

SAMBODHI

VOL. XVIII

1992-93

: EDITORS :

DR. J. B. SHAH

DR. N. M. KANSARA



L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY
AHMEDABAD

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Published by :

J. B. Shah & N. M. Kansara
L. D. Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad - 380 009 (India)

December, 1994.

Printed by :

MAC GRAPHIC
S/1, Dirajlal Shroff Chamber,
Opp. Navchetan High School,
Paldi, Ahmedabad 380 006.
Phone : (079) 6576122

Price : Rs. ~~75~~00 **Rs - 100**

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BHARTṚHARI'S PERSPECTIVISM (3): ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE THIRD KĀṆḌA OF THE VĀKYAPADĪYA*

Jan E. M. Houben

1. Introduction

In 1884 the first fascicle of an edition of the Vākyapadīya, which had by that time already attracted the attention of scholars like Kielhorn and Bühler, was published in Benares. But as recently as in 1977, Scharfe had to write that "The study of Bhartṛhari's thought is still in its infancy; critical editions and usable translations come forth only slowly" (Scharfe, 1977:174). The same year 1977, however, saw the publication of W. Rau's critical edition of the Vākyapadīya-kārikās, later on supplemented by a word-index (Rau, 1988)¹; and Iyer's translation of the second Kāṇḍa (Iyer, 1977), followed by the edition of the second Kāṇḍa (Iyer, 1983), which contained for the first time all available fragments of the ancient Vṛtti on the second Kāṇḍa. The editions of Rau and Iyer, the results of many years of work, constituted an important step forward in the study of the Vākyapadīya. But they can still not be considered as 'final' (nor were they presented as such by the editors).

Even on the basis of these more acceptable editions of Rau and Iyer, however, it is not at all easy to get a complete picture of Bhartṛhari's philosophy. Iyer, attempting to give a comprehensive and systematic account of Bhartṛhari's thought in his book on "the Vākyapadīya in the light of the ancient commentaries," had to admit that

there are gaps in our information relating to the details of the process of manifestation of the cosmos from the Brahman-*Sabdatattva* and of its merging into it. One gets the impression that Bhartṛhari believed that it was a cyclic process, but the cycle is nowhere described on detail. The fact is that he never forgets that he is a grammarian and as one approaches the end of the Vākyapadīya, matters grammatical occupy his attention more and more and the metaphysical and cosmogonic background is forgotten. (Iyer, 1969:404)

- If it is so difficult to reconstruct a complete system on the basis of the Vākyapadīya, one may wonder what role such system should have played in Bhartṛhari's thought. As

* The present article is mainly a summary of some important sections (rearranged and with some new paragraphs and references) of my thesis (mainly part 2 of Houben, 1992) which was the result of the project "The Indian theory of language of Bhartṛhari" at the University of Utrecht, 1988-1992. I am very grateful to Professor A. Aklujkar, Professor H. Bodewitz and Professor J. Bronkhorst for their help, advice and criticism during the whole project. One year of study at the University of Vancouver was made possible by the Government of Canada through a gratefully accepted Government of Canada Award (1988-1989). Thanks are also due to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for financial support to participate in a few seminars and conferences, which gave the author much appreciated opportunities to exchange ideas with scholars working in relevant fields. Finally, I am grateful to the International Institute for Asian Studies (Leiden) and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for enabling me to do follow-up research on some points in my thesis and to write this article. The present article is planned as the third in a series of articles dealing with Bhartṛhari's 'perspectivism' (cf. note 3).

regards the specific philosophical topic mentioned by Iyer, namely whether Bhartṛhari believed that there is a cyclic manifestation of the cosmos or not, I think it can be shown that Bhartṛhari was aware of both the cyclical worldview and the view of a non-cyclical, permanent world, without being committed to either one to the exclusion of the other.²

Instead of trying to infer a complete system on the basis of what is stated and perhaps presupposed in the VP, one could also try to concentrate on features which do figure prominently in the VP, whether or not this will lead us to a complete 'closed' philosophical system.

A feature which has been recognized, in one form or the other, by several scholars, but the importance of which is yet to be determined, is what may be called Bhartṛhari's 'perspectivism'. Bhartṛhari's approach to problems of language, meaning, reality and their relation may be characterized as largely 'perspectivistic', in the sense that (linguistic or extra-linguistic) reality is described as different from different points of view. Generally speaking, no single viewpoint is explained to the exclusion of others. Different viewpoints are discussed in their mutual opposition and complementariness. Sometimes the viewpoints are simply enumerated. Sometimes Bhartṛhari adds a statement of what would be acceptable from two opposed points of view. Sometimes he has a certain preference for one view or the other. And sometimes he seems to develop 'his own' view by integrating the opposed views of other thinkers. But even if he prefers one view or develops a new synthesis, others are not totally discarded. One may say that his preferences are always pronounced against the background of a relativizing attitude and a keen awareness of alternative frameworks of reference.

With this relativizing attitude or 'perspectivism' not everything is said that there is to say about Bhartṛhari's philosophy. Yet, if we are to understand more precisely what 'Bhartṛhari's own' view was, we also have to come to terms with his 'perspectivism' and try to assess its extent and implications. I will not endeavour to explain in a few words or pages the essence of the philosophy of Bhartṛhari, as some others have attempted to do before me, but instead try to acquire an insight into the structure of the exposition. In the present article we will be mainly concerned with the third Kāṇḍa.³ The order and sequence of the topics discussed will be studied, and special attention will be paid to a few crucial kārīkās in which Bhartṛhari explicitly announces the scope and aim of important sections.

2. The first kārīkās and the scope of the third Kāṇḍa

After it has become gradually clear in the second Kāṇḍa that the sentence and the sentence-meaning are to be considered the main linguistic units,⁴ the third Kāṇḍa (with its 1300 kārīkās larger than the first and second Kāṇḍa together) is devoted to words, their meanings, and their reality. It can be said, more precisely, that the third Kāṇḍa deals with the thing-meant and its reality or ontological status, the word or linguistic elements used to express it, and the relation between these two. In a few places the reader is reminded of the primacy of the sentence, but otherwise words are simply accepted as

individually meaningful.

It is not so much the primacy of the sentence, but rather another theoretical result of the discussions in the second Kāṇḍa which 'carries over' to the third Kāṇḍa: this is the relativization of the status of individual words and word meanings. Just as, in the second Kāṇḍa, the status of individual words and word meanings is relativized by emphasizing that they form part of sentences, similarly, their status is relativized in the third Kāṇḍa, here, however, not on account of their being part of sentences, but on account of various other grammatical, semantic and philosophical considerations.

From the very first two kārīkās of the third Kāṇḍa, Bhartṛhari's awareness of alternative frameworks of reference and his intention to enumerate and contrast different views is evident.⁵

- 3.1 The word is distinguished by some as twofold, (by some it is distinguished) as fourfold or (it is distinguished) as fivefold, after it has been abstracted from sentences, just as stem and suffixes (are abstracted from words.)
- 3.2 When word-meanings are abstracted, two permanent word-meanings of all words have been described: it is either the universal or the substance.

These kārīkās, in accordance with the trend of the discussions in the second Kāṇḍa, present the sentence as the primary unit. But once words and their meanings are accepted, Bhartṛhari does not attempt to connect the theories discussed with the idea that the sentence is primary. Are nevertheless certain theories more acceptable to Bhartṛhari than others? And if yes, what are the criteria to make one theory preferable to another?

Partly because no ancient commentary on the kārīkās is available for this Kāṇḍa, it is often very difficult to find out what Bhartṛhari's attitude towards a particular view is. Because on one single topic many different views are discussed, and because there are usually no direct statements by Bhartṛhari about whether or to what extent a certain view is acceptable or not, the sequence and way in which the different views are discussed acquire a crucial importance if one wants to evaluate Bhartṛhari's attitude with regard to a certain view. In any serious study of the third Kāṇḍa or a part of it, sufficient attention should, therefore be paid to the structure of the discussion and to the place a certain statement occupies in the whole Kāṇḍa.

3. Division of the third Kāṇḍa into Samuddeśas

For an insight into the structure of this extensive Kāṇḍa, one may resort first of all to the traditional division into 14 chapters or *samuddeśa-s* or 'comprehensive exposes'. This division can be largely justified on the basis of the topics discussed in different sections of the Kāṇḍa. Still, the division found in modern editions may not be in all respects original. Helārāja, who wrote the oldest presently available commentary on the third Kāṇḍa, refers to one of the kārīkās belonging to what forms the fourth chapter (called Bhūyo-dravya-samuddeśa) in all available VP editions and mss (including mss with Helārāja's commentary), as a kārīkā of the Guṇa-samuddeśa, which forms the fifth

chapter in these editions and mss (VP IIIa:106.8-11, and Iyer, 1963, Introduction:xii-xiii). Since the fourth chapter (Bhūyo-dravya-samuddeśa) in the mss consists of just three kārīkās, only two are left, and the thesis that they were even considered an independent chapter seems hardly viable. The character of these two kārīkās, moreover, shows that they were intended to introduce all succeeding discussions in the third Kāṇḍa. They do not deal specifically with *dravya*, the supposed subject of the Bhūyo-dravya-samuddeśa. From Helārāja's introduction to these two kārīkās it is clear that he did not consider them a part of the preceding chapter dealing with relation (saṃbandha)⁶. The conclusion can only be that Helārāja considered these three kārīkās, which form an independent chapter in the mss, to be part of the next chapter.

For the moment it seems most expedient to start with Helārāja's division as the more authoritative one, Helārāja having access to an older stage of the tradition than that represented by the manuscripts available at present. Even apart from the view which Helārāja apparently had in this respect, one may entertain serious doubts about the *raison d'être* of a Samuddeśa ('comprehensive expose') consisting of three kārīkās out of which only one deals specifically with the alleged subject, defining it in a pragmatic way.⁷

Here, the third Kāṇḍa is, therefore, considered to consist of thirteen chapters.⁸ The references to the kārīkās are to VP = Rau's edition, which, like other modern editions, follows the division found in the manuscripts. But Rau's chapter four and five of the third Kāṇḍa are in the present article considered to be one single Samuddeśa, which will be called the Guṇa-samuddeśas^{Hel}, to indicate that it is the Guṇa-samuddeśa as accepted by Helārāja.

4. Some preliminary considerations with regard to the structure of the third Kāṇḍa

Of these thirteen chapters of the third Kāṇḍa, the last one (Vṛtti-samuddeśas, no. 14 in VP) is of colossal dimensions. It alone is about as big as the remaining twelve chapters together, and on its own much bigger than the entire first and second Kāṇḍas taken together. While this last chapter discusses compound formations and derivatives (*vṛtti*), the other twelve chapters of the third Kāṇḍa discuss meanings belonging to simple, uncompounded individual words. The last chapter is largely self-contained, having its own inner structure and logic.⁹ It uses some of the results arrived at in the discussions in the preceding chapters and in the previous Kāṇḍa, but, reversedly, has little immediate bearing on the discussions in these. Therefore, we can eliminate it without much harm from our analysis of the structure of the first and more basic part (chapter 1-12 = 1-13 in VP) of the third Kāṇḍa.

What can we say about the way the subject matter is divided over these chapters? At first sight, they seem to break up into two groups. The first two chapters (the Jāti-and Dravya-samuddeśa) show how it is possible to hold that each word denotes a universal (*jāti*, 'universal property or generic feature') or individual substance (*dravya*, 'substance' or 'individual', used in opposition to the *jāti*). The Jāti-samuddeśa shows that the universal as the word meaning is possible, even in some problematic cases. And the

Dravya-samuddeśas shows that it is possible to hold that each word ultimately denotes the ultimate individual substance. These two chapters may be considered to belong to one group. In the other group too, each chapter discusses how a certain word meaning is expressed in language, but the word meanings discussed are more specific; generally speaking, it is not attempted to show that all words denote from a certain point of view a certain word meaning. Thus, in the chapters of this second group, it is investigated how language expresses more specific meanings such as 'direction' (*diś*), 'means' (*sādhana*, or *kāraka*, 'contributive factor in an action'), 'action' (*kriyā*), 'time' (*kāla*), 'person' (*puruṣa*), 'number' (*saṅkhyā*), 'aspect' (*upagraha*) and 'gender' (*liṅga*).

Between the first group in which something is said about the word meanings of all words, and the other group in which more specific notions expressed in language are discussed, there are some chapters which we cannot immediately attribute to the one or the other group. First, there is the Saṁbandha-samuddeśas, the chapter on relation. Inasmuch as it discusses not the meaning of a word but the relation between word and meaning, it occupies a unique position quite different from all other chapters. However, also the problem of 'relation' as the specific meaning of a word is discussed in this chapter, and in that respect it would belong to the second group. On the other hand, the concluding passage in which all words are said to express one meaning (esp. 3.3.87) would link it with the first group.

Next, the fourth chapter, the Guṇa-samuddeśas^{1el} consisting of the Bhūyo-dravya-samuddeśa 'further chapter on substance' and the Guṇa-samuddeśa 'chapter on quality' of the manuscripts, is again fully occupied with word meanings. But are these general word meanings, like the universal and the substance in the Jāti-and Dravya-samuddeśas? Or rather more specific meanings like direction, means, action, etc. ? At this point our 'preliminary considerations' cannot bring us much further, and it seems expedient to embark on a closer study of the different sections of the third Kāṇḍa.

5. The universal property (*jāti*), the individual substance (*dravya*), and the permanent word meaning

The first two chapters, the Jāti-and Dravya-samuddeśas, are concerned with the question: what is the nature of the meaning of a word, is it a universal property (*jāti*) or an individual substance (*dravya*) ? Because Sanskrit philosophers of the different schools of thought have not agreed on a sharp distinction between meaning and referent,¹⁰ this amounts to the question whether a word refers to a universal (*jāti*) or rather to an individual substance (*dravya*), and the whole problem becomes inextricably bound up with the problem of the reality or the ontological status of things referred to in language. The theoretical opposition between these two notions is apparently at the basis of the dichotomy between the first two chapters. As we will see, the opposition plays an important role also in other Samuddeśas. It is, therefore, worthwhile to study the nature of this opposition more deeply.

Beforehand, it should be noted that *dravya* is the opposite of *jāti* 'universal' in

various senses. It may refer to the individual substance in which the universal inheres (3.1.29); it may also refer to a particular instance, without necessarily being a substance (3.1.13; 3.4.3); or it may be the ultimate substance which is not particularized but underlies everything (Dravya-samuddeśa 2-18). Some steps in the discussions can only be understood if we are aware of the broad semantic field covered by this and some other words (e.g. *artha*, 'meaning', 'referent', 'thing-meant', 'purpose'). They do not have corresponding, equally broad terms in modern (academic) English, but Sanskrit authors used them in their broad sense even in more scholarly discussions like those reflected in the *Vākyapadīya*.

To make the problem of the universal and individual substance more lively to a modern reader it may be explained in simple words as follows. On the view that the universal is the meaning of a word it may be argued as follows. If the word 'cow' referred only to one specific individual cow, one would need another word to refer to another specific cow. Indeed, for each individual thing one would need a separate word, in each case one would need a new relation between word and thing-meant, and communication between people would be impossible. But if the word refers to the universal or the universal property common to all individual cows, it is possible to refer in different situations to different things as 'cow'; it is possible to recognize new things as cows and to refer to them as cows and communication becomes possible. Therefore, it should be accepted that a word refers first of all to a universal.

On the view that the substance is the meaning of a word, however, one may argue as follows. If someone tells you, 'bring me the cow' he certainly does not want you to bring the universal inhering in all cows. If at all the universal plays any role in communication it is precisely to differentiate the specific substance. Therefore, one should accept that words refer first of all to the individual substance rather than to the universal.¹¹

So far, the problem has been described as a linguistic-empirical problem. In the MBh-discussion of the universal-substance problem, there is an important complication, and since Bhartṛhari is so intimately familiar with the MBh and refers to it continuously, we have to take this complication into account. In the MBh, it is concluded that *śabda*, *artha* and the relation between the two, should be permanent. Applied to the views that the universal and the substance respectively are the meaning of a word, this means the two views have to show how respectively the universal and the substance are permanent.¹² In the concluding paragraph of the MBh-discussion, the author takes some distance from the problem and says that whatever is accepted as permanent should be taken to be the word meaning.

The whole discussion in the MBh takes place in the context of individual words and their meanings.¹³ In the second Kāṇḍa of his VP, however, Bhartṛhari arrived at a preference of the sentence as the basic unit. The immediate implication of this preference for the sentence is, as we have seen, the relativization of the status of words and word

meanings.

If Bharṭṥhari wants to remain faithful to the MBh, he has to explain how word meaning, either as a universal or as an individual substance, is permanent. Accordingly, he spoke of "two permanent word-meanings of all words, the universal or the substance" in the introductory kārīkās of the third Kāṇḍa. But if he wants to remain faithful to his preference for the sentence evinced in the second Kāṇḍa, he cannot accept a permanent, independent status of separate word meanings. Or at least, taking into account his encyclopedic approach, we would expect him to pay sufficient attention to views in which a permanent, independent status of separate word meanings is not accepted, even if he discusses at times views (such as the Mīmāṃsā-view) which do accept such status for them.

6. The Jāti-samuddeśa

What do we find in the Jāti-samuddeśas ? A few crucial passages may be highlighted here. After the introductory kārīkās, the topic discussed first is the problem of substitutes in a prescribed (ritual) act.¹⁴ On the view that the sentence is indivisible, there were some difficulties, which were explained in the second Kāṇḍa (2.64-71). The difficulties were solved in a general way by pointing out that if the sentence is accepted as indivisible, one may still resort to the postulation of words as its part (2.88ff). On the view that individual words have their own meaning and that it is the universal, the problem is still there: taking an object different from the one prescribed would mean a deviation from the prescript. The solution presented in the Jāti-samuddeśa (3.1.3-5) is that the universal implies, either on its own accord or on account of the context, not just an object in which it inheres, but an object which also has a certain capacity and which may be replaced by another object having a different universal but the same capacity.¹⁵ In this solution the universal which is the word meaning remains the same universal, but some flexibility has been introduced in its relation with the individual instance.

Next, kārīkā six gives a model of the relation between word and thing-meant on the view that the word meaning is the universal.¹⁶

3.1.6 First the own universal is expressed by all words; next that (own universal) is superimposed¹⁷ on the meaning universals.¹⁸

The following kārīkās (7-10) show that this way it can be maintained that the universal is the word meaning even in a case like the word 'universal' itself. This would be a problematic case for someone strictly adhering to the Vaiśeṣika system, according to which a universal of a universal is impossible. If the universal of the word, i.e. the signifier, is merely superimposed, this principle need not be abandoned.

In 11 a different viewpoint is adopted, and the Vaiśeṣika principle is no longer adhered to. Whereas according to 6 the word expresses only its own universal directly (*abhidhīyate*) and the connection with the meaning universal is through superimposition, the word itself expresses (*abhidhāna*) this meaning universal directly according to 11¹⁹:

11. Also if words (directly) express meaning universals: all words (even the word 'universal') express a universal, since word meanings are defined by their function (in language).

In other words, from the point of view of how a word meaning functions in verbal usage, one may hold that all words directly denote a universal: not only in an unproblematic case like 'cow' etc., but also in the case of 'universal', simply because language treats 'universals' and 'cows' in the same way as things which may be referred to through a universal feature. Word meanings, being thus defined by the way they function in verbal usage, do not have an absolute, independent status.

The next *kārikā* may be understood along the same lines. Not only if a universal is to be expressed does a word express a universal, but even if a particular is to be expressed²⁰ :

12. On the assumption that the meaning of individual words is the universal, the universal or even the particular is referred to by words as a universal; therefore, the (words) express the universal.

This is next contrasted with a view which is diametrically opposite.²¹

13. On the other hand, on the assumption that the substance is the meaning of individual words, each meaning is expressed as something having the properties of a substance. Therefore it is accepted that each meaning is a substance on the basis of its properties of substance.

In the following *kārikās*, Bhartṛhari returns to different ways to accept the universal as the meaning of the word. From this it should not be inferred that the view expressed in 13 would be unacceptable to Bhartṛhari.²² The *Jāti-samuddeśa* is devoted to the view that the universal is the meaning of words, and the view that substance or the particular is the meaning of words will be explained at other places in the VP²³ :

One of the views discussed seems to turn the universal into something mental. The universal is not so much a property of the object but rather of the cognition.²⁴

19. Some consider the universal to be the cognition (*pra-khyā*) which has the form of recurrence; [and] they consider that (the cognition) which has the form of exclusion (i.e. of 'going apart') is the substance.

Towards the end of the *Jātisamuddeśas*, in *kārikā* 101, Bhartṛhari discusses a view which is to some extent similar. According to Helārāja, *kārikā* 19 explains the view on word meaning according to the Buddhist school of Vijñānavāda (VP IIIa:32.10), and 101 the view on the universal of the Buddhists (*saugatānāṃ... jāti-darśanam*, VP IIIa:99.2). As in 19, the universal is in 101 something in the mind.

From 25 onwards, the relation between the universal and the individual instance is discussed. It is pointed out that anything that arises has its universal, and that this universal instigates the causes for its own manifestation in the individual instance (3.1.25). The universals, by virtue of permanent and impermanent causes, manifest themselves time and again in the effects (3.1.26). And the universal is also the *sādhana*'means' in the case of an object to be produced; it instigates the action, in order to bring about its own substratum (3.1.27).

The latter point refers to a problem which will be solved much later (3.7.7) in an alternative way. The problem is illustrated in an example like 'he makes the pot': here, the pot is grammatically the object of the action expressed by 'makes'. In other words, the pot plays the role of one of the six *kāraḥas* or contributive factors in an action, namely *karman* or grammatical object, and it is as such a *sādhana* 'means' in the accomplishment of an action. But how is it possible that the not-yet-existing object is the 'means' in the accomplishment of the action? The problem may be solved on the assumption that the meaning of the word is the universal, which itself is permanent. On this assumption it may be maintained that it is this universal 'pot', or 'pot-ness', that plays the role of grammatical object and is thus the 'means' in the accomplishment of the action. That this universal is getting a new substratum in the form of the new individual pot poses next no problems anymore. Below, in VP 3.7.7, Bhartṛhari will explain the solution of the problem on the view that the word meaning is the individual instance and not the universal. Here, in the *Jāti-samuddeśas*, the whole discussion is based on only one of two acceptable presuppositions. That Bhartṛhari gives here a positive presentation of a certain solution to a grammatical-semantic problem is, therefore, no sufficient reason to consider it his definitive and finally preferred view on the issue.

Of particular interest is next the passage according to which the universal is simply existence, divided into cows, etc.²⁵

33. Existence, divided into cows etc. through differentiation according to the things related to it, is called the universal. On this (existence) all words are based.

It is this existence (or Existence, with capital, because of its all-embracing character) that is the meaning of the stem and of the root, and it is expressed by affixes like *tva* and *tā* (34). Moreover, if action or an entity are expressed, it is in fact existence that is expressed as having sequence or as being without sequence. And it is nothing but existence that assumes the six stages of being (35-39).

What is here the status of the individual word meanings? Inasmuch as all words express ultimate Existence, it can be maintained that their meaning is permanent. But since individual word meanings are divisions of existence, it is not clear how permanent their independent status is. In 42 and 43 Bhartṛhari mentions two different views on the permanence of the individual universals. According to some, each universal has always one substratum or the other; and there is never a time (e.g. the end of the world-period), when there is nothing whatsoever (42).²⁶ On the other hand, those believing in an 'end of the world-period' hold that at such a time when all divisions are absorbed in their source, the universals which have their own specific substrata acquire *dravyasattva*, which probably means that they become one with the ultimate substance (43).²⁷ And in the context, this ultimate substance would be the same as the existence in 33. It seems that the individual universals are more permanent in 42 than in 43. In practice, however, from a human point of view, there will be little difference between the permanence which

lasts for one world-period and the absolute permanence not limited by world periods. It is of interest to note that the universals are here not described as entities in any way dependent upon language or human thought (as in other passages in the VP, and in the *Jāti-samuddeśa* e.g. in *kārikās* 11-12,19), but they are independent realities, even though they are ultimately just divisions of one all-embracing existence. Both existence and its divisions precede its being expressed in language (cf. also 46).

One may ask: what is the status of the sambandhins, 'things related to (existence)' in *kārikā* 33 ? In 40 four different views are enumerated²⁸.

40. The substratum, or the own elements, or entities which are different (from it), or the own capacities are the causes of seeing division in existence.²⁹

At least two view, the first and the third, accept some kind of division between existence and the things related.³⁰ The view which indentifies the 'things related' as capacities of existence could be taken to imply that the 'thing related' have no independent status, in contradistinction to the view according to which they are explicitly said to be 'entities which are different' (*bhāvā vyatirekiṇah*).

In the *kārikās* after 46, several potentially problematic cases are explained according to the view that the universal is the word meaning. The problems relate mainly to number as expressed in verbal and nominal ending (49ff), and to compounds (47-48, 87, 90-91). From 54 the context of the discussion is Vedic injunctions .

In a digression (72-80), Bharṭṛhari returns to the problem of substitutes in Vedic injunctions. He discusses the relation between quality, substance and (prescribed) action, both from the point of view that word meaning is the substance and that it is the universal. In 3.1.3-5 Bharṭṛhari has provided for the possibility of a substitute if the word meaning is a universal, making use of the notion of *śakti* 'capacity'. According to 76, there is a problem if the substance and the quality of a prescribed object would be equally eligible for substitution. Preferably, only the quality should be substituted and not the substance. *Kārikā* 77-79 explain next that there is a solution if the object refers to a universal or to a capacity. The solution is worked out from the point of view of the universal as the word meaning. But this should not be mistaken as an indication that Bharṭṛhari prefers the 'universal view' to the 'substance view' as Helārāja seems to suggest in his comments on these *kārikās*. Since Bharṭṛhari will argue that the individual substance can be seen as a capacity (3.6.1, 3.7.1-2), the reference to 'capacity' in *kārikā* 77 implies that on this view too the desired solution can be reached. In *kārikā* 80 Bharṭṛhari mentions that some would accept a substitution of the substance as equal with a substitution of a quality. This option is apparently not preferred by Bharṭṛhari, but included for completeness' sake. The wording of this *kārikā* and the mentioning of the capacity in 77 do not support Helārāja's explanations according to which this non-preferred view is exclusively connected with the 'substance view'. In any case, this passage (72-80) introduces some refinements after the possibility of substitutes was provided for in 3.1.3-5.

From 92 onwards, Bhartṛhari returns to the question: what is a universal? According to some a universal is similarity, according to other it is a capacity (3.1.92). Some thinkers (identified as Vaiśeṣikas by Helārāja) emphasize that a universal is to be postulated as a separate entity (3.1.93-94). According to some, if one cognition arises with regard to several individuals, one cognizes the essence of the individuals, as it were (3.1.96). The main problem according to Helārāja is whether or not the universal is separate entity (VP IIIa:93.22; 94.1; 96.2; 99.1). The Buddhist view explained in 101 has been mentioned above.

The Jāti-samuddeśas concludes with a passage in which the domain of the universal is restricted. First, in 104, a view is mentioned according to which there are universals in cognitions as in external objects, and the kārikā attributes this view to the Saṃsarga-view; Helārāja does not give more details about this Saṃsarga-view, but elsewhere, the Saṃsargavādins have been indentified as Vaiśeṣikas (Helārāja on 3.7.9, VP IIIa:239.3-4; cf. discussion below). In the Vaiśeṣika-system, a cognition³¹ is considered a quality (*guṇa*) of the self (*ātman*) and universals reside in substance, qualities and actions. The view in 104 is, therefore, in accordance with the Vaiśeṣika system. The next kārikā (105) mentions a view which does not accept universals in cognitions; and the following kārikās (106-110) explain how it is impossible that a cognition could ever be the thing know in another cognition. A cognition cognizes itself but is not cognized in another cognition, just as a light illuminates itself but is not illuminated by another light. In the context, this is an elaboration of what was said in 105, that universals reside in 'things to be known' (*jñeya*) but not in a cognition or knowing (*jñāna*) itself.

The combination of the comparison of a cognition with light and the refusal to accept a cognition being cognized in another cognition would be in accord with Vijñānavāda tenets³² with which Bhartṛhari must have had some acquaintance.³³ Whatever Bhartṛhari's evaluation of this view (he seems quite positive about it, 'in spite' of its closeness to Buddhist ideas), they leave much room for word meanings which are *not* well-defined individual basic units.

What we have seen so far may be summarized as follows: On the basis of the tendency to prefer the sentence as the primary unit one would expect some attention for views which relativize the status of the individual word meaning. In the Jāti-samuddeśas, much positive attention is still paid to views according to which word meanings in the form of universals are well-established and individually permanent. But in most of these views, the individual status of universals is, on closer study, not so absolute, for instance because they are dependent on the function of language (3.1.11); or because they are simply unreal because in fact there are only differences (3.1.19, 101); or because they are only divisions of one all-embracing Existence (3.1.33-39), while the seeing of divisions may be caused in different ways. (3.1.40). In the 'Existence-approach', it can be maintained that words have a permanent meaning, inasmuch as all words express Existence; and yet the status of individual words and their specific meanings need not be

absolute, because the particular universals are just divisions of this all-embracing Existence. In the final part (92-110), mentalist and other views which would not imply word meanings as well-defined individual basic units receive considerable attention. The “comprehensive exposition” on *jāti* ‘the universal’ contains, therefore, also several starting-points for a ‘critique’ of the universal.

All in all, Bhartṛhari has shown how it is possible that the meaning of a word can be a universal, and can be permanent in an absolute or relative sense, without definitely committing himself to word meanings as well-defined individual basic units.

7. The incomplete ‘comprehensive exposé’ in the *dravya-samuddeśa*

An approach comparable to the ‘Existence-approach’ in the *Jāti-samuddeśa* (3.1.33ff), may be recognized in the *Dravya-samuddeśa*. Again, all words express the same things, and, again, the status of individual words and their specific meanings is not presented as absolute. In the *Dravya-samuddeśa*, however, this one thing, expressed by all words, is not a universal but it is the substance. And it is not called existence (*sattā*) but referred to by another derivative from the root as ‘to be’: *satya* ‘true’ or ‘real’ (3.2.2, 11,15). In the first *ātman* (self), *vastu* (thing), *svabhāva* (own nature), *śarīra* (body), *tattva* (reality), are said to be synonyms of *dravya*, ‘substance’.

If we compare the rest of the *Dravya-samuddeśa* (2 till end) with the *Jāti-samuddeśa*, there is an important structural difference. In the *Jāti-samuddeśa* the idea that all words express the universal inasmuch as they express existence in one of its divisions, is one of the views explained. According to Helārāja, the idea represents an Advaita-Vedānta approach (VP IIIa: 41.6 and cf. VP IIIa: 96.22). Other views are explained according to which universals are just ‘similarities’ perceived in things which are in fact utterly distinct; or they are separate, independent entities. In addition, several technical problems are discussed which arise on the assumption that the universal is the word meaning in all cases. In the *Dravya-samuddeśa*, however,⁶ other views’ as well as the technical discussions are conspicuous by their absence. The entire *Dravya-samuddeśa* — with its 18 *kārikās* much smaller than the *Jāti-samuddeśa* — elaborates one and the same idea that all words express a single entity (Entity) in what may be called an Advaita-Vedānta-like way.³⁴

As for this Advaita-Vedānta-like idea, it is parallel to the idea expressed in the ‘existence’-passage in the *Jāti-samuddeśa* (3.1.33-43) inasmuch as in both cases all words express one and the same entity. In both cases, it can be maintained that the meaning expressed by words is permanent, a requirement inherited from the accepted grammatical tradition (cf. discussion above). In both cases, the status of the individual word meaning themselves is not necessarily absolutely fixed, a requirement resulting from the preference for the sentence as the primary unit in language. In the *Jāti-samuddeśa* 3.1.33-43, this non-fixed character of the individual word meanings — i.e. of the specific universals — is not emphasized. Two different views are recorded which make the specific universals either absolutely permanent or permanent only within a world period.

In the *dravya-samuddeśa*, however, it is recognized that the fact that all words express the ultimate Substance, would imply that all words have all meanings (*sārvārthyam*). In fact, however, it is not the case that all words have all meanings, on account of a 'delimitation through particular forms'³⁵:

3.2.5 On account of a delimitation through (particular) forms the connection with all meanings is restricted; just as the capacity of eyes etc. is restricted by tubes etc.

In other words, just as the visual field is restricted if one looks through a tube, like that the unbounded semantic field of a word (ultimately denoting the ultimate substance) is restricted through particular 'forms'. Whatever is meant by these 'forms', it is they that determine that a word meaning has a specific character, different from others. On the other hand, it is the fact that the meaning of a word is ultimately the ultimate Substance, which makes the meaning of the word permanent. In the *Dravya-samuddeśa* much attention is paid to the latter aspect. It is not explained what these 'forms' are and how exactly they restrict the meaning. They are said to be untrue in 3.2.2, and the forms of an object are compared with limiting features of the true (reality)³⁶:

3.2.2 The true thing-in-itself is ascertained through its untrue forms. Through the untrue limiting features, only the true (reality) is expressed by words.

In 3.2.6 it is emphasized that, ultimately, these forms too are identical with reality (or Substance). A subtle difference with the 'Existence'-passage in the *Jāti-samuddeśa* is that in the *Jāti-samuddeśa* the division of Existence clearly precedes its being expressed in language. But here, in the *Dravya-samuddeśa*, while the limiting features are in fact not different from the Substance (3.2.6), they enter the scene only when the Substance is being expressed. Since the *Dravya-samuddeśa* otherwise does not say anything about these limiting features or forms, *Bharṭṥhari*, while demonstrating how all words ultimately express a permanent meaning on the view that the word meaning is the substance, has not committed himself to an absolutely fixed character of individual word meanings.³⁷

8. The *Sambandha-samuddeśa* as a continuation of the *Dravya-samuddeśa*

We now come to the *Sambandha-samuddeśa*, the chapter on 'relation'. *Helārāja* introduces the first *kārikā* of the *Sambandha-samuddeśa* as follows: "With the (preceding) two expositions, (*Bharṭṥhari*) has established the Universal and the Substance as the meaning of a word, distinguishing different points of view; now, a relation must be the cause of (the fact) that a meaning is expressed by a word, otherwise anything would be conveyed by anything; therefore, he says in order to explain the relation (the following)" (VP IIIa:122.1-2). From this, one could infer that the notion of relation as it is discussed in the *Sambandha-samuddeśa* is equally relevant to the *Jāti-* and *Dravya-samuddeśa*. However, in the exposition of the *Sambandha-samuddeśa* indications are found which point in a different direction.

One of the first problems discussed in the *Sambandha-samuddeśa* is: how can 'relation' be expressed in words? In the theories advanced to account for the problem

(3.3.1-19), there is no indication that a word expressing 'relation' would first of all express the universal residing in relation. A peculiar theory is explained in some detail (3.3.13-16), according to which (almost) all words have in one way or the other a relation with the thing-meant, a relation analysable in terms of the two types of relation accepted in the Vaiṣeṣika system: *saṃyoga* 'connection' and *samavāya* 'inherence'. There is no place in this theory for a universal which would necessarily intervene between the expressive word and the thing-meant. Does this mean that the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa, in a sense, a continuation of the Dravya-samuddeśa ?

In the Dravya-samuddeśa, 'other views' than the Advaita-like view which forms the main subject were conspicuous by their absence. The view in the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa using Vaiṣeṣika-notions would make up, to some extent, for this 'incompleteness' of the Dravya-samuddeśa. And there are other passages which seem to be closer to the Dravya-samuddeśa than to the Jāti-samuddeśa.

In Saṃbandha-samuddeśa 39-52 a theory is explained which accounts for the relation between the exterior object and the word by assuming that in language the exterior object has only 'Secondary' or 'Metaphorical' existence (*anyā sattaupacārikī*, 39). The problem of the relation between an exterior object and the expressive word is urgent only on the view that the word meaning is the individual substance. If word meaning is a universal, the problem poses itself quite differently: on that view, one has to account for the relation between word and universal and for the relation between universal and individual object. And this was done in various ways (from different points of view) in the Jāti-samuddeśa. It is true that the theory of 'Secondary Existence' may be translated in terms of the view that the word meaning is the universal. For instance, it could be said that the secondary existence of an object is in fact its universal, viewed either as a mental concept or as an independent entity. But the fact remains that from the point of view of the Jāti-samuddeśa the whole theory of 'Secondary Existence' is superfluous, because the problem was solved in the Jāti-samuddeśa in its own terms.

