THE ROLE OF MEANINGS IN PĀÑINI'S GRAMMAR*

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ABSTRACT: In this paper an attempt is made to show that meanings play an essential role in Pāṇini's grammar. This role is then found to consist in their being the input of the grammar. This, when accepted, seems to have as consequence that Pāṇini's grammar cannot, as a rule, generate single words. The smallest utterance that can be produced is, in general, the sentence. This last statement must be qualified on account of the kāraka device used by Pāṇini.

1.1. Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī contains about four thousand sūtras. In more than one thousand of them there is a reference to the meaning of the grammatical elements introduced or discussed (Pandit, 1974: 181). Moreover, the Aṣṭādhyāyī is accompanied by a list of verbal roots, the Dhātu-pātha, the meanings of which are given throughout. In another paper (Bronkhorst, forthcoming) I have argued that there are reasons to think that those meaning indicating words were there from the beginning. And if they were not there, they were understood. In the same paper I also argued that in the list of nominal stems and other grammatical elements known as "Gaṇāpātha", meaning indicating words, though not expressed, are understood.

What role do those meanings play in the grammar? Three answers are conceivable: a. They play no, or almost no role in it. b. They are part of the output of the grammar; i.e. the grammar produces utterances together with an indication as to their meaning. c. They are the input of the grammar; i.e., on the basis of a meaning that is to be expressed, the grammar produces an appropriate utterance.

All the three possible answers are represented in the literature. As a rule they are presented as dogmatic assertions. The first view, that meanings play no, or virtually no, role in Pāṇini's grammar, is accepted by Roodbergen (1974: Introduction, p. ii), and also by Misra (1966: 110-1; see also 1966: 17-8). Thieme (1932: 236-7(524-5)) may be counted among those who assign a very subordinate role to meanings.

The second view, that the meanings of the utterances produced by the grammar are themselves part of the output, is most sparsely met with in the literature. It is found in Joshi (1969: 16-7), where he says about the rules on

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syntax that they "utilize the words provided by the wordproducing rules and offer ... semantic interpretation of the sentence." It may be noted that this statement is not about Pāṇini's grammar as a whole, but about the rules on syntax in the same.

The third view, that meanings are the input of Pāṇini's grammar, is clearly adopted by Buiskool (1939 : 16) where he states that "The task Pāṇini imposes upon himself, is to give as completely as possible a record of the language he intends to describe, in fixing accurately the sound-symbols that correspond to a (sic) particular psychological contents." Unfortunately, Buiskool specifies those psychological contents in a way that is incompatible with Pāṇini's grammar. The same point of view, but now restricted to certain parts of the grammar, is represented by Kiparsky and Staal (1969 : 84) and van Nooten (1969 : 244).

All the authors mentioned above, with only one exception, merely posit their view regarding the role of meanings in the Astādhyāyī. The exception is van Nooten, to whose arguments we shall pay attention is subsection 1.3, where more evidence from Pāṇini's grammar will be produced to show that possibility e is to be preferred to b. In 1.2 it will be shown that possibility a can be discarded. §2, finally, will deal with an important consequence of the outcome of §1.

1.2. It seems clear that interpretations of the Astādhyāyī that give meanings their share are to be preferred to interpretations that do not. I shall none the less mention two more reasons why we must accept that meanings play a very important role in Pāṇini's grammar. In both cases I shall be brief, referring the reader to the relevant literature for further details.

Joshi and Roodbergen (1973 : Introduction, pp. ii-iv) point out that P. 2.2.1-5 are superfluous in the sense that the forms to be derived with their help can also be obtained without them. The two authors conclude that the rules P.2.2.1-5 are in all probability later interpolations. Cardona (1977) objects to this conclusion, rightly I think. He shows that the forms for the formation of which P.2.2.1-3, 5 are used can be obtained without these rules, it is true, but they will then not express the same meanings. The choice is therefore between dropping rules from the Astādhyāyī and accepting the importance of meanings. Obviously our preference must go to the second alternative. (See also Cardona, 1976 : 159-60.)

