagawa (19...).