Again, in the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa passage starting with 3.3.52 the problem is the relation between the particular exterior object and the word, whereas the problem in terms of the Jāti-samuddeśa would be: what is the relation between the particular exterior object and the universal ? and next, what is the relation between word and universal, and does the universal have independent external existence or is it rather something figuring in the mind ? In 3.3.73, even the universal (*sāmānya*) is expressed by words as a particular. The kārikā is a mirror-image of kārikā 12 in the Jāti-samuddeśa, according to which all words refer to a universal, even in the case of a particular. This kārikā shows most clearly the intimate connection between the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa and the *dravya*-view, and its contrast with the Jāti-samuddeśa.

Towards the end of the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa, we cannot discover strong reasons to assume that the ideas are more closely related to either the Dravya-samuddeśa or the Jāti-samuddeśa. The last two kārikās, for instance, seem to be equally applicable to both.

The only difference is that in 3.3.87, as in the *Dravya-samuddeśa*, the multifariousness of the one Thing-meant, is closely connected with the expression in words of this one Thing-meant. In *Jāti-samuddeśa* 3.1.33-43, the division of Existence clearly preceded its being expressed in language.

We therefore have to arrive at the remarkable conclusion that the *Sambandha-samuddeśa* is on the whole much more intimately connected with the 'individual substance' view than with the 'universal' view. It may be considered to be a direct continuation of the discussion of the 'substance' view started in the *Dravya-samuddeśa*.

9. The *Guṇa-samuddeśa*^{Hel}

In *Helārāja*'s division, the next chapter is the *Guṇa-samuddeśa*^{Hel}. It absorbs the three *kārikās* called 'Bhūyo-dravya-samuddeśa' in the manuscripts, the first two of which are as follows.³⁸

- 1-2. Some meanings of words, which are in the science (of grammar) abstracted and separated from the meaning of a sentence, arising from that (sentence meaning) which is an aggregate and has the character of consciousness, just like the meanings of stem and suffix (arise from and are abstracted and separated from the word), (some of these meanings of words) which are the basis of the correctness of words, will be explained concisely according to tradition, their nature being inferred from grammar.

The character of these *kārikās* is quite general. They seem to reintroduce the subject matter of the third *Kāṇḍa* namely the discussion of individual word meanings. The difference with the first general introduction, *kārikās* 1-2 in the *Jāti-samuddeśa*, is that there it was emphasized that the word meanings are permanent, and that they may be considered as either a universal or a substance. The feasibility (as well as the limits) of this permanence was demonstrated in various ways in the remainder of the *Jāti-samuddeśa* and in the *Dravya-samuddeśa*. But the introduction here seems to clear the way for a more specific discussion of word meanings. And this is what we actually find in the chapters which have been categorized above as the second group of chapters: chapters dealing with more specific word meanings such as 'direction' (*diś*), 'action' (*kriyā*), 'time' (*kāla*), 'person' (*puruṣa*), etc.

It is next, the third, *kārikā* which deals with *dravya* 'substance' as the meaning of a word.³⁹:

3. The thing in reference to which (*yatra*) a pronoun indicating an object is used, that thing (so 'rtaḥ), intended as something which can be differentiated, is called 'substance'.

According to *Helārāja*, commenting on the first *kārikā* of the *Dravya-samuddeśa*, it is this *kārikā* that represents the view of *Vyāḍi*, according to whom all words denote *dravya* 'substance' (VP IIIa:106.8-10). Substance, according to *Helārāja*, is of two kinds: that belonging to the level of ultimate truth (*pāramārthika*) and that belonging to the level of (linguistic) practice (*sāṃvyaṅavahārika*). The substance of the ultimate level is discussed in the *Dravya-samuddeśa*, and for the substance of the level of linguistic practice *Helārāja* cites — as a *kārikā* from the *Guṇasamuddeśa*^{Hel} — the *kārikā* translated here.⁴⁰

Now, it is not only this *kārikā* that has close connections with the notion of *dravya* 'substance'; also in the remaining part of *Guṇasamuddeśa*^{Hel} (VP 3.5 or the *Guṇasamuddeśa* of the mss), the notion of *dravya* 'substance' plays a basic role. In *kārikā* VP 3.5.1-2 (which would be *kārikās* 4 and 5 of *Guṇa-samuddeśa*^{Hel}), *guṇa* 'quality' is defined only in relation to *dravya* 'substance'⁴¹ :

1. Whatever is in combination and differentiates and is understood with (that) function, is said to be a *guṇa* 'quality' in the science (of grammar) on account of its dependence.
2. The differentiating *guṇa* 'quality' that belongs to the inexpressible *dravya* 'substance' (and) that is assumed in order to express it, of that (differentiating quality) degree is designated.

The word *dravya* is also used in *kārikās* 7-9; and in 3,4 and 5 it is referred to as *pradhāna* 'the main thing' (3,4) and *vastu* 'object' or 'thing-as-it-is' (5)

What exactly is meant by this *guṇa*, defined in dependence on *dravya* 'substance'?⁴² From the definition in the two *kārikās* translated above, one thing is very clear : Bharṭṛhari's *guṇa* is here not the same as the *Vaiśeṣikas*' *guṇa* 'quality'. For, in Bharṭṛhari's definition anything that differentiates and is dependent on a substance is called *guṇa*. In the *Vaiśeṣika*-system, however, many other entities may be related to a substance and specify it, not only *guṇas* 'qualities' in the strict sense (colour, etc.), but also *karmas* 'actions' and *sāmānyas* 'universals'.⁴³ Nor is it clear that the concepts of *dravya* 'substance' and *guṇa* 'quality' should be understood in the light of the *Saṃkhyā* view, namely that the *dravya* is just a collection or coming together of *guṇas*.⁴⁴ Here in VP 3.5.1, *guṇa*, as something contrasting with and related to *dravya* 'substance', seems even to comprise what has been called 'universal' elsewhere. This is not explicitly stated in the *Guṇa-samuddeśa*. But there are some reasons to believe that this was nevertheless Bharṭṛhari's intention.

First of all, according to 3.5.1 anything that differentiates is to be considered a *guṇa* 'quality'. From this one may infer that a universal is a *guṇa* 'quality' inasmuch as it differentiates. In the *Vaiśeṣika*-system, this differentiating function of at least some universals seems to have been accepted since an early time.⁴⁵ In the *Jāti-samuddeśa* itself, not much attention is paid to the differentiating function of a universal, but rather to its function of inclusion, and its permanence. One place which is of interest is 3.13b, according to which the universal secondarily indicates a capacity (*jātiḥ śaktyupalakṣaṇam*). The fact that here a capacity is only secondarily indicated is in accordance with the main thesis in this chapter : that primarily the universal is expressed by a word. But then, this universal does indicate or define (*lakṣ*) also something else.

In the MBhD it is said with so many words that 'universals etc.' differentiate substance: "But universals etc. differentiate the substance in order to convey its existence; they are the limiting features of the word."⁴⁶ There is also a MBhD-passage (MBhD 6b:26.23ff) which attributes to the one who accepts universals as primary, the dictum: "There is no understanding with regard to a thing to be differentiated if the

differentiator (itself) is not grasped.” The differentiator to be grasped first is here the universal.

In spite of the absence of explicit statements, it seems therefore quite natural to assume that *jatis* are according to Bhartṛhari *bhedakas* ‘differentiators’ of the particular substance, the thing to be differentiated (*bhedya*). As such, they are included in his definition of *guṇa* ‘quality’.⁴⁷ Helārāja too includes the *jāti* ‘universal’ in what is defined as *guṇa* ‘quality’ in 3.5.1, and supports this inclusion with references to the MBh⁴⁸: “thus even the universal, because it is dependent inasmuch as it inheres in the substance, is said to be a *guṇa* ‘quality’.”

The exposition in the entire *Guṇa-samuddeśa*^{Htel} (VP 3.4 and 5) starts, therefore, from the assumption that words express (in fact, ultimately) the individual substance, particularised by differentiators (which may include universals). This can only lead us to the conclusion that this *Samuddeśa* further continues the exposition of ‘substance’ as the meaning of the word, the exposition which started with the *Dravya-samuddeśa*, and which continued in the intervening *Sambandha-samuddeśa*.

We have to conclude, moreover, that the *Guṇa-samuddeśa*^{Htel} (VP 3.4 and 3.5) deals again with word meanings in a very general way, more like the preceding chapters, and unlike the following chapters which deal with more specific word meanings. In contrast with the preceding chapters, however, the *Guṇa-samuddeśa*^{Htel} works with a fundamental dichotomy in the field of meaning, that between *dravya* and *guṇa*, without trying to reduce the one to the other. It elaborates the idea that in fact the individual substance (*dravya*) is expressed, not, as in the *Dravya-samuddeśa*, from the point of view of the permanence of the ultimate Substance, but from the more pragmatic point of view of how *dravya* is expressed in language. It is in that context that the differentiators (including universals) or *guṇas* ‘qualities’ of the substance appear on the scene and have to receive more serious attention.

10. The chapters following *Guṇa-samuddeśa*^{Htel}

The eight chapters following the *Guṇa-samuddeśa*^{Htel}, as pointed out earlier, discuss more specific meanings and how they are expressed in language. While Helārāja introduces the first four of these chapters, the *Dik*-, *Sādhana*-, *Kriyā*- and *Kāla-samuddeśa* with reference to the first *kārikā* of the *Dik-samuddeśa*,⁴⁹ the next four chapters, *Puruṣa*-, *Samkhyā*-, *Upagraha*- and *Liṅga-samuddeśa*, are presented by him as a kind of addenda.

Of considerable importance is here the first *kārikā* of the *Dik-samuddeśa* (the chapter on *diś* ‘direction’), which enumerates the main notions of this and the following three chapters as follows⁵⁰:

- 3.6.1 ‘Direction’, ‘means’, ‘action’, ‘time’ (as words) denoting things, are by no means fixed, if word meanings (or things denoted by words) have the form of capacities.

On the basis of only this *kārikā* one could infer a few things about these chapters,

even without studying them in detail. First, there are here some elements 'denoting things' (*vastv-abhidhāyin*). What are these elements ? If Helārāja's commentary is followed, they are the words 'direction', 'means', 'action', 'time' themselves.⁵¹ And what is meant with 'things' (*vastu*) denoted by them ? In the first kārikā of the Dravya-samuddeśa, *vastu* was mentioned as one of the synonyms of *dravya* 'substance'. Could this mean that the starting point is again the view that words denote the substance, as was the case in the preceding chapters from the Dravya-samuddeśa onwards ? Our kārikā 3.6.1, however, mentions an additional condition in the phrase *śaktirūpe padārthānām* 'if word meanings have the form of capacities'. What does this mean if the words have been said to denote objects ? Do these words finally express the substance or capacities ? It is moreover possible to interpret *padārtha* differently. It is not only 'meaning of the word', but because of the absence of a sharp and clear distinction between meaning and referent it is in some contexts rather 'thing denoted by an individual word' or simply 'thing'. Finally, these words are said to be 'always un-fixed' or 'by no means fixed'. As observed above, the most immediate implication of the second Kāṇḍa for the third Kāṇḍa was that the status of words and word meanings (and smaller units) is strongly relativized. In the preceding chapters of the third Kāṇḍa we have seen that when Bhartrhari defended that the meaning of words is (ultimately) permanent, he did not commit himself too much to accepting individual word meanings as absolutely fixed in themselves.

On the basis of just this kārikā 3.6.1 one can therefore conclude that the discussion in the following chapters starts (again) from the assumption that individual words denote individual things, which are not absolutely fixed, but have the character of capacities; the four main notions themselves are not absolutely fixed either.

10.1. The Dik-samuddeśa

In the Dik-samuddeśa, it is indeed emphasized that 'direction' as expressed in language is a 'capacity' and as such not absolutely fixed in itself. Apart from the first kārikā introducing the subject-matter of this and the following three chapters, it is nowhere emphasized that the meaning of the word is the individual substance rather than the universal. On the other hand, nothing indicates that first of all the universal would be expressed by the words. In a straightforward interpretation of the chapter it is much simpler to assume that the starting point is throughout the view that word meaning is *dravya* at least in its meaning of 'individual instance', without a necessarily intervening universal; it is argued in the Dik-samuddeśa, that in the case of *dis* 'direction', this individual instance is actually a capacity. There is also a kārikā (3.6.17⁵²) which, while not in conflict with the view of *dis* 'direction' as a capacity, clearly echoes the Vaiśeṣikas who categorize it as a *dravya* 'substance.'

10.2. The Sādhana-samuddeśa

In the first kārikā of the next chapter, the Sādhana-samuddeśa, *sādhana* or 'means' is explicitly defined as a capacity (*sāmarthya*) (3.7.1). The following kārikās give

different views on this 'means' as a capacity and its relation (if any) to the substance in which it inheres.

A kārikā which is of particular interest is 3.7.7. Here it is pointed out that a mentalist approach according to which the thing referred to by words is a mental substance (as explained in preceding kārikās), allows for a solution to a problem which arises on the assumption that word meaning is the particular instance. The same problem was solved in a different way in the Jāti-samuddes'a (3.1.27), on the assumption that word meaning is the universal. The problem is: how is it possible that in a sentence like 'he makes the pot', the role of grammatical object is played by something which does not yet exist, namely the pot which is precisely the thing to be produced? Here the solution is possible on the basis of 'mental states': it is the mental state in which the pot is conceived which forms the grammatical object of the action, not the not-yet-existing external pot. This mental state is still an individual instance, though not an external object. The solution presented here, and the fact that it is explicitly said to be based on the assumption that the individual instance is the word meaning,⁵³ are just indications of the fact that the entire 'mentalist approach' (3.7.3-7) presupposes the view that the word meaning is the individual instance,⁵⁴ and that it solves problems (relation word - external thing) which would not arise, or which would arise in entirely different terms, if the word meaning was thought to be the universal.

We have seen that in the Jāti-samuddes'a much attention was devoted to the problem of substitutes which are a factor (*sādhana*) in a prescribed action. In the Sādhana-samuddes'a this problem receives very little attention, probably because it is already solved by the discussions in the Jāti-samuddes'a. There, the solution was possible by introducing the notion of *śakti* 'capacity' (3.1.3-5). In the Sādhana-samuddes'a, factor (*sādhana*) is from the beginning defined as a *śakti* 'capacity'. In this samuddes'a it is mentioned only *en passant* that the object in an action may be substituted: in the 3.7.26 it is said, in order to distinguish the grammatical notions *karana* 'instrument' and *hetu* 'cause', that the former can be substituted but not the latter. Helārāja mentions that some explain *karana* here as referring to any *sādhana* or means in an action.

Skipping a lot of interesting and relevant material, we may now turn to the final section of the Sādhana-samuddes'a (3.7.165-167)⁵⁵:

165. On the basis of the fact that an indeclinable is taught in the sense of the ending, it should be inferred that the meaning of the ending is different from the substance, and that it is expressed by the indeclinable.
166. But substance, if it exists in a certain way, than it exists for ever in the same way. This nature of the substance which belongs to it, is not given up even if it is connected with action.⁵⁶
167. Therefore, the substance which is instrument, does not again become the object. Otherwise, each individual substance could become different.

Kārikā 165 returns to a point made earlier (3.7.13-15, 38, 43), namely that the

grammatical means expressed by 'nominal endings etc.' is represented in language as different from the substance (expressed by the nominal stem) to which it belongs. From 166 and 167 it may be understood that the point of departure was all the time that the meaning of the word was first of all the individual substance rather than the universal; the grammatical means, defined as a capacity, and expressed by 'nominal endings etc.', is represented as different from it. The grammatical means is an 'individual instance',⁵⁷ but because it is also argued that it is certainly not *dravya* in the sense of physical substratum, it is easy to see why the word *vyakti* 'individual instance' was used in 3.7.7.

10.3. The Kriyā-samuddeśa

The next chapter in the group of four is the Kriyā-samuddeśa, devoted to 'action'.⁵⁸ At first action is described as it is expressed in language⁵⁹ :

1. To the extent that something which may be either finished or unfinished is expressed as something to be accomplished because it has assumed the form of sequence, it is understood as *kriyā* 'action'.

After this, the nature of 'action' is approached mainly in what may be called a 'logical-atomistic' way, correlated to the view that the individual instance is the primary meaning of the word.⁶⁰

In kārikā 21 there is a switch, explicitly indicated both in the kārikā⁶¹ and by Helārāja,⁶² to the view that the word meaning is the universal. The view that action is a universal will predominate in the remainder of the chapter. In kārikās 34-39, action is described according to different views about the ultimate reality. Some of these, presenting the basis of action as something all-pervading (34) or as an underlying reality (35), have no obvious connections with the view of the word meaning as a universal. But its description in terms of Existence (36) reminds rather of the Jāti-samuddeśa (3.1.33ff). At the end, action is again described in terms of Existence.⁶⁴

- 63ab. And that one meaning called 'Existence' is in one way or the other expressed by specific (verbs).⁶⁴;
64. Just as one and the same person (arthātmā, object- or meaning-element, here: person) is referred to as teacher and maternal uncle on the basis of differences between the (persons) related to him, so is the case with 'cooking' and 'being'.

On the analogy with the preceding two Samuddeśas, we might have expected a clear description of action in terms of 'capacities', but such a description is not found in the Kriyā-samuddeśa. 'Capacity' does play a role in kārikās 34 and 36, where it belongs to the All-pervading or to Existence, and makes it appear in different forms. In 14 the capacity of a following element in an action was superimposed upon an earlier one. But action itself is not defined as a capacity in this Samuddeśa. Only in the preceding Sādhana-samuddeśa it was pointed out that action may serve as a means (3.7.16-17; also 3.7.34 in Phullarāja's interpretation), which, in turn, was defined as a capacity (3.7.1).

Can it then be maintained that for *kriyā* sas universal, 'the word *kriyā* is by no means fixed', as stated in 3.6.1? The answer should here probably be parallel to the answer to

the question whether the word as expressive of the universal is well-established or not according to the Jāti-samuddeśa. Inasmuch as the words express the ultimate universal, i.e. Existence, their meaning is absolute and they are as such well-established. But inasmuch as individual word meanings are only divisions of this Existence, their specific meaning is not absolute in itself. The same is true for verbs expressing action. Inasmuch as they all ultimately express the one verb-meaning 'Existence', they are well-established. But inasmuch as individual verbs express this Existence only in a certain way, their meaning is not so absolute and they are not so well-established. It would thus be only the verbs *as* and *bhu* 'to be', which would express this Existence in its full form.

In any case, the Kriyā-samuddeśa starts with views corresponding to the 'individual instance' view and in that sense the introductory kārikā 3.6.1 applied also to this Samuddeśa.

10.4. The Kāla-samuddeśa

Next, in the Kāla-samuddeśa, it is again the 'individual instance' view which first receives all attention. Kārikā 1 defines *kāla*, in accordance with the Vaiśeṣika-thinkers, as 'one permanent all-pervading substance'. This and numerous other views on time are subsequently explained (cf. the survey given by Peri in the introduction to his translation: Peri, 1972:13-17). Having discussed a great number of these views, Bhartṛhari observes⁶⁵:

58. Whether (time) is a capacity present in the understanding, or rather really existing outside, verbal usage is not possible without having recourse to an entity 'time'.

Here, the view that time is something mental is opposed to the view that it is something external. Whatever be the case, in verbal usage one has to make use of the notion of time.

Elsewhere in the Kāla-samuddeśa, the notion of *śakti* 'capacity' plays again an important role; aspects of time are referred to as 'capacities' (3.9.24 with *kālaśakti* as Tatpuruṣa 3.9.49, 50, 51). There is also a general reference to time as a capacity : *śaktyātmadevatāpakṣair bhinnam kālasya darśanam*, "The understanding of time is different with the views (that it is) a capacity, the self, a deity (respectively)." Thus, a very important view in the Kāla-samuddeśa, which considers time a capacity,⁶⁷ and therefore something not absolutely well-defined in itself, is again in accordance with VP 3.6.1.

11. The Puruṣa, Saṃkhyā-, Upagraha- and Liṅga-samuddeśa

It has been pointed out above that while the first four chapters of the group of eight are introduced by Helārāja with reference to the first kārikā of the Dik-samuddeśa, the next four chapters, Puruṣa, Saṃkhyā-, Upagraha- and Liṅga-samuddeśa, are presented by him as a kind of addenda.⁶⁷ The first three of these chapters refer to notions which become manifest together with the verb-meaning (bhava, 'Being') expressed by the verb. These are, (apart from *kāla* 'time', to which one of the previous chapters was devoted) *puruṣa* 'person', *saṃkhyā* 'number', and *upagraha* 'aspect.' While some of the notions discussed so far are not only expressed by verbs but also by nouns (Helārāja mentions

sādhana and *saṃkhyā*, VP IIIb:130.2), the last among the four additional chapters discusses a notion which is expressed only by nouns, namely *liṅga* 'gender'.

In each chapter, the nature of the notion under discussion is explained. It is also explained how the notion under discussion is expressed in language (especially 3.10.1-2; 3.11.4-11; 3.12.1-4; 3.13.3). And finally, it is pointed out that the correlation between 'how things really are' and how they are expressed in language is often problematic (3.10.2ab; 3.11.2; 3.12.5cd; 3.13.7-10, 28cd-29). The problems concern the relation between 'actual' or 'external' reality and the way things are expressed in language. It is pointed out that there is no direct or necessary correlation between the way things are expressed in language and the way they really are. This lack of a direct and necessary correlation may imply that the speaker has some freedom in representing a thing as he wants (on account of *vivakṣā* 'the speaker's intention': 3.12.5, 3.13.19, 3.13.24), or that verbal usage makes people express things in a certain way even though it does not correspond to reality (3.11.5, 3.13.29).

While the (specific) 'thing-meant' of the notions under discussion may in some cases be a universal (e.g. in at least one of the views regarding *liṅga* 'gender'), there is no indication that a universal necessarily intervenes. The specific problems arising for the understanding of number (*saṃkhyā*) as expressed in verbal and nominal endings, were already discussed in the *Jāti-samuddeśa* (49ff) on the acceptance of the 'universal' view. The *Samkhyā-samuddeśa* can therefore focus on the problems which arise if the substance is first of all expressed, and on more general semantic and grammatical-technical problems involved in the linguistic expression of 'number'.

12. Some observations

We may conclude this discussion of the third *Kāṇḍa* with a few observations:

(1) If the main theoretical division in the second *Kāṇḍa* is the division between the acceptance of either the sentence or the word as primary, the main theoretical division within the third *Kāṇḍa* is no doubt that between the 'universal' and the 'substance' view. The opposition between these two is pointed out at the beginning of the first or *Jāti-samuddeśa*, and plays a role, sometimes more manifest, sometimes more at the background, also in the other chapters.

(2) In the third *Kāṇḍa*, as in the previous ones, there is a tendency to pay positive attention to quite divergent views, and usually there is no absolute commitment to one view to the exclusion of others. The approach to the different problems may be characterized as encyclopedic and perspectivistic. Against the background of this perspectivistic approach, there are still theoretical preferences, which are usually in accordance with the requirement, inherited from the second *Kāṇḍa*, that individual word meanings, if at all accepted, have no well-defined, independent status.

With regard to the opposition universal-individual substance, the picture which emerges at the end is the following. While it is possible to consider all word meanings

to be either universals or individual substances, the word meaning of the verb — action — is preferably conceptualized as a universal, and the word meaning of nouns — factors in the action — as individual things. These individual things are capacities rather than substances. Other notions such as person and number specify the individual factor and/or the action. But even action may be conceived of as an individual, and even factors in the action may be conceived of as universals. The opposition which determines so much in the structure of the third Kāṇḍa is therefore not absolute, but dependent on the perspective one takes.⁶⁹

(3) Because of Bharṭṛhari's perspectivistic approach to theoretical problems, it is of the utmost importance to be aware of the place a certain discussion occupies within the entire Kāṇḍa, in order to be able to judge the relative value attributed by Bharṭṛhari to that discussion. Some insight into the structure of this huge Kāṇḍa is indispensable. Because several contrasts and oppositions are playing a role, one may understand the structure in several ways. Without denying the possibility of seeing other meaningful structures, I will here propose the following.

The first division of the text which forces itself on the reader is that between the colossal last chapter and the rest. The last chapter discusses problems relating to compounds and derivatives, the others problems mainly relating to simple words (and smaller units). The contents of the Bhūyo-dravya-samuddeśa and the Guṇa-samuddeśa are intimately related. With Helārāja they may be taken as a single chapter, Guṇa-samuddeśa^{Hel}. Next, the remaining 12 chapters (all except the last or Vṛtti-samuddeśa) may be divided as follows. The Jāti-samuddeśa forms one 'group' in which problems are approached first of all from the 'universal' view, as opposed to the remaining 11 in which the problems are, at least initially, approached from the 'individual substance' view. The Dravya-samuddeśa alone does not suffice to 'counterbalance' the discussions in the Jāti-samuddeśa: the Jāti-samuddeśa discusses many aspects of the 'universal' as word meaning from quite divergent points of view, whereas the Dravya-samuddeśa highlights only one aspect of 'substance' as word meaning from quite divergent points of view, whereas the Dravya-samuddeśa highlights only one aspect of 'substance' as word meaning from a single point of view. Because the Saṃbandha-samuddeśa, Guṇa-samuddeśa^{Hel}, etc. continue and supplement the discussion started in the Dravya-samuddeśa, the justification for the separate existence of the Bhūyo-dravya-samuddeśa ('further chapter on dravya'), which was already weak, becomes even more deficient.

Another major dividing line can be perceived as follows: the first three Samuddeśas focus on things which are valid for all word meanings: they are all universals, or the substance; and each has a relation with a word. Next, the first kārikās of the Guṇa-samuddeśa^{Hel} reintroduce the subject matter of the third Kāṇḍa for more specific word meanings (which were partly already discussed from the point of view of the universal as main word meaning). After the fundamental dichotomy between *dravya* and *guṇa* is introduced in the Guṇa-samuddeśa^{Hel}, the eight following chapters deal with more specific

grammatical-semantic notions. They subdivide further into the first and the last four chapters. The first four, dealing with four notions of major importance, are separately introduced by a verse at the beginning of the first of these (3.6.1). The verse suggests that these notions are not absolute and well-defined. The Samuddeśas explain them usually as capacities, but in the latter half of the Kriyā-samuddeśa action is a universal. The last four chapters deal with four additional grammatical notions and the questions: how are they expressed in language, and how do they correspond to reality ?

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- VP IIIb = Vākyapadīya, third Kāṇḍa, pt. 2 (kriya—Vṛtti samuddeśa), with Helārāja's commentary, edition Iyer, 1973. (Number refer to Page.line.)
- VV = Vighrahavyāvartanī. Edition and Translation: The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna Vighrahavyāvartanī, Second Edition (Revised and Enlarged), Translated from the original Sanskrit with Introduction and Notes by K. Bhattacharya; text critically edited by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst.

FOOT NOTES :

1. Bhate and Khar published an index to the VP in 1992. The index is based on the text as given in Rau's edition. Rau's text has been reproduced without the critical apparatus, and without indicating that some text portions are not found in manuscripts of an entire branch in the stemma (Rau gives these portions in a smaller type, because they may not have belonged to the archetype). A few misprints and mistakes in Rau 1977 and 1988 are tacitly corrected in Bhate and Khar, 1992, e.g. VP 2.127d, last word *vācyataṃ*-> *vācyatām* in Bhate and Khar, 1992, p. 14 of text; Index, Rau 1988 *praciti*-> *pracita* in Bhate and Khar, 1992:120.
2. See my discussion of VP 1.172 and 173, in "Bharṭṭhari's Perspectivism (1): The Vṛtti and Bharṭṭhari's Perspectivism in the first Kāṇḍa of Vākyapadīya" (forthcoming); and the discussion of VP 3.1.42 and 43 below.
3. Two other articles in preparation are devoted to Bharṭṭhari's perspectivism in the first and second Kāṇḍa. Article no. 4 in this series (a preliminary version of which was presented as a paper at the World Sanskrit conference in Melbourne, January 1994) discusses Bharṭṭhari's familiarity with technical and doctrinal aspects of Jaina thinkers, in order further to illustrate the scope of his perspectivism and his encyclopedic approach. In one or more subsequent articles, I hope to deal with possible philosophical similarities and contrasts between Bharṭṭhari's perspectivism and Jainism and Vedānta, which developed a perspectivism which is clearly subservient to the deeper aim of proving the superiority of the own view. The numbers of the articles indicate the order in which they should be read at the end, but say nothing about the order of finalization or publication.
4. The second Kāṇḍa discusses a whole gamut of views on the sentence and the word, their meanings, their mutual relations (word and sentence, word and sentence-meaning, word-meaning and sentence-meaning, etc.) and the relative, linguistic and philosophical importance of the different units. The two extreme positions between which all views have a certain place are the position according to which the sentence and its meaning are entirely indivisible, and the position according to which it is merely a combination of individual words and word meanings. Statements representing the radical 'indivisible sentence' position are often qualified in preceding or following statements. Even if word meanings are said to be inexistent, they are assigned a role as the means towards the understanding of the full meaning (2.43-414); or they can be analyzed afterwards from the sentence meaning (2.443,445); or the sentence meaning, a flash of intuition, is brought about by the word meaning (2.143). In another group of theories, the reality of individual word meanings is not utterly denied, but they are said to be neither existent nor non-existent (2.428), or not independent (2.423-424), or not fixed (2.445-446). From all these points of view, as from the point of view that word meanings are well-defined individual basic units, it is necessary to discuss the word and its meaning.
5. 3.1.1. *dvidhā kaiścit padaṃ bhinnam caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā /
apoddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyādivat //*
3.1.2. *padārthānām apoddhāre jātir vā dravyam eva vā /
padārthau sarvaśabdānām nityāv evopavarṇitau //*
6. *tad evaṃ śabdārthayoḥ sambandham uktvā...* "Having explained thus the relation between

word and meaning..." (VP IIIa:182.1).

7. There are other Samuddeśas which are very short (the Puruṣāsamuddeśa consists of only 9 kārikās, the Dik-samuddeśa of 28), but they always contains apart from the definition much more materials which is directly relevant to the subject.
8. The problem crated by references in the VP-Vṛtti and Puṅyarāja's commentary to other Samuddeśas than those found in the available manuscripts has been discussed by Iyer (1969:7-8). It is not certain that these should have formed chapters of the VP.
9. The linguistic relation relevant in the preceding chapters is mainly the relation between individual word and thing-meant or the relation between a lower-level unit and its meaning. In the Vṛtti-samuddeśa, the situation is much more complex. The relation between the compound as a whole and the thing-meant is here only one of the relations that play a role. In addition, the parts of the compound may be thought to have meanings on their own, and thus theoretically it may be asked what the relation is between the parts and the compound, between the parts themselves, between the parts and the meaning of the compound, between the meanings of the parts and the meanings of the compound. This creates a situation parallel to that in the discussion of the sentence and its parts in the second Kāṇḍa.
10. Even if some have clearly distinguished meaning and referent conceptually, Sanskrit philosophers have not agreed on an unequivocal terminology to express the distinction; see Houben, 1992, p. 46ff.
11. In these explanations the emphasis was on the speaker. From the point of view of the listener, the two views may be explained as follows. If an unspecified thing is to be expressed through one of its features, it is first of all this feature that is to be grasped. And this feature should occur in other instances too, otherwise it cannot be recognized as a feature; so it should be a universal feature. Therefore the universal should be grasped first. On the other hand, if a universal feature is made use of, it is only to point to a specific substance to which it is somehow related. So one first understands that ther is some substance, next that it is characterised by this or that universal feature. (One may compare the explanations in the MBhD 6b:26.23ff.)
12. One may compare here the translation and discussion of the relevant pasage (MBh 1:7.8ff) by Joshi and Roodbergen in Joshi and Roodbergen, 1986:100ff.
13. It is asked: "with what padārtha in mind is the following constituent analysis made: *siddhe śabde arthe sambandhe ca* 'when the word, the meaning and (their) relation are *siddha*'?" Joshi and Roodbergen (1986:100) translate *padārtha* here as 'meaning (of the word *siddha*)', but it is better to follow the explanation in the MBhD: the question concerns the meaning conveyed by a word in general: is it a universal or a substance ? (MBhD 1:22ff).
14. Because the Mīmāṃsakas defended that the word meaning is univrsal (Jaimini Sūtra 1.3.33-35), one may expect Bhartṛhari to pay attention, especially in this Jāti-samudeśa, to the Mīmāṃsakas' argumentation and the context of their argumentation (namely, Vedic ritual). But this is not the place to elaborate on the complex relation between Bhartṛhari and the Mīmāṃsakas (one may compare, f.i. Bronkhorst in Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik no. 15 (1989): 101-117).
15. The continuity in the three kārikās 3.1.2-5 discussing the problem is that the notion of śakti

plays a crucial role in each. According to Helārāja (VP IIIa: 13.11-12) three different solutions of the problem are given in these kārīkās.