Renou (1955 : 111-2) mentions a number of nipātana-sūtras which introduce ready-made forms that, Renou thinks, could very easily have been introduced analytically. One such ready-made form is ugrampaśya (P.3.2.37). The immediately preceding rule introduces asūryampasya, but analytically (P.3.2.36 : asūryātalātayor drṣitapoh). What Renou does not seem to notice is this. P.3.2.36 prescribes the affix khaś (anuvṛtti from rule 28) in the sense kartṛ. (P.3.4.67)
to the root *dris* when the *upapada* is *asūrya* and expresses the *karman* (*anuvṛtti* of *karmaṇī* from rule 22). In this way *asūryampaśya* comes to mean "who sees not the sun" (*sūryam na paśyanti*, as the *Kāśika* has it; not "one not seen by the sun", as Chattopadhyay (1967: 536) tells us. A similar derivation would ascribe to *ugrampaśya* the meaning "who sees (something) fierce", instead of "fierce-looking" which it really means. (This is the meaning Monier-Williams’ Dictionary ascribes to *ugrapaśya*. See also the *Nyāsa* on this rule (part II, p. 566): *ugrampaśyeti*/karmanī an iti prāpte dṛṣṭaḥ khas nipātyate/ and the *Padamāñjarī* on the same (part II, p. 566): *ugram paśyati/ti/kriyāviśeṣaṇam etat*) An analytic description of *ugrampaśya* would therefore require adjustment of meaning-conditions. Pāṇini saved himself that trouble by introducing *ugrampaśya* as a *nipātana*.

Renou further mentions *bhujja* and *nyubja* (P.7.3.61), and *prayāja* and *anuvṛja* (P.7.3.62). The fact that these words are given ready-made can again be explained by the circumstance that the special meanings of these terms could not easily be arrived at analytically. (Renou seems to admit this in the case of *prayāja* and *anuvṛja* when he says: "cités comme mots techniques, sans doute.") Further examples are discussed by Bhattacharya (1966: 107-8; 110-2). Bhattacharya (1966: 103) also quotes a verse (without mentioning its source), in which it is stated that the purpose of certain *nipātanas* is to specify meaning. It reads: *aprapteḥ praṇaḥ ca ṃpi praṃter vāraṇam eva ca/ adhiṅkārthavivakaḥ ca travam eva nipātanaḥ/[

This much suffices to show that meanings play an essential role in Pāṇini’s grammar. We therefore discard possibility a.

1.3. We are now faced with the remaining two possibilities. Either meanings are the input of Pāṇini’s grammar, or they are part of its output. In a way the two alternatives are diametrically opposed to each other. At the same time both do full justice to the meanings in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and its appendices. It is therefore hard to see how one could choose between them.

van Nooten (1969 : 244) made an attempt to prove that “meaning statements are on the whole not of the type: ‘element a means x’, but rather: ‘to express the notion x, use element a’. ” van Nooten’s procedure is to show that rules which introduce suffixes are arranged according to meaning, rather than according to the suffixes involved.

van Nooten’s attempt cannot but be deemed laudable. That the nature of the evidence he adduces does not make his arguments as compelling as one might wish, does not detract from this. Cardona’s (1976 : 186) comment, which says that “What van Nooten has tried to prove was well known before…”, is therefore extremely unfair. The question is not what scholars think, or think they know, but on what grounds they hold their beliefs. Before van Nooten they had no grounds whatever for the opinions they had regarding the role of meanings in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (or at any rate they never showed they had any); van Nooten tried to give them some.
There is a better reason than van Nooten's to accept that meanings are the input of Panini's grammar. It is based on the existence in the Astadhyayi of the so-called "one name section". This section covers the rules P.1.4.1. to 2.2.38 and begins in the following fashion:

P.1.4.1.  saka\v{r}a\v{r}ad ek\dha sam\j{\breve{\imath}}a  "Up to (the rule) P.2.2.38 (only) one name (is to be assigned.)"  P.1.4.2 vipratisedhe param k\acute{\text{a}}ryam  "In case of conflict (the rule) which follows (in the order in which the rules occur in this book) must be made (to take effect.)"  It is not our concern to determine whether P.1.4.2. exerts its influence in the whole of the Astadhyayi or in the section specified in P.1.4.1 only. Certain is that it exerts its influence in the "one name section".