16. 3.1.6 *svajātiḥ (SI: svā jātiḥ) prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate / tato 'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā //*
17. I interpret *adhyāropakalpanā* as 'the making or creating of a superimposition -> the fact that A is superimposed on B'. Helārāja understands *kalpanā* 'the idea or postulation' as an indication that the superimposition or identity are merely imagined. But *kalpanā* may simply mean 'making, performing' just as *kalpate* in 8 means 'to perform'. The kārīkā describes a process in the mind, but there need not be any suggestion of contrast between reality and what happens in the mind.
18. As a Tatpuruṣa *artha-jāti-* would mean 'the universal inhering in the meaning or the thing-meant'. But if the meaning is itself a universal, e.g. in the case of the word 'universal' one would prefer to interpret it as a karmadhāraya, 'the universal which is the meaning', because the universal of the universal is impossible according to Vaiśeṣika (see below).
19. 3.1.11. *arthajātyabhidhāne 'pi sarve jātyabhidhāyinaḥ / vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ //*
20. 3.1.12. *jātau padārthe jātir vā viśeṣo vāpi jātivat / śabdair apekṣyate yasmād atas te jātivācīnaḥ //*
21. 3.1.13. *dravyadharmā padārthe tu dravye sarvo 'rtha ucyate / dravyadharmāśrayād dravyam ataḥ sarvo 'rtha iṣyate //*
22. Thus according to Akalujkar's summary in the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol 5 (1990:154, my emphasis): "So, even according to the view (*not accepted by the author*) that words designate substances (that is, particulars) they do so by virtue of having the properties of substances". It does not seem proper to speak of the non-acceptance of the view (emphasized phrase) by Bhartṛhari, but it was, of course, neither the exclusively accepted view.
23. Cf. the Dravyasamuddeśa, 3.3.73 and 3.4.1.
24. 3.1.19. *anupravṛttirūpā yā prakhyā tām ākrīṭim viduḥ / ke cid vyāvṛttirūpām tu dravyatvena pracakṣate //*
25. 3.1.33. *sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu / jātir ity ucyate tasyām sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ //*
26. The view reminds of the Mīmāṃsakas. Helārāja cites the dictum *na kadācid anīdr̥ṣam jagat* 'there was never a world which was not similar to this one' (which precludes the gradually coming into being of different elements at the beginning of a world-period) (VP IIIa:49.1). The same dictum is later on (VP IIIa:51.21.52.1) explicitly attributed to the followers of Jaimini (Mīmāṃsakas).
27. Helārāja refers here, among others, to Advaitins.
28. 3.1.40. *āśrayaḥ svātmamātrā vā bhāvā vā vyatirekinaḥ / svaśaktayo vā sattāyā bhedadarśanahetavaḥ //*

- 29 *Sattāyāḥ* objective genitive connected with *bheda* in the cpd. Cf. Speyer, 1886:85, {115 and 177f, {231.
- 30 Helārāja, adopting what he considers the ultimate view, explains all views as if the division were not real.
- 31 According to PDhS 211: *buddhi*, *upalabdhi*, *jñāna* and *pratyaya* are synonyms. NS 1.1.15 mention *buddhi*, *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* as synonyms.
- 32 Cf. VV p. 117 n 1 “Sāṅkara criticizes there the Buddhist idealist (Vijñānavādin), who holds that cognition is self-luminous, a lamp...” and Viṃśatikā ViS 10 + (6:21-22): *itarathā hi vijñapter api vijñaptiyantaram arthaṃ syād iti vijñaptimātratvaṃ na sidhyetārthavañtvād vijñapūnām*. A ‘cognition of a cognition’ is impossible also according to other thinkers. For instance, in the Vṛttikāra-portion in ‘Sabara’s Bhāṣya, a cognition of direct perception is said to have a thing as its object, but not another cognition (*arthaviśayā hi pratyakṣabuddhir na buddhyantaraviśayā*, ed. Frauwallner, 1968:28.19). The ‘functional’ approach to cognitions may be recognized in kārikās 23-24 of the Saṃbandhāsamuddeśa. Cf. discussion under these kārikās, in Houben, 1992.
- 33 According to Helārāja, the view in 105 belongs also to the Saṃsarga-view. We do not know whether or not the Saṃsarga-view is for Helārāja entirely synonymous with Vaiśeṣika-view, but it may be pointed out that the view explained in the kārikās starting with 105 can hardly have been accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas as we know them. In their system, all categories and categorizable objects are by definition knowable (this was clearly pronounced for the first time (as far as we know) by Praśastapāda in the well-known dictum *saññām api padārthānām astivābhidheyatvājñeyatvāni*, there is no reason to think that it would not suit pre-Praśastapāda Vaiśeṣika) and a cognition is known as a quality of the self. Also in the closely related Nyāya-system (as in the Buddhist school of Sarvāstivāda), a cognition can be cognized in another cognition, it can be both cognizer and cognized. Bronkhorst has pointed out that Nyāya shared with Sarvāstivāda the views that mental states can be observed (1985a:108; 127n 3a), that the three times (past, present, future) exist, and that more than one mental state cannot occur at the time in one person (1985a:127). As cognitions cannot be simultaneous (NS 1.1.16), the cognizing cognition and the cognized cognition should belong to different times.
- 34 The Dravyāsamuddeśa contains some of the main passages adduced as support for the thesis that Bhartṛhari’s persuasion would be exclusively Advaita Vedāntic (Sharma, 1975). Yet, it should be admitted that some passages in the Dravyāsamuddeśa are easily reinterpreted in a (Buddhist) vijñānavāda sense.
- 35 3.2.5 *ākāraś ca vyavacchedāt sārvarthyam avarudhyate |
yathaiiva cakṣurādīnāṃ sāmartyaṃ nālikādibhiḥ ||*
- 36 3.2.2 *satyaṃ vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate |
asatyopādhibhiḥ śabdaiḥ satyaṃ evābhidhīyate ||*
- 37 In the MBhD it is explained that ‘universals etc.’ are the qualifiers of the substance and the limiting features of the word: MBhD, 1:15.25-26: *jātyādayas tu bhedakā dravyasya sattvaṃ vaktum upādhibhūtās te śabdasyeti*. Since we have seen that in the previous chapter the status of specific universals was not absolute on several views, they also leave the status of the

specific word meaning indeterminate, if they are considered to be the limiting factors of the individual substance.

38 3.4.1-2 *saṃsargaūpāt saṃbhūtaḥ saṃvidrūpād apoddhṛtāḥ /
śāstre vibhaktā vākyārthāt prakṛtipratyayādivat //
nimittabhūtāḥ sādhutve śāstrād anumitātmakāḥ /
ke cit padārthā vakṣyante saṃkṣepeṇa yathāgamam //*

39 3.4.3 *vastūpalakṣaṇaṃ yatra sarvanāma prayujyate /
dravyam ity ucyate so 'rtho bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ //*

40 One could read this kārikā in such a way, that it does not say anything more than that a thing-meant (*artha*) may be represented as the 'substance'; for it should be intended as something to be differentiated. But Vyāḍi's view was referred to by Helārāja as the view that all words simply denote the substance. The reference in the kārikā to the speaker's intention serves, according to Helārāja, to take into account that linguistic meaning (*śabdārtha*) is being dealt with, and not the external object or thing-as-it-is (*vastv-artha*). Thus, even a universal may be represented in language as an individual substance to be specified, irrespective of the fact that it is in fact not an individual substance (VP IIIa:187.17-188.3). Cf. MBhD 1:15.25-28.

41 3.5.1 *saṃsargi bhedakaṃ yad yat savyāpāraṃ pratīyate /
guṇatvaṃ paratantratvāt tasya śāstra udāhṛtam //*

3.5.2 *dravyasyāvyapadeśasya ya upādiyate guṇaḥ /
bhedako vyapadeśāya tatprakarṣo 'bhidhīyate //*

42 On substance and quality in Sanskrit grammatical theory see also Matilal, 1990a:378-389.

43 The Vaiśeṣika side of the problem of qualities and universals was discussed in a few articles by W. Halbfass. Halbfass, 1976, 1979, 1980a. 199, most of which were reprinted in a slightly revised form in: Wilhelm Halbfass, *On being and What There Is, Classical Vaiśeṣika and the History of Indian Ontology*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992 (viii + 303 pp)

44 Cf. Wezler, 1986.

45 Cf. the term *sāmānya-viśeṣa* 'specific universal' in the sūtras, and the *apara-sāmānya* in the PDhS.

46 MBhD, 1:15.25-26: *jātyādayas tu bhedakā dravyasya sattvaṃ vaktum / upādhibhūtās te śabdasyeti/Cf. translation MBhD 1:65.*

47 The word is in this context perhaps better translated as 'anything dependent on a substance' or 'secondary thing' (as opposed to *pradhāna*, 'the primary or main thing').

48 *Iti jāter api pāraṇtryāt dravye samavāyād guṇatvam uktam* (VP IIIa:193.6).

49 This is clear from the wording in the introductory lines to each chapter (with *uddiṣṭā* 'referred to', and a reference to the place of the notion under discussion in the enumeration in 3.6.1). The reference seems to have been overlooked by Bandini (1980) and Peri Sarvesvara (1972); Bergdahl and Iyer show awareness of it in the Sādhana- and Kāla-samuddeśa respectively (Bergdahl, 1988:67; Iyer, 1974:36).

50 3.6.1 *dik sādhanam kriyā kāla iti vastvabhīdhāyinaḥ /
śaktirūpe padārthānām atyantam anavasthitāḥ //*

51 VP IIIa: 209.4-11. On the basis of the Sanskrit only, one could understand that the elements 'denoting things' are words or other elements (like nominal endings) expressing 'direction', 'means', 'action', 'time'. For the following chapters will show how 'direction' is expressed by words like *pūrva* and *apara* (3.6.9) and in certain circumstances through the fifth and sixth nominal ending (3.6.21); the 'means' is expressed through nominal endings and sometimes secondary nominal affixes (3.7.13, 43); 'action' is conveyed by the verbal root (3.8.52); and 'time' through verbal endings and affixes (e.g. 3.9.94-98). If 3.6.1 is interpreted in this way, the expression *dik sādhanam kriyā kāla iti* does not cite the respective four words, but refers to the things expressed by these elements.

52 3.6.17 *sarvatra tasya kāryasya darśanād vibhur iṣyate /
vibhutvam etad evāhur anyah kāyavatām vidhiḥ //*

Because its effect is seen everywhere, [direction] is accepted as omnipresent.

That is called its omnipresence; the situation of corporeal things is different.

53 The formulation 3.7.7, *vyaktau padārthe... sādhanatvam tathā siddham*, shows that it was all the way presupposed that the individual instance was the word meaning (otherwise, if the author switched only here to this view after first presupposing the other view, one would expect an expression with *tu*).

54 The same applies to the famous passage in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (3.3.39-51) where Secondary Existence is introduced to solve certain semantic problems.

55 3.7.165 *vibhaktyarthe 'vyayībhāvavacanād avasīyatām /
anyo dravyād vibhaktyarthaḥ so 'vyayenābhīdhīyate //*
166 *dravyam tu yad yathābhūtam tad atyantam tathā bhavet /
kriyāyoge (SI: kriyābhede) 'pi tasyāsau dravyātmā nāpahīyate //*
167 *tasmād yat karaṇam dravyam tat karma na punar bhavet /
sarvasya vānyathābhāvas tasya dravyātmano bhavet //*

56 *kriyāyoge Iyer, however, reads: kriyābhede.*

57 Although, from a Vaiśeṣika point of view, the grammatical means may be specific universals in some - but not all - cases: 3.7.10cd, 11.

58 In addition to Iyer's sometimes paraphrasing translation of the *kārikās*, one may refer to the translation (into German) of the *kārikās* and Helārāja's commentary by Bandini, 1980 (*Kriyā-samuddeśa*).

59 3.8.1 *yāvat siddham asiddham vā sādhyatvenābhīdhīyate /
āśritakramarūpatvāt tat kriyeti pratīyate //*

60 Helārāja, VP IIIb: 18.13-15; 19.1-3; Bandini, 1980:48.

61 21a: *jātim anye kriyām āhur.*

62 VP IIB: 18.15:... *idānīm jātivādimatenāha*, "...now he says according to the view that the universal (is denoted by the word)."

3.8.21 *jātim anye kriyām āhur anekavyaktivartinīm /
asādhyā vyaktirūpeṇa sā sādhyevopalabhyate //*

63 3.8.63ab *ekaś ca so 'rthaḥ sattākhyah kathaṃ cit kaiś cid ucyate /*

3.8.64 *ācāryo mātulaś ceti yathaiko vyapadiśyate /
sambandhibhedād arthātmā sa vidhiḥ paktibhāvayoh //*

64 The second line refers to a problem - not relevant in our discussion - in connection with nominal forms referring to actions such as *pakti* 'cooking', *bhāva* 'being', and the grammatical gender they have as nouns.

65 3.9.58 *jñānānugataśaktiṃvā bhāyaṃvā satyataḥ sthitam /
kālatamānam anāśritya vyavahartuṃ na śakyate //*

66 In the first or Brahma-kāṇḍa, third kārikā, time was described as the 'time-capacity' (*kālaśakti* as Karmadhāraya, 1.3b). There, it belonged to *brahman śabdatattva*, but in the Kālasamuddeśa, as in the entire third Kāṇḍa, the word brahman is conspicuous by its absence. (Also in the second Kāṇḍa, brahman is absent, except for 2.237 where it figures in an illustration for a theoretical point.) Places in the Kāla-samuddeśa which could answer the question 'time, a capacity of what?' are 3.9.58 (it is a capacity present in the understanding), and 3.9.59 (it belongs to each *bhāva* 'entity'; note the v.1 in some mss with *bhāvasya* in singular).

67 An explicit relativization of this opposition— one may read it already in the first kārikās of the third Kāṇḍa— is found in the Vṛtti-samuddeśa, which we had excluded from our discussion:

3.14. 355. *aprthakśabdavācyasya jātir āśrīyate yadā /
dravyasya sati saṃsparśe tadā jātipadārthatā //*

356. *dravyasya sati saṃsparśe dravyam āśrīyate yadā /
vācyamtenaiva śabdena tadā dravyapadārthatā //*

357. *aprthakśabdavācyāpi bhedamātre pravartate /
yadā sambandhavaj jātiḥ sāpi dravyapadārthatā //*

358. *atyantabhinnayor eva jātidravyābhidhāyinoḥ /
avācyasyopakāritva āśrite tūbhayārthatā //*

355. If one has recourse to the universal, even though the substance, not expressed by a separate word, is touched upon, then the word meaning is the universal.

356. If the individual substance is touched upon, and if one has recourse to the substance as what is expressed by that very word, then the word meaning is the substance.

357. If the universal, though not expressed by a separate word, functions merely to distinguish [the substance], just as relation [in a compound functions merely to distinguish the thing related], then too the word meaning is the substance.

358. But the two which express the universal and the substance [respectively], and which are entirely distinct, have both meanings if it is accepted that [the universal and the individual substance respectively] assist the [other] which was not expressed.

NĀṬYAŚĀSTRA AND INDIAN THEATRE*

Radhavallabh Tripathi

LIST OF ABBRIVATIONS

- NŚ : *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata, Edn. published from Oriental Institute, Baroda in four Volumes.
- Abh. : *Abhinavabhāraṭī* commentary on NŚ by Abhinavagupta, published in the Edn. of NŚ as above.
- Abhinava : Abhinavagupta,
- Mal. / Mālavikā. : *Mālavikāgnimitram* of Kālidāsa.
- Vikram. / Vik. : *Vikramorvaṣīyam* of Kālidāsa
- K. : Kālidāsa.
- Br. : *Brāhmaṇa*
- KSS : *Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra*
- MB. : *Mahābhārata*

The word *Nāṭya*, literally meaning the practice of a dancer or an actor has been defined in lexicons as the combination of dance, singing and playing of musical instruments¹. *Tauryatrika* and *Lāśya* are mentioned as its synonymms.²

In the tradition of NŚ, the concept of *Nāṭya* embraces all the functions of theatre. *Nāṭya* has been viewed here in the light of our philosophical traditions within an ethical and cultural framework. The values and social functions of art have also been kept in view in the concept of *Nāṭya* in our tradition.

Technically, *Nāṭya* lies in the practice of the artistes. Therefore, the word *prayoga* rightly comes to be equated with it. The externalised form of *Nāṭya*, to be visualised by an audience, is *prayoga*³. Sometimes it is also termed as *abhinaya*⁴. Kalidasa rightly suggests that *prayoga* is sine qua one of *Nāṭyaśāstra*⁵. This is the practical outlook with regards to the concept of *Nāṭya* and accordingly the definitions of *Nāṭya*, to quote Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* can be simplified in the following terms :

योऽयं स्वभावो लोकस्य सुखदुःखसमन्वितः । सोऽङ्गाद्यभिनयोपेतो नाट्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥ (NŚ. I.119)

Prayoga and *abhinaya* are therefore invariably linked to *Nāṭya*, but they definitely do not cover the hole gamut of *Nāṭya*. To understand *Nāṭya* in its totality, we will have to turn to its creative process starting from subtle psychological levels and leading to the manifestation of *Nāṭya* in an audio-visual form.

Nāṭya is created on three levels. First, a poetic or dramatic piece is created by an author, which is subsequently taken up for production on the stage by the performing artists. Visualisation of this stage production by an audience forms the final stage of *Nāṭya*.

* Lecturers Delivered under the Annual Lecture series of L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad - 1989.

Thus, a poet or a dramatist is the first creator of *Nāṭya*. He adopts word as his medium. According to NŚ, the contents presented by the poet or the dramatist through this medium of word comprise *lokavṛtta* (behaviour of the people) or *bhāva* (that which has already happened or that which is going to happen in our world). The word 'avasthā' is also used sometimes to denote the contents of *Nāṭya*⁶. The poet creates *Nāṭya* by re-telling that which has already happened. The NŚ terms it as *bhāvānukīrtana*⁷, while the tradition of epics defines it as 'anuvyāharana'⁸.

The stage-performance tends to re-design this literary or dramatic piece. It has to be trans-created through the language and idiom of theatre by the actors. In the creative process of an actor performing on the stage, his own body becomes his medium. Through his speech physical gesticulations, concentration within his own psyche and by proper utilisation of the stage-properties, he creates a theatrical Universe. This process has been termed as 'anukarana' (re-doing) in NŚ.

The performance of the actor is re-captured through aesthetic sensibility and imagination by an ideal spectator. This is the culmination of the creative process of *Nāṭya*, where the creativity of a dramatist and the efforts of the actor enable the audience to identify themselves with the world belonging to a different plane of time and space. According to NŚ, this is *anudarśana* or *anubhāvana* (re-seeing or feeling again)⁹. Abhinavagupta substitutes it by the term 'anuvyavasāya'¹⁰ which is imbued with philosophical meaning.

Thus from the poet's point of view, *Nāṭya* is basically *anukīrtana*. It is *anukarana* for the actor; and *anudarśana* or *anubhāvana* for the audience. The process of creating the *Nāṭya* undergoes through a trio comprising the poet's vision, the actor's disposition and the sensibility of the spectator. But this creative process does not go in a linear order, and none of the three elements responsible for the creation of *Nāṭya* works in isolation to the others. Nor can it be singled out from the others. The trinity of *anukīrtana*, *anukarana* and *anudarśana* forms one single cause for the manifestation of *Nāṭya*. We can define the *Nāṭya-hetu* (cause of *Nāṭya*) on the lines of Mammata in the following way : अनुकीर्तनानुकरणानुदर्शनानि तस्य नाट्यस्य उद्भवे निर्माणे समुल्लासे च हेतुर्न हेतवः ।

In case anyone of these members of the trio appears to be missing, its effects materialise through the assimilation of its characteristics by the other two.

This intricate process of creation of *Nāṭya* running on three levels in a cyclic order involves multi-dimensional structure of time and space. Bharata rightly says that the word of *Nāṭya* incorporates all the three worlds¹¹. The three worlds involve not only multi-dimensional space, but various dimensions of time also. If *Nāṭya* is re-doing or re-telling of that which has happened, it is also correlated with that which is happening or going to happen. The past and the present are, thus, treated together in *Nāṭya* and this treatment also tends to extend beyond the spheres of the past and the present, expanding its frontiers towards future. It reveals the shape of things to come : भविष्यत्श्च लोकस्य सर्वकर्मानुदर्शकम् । (NŚ, I. 14)

Rooted in his own time, the poet interpretes the historical or mythological time, which is further represented by the actor on the stage and is re-visualised by the spectator. The treatment of time and space does not involve this multiplicity and variety of layers in any other art-form.

The above view of *Nāṭya* presents its concept in the context of its creative process. There is one more way to understand what *Nāṭya* is, i.e. by analysing its structure. Bharata says that there are five elements constituting *Nāṭya*¹², while Kohala, his able student, further expands the idea of the fundamental elements of *Nāṭya* by suggesting the *nāṭyasamgraha* (the digest of theatre) which comprises the following eleven elements, and the treatment of these eleven elements forms the subject matter of the whole of the NŚ :

- Rasa (Chap. VI)
- Bhāva (Chap. VII)
- Abhinaya (Chap. VIII-XXVI)
- Dharmī (Chap. XIII)
- Vṛtti (Chap. IXX)
- Pravṛtti (Chapp. XIII)
- Siddhi (Chap. XXVII)
- Svara (Chap. XXVIII)
- Ātodya (Chap. Chap. IXXX-XXXI)
- Gāna (Chap. XXXII)
- Raṅga (Chap. II-III)

These eleven elements have been listed above in the same order as in a single *kārikā* of NŚ (VI.10)¹³, indicating a continuum, the sequential order therein working both from the right and the reverse sides completing the circuitous process of the manifestation of *Nāṭya*.

We have discussed the three levels of the creative process for materialisation of *Nāṭya* where the poet stands at the first end. He creates a play out of *Rasa*. The overpowering nature of *Rasa* oozing the heart of the poet leads him to the expression of *bhāvas*¹⁴, projecting the *dharmī* the *vṛtti* and the *pravṛtti* of a particular play. The actor however, stands on the platform of the theatre. He is supported by the music, orchestra or songs and then he starts his *abhinaya* in accordance with the *vṛttis*, the *pravṛttis* and the *dharmī* respectively, ultimately reaching the expression of *Rasa* via *bhāvas*. The spectator also first sees the *raṅga* the stage or the theatre — with its paraphernalia, and then is attuned to the musical notes or the orchestra, then grasps the *vṛttis* and *pravṛttis* of the play in performance and then ultimately realises *Rasa*. Thus, in the *nāṭyasamgraha*, the journey of *Nāṭya* starts from *Rasa* and ends in *Rasa*, the sequence of the employment of its various elements varying according to the requirements of the

poet, the actor or the spectator.

The followers of Udbhata had objected to the order of the presentation of the eleven elements in the *Kārikā* of NŚ, arguing that *raṅga* (theatre) should be counted as no.1, then *gāna* and so on. Lollaṭa refuted them and he tried to justify the order as given by Bharata or Kohala, on the following grounds : (i) *Rasa* and *bhāvas* are inherent within the actor in an instinctive form; (ii) they form the internal landscape and are the desideratum; (iii) in the *nāṭyasamgraha*, the order of employment of the eleven elements is not meant to be mentioned successively¹⁵. We can, however, better appreciate the order in which the eleven fundamental elements of *Nāṭya* have been mentioned if we take Abhinavagupta's view-point into account. The process of *Nāṭya* goes on at various levels. The author or the dramatist and the actor stand on the creative side, and the spectator stands at the receiving end. The author creates a poem out of *Rasa*, which leads to *bhāva*, which determines the mode of *abhinaya* forming the *vṛttis* and the *pravṛttis*. Thus, the successive order of employment from the dramatist's point of view may be shown as under : *Rasa*—>*bhāva*—>*abhinaya*—>*dharmī*—>*vṛtti*—>*pravṛtti*, etc.

From the dramatist's point of view, *raṅga* or theatre may come in the last, but an actor starts his activity on it. Therefore, from the actor's point of view, the creation of *Nāṭya* will run through the successive employment of the fundamental elements in the following way : *Raṅga* —> *gāna* —> *ātodya* —> *svara* —> *siddhī* —> *pravṛtti* —> *vṛtti* —> *dharmī* —> *abhinaya* —> *bhāva* —> *Rasa*.

In this way, we can say that, the creative activity of *Nāṭya* embraces both the right and reverse orders of the employment of these eleven elements. *Nāṭya*, however, lies in the integration or sythesis of these fundamental elements. *Abhinava*, therefore, has rightly emphasised over its collective nature by calling it '*samudāyarūpa*'. The proper combination, interaction and corelation of these eleven fundamental elements becomes *Nāṭya*. *Nāṭya*, thus, lies in the linkage of these elements through a continuous cyclic process with interdependence. These elements constitute both body and soul of *Nāṭya*. *Itivṛtta* (the plot) or *lokavṛtta* forms its body¹⁶ and *Rasa* is its soul.

Rasa, *bhāva*, *abhinaya*, *dharmī vṛtti* and *pravṛtti* these six elements constitute the interior of *Nāṭya*. We can define their relationship with *Nāṭya* as that which forms an indivisible bond (*samavāya-vṛtti*) while the remaining five — *siddhi*, *svara*, *ātodya*, *gāna* and *raṅga* — are comparatively external; they can be said to be related to *Nāṭya* by *saṃyoga-vṛtti*. In the creative activity for *Nāṭya* all these interior or internal elements are interlinked.

Raṅga appears to the most external elements. It also appears to be the most earthly of the constituents of the *nāṭyasamgraha*, while the other elements more or less tend to be somewhat ethereal. However, *raṅga* is essentially linked with the whole process of *Nāṭya* culminating in *Rasa*. So far as its shape is concerned, the theatre according to NŚ is of three types — *caturasra* (square), *vikṛṣṭa* (rectangular) and *tryasra* (triangular). These three types are again combined with three types of size - *jyestha* (largest), *madhya*

(medium) and *avara* (small). Thus there are nine types of theatre. Measured either by *hasta* or *danda* these nine types multiply into eighteen, the largest having the capacity to accommodate a few thousand spectators, and the smallest for the selected few¹⁷. This vast range of the types of theatre is to be utilised selectively in co-relation with the other components of *nāṭyasaṃgraha* and also in accordance with the type of the play to be performed. From the point of view of the tempo and mode of performance, the major types of drama (daśarūpakas) are divided into two categories *āviddha* (forceful) and *sukumāra* (graceful).¹⁸ *Ḍima*, *samavakāra*, *vyāyoga*, *Ihāmrga* - these four fall in the first category and the rest of the six in the second. The *āviddha* type, dominated by the *ārabhaṭī vṛttis* with the conspicuousness of the *sāttvaī* requires vigorous movements and larger space. The four divisions of *sāttvaī*, namely *utthāpaka*, *parivartaka*, *samlāpaka* and *saṅghāṭya* comprise the motifs of fight, the spectacle; while the divisions of *ārabhaṭī* require big sets, use of properties, scenes of war and retreat. For the performance of *āviddha* type of plays, therefore, the largest (*jyeṣṭha*) theatre will be suitable, while for the *sukumāra* type, where *kaiśikī vṛtti* predominates, the medium type will be the best. For the smaller plays like *Bhāṇa* and *prahasana*, however, the smallest (*kaniṣṭha*) theatre will be just sufficient, as *Bhāraṭī Vṛtti* which comprises more speech and less action rules in such plays. NŚ thus offers a big range of theatres for the choice of the performer. The architecture and the shape and size of the playhouse are closely linked with the *vṛttis* and, therefore, they not only affect the acoustics — the music, orchestra and the dialogue-delivery, but also have their own impact on the delineation of *pravṛttis* and subsequently on *abhinaya*, *bhāvas* and *Rasa*.

Gāna, the second category in the *nāṭyasaṃgraha*, counting from the reverse side, is likewise closely linked with the other categories. It prepares a ground for the performance of a play. Bharata, therefore, suggests that *gāna* should precede all other items before the start of a play, because it forms the *śayyā* (basis) for the dramatic performance : गीते प्रयत्नः प्रथमं तु कार्यः । शय्यां हि नाट्यस्य वदन्ति गीतिम् ॥

It is in the fitness of things, therefore, that many of the items of *pūrvaraṅga* (preliminary rituals for a dramatic performance) are related to music and orchestra. *Pratyāhāra*, the very first amongst the 19 items of *pūrvaraṅga*, consists of the entrance of the members of the orchestra on the stage, and *avatarāna*, coming just after it, indicates the songstresses taking their proper place. *Ārambha* is the beginning of songs, while the next items — *āśrāvāna*, *vaktrapāṇi* and *parighattana* are all related to musical instruments (*ātodyas*).

Ātodya (instruments) and *svara* (notes) are the next items in the *nāṭyasaṃgraha*. They are directly related to *Rasa*. The employment of *gāna* and *ātodya* with *svara* paves the way for the *siddhi* (success) of the play being performed. The *siddhi* is of two types *daivī* (divine) and *mānuṣī* (human). These two types of *siddhi* are related to the modus operandi in a performance leading to the creation of theatric time and space. If the consciousness of the spectators is completely switched over to this different plane of time

and space and they are so much absorbed therein that they become forgetful of all empirical realities for the time-being, then the performance of the play is heading towards *daivī siddhi*. On the contrary, when the consciousness of the historical present also runs side by side with the realisation of a mythological or the theatric time, it is *mānuṣī siddhi*¹⁹. *Mānuṣī siddhi*, therefore, carries with it an element of alienation. We have talked of the three creators of *Nāṭya* - i. e., the dramatist, the actor and the spectator. They are sometimes involved in their own creations and sometimes they stand apart.

The idea of *siddhi* is corelated to the *pravṛttis*, the *vṛttis* and the *dharmī*. The type of *siddhi* desired to be achieved in a performance will decide its mode of production - its *pravṛtti*, *vṛtti* and *dharmī* and vice versa.

Pravṛtti means the study of man. To be able to inculcate and practice the *pravṛtti* in a play or its performance, a playwright and an actor must observe the habits, temperaments and the day-to-day life of the people. This study of the people encompasses whole of the world and even the entire Universe. But, from the practical point of view of presentation of *pravṛttis* within the frame-work of the theatric Universe, the *pravṛtti* is divided into four categories only - *Āvantī*, *Dākṣiṇātyā*, *Pāñcālī* and *Ardhamāgadhī* covering hypothetically all the areas of this vast peninsula. This fourfold demarcation of the *pravṛtti* is justified by the authors of the NŚ on the basis of the corelation between the *pravṛttis* and the *vṛttis*. It is through the *vṛttis* that the *Nāṭya* established its own identity. Bharata even terms the *vṛttis* as the progenitresses of *Nāṭya* : सर्वेषांभेव काव्यानां मातृका वृत्तयः स्मृताः । आभ्यो विनिःसृतं ह्येतद् दशरूपं प्रयोगतः ॥

(NŚ XVIII.4)

And since there can be only four *vṛttis* in the performance of *Nāṭya*, the number of *pravṛttis* corresponding to each one of the *vṛttis* has been restricted to four. In fact, if the *pravṛtti* is the information regarding the tendencies and the behaviour of the people, *vṛtti* lies in presenting these tendencies and behaviour-patterns in theatric idiom. Abhinava defines *vṛtti* as the line of action (*itikartavyatā*) leading *nāṭya* to its *puruṣārtha*²⁰. The line of action to accomplish any *puruṣārtha* goes through the four channels of speech (*vāk*), mind (*manas*), body (*deha*) in graceful action and body in forceful action. In the performance of *Nāṭya*, *Bhāratī vṛtti* is generated out of speech, *Sātvatī* out of mind and out of graceful gesticulations is born *Kaiśikī*, while forceful movements produce *Ārabhatī vṛttis*²¹.

Bhāratī vṛttis provides dialogues in the performance, *Sātvatī* substantiates them with sentiments or emotions, while *Kaiśikī* imbues *Nāṭya* with beauty and grace; *Kaiśikī* provides it with an impetus to move on with vigour, variety and force. *Vṛttis*, thus, occupy a key-position for the creation of *Nāṭya* and Bharata rightly emphasises over their importance by calling them the mothers of *Nāṭya*.

Nāṭya reaches the potential point vibrating with creative possibilities through *vṛttis* where various tendencies begin to materialise in theatrical forms. *Dharmī* the next

component of the *nātyasaṃgraha*, is the *modus operandi* through which these various tendencies become apparent. *Dharmī* has been defined as the *itikartavyatā* of *Nātya* by Abhinava and *Śāringadeva*²². Viewing the concept of *dharmī* in a wide perspective, Abhinava covers the vast spectrum of the creative process applicable to any art, combining two aspects - *lokānusāritva* (that which follows this earthly world) and *vicitrayogitva* (that which is heightened or deviated²³). The first stands for a faithful account of the real practices prevailing in our world, whereas the second invests them with beauty and grace and brings out their inner core. These two aspects which are common to all art-activity, have been termed in the NS as *lokadharmī* and *nātyadharmī*. Of these, the first manifests where the play projects natural behaviour of characters, depicting various professions and activities of the people as observed in this world. Performance in *lokadharmī* style goes without additional playful flourish of limbs, various conventional gaits or postures. But when the performance has additional decor in speech or other deliberations by the actor, and requires conventional enunciations, it is said to be dominated by *nātyadharmī*.

Dharmī is the fundamental principle in art-creation and its two aspects — *lokadharmī* and *nātyadharmī* are complimentary to each other. In the history of Sanskrit Poetics, the concepts of *svabhāvokti* and *vakrokti* have sprung from these two aspects of *dharmī*, respectively²⁴. Although *lokadharmī* is supposed to be the realistic practice and *nātyadharmī* the idealistic practice, the tradition of *Bhāratīya Nātyaśāstra* always upholds *loka* or *lokavṛtta* as the most essential source of all art activity²⁵. Like rest of the components of the *nātyasaṃgraha*, these two aspects of *dharmī* are naturally dependent on each other even though apparently they look as poles apart, *Lokadharmī* constitutes the basic or raw material, while *nātyadharmī* brings out innovations providing all theatric activity a perspective. The distinction as well as the inter-relation between these two *dharmīs* have been summed up by Bharata as follows : स्वभावो लोकधर्मो तु विभावो नाट्यमेव हि । (NS, XXI. 193)

Lokadharmī is the very nature of things to be represented in *nātya*, It is the *nātyadharmī* which transforms them as *vibhāvas*. To the theorists of NS, therefore, any theatrical activity is impossible without *laukika dharmā* of *lokadharmī*²⁶, but the fact that *nātyadharmī* is the very life of a dramatic performance has also been very well emphasised by them²⁷.

Dharmī, as visualised through the *vṛttis* and the *pravṛtti* indicates the way for adopting the type of *abhinaya* which subsequently leads to the *bhāva* and *Rasa*. This creation of *bhāva* and *Rasa* by *abhinaya* is in fact the *nātya*. As *abhinaya* comprises all the activities of a theatre-artist in performance, *nātya* can also be defined as the act of a *naṭa* : नटकमेव नाट्यं स्यादिति नाट्यविदां मतम् । (BP., II.46, line 15th).

Abhinaya incorporates all the equipments of the actor, and it has four channels, i.e. - the body, the speech, the mind and the qualities or the external objects. Accordingly,

abhinaya is of four types — *āṅgika* (pertaining to the limbs of the body), *vācika* (pertaining to the speech), *sāttvika* (through *sattva* or concentration of mind) and *āhārya* (pertaining to external objects). These four types of *abhinaya* are interrelated to the *dharmī*, *vṛtti*, and *pravṛtti* and are also interrelated to each-other. If the performance is pre-dominated by *nāṭyadharmī* methods, *sāttvika abhinaya* will be conspicuously adopted, but if it is being done in *lokadharmī* style, the emphasis will be shifted to *āhārya* type of *abhinaya*. Thus, the *abhinaya* is regulated by *dharmī* and it leads to the expression and realisation of the *bhāvas*. The *bhāva* comprises the complete environment created by the performer and his acumen on the stage. The *bhāva*, coming from the root *bhū* (*sattāyām*) indicates the amalgum of moods, emotions or sentiments which generate from the combination and practice of the four *abhinayas* proceeding in accordance with the *dharmī*, the *vṛtti* and the *pravṛtti*. The *bhāva* generated in this way culminated in *Rasa*. Bharata has, therefore, accepted the double etymological meaning of *Bhāva* - i.e., that which come into existence is *bhāva*, and that which leads to relish or aesthetic rapture is also *bhāva*. The expression of *bhāvas* on the stage leads to the experience of *Rasa*, which is the summum bonum of the *nāṭya*-performance. Abhinava points out that the concept of *Rasa* has been borrowed from the Upaniṣadic philosophy, where *Rasa* or Ananda is the very quintessence of human life and signifies the Ultimate for which each one of us lives and strives²⁸. All the components of the *nāṭyasamgraha* in the chain lead to *Rasa* and in this way *Nāṭya* proceeds from the outer world to the inner one. But nothing goes on in the *nāṭya* without *Rasa*, as Bharata says : न हि रसादृते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते ।

Rasa, therefore, regulates all the components of the *nāṭyasamgraha* and in समभवन् सर्वे कर्मभावानुदर्शनात् ॥ (iii) ततो भूतगणाः ह to the outer world.

Rasa is called *Vibhāvādisamūhālambanātmaka* and *Vibhāvādiṅvitāvadhī*, i.e. always depending on the combination of various *bhāvas* and fading away with their disappearance. Because of the multiplicity of *bhāvas* within the texture of *Rasa* experience, Vamana and Saṅkuka define *Rasa* as a state replete with opposite or diverse forces — *samplava* or *sambheda*²⁹.

There is nothing beyond and without *Rasa* in *Nāṭya* and *Rasa* is realised at various levels in its creative process. It functions within the author and the dramatist as a creative force its overpowering effect leading him to create a thing of beauty which is joy forever'. Bhaṭṭatauta had presented an analysis of the creative process of the poet and he said : यावत् पूर्णो न चैतेन तावन्नैव वमत्यमुम् । (Q. by Abhinavagupta).

The actor, as discussed above has to concentrate within his psyche or *sattva* in order to be able to project the cause, the stimulants and the ensuants of different emotions on the stage. This concentration leads him to *samādhi* replete with the joy of creation. Finally, this *Rasa* is realised by the connoisseure or the ideal spectator (*sahrdaya prekṣaka*). The impact of *Rasa*, therefore, is conspicuous on all the three fronts of the

nāṭya-process. Considering this all-pervading nature of *Rasa* in theatrical activity, Abhinava goes to the extent of saying that *Rasa* is *Nāṭya* as *Nāṭya* is *Rasa*³⁰. From the point of view of the spectator, this *Rasa* is the state of consciousness in blissful enjoyment. Therefore, Abhinava, when he treats *Nāṭya* and *Rasa* as equals, defines *Nāṭya* as a *cittavṛtti* a state of consciousness or an experience³¹.

To sun up, the concept of *Nāṭya* can be presented from various angles. viz. :

1. From the angle of the practical approach — according to which, some theme, comprising the behaviour or nature of the people in this world becomes *Nāṭya* when presented on the stage with four-fold *abhinaya* by the artiste.
2. From the point of view of its creation - *Nāṭya* is a combination of the triple process comprising — (1) *anukīrtana* (re-telling through words), (ii) *anukarāṇa* : representing through *abhinaya*, (iii) *anubhāvana* also termed as *anudarśana* and *anuvyavasāya* (re-visualising).
3. From the point of view of its structure, *Rasa* is *Nāṭya* as an amalgam of eleven fundamental elements *Rasa, Bhāva, abhinaya* etc.