I shall now discuss an example of the working of P.1.4.2, hereby following Cardona (1970 : 43-4). Take the sentence dhanu\d{\breve{s}}a vidhyati "He pierces with (arrows shot from) a bow." Here a bow is the instrument (kara\n{\breve{n}}a) of the action of piercing, if only indirectly, through the arrows. It is also the point from which (ap\d{\breve{\a}}\d{\breve{\d}}\d{\breve{n}}a) arrows are shot. The names "instrument" (kara\n{\breve{n}}a) and "point from which" (ap\d{\breve{\a}}\d{\breve{\d}}\d{\breve{n}}a) are given to the bow by P.1.4.42 (s\d{\breve{\a}}dhat\d{\breve{a}}tam\d{\breve{a}}m kara\n{\breve{n}}am) and P.1.4.24 (dhruvam ap\d{\breve{a}}ye\d{\breve{\d}}\d{\breve{n}}am) respectively. Both these rules lie in the "one name section." As a result of P.1.4.1 only one of the two names can be given to the bow. P.1.4.2 takes care that the bow is called only "instrument" (kara\n{\breve{n}}a), not "point from which" (ap\d{\breve{\a}}\d{\breve{\d}}\d{\breve{n}}a). Consequently only the sentence dhanu\d{\breve{s}}a vidhyati is produced (with the help of P.2.3.18) and not the incorrect sentence *dhanuso vidhyati (by P.2.3.28).

This example illustrates the working of P.1.4.2. But this illustration presupposes that meanings are the input of Panini's grammar. For suppose that the opposite is true, that meanings are part of the output of the grammar, accompanying the utterances produced by the same. In that case the sentence dhanu\d{\breve{s}}a vidhyati might be produced at one time or another, together with the information that the bow is the means par excellence (s\d{\breve{\a}}dhat\d{\breve{a}}tama) of piercing. But the information that this same bow is also a "point from which" would not in any way be conveyed. What is more, P.1.4.2 would not have any role to play in this derivation. The rules P.1.4.24 and P.1.4.42 cannot come in conflict as long as it is not known that our bow is to be both instrument and point from which, i.e. as long as we do not know what meanings are to be conveyed. Until then, indeed as long as we are waiting for those rules to supply us with this information, the rules apply in turn, thus producing both dhanu\d{\breve{s}}a vidhyati and the undesired *dhanuso vidhyati. Generalizing a bit, it can be said that the presence of rules which assign k\d{\breve{\a}}\d{\breve{\kappa}}aka names in the "one name section" cannot be explained, when we think that meanings are part of the output of Panini's grammar.

If, on the other hand, we assume that meanings are the input of Panini's grammar, the above example is not problematic in any way. In that case both the meanings "point from which" and "means par excellence" are part of
the input. As a result there is conflict between P.1.4.24 and P.1.4.42. The former of these two rules would assign the name aṇḍāna, the latter the name karatṭa. P.1.4.2 brings it about that P.1.4.42 wins. We note that the undesired sentence *dhamuso vidhyati is not produced, quite simply because no semantic input occurs in which a bow is merely the point from which, and not simultaneously means par excellence. This same circumstance, incidentally, prevents the grammar from producing sentences like vaṇṇinā siṅcati “he sprinkles with fire.”

More examples of the role of P.1.4.2 in the realm of the kārakas have been given by Cardona (1974 : 234-6). They all support the conclusion of this first section: Pāṇini’s grammar turns meanings into utterances.

2.1. The conclusion of §1 seems to have the following consequence: Pāṇini’s grammar does not, as a rule, produce single words; it produces, as a rule, larger utterances. The reason is that, as a rule, no meanings can be found which, by means of Pāṇini’s grammar, give rise to single words. The remainder of this section will support and specify these statements.

In what follows, I shall call “semantic elements” the meanings which are found, or understood, in the Aṣṭādhyāyī and its appendices. They will be printed between hooks (< >) where they occur. Our first task is to find out what semantic elements underlie the utterances which we are going to study. I write down the derivations in a way which is self-explanatory, and which shows which semantic elements play a role, and where.

First bhūyate, 3rd Sing. Pres. Pass. of the root bhū “be”:

1. bhū Dhp. I. 1 <sattā>
2. bhū — IAṬ 3.4.69 <bhāva>; 3.2.123 <vartamāna>
3. bhū — ta 3.4.78; 1.4.22 <eka>
4. bhū-yaK—ta 3.1.67
5. bhū-ya-te 3.4.79

The semantic elements which play a role in this derivation are <sattā>, (bhāva), <vartamāna> and <eka>. These semantic elements and bhūyate therefore belong together, the latter giving expression to the former. Nothing more than this set of semantic elements is required to obtain the word bhūyate.

In passing we observe that one set of semantic elements may give rise to several utterances. A concrete instance is the set {<sattā>, <bhāva>, <āsīs>, <eka>} which can give rise to three utterances: bhāvīṣṭa, bhāvīṣṭa and bhūyatām. For reasons of space we cannot enter into the details of the derivations. We note that these same utterances could have
been arrived at on the basis of the set \{<bhū>, <bhāva>, <eka>, <āśis>\}. Generalizing we can say that one utterance can be the expression of more than one set of semantic elements.

Until now we could assign sets of semantic elements to single words. This changes in the next example, tvam bhavasi.

1. yuṣmdad \(<\text{yuṣmdad}>\)
2. yuṣmdad-bhū Dhu. I.1 \(<\text{sattā}>\)
3. yuṣmdad-bhū-IA \(3.4.69; 1.4.54<\text{svatantra}>; 3.2.123 <\text{vartamāna}>\)
4. yuṣmdad-bhū-siP \(3.4.78; 1.3.78; 1.4.22 <\text{eka}>\)
5. yuṣmdad-su-bhū-si 4.1.4.2; 1.4.22 <\text{eka}> etc.

This derivation shows that the utterance tvam bhavasi gives expression to the set \{<yuṣmdad>, <sattā>, <svatantra>, <vartamāna>, <eka>\}. The question is now: what semantic elements underlie the separate words tvam and bhavasi?

This question can easily be answered for the word tvam. It gives expression to \(<\text{yuṣmdad}>\) and \(<\text{eka}>\). Be it noted that in deriving tvam use must be made of P.2.3.46: \text{prātipadikārthaliṃgangaparimāṇavacanamāṭre prathamā}. The sūtra is here not interpreted in accordance with the tradition, but following Speyer (1886: 26, note 1): “The first case serves only to signify the gender and number of the thing designated by the word’s rude form or prātipadika.” See also Thieme, 1956: 1-10 (=1971: 573-82).

What semantic elements underlie bhavasi? Perhaps what remains after subtracting \(<\text{yuṣmdad}>\) and \(<\text{eka}>\) from the set underlying tvam bhavasi? Neither these three semantic elements, nor indeed any other set of semantic elements can generate the single word bhavasi. The reason is that in order to generate bhavasi we not only need semantic elements, but we must also know that yuṣmdad is upapada, and that yuṣmdad and the verbal ending refer to the same thing. The rule which contains these requirements is P.1.4.105: yuṣmdady upapade samāṇadhirkarāne sthānīny api madhyamāḥ “When yuṣmdad is the attendant word (upapada), also when only understood, [and when this word yuṣmdad] refers to the same thing (samāṇadhirkaraṇa), [the endings called] madhyama [are employed.]” We conclude that without tvam the word bhavasi cannot be generated. In this we agree with Hari Dīkṣita, who wrote in his Bhāchabdaratna (p. 113): \text{na hi padāntaranirapekṣam eva padam iha āśtre samśkāryam iti niyamāḥ / yuṣmdady upapade ityāder asaṅgatiprasaṅgāt}.

Our conclusion is in need of some specification. The single word bhavasi can be generated in case the word tvam is understood but not expressed. The words sthānīny api “also when merely understood” in P.1.4.105 provide
for this. But this circumstance merely emphasizes that the single word bhavasi as it occurs in tvam bhavasi cannot be generated.

The above arguments, which show quite generally that finite verbs with endings of the 2nd person cannot be produced in isolation by Pāṇini’s grammar, apply virtually unchanged to finite verbs with endings of the 1st person. (See P.1.4.107.) Are they also valid for the 3rd person?