We have discussed these three points of view. Besides, there can be one more approach to understand the concept of *Nāṭya*, i.e., from the view-point of the purpose and functions of *Nāṭya*. *Nāṭya* has been viewed as a *yajña* from this view-point. *Nāṭyaśāstra* is supposed to be the *sārvavarnika pañcama Veda* - the Fifth Veda open to all without any discrimination of cast, colour or creed. The practice of *Nāṭya* is identical with the practice of Veda. *Nāṭya*, therefore, is *yajña*, not merely in metaphorical terms, it is *yajña, ipso facto*.



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तौरीत्रिकं नृत्यगीतवाद्यं नाट्यमिदं त्रयम् । (Amarakośa 1.8.10).
2. तौरीत्रिकं नृत्यगीतवाद्यं नाट्यं च तत् त्रयम् । (Śabdaratnākara, 1890), also Halāyudha, 93.
नाट्यं तौरीत्रिके लास्ये । (Medinī. 26.34).
3. प्रयोगः परिषदि प्रकटीकरणम् । (*Abhinavabhāratī*).
4. प्रयोगो यस्तु नाट्यादेर्भवेदभिनयो हि सः । (Kāṭyavema on MA).
5. प्रयोगप्रधानं हि नाट्यशास्त्रम् । (MA. Act. II)
6. (i) तदन्तेऽनुकृतिर्बद्धा यथा दैत्यैः सुरा जिता. ।
(ii) नानाभावोपसम्पन्नं नानावस्थान्तपत्तकम् ।
(iii) लोकवृत्तानुकरणं नाट्यमेतन्मया कृतम् ।
सप्तद्वीपानुकरणं नाट्यमेतद् भविष्यति ॥
(iv) येनुकरणं ह्येतन्नाट्यमेतन्मया कृतम् ।
(v) त्रैलोक्यस्यास्य सर्वस्य नाट्यं भावानुकीर्तनम् । (NŚ. I.57,112,117, 118, 107).
(vi) अवस्थानुकृतिर्नाट्यम् । DR I.

7. त्रैलोक्यस्यास्य सर्वस्य नाट्यं भावानुकीर्तनम् । NS I. 1.107.
8. सोऽनुव्याहरणाद् भूयः शोकः श्लोकत्वमागतः Rāmāyaṇa, I.2.39.
9. (i) धर्म्यमर्थं यशस्यं च सोपदेश्यं ससग्रहम् ।
भविष्यतश्च लोकस्य सर्वकर्मानुदर्शकम् ॥
(ii) तस्मिन् समवकारे तु प्रयक्ते देवदानवाः ।
हृष्टाः समभवन् सर्वे कर्मभावानुदर्शनात् ॥
(iii) ततो भूतगणाः हृष्टाः कर्मभावानुदर्शनात् ।
महादेवश्च सुप्रीतः पितामहमथाब्रवीत् ॥ NS I. 14; 4.4; 4.11.
10. Abhinavabhāratī, Vol. I, P. 36
11. त्रैलोक्यस्यास्य सर्वस्य नाट्यं भावानुकीर्तनम् । NS I. 107.
12. अभिनयत्रयं गीतातोद्यं चेति पञ्चाङ्गं नाट्यम् । Abh. I, p. 264.
13. रसा भावा अभिनया धर्मा वृत्तिप्रवृत्तयः ।
सिद्धिः स्वरास्तथातोद्यं गानं रङ्गश्च सङ्ग्रहः ॥ NS VI. 10.
14. यावत् पूर्णो न चैतेन तावन्नैव वमत्यमूम् । (Bhaṭṭatauta quoted in Locana). परिपूर्णकुम्भोच्चलनवत् Abhinava in Locana
15. रसभावानामपि वासनावशेन नटसम्भवादानुबन्धिबलाच्च लयाद्यनुसरणादन्तर्भूतस्यापि प्रयोजनवशेन पुनरुद्देशदर्शनात् क्रमस्य चाविवक्षितत्वात् । (Abh. I. p. 264).
16. इतिवृत्तं त नाट्यस्य शरीरं परिकीर्तितम् । NS IX.1.
17. Abhinava is of the view that all these 18 types of Theatre have been in use at sometime or other, some of them might have become out of use during his times : एतच्च सर्वसम्भवमात्रेणोच्यते, नानुवादकतया । न त्वियन्तो भेदा उपयोगिनः । एवं चाष्टादश भेदास्तावच्छास्त्रे दृष्टाः । ते चाद्यत्वे यद्यप्यनुपयोगिनः, तथापि सम्प्रदायाविच्छेदार्थं निर्दिष्टाः । केषांचित् कदाचिदुपयोगो भविष्यतीति । यदुक्तम् - अप्रयुक्ते दीर्घसत्रवत् । (Abh. I, p. 49)
18. NS XXVI. 24-31.
19. Ibid. XXVII. 9-17.
20. व्यापारः पुमर्थसाधको वृत्तिः । (Abh. Vol. II. p. 452).
21. धर्मादिपुरुषार्थचतुष्टये साध्ये वागङ्गसत्त्वचेष्टासामान्यम् । तच्च सङ्क्षिप्तेनावान्तरभेदेन चतुर्धा । यद् यत् किल कर्मारभ्यते तत्र वागङ्गमनःकायव्यापारस्तावदस्ति । तत्र कस्यचिल्लालित्यवैचित्र्यक्रमस्यानुप्रवेशः । यत् उत्तमप्रकृतीनां सौष्टमय एव सर्वो व्यापारः । तदेव तद् वृत्तिचतुष्टयम् । भारती वाग्वृत्तिः । मनोव्यापाररूपा सात्त्विकी सात्त्वती । सदिति प्रख्यारूपं सवेदनम् । तद् यत्रास्ति तत् सत्त्वं मनः । तस्येयमिति ।
22. इतिकर्तव्यता तस्य द्विविधा परिकीर्तिता ।
लोकधर्मा नाट्यधर्मा चेत्येते च द्विविधे पुनः ॥ (Saṅgītaratnākara, II, p. 9). इतिकर्तव्यताप्रकारनियमः । (Kallinātha)
23. काव्यनाट्ययोर्हि लोकानुसारित्वं विचित्रयोगित्वं वा धर्म । Abh. Vol. II, p. 214))
24. काव्ये च लोकनाट्यधर्मिस्थानीयेन स्वभावोक्तिवक्रोक्तिप्रकारद्वयेन अलौकिकप्रसन्नमधुरौजस्वि-
शब्दसामर्थ्यसमर्प्यमाणविभावादियोगादियमेव रसवार्ता । (Locana on Dhvanyāloka II.4).
25. लोकस्य चरितं नाट्यमित्यवोचः (NS XXXVI. 11).
लोकशास्त्रनुसारेण तस्मान्नाट्यं प्रवर्तते । (Ibid. V. 160).
लोको वेदस्तथाध्यात्मं प्रमाणं त्रिविधं स्मृतम् ।
वेदाध्यात्मपदार्थेषु प्रायो नाट्यं प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
वेदाध्यात्मोपपन्नं शब्दश्छन्दस्समन्वितम् ।

- लोकसिद्धं भवेत्सिद्धं नाट्यं लोकात्मकं तथा ।
 न च शक्यं हि लोकस्य स्थावरस्य चरस्य च ।
 शास्त्रेण निर्णयं कर्तुं भावचेष्टाविधिं प्रति ॥
 तस्माल्लोकप्रमाणं हि विशेयं नाट्ययोक्तृभिः॥ (Ibid. XXV. 120-123).
26. लौकिकधर्मव्यतिरेकेण नाट्ये न कश्चिद् धर्मोऽस्ति । तथापि स यत्र लोकगतप्रक्रियाक्रमो रञ्जना- धिक्व्यप्राधान्यमतिरोहयितुं कविनाटव्यापारे वैचित्र्यं स्वीकुर्वन् नाट्यधर्मात्युच्यते । (Abh. Chap. XXXIII).
27. यस्मात् कविगता नाट्यगता वागालङ्कारचेष्टा नाट्यधर्मीरूपा सर्वप्राणवती । (Ibid., on NŚ XXII. 84).
28. नाट्यधर्मी प्रवृत्तं हि सदा नाट्यं प्रयोजयेत् ।
 असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत् ततो वै सदजायत । तदात्मानं स्वयमकरुत । तस्मात् तत् सकृतमुच्यते। यद् वै सकृतं रसौ वै सः । रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दीभवति । (Taittirīya Upaniṣat, II.7); आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । आनन्दाद्ध्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, आनन्दं प्रयन्ति अभिसंविशन्ति । (Ibid. III. 3.6)
29. प्रतिभाति न सन्देहो न तत्त्वं न विपर्ययः ।
 धीरसावयमित्यस्ति नासावेवायमित्यपि ।
 विरुद्धबुद्धिसम्भेदादविवेचितसम्प्लवः । (Q. in Abh. Vol.I, p.273)
 करुणप्रेक्षणीयेषु सम्प्लवः सुखदुःखयोः ।
 यथैवानुभवतः सिद्धस्तथेवैजःप्रसादयोः ॥ (Vāmana : Kavyālaṅkārasūtra., 3.1.8-9)
30. नाट्यात् समुदायरूपाद् रसाः । यदि वा नाट्यमेव रसाः । रससमुदायो हि नाट्यम् । नाट्ये एव च रसाः । काव्येऽपि नाटयायमान एव रसः । काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रत्यक्षकल्पसंवेदनोदये रसोदय इत्युपाध्यायः । (Abh. Vol. I, p.290)
31. तेनानुव्यवसायवत् विशेषविषयीकार्यं नाट्यम् । प्रयोक्त्रा दृश्यमानेन योऽनुव्यवसायो जन्यते सुखदुःखाकारतत्तच्चित्तवृत्तिरूप-रुषितनिजसंविदानन्दप्रकाशमयः, अत एव विचित्रो रसनास्वादनचमत्कार-चर्वणनिर्वेशभोगाद्यपरपर्यायः तत्र तदवभासते वस्तुतन्नाट्यम् । तच्च ज्ञानाकारमात्रमारोपितं स्वरूपं सामान्यात्मकं तत्कालनिर्मितरूपं चान्यद्वा वस्तुकिञ्चिदस्तु । (Abh. Vol. I, p. 37)

LATER PARAMĀRAS OF ĀBŪ

Ram Vallabh Somani

Paramārā Dhārāvarṣa ruled for a long time on Arbuda-Maṇḍala. According to the Śiva Temple inscription of Ābū dated VE 1265, his brother Prahādān was nominated as Yuvarāj. But it seems that he was predeceased to Dhārāvarṣa. Somasiṅha, the son of Dhārāvarṣa succeeded him, in VE 1277. The last known date of Dhārāvarṣa is VE 1276, as is apparent from two inscriptions found at Makavel (Sirohī) and Ārāsaṇā.¹ The earliest known dates of Somasiṅha are as under :

(i) The inscription incised on a pedestal of an icon in the temple of village Dānta, dated VE. 1277, mentions the name of Somasiṅha as a ruler.²

(ii) The colophon of the Ms. *Kulaka Prakaraṇa* (Pāṭan Bhaṇḍār), dated VE 1279, refers Somasiṅha as a ruler of Chandrāvati.³

It proves that Somasiṅha succeeded in VE. 1277 and Prahādān did not rule at all. The most important event of Somasiṅha's reign is the consecration of the Luṅig-Vasati temple of Ābū in VE 1287.⁴ His son Kānhaḍadeva worked as Yuvarāj as is apparent from the Nānā (Distt. Pālī) inscription of VE 1290. The last known dates of Somasiṅha are VE. 1293, as known from the inscriptions of Luṅig Vasati and Devakṣetra.^{4A}

Chandrāvati-inscriptions of VE. 1293

Recently a few memorial inscriptions of VE 1293 Jeth Sudi 12 have been known recording the deaths of the following persons -

(1) For the sake of Mahāmaṇḍales'var Luṅigadeva Mahādeva's son Kānhaḍadeva gave away his life.⁵ He was different from Kānhaḍadeva, the ruler of Chandrāvati.

(2) For the cause of Raṅak Luṅigadeva, Achalā gave away his life in a battle.⁶

(3) When Chandrāvati was ruled by Mahārāwal Kānhaḍadeva, Arisiṅha's son Tihuṇa Pāla died in a battle.⁷

It is not known who was this Luṅigadeva. He was either Bāghela Luṅigadeva or some local chief and descendant of Raṅa Siṅha. Nothing can be said with certainty. But on the basis of these epigraphs it is certain that some battle took place wherein Luṅigadeva and Kānhaḍadeva fought with each other. It seems that after the death of Somasiṅha in VE 1293, Luṅigadeva might have rebelled and a civil war broke out. Kānhaḍadeva the ruler of Ābū also died after four or three years and Pratāpasīṅha then a boy succeeded him.

Invasion of Jaitra Siṅha of Mewār

According to epigraphic sources of Mewār Mahārāwal Jaitrasiṅha invaded Chandrāvati and fought against Rāṅak Tribhuvan at Koṭadā. The Cīrawā inscription of VE 1330 mentions that Talārakṣa, Bālā, the son of Mahendra, gave away his life while

fighting against the army of the ruler of Gujarāt at Kotādā (near Chandrāvati).⁸ Rāṇak Tribhuvan ruled between VE 1299 to VE 1302. Therefore, it seems that this battle took place about VE 1300. As a result of this battle Paramāra Pratāpasin̄ha was deprived of the power and some Ālhanasin̄ha became the ruler of the place before VE 1300.⁹

Ālhanasin̄ha

An inscription dated VE 1300, mentioning the name of Ālhanasin̄ha as the ruler of Chandrāvati, has been found from Kālinjarā (District Sirohī). Although the name of the family is not quoted but he seems to be a Paramāra ruler. One more inscription dated VE 1301 is also noticed from Kāyandrā recording the grant of some land to the temple.¹⁰ He ruled for some years.

Mūlarāja

Recently a copper plate, dated VE 1316, has been reported from Chandrāvati mentioning the name of Mahārājakula Mūlarāja as the ruler of the place. The antecedents of Mūlarāja given in the plate are (1) Mahāmaṇḍaleśvara Rāṇaka Vādā (ii) His son Mahāmaṇḍaleśvar Rāṇaka Padmadeva and his son Mahārājkula Mūlarāja¹¹. It seems that he is neither related to Alhanasinha nor to Pratāpasin̄ha. In the present state of knowledge, we cannot link him with any other Paramār family. But Mūlarāja also remained a subordinate vassal of the rulers of Gujarāt. He fought in a battle field, alongwith arms of Viśaldeva of Gujarat.

There is an inscription, dated VE 1320, in the Vaidyanātha temple Bādali ((Iḍar) having the name of Arjundeve as a ruler. Bādali was ruled by the Paramārs of Ābū for a long time. But Arjundeve seems to be Cālukyā (Bāghelā) ruler of Gujarat. His one more inscription dated VE 1320 is also noticed from Ajārī. At the time when Candrāvati was invaded by a Muslim army in VE 1340-42 the ruler was Jaitra Karnā.¹² He was defeated and Pratapasin̄ha recaptured it.

Extension of the Power of the Chauhāṇs

The Sonagarā Cauhāṇs of Jalore attempted to extend their sway in Ābū area. From Baralut near Sirohi (13 Kms in north west) two inscriptions dated VE 1283, of the reign of Sonagarā Udai Sinha and dated VE 1330 of Cacigadwa have been noticed.¹³ Similarly there is an inscription of VE 1319 at Sundā-hills of the Cauhāna ruler¹⁴. Some more inscriptions of these rulers have been noticed near Sirohī i.e. from Sonapur (V.E. 1333), Uthamāṇ (VE 1356) Bāghasiṇ (VE 1359) and a few other places.¹⁵ All these facts prove that Cauhāṇs were rapidly increasing their power in Ābū area.

Muslim Invasion

On the basis of the Ābū inscription of VE 1342 of Mahārāwal Samarasin̄ha of Mewār and the Pāṭanārāyaṇa temple inscription of VE 1344, a fierce Muslim invasion took place in Ābū area which was ably resisted with the assistance of the ruler of Mewār.¹⁶ According to the Persian Chronicles, no sultan of Delhī invaded Ābū between VE 1340-1342. It was perhaps an invasion of some Mangol generals, who proceeded up

to Ābū unchecked. It gave a deathblow to the Paramār rulers of Ābū. The Pāṭanārāyaṇ inscription also refers to the victory of Pratāpasīṅha over Jaitra Karṇa the rulers of Chandrāvātī.

Vīśaladeva

There are 4 inscriptions of Vīśaladeva ranging from VE 1344 to 1352 :

- (1) The Pāṭanārāyaṇ inscription of VE 1344.¹⁷
- (2) The Daṅṭāṇi Jain temple inscription of¹⁸ VE 1345.
- (3) The Delawārā Jain temple inscription¹⁹ of VE 1350.
- (4) An unpublished inscription from Majār VE 1352.

The Pāṭanārāyaṇ inscription contains of the name of Pratāpasīṅha as the ruler of Candrāvātī while Vīśaladeva is referred as an vanquisher of the Turuṣkās. It proves that at the time, when the invasion took place Pratāpasīṅha was the ruler of the place. He was later removed by Vīśaladeva. We do not have much information about him. Like other rulers of Ābū, he remained a subordinate ruler of the Bāghelās of Gujarāt. All his inscriptions refer the name of the ruler of Gujarat as his overlord. He also took part in a battle of Mālavā fought by Sāraṅgadeva. Pratāpasīṅha and his son, were given a small Jagir near Daṅṭāṇi, as is apparent from a Jaina temple inscription of VE 1345. This inscription is very clear. In the beginning it refers to the name of Vīśaladeva as the ruler of Candrāvātī. His overlord was Sāraṅgadeva. During the tenure of these rulers Daṅṭāṇi was held by Paramān Pratāpasīṅha and his son Arjuna. He donated two fields for the Rathayātrā of Parśvanātha.

The Ābū inscription of VE 1350, of the time of Vīśaladeva, contains the details of various donations made by various Jaina families for the Jain temples of Ābū. It also has the name of Sāraṅgadeva as an over lord.

Vikramasiṅha

Vīśal was succeeded by Vikramasiṅha. What relations existed between them are not known. The Uthameśvar Śiva temple inscription of VE 1361 mentions the father's name of Vikramasiṅha as Rāmā. The inscription is fragmentary and no other details and royal titles have been given. Although, we cannot say definitely that Vikramasiṅha of this inscription is the same person referred to in the Baramāṅ inscription but on the basis of donations given by him, we may link him with Vikramasiṅha the ruler of Chandrāvātī. The Sun temple of Baramāṅ has an inscription mentioning VE 1356 *Caitra sudi 3 some brahmaṇe mahāsthāne mahārājākula Śri Vikramasiṅha kalyāṇavijayrājye*²⁰.

No other details of the Paramāras of Ābū are known. The Kacchuli-Rāsa was composed by Pragna Tilaka Suri in VE 1363. It contains more details upto VE 1377 when repair works of the Jain temples of Ābū were undertaken. This Rāsa mentions that the place was ruled by the Paramārs. Therefore, we may say that up to VE 1363, when the above work was composed it was definitely under the Paramāras. Sultān Alāuddin

Khilji invaded in VE 1368 and the place was recaptured by Chauhān Rāo Lumbhā in VE 1371-72. After this no Paramāra ruler could regain Ābū.

Foot Note

1. *Arbudacala - Pradaksinā Jaina-Lekha-Sandoha* (Ābū No.5) Inscription No.21 pp.6/PRASWC 1961-17 p.61.
2. E.I. Vol. XXXVI pp. 210-11.
3. *Sri-Praśasti-Saṃgraha* Edited by A.M.Sāha Vol.I No.132, pp.83.
4. *Arbuda-Pracina-Jaina Lekha-Sandoha* (Ābū No.1) Ins. 250 and 251.
- 4.a. The Devakṣetra-Inscription of VE 1293 mentions Sūmasiṃha as a ruler संवत् १२९३ वर्षे जेठ दिने सूमसिंहदेवकल्याणविजयराज्ये; It is also noticed by mr. sukhantakar in PRASWC 1916-17, p. 69.
- 5 to 7. These three inscriptions were recently noticed near the bridge of Chandrāvati. The Author has edited them in Varadā in a paper 'Ābū-ke-Antima-Paramār Raja'.
- 7A Raṇasiṃha remained the ruler, of Ābū VE 1221 to 1228. After the death of Kumārapāla Cālukya he was removed from the power (Author's paper on Raṇasiṃha Paramāra published in the 'Śodhapatrikā.'
8. The Cirawā inscription of VE 1330 verses 19 to 20 (published in Vīr-Vinod Vol. I pp. 389-92. A. K. Majamudar - The Cālukyās of Gujarat, p. 173.
9. Muni Jinvijayji - Pracīna-Jaina-Lekha-Saṃgraha, Vol. II No. 426 pp. 260-61.
10. Annual Report on the Rajputana-Museum, Ajmer 1908, p. 8
11. The Copper plate was recently discovered by Mr. Brij Mohan Sinha Parmar of Archaeology and Museum Deptt., Jaipur, who has published a note "The Coins and Copper plates from Chandrāvati, p. 3)
12. I. A. Vol. XLV p. 77.
13. I.A. Vol. XXXVI pp. 33-36
14. Nahar-Jaina-Lekha-Saṃgraha Vol. I No. 943 and 944/E.I. Vol. IX pp. 70-83.
15. Author's paper "Uthamān-Pāladi-Aur-Baghsīna ke-Śilālekha published in the Śodha-Patrikā, Vol. XXIII No. 2 pp. 65 to 70.
16. I.A. Vol. XVI p. 347/The Bhavanagar Inscriptions p. 84 PRASWC 1905-6, p. 62
17. V.N. Reu-I.A. Vol. XLV p. 77
18. संवत् १३४५ वैशाख सु. ४ शुक्ले स्वस्तिश्रीचंद्रावत्यां महाराजाधिराज श्रीवीसलदेव विजयराज्ये । श्री सारंगदेवविजयराज्ये दंताणीग्रामे प्रमरान्वयराजदे..प्रतापसिंहदेव.. Inscription of Dantāni
19. Arbudacala-Pracina-Jaina-Lekha-Sandoha, Ins No. 2 dated VE 1350.
20. PRASWC 1916-17, p. 72/Edited by R. C. Agrawal in Varada Vol. VII No. 4 pp. 1-6.

THE APABHRAṂŚA PASSAGES OF THE DHARMARATNAKARAṆḌAKA

H. C. Bhayani

There are eleven Apabhraṁśa passages in Vardhamānasūri's *Dharmaratnakaraṇḍaka* (=DRK)¹. Mostly their text is not well-preserved and has not received proper editorial care. It is defective in various aspects, and so requires to be emended.² Below I give the printed text, the restored text and its Sanskrit *chāyā*.

1. p. 180 verses 53-56.

ताव फुरइ वेरग्गु चित्ति कुललज्जवि तावहिं ताव ।
अकज्जहतणियसंक गुरुयाणा वि भओ ताव ।
ताविंदियह वसाइं जसहसिरि हाइ तावहि
रमणीहिं मणमोहणीहिं पुरिस वसीहोइ न जावहि ॥
सो सुकयकम्मु सो णिउणमइ, सिवहमग्गि सो संघडिओ ।
परोहणओसहिसरिसियहं, ज बालियहं न पिडि पडिओ ॥

Actually this is a single stanza made up of two units (4 lines + 2 lines). The metre is a Dvibhaṅgī of Vastuvadana and Karpūra, commonly also called Satpī or Sārdhacchanda.

The Restored Text :

ताव फुरइ वेरग्गु चित्ति कुल-लज्ज-वि तावहिं ।
ताव अकज्जह तणिय सैक गुरुयण-भउ तावहिं ॥
ताविंदियइं वसाइं जसह सिरि (?) होइ वि तावहिं
रमणिहिं मण-मोहणिहिं पुरिसु वसिहोइ न जावहिं ॥
सो सुकय-कम्मु सो निउण-मइ, सिवह मग्गि सो संघडिउ ।
पर-मोहण-ओसहि-सरिसियहिं, जो बालियहिं न पिडि पडिउ ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

तावत् स्फुरति वैराग्यम् चित्ते कुललज्जा अपि तावत्
तावत् अकार्यस्य शङ्का गुरुजन-भयम् तावत् ।
तावत् इन्द्रियाणि वशानि यशसः श्रीः(?) भवति अपि तावत्
रमणीनाम् मनोमोहिनीनाम् पुरुषः वशीभवति न यावत् ॥
सः सुकृतकर्मा सः निपुणमतिः शिवस्य मार्गे सः संघटितः
पर-मोहन-औषधि-सद्दृशीनाम् यः बालिकानाम् न गोचरे पतितः ॥

2. p. 204, verse 1.

धम्मं जिणपणियं घणु, जे संबल कर लेंति ।
ते परलोयपयाणडे, पहिय न दुत्थिय हेंति ॥

The metre is *Dohā*.

The Restored Text :

धम्मउ जिण-पणियउ घणउ, जे संबलु करि लेंति ।
ते पर-लोय-पयाणडइ, पहिय न दुत्थिय होंति ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

धर्मम् जिण-प्रणीतम् बहुं ये सम्बलम् करे (कृत्वा) गृह्णन्ति ॥
ते पर-लोक-प्रयाणके पथिताः दुःस्थिताः न भवन्ति ॥

3. p. 237, verse 79.

छुह मिट्ठी तिस सीयली, मउई निह न भंति ।
जा रुच्चइ सा रूयडी, छेयए उ भणंति ॥

The Restored Text :

छुह मिट्ठी तिस सीयली, मउई निह न भंति ।
जा रुच्चइ सा रूयडी, छेया एउ भणंति ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

क्षुधा मिष्टा तृषा शीतला, मृद्धी निद्रा न भ्रान्तिः ।
या रुच्यते सा सुन्दरा, छेकाः एतद् भणन्ति ॥

4. p. 283-284, verses 73-75.

जसु निमित्तु हयहीयडा., पई जलनिहि तरिओ ।
तं कलत्तु एवंविह दुन्नयसयभरिओ ॥
एउ अपुव्वु जं पेक्खे, विलज्जवि नवि करेइ ।
हरिसुल्लसियमुहुल्लउ, महु अग्गइ धरेइ ॥
वरवेल्लिओ मातियवइ, दुसव्वइ जाह पलंति ।
जो एक्कसि वेढेंति तरु, जो मरणेहि मुंचंति ॥

Actually v. no. 73 and 75 from one stanza. Its metre is a *Dvibhaṅgī* of *Rāsāvalaya*. (the first four lines) and *Dohā* (the last two lines)¹. This is the first known instance of this kind of *Dvibhaṅgī*.

The Restored Text :

जसु निमित्तु हय-हियडा पई जलनिहि तरिउ
तं कलत्तु एवंविह-दुन्नय-सय-भरिउ ।
एउ अपुव्वु जं पेक्खेवि लज्ज-वि नवि करइ
हरिसुल्लसिय-मुहुल्लउ महु अग्गइ धरइ ॥
वरि वेल्लिउ मा तियमइउ, सच्चइं जाहं पलंति (९) ।
जो एक्कसि वेढेंति तरु, सो मरणेहिं मुंचंति ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

यस्य निमित्तम् हत-हृदय त्वया जलनिधिः तीर्णः
 तत् कलत्रम् एवंविध-दुर्णय-शात-भृतम् ।
 एतद् अपूर्वम् यद् प्रेक्ष्य लज्जा अपि नैव करोति ।
 हर्षोल्लसित-मुखम् मम अग्रे धारयति ॥
 वरम् वै वल्लयः न नार्यः सत्यानि यासाम् पाल्यन्ते (९) ।
 यम् एकवारम् वेष्टयन्ति तरुम् तम् मरणेन मुञ्चन्ति ॥

5. p. 355, verses 195-197.

कुलकलंकणु सच्च-पडिवक्ख गुरुलज्जासोयकरु
 धम्मविग्घु अत्थपणासणु, जं दाणभोगेहिं रहिओ ॥
 गालियघायघुम्मंतलोयणु तणु संतावणि कुगइ पडितहि पिय जूइयमरज्जू ।
 जूइं अत्थु जु विढवियइ तिं अत्थिहिं नवि कज्जू ॥

Actually this is a single stanza. The metre is of the *Dvibhaṅgī* type called *Raddā*. It is made up of two units : 5 *caranās* of Mātrā plus four *caranās* of Dohā.

The Restored Text :

कुल-कलंकणु सच्च-पडिवक्खु
 गुरु-लज्जा-सोय-करु, धम्म-विग्घु अत्थ-प्यणासणु ।
 जं (?) दाण-भोगेहिं रहिउ, गालिय-घाय (?) गत्त) घुम्मंत-लोयणु ॥
 तणु-संतावणि कुगइ-पहि, तहिं पिय जुइ म रज्जु ।
 जूइं अत्थु जु विढवियइ, तिं अत्थिहिं नवि कज्जु ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

कुल-कलङ्कनम् सत्य-प्रतिपक्षः
 गुरु-लज्जा-शोककरम्, धर्म-विघ्नम् अर्थ-प्रणाशनम् ।
 यद् (?) दान-भोगाभ्याम् रहितम्, गलित-गात्र-घूर्णायमान-लोचनम् ॥
 तनु-संतापने कुगइ-पथे, तस्मिन् प्रिय द्यूते मा रज्यस्व ।
 द्यूते अर्थः यः अर्ज्यते, तेन अर्थेन नैव कार्यम् ॥

6. p. 359, v. 284.

भमरा सुरतरुमंजरिहिं, परिमलु लेवि हयास ।
 हियडु फुट्टिवि कह नहि, अह ढंढोलिउं पलास ॥

The metre is *Dohā*.

The Restored Text :

भमरा सुरतरु-मंजरिहि, परिमलु लेवि हयास ।
 हियडुं फुट्टिवि कह न मुउ, ढुंढुल्लंतु पलास ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

भ्रमर सुर-तरु-मञ्जरीणाम् परिमलम् गृहीत्वा हताश ।
हृदयम् स्फुटित्वा कथम् न मृतः भ्रममाणः पलाशे ॥

7. p. 369, verse 98.

उज्जयु कज्जारंभियउनहि किं करइ
धन्नउ पगु वि न देइ असइढलु संभवइ ।
सूरह सत्त तुरंम गयणि भमंताह
विब्मह कोडिगंइंदह एउ वियदिंताह ॥

The metre is *Rāsāvalaya*.

The Restored Text :

उज्जमु कज्जारमि अपुन्नह किं करइ
धन्नउ पउ-वि न देह असइढलु संभवइ ।
सूरह सत्त-तुरयहिं (ण) गयणि भमंताहिं
लब्भइ कोडि गइंदहिं पउ वि ण दिंताहि ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

उद्यमः कार्यारम्भेन अपुण्यस्य किं करोति
धन्यः पदम् अपि न ददाति असाधारणम् संभवति ।
सूर्यस्य सप्त-तुरगैः न गगने भ्रमद्भिः
लभ्यते कोटिः गजेन्द्रैः पदम् अपि न ददद्भिः ॥

8. p. 383, verse 1.

कल्लइ बोरइं विक्किणइ, अज्जु न जाणइ खक्ख ।
पडुयइ अडविहिं करि, मु घरु न सहउं एह अणक्ख ॥

The same verse occurs in the *Manoramā-kahā* (p. 40, v. 213). There we have अज्जु and सुघरु

The metre is *Dohā*.

The Restored Text :

कल्लइ बोरइं विक्किणइ, अज्जु न जाणइ खक्ख ॥
पडिवउ अडविहिं करिसु घरु, न सहउं एह अणक्ख ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā*

कल्येः बदराणि विक्रिणाति, अद्य न जानाति खक्खा ।^२
पुनरपि अटव्याम् करिष्यामि गृहम्, न सहे एतद् मनोदुःखम् ॥

9. p. 385, verses 1-3

This passage occurs also in the *Manoramā-kahā* (p. 41, no. 218). The metre is *Vadanāka*. At both places the text is partly defective. The text is to be restored as follows:

सिसरि सुयंधु तेल्लु लाइज्जइ, कुंकुमि अंगरागु निरु किज्जइ ।
 रुइ आहारि समगल वड्ढइ, निद्धु - वि भोअणु सोसु न कड्ढइ ।
 अच्छा चंदण अच्छा कप्पड, पाय पसारिवि सुव्वइ चप्पड ।
 गिम्हु-वि विविह-वणेहिं समाउलु, वर-हिंदोलय-रास-रमाउलु ॥
 पाउस पुत्तय पशिणहिं लब्भइ, मेइसि सव्व जि निय-जलि गब्भइ ।
 ठाउ ठाउ रेल्लयहि रमाउलु पमुइय-पामर-कय-कोलाहलु ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

शिशिरे सुगन्धि तैलम् अपर्यते, कुङ्कुमेन अङ्गरागः नियमेन क्रियते ।
 रुचिः आहारे अत्यधिका वर्धते, स्निग्धम् अपि भोजनम् शोषम् न कर्षति ।
 श्लणम् चन्दनम् श्लक्षणम् वस्त्रम्, पादौ प्रसार्य सुप्यते ऊर्ध्वमुखम् ।
 ग्रीष्मः अपि विविध-वनैः समाकुलः, वर-हिन्दोलक-रास-रमणीयः ।
 प्रावृष् पुत्रक पुण्यैः लभ्यते, मेदिनी सर्वा अपि निज-जलैः गर्भ्यते ।
 स्थानम् स्थानम् लघु-जलप्रवाहेः रमणीयम्, प्रमुदित-कर्षक-जन-कृत कोलाहलम् ॥

10. 386, verses 1-3.

This passage occurs also in the *Manoramā-kahā* (p. 41). The metre is *Vadanaka*. At both the places the text is partly defective. It is to be restored as under :

सीयल-वाइहिं वज्जइ दंत, संकडियहिं पावियहिं निसंत ।
 सीयालइ सीइ(?) दज्जइ-चम्म, छोहे न चडइ जु किज्जइ कम्म ।
 खणि खणि पिज्जइ उन्हुउं पाणिउ, नइ-दह-कूव-तलायहं आणिउ ।
 ताविं लूइ दहइ जु देहु, तसु उन्हालह नाउं म लेहु ।
 हेट्ठइ कादउ उप्परि पाणिउ, पइ पइ आवहिं कुहियउ घाणिउ ।
 पाउसु परहउ किट्टउ बारह, जो अणुहरइ कुहिय-चम्मारह ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

शीतल-वातेन वाद्यते दन्ताः, संकीर्णे प्राप्यते निशान्तः ।
 शीतकाले शीतेन दह्यते चर्म, अन्तम् न प्राप्नोति यद् क्रियते कर्म ।
 क्षणे क्षणे पीयते उष्णम् पानीयम्, नदी-हृद-कूप-तटाकेभ्यः आनीतम् ।
 तापेन उष्णवातेन दहति देहं यः, तस्य उष्णकालस्य नाम म गृह्णीथ ।
 अधस्तात् कर्दमः उपरि पानीयम्, पदे पदे आयान्ति कुथिताः घ्राणयः ।
 प्रावृड् दूरम् नश्यतु द्वारात्, यः अनुहरति कुथित-चर्मकारम् ॥

11. p. 396, verse 46

ताविज्जं तह पत्थरह, चह निव्वट्टइ लोहु ।
 तह जीवह तवताविय, किट्टइ कम्मविरोहु ॥

The metre is *Dohā* :

The Restored Text :

ताविज्जंतह पत्थरह, जह निव्वट्टइ लोहु ।
तह जीवह तव-तावियह, फिट्टइ कम्म-निरोहु ॥

Sanskrit *Chāyā* :

ताप्यमानात् प्रस्तरात्, यथा निर्वर्त्यते लोहम् ।
तथा जीवस्य तपस्तापितस्य, नश्यति कर्म-निरोधः ॥

Foot Notes :

1. Under the Chandonuśāsana IV. 87, Hemacandra has noted that when a metre like वस्तुवदनक, रसावलय, वस्तुक, मात्रा etc. are combined with the metres like कुड्कुम, कर्पूर, दोह, द्विपदी etc., the two stanges forming a one unit, the combinations are called Dvibhaṅgī.
2. In the story of the potter Anaksa, the name of the merchant's daughter (p. 383), who becomes a queen should be Khakkha. Kharakā is a mistake.