I think they are valid for certain finite verbs with 3rd person endings. P.1.4.108 reads: seṣe prathamaḥ. “In the remaining cases the endings of the 3rd person.” The remaining cases are those cases where neither yusmad nor asmad are the attendant words, that is to say, 1 where a word other than yusmad or asmad is the attendant word, and 2 where there is no attendant word. We have met a case where there is no attendant word (that refers to the same thing) in bhūyate. A word other than yusmad or asmad is the attendant word of finite verbs like bhavati. We know that words like bhūyate can be produced in isolation. Clearly words like bhavati cannot.

2.2. It is not possible to get a clear picture of how large groups of words are produced by Pāṇini’s grammar without paying attention to the kāraka device. I shall therefore first give a short, indeed sketchy, characterization of this device. My characterization is closest to Cardona’s description of the same, if I have understood his expositions correctly. See esp. Cardona, 1967 and 1974; also Joshi, 1974.

Until now we have only met with semantic elements which either directly gave rise to a grammatical element, or contributed to the production of such a grammatical element. (There are also semantic elements which not in any way give rise to a grammatical element. An instance is <kṣepa> “abuse,” in the derivation of khaṭvārūṭha. The semantic element <kṣepa> brings it about that khaṭvām is compounded with the following participle. See P.2.1.26. The difficulty with case-endings is this, that no seven meanings are so obliging as to correspond clearly to the seven groups of case-endings. Six of these groups of case-endings are as a rule expressive of a relationship with the verb, one, the genitive case-ending, is usually not. Further specification of meanings meets with difficulties.

What Pāṇini does to make the situation easier to handle is this. He introduces “pseudo-meanings” which do show the required correspondence with case-endings. It is obvious that no one-to-one relation can exist between these pseudo-meanings and the less accommodating “real” meanings. Indeed, at times totally different real meanings converge into one pseudo-meaning. So the real meanings karmanā yaṃ abhiprātī (P.1.4.32) and priyamaṇāḥ (P.1.4.33), as well as īpsitāḥ (P.1.4.36) and others, are bundled together in the one pseudo-meaning sampradaṇā. Or one real meaning can turn into several pseudo-meanings, depending on the context. For example, the real meaning yaṃ prati kopāḥ can become sampradāṇa (P.1.4.37) as well as karman (P.1.4.38).
Even after introducing pseudo-meanings some irregularities remain. They are of three kinds:

1. Sometimes two different case-endings can be used to express exactly the same thing in the same context. There is, for example, no difference in meaning between stokena muktaḥ and stokān muktaḥ; see P.2.3.33. In such cases two case-endings correspond to one pseudo-meaning.

2. A normal passive-active transformation turns a nominative case into an accusative. The problem of how to make these two groups of case-endings correspond to the one pseudo-meaning karmāṇ has been elegantly solved in the Asūrdhyāyī with the help of P.2.3.1: anabhīhite. (Many examples illustrating the workings of this rule can be found in Joshi, 1975 : 22-4.) No such elegant solution has been found in the cases where the nominative does not become an accusative. An instance is mātā smanjāyate, which has as its active counterpart mātuh smarati. See P.2.3.52.

3. Combinations of these first two kinds of irregularities also occur. Thus the passive pita smanjāyate corresponds to two active sentences. See P.2.3.22.

The kāraka device does not only facilitate the transition from real meanings to case-endings. It also does good work in describing the meanings to be expressed by primary suffixes and compounds. See Singh 1974 : 299-302. (Singh is of the opinion that also secondary suffixes represent kārakas. This is doubtful). This does not, however, change the fact that the kāraka device was introduced with an eye to the case-endings. This is shown by the circumstance that each group of case-endings corresponds to one kāraka category. (The genitive case takes a special position and does not count here.)

Our short survey of the kāraka device can be summed up as follows. Kāraka names are pseudo-meanings which have been introduced to facilitate the transition from real meanings to case-endings. Such a device was needed, because no one-to-one correspondence between real meanings and groups of case-endings exists. This exceptional behaviour of the Sanskrit language (if we wish to call it thus) is the reason of existence of the kāraka device.