REFERENCES

1. *Dharmaratnakaraṇḍaka* of Vardhamānasūri, edited by Muncandravijaya Gani, Ahmedabad, 1994.
2. For a description of the metres used in the Apabhraṃśa passages of Vardhamānasūri's other two works, viz., the Manoramā-kahā and the Jugāijijīṇḍacariya, See H. C. Bhayani, *Indological studies*, 1993, pp. 267-274.

AKHO : THE POET OF PROTEST IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY GUJARAT

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This paper is an attempt to explore the socio-cultural climate of Gujarat in the seventeenth century, particularly through the poems of Akho, a noted 'Jñāni Bhagat' of Gujarat. An attempt is also made to understand the spirit of pre-modern Gujarati Society, which under the cultural impact of the colonial rule seems to have not been fully appreciated.

Gujarat enjoyed peace and prosperity as an important province of the Moghul empire from 1572-73 onwards. European travellers who visited Gujarat in the seventeenth century had given the accounts of its growing trade, commerce and industry. Gujarat with its prosperous capital at Ahmedabad and thriving ports like Cambay and Surat, had thus become a prized possession of the Moghul empire'.¹

Gujarati Society by this time had developed a social defence-mechanism in the form of caste-system. Social barriers were stiffened due to the emergence of many castes and sub-castes, which required new local habitations and names by migration. This social process was not the result of decay but of a purposive corporate effort to preserve the group identities.² This sort of defence-mechanism had also given certain strength to the social structure to resist exogenous cultural forces which it thought to be of subversive nature. At the same time, from within, this very social structure provided a scope to those individuals who wanted to challenge the socio-religious anomalies which had crept in over a period of time.

During the seventeenth century, the Bhakti movement in Gujarat seemed to have lost its vigour, except in some parts of Saurashtra, as a new impulse. Peace and prosperity had made Vaishnavism a soft sect. Perhaps under the influence of Moghul life-style its pleasure-loving high-priests and their followers, under the guise of various ceremonies, made the Vallabh sect a privilege of the select. Scholars and ascetics who debated over the systems of metaphysics had lost touch with the social reality.³

The society, on the whole, did not bother much about the religious anomalies and philosophical controversies; nevertheless, such religious sects and scholarship had gained a sort of legitimacy and influence in the society. This has been deplored in a small Sanskrit play written in 1637 by Dāmodara Saṁnyāsī⁴ who lived on the bank of Narmada. In this play he presents a picture of rivalries among the various religious sects including the Sanatanis, the Vaiṣṇavas, the Jainas and the Buddhists. The author, while trying to justify Śaṅkara's philosophy of Vendānta, ridicules, among others, the Vallabha sect founded by Vallabhācārya (1472-1530). He castigates, what he calls, the voluptuous life-style of the Vaiṣṇava Gurus and their female followers. Dāmodara Saṁnyāsī seems to be jealous of their riches and strongly feels that the Brahmins are deprived of their

legitimate share by these Gurus. At the same time, he also deplors the greedy mentality of the Brahmins who criticize the Vedic religion by flattering, what he calls, the Kṣudras, to get even a petty alms. Thus, a scholar like Dāmodar Saṁnyāsī does not seem to be above such sectarian approach.⁴ However, it was Akho who openly protested against those so called guardians of social morality, religion and scholarship, through his poems written in Gujarati language.

Akho (c. 1591-1656) was a gold-smith by caste. He came to Ahmedabad from a near by village called Jetalpur. Several incidents in his life are said to have made his sensitive mind disillusioned about artificial social relationship. He lost his wife early, and also his sister whom he loved with deep affection. In one incident, ignoring the 'traditional dishonesty' of the gold-smith Akho added his own gold while preparing an ornament for a lady whom he cherished as his sister. The lady could not imagine that Akho, by the very nature of his profession would remain honest and would not mix any other metal in gold. Being, thus, distrustful she got her ornament tested, and to her utter surprise found that it contained gold worth more than its original weight. When Akho learnt about her suspicion he was shocked. He was convinced that there was no place for an honest man in the society, which gave recognition to only rogues. Yet in another incident, he as the head of the royal mint at Ahmedabad, became a victim of the mischief done by some of his caste fellows who charged him for alloying silver with baser metals in minting coins. He was imprisoned on a charge of committing defalcation. However, he was found innocent and set free. Fed up with such deceitful ways of the world he decided to find out the true significance of life.⁵

First he sought refuge in prayer, and performed many rituals, but found no peace. So as a devout follower of the Vallabha sect he went to Gokul in the hope of getting spiritual solace from the Goswami, the head of the Vallabh sect. Being a rich person Akho was accorded warm hospitality by the Goswami. But his spirit revolted against the feasts and festivities of the sect. So he left for other religious places including Mathura and Prayag. Finally he came to Kashi. In Kashi he sat at the feet of many scholars and ascetics; but found them below his expectation. Finally, by chance, he happened to listen the discourse of Saṁnyāsī, Brahmānanda. In Brahmānanda, Akho discovered his genuine guru. The Swami also found in Akho his true disciple, his not being a *dvija*. After spending three years under him Akho, now as a pauper, on his way back to Ahmedabad, once again visited Gokul. Gokulnātha, the head-priest, though recognized Akho in his rags, not only refused to receive him but instructed his doorkeeper to drive him out. In Ahmedabad as well as in other places of Gujarat, Akho came in contact with the ascetics of different sects whom he found indulging in worldly ways. Thus, disgusted with the hypocrisy of the leaders and followers of various sects Akho decided to spend the rest of his life in exposing them, and at the same time, showing people the right way to discover for themselves the true significance of life through his poems.⁶

The collection this poetic compositions in Gujarati include *Pañcīkaraṇa*, *Guru-śiṣya*

Samvāda, Akhegītā, Anubhavabindu, Citra-vicāra-samvāda, Kaivalyagītā, Śatpadī, known as *chappās* (i.e. satpadis six lined stanzas) etc., and also in Hindi, *Brahmañilā*, Santapriya etc.⁷ Most of his works are treatises on Vedānta philosophy. However, his seven hundred and forty-six *chappas* are best known for his meriless exposure of the worldly-wise, the sādhus, the ascetics and the scholars in their true colours. Akho, thus, through these *chappās* the epigrammatic stanzas, has expressed the dominant note of his age in biting verses. This particular part of his work has permeated the masses, and many of these *chappās*, even today have become common literary heritage and passed into ordinary household language of the people of Gujarat.⁸

Some of his *chappās* deal with the fake gurus. In one of such *chappā* Akho criticizes his first Vaiṣṇava guru, Gokulanātha. He says, "I made Gokulanātha my guru; it was like putting reins on an old bullock (Who eats your food but does not respond to the goad). He would take away your wealth but not the uneasiness of your mind. What goad can such a guru do?"⁹ In another *chappā* he remarks, "with great zest he has proclaimed himself a guru. But how can a man with a stone round his neck float? He does not know Hari at all, he is merely posing as a teacher"¹⁰. Akho does not believe in the spiritual benefit of pilgrimage. But at the same time he extols the virtues of genuine saint, "at whose feet are million places of pilgrimage."¹¹

Akho hates external forms of religion and comments: "He has spent fifty three years of his life in making religious marks on his body; his rosaries have been worn out, his feet are tired with wandering from one sacred place to another. Yet he has not reached God."¹² Akho while developing some of his themes uses very homely illustrations. Thus, most of his illustrations are from the daily life of a common man who would instantly grasp the meaning of his poem. For example, he compares a person who pays no heed to what is taught to him or what he has heard, with a leaky leather bag going down a deep well.¹³ He has no sympathy for those who go to temple and mechanically listen to sacred reading. Such persons would become deaf but would not get real knowledge.¹⁴ He also ridiculed those whose "gods are as numerous as the stones they worship."¹⁵

Akho has no special respect for Sanskrit, the language of the learned. He exhorted people to use Prakrit or regional language.¹⁶ He thus used Gujarati or Hindi to express his thoughts. His objective was to teach the masses and make them aware of the follies practised all around. That is why he said, "why do you stick to (this or that) language, O, idiot? He who succeeds on the battle field (irrespective of the weapons that he uses) is a hero."¹⁷ He excels in sarcasm when he criticizes so called scholars. He says, "A shallow man of learning is like a quarrelsome woman whose vanity is pampered by giving birth to a son; he is like a vicious bull who has fattened himself by grazing in the rains; a mad dog attacked with rabies. No doubt, every one is afraid of such a person, says Akho because he is like a monkey drinking wine."¹⁸ He has a dig at the poets also who are away from the substance of life and only indulge in verbiage. He remarks, "poets only make an empty noise to make themselves heard, like the thunder of the sky, when

the constellation, Rohinī, is in the ascendent. They only want to be worshipped; they join couplet to couplet, full of empty words."¹⁹ Akho protests against his being called a poet. He styles himself a knower, Jñānī. He says; "Do not consider a Jñānī a poet. How will you be able to describe the rays of the sun?"²⁰

Like Narasiṃha Mahetā, Akho hates social discrimination. He has no regard for the Society which makes the Brahmins and Vaiṣyas the masters of the untouchables. He comments : "To Narāyaṇa none is high and none is low. The world is made up of five elements but a fool takes pride in his caste. In order to maintain their caste some are called the head, some the arms, some the waist and some the feet. But really the Brāhmaṇas, the Kṣatriyas, the Vaiṣyas and the Śūdras all make up the body of Hari. Who, then is Sudra ?"²¹ Akho criticizes the general idea of the people who believe in touch-me-notism. Pollution, he says, is daughter to the low-caste man and is wedded to the foolish husbands the brahmins and the vaiṣṇavas - who enjoy it through out their life. Says Akho, it can be got rid of by only knowing Hari, otherwise it will take hold of body and mind.²² Akho is vehement in his criticism of the vaiṣṇava followers who in their outward appearance keep themselves clean and move like a dandy. By taking rich food they look like a bull, but he warns that the Māyā in subtle form has made its home in their fat bodies, and ultimately would consume them.²³

Akho is also airtical of superstitious belief about the planetary influence on human life. According to him, these very planets - sun, moon, Rahu, Ketu, Śani, etc., are themselves helpless. They are dependent on Hari who lives in our heart.²⁴

After all, Akho was the product of his times. The social and religious anomalies which he pointed out with his pithy epigrams and terse phrases were unequalled by any other poet of Gujarat. However, it may be noted that some of his predecessors like Narasiṃha Maheta and Mandan had also touched upon some of the aspects of his themes. And Akho did take a few of the phrases used in his poems from them, particularly for Mandan.²⁵ Nevertheless, it is certain that Akho had an originality of his own. He could see in a flash the unheady attitude of some people towards life. Being a goldsmith by caste his mind was unfettered by any hereditary predilections for the tradition of the Brahmins or the moral weaknesses of a calculating business culture. It also may be noted that Akho was product of an urban social environment. At existential level he reacted sharply against that material prosperity and artificial urban mannerism which had corrupted the mind and blunted the sensitivity of the society. He, therefore, only wrote about what was true to his own experience. That is why, there is not a tinge of artificiality in his language.

In the 19th century a few intellectual elites like Narmada were attracted towards Akho for his role as a reformer, as Akho had carried his tirade against the Vallabha sect. However, Narmada found in Akho a 'dry' poet who had no likings for nice things in life, though he appreciated Akho's deep knowledge of Vedānta.²⁶ Narmada's comments on Akho were made before the former became completely a changed person. In the

twentieth century K. M. Munshi shared Narmada's views. However, Munshi is less sympathetic. He dubs Akho as a poet who preached the gospel of other worldliness, simply because he was steeped in the tradition of Vedānta, which, according to Munshi, considered the world as an illusion.²⁷

In fact, Akho's Vedānta was not a system of particular philosophy or thought. He opposed all systems of thought which conditioned the mind. He even did not want to be conditioned by the very structure of the language in which he expressed his views. In one of his *chappās* he comments, "Language is simply a network of the fifty two letters of the alphabet, and the real substance lies in the fifty-third thing; where language ends, substance begins."²⁸ Thus, as a true econoclast he does not want to entertain any image or thought which may condition his direct perception of concrete reality. This would be as good as an intellectual death for one who carries certain image of man of his milieu. Obviously intellectuals like K. M. Munshi would not like to venture into this realism. It is interesting to compare Akho's approach with a French philosopher, Michel Foucault. While commenting on the limitations of the concept of 'modern man' as an individual he wrote : "From within language experienced and traversed as language, in the play of its possibilities extended to their furthest point, what emerges is that man has 'come to an end', and that, by reaching the summit of all possible speech, he arrives not at the very heart of himself but at the brink of that which limits him; in that region where death prowls, where thought is extinguished, where the premise of the origin interminably recedes."²⁹

Thus for Akho Vedānta was not an intellectual occupation. Even when he used certain Vedāntic terms, which were also used by others, he asserted that he did not imitate anybody.³⁰ He wanted to see and feel life afresh. Akho stared at life squarely in its concreteness and discovered the wrong pursuits being made by his society. This brought a radical change in his priorities. K. M. Munshi and many other scholars who view pre-modern society as a society of make-believe, living in superstition and lacking individual freedom and equality, should for a moment suspend their image of a modern man as an individual, and try to understand sympathetically the structure of social relationship which also allows a rebel like Akho to express his views. With his altered priorities Akho sought the freedom which his society could not give. On the contrary, his urban society tried to enslave him through its competitive worldly ways. Akho refused to be obliged. He lived in that very society, but he lived like a bird on its flight, whose shadow though fell on the net (of the society), was not caught in it. ³¹

We do not have any information about how Akho's *chappās* were received by his society. He does not seem to have been ostracized by the society despite his scathing remarks against the religious priests. On the contrary he seems to have touched the right cord of the society (which otherwise continued its traditional forms of religious and social relationship). If it were not so his *chappās* would not have enjoyed such immense popularity among the masses till today, as the social anomalies which Akho tried to expose were neither new to his society nor are they irrelevant to us.

In short, if religion was the focal point of social life in the pre-modern society as it is to some extent, even to day, what was its true nature ? How was it to be realized ? Akho pointed out in his own way what he considered to be the true nature of religion-which he called self-realization. His emphasis was on self-awakening, without which dream and the world would not disappear. (*Jāgyā vinā jāye nahī. ek sapana ne samsāra*). Therefore, he was not running away from the life as such, but was exposing various avenues of escapement in the name of worldly wisdom and religious ceremonies. Though an average man in the society knew this in his heart, poets like Akho articulated their innermost feeling. This has not been fully appreciated by those scholars whose epistemological approach is quite different to understand the spirit of pre-modern society. It may not be wrong to say that the pre-modern society had developed a cultural feedback system which kept the society nourishing, when apparently, the stream of life-force seemed to be on the verge of being dried out. Poets like Akho as a symbol of this cultural life-force kept the stream flowing.

FOOT NOTES :

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 Rasiklal Parikh, Hariprasad Shastri (ed.) *Gujarātano Rājakīya Ane Sāṃskṛtika Itihāsa* (Gujarati), Vol: VI., B. J. Institute of learning & Research, Ahmedabad, 1979, pp. 265-267;
 Refer for details, Makrand Mehta, *Indian Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Historical Perspective*, Academic Foundation, Delhi 1991.
2. K. M. Munshi., Op.cit., p.225.
3. Ibid., p. 229.
4. Refer for details, Dāmodar Saṃnyāsī, *Pākhāṇḍādharma-khāṇḍana-Nāṭaka* (Sanskrit), Saṃvat 1693, translated edition in Gujarati, Ahmedabad, 1931,
5. Umashankar Joshi, *Akho : Eka Adhyayan* (Gujarati) Revised Edition, Ahmedabad, 1973, pp. 17, 18, 19; K. M. Munshi, Op.cit., P. 230
6. K. M. Munshi, Op. Cit. pp-230, 231; Govardhanram Madhavram Tripathi, *The Classical Poets of Gujarat*, 3rd edition, N. M. Tripathi pvt. ltd. Bombay, 1958, P. 26.
7. Narmadashankar Devshankar Mehta (ed.), *Akho-Kṛta Kāvyo*, Part I (Gujarati), Gujarat Vernacular Society, Ahmedabad, 1931, p. 18.
8. Govardhanram Tripathi, op. cit., p. 26; Jhaveri Krishnalal Mohanlal, *Milestones in Gujarati literature*, 2nd edition, The Gujarati printing press, Bombay 1938, pp. 81-83.
9. Umashankar Joshi, op.cit. p. 24,
10. Umashankar Joshi (ed.) *Akhānā Chāppā* (Gujarati), Ahmedabad, 1953, p.3.
11. Ibid., p. 16.
12. Umashanker Joshi, *Akho: Eka Adhyayana*, p. 107.
13. Umashankar Joshi, *Akhānā chāppā*, p. 116

14. Ibid., p. 115.
15. Ibid.,
16. Ibid., p. 47
17. Ibid.
18. K. M. Munshi, op. cit., p. 232
19. Ibid.
20. Umashankar Joshi, *Akhānā Chāppā* p. 5
21. Ibid., pp. 2, 3., K. M. Munshi, op. cit., p. 233
22. Umashankar Joshi, *Akho: Eka Adhayana* p. 108.
25. Ibid., pp. 96-112.
26. Narmadashankar lalshankar, Junam. *Narma Gadya*, 2nd revised edition (Gujarati), Bombay pp. 17, 18, 19, 457, 458
27. K. M. Munshi, op. cit., pp 229, 230, 236.
28. Umashankar Joshi, *Akhānā Chāppā* p. 47
29. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (English tran.) Tavistock publications London 1970, p. 383.
30. Umashankar Joshi and Ramanlal Joshi (ed.) *Akhe Gītā* (Gujarati) Gujarat University, Ahmedabad, 1978, p. 29.
31. Umashankar Joshi, *Akho: Eka Adhyayana*, p. 354.

THE CONCEPT OF CHANGE, AS TREATED IN BUDDHISM

Bhavana Trivedi

Section II

-I-

Vaibhāṣika merely stated the doctrines. Later on the Sautrāntika school critically reflected upon the doctrines presented and surveyed the implications underlying them. Besides this, the Sautrāntika school did not establish any separate philosophical theory of its own. So far as the Sautrāntika school basically accepts the thesis of Vaibhāṣika, instead of considering them as two separate metaphysical schools, one can “consider them not as two school but as two phases of the same metaphysical pattern.”¹

Thus Sautrāntika accepts the Vaibhāṣika's distinction of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *svalakṣaṇa*. The former school differs from the latter school in so far as it maintains more consistently with its doctrine of momentariness, that *svalakṣaṇa* can not be directly perceived, but only indirectly presented.

-II-

The Buddha preached ‘*Sarvam anityam*’— indicating thereby the impermanence of the phenomena of the world, which he thought, were constantly subject to origination, growth, decay and destruction and therefore not worth clinging to.² The Buddhist schools that came into existence long after the death of their Master, interpreted the original message of the Buddha by giving it a strictly speculative, theoretical, logical form of the philosophical doctrines, which bare all the merits and demerits of a purely speculative theory. From the original message of the Buddha if one shifts one's attention to its various interpretations by the different Buddhist schools, one cannot remain without feeling, that it carries one from the original insight (*prajñā*) of the master to the subsequent elaborations (*drṣṭis*) of the disciples.

-III-

Originally Buddha's analysis of the world was that it is constituted by a complex of impermanent states (*anityam*)³ governed by the causal laws and that *nirvāṇam* results, when they are transcended⁴. This message of the Master was later on given the doctrinal form by his disciples of Hīnayāna school, which is known as the principle of momentariness. It should be noted here, that though primarily held by the Vaibhāṣikas, the principle was given a wellknit doctrinal form by the Sautrāntika school.

The principle asserts, that whatever is, is momentary.⁵ Accordingly, the doctrine maintains, that to be, means to be causally efficient⁶ and to be causally efficient means to be subject to change, which, in turn, implies, to be momentary; since the permanent if changes, it ceases to be permanent.

In other words, according to this doctrine, existence is not different from the causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*). The implication is, that there is no separate thing which undergoes change or, of which, change is characterised or predicated.

Before bringing forth the truth of this thesis, the falsity of the view, that change is attributed to, or affirmed of the thing — or it is the permanent substance that undergoes change — has been demonstrated.

Before we proceed further, it is necessary to clarify that according to the Sautrāntika school, if an entity is not momentary, it is bound to be eternal, because it is in the nature of a thing either to be subject to destruction or not. If it is not in its nature to be destroyed, it can never be destroyed by any number of attempts of the accessories. But if it is in the very nature of the thing to be destroyed, no amount of the attempts of the accessories, can stop it from destruction. The implication is, that the germs of destruction are inherent in all the existing entities. A causally efficient seed, therefore, does not need any accessories for its being replaced by the sprout-series. Similarly, it does not require any external agent other than itself for the destruction.⁷

By implication, therefore, the germs of destruction being inherent in each and every entity, an entity cannot last for more than — or beyond — an instant. If an entity does not annihilate itself, nothing else can ever destroy it, and if it does not end itself in the instant following its appearance, there is no reason why it should disappear at all at any time. This implies, that if an entity is not momentary it has to be eternal. Sautrāntika, therefore, by demonstrating the impossibility of a permanent or eternal entity being causally efficient, makes the way for the acceptance of the remaining alternative as valid.

Now the thesis under examination is, that no continuant or *sthāyibhāva* is capable of producing the effects. Take for instance a continuant (*sthāyibhāva*).

If it is to produce the effect, it must produce it either simultaneously (*yugapat*) or successively (*kramēṇa*), there being no third alternative besides these two.

If it produces its effects successively, it must either possess the capacity (*sāmarthya*) to produce the effects, or it must be devoid of that capacity.

If it possesses the capacity, why should it not produce the effects all at once as the capacity (*sāmarthya*) being present, there is not bar to its producing its effects all at once.

If it does not possess the capacity (*sāmarthya*), then it will not produce any effect at any time whatever, which would amount to saying, that the continuant does not exist.

It can not be said, that it produces its effects with the help of the auxiliary conditions (*sahakāri*). A thing that possesses the capacity of casual efficiency, does not require the help of the auxiliary conditions.

If the thing does not possess the capacity, the auxiliary conditions cannot help in producing any effect. The auxiliary help is, therefore, useless.

Now regarding the proximity of the auxiliary conditions, the causal efficiency of the

thing must be either due to the thing itself, or due to the proximate auxiliary conditions.

If it is due to the thing itself, then the auxiliary conditions have nothing to do.

If it is due to the thing as changed on account of the proximity of auxiliary conditions, then the thing has ceased to be a continuant and has become a different thing.

Further, are these auxiliary conditions themselves capable (*samartha*) or incapable (*asamartha*) ? If capable, why should they not produce the effect by themselves along ? Why should they behave as subsidiaries to the continuant ? And if they are incapable, they are useless as assisting help.

Now let us see what the auxiliary condition really does. Does it render any obligation (*upakāra*) to the continuant in producing the effect ?

If yes, the further question would be, whether the aid given is different or non-different from the auxiliary condition ? If non-different, it is the auxiliary condition in another name and in so far as it is the auxiliary condition and does not make any difference to the continuant in producing the effect, it is useless.

If however, this aid is different from the auxiliary, the aid becomes real and the auxiliary becomes useless.

Again, this *upakāra* or aid must be either different or non-different from the effect produced.

It can't be different, for it is not so experienced; and even if it were so, it would have been an additional cause of the effect besides the primary cause. Furthermore, it will be really an effective condition since the presence of the continuant without it does not produce the effect, whereas its presence as an aid to the continuant, produces the effect. In other words, there is no relation of agreement in presence as well as in absence between the aid rendered and the effect produced. There is only the agreement in absence between the continuant and the effect but no agreement in presence; because in spite of the presence of the continuant, there is no effect, where the aid rendered is absent. This shows that the aid rendered is the real cause and not the continuant.

It might be argued that the continuant has the real cause, possesses the capacity to produce the effect; whereas the so called auxiliaries make their appearance through their respective causes and have nothing to do with the production of the effect. Even this does not bear strict examination.

If the continuant possesses the capacity, why should it fail to produce the effect even in absence of the auxiliaries, since the later have nothing to do with the effect and the continuant is the real cause.

A cause which possesses the capacity to produce the effect, is never seen to be unable to produce the effect or to be deprived of its capacity for no reason whatever. One may argue therefore, that it is the nature of the effect to be produced by a capable cause along with the other conditions. Therefore, despite the continuant begins really the

capable cause, it does not produce the effect independantly but produces it with the help of the auxiliary conditions. Even this does not help the situation, since the continuant in that case would be dependent on the nature of the effect and has, therefore, no independent capacity to produce the effect.

Again, one may argue, that the continuant, through capable of producing the effect, is yet of such nature that it does not produce the effects all at once, but does so after the lapse of a few moments. But in that case, no continuant would produce any effect at any time. If the continuant's nature is such that it can not produce an effect immediately, inspite of having the capacity, it must always detain the production of the effect till a few moments have elapsed.

In case of the repetition of the same story over again at the time of production, the result will be, that it will never produce any effect at any time.

One may say, that a continuant does not require help of the auxiliary conditions to produce the effect but it has the capacity to produce the effect independently. It must then be admitted that it is only the special kind of a continuant that can do so. For instance, the case of a sprout producing seed.

The seeds are in the granary as well as in the fields. But the difference between the two is, that while granary seeds do not produce sprout, only those in the field do so. Therefore, if the seed possesses the capacity to produce, it can do so not as seed as such, but only as a special variety of seed, namely as seed in the field. This special character, namely, the casual efficiency, can only belong to the immediately antecedent seed, to which the sprout follows in the next moment or *kṣaṇa*. If it (the casual efficiency) belonged to the earlier moments, i.e. the moments earlier than the immediately antecedent moment, then the sprout would come forth from the seed even in the earlier antecedent moments, but it actually does not. Therefore, the special character answering to the capacity to produce the sprout, belongs only to the seeds at the immediately antecedent moment before the coming into being of the sprout.

In other words, the seeds of the earlier moments are not the same as the seed of the immediately antecedent moment which later on really produces the sprout. Therefore, it is not the seed as a continuant, but only the seed as a momentary immediate antecedent of the sprout, that produces the effect. Causal efficiency, therefore can belong only to the momentary and not to a continuant.

Just as a continuant can not produce its effects successively, so also it can not produce them all at once, because no continuant is actually observed to behave in this way.

Further supposing if a continuant produces all its effects at once, it will have nothing left in that case to produce at any other time, for what has been produced cannot be produced again. This means, that after having produced all its effects, the contiuant will loose its causal efficiency and, therefore, will cease to exist, existence being the same as causal efficiency.

Nor can it be said, that after having produced all its effects at once, the continuant produces some other effect at a subsequent moment. This contradicts the simultaneous production of all the effects and amounts to the first alternative, namely the successive production of the effect.

Thus, in as much as a continuant cannot exercise causal efficiency either successively or simultaneously and as there is no alternative (*trīyarāśi abhāvāt*), it follows that causal efficiency — which is the mark of existence — being excluded from a continuant (sthāyibhāva) must be (belong to the) *kṣaṇika* or the momentary only.

Regarding the knowledge of such momentary reals, the Sautrāntika maintains that the entities being momentary by nature, they cannot be held to be subject to perception, because by the time of their being perceived, they cease to be and are replaced by their succeeding moments. What is actually apprehended, is therefore the impression or image of the former existent on the latter. That is, is an indirectly inferred representation and not the presentative perception.

Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika alike accept the theory of *nairātmya*⁸ and *saṅghāta*. Like Vaibhāṣika School, Sautrāntika also considers substance as more a label or a name, used for identifying an aggregate of momentary states for practical purposes. Accordingly, what is called 'our perception of a thing' refers in fact to the contact of the various senses to the corresponding sense data, which when referred to as a whole, is named or labelled as an 'object' or a 'thing'. In fact, therefore, the so called object or thing is merely a designation used for referring to the so called sense data, each representing a unit of sensation, rising into being and dying the next moment.⁹ According to the principle of momentariness, everything being momentary, neither the cause nor the effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary existence has been succeeded by the destruction of its momentary antecedent, called cause. There being no permanent entity undergoing change, the phenomena of change or causality is explained by this school as one change being determined by another in chain, instead of the permanent entity undergoing change and this determination is known as "that happening, this happened."

In the following dialogue of King Milinda and Nāgasena, the conversation turns upon the problem of the identity or non-identity of the being in his several existences :

The saint Nāgasena says : It is not the same being and yet they are not separate beings which relieve one another in the series of existences. "Give an illustration", says King Milinda. "If a man were to light a light, O great king, would it not burn on through the night ?"—"Yes sir, it would burn through the night."—"How then, O great king, is the flame in the first watch of the night identical with the flame in the midnight watch ?"—"No, Sir,"—"But how then, O great king, was the light in the first watch of the night another, in the midnight watch another, and in the last watch of the night another ?"—"No Sir, it has burned all night long feeding on the same fuel."—"So also, O great king, the chain of element of being..... completes itself; the one comes, the other goes. Without beginning, without end, the circle completes itself: therefore it is neither the same being nor another

being, which presents itself last to the consciousness.” The doctrine meant the causal law as applied to the *dharmāḥ*, which stood for its ethical significance in the Vaibhāṣika School. By accepting the reality of only momentary, unrelated point instants (*svalakṣaṇa*) and consequently dismissing the universal as imaginary thought construction¹⁰, the Sautrāntika school denies the existence of any relation like inherence (*samavāya*) wherein the attributes are said to co-exist in the substance. As there are no separate substance there is no need for them to admit any relation of the inherence. According to the Principle of Momentariness, there is no continuity between one dharma and another dharma. The causal relation, therefore, cannot be had between them in its usual (ordinary) sense of the term. The cause, then, is considered to be only an occasion, depending on which the effect is held to happen (*asmin sati idaṃ bhavati*).

The dharma moments are thus considered to be subject to this law of dependent origination.¹¹

Accordingly *pratītyasamutpāda* is held to stand for the law of their rigorous temporal sequence.

For Sautrāntika, therefore, change implies “revolution, not evolution”¹². Accordingly, in the statement, ‘AB’ changes into ‘AC’- the conditions bringing about change, alter from B to C without at all affecting A. ‘A’ is therefore held to be merely a conventional adjunct to B & C. As being redundant, it can therefore be dispensed with as superfluous. The result is, that ‘B becomes C. Here we have the case of change which is not only perpetual but total as well¹³. In case of the seed becoming sprout, we must identify seed with continuous activity, even before its becoming the sprout. The causal efficiency being the sole test of reality, the inactive seed can never be held to produce the sprout at any time and consequently it can not be considered as unreal because unproductive.

If ‘A’ of this statement is held to stand for ego (*attā*) the early Buddhism (as we have already seen), stops at its theoretical dismissal by considering it to be a conventional adjunct.

The Mādhyamika Buddhism with its mature interpretation, tries to work out theoretically and pin-point the underlying significance behind the seemingly theoretical dismissal of ‘A’, by using the significant words like ‘*śūnya*’ and ‘*ālaya*’ referring to the actual achievement of a state when the mind is totally silenced.

It is only in the Buddha’s treading of the Path, that the underlying deep significance hidden behind this theoretical dismissal of A, gets totally revealed, wherein it is held to stand for the actual process leading to the complete dissolution of the ego (*attā*) by constantly striving and treading the path of spiritual discipline.

- IV -

The exhaustive analysis of being into the momentary point-instants makes it impossible for the realists to explain the causation all the more. Because just as it is

contradictory to refer to change in case of the permanent entity (a permanent, by definition cannot change), so also, in case of the momentary states or events too, a different type of contradiction arises while referring to the experience of change in its context.

The experience of change implies the experience of the process, which in turn, implies continuity. But the experience of continuity is contradictory to the accepted reality of the momentary, unrelated point-instants. The concept of momentary event, by definition implies, that once when one momentary event is replaced by another, it has ceased to exist. Moreover, it cannot be said that the first momentary event has suffered a change, as it can only be said so on condition of somehow becoming the next momentary event. But the two, in fact, are *ex hypothesi* different.

For two entities to be related, they must exist. But on the hypothesis of the momentary events, the event A has ceased to exist by the time it is replaced by the event B. Therefore, there can be no relation between A and B. It is, therefore, improper to say that the event A occurs after (or before) the event B.

The speculation about the doctrine of impermanence thus leads Sautrāntika to form a theory that all the states are momentary point-instants. This theory caused troubles regarding the explanation of perception and causation.

A logical corollary of the principle of momentariness is the non-acceptance of the reality of past and future. If real is that which is causally efficient, neither past nor future can be considered to be real. The past moment being 'past', it has ceased to be causally efficient. Similarly, the future moment, since it has not yet come into being, it can not be held to be causally efficient yet. The rejection of past and future moments consequently would result into the rejection of the self transending, dynamic, causally efficient present. To be dynamic or causally efficient, means to be related. Therefore, the rejection of the former, implies the rejection of the latter; with the result that the system should be held to be accepting the reality of the static unrelated, point instants which are neither causally efficient, nor subject to change. Such a point-instant is a pure concept resulting from bare intellectual abstraction.

Moreover, the term '*santāna*' is purposely used by Buddha specifically showing, that the reality that he refers to, is not destroyed issueless, but it is perpetually productive (it is *santānavāda*, not annihilationism).¹⁴ The Sautrāntika is correct in so far as it maintains that the entities being momentary, their existence can only be maintained through indirect, representation. But in its attempt to be consistent with the doctrine of momentariness, the Sautrāntika creates a critical situation for its accepted stand of representation. The presentative knowledge being the pre-condition of the representative knowledge, to accept the latter and rejection of the former, becomes fatal even for the survival of the latter.

Besides, further trouble arises when the Sautrāntika accepts two contradictory theses : (1) On the one hand, it accepts the representative theory; and (2) on the other hand, it

rejects the reality of past and future, in consistency with its principles of momentariness. By the acceptance of the former theory, the Sautrāntika accepts the reality of succeeding and preceding moments, whereas, by its acceptance of the latter thesis, the Sautrāntika rejects the reality of past and future.

It has been argued that the doctrine of momentariness is opposed to the fact of life; because in fact, we are aware of the permanent states of our self-identity through change. In support of the argument, it has been affirmed that many perceptual experiences seem to refute the doctrine of momentariness. For instance, if I am watching an object over a period of time and my mental state is unchanged, it is absurd to postulate a succession of different momentary states.

To this charge, the Buddhistic reply would be that such experiences and the fact that I describe a succession of states as though it is a single event, are misleading for two reasons : (a) because we induce a false sense of unity in ourselves and in other things through the operation of our constructive tendencies; (b) we very well know in some cases that something described as a single event is a sequence of momentary states. A flame, for instance, of a burning candle constitutes the rapid replacement of one flame-state by another, though it appears as a single process or event.

It is objected, that the principle of momentariness fails to explain perception. If the object and its cognition both are momentary, how can the perception become possible ? Moreover, perception being a process, the entire process of the subject contacting the object through the sense organs cannot take place in one moment's time.¹⁵

Besides, one moment cannot be held to know the other moment, because by the time it reaches the latter, both are dead. Supposing that the cognition-moment leaves its impression and efficiency on the succeeding moment, the moment to be cognised is no longer there.

If another moment has emerged instead, the knowledge is not of the first moment. When one moment cannot be known, it becomes difficult to imagine as to how can the other moments become known. The object of perception being momentary in nature, it cannot enter into the causal relation with knowledge. Causality presupposes the determinate, temporal sequence which is not possible to take place in case of the entity which is without duration or, in other words, momentary.

There are two aspects in the experience of change; the aspect of succession as well as continuity. While accepting the reality of perpetually changing, independent states and denying the continuity implicitly inhering in change by rejection of the self-substance (*pudgala*), is equivalent to the position which considers change to be real, but does not accept the element of felt continuity implicit in it which is implied by the very experience of change. To accept only the reality of pure difference and yet to regard it at the same time to be a self-sufficient whole or unit by itself, is to commit the fallacy of conceiving the part as the whole. By ignoring one of the two aspects forming the complex of change and thereafter claiming that there is no problem at all is to overlook the very issue under

consideration.

To make this Sautrāntika position logically more sound, it should have taken one of the following positions : either it should have taken into account the reality of both the relative aspects, or it should have rejected them both as incompetent to be considered as ultimately real. Therefore, it is its half-hearted acceptance of logic. Neither does it consider these aspects to be relative nor does it consider them to be disqualified to be ultimately real. It, therefore, commits the two fold mistakes :

- (1) Its partial acceptance of the reality of one of the two relative terms.
- (2) Its mistake in regarding that which is relative to be the absolute and consequently ultimately real.

As a result, they fail to give any solution satisfactorily to the problem of change, inspite of its strong logic. Before we conclude, it needs to be mentioned, that inspite of its multiple drawbacks, the principle of momentariness has its practical worth in so far as it helps breaking down the preconceptions about the permanance of substance. As such preconceptions only tie a man to the world. Yet it seems only a pointer to the non-dual experience or rather it is an indirect way of hinting at it.

Notes :

1. 'The Yogācāra Idealism' by A.K.Chatterjee. Chapt.I.(Benaras Hindu University Publication,1962).
2. Aṅguttara Nikāya, I,pp.140-141: "tinimāhi, bhikkhave, saṅkhatassa saṅkhatalakkaṅṅāni/ katamāni tini? Uppādo paññāyati,vayp paññāyati, thitassa aññathattam paññāyati".
3. Sarvam anityam
4. Nirvāṇaṃśāntam
5. 'Kṣaṇabhaṅga Siddhi Vyatirekātmikā' by Ratnakirti verse 77.6 : 'yat sat tat kṣaṇikam'.
6. Sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamah- Pramāṇavārtika, I.168.
7. N.M. pp. 447-448.
8. The Piṭaka literature represents the doctrine of non-substances (anattā) in the following words:
"Samudāyo samudāyo ti kho bhikkhave vipassissa bodhisattassa pubbe ananussutosu dhammesu cakkhum udapādi....." - S. N. Part II, Book XII (Nidāna-saṃyuttam) 15, Page 7. (P. T. S. London, 1988, Edi. by L. Fear).
9. Says M.N.I., P. 13 "atha vā paṃassa evam ditṭhi hoti - 'yo me ayam attā vādo vedeyyo tatra tatra kalyānapāpakānaṃkammānaṃvipākkṃpaṭisamvedeti /So kho pana me ayamattā nicco dhuvo sassato avipariṇāmadhammo sassatisamaṃ tatheve thassati' iti"
Also refer to Mah. S. of D.N., pp. 62-68 in the Book 'Dialogues of the Buddha: R. Davids. Vol. III, Part II. (P.T.S. 1959).
10. Refer to Avayavinirākaṇa - in "Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts" : (Calcutta, 1010).
11. Na hi ete jātyādayo dharmā dravyataḥ samvidyante yathā abhivyajyante l.... bhagavān,.... saṃskārapravāhasya saṃskṛtatvaṃ pratityasamutpannatāṃ dyotayitukāma idamāha "triṇīmāni, saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni", na tu kṣaṇasya nahi kṣaṇasyotpādādayah prajñāyante l.... tatra pravāhasyādirutpado nivṛtīrvyayaḥ Sa eva pravāhonuvarṭtamānah sthitiḥ | Tasyā purvāparaviseṣaḥ

sthityanyathātvam..āha cātra “jātirādih pravāhasya vyayaschedaḥ sthitistu saḥ | Sthityanyathātvam tasyaiva pūrvāparaviśiṣṭatā” tasmāt pravāha eva sthiṭiḥ...pratikṣaṇam cāpi saṃskṛatasya itāni lakṣaṇāni yujyante vināpi dravyāntarakalpanayā. na vai saṃskṛtaasya sthityevocyate lakṣaṇānāmapi tu sthityanyathātvam saṃsatastvtra sūtre saṃskṛtasyedam lakṣaṇam iti dyotitam bhagavatā “saṃskṛtaṃ nāma yadabhutvā bhavati bhutvā ca punar na bhavati yaścāsya sthitisamjñakāḥ prabandhaḥ so’ nyathā cānyathā ca bhavati iti | kim atra dravyanrajātyādibhiḥ kathamidānim sa eva dharmo lakṣyastasyaiva lakṣaṇam yokṣyate —A. K. B., li, 46 ab.

12. ‘Outlines of Indian Philosophy’ by M. Hiriyanna, p.211.
13. It would be interesting to observe a remarkable contrast of the Advaitic view regarding the explanation of the same statement, namely ‘AB changes into AC’. Śrīkarācārya maintaining, that in the statement - ‘AB changes into AC’, ‘A’ refer to the element of felt continuity, of the experience of change. This felt continuity being a fact of experience, it cannot be ignored but instead, it needs to be explained. Accordingly Śrīkara concludes, unlike the Sautrāntikas, that the felt continuity is an experience of permanence in time. Now time, being of the nature of flux, to talk of the experience of ‘permanence in time’, is to utter a contradictory statement. yet, the feeling of a continuity cannot be ignored. This experienced or felt persistence in time he names Parināmi-nitya and distinguishes it from the permanence which is timeless - kūṭastha-nitya, which he regards to be the ultimately real. The former (persistence in time), is regarded by him to be the empirical reality, which he believes to be the appearance (*vivarta*) of that which is transcendently real. In the statement ‘AB changes into AC’, ‘A’ though directly refers to the empirically real object which seems to be identical in the midst of change, points to the substratum which is timeless permanence in the final analysis and which transcends the threefold temporal divisions of past, present and future.
14. Annihilationism maintains that entity is destroyed issueless.
15. Vartamānāmbanagrahaṇe ca kṣaṇabhaṅgabādhaḥ-M.V.S.T. Sthiramati, part I, page 21 (Edited by V. Bhattācārya and G. Tucci).

THE JAINA VIEW DARKNESS

Himanshu Shekhar Acharya

The *Jainas* accept darkness (*tamas*) as one of the qualities of *Pudgala*¹. A *Pudgala* is one of the five non-soul substances (*aṅvadravyas*) enumerated in the system². It is found in two forms i.e. atoms (*anu*) and aggregates (*skandha*)³. Aggregate which is equivallant to the whole of the *vaiśeṣikas* is a product of the conglomeration of atoms⁴. Atoms arise only through disintegration of aggregates.⁵

Umāsvātī in his commentary on his own work titled *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* notes that the four such as darkness, shade, heat and lusture out of the ten qualities of pudgala are caused by the transformation of pudgala.⁶ Probably this is the reason for those being known as modes (*vikāra* or *payrāya*) in the system.⁷ Besides, while clarifying the necessity of formulating two independent *sūtras* for the enumeration of the qualities of pudgala, he says that the qualities like colour etc. (enumerated in the *sūtra* 5.23) are transformed from both atom and aggregate while darkness etc. (enumerated in the *sūtra* 5.24) are transformed from aggregate only.⁸

Vijaylāvanya Sūri quotes *Syādvādins* saying that *pudgalas* are transformed into light and darkness.⁹ During transformation from light to darkness the luminosity of *pudgalas* of light are removed with their substance remaining constant.¹⁰

The arguments of the scholars like Hemachandra Sūri, Vijaylāvanya Sūri, Bhavasena etc. go in favour of the positivity of darkness.¹¹ The author of BS points out that the destruction of light transforms into darkness.¹²

Pujyapada, Nemichandra etc. hold darkness to be the factor obstructing our visual perception besides being a mode of *pudgala*.¹³

To conclude, *tamas* according to Jainas is a quality being a mode of *pudgala* and it can be considered as a substance since a mode (*payrāya*) is not different from a substance.¹⁴ It is worth mentioning here that *tamas* and *chāyā* are considered as two different entities in the form of two independent modes of *pudgala*¹⁵ while these are accepted as identical by Naiyāyikas. In the texts of Nyāya *chāyā* is used as a synonym for *tamas* or *ālokābhāva*. According to *Jainas* *chāyā* is the form of an object reflected on another substance.¹⁶ It is divided into two types such as one in the form of an envelope of light and another is in the form of image (*pratibimba*).¹⁷ *Tamas* is considered as opposed to light by both Jainas¹⁸ and Naiyāyikas. It may also be observed that the second variety of *chāyā* i. e. envelope of light, resembles by its nature the *tamas* of Vaiśeṣikas and Sāmkhyas.¹⁹

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

BDS : Bṛhadravayasamgraha of Nemichandra, ed by Monoharalal Shastri, Srimad Rajachand Ashram, agas, 1966.

- BS : Bhagavatisūtra with Abhayadevasūri's com. ed. by N. V. Vaidya, Vijaydevasūri Samgha Series : Bombay.
- PS : Pancāstikayasāraḥ of Kundakundacharya ed. by A. Chakravarti Nayanar, Bharatiya Jnanapitha Publication, Varanasi, First edition, 1975.
- SK : Saṁkhyakārikā of Iswarakrishna with commentary Sārabodhinī of Sivanarayana Shastri with Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī of Vacaspati Mishra, Nirnayasagar, Bombay, 1940.
- SR : Syādvādarahasya of Hemachandrasūri, ed by, Yasovijayjnaniswara, Bharatiya Pracya Tattva Prakashan Samiti, Pindwada, 1974.
- S : Sarvārthasiddhi of Pujiyapāda ed. by C. S. Mallinathan, Jaipur, 1951.
- STSVS : Syādvādaṭīkā of Vijaylāvanyasūri a com. on Śastravārta-samccayaḥ of Haribhadrasūri, ed. by Pannayasri Susilavijayagani, Sri Vijaylāvanya Suriswar Jnanamandir, Botad, Saurashtra 1953.
- TAS : Tattvārthādhigamasūtra of Umāsvātī with his own commentary, ed. by Khubchandji S. Shastri, Bombay 1932.
- US : Uttarādhyayana Sūtra, ed. with a commentary by Jarl Charpentier, Ajoy Book Service, New Delhi, 1980.
- VP : Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, ed tr. by K. Raghavanpillai, Motilal Banarasi Das, Delhi, 1971.
- VS : Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda with Upaskāra & Extracts from Vivṛti ed. & Tr. by N. L. Sihna, S. N. Publication, Delhi, 1986.
- VTP : Viśvatattvapra-kāśa of Bhavasena, ed. by V. P. Johrapurkar, Jaina Samskṛti Samraksaka Mandal Samgha, Solapur, 1964.

Foot Notes :

1. Śabdabandha-saukṣmya-sthaulyasamsthānabheda-tamas-chāyātapodyotās ca, TAS, 5:24; BS 5:9:224 and US, 28:12.
2. Ajivakāḥ dharmādharmākāśapudgalāḥ, TAS, 5:1.
Here the word *Pudgala* consists of two terms i.e. *pud* and *gala*; *pud* means 'to integrate' and *gala* denotes 'to disintegrate'.
Pudgalas according to Jainas are subject to intergration and disintegration which result in the creation of bodies. Explaining this Umāsvātī says - 'Bhedasaṅghātebhyo utpadyante' vide TAS, 5.26.
3. *Aṇavaḥ skandhās ca*. Ibid 5:25.
4. *Khando paramāṇusamghādo*. PS 2:79.
5. *Bhedād aṇuh*. Umāsvātī, op, cit. 5.27.
6. Tamas chāyātapo'dyotās ca. vide Umāsvātī's Bhāṣya on his TAS, p.272; for other six

- qualities of Pudgala, vide TAS, 5.24.
7. *Ete pudgalavikārāḥ*, SS, p.64;*Pudgaladavvassa pajjāyā* BDS, gāthā. 16.
 8. Umāsvātī, op. cit, p.27.
 9. Interestingly, the gramarians too consider darkness to be caused by transformation of atoms, Bhartṭhari states. *Aṇavah sarvaśaktivāt bhedasamsargavṛttayah chāyā-tapatamah-śabdabhā vena parimāṇinah*. VP. 1. 110.
 10. *Dīparupeṇa parinatānām bhāsvarapudgalānām tamorupeṇa pariṇāmād bhāsvara-pariṇā matyāgepi dravyatvāparityāgāt tamaso dravyarupatayaiva syādvādibhir abhyupagamād ity āśayah*. STSVS, p. 121 l. 24-26.
 11. Vide SR, P. 14: Vijaylāvaṇyasūri, Op.cit., VTP p. 22, 1.9-10.
 12. *Dīpādivināśasyāpi tamisrādirupatayā pariṇāmāt*. BS, 1.3.32.
 13. *Tamo drṣṭipratibandhākaraṇam Pprakāśavirodhi, ete pudgalavikārāḥ*. Pūjyapāda, Op. cit.; cf. Nemichandra, Op. cit. Bhāṣya thereon. P.47.
 14. cf. Kundkundācārya, Op. cit. 1:12.
 15. Umāsvātī, Op. cit, 5:24.
 16. Ibid, Bhāṣya (Hindi Tr.), there on p.272.
 17. Ibid; cf. *sa ca dvividhavarṇadivikāraparinata pratibimbamātrātmikā ceti*. Pūjyapāda, Op. cit, P. 64; also Bhāṣya on BDS, p.47.
 18. Pūjyapada, op. cit., p.64.
 19. Vide VS, 5: 2: 20, also.
.....*guruvaraṇakam eva tamah*, SK, ka. 13.

THE DATE OF THE DEVENDRASTAVA : AN ART-HISTORICAL APPROACH

Lalit Kumar

The *Devendrastava* (*Devindatthao*) is one of the *Prakirṇaka* works of the Jaina Canonical literature. Subhash Kothari has recently published a Hindi translation of *Devendrastava* alongwith a scholarly introduction, contributed by Sagarmal Jain¹. The language of the existing edition of the work is *Māhārāṣṭrī Prākṛita*. However, it is acknowledged by these two writers that there are some manuscripts in which *Ardhamāgadhi* variants of the texts are also available². The *Devedrastava* is a work of Ṛṣipālita whose name occurs in the *Sthavirāvali* of the *Kalpasūtra*. In this work Ṛṣipālita's name occurs at the twelfth place after Mahāvīra. Prof. Jain in his succinct discussion has shown that Ṛṣipālita lived in the first century B.C³.

Without going into other detailed arguments put forward by these writers with regard to the dating of the *Devendrastava*, I would like to extend some more internal art-historical evidences in favour of their early dating of the text.

The *Devendrastava* describes in *gāthā* 82-93 the locale of the *Jyotiṣka* gods⁴, number of their *Vimānas*, their sizes, carrier of the *Vimāna* etc. The *gāthā* no. 93 has a specific bearing on the present context. It reads.

पुरओ वहंति सीहा, दाहिणओ कुंजरा महाकाया ।
पच्चत्थिमेण वसहा, तुरगा पुण उत्तरे पासे ॥

i.e. (the *Vimāna* is) born by a lion in the east, a giant elephant in the south, a bull in the west and a horse in the north.

This is exactly the same order in which the four animals are seen on the abacus of the famous quadripartite lion capital of Sarnath, erected by Aśoka, (B.C. 272-231). So far these animals and the quadripartite lion have been interpreted in their Buddhist perspective only. A *dharmacakra*, originally surmounted on the lion capital is almost lost. It was for the erection of this *dharmacakra* that the quadripartite lion capital was primarily conceived. The *dharmacakra* was intended by Aśoka to keep the Buddhist *Samgha* intact from the impending danger from schism which had already surfaced in the Buddhist *Samgha*. This is amply clear from the inscription engraved on the pillar which had once surmounted the lion capital.⁵ In this way, *dharmacakra* symbolised, not only the time, the eternal truth, but also the solemn desire of the ruler to maintain the Buddhist *Samgha* intact for time immemorial. To herald this majestic will, Aśoka chose Sarnath, as the most appropriate place where Buddha had set the wheel of law into motion.

The *dharmacakra* was not a sectarian symbol in India. The *dharmacakra* is often seen in the art of Bharhut, Sāncī, Bodhagaya and Amrāvati, and also in the Jain art of Mathura and Causā bronzes. The *dharmacakra* is referred to as *Brahmāṇḍa Cakra*, *Bhāva Cakra*,

Kāla Cakra, *Dharma Cakra*, and *Sudarśhan Cakra* in Indian literature. It is a *Vṛtta Cakra*, a symbol of Viṣṇu and above all it is a wheel of time in the *Ṛgveda*.

The quadruple lion capital seems to be carrier or the vehicle of the *dharmacakra*. According to the description found in the *Devendrastava* it should be identified as the *Jyotiṣka Vimāna*. The four animals and the intervening wheels on the abacus represent the chariot of the *Jyotiṣka* god or the god of light.⁶ The most luminous god of light is the Sun, represented here by the four adorning lions who look around in all the four directions. The lion is a west-Asiatic art motif which had been assimilated in Indian Art and Culture at a very early period. Thus, the quadripartite lion with the abacus represents aniconic representation of the Sun god. This conception of Sun god does not conform to the later iconography of the god in which his chariot is driven by four or seven horses.

In this way the *Devendrastava* provides the earliest literary reference to the interpretation of the abacus of the quadripartite lion capital of Sarnath. It may be pointed out that Sarnath lion capital is the only archaeological example of its kind in the realm of Indian art where the conception of a *Vimāna* of a *Jyotiṣka* god has been given a concrete shape. In the present example it is the *Vimāna* of the Sun god.

The *Devendrastava* also refers to some other kinds of *Vimānas* or palaces. There are described as circular, triangular, square (*catuṣkoṇa*) or rectangular in shape.⁷ It further adds that circular, triangular and rectangular palaces have one, three and four entrances respectively.⁸

It perhaps refers to the earliest cave architecture of India which developed during the Mauryan period in Bihar. The Lomas Ṛṣi cave, the *Sudāmā* Cave, *Viśkarma* Cave, *Karṇa Cauper* Cave etc. of the Barabar Hills, in Rājgir, represent the kind of architecture referred to in the text. However, it does not strictly follow the description. It has to be born in mind that the text is not an architectural treatise in detail. It is sufficient for the author of the *Devendrastava* to refer to the architecture by their shapes.

Most of the Barabar hill caves have an outer rectangular chamber and an inner circular room with a separate opening from the inside only. The main entrance is the side of the rectangular chamber.⁹ The doorway has a characteristic converging door jambs and forms a trapezoidal opening. About twenty kilometers away from Rājgir, is another cave called Sitāmarhi cave. It also bears the Mauryan polish. It has a rectangular plan with characteristic trapezoidal entrance, but it has a semi-elliptical elevation which give it a triangular look.¹⁰

Thus, a special reference to the *Jyotiṣka Vimāna* born by the four animals, as seen on the abacus of the lion capital of Sarnath and a reference to the earliest cave architecture of India, makes the *Devendrastava* a fairly early text, the antiquity of which can be traced back to the Mauryan period, save for the date of Ṛṣipālita, the author of the text. Ṛṣipālita's name occurs only in the *Sthavirāvali* of the *Kalpasūtra*. Once the whole chronology of the *Sthavirāvali* of the *Kalpasūtra* is fixed it would be easy to provide a precise date to the *Devendrastava* and its author Ṛṣipālita. Till then, the date

of R̥ṣipālita as fixed by Sagarmal Jain seems most logical. Undoubtedly, it should be attributed to a period not later than the first century, B.C.

Footnotes :

1. *Devindatthao (Devendrastava)*, Subhash Kothari (trans.), Agam Ahimsa Samata evam Prakrit Samsthana, Udaipur, 1988 (in Hindi).
2. *Ibid.*, p. xxii. In spite of its being an early text, the *Ardhamāgadhi* variants have given place to the *Māhārāṣṭrī* Prakrit by the editors. Editors invariably face a dilemma, when the date of a work is not certain. This makes the editor's task more challenging in the reconstruction of the original text.
3. *Ibid.*, p. xxi
4. The classification of gods is found in all the ancient religions of India. In Jainism gods are classified as *Bhavanpati*, *Vyantara*, *Jyotiṣka* and *Vaimānika*. On a comparative study of Indian religions one finds parallels in the classification of various gods. However, in Jain religion the *Jyotiṣka* gods have been put in a separate class. This class of gods include sun, moon, planet, constellation and stray star. These are dealt in detail because of highly complex cosmological concept which Jainas had evolved in course of time. The *Sūryaprajñapti* is one of the earliest treatise on the Jaina cosmology which is attributed to the 3rd century B. C. But it is silent about the *Vimanas* of the *Jyotiṣka* gods.
5. S. P. Gupta, *The Roots of Indian Art*, Delhi, 1980, pp. 124-25.
6. A detailed study on the Symbolism of the Sarnath Lion Capital will be published soon by the present writer.
7. *Devindatthao*, *gāthā* 209.
8. *Ibid.*, *gāthā*, 216.
9. Gupta, R I A, pp. 189-192, fig. 2 - 5.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 197 - 198 fig. 8.

INDIAN CONCEPTS OF TIME AND ARCHAEOLOGY

R. N. Mehta

Sthira-dravya-samutpannām dharāstara-nivāsinim |
Vande purā-vastu-vidyām nara-kārya-prabodhinīm ||

Introduction

Human beings, along with other living beings experience the changing patterns of day, night, seasons etc. The reflections of these experiences give three basic notions of time. One of them is a continuous change of day and night. The other is the continuous repetition of day and night as well as seasons in cyclic order. The third is the experience of short and long days and nights. These aspects are the basis of three concepts of Time. The aspects of time are linear, cyclic and relative. With the advancement of the agricultural production, the need to calculate the change of seasons and year led to the counting of days of the months for understanding the annual cycle. Further development led to the counting of the year for different transactions. These developments introduced the element of numbers to understand the changing patterns of Time as well as the duration.

Cultural Parameters

With these fundamental aspects of the phenomenal world different cultures tried to develop the concepts of time, according to their view points. These led to differences of the understanding of Time as linear, cyclic, relative etc. In the cultural activities these differences become prominent feature of discussions about the nature of Time as linear, cyclic or relative. These discussions for calculations as reflected in the calendars of different cultures are taken into consideration and efforts are made to understand them in a linear pattern in the cultural ethos of the evolutionary model that is popular at present. This model based only on the time-scale often fails to accommodate the differences observed at different places in our spatio-temporal world. It raises an important problem of understanding this phenomenon and the its understanding in other cultural atmosphere.

Aims

When only a linear evolutionary pattern of time-scale is not able to explain the spatio-temporal phenomenon, it is interesting to know the other view points of this aspect of the world, and compare them with the one used generally in Archaeology. With this aim in view, Indian concepts of time and Archaeology are discussed.

Archaeology

Archaeology tries to search the material relics of by gone Human activities in their spatio-temporal context with a view to understand the question of Human genesis and travel to the Present on this Planet Earth.

This search has two aspects. One of them is the search of the remains of the Human

activity on the Earth. The other is its presentation in the time sequence.

The notion that this search draws a better picture of past human activities than the one that is available in the verbal record of different cultures, forms the basis of this activity in Archaeology. The first aspect of the search of places with archaeological remains for understanding the activities of Man in Nature is the foundation store of Archaeology. When this aspect is further analysed, it points to two different activities. One of them is the search of the sites that preserve the relics and the other is the understanding of the process of the formation of the site.

It is noted that the material remains form the mound. This aspect of the formation of the mounds is noted by Vyāsa in the *Mahābhārata* XII.225.1.2. It is noted that "All the Movable and Stable life elements get destroyed and become the part of the Earth. When these destroyed forms of life have become the part of the Earth it looks barren like the back of a tortoise."

This observation of the features of destroyed elements is the reversal of the process of creation as indicated in XII.224.74.

Archaeology tries to understand the process of creation through the mounds indicative of the process of the living that is turned into the element of Earth, by a reversal of the order of the formation of the mounds by excavations and study the materials discovered in this process.

Archaeology from this angle becomes a study of the creation, through the remains of the process of destruction. These process take place in Time and therefore the notions of time or Kāla become important.

It is observed on any archaeological site that the process of beginning, continuity and destruction are observed. However, on the site with a long life, these processes are repeated and, therefore, the processes of regeneration and destruction are also observed. With the basic notion of time as an irreversible aspect of nature, the observations of the cycles of origin continuity and destruction are treated as different links in a continuous chain.

With our advanced methods of calculating the time-factor at different places, it is known that, the cycles of origin, stability and destruction as well as the repetition by regeneration etc., are well-known. This cyclic phenomenon is again correlated on a linear pattern that suggests that at different places on the habitable globe the cyclic pattern of origin, stability and destruction is a well-known phenomenon.

This cyclic pattern is known to belong to different time-spans and therefore, the relativity of the existence of different sites is also a well-known phenomenon.

Thus, Archaeological activities that are the reversal of the processes of destruction, by both destruction by excavations of the site and preservation of the remains as well as their study on the time-scale are similar at a refined level, to the Human experience of the linear, cyclic and relative patterns of time.

Indian Views :

It is therefore interesting to review briefly, the Indian concepts of Time. In India Time is known as *Kāla*. The earliest evidence about the concepts of *Kāla* are noted in the *Atharvaveda*, XIX.53.54. Analysis of the Sukta indicates that here *Kāla* is the Almighty force or deity of the universe. It is the cause of the phenomenal world and suggests its linear, cyclic and relative concepts.

This Vedic trend continues in the succeeding literature. The *Mahābhārata* has many references from which these concepts could be easily inferred. In the *Mahābhārata* XII.220.35, *Kāla* is defined as that which is used in counting all creation.

This idea is expressed in *Bhagavad Gītā* 10.30. The all destroying capacity of *Kāla* is noted in 11.32. Interestingly, the same idea of destruction and defeat at appropriate time is expressed by Ṛṣi Kṛṣṇa in the Ṛgveda X.42.9. This is the only reference of.

The repeated cycle of creation, stability and destruction is given a relative pattern also in *Mahābhārata* XII.224. This idea of Kalpa is noted by *Matsya*, 289, *Viṣṇu* I.3.

The grammarians have considered the *Kāla* in great details. They consider *Kāla* in the phenomenal world as a powerful entity. Specially Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* considers *Kāla* and its powers of stopping and encouraging the activities in the phenomenal world as the primary cause of order of things. It also has the power of aging. Its definition include the linear and cyclic and relative elements.

The calculations of Kalpa and Yugas are also based on the principle that "One year of Men is a day of Gods and such 360 days are one divine year. This is further expanded in the case of Brahmā. These calculations indicate that they are highly enlarged version of Human experience. They use the years and the decimal system of reconing time.

These ideas of Time are the works of Astronomers, which indicate that four Yugas cover 4,320,000 years of Men and 12,000 years of Gods. These are again developed in Manvantarās and Kalpa that is computed as 4,320,000,000 x 1000 by *Brahmagupta*. Those computed by Āryabhaṭa are 4,354,560,000 years x 1008 for a Kalpa. They indicate the astronomers' different views of the cyclic phenomenon with its relative lengths.

However, there are other notions of Time in the Vedic Philosophies. The Vaiśeṣikas in particular consider time as one of the *Dravya* with its *Guṇa* and *Karma*. Its indicators are also noted as earlier, contemporary, later, speedy and slow.

The other notion places time under a powerful deity like *Īśvara*, *Śiva*, *Viṣṇu*, *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* asks a question about the ultimate cause of the phenomenal world and after considering several options, including *Kāla*, opines in favour of *Īśa*. This tendency increases in the Purāṇas and Philosophy. In the Purāṇas, time is placed under the Supreme deities like *Śiva*, *Viṣṇu* and others, Philosophy places Time under the indescribable Brahman. Under this idea also Time-less becomes manifest in the world as time. Both these ideas reject Time as the Supreme deity, but its linear, cyclic and relative pattern is accepted.

A quotation from *Vāyavīya Saṁhitā* VIII. I. 6. 67 indicates that “The lord is described as one who produces time and is the Lord of all the reumas and the liberator of all bondage.

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Time in this tradition is considered only as a mental construction, as noted by Bharṭhari in another context. III. 9. 6. These aspects give different view points in Indian thought. One of them as already noted is its independent existence. The second is that it is one of the powers of the Supreme reality. The third view point notes the time as only a mental concept. This view connects time in the understanding of the phenomeval world, that itself is considered unreal.

The Buddhist consider time as only a continuous becoming only and is in the constant flux. In this constantly moving linear momentariness the idea of rebirth exists. This gave it a cyclic view. Their Vajrayāna school however, has developed a Maṇḍala known as *Kālacakra*. It is described by Abhayadeva Gupta in Niṣpannayogāvali (G. O. series CIX). In this concept time is given the Supreme position as an emnation of the Śūnya.

The whole Maṇḍala has the central deity, the kālacakra with the Śakti viśvamātā. This iconograpoic form reminds one of the notion of Kāla with his Śakti, as represented by Bharṭhari I: 1-3 as well as *Saundarya Lahari* of Śankarācārya. All these notions represent Kāla as well as the supreme deity Śiva as powerful with their respective Śaktis only.

The Buddhist notion of *Kālacakra* as emnating from Śūnya with the Bījamantra Hṛīmīś is their common belief of the phenomenal world. It is conceived for understanding the beginning, existance and dissolution of the universe.

The whole Maṇḍala has the outer ring of Kāyamaṇḍala with the phenomenal world of the twelve months, tithis, with their respective deities, Nāgas and the cemetary, planets etc.

This outer Maṇḍala encloses within it the Manomandala in which desires in the form of deities, Bodhisattvas with their śaktis and several other deities reside.

Within this circle, four Dhyānī Buddhas with their Śaktis reside. Besides them the Dharinīs, Pujā, Naivedya, deities, Nṛtya, Kāma, Vādya, Gīta and others reside.

Within this circle of Dhyāne Buddhas the deities of light such as Kṛṣṇādīpta, Raktadīpta, Pītadīpta and Svetadīpta, Dhuma, Marīci, Pratīpa, Khadyota surround the main deity Kālacakra in embrace with its Prajna Viśvamātā. The deity has under his feet several deities.

Kālacakra is conceived as a deity with four faces, three necks, six shoulders, twelve hands.

This Maṇḍala gives the idea of the phenomenal world of the Mahābhūtas, and the Bodhisattvas always ready to assist the human worshippers of the phenomenal world of the origin, stability and destruction.

This deification of Kālacakra and its artistic representation is indicative of the global phenomenon of the life that depends on Kāla that himself emanates from the Śūnya.

These ideas in Buddhist circles suggest their notions of the constantly changing patterns of the universe with its repetitive or cyclic pattern, that is experienced by those in *Avidyā*. The Buddhists aim at rising above these aspects of *avidyā* and try to achieve *śūnyā*, *tathatā* etc.

The idea of Time of Kāla as an important element in existing phenomenal world is also known to the Jains. In their cosmological thought, they are divided in their opinions about Kāla. One opinion considers it as a mental concept, the other accepts it as an important element.

According to the later opinion, Kāla is an *Ajivāsti-kāya*.

It is *Anandī* and *Ananta* that is it has an existence and is beginningless and endless. This Kāla gets subdivided by the moving astronomical objects like the Sun, Moon, Planets, *Nakṣatras*, Stars, etc. The consideration of the division of Time is a Human characteristic. Due to this characteristic it could be counted and it becomes *Saṅkhyeya*. It has the nature of non-countability that is known as *Asaṅkhyeya*.

This time-cycle moves in *Utsarpiṇī* and *Avasarpiṇī*, with six divisions of each. In it the *Jīvāstikāya* moves. The *Jīvas* are classified into Human, *Tiryāṅca*, *Daivī* and *Nārakū*. For their life duration time is considered in relative lengths in the number of years as well as by similes of *Palyopama* or *Sāgaropama* etc.

When these notions are classified the aspects of linear, cyclic and relative nature of Kāla become clear.

Thus most of the school of Indian thinkers seem to indicate the following basic notions of time :

1. In final analysis Kāla does not exist.
2. Kāla is a characteristic of the Phenomenal world.
3. It is linear, cyclic and relative.
4. It is irreversible due to its linear character.
5. Those systems that believe in non-existence of Time, include it as manifestation of the unmanifest.
6. Those who identify the unmanifest as a deity either consider Kāla as one of its characterisation or consider it as a deity of lower order.

From these consideration, when iconographic systems evolved, they led to many iconographic presentations of Kāla as Mahākāla, Kālari, Kālacakra, Mahākālī etc. Usually, they have emphasised their destructive aspects, as the other aspects of creation and stability are either considered less important for Kāla or are attributed to other deities.

On the basis of these notions of time, the Indians have looked upon the past, the present and the future as the function of time, as a cycle of activities or Karma.

The Idea of linear activity of *karma* is well known. When any action is completed it comes to an end. The new Karma has to begin its linear action oncemore. The duration of the Karma and its Krama or sequence is different and remains *adr̥ṣṭa*. This is a term with many shades of meaning. *Karma* is essential for ultimate realisation or *Mokṣa*. Some schools emphasise that need of knowledge or Jñana and Bhakti. But all of them would agree on Karma without attachment and for *lokasaṅgraha* or good of the living.

The World-View of most of these schools is the release from the bonds of the phenomenal world. This is achieved by the soul by his own effort. For this, the soul moves from different species of living organisms and becomes a Human being. His efforts ultimately lead to the Mokṣa. Thus, in such a world view, the short span of Human life is only a stage in the progress of the soul.

For this progress proper action and ideas are necessary. These aspect of life and its purpose have shaped the Indian notions of time, History, Archaeology and other subjects, along with the activities in life.

On a wider outlook of life, with its polycyclic nature of the phenomenal world, the ideas of History are shaped as understanding of the four-fold Puruṣārtha as, if one has a progressive view of life as notied in *Atharvaveda* XV.6.11. Here the emphasis is more on action rather than linear chronology. It is, therefore, natural that action has more relevance in Indian thought than linear chronology. In Indian thought the chronology of an individual is cyclic. Each cycle begins with birth and terminates with death. So in these repetitive cycles linear chronology is not very appealing. However, for practical purpose of life, the business activities, administration, agricultural prupose and annual *vratas*, religious observations etc., minute calculations of time are found. Even in the acts of music and dancing the time-factor is carefully considered. The sciences in Indian also take careful conginsance of the time-factor. These aspects of phenomenal existence indicate that in India for practical, religious activities, the time was noted as an important factor. The correlation of Lunar and Solar year was established to regulate the understanding of the seasons for agricultural activities. The Indian *Pañcāṅga* not only takes care of the year, but the names of the months in final analysis are based on the changes observed in nature. Thus, necessary chronology was well-known to the Indians. Again, the chronological frame work for administration has led to the development of different eras that effectively served their function, in different parts of the country. When ever required, two or three eras were noted in the inscriptions and other functional records.

These aspects have proved their worth when an effort was made to arrange the Indian Eras in conformity with the Christian Era known to the English. This exercise confirmed the idea that Indians had a good sense of chronology for all practical purposes.

Intrestingly, when the notion of History was constricted only to the memory of the Past as written documents, Archaeology in those cultures had to wage a struggle to free history from this narrow notion. In this struggle Archaeology relied on the material relics and chronology, and slowly and steadily succeeded in its task. The languages memory however has to find out the middle course by inventing artificial boundary between history and prehistory. This boundary is different for different countries and places. This aspect of Archaeology suggests that linear chronology is only a metal concept of a culture believing in only a linear systems of existence.

This system had to struggle hard on the conceptual frame of reference of serialisation of Actions or *Krama* that is too-well known in India. With its long view of unity of life, these notions of Evolution, often do not appeal to a thoughtful Indian.

Even the experience of existence of the use of Stone-tools from Indian view is not very conducive to the system of classification of Stone, Bronze-copper and Iron ages with their marginal over-laps as a universal chronological system.

Even though this universal linear pattern might not be very appealing, the respect for the past and the Tradition is not-wanting. Actually Indians have a strong feeling for *Rta* and correct tradition for peace and prosperity. With proper maintenance of this tradition, the life could be well-maintained. Its reversal and disorder would lead to chaos and misery ; so the search of truth is an essential aspect of Indian system. In this search for good order and progress the value of the study of the materials is well-recognised, specially by the Vaiṣeṣikas and the Jains. They emphasise the understanding of the *Dravya, Guna Karma, Dig* or *Kṣetra, Kāla* and *Bhava* or special view point. From these aspects archaeology has tremendous attraction, as a search for truth about what happened in the Past. The maintenance of good tradition and avoiding the evil one is a constant feature in India. With this emphasis for truth, its search of the *Kūrma Pṛṣṭa* Earth, with the remains of *Pralaya* and reversal of the order of *Pralaya* to know about the existance and origin of Human action on the habitable parts of the globe, better understanding of Karma of the past generations is essential. This base gives high regard to Archaeology. These aspects of Archaeology are in last analysis, efforts to revive the memory of the Past. This is a noble task for according the to *Bhagawad Gīā* II.63, Humanity gets destroyed by the loss of memory .