We note that, in view of the above, it is incorrect to think that, say, karmāṇ really means kartur īpsitatamam (see P.1.4.49), while yam prati kopah gets the appellation karmāṇ due to the unfortunately exceptional behaviour of the Sanskrit language. This would be missing the point. Had the language been well-behaved, there would have been no need for a kāraka device, and the term karmāṇ would not be found in the grammar; kartur īpsitatamam would have sufficed.

The six pseudo-meanings will from now on go by the name “pseudo-elements.” To distinguish them from real semantic elements, two pairs of
hooks (<< >>) will be used. The six pseudo-elements are: <<kartṛ>>, <<karman>>, <<karaṇa>>, <<sampradāna>>, <<apādāna>>, <<adhikaraṇa>>.

I conclude this subsection by contrasting the kāraka device with another buffer device in the Āṣṭādhyāyī, which exists in the so-called lakāras. The lakāras are used in the formation of verbal forms. A vital distinction is that kārakas are pseudo-meanings, whereas the lakāras are pseudo-forms. I can think of two reasons that may explain this difference in treatment: 1. The lakāras, unlike the kārakas, unite different meanings at one and the same time; e.g., in the formation of bhavati the two meanings kartṛ (by P.3.4.69) and vartamāna (by P.3.2.123) are jointly expressed by IAT. 2. The original meanings “shine through” the lakāras. E.g., in the formation of bhūyate, the meaning bhāva is still required to get the vikaraṇa yaK (by P.3.1.67). In the case of the kārakas, on the other hand, the pseudo-meanings “cover” the original meanings. That is to say, once the original meanings have been replaced by pseudo-meanings, those original meanings play no role any longer.

2.3. What bearing has the kāraka device on the question how large utterances are produced by Pāṇini’s grammar? In order to arrive at an answer, we shall study some concrete derivations.

It can easily be verified that the semantic elements underlying aksaṇa dīvyati puruṣah “the man plays dice” are: <<krīḍā>>, <<puruṣa>>, <eka>, <vartamāna>, <svatantra>, <aṅga>, <bahu> and <sādhakatama>. It is further clear that the three elements <aṅga>, <bahu> and <sādhakatama> correspond to the word aksaṇ, while <krīḍa>, <puruṣa>, <eka>, <vartamāna>, <svatantra> correspond to the two words dīvyati puruṣah. For reasons similar to the ones we found in the case of tvam bhavasi, the second group of semantic elements cannot again be split into two. As a result, the semantic elements underlying aksaṇa dīvyati puruṣah fall automatically into two groups, as follows: <<krīḍa>> <puruṣa> <eka> <vartamāna> <svatantra> <aṅga> <bahu> <sādhakatama>. At first sight, therefore, it seems that the derivations of aksaṇ and of dīvyati puruṣah are independent of each other.

Unfortunately, this first impression is wrong. As long as we do not know that the meaning <sādhakatama> stands in relation to the verbal root div, there is no chance of obtaining the desired accusative case-ending. Only when accompanied by that verbal root can this case-ending be realized, by P.1.4.43. We must conclude that the group of semantic elements <aṅga>, <bahu>, <sādhakatama> in isolation cannot give rise to any utterance whatever. That is to say, in spite of the fact that in the above example all semantic elements fall of their own into two groups, this does not mean that those two groups are independent of each other. It seems indeed that Pāṇini’s grammar as a rule derives whole sentences, and combinations of sentences.
At this point we must take the kāraka device into account. If, in the above example, we replace semantic elements by pseudo-elements wherever possible, we get the following two groups: \{<krīḍā> <puruṣa> <eka> <vartamāna> <kartr>\} \{<ākṣa> <bahu> <karman>\}.

The difference from our earlier two groups seems negligible. Instead of <svatantra> there, we have here <kartr>; and for <sādhakatama> there, here we find <karman>. But this small difference has an important effect. Whereas the group \{<ākṣa> <bahu> <sādhakatama>\} could not, on its own, give rise to an utterance, the new group \{<ākṣa> <bahu> <karman>\} can. In other words, this group has gained independence. In order to derive aksān, we need nothing beyond the group \{<ākṣa> <bahu> <karman>\}. We do not even need to know the activity with respect to which dice, aksān, are karman.