This memory and the power of Almighty *Kāla* is relation to Human activities is described by one of the great philosopher of India as :

*Sā ramyā nagarī mahān sa nṛpatih sāmāntcakram ca yat,
Pārśve tasya vidaghasatpariṣadas tāś candrabimbānanah ।
Utsiktaḥ sa tu rājaputranivahas te bandinas tāḥ kathāḥ
Sarvamāyasya vaśād agāt smṛtipadam kālāya tasmai namaḥ ॥*

References :

1. *Atharvaveda*, XIX. 53-54.
2. *R̥gveda*, X.42.9
3. The references to *Mahābhārata* are from Critical Edition, Poona, used by Sātavalekar.
4. *Matsya Purāṇa*, 289.
5. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, Press, Gorakhpur Edition.
6. Harishankar Prasad (Ed.). *Time in Indian Philosophy*, p. 359 ff. for discussions of Kalpa.
7. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, I.S: II.6.8.
8. *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 2.
9. Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*.
10. Abhaydeva, *Niṣapanna Yogāvali* (G.O. series, CIX)
11. Saṅkarācārya, *Saundaryalaharī*.
12. Pandit Dalsukh Malvania (Ed.) *Sthānāṅga* and *Samavāyāṅga*; also Pandit Sukhlalji (Ed), Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*.

भारतीय दर्शन में अभाव की समस्या

हेमलता श्रीवास्तव

भाट्ट मीमांसकों की अभाव के बारे में यह धारणा है कि यह एक वास्तविक सत्ता है और इसको हम अनुपलब्धि के द्वारा जानते हैं। भाट्ट मीमांसक और अद्वैत वेदान्ती अनुपलब्धि को ज्ञान का एक निश्चित स्रोत मानते हैं। परन्तु अन्य सभी सम्प्रदायों ने इसका विरोध किया है। जयन्त भट्ट के अनुसार यद्यपि अभाव एक सत्ता है, परन्तु ज्ञान का एक निश्चित साधन अनुपलब्धि नहीं है। अब हम सभी सम्प्रदायों का वर्णन करके यह निर्णय लेते हैं कि अभाव को किस आधार पर स्वीकार या अस्वीकार करते हैं ?

कुमारिल^१ अभाव के वस्तुनिष्ठ दृष्टिकोण को मान्यता प्रदान करते हैं। अभावात्मक तथ्य चार भागों में वर्गीकृत किये जा सकते हैं। प्रथम, प्रागभाव के अन्तर्गत हम दूध में दही के अभाव वाले उदाहरण को, दूसरे प्रध्वंसाभाव के अन्तर्गत मृत्यु के बाद व्यक्ति के अभाव वाले उदाहरण को, तीसरे अन्योन्याभाव के अन्तर्गत 'गाय घोडा नहीं है और घोडा गाय नहीं है' इस उदाहरण को, तथा चौथे अत्यन्ताभाव के अन्तर्गत आकाश-पुष्प का उदाहरण ले सकते हैं। अभाव आकाश-पुष्प की तरह असत् नहीं है।

निषेधात्मक निर्णय से ही निषेधात्मक तथ्य का जन्म होता है। प्रश्न उठता है कि इसका ज्ञान हमें किस माध्यम से होता है ? ऐसा अनुपलब्धि प्रमाण के द्वारा संभव है। अभावात्मक निर्णयों को प्रत्यक्ष और अनुमान के माध्यम से नहीं जाना जा सकता है क्योंकि ये भावात्मक साधन हैं। प्रत्यक्ष में इन्द्रिय-प्रदत्तों का एक निश्चित विषय में संबंध है। दो अस्तित्ववान् वस्तुओं के बीच ही संबंध संभव है। शुद्ध अभाव संभव ही नहीं है। निषेध या अभाव सिर्फ शुद्ध मनस् के द्वारा संभव है प्रत्यक्ष या स्मृति के आधार पर नहीं।^१

प्रभाकर का अभाव संबंधी सिद्धान्त कुमारिल के विरुद्ध है। वे न तो अभाव को एक अलग पदार्थ मानते हैं और न अनुपलब्धि को अलग प्रमाण। अभावात्मक निर्णय वैध है क्योंकि ये भावात्मक तथ्य से अप्रत्यक्ष रूप से संबंधित हैं। भावात्मक अस्तित्व का प्रत्यक्ष स्वयं के द्वारा दो प्रकार से संभव है। यहाँ पर यह आक्षेप किया जाता है कि हम दो चीजें मैदान और घट को प्राप्त करते हैं। और बाद में हम सिर्फ मैदान देखते हैं। अब, यहाँ पर इन दोनों में भेद का क्या कारण है ? अगर हम परवर्ती अनुभव को स्वीकार करते हैं तो प्रभाकर को अभाव की सत्ता को स्वीकार करना चाहिए लेकिन यहाँ ध्वंसाभाव मानने की कोई आवश्यकता नहीं है। अतएव यह ज्ञान कि 'मैदान में कोई घर नहीं है', मात्र यह ज्ञान है कि घर का कहीं और अस्तित्व है इस लिए इस ज्ञान को किसी और प्रमाण की आवश्यकता नहीं है क्योंकि ज्ञान स्वप्रकाश है।

अभाव के बारे में बौद्धों का मत कुछ हद तक प्रभाकर से मिलता जुलता है। अभाव को स्वतंत्र रूप से नहीं जाना जा सकता। अभाव विशेष समय, स्थान और विशेष विषय से संबंधित होने के कारण ही अनुभव किया जा सकता है। अतः अभाव के ज्ञान के लिए किसी स्वतंत्र प्रमाण की आवश्यकता नहीं है। अभाव या निषेध का वास्तविक अस्तित्व नहीं है। इसी प्रकार निषेध निःस्वभाव है क्योंकि हमें अभाव का कोई विशेष स्वरूप नहीं दिखायी पड़ता है, जो इसे दूसरी सत्ताओं से अलग कर

१. श्लोक वार्तिक, अभाव

२. गृहीत्वा वस्तुसद्भावं स्मृत्या व प्रतियोगिनम् । मानसं नास्तित्वाज्ञानं जायतेऽज्ञानपेक्षया ॥ श्लोक्तार्तिक, अभाव-२७ ।

सके । इसे भाषिक अनुप्रयोग में दूसरे प्रकार से वर्णित किया गया है ।^३

नैयायिकों का अभाव संबंधी मत भाट्ट दार्शनिकों से मिलता जुलता है । परन्तु नैयायिकों का कुछ बातों में, विशेषकर अभाव के ज्ञान के प्रमाण (स्रोत) को लेकर, भाट्ट मीमांसकों से मतभेद है । भाट्ट मीमांसकों के अनुसार केवल भावात्मक तथ्य ही प्रत्यक्ष द्वारा जाने जाते हैं न कि अभावात्मक या अनुपस्थित तथ्य । भाट्ट मीमांसक के इस सिद्धान्त से नैयायिक सहमत नहीं है । उसके अनुसार यह ज्ञान कि "भूतल पर घट नहीं है" इस ज्ञान से कि "प्याले में दही है" मिलता जुलता है । तब यह कैसे कहा जा सकता है कि भूतल का ज्ञान प्रत्यक्ष इन्द्रियों द्वारा और घटाभाव का ज्ञान दूसरे स्रोतों (अनुलब्धि) द्वारा संभव है ? इन दोनों का ज्ञान हमें तभी होता है जब हमारी आँखें कार्य करती हैं ।

ऐसा प्रतीत होता है कि अभाव आकार और रंग से वंचित है, और चूँकि आकार और रंगयुक्त वस्तुएं ही प्रत्यक्ष का विषय हैं, अतः ये आँखों द्वारा प्राप्त नहीं की जा सकती हैं । किन्तु उपर्युक्त कथन उपयुक्त नहीं है । उदाहरणार्थ, अणुओं के आकारयुक्त और रंगयुक्त होने पर भी वे प्रत्यक्ष का विषय नहीं हैं । अभाव भावात्मक बिन्दुपथ की एक योग्यता है । घटाभाव इसके बिन्दु अर्थात् भूतल से विशेषण रूप से सम्बद्ध है । आँखों का संबंध घटाभाव से भूतल के साथ संयोजन के माध्यम से ही संभव है ।

कुमारिल आक्षेप करते हैं कि किसी भी वस्तु को हम केवल प्रमाण के माध्यम से ही जान सकते हैं । तात्पर्य यह है कि सभी भावात्मक तथ्य भावात्मक प्रमाणों, जैसे प्रत्यक्ष इत्यादि, द्वारा और सभी अभावात्मक तथ्य निषेधात्मक साधनों, जैसे अनुपलब्धि, द्वारा ही जाने जाते हैं ।

कुमारिल के इस मत से नैयायिक सहमत नहीं हैं । उसके अनुसार हम अभावात्मक तथ्यों को भी कभी प्रत्यक्ष कभी अनुमान और कभी शब्द द्वारा जानते हैं । उदाहरणार्थ, वर्षा का न होने का अनुमान हम सूखे मैदान को देखकर ही कर सकते हैं । इसी प्रकार यह तथ्य कि 'अशोक ने कलिंग के नरसंहार के बाद कोई युद्ध नहीं किया' ऐतिहासिक तथ्य है और इसको केवल इतिहास के माध्यम से ही जाना जा सकता है ।

यद्यपि 'वैशेषिकों' के मत का खण्डन कुमारिल के अनुयायियों ने नहीं किया है फिर भी श्रीधर का पार्थसारथि के अभाव संबंधी दृष्टिकोण पर पर्याप्त प्रभाव दिखायी पड़ता है ।

निषेध वास्तविक सत् है लेकिन इसे किसी निश्चित साधन द्वारा नहीं जाना जा सकता । यह अनुमान द्वारा भी जाना जा सकता है । अगर इसे अनुपलब्धि द्वारा जानना संभव है तो यह भी कहा जा सकता है कि यह केवल अनुपलब्धि ही नहीं है जो हमें निषेध का ज्ञान प्राप्त कराती है बल्कि योग्यानुपलब्धि है । श्रीधर के अनुसार जब हमें घट की उपलब्धि होती है तो जो हमें पहले घटाभाव का ज्ञान प्राप्त हुआ था, वह खंडित हो जाता है । उदाहरणार्थ, कमरे में घटाभाव है परंतु उस समय हम इसका अनुभव नहीं करते जब कुछ समय पश्चात् सेवक घट को कमरे में लाता है तब हमें यह प्रतीत होता है कि कुछ समय पूर्व कमरे में घटाभाव था । किन्तु भाट्ट दार्शनिकों के अनुसार पूर्वज्ञान पश्चात्ज्ञान हो जाने पर खंडित नहीं होता है ।

श्रीधर के अनुसार ऐसे उदाहरणों में न्यायिक प्रक्रिया सम्मिलित है । जब एक वस्तु स्मरणीय है और उसका स्मरण नहीं हो पाता तो उसको वहाँ पर अनुपस्थित होना चाहिए ।

३. न्यायमंजरी, पृष्ठ ५४-५५

४. न्यायकन्दली, पृष्ठ २२५-२८

अनुपलब्धि का स्वरूप

कुमारिल के अनुसार अभाव के संदर्भ में अन्य पांच प्रमाण उपयुक्त नहीं है। अतः अभाव के ज्ञान के लिए अनुपलब्धि को प्रमाण मानना आवश्यक है। धर्मराजध्वरीन्द्र के अनुसार ज्ञान रूपी करण से उत्पन्न न होने वाले अभावानुभव के असाधारण कारण को अनुपलब्धि प्रमाण कहा जाता है। अनुमान व्याप्तिजन्य ज्ञान है परंतु अनुपलब्धि नहीं है।^१ इसलिए यह कहा जा सकता है कि ज्ञानयोग्य पदार्थ की अनुपलब्धि ही उस पदार्थ के अभाव को सिद्ध कर सकती है न कि ज्ञान के अयोग्य पदार्थ की अनुपलब्धि।

कुमारिल भट्ट के अनुसार प्रमाण और उससे ज्ञेय वस्तु के स्वभाव में समानता होनी चाहिए। भावात्मक वस्तुओं का ज्ञान भावात्मक प्रमाणों से और अभावात्मक वस्तुओं का ज्ञान अभावात्मक प्रमाणों द्वारा होता है। कुमारिल सत् और असत् दो प्रकार की वस्तुएं मानते हैं।

जयन्त भट्ट उपर्युक्त मत पर आक्षेप करते हैं। उनके अनुसार अभाव से कहीं-कहीं भाव पदार्थों का ज्ञान होता है। प्रमाण सामग्री में अभाव का भी समावेश रहता है। अतएव प्रमाण और प्रमेय में सत्तापरक एकरूपता का सिद्धान्त स्वीकार नहीं किया जाता।^१

अभाव के वास्तविक स्वरूप के विषय में भारतीय दार्शनिकों के मतों का कई प्रकार से विभाजन किया गया है। भाट्ट मीमांसक और अद्वैत वैदान्तियों के अनुसार अभाव एक पदार्थ है और जिसका ज्ञान अनुपलब्धि प्रमाण से होता है। प्रभाकर मीमांसक और सांख्य सत्ता और असत्ता ये ही वस्तु के दो रूप मानते हैं। उनके अनुसार अभाव कोई पदार्थ नहीं है किन्तु उसका ज्ञान प्रत्यक्ष द्वारा संभव है। नैयायिकों के अनुसार अभाव एक पदार्थ है जिसका ज्ञान प्रत्यक्ष द्वारा तथा वैशेषिकों के अनुसार अनुमान द्वारा संभव है। बौद्धों के अनुसार यह कल्पना मात्र है फिर भी इनका ज्ञान अनुमान द्वारा संभव है।

अनुपलब्धि की प्रामाणिकता

नैयायिक अनुपलब्धि का अस्तित्व नहीं स्वीकार करते क्योंकि उनके अनुसार इसका अन्तर्भाव प्रत्यक्ष में हो जाता है। यहाँ पर यह आक्षेप है कि चक्षु से अभाव का ग्रहण नहीं किया जा सकता क्योंकि इन्द्रियों स्वसम्बद्ध अर्थ का ही ग्रहण करती है और अभाव के साथ चक्षु का कोई संबंध नहीं है।

नैयायिकों ने उपयुक्त आक्षेप के समाधान के लिए विशेषण-विशेष्यभाव नामक एक नये संबंध की कल्पना की है और इसी संबंध के अभाव को प्रत्यक्षगम्य माना है। उदाहरणार्थ, 'भूतल घटाभाव से विशिष्ट है।' इस कथन में घटाभाव विशेषण तथा भूतल विशेष्य है तथा 'घटाभाव भूतल से विशिष्ट है', इसमें भूतल विशेषण तथा घटाभाव विशेष्य है। परिणामस्वरूप इस नियम के होते हुए भी कि "इन्द्रियों स्वसम्बद्ध अर्थ का ग्रहण करती है," इन्द्रियों से अभाव का ग्रहण किया जा सकता है।

वेदान्ती दार्शनिकों को उपर्युक्त संबंध अमान्य है। उनके अनुसार संबंध के लिए तीन बातों का होना आवश्यक है। दो व्यक्ति जिन पर वस्तु आश्रित है, आश्रित वस्तु उन दोनों वस्तुओं से भिन्न है तथा उसकी स्वतंत्र सत्ता है। ये तीनों बातें विशेषण-विशेष्यभाव संबंध पर नहीं घटित होती है। इसलिए यह संबंध नहीं है।

५. ज्ञानकरणाजन्याभावानुभवासाधारणकारणम् अनुपलब्धिरूपं प्रमाणम् अनुमानादिजन्यातीन्द्रियाभावानुभवहेतावनुमानादावति-
व्याप्तिवारणायजन्यतेति । वेदान्तपरिभाषा, लखनऊ २०२१ पृष्ठ संख्या २१४-१५ ।

६. अभावश्च क्वचिल्लिङ्गमिह्यते भावसविदः । तस्माद्युक्तमभावस्य नाभावेनैव वेदनम् । न्यायमंजरी, १.५१.

इसके उत्तर में नैयायिकों का कहना है कि विशेषण-विशेष्यभाव, में संबंध न होने पर भी उसमें संबंधत्व का अभिनिरूपणीयत्व रूप साधर्म्य है। अतएव इसे उपचारवश संबंध कहा जा सकता है। नैयायिकों के अनुसार उसी अभाव का ग्रहण होता है जिसमें विशेषणता रहती है।

बौद्धों के अनुसार तो विशेषण विशेष्यभाव को संबंध माना ही नहीं जा सकता, क्योंकि उनके अनुसार यह कल्पनामात्र है। अभाव का उस वस्तु के साथ कोई सहअस्तित्व या समन्वय नहीं हो सकता जिसका अभाव बताया गया है। उदाहरणार्थ, कोई घट किसी समय किसी स्थान पर है तो उस समय उस स्थान पर उसके अस्तित्व का निषेध संभव नहीं। इसी प्रकार यदि वह घट नहीं है तो उस समय उस स्थान पर उस घट के अस्तित्व को सिद्ध नहीं किया जा सकता।

जयन्त भट्ट बौद्धों के उपर्युक्त मत की समीक्षा करते हुए कहते हैं कि किसी एक घट के नष्ट हो जाने पर यह नहीं कहा जा सकता कि सभी घटों का नाश हो गया है। अभाव भी अपने अस्तित्व या विनाश के लिए कारण का अनुवर्तन करता है। अतएव जयन्त भट्ट के अनुसार विकार में अभाव की वस्तुसत्ता है और विशेषण विशेष्यभाव के माध्यम से उसका प्रत्यक्ष होता है।

प्रशस्तपाद के अनुसार अनुपलब्धि का अन्तर्भाव अनुमान में हो जाता है जैसे उत्पन्न कार्य को देखकर कारण सामग्री का अनुमान होता है, इसी प्रकार घटादि कार्य के प्रागभाव से उसकी कारण सामग्री के अभाव की भी अनुमान से सिद्ध हो जाती है।

७. अभावोऽप्यनुमानमेव । यथोत्पन्नं कार्यं कारणासद्भावे लिंगम्, एवमनुत्पन्नं कार्यं कारणासद्भावे लिंगम् ।
प्रशस्तपादभाष्य : अनु. प्र.

લાડોલની આરસની જિનપ્રતિમાઓના દસ અભિલેખ

લક્ષ્મણભાઈ ભોજક

શ્રી લાલભાઈ દલપતભાઈ ભારતીય સંસ્કૃતિ વિદ્યામંદિરના સંગ્રહમાં લાડોલથી લાવવામાં આવેલ આરસની અભિલેખયુક્ત ૧૦ જિન પ્રતિમાઓના લેખ અહીં પ્રકટ કરવામાં આવી રહ્યા છે. લેખો સંવત (૧) ૩૧૩ (ઈ.સ. (૧) ૨૫૭) થી સં. ૧૩૩૭ (ઈ.સ. ૧૨૮૧) પર્યન્તની મિતી ધરાવે છે. અભિલેખો લાટાપલ્લી-હાલના લાડોલના કાન્હૂવસહિકા ચૈત્ય અંદર (મોટે ભાગે ભમતી આદિ) માં પ્રતિષ્ઠિત થઈ હશે તેવી જિનમૂર્તિઓના સંબંધમાં છે. આઠ લેખોના પ્રતિષ્ઠાપક આચાર્ય ચૈત્રવાલ-ગચ્છના શાલિભદ્રસૂરિના શિષ્ય ધર્મચન્દ્ર છે; જ્યારે બે પ્રતિમાઓ નાણકીય ગચ્છના ધનેશ્વરસૂરિદ્વારા પ્રતિષ્ઠિત થયેલી છે. લેખો સંબંધ મુખ્ય હકીકતો નીચે તાલિકામાં દર્શાવી પછી તેના મૂળ પાઠી સાલવારી અનુસાર પ્રસ્તુત કર્યા છે. ત્રણ લેખોમાં લાડોલનું પ્રાચીન નામ લારાપલ્લી હતું તેનો મહત્ત્વપૂર્ણ ઉલ્લેખ મળે છે; તદુપરાન્ત ત્યાં કાન્હૂવસહિકા નામનું જિનાલય હતું તેવી પ્રથમ જ વાર ભાળ ચાર લેખો દ્વારા મળે છે. ચૈત્રવાલ, ચૈત્ર (વા ચિત્રવાલક) ગચ્છ સંબંધિ સાહિત્યિક ઉલ્લેખો તો છે, પણ અહીં તેના સંબંધમાં અભિલેખીય પ્રમાણ મળ્યાં હોઈ તે વાત મહત્ત્વની બની રહે છે. પ્રતિમાના કારાપકો મોટે ભાગે ઉકેશવંશના (એટલે કે ઓસવાળ જ્ઞાતિના) છે; માત્ર સં. ૧૩૨૬ (લેખાંક ૫) ના કારાપક પલ્લિવાલ જ્ઞાતિના છે. સં. ૧૩૨૫ (લેખાંક ૪)ના કારાપકરૂપે શ્રેષ્ઠિ કાન્હૂના પુત્ર જસહડનાં પૂનમાલાદિ પુત્રો છે; અને તે લેખમાં સ્વકીય દેવગુરુખત્તકનો ઉલ્લેખ જોતાં સંભવ છે કે જે શ્રેષ્ઠિ કાન્હૂએ આ જિનાલય બંધાવ્યું હોય અને જેમના નામથી મંદિર કાન્હૂવસહિકા ચૈત્ય કહેવાતું હશે તેનો જ આ પરિવાર જણાય છે. તો પછી મંદિર સં. ૧૩૧૩ (ઈ.સ. ૧૨૫૭) થી લગભગ ત્રણેક દશકા પહેલાં તો બંધાઈ ચૂક્યું હોવું ઘટે.

આ લેખોથી ગુજરાતમાં વાઘેલાકાલીન અભિલેખોની સૂચિ વૃદ્ધિગત થાય છે.

લેખાંક	સંવત	ગામનું નામ	જિનાલયનું નામ	પ્રતિમા નામ	પ્રતિષ્ઠાપક આચાર્ય
૧	(૧)૩૧૩	લાટાપલ્લી	કાન્હૂવસહિકાચૈત્ય	અજિતસ્વામિ	ધર્મચન્દ્રસૂરિ
૨	૧૩૨૦	લાટાપલ્લી	કાન્હૂવસહિકાચૈત્ય	બિમ્બખત્તક સહિત	ચૈત્રગચ્છીય શાલિભદ્રસૂરિ શિષ્ય શ્રીધર્મચંદ્રસૂરિ
૩	૧૩૨૦	લાટાપલ્લી	કાન્હૂવસહિકાચૈત્ય	નેમિનાથ ખત્તક સહિત	ચૈત્રગચ્છે શાલિભદ્રસૂરિશિષ્ય શ્રીધર્મચંદ્રસૂરિ
૪	૧૩૨૫	-	-	સ્વકીય દેવ ગુરુખત્ત કે શાંતિનાથ	"
૫	૧૩૨૬	-	-	શાંતિનાથ બિંબ	ચૈત્રવાલગચ્છે શાલિભદ્રસૂરિ શિષ્ય ધર્મચંદ્રસૂરિ
૬	૧૩૩૦	-	ચૈત્રગચ્છીય કાન્હૂવસહિકા	સુવ્રતસ્વામિ	નાણકીયગરછે ધનેશ્વરસૂરિ
૭	૧૩૩૦	-	-	ચંદ્રપ્રભસ્વામિ	"
૮	૧૩૩૧	-	-	અજિતસ્વામિ	શાલિભદ્રસૂરિ શિષ્ય ધર્મચંદ્રસૂરિ
૯	૧૩૩૧	-	-	આદિનાથ બિંબ	ચૈત્રગચ્છે શ્રીધર્મચંદ્રસૂરિ
૧૦	૧૩૩૭	-	-	" "	" "

(मू.क्र. १९४ : पबासण : सफेद आरस : २० x ५७ से.मी.)

संवत् १३१३ वर्षे फाल्गु. सुदि ४ लाटापल्ली श्री कान्हूवसहिकायां चैत्ये उकेसवालज्ञातीय पूनिपुत्रिका राजू आत्मश्रेयोर्थ श्रीअजितस्वामिबिंबं कारितं श्रीधर्मचंद्रसूरिभिः ॥

(२)

(मू.क्र.१७५ : पबासण : सफेद आरस : २० x ५७ से.मी.)

संवत् १३२० वर्षे माह शुदि १० दशम्यां गुरौ लाटापल्यां श्रीकान्हूवसहिकाचैत्ये श्रीउकेसवालज्ञातीय श्रे. जाजा श्रे. जालू सुत श्रे. वाहडेन मातृपितृश्रेयोर्थ श्रीखत्तकसहितं कारितं प्रति. श्रीचैत्रगच्छीय पूज्य श्रीशालिभद्रसूरिशिष्यैः श्रीधर्मचंद्रसूरिभिः ॥

(३)

(मू.क्र. १७६ : पबासण : सफेद आरस : २१ x ५८ से.मी.)

संवत् १३२० वर्षे माह सुदि १० दशम्यां गुरौ लाटापल्यां श्रीकान्हूवसहिकाचैत्ये श्रीऊकेसवालज्ञातीय श्रे. जाजा श्रे. जालू तत्सुत श्रेष्ठि बाहडेन भार्या नालदेवि श्रेयोर्थ श्रीनेमिनाथबिंबं खत्तक सहितं कारितं प्रतिष्ठितं श्रीचैत्रगच्छे प्रभु श्रीशालिभद्रसूरिशिष्यैः श्रीधर्मचंद्रसूरिभिः ॥ छ ।

(४)

(मू.क्र. १७९ : पबासण : सफेद आरस २१ x ५८ से.मी.)

संवत् १३२५ वर्षे फागुण सुदि ४ बुधे श्रे. कान्हू सुत श्रे. जसहड सुत पूनमाल श्रे. जयनादेवकुमार श्रे. रतनेन पिता जसहड मातृ देई श्रेयोर्थ स्वकीयदेवगुरुखत्तके शांतिनाथबिंबं कारितं प्रतिष्ठितं श्रीचैत्रगच्छे श्रीशालिभद्रसूरिशिष्यैः श्रीधर्मचंद्रसूरिभिः ॥ श्री ॥

(५)

(मू.क्र. २१८ : काउसगमां उभा शांतिनाथ : सफेद आरस : १३७ x ४९ से.मी.)

संवत् १३२६ वर्षे चैत्र वदि १२ शुके पल्लीवालज्ञातीय श्रे. धणपाल भार्या श्रे. माधव तत्सुतया कर्पूरया आत्मश्रेयोर्थ श्रीशांतिनाथबिंबं कारितं प्रतिष्ठितं श्रीचैत्रवालगच्छे श्रीशालिभद्रसूरिशिष्यैः श्रीधर्मचंद्रसूरिभिः ॥ मंगलं महाश्रीः ॥

(६)

(मू.क्र. १९८ पबासण-परिकर : सफेद आरस : पबासण ३१.५ x ३५ से.मी. परिकर ५१ x ९० से.मी.)

सं. १३३० वर्षे चैत्र वदि ७ शनौ चैत्रगच्छीय कान्हूवसहिकायां श्रीनाणकीयगच्छे ठक्कुरगोत्रे उकेशज्ञातीय श्रे. यशोदेव सु. जाजा भार्या जालू सुत वाहडेन बृहद्भ्रातृ आंबड तद्भार्या हासल श्रेयोर्थ श्रीसुव्रतस्वामिबिंबं कारितं प्रतिष्ठितं श्रीमन्नेश्वरसूरिभिः ॥

(७)

(मू.क्र. १९९ : पबासण : सफेद आरस : ३० x ८९ से.मी.)

सं. १३३० वर्षे चैत्र वदि ७ शनौ श्रीनाणकीयगच्छे ठक्कुरगोत्रे उपकेशज्ञातीय श्रे. यशोदेव सुत श्रे. जाजा भार्या श्रे. जालू सुत श्रे. वाहडेन आत्मश्रेयोर्थ श्रीचंद्रप्रभस्वामिबिंबं कारितं प्रतिष्ठितं श्रीधनेश्वरसूरिभिः ॥

(८)

(मू.क्र.२०० : पबासण : सफेद आरस : २१.५ x ५८ से.मी.)

संवत् १३३१ वर्षे वैशाख शु.४ सोमे श्रीचैत्रगच्छे श्रीशालिभद्रसूरिशिष्य पं. अजितचंद्रेण आत्मश्रेयसे श्रीअजितस्वामिबिंबं कारितं प्रति. श्रीशालिभद्रसूरिशिष्यैः श्रीधर्मचंद्रसूरिभिः ॥ श्री : ॥

(९)

(मू.क्र.२०१ : पबासण : सफेद आरस : १० x ३० से.मी.)

संवत् १३३१ वै.सु. ७ गुरौ श्रे. वयजलपाल श्रे. श्रीआदिनाथबिंबं कारितं श्रीचैत्रगच्छे प्र. श्रीधर्मचंद्रसूरिभिः ॥

(१०)

(मू.क्र.२०२ : पबासण : सफेद आरस : २० x ५८ से.मी.)

संवत् १३३७ वर्षे माघ वदि ७ बु(धे) उवएसवालज्ञातीय श्रे. रतन सुत माणिक वयजलाभ्यां मातृ जासू श्रेयसे श्रीआदिनाथबिंबं कारितं प्र. श्रीचैत्रगच्छे श्रीशालिभद्रसूरिशिष्यैः श्रीधर्मचंद्रसूरिभिः ॥

કિશોરલાલ મશરૂવાળાનો કર્મવિચાર*

મધુસૂદન બક્ષી

કર્મવિચાર

મશરૂવાળાના મતે અદ્વૈત, વિશિષ્ટાદ્વૈત સેશ્વર, નિરીશ્વર, વૈદિક, જૈન, બૌદ્ધ ગમે તે વાદ હોય પણ કુંભારના જેવો સૃષ્ટિનો ઘડનાર ઈશ્વર હિંદુ પરંપરામાં માન્ય થયો નથી. ઈશ્વર ઉપરાંત આ પરંપરામાં 'કર્મ' નામની શક્તિનો પણ સ્વીકાર કરવામાં આવ્યો છે. ખાસ તો સેશ્વર મતોમાં "ઈશ્વર અને કર્મનું કોઈકને કોઈક પ્રકારનું દ્વિરાજકત્વ" સ્વીકારવામાં આવ્યું છે. આ અભિગમને લીધે ઈશ્વર "સ્વેચ્છાચારી સર્વાધિકારી" રહેતો નથી અને કર્મ પણ સંપૂર્ણપણે સ્વાધીન રહેતું નથી. ઈશ્વરને કર્મફળપ્રદાતા તરીકે કે કેવળ સાક્ષી કે અકર્તા તરીકે પણ સ્વીકારવામાં આવ્યો છે.

મશરૂવાળા એ પણ સ્પષ્ટ કરે છે કે ઈશ્વરને શરણે ગયેલા ભક્તોને માટે ઈશ્વરનું સર્વાધિકારિત્વ માન્ય થાય છે પણ જે લોકોએ આવી અનન્ય શરણાગતિ ન સ્વીકારી હોય તેમને માટે તો ઈશ્વર કર્મફળપ્રદાતા તરીકે જ સ્વીકારાય છે, અને તેથી કર્મનું આધિપત્ય જ રહે છે.

કર્મવાદ પ્રમણે સંસારનાં સુખદુઃખ માટે ઈશ્વર નહીં, પણ કર્મ જ જવાબદાર છે. આપણે વર્તમાન સ્થિતિ માટે આપણાં કર્મો જ જવાબદાર છે અને આપણી વર્તમાન સ્થિતિમાંથી બહાર નીકળવા માટે કે તે સ્થિતિમાં ફેરફાર કરીને પ્રગતિ લાવવા માટે પણ કર્મ જ જવાબદાર છે; એ કર્મો આ જન્મનાં હોય કે પૂર્વજન્મનાં હોય, પૂર્વજોનાં હોય કે પછી સમગ્ર સમાજનાં હોય. જો કે ઈશ્વરની શરણાગતિ સ્વીકારનારને માટે આપણી વર્તમાન પરિસ્થિતિમાં ઝડપી પરિવર્તન લાવવાનું ઈશ્વરની શરણાગતિને લીધે થાય છે, બાકી કર્મના નિયમનું પ્રવર્તન તો સહુએ સ્વીકારવું જ રહ્યું. (સંસાર અને ધર્મ, ૮૫-૮૬)

કર્મક્ષય અને પ્રવૃત્તિ વિશે સ્પષ્ટતા કરતાં મશરૂવાળા લખે છે કે જ્યાં સુધી દેહ છે ત્યાં સુધી કર્મ કરવાનું સાવ છોડી દેવું શક્ય નથી પણ જાણે અજાણ્યે થતી કોઈ પણ ક્રિયા વિવિધ પ્રકાર પ્રકારનાં સ્થૂળ સૂક્ષ્મ પરિણામો સમકાલિક રીતે કે અનુકાલિક રીતે નીપજાવે છે. આવાં કરોડો કર્મોની અસરોથી દરેકનું ચારિત્ર્ય વ્યક્તિત્વ ઘડાય છે. જેટલું આ ઘડતર ઉત્તરોત્તર વધુ શુદ્ધ થતું જાય તેમ તેમ કર્મનો ક્ષય માનવો અને જો ઉત્તરોત્તર અશુદ્ધ થતું જાય, તો કર્મનો સંચય માનવો. (સંસાર અને ધર્મ, ૧૮૧-૮૪, સમૂળી ક્રાંતિ; ૨૦૮-૧૧)

કર્મવિચારમાં કેટલીક ક્ષતિઓ મશરૂવાળાએ દર્શાવી છે, જેમાંની કેટલીક નીચે પ્રમાણે છે :

- (૧) જે તે વસ્તુને વ્યક્તિનાં જ પૂર્વકર્મનાં પરિણામ તરીકે ઘટાવવામાં આવે છે; એટલું જ નહીં પણ ઘણી બધી પરિસ્થિતિને તે પરિસ્થિતિમાં મૂકાયેલી વ્યક્તિનાં પોતાનાં પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મોનાં પરિણામો તરીકે ઘટાવવામાં આવે છે. દા.ત. બાળમરણ, અસ્પૃશ્યતા, દુકાળ, બાળવિધવાની અવસ્થા, રોગ વગેરે માટે - "જેનાં જેવાં કર્મો" તેવું કહીને - છૂટી જવામાં આવે છે. પ્રારબ્ધ ભોગવ્યા વગર ચાલે જ નહિં એમ માનીને જ્ઞાનીઓની પરિગ્રહ અને ભોગવૃત્તિનો પણ બચાવ કરવામાં આવે છે.
- (૨) આપણાં પોતાનાં કે અન્યનાં પૂર્વકર્મ કે સમાજનાં પૂર્વકર્મ ને તેનાં સામાન્ય અર્થમાં લેવાને બદલે હંમેશાં એકદમ પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મો તરીકે સમજવામાં આવે છે. દા.ત. બે દિવસ પહેલાં ખાવામાં અવિવેક થઈ જાય તો વ્યક્તિની પાચન ક્રિયામાં જે મુશ્કેલીઓ થાય તેને વ્યક્તિના તાજેતરના પૂર્વકર્મનાં પરિણામ તરીકે લેવામાં આવે છે, પણ કોઈ કાયમી રોગ વ્યક્તિને થયો હોય તો તેને પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મોનું ફળ ગણવામાં આવે છે. કોઈ વસ્તુનું કારણ ખબર ન પડે તો તરત જ લોકો તેને પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મો સાથે જોડી દે છે. ખરેખર તો, પૂર્વકર્મનો અર્થ મશરૂવાળા પ્રમાણે તો એટલો જ કોઈ પણ વર્તમાન સ્થિતિ મનસ્વી ઈશ્વરના તોરનું પરિણામ નથી પણ "આજની સ્થિતિ ભૂતકાળના આચરણનું પરિણામ છે". કિશોરલાલની દૃષ્ટિએ "બધા અનુભવોને પૂર્વજન્મના કર્મ સાથે ઝટ લઈને જોડી દેવાની આવશ્યકતા નથી." (જીવનશોધન, ૨૨૨). જીવનનાં આપણા અનુભવો કે પરિસ્થિતિનાં મોટા ભાગનાં કારણો, મશરૂવાળા પ્રમાણે, આપણાં આ જન્મનાં જ કર્મો અને સંકલ્પોમાં જોઈ શકાય છે.