A second example may further clarify my point. The following two sentences derive from almost the same semantic elements:

1. puruṣāya krudhyāmy aham
2. puruṣam abhirudhyāmy aham

Indeed, both these sentences can be translated "I am angry with the man". The semantic elements, arranged into groups, are respectively:

1. \{<puruṣa> <yam prati kopah₁> <eka>\} \{<kopa₁> <asmad> <vartamāna> <eka> <svatantra>\}
2. \{<puruṣa> <yam prati kopah₁> <eka>\} \{<abhi> <kopa₁> <asmad> <vartamāna> <eka> <svatantra>\}

Index numbers are used to indicate the elements of different groups which belong together.

As was the case in our earlier example, we are here again confronted with a group of semantic elements which, by itself, is not in a position to produce a Sanskrit utterance. Here the group is:

\{<puruṣa> <yam prati kopah> <eka>\}

Indeed, this single group must in one case give rise to puruṣāya, in another to puruṣam. Which of these two forms is to be chosen depends entirely on the context in which our group occurs. When the verbal root expressive of anger is krudh and is employed without a preposition, the dative must be used. When this same verbal root is employed together with a preposition, the accusative is correct. This we learn from P.1.4.37-8.

Let us now use pseudo-meanings instead of real meanings wherever possible. The two sentences under discussion then appear to derive from:

1. \{<puruṣa> <sampradāna> <eka>\} \{<kopa> <asmad> <vartamāna> <eka> <kartr>\}
2. \{\textless puruṣa} \textgreater \textless karman} \textgreater \textless eka} \textgreater \{\textless abhi} \textgreater \textless kopa} \textgreater \textless asmad} \textgreater \textless vartamāna} \textgreater \textless eka} \textless kartṛ} \textgreater \}

These two sets of semantic elements no longer have a group in common, as they did when we used only real meanings. The groups are now different, and therefore give rise to different utterances (purusāya and purusam respectively). Again the groups have gained independence, in the sense that no information from outside the group is required in order to be able to derive an utterance from it.

These few examples must suffice to show that Pāṇini’s grammar primarily generates whole sentences (or even combinations of sentences), but that the kāraka device enables us to find sets of semantic elements (which now include pseudo—elements) that give rise to parts of whole sentences.

3. The outcome of our investigation can be summed up in two points. 
1 Pāṇini’s grammar turns meanings into utterances. 
2 As a result we must assume that this grammar primarily generates sentences, or even groups of sentences.

I have nothing to add to the first point. I know of no grounds to doubt its validity. I am less certain about the second point. It is true that a simple and straightforward application of Pāṇini’s grammar will as a rule produce sentences, not single words. But this fact may not fully settle the issue.

Imagine that Pāṇini wanted to write a grammar that would produce single words on the basis of a semantic input. What semantic elements would underlie, say, bhavasi? If one tries to answer this question, he will realize how much trouble Pāṇini saved himself by bringing the accompanying word tvam into the picture. Similarly, in assigning meanings to case-endings, one is bound to take the context into consideration.

I therefore propose the following. The evidence at our disposal strongly suggests that Pāṇini’s grammar produces, as a rule, whole sentences (or groups of them). We stick to the conclusion that it indeed primarily produces whole sentences until and unless evidence to the contrary is procured.

One final remark. The presupposition that underlies Pāṇini’s grammar as we have come to know it, is that the meaning of an utterance is equal to the sum of the meanings of its parts. A consequence of this would be that also preverbs are, by themselves, meaningful for Pāṇini. There is some independent evidence to support this. When Pāṇini informs us in प.1.4.93 (adhīparī anarthakau) that adhi and pari are called karmapravacaniya provided they have no meaning, we conclude that adhi and pari do have meaning in other circumstances, i.e. when they are ordinary preverbs (upasarga). On the other hand, sometimes meanings are ascribed to roots which can only be expressed by those roots in combination with preverbs (Bronkhorst, forthcoming). This suggests that the preverbs somehow participate in the meanings of the
verbal roots. Since this question needs further study, I shall say no more about it.

REFERENCES


Nyāsa. See Kaśikāvṛtti.

Padamañjarī. See Kaśikāvṛtti.


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