* ગુજરાત તત્ત્વજ્ઞાન પરિષદ, ભદ્રેશ્વર (કચ્છ), ૧૬-૧૭-૧૮ ફેબ્રુઆરી ૧૯૮૨ માં રજૂ કરેલું પેપર.

- (૩) આપણાં સિવાય બીજાનાં પૂર્વકર્મો આપણે આજે જે પરિણામ સહન કરીએ છીએ તેને માટે જવાબદાર હોઈ શકે છે.
- (૪) આ ઉપરાંત આપણાં નિયંત્રણમાં ન હોય તેવાં પ્રાકૃતિક બળોને લીધે પણ આપણે કેટલીક પરિણામરૂપ પરિસ્થિતિ ભોગવવી પડે છે. જેમ કે રેલ, વીજળી, ભૂકંપ વગેરે.
- (૫) પૂર્વકર્મવાદ વ્યક્તિને જ જવાબદાર ઠરાવે તે ઠીક નથી; કારણ કે, દૃષ્ટાંત તરીકે લઈએ તો, માબાપના દુરાગ્રહથી બાળલગ્ન થયા પછી કોઈ છોકરી બાળવિધવા થાય તો તે છોકરીનાં નહીં પણ તેનાં માબાપનાં પૂર્વકર્મો જવાબદાર છે. બીજું દૃષ્ટાંત : "હું આગગાડીમાં બેસું એ મારું કર્મ ખરું; પણ આગ ગાડીને અકસ્માત થવામાં ગાર્ડ, ડ્રાઈવર, સ્ટેશન માસ્તર વગેરેનાં કર્મનો જ વધારે બળવાન હાથ ગણાય." (જીવન શોધન, ૨૨૩) મશરૂવાળા મુજબ સ્વકર્મનાં જ ફળો આપણે ભોગવવાનાં રહે છે તેવો "એકાંતિક નિયમ" પ્રવર્તતો નથી."

મશરૂવાળાના કર્મવિચારની સમીક્ષા

મનુષ્યના સુખદુઃખ કે તેની વર્તમાન પરિસ્થિતિ માટે જવાબદાર પરિબળોનું વિશ્લેષણ કરવાની મશરૂવાળાની પદ્ધતિ ઉપયોગી જણાય છે કારણ કે તેવાં વિશ્લેષણમાં તેઓ કોઈ એક જ ઘટકને સર્વશે જવાબદાર ગણતા નથી. વ્યક્તિ અત્યારે જે પરિસ્થિતિમાં મૂકાયેલી છે તે પરિસ્થિતિ તેમ જ તેના સંદર્ભમાં તે સુખદુઃખ ભોગવે છે તે અનુભવો માટે વ્યક્તિનાં પોતાનાં કર્મો, અન્ય વ્યક્તિઓનાં પૂર્વકર્મો, સામાજિક પરિસ્થિતિ પરંપરા, માળખું કે રૂઢિ, કેટલીક કુદરતી આપત્તિઓ વગેરેનું પ્રદાન છે તે નિર્વિવાદ છે. મશરૂવાળા મોટા ભાગનાં કારણોમાં કોઈ વ્યક્તિનાં પોતાના કે અન્ય વ્યક્તિના આ જન્મનાં સંકલ્પો અને કાર્યોને જ જવાબદાર ગણે છે. તેથી તેઓ માને છે કે કોઈ પરિસ્થિતિનાં કારણ તરીકે તરત જ પૂર્વજન્મને જોડી દેવાની જરૂર નથી. સ્વકર્મ, પરકર્મ, ઉભય કે આધિદૈવિક કારણો પણ પ્રવર્તી શકે છે. જગતમાં પાપ વધી જવાથી અતિવૃષ્ટિ કે દુષ્કાળની સ્થિતિ આવે છે તેવી માન્યતા પણ મશરૂવાળાને વાહિયાત લાગે છે, જે યોગ્ય જ છે. મોટે ભાગે મશરૂવાળા 'પૂર્વકર્મ' શબ્દ પ્રયોજે છે, "પૂર્વજન્મનાં" કર્મો તેવા શબ્દો નહિ."

કોઈ છોકરી બાળવિધવા થાય તો તેનું કારણ તેના માબાપના આ જન્મનાં કર્મો જ છે. તેનો અર્થ એ થયો કે સતીપ્રથા, બાળલગ્નો, દહેજપ્રથા વગેરે અંગેના મનોવલણોમાં સામાજિક આર્થિક પરિબળોને લીધે પરિવર્તન થાય કે કાયદાકાનૂન બદલાય તો બાળવિધવાઓ, સતીઓ કે દહેજનો ભોગ બનનાર સ્ત્રીઓની સંખ્યા શૂન્ય થઈ શકે. આમ સામાજિક તંત્રો બદલાય, કે સામાજિક-રાજકીય વ્યવસ્થાઓમાં ક્રાંતિકારી ફેરફાર થાય તો વ્યક્તિને તંત્રને લીધે જે યાતનાઓ ખોટી રીતે સહન કરી પડે છે તે દૂર થાય છે. આમ જગતનાં કેટલાંક અનિષ્ટો કોઈ એક વ્યક્તિને અધીન ન હોય તેવાં સામાજિક-રાજકીય-આર્થિક તંત્રો અને મનુષ્યોનાં નિયંત્રણમાં ન હોય તેવી કુદરતી આપત્તિઓને લીધે સરજાતાં હોય છે. "દુકાળ પડે છે તે દુકાળિયાઓનાં સ્વસંકલ્પથી જ એમ ભાગ્યે જ કહી શકાય. એ બ્રહ્માંડના સંકલ્પનું એટલે કે બ્રહ્માંડની શક્તિઓનું પરિણામ છે." (જીવનશોધન, ૨૨૪) આ વાક્યનો બ્રહ્માંડ વિશેનો છેલ્લો ભાગ ગંભીરતાથી ન લઈ શકાય પણ મશરૂવાળા આ વાક્યનાં પહેલા ભાગમાં જે કહે છે તે સર્વ સ્વીકાર્ય છે.

આમ દરેક ઠેકાણે વ્યક્તિનાં આ જન્મનાં પૂર્વકર્મોને આગળ કરવાં એ પણ અયોગ્ય છે અને પૂર્વકર્મોમાંયે પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મો આગળ કરવાં એ ભૂલ છે એમ મશરૂવાળા માને છે, જે યોગ્ય જ છે.

મશરૂવાળાએ મોટાભાગનાં આપણા વર્તમાન અનુભવોને માટે પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મની ધારણા ઉપયોગમાં લીધી નથી. એ જ વાતને આગળ લઈ જઈને આપણી કોઈ પણ અત્યારની પરિસ્થિતિ માટે પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મો જવાબદાર નથી એમ કોઈ કહે તો તે વાત વજૂદવાળી જણાય છે. પ્રશ્ન એ છે કે જો બાળવિધવાની યાતના સામાજિક કુરિવાજોને લીધે સમજાવી શકાતી હોય, દુકાળ પીડિતોની યાતના કુદરતી આફત કે માનવસર્જિત બેદરકારીની સ્થિતિ સાથે જોડી શકાતી હોય, પોતે કરેલા ગુના માટે જેલવાસ ભોગવી રહેલી વ્યક્તિની સ્થિતિ જોતાં પોતાનાં કર્મથી સમજાવી શકાતી હોય અને કોઈ બીજી વ્યક્તિના પૂર્વકર્મોને લીધે આપણે ભોગવવું પડતું હોય તો પછી એવું કોઈ ચોક્કસ દૃષ્ટાંત આપવું પડે કે જ્યાં સ્વકર્મ, પરકર્મ કુદરતી અને સામાજિક પરિસ્થિતિ કોઈ જવાબદાર ન હોય અને પૂર્વજન્મનું અમુક કર્મ આ જન્મની આ વ્યક્તિની આ પરિસ્થિતિ માટે જવાબદાર છે તેવું સ્પષ્ટ રીતે દર્શાવી શકાય. આવું કોઈ નક્કર દૃષ્ટાંત આપી શકાય તેમ નથી. જે દૃષ્ટાંતો આપવામાં આવે તેમાં સ્વકર્મ, પરકર્મ, સામાજિક પરિસ્થિતિ કે કુદરતી પરિસ્થિતિને કારણરૂપ દર્શાવી શકાતી

હોય છે. એટલે કર્મને સ્વીકારનારાએ આ બધી પરિસ્થિતિ પણ પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મને અધીન છે. તેવું કહેવું પડે અને તેઓ તેમ કહે તો મનુષ્યનાં આ જીવનનાં તમામ કર્મો પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મોને અધીન છે તેમ સ્વીકારવું પડે, જે કોઈ રીતે સ્થાપી શકાય નહિં.

આ સંજોગોમાં કર્મવાદીએ અદૃશ્ય તત્ત્વો ધારવાં પડે છે. મશરૂવાળા પોતે માને છે કે અદૃશ્ય શક્તિ સ્વયંસિદ્ધ સત્તા તરીકે સ્વીકાર્ય છે અને કર્મ, પુનર્જન્મ વગેરેની માન્યતાને તેઓ સંભવનીય ગણે છે. પરમાત્મા પરની નિષ્ઠા મશરૂવાળાની દૃષ્ટિએ સ્વતઃસિદ્ધ છે, જ્યારે પુનર્જન્મ અને મોક્ષવાદ વગેરે માત્ર સંભવનીય છે. "મરણોત્તર સ્થિતિ વિશે જે કંઈ ખુલાસો કરવામાં આવ્યો છે, તે માત્ર સંભવનીય તર્ક છે એ યાદ રાખવું જોઈએ. જો પુનર્જન્મ છે જ એમ કહેનાર સામે એમ કહેવા માટે કોઈ પ્રમાણ નથી એવો આક્ષેપ મૂકવામાં આવે, તો પુનર્જન્મ નથી જ એમ કહેનાર સામે પણ એ જ આક્ષેપ મૂકી શકાય" (જીવનશોધન, ૧૨૧). મશરૂવાળા ના સૂચન મુજબ શ્રેયાર્થીઓએ આ વાદવિવાદમાં પડવાની જરૂર નથી.

કિશોરલાલ એમ પણ કહે છે કે "જે ફરીથી જન્મ લેવા માટેનાં સંકલ્પો નિમણિ કરે તેને માટે તો પુનર્જન્મ અને મોક્ષ એ બંને સત્ય થઈ શકે છે" (જીવનશોધન, ૧૨૫). એટલે કે જો કોઈ પુનર્જન્મમાં માનતું હોય અને તેમાં ઈરાદાપૂર્વકનો સંકલ્પ ભળે તો પુનર્જન્મ સત્ય બને છે અને જે તેમાં ન માનતો હોય પણ પુનર્જન્મનો કાયદો સત્ય હોય તો તે તેને લાગુ પડે જ તેમાં તેનો સંકલ્પ ભળેલો ન હોય.

આ બધી રજૂઆતોથી સ્પષ્ટ થાય છે કે પરમેશ્વર કે અંતિમ તત્ત્વની સ્વયંસિદ્ધતા ને મશરૂવાળા કર્મ, પુનર્જન્મ, મોક્ષ વિગેરે વિભાનવાઓથી તિમ્ન એવો સત્તાલક્ષી અને જ્ઞાનલક્ષી દરજ્જો આપે છે કારણ કે પુનર્જન્મની વિરૂદ્ધ પ્રતીતિ કરાવનારાં પ્રમાણો નથી પણ તેને સાબિત કરનારા પણ પ્રમાણો નથી એણે જ તે સંભવનીય અટકળો જ છે.

ટૂંકમાં પરમતત્ત્વ પ્રમાણાતીત હોવા છતાં નિશ્ચયક્ષમ decidable છે. જ્યારે કર્મ, પુનર્જન્મ વગેરે અનિશ્ચયક્ષમ undecidable છે તેવું મશરૂવાળાને અભિપ્રેત છે. જો કે મશરૂવાળા એમ માને છે કે પુનર્જન્મનો વાદ શ્રેયાર્થીને શ્રેય માટે પુરુષાર્થ કરવામાં જબરું પ્રેરકબળ પૂરું પાડે છે. પુનર્જન્મવાદ મોક્ષવાદ ખોટા હોય તો પણ શ્રેયાર્થીને શ્રેય માટે પ્રયત્નશીલ રહેવાનાં પૂરતાં કારણો છે તેવું પણ મશરૂવાળા માને છે.

હવે આ સંદર્ભમાં કેટલીક બાબતોનો વિચાર કરીએ :-

- (૧) મશરૂવાળાના પૂર્વકર્મના વિશ્લેષણ મુજબ મોટા ભાગના અનુભવો કે પરિસ્થિતિનો ખુલાસો થઈ શકે છે તે જોતાં પૂર્વજન્મના કર્મની ધારણા કોઈ રજૂ કરે તો પણ તેનું ક્ષેત્ર ખૂબ જ મર્યાદિત થાય છે.
- (૨) મશરૂવાળ લખે છે કે બધે તરત જ પૂર્વજન્મના કર્મને માની લેવું યોગ્ય નથી તેનો અર્થ એવો કે કયાંક પૂર્વજન્મ નો કર્મો નો સંબંધ દર્શાવી શકાય છે પણ ચોક્કસ કયાં પરિણામો પૂર્વજન્મને લીધે છે તે અંગે તેમણે કોઈ સ્પષ્ટતા કરી નથી.
- (૩) અદૃશ્ય બાબતોની લોકોત્તર ધારણાઓનો જે અત્યારના સમાજવિજ્ઞાનો, ઈતિહાસ, પ્રાકૃતિક વિજ્ઞાનો વગેરેનાં ક્ષેત્રે સ્વીકાર થતો નથી અને વ્યક્તિની પરિસ્થિતિ માટેનાં પરિબળોને કર્મવાદ કે પુનર્જન્મવાદ વગર તે તે ક્ષેત્રોના સંશોધકોએ ઓળખી બતાવ્યા છે. કાનૂની ક્ષેત્રે પણ જવાબદારી-નિર્ધારણ માટે વ્યક્તિનાં પૂર્વકર્મો જોવાય છે, તેનાં પૂર્વજન્મનાં કર્મો નહિં. ઘણી બધી બાબતોના ખુલાસો થઈ ન શકતા હોય તો પણ મશરૂવાળા જેને સંભવિત ધારણાઓ ગણે છે તેનો જ આધાર લેવો પડે તેવું પ્રસ્થાપિત થઈ શકે તેમ નથી. મશરૂવાળા પોતે પણ આ બાબતમાં આગ્રહી જાણતા નથી તે યોગ્ય જ છે.
- (૪) મશરૂવાળાની કર્મ વગેરે બાબતોની રજૂઆત પ્રત્યેની સાવચેતી ઘણી નોંધપાત્ર જણાય છે. દા.ત. તેઓ લખે છે : "દેખીતાં પરિણામો અથવા અનુભવોનાં અગોચર કારણો વિશે અથવા પ્રત્યક્ષ કર્મોનાં અગોચર ફળ વિશે સચુક્તિક જણાતી કલ્પના તે વાદ છે. વાદને સિદ્ધાંત માનવાની ભૂલ ન કરવી જોઈએ સિદ્ધાંત એ અનુભવથી કે પ્રયોગથી શોધાયેલો અચળ નિયમ છે" (જીવનશોધન, ૩૮૮).

આ દૃષ્ટિએ મશરૂવાળાએ 'કર્મવાદ' શબ્દ પ્રયોજ્યો છે, કર્મસિદ્ધાંત નહિ.

મશરૂવાળાનાં મુખ્ય પ્રતિપાદન મુજબ સ્વસંકલ્પજનિત, પરસંકલ્પજનિત અને ઉભયજનિત પરિણામોનો વિચાર

કરીએ કે પ્રાકૃતિક સ્થિતિનો વિચાર કરીએ તો ઘણાં બધા અનુભવોનો અને પરિસ્થિતિઓનો ખુલાસો મળે છે. એ સંજોગોમાં જ્યાં ત્યાં પૂર્વજન્મના કર્મો સમજવાની જરૂર રહેતી નથી. પરંતુ ક્યાં ક્યાં પૂર્વજન્મ ધારવો પડે તે બાબત મશરૂવાળા સ્પષ્ટ કરી શક્યા નથી. અથવા તેમને તે આવશ્યક જણાયું નથી.

કર્મવાદ કે કર્મવિચારમાં ક્યાં કર્મો નૈતિક છે, ક્યાં અનૈતિક છે, ક્યાં કર્મો તટસ્થ છે, કોનું કેવું, કેટલું અને ક્યારે પરિણામ આવે છે, એ પરિણામો કેટલા પ્રમાણમાં સુખદાયક કે દુઃખદાયક છે અને કર્મો તેમજ તેનાં પરિણામો વચ્ચે શા માટે આ પ્રકારનો સંબંધ છે વગેરે પ્રકારના ઘણા પ્રશ્નો ઉદ્ભવે છે. આ બધી બાબતોનો વિગતવાર આંતરસંબંધ સ્થાપ્યા વગર કર્મવિચાર અપર્યાપ્ત રહે છે. મશરૂવાળાએ કર્મવાદમાં આમાંથી કેટલીક બાબતો વિશે વિચાર કર્યો છે તે રસપ્રદ છે અને નક્કર વિગતો લઈને કર્મવાદ તેના ઉપર કેટલો પ્રકાશ પાડે છે તે રીતે વિચારવાથી વધુ સ્પષ્ટ થઈ શકે છે.

મશરૂવાળા કબૂલે છે કેટલીક બાબતોનાં કારણો અપ્રકટ રહે છે. આપણી બુદ્ધિ આવાં અપ્રકટ કારણોને શોધે છે.

કવિ લીંબોકૃત ઋષભદેવ ફાગ : એક પરિચય

(અનુમાને ૧૬ મો શતક)

કનુભાઈ ધ. શેઠ

પ્રાસ્તાવિક

પ્રાચીન મધ્યકાલીન ગુજરાતી સાહિત્યની એક વિશિષ્ટતા એ છે કે તે બહુધા પદ્યાત્મક છે. ગદ્ય નગણ્ય છે. એમાં ઉપલબ્ધ પ્રારંભનું સાહિત્ય એટલે જૈનોનું જ સાહિત્ય. ઉપર્યુક્ત પદ્યાત્મક સાહિત્યની સ્વરૂપના પ્રકારોની અપેક્ષાએ અન્વેષણા કરવામાં આવે તો એમાં રાસ, ચોપાઈ, પ્રબંધ વગેરે દીર્ઘ કાવ્યપ્રકારો સાથે સાથે ફાગ, બારમાસી, વિવાહલો, સંધિ, ધવલ, વેલી જેવાં લઘુ કાવ્ય પ્રકારો વિકસેલા જોવા મળે છે. લઘુ કાવ્યપ્રકારોમાં ફાગ પ્રકારના કાવ્યો પરત્વે જૈન કવિઓનું પ્રદાન પ્રમાણ અને કવિત્વની અપેક્ષાએ નોંધપાત્ર છે. અત્રે અઘયાવત્ પ્રસિદ્ધ કવિ લીંબોકૃત 'ઋષભદેવ ફાગ' કાવ્ય સપરિચય રજૂ કરેલ છે.

પ્રતવર્ણન અને સંપાદન પદ્ધતિ

પ્રસ્તુત કૃતિનું સંપાદન લા.દ. ભારતીય સંસ્કૃતિ વિદ્યામંદિર, અમદાવાદના પુણ્યવિજયજી હસ્તપ્રત ગ્રંથભંડાર ક્રમાંક ૫૧૫ ની એક માત્ર પ્રત પરથી કરેલ છે. પ્રતમાં કુલે એક પત્ર છે. પત્રનું માપ ૨૪.૫x૧૦.૫ સે.મી. છે. બનને બાજુ ૨ સે.મી. નો હાંસિયો છે. પત્રમાં એકદરે ૧૫ પંક્તિઓ અને ૪૨-૪૩ અક્ષરો છે. કુલ ૨૭ કડીઓ છે પાતળા કાગળની આ પ્રત સુંદર મરોડદાર નાગરીલિપિમાં લખાયેલી છે. રાગ, ઢાલ વગેરે તથા શ્લોક ક્રમાંક લાલ કરેલા છે. પ્રતનો લેખન સંવત પ્રાપ્ત થતો નથી પણ લેખન પદ્ધતિ અનુસાર અનુમાને તે સત્તરમો શતકનો હોય એમ લાગે છે.

આરંભ : રાગ કેદારો. પ્રથમ શ્લોક સંસ્કૃતમાં

અંત : ઈતિ શ્રી ઋષભદેવ ફાગ સ્તવન.

પ્રસ્તુત કૃતિનું સંપાદન એક માત્ર પ્રત પરથી કર્યું છે. સર્વત્ર મૂલ પાઠ કાયમ રાખ્યો છે. કેટલીક જગ્યાએ પાઠ પડી ગયેલો છે. તેને [] કૌંસ દ્વારા દર્શાવ્યો છે.

કાવ્યનો કર્તા : કવિ લીંબો

એની રચના સંવત પ્રાપ્ત થતી નથી પણ તે અનુમાને સોળમા શતકનો અંત ભાગમાં એની રચના થઈ હશે.

સેવક લીંબઉ [બો]લઈએ, તુઝ તોલઈ કુણ સ્વામિ,

દેહિ વિમલ મતિ જગપતિ, હું લીણઉ તોરઈ નામિ. ૨૭

આ કવિ લીંબા વિષે કોઈ અન્ય માહિતી પ્રાપ્ત થતી નથી. પણ એણે આ કાવ્ય સિવાય 'પાર્શ્વનાથ નામ્ના સંવેગરસ ચંદ્રાઉલા' (કડી ૪૯), 'દેવપૂજા ગીત' (કડી ૧૫), 'ચોવીસ જિન નમસ્કાર' (કડી ૨૫) અને 'વીસ વિહરમાન જિન ગીત' (કડી ૨૦) જેવી રચના કરી હોવાનો ઉલ્લેખ મળે છે.

ઋષભદેવ ફાગ : એક કાવ્ય તરીકે

'ઋષભદેવ ફાગ' એ ૨૭ કડીનું ફાગ કાવ્ય છે વર્ણ્ય વિષય જૈન પરંપરામાં પ્રસિદ્ધ પ્રથમ તીર્થંકર ઋષભદેવના ચરિત્ર - પ્રસંગને આ લેખવાના છે.

કાવ્યના પ્રારંભમાં કવિએ સંસ્કૃતમાં શારદાનું સ્મરણ કરીને, 'નાભિનંદન' ઋષભદેવ ને નમન કરીને એમના વંશ

૧. પ્રાચીન-મધ્યકાલીન પરંપરામાં આવા લગભગ ૧૧૭ કાવ્ય પ્રકારો હોવાનું શ્રી અગરચંદ નાહટાએ નોંધ્યું છે. જુઓ, પ્રાચીન કાવ્યોની રૂપ-પરંપરા, બીકાનેર ૧૯૬૨, પૃ. ૨-૧૮.

સ્થાપના વગેરે અંગે 'ફાગબંધ'માં કહેવાનો ઉપક્રમ કર્યો છે :

શ્રીશારદાં હૃદિ ધ્યાત્વા, નત્વા શ્રીનામિનંદનં,
ફાગબંધેન વક્ષેહં, તદ્વંશસ્થાપના... ૧

ઋષભદેવ યૌવનવય પામ્યા તે સમયે ઈંદ્રે મહોત્સવ કર્યો પછી એમને તે સિંહાસન પર બીરાજમાન કરે છે, તે પ્રસંગ કવિ સંક્ષિપ્તમાં આલેખે છે.

રાજ સમય જાણી કરી, કરઈ મહોત્સવ ઈંદ્ર,
બહુ આભરણઈ શોભતાં, સિંહાસણિ જિજ્ઞાસંદ ૫
બિંહુ પાસઈ ચામર ઢલઈ, મેઘાડંબર છત્ર,
રાજ કરઈ રલી આમણું, ઋષભદેવ સુપવિત્ર. ૬

વસંતઋતુનો આરંભ થતા પ્રકૃતિમાં જે પરિવર્તન થાય છે. એનું કવિએ ઉચિત સુંદર પ્રાસ અને અનુપ્રાસની સહાય વડે કરેલ વર્ણન રૂચિર બની રહે છે.

એક અવસરિ હિવ હોઈ, ઋતુ મધુ માધવ જોઈ,
માધવી મહમહઈએ, મધુકર ગહગહઈ. ૭
ચંપક બહુલ મંદાર, મહોર્યા સવિ સહકાર,
મલયાચલ તણઉએ, સુરભિ પવન ઘણઉએ. ૮
લવંગ તાલ તમાલ, કરણી વેલિ ગુલાલ,
વન રલીઆમણું એ, એહવં સોહામણું એ. ૯

વસંતના પ્રભાવે ક્રીડા કરતા યુગલો અને દેવો, સુમધુર સ્વરે ગાન કરતી કોકિલા, વર્તુલમાં ફરતા યુગલો, જળમાં કેલિ કરતા યુગલો, કુસુમ-સેજ બીછાવતી મૃગ-નયની ગજગામિની નારીઓ, અંગ પર શણગાર કરતી નાયતી અપ્સરાઓ વગેરે ના પ્રાસાનુપ્રાસની રચનાની સહાયથી કવિએ સુરેખ ચિત્રો ઉપસાવ્યાં છે.

એક ખંડોખેલિ ખેલઈ, ગેલિં કરઈ જલ-કેલિ,
એક વિલેપન બાવન, ચંદન મૃગમેદ મિલ. ૧૧
પુષ્પુ તણા ઘર કે કરઈ, કે કરઈ કુસુમની સેજ,
મૃગ-નયણી ગજગામિની, આણઈ અધિકઈ હેજ. ૧૨
અપછર નાચઈ રંગિ, અંગિં કરી સિણગાર,
માદલ ભૂંગલ ભરીઅ, તાલ નફેરીઅ એક ૧૩

ઋષભદેવને કેવલજ્ઞાન થયું તે પ્રસંગે ઔરાવત હાથી પર આરોહણ કરી આકાશમાંથી ઉતરી આવેલ ઈંદ્ર તથા કનકરથ પર કે અન્ન પર કે રાજહંસ પર કે ગરુડ કે વૃષભ પર બેસી આવેલા અન્ય ચોવીસ દેવોનું વર્ણન કવિએ સંક્ષિપ્તમાં સુરેખ આલેખ્યું છે તથા એમણે કરેલ 'સમોસરણ'ની રચનાનું વર્ણન લક્ષ્યાત્ર છે.

સહસ વરિસ હવું નિરમલ, કેવલનાણ જિણંદ,
અમર આકાસિહિં ઉતરઈ, ઉતરઈ અપંછર વૃંદ, ૧૯
ઈંદ્ર ઔરાવણ વારણ, આરોહઈ મનરંગિ,
એક કનકરથ બઈઠલા, ચઢિઅલા એક તુરંગિ, ૨૦
રાજહંસ સુર કે ચઢયા, કે ચઢિયા ગરુડિ વિમાનિ,
કેઈ વૃષભ-વર વાહણિ, કે પંચાનણિ જાણિ. ૨૧

ઈણિ પરિ ચઉવીહ દેવ, આવ્યા કરવા સેવ,
સમોસરણ કર્યું એ, પુણ્ય પોતઈ ભર્યું એ. ૨૨

ઋષભદેવના કેવલજ્ઞાન પ્રાપ્તિ પ્રસંગે એમની માતા મરુદેવી ત્યાં હાથી પર ચઢીને ઉપસ્થિત થાય છે. તે પ્રસંગે કવિએ કંડારેલ શબ્દ ચિત્ર અને તે પ્રસંગ નોંધપાત્ર છે.

હસ્તી ચઢિ મરુદેવિ, તિહાં આવઈ તતખેવિ,
આનંદઈ ભરીએ, પામઈ શિવપુરી એ. ૨૩

કાવ્યને અંતે કવિ પોતાના નામનો ઉલ્લેખ કરી 'વિમલમતિ જગપતિ'નું સ્મરણ કરે છે.

સેવક લીંબઉ [બો]લઈએ, તુઝ તોલઈ કુણ સ્વામિ,
દેહ વિમલમતિ જગપતિ, હું લીણઉ તોરઈ નામિ. ૨૭

કવિ લીંબોકૃત

ઋષભદેવ ફાગ. (આદિનાથ ફાગ)
(અનુમાને સોળમા સૈકાનો અંત)

રાગ કેદારી

શ્રીશારદાં હૃદિ ધ્યાત્વા, નત્વા શ્રીનામિનંદનં,
ફાગબંધેન વક્ષેહં, તદ્વંશસ્થાપના... ૧

ઢાલ ફાગની

સોહમ સુરપતિ પભણતિ, પણમિય પ્રભુના પાય,
લ્યઉ એ રૂઅડી સૂખડી, સેલડી લીઈ જિનરાય. ૧

તામ, પરંદર સુંદર, થાપઈ ઈષાંગ વંશ,
જય 'મેરુદેવી- નંદન, ત્રિભૂવન કરઈ પ્રસંસ. ૨

અનુકમિ પામ્યું યૌવન, મોહન મૂરતિ સ્વામી,
તું અમરેસર આવીઉ, ભાવિઉ જિનગુણગ્રામિ.' ૩

ઈંદ્રાણી પણિ આવઈએ, ભાવઈ એ ગીત રસાલ,
કરિઉ વીવાહ મનોહર, જિનવર રૂપ વિશાલ. ૪

અથ દૂહા

રાજ સમય જાણી કરી, કરઈ મહોત્સવ ઈંદ્ર,
બહુ આભરણઈ શોભતા, સિંહાસણિ જિણચંદ. ૫

બિહું પાસઈ ચામર ઢલઈ, મેઘાંબર છત્ર,
રાજ કરઈ રલીઆમણું, ઋષભદેવ સુપવિત્ત. ૬

ઢાલ અઢીઉ

એક અવસરિ હિવ હોઈ, ઋતુ મધુ માધવ જોઈ,
માધવી મહમહઈ એ, મધુકર ગહગહઈ. ૭

ચંપક બહુલ મંદાર, મહોર્યા સવિ સહકાર,
મલયાચલ તણઉ એ, સુરભિ પવન ઘણઉએ. ૮

લવંગ તાલ તમાલ, કરણી વેવિ ગુલાલ,
વન રલીઆમણું એ, એહવું સોહામણું એ. ૯

ઢાલ કાગની

- લોક લાખ તિહાં કીડતિ, કીડતિ દેવ યુગાદિ,
કંઠ સકીમલ કોકિલ, બોલઈ સરૂઈ સાદિ. ૧૦
- એક ખંડોખેલિ ખેલઈ, ગોલિં કરઈ જલ-કેલિ,
એક વિલેપન બાવન, ચંદન મૃગમેદ મેલ. ૧૧
- પુષ્પુ તણા ઘર કે કરઈ, કે કરઈ કુસુમની સેજ,
મૃગ-નયની ગજગામિની, આણઈ અધિકઈ હેજ. ૧૨
- અપછર નાયઈ રંગિં, અંગિં કરી સિણગાર,
માદલ ભૂંગલ ભેરીઅ, તાલ નફેરીઅ એક. ૧૩

ઢાલ અઢીઉ

- ઈણિ પરિ વસંત-માસ, લોક રમઈ ઉલ્હાસિ,
તે દેખી હવઈ એ, સ્વામી ચીંતવઈએ. ૧૪
- એહવું સુખ ઉદાર, અનેથિ છઈ કિંહી સાર,
જ્ઞાનિ નિહાલતા એ, પૂરવ-ભવ પેખતા. ૧૫
- જે સર્વારથ સિદ્ધિ, વિલસી બહુલી રિદ્ધિ,
તે સવિ સંભરઈ, વૈરાગ મન ધરઈ. ૧૬

અથ દૂહા

- જીવ અવિદ્યા આવર્યા, ન લહઈ તત્ત્વ વિચાર,
રાગ દ્વેષાદિક ભર્યા, ભમઈ બહુ સંસાર. ૧૭
- તઉ લોકાંતિક સુર ભણઈ, તીરથ કરી પ્રભુ દેવ,
પંચ મહાવ્રત આદરઈ, દાન દેઈ જિનદેવ. ૧૮
- સહસ વરિસ હવું નિરમલ, કેવલનાણ જિણંદ,
અમર આકાસિહિં ઉતરઈ, ઉતરઈ અપછર વંદ. ૧૯
- ઈંદ્ર ઐરાવણ વારણ, આરોહઈ મનરંગિ,
એક કનકરથ બઈઠલા, ચઢિઅલા એક તુરંગિ. ૨૦
- રાજહંસ સુર કે ચઢયા, કે ચઢયા ગરુડિ વિમાનિ,
કેઈ વૃષભ-વર વાહણિં, કે પંચાનણિ જાણિ. ૨૧

ઢાલ અઢિઉ

- ઈણિ પરિ ચઉવીહ દેવ, આવ્યા કરવા સેવ,
સમોસરણ કર્યુ એ, પુણ્ય પોતઈ ભર્યુ એ. ૨૨
- હસ્તી ચઢિ મરુદેવિ, તિહાં આવઈ તતખેવિ,
આનંદઈ ભરીએ, પામઈ શિવપુરીએ. ૨૩
- થાપિઉં તીરથ-સાર વરત્પઉ જય જયકાર,
શ્રી ભરહેસરુ એ, વંદઈ જગગુરુએ. ૨૪
- પૂરી પર(ખ)દ બાર, જોઈ જગદાદાર,
સ્વામિ વયણ સુણઈએ, વલિ વલિ ગુણ યુણઈ, ૨૫

ઢાલ ફાગની

ગામ નગર પૂરિં આગરિ, વિરહઈ આદિ જિણંદ,
ભવિઅ કમલ પરિબોહએ, મોહઈ અમર-નરિંદ. ૨૬


સેવસ લીંબઈ (બો)લઈએ, તુઝ તોલઈ કુણ સ્વામિ,
દેહ વિમલમતિ જગપતિ, હું લીણઈ તોરઈ નામિ. ૨૭

ઈતિ શ્રી ઋષભદેવ ફાગ સ્તવન.

કઠિન શબ્દાર્થ

(પ્રથમ અંક ચરણ અને બીજો અંક પંક્તિ ક્રમ સૂચવે છે. સં = સંસ્કૃત, પ્રા = પ્રાકૃત, દે = દેશ્ય)

અપહર	૧/૧૩	અપસરા
અમરસર	૩/૩	દેવોનો રાજા-ઈંદ્ર
ઐરાવણ	૧/૨૦	ઐરાવત-ઈન્દ્રનો હાથી
કનકરથ	૩/૨૦	સોનાનો રથ
કેવલનાણ	૨/૧૮	કેવળજ્ઞાન, સર્વજ્ઞાન
ખંડાખલિ	૧/૧૧	કીડા માટેની નાની વાવ.
ગુણપ્રાપ્તિ	૪/૩	ગુણ સમુદ્ર (તે પદને અંતે વપરાય છે.)
પંચનાણિ.	૪/૩૧	પાંચમુખવાળો સિંહ
પરિબોહએ	૩/૨૭	પ્રતિબોધ.
પેખતા	૪/૧૫	જોતા
ભૂંગળ	૩/૧૩.	(દે. મૂગલ) એક વાજિંત્ર
માદલ	૩/૧૩	(સં. મદલ) એક વાદ્ય
રાજ	૧/૫	શ્રેષ્ઠ
રૂઅડી	૪/૧	રૂઠું, ઉત્તમ
લોકાંતિક	૧/૧૮	પરલોક, સ્વર્ગ
વારણ	૨૦/૧	હાથી
સોહમ	૧/૧	તે (બ્રહ્મ કે ઈશ્વર) હું છું
હિવ	૧/૭	હવે
હેજ	૪/૧૨	હેત, ઉમળકો.



ઠાંસલપુર (સા.કાં.)નો સમમાતૃકાપટ્ટ - નવીન ઉપલબ્ધિ

આર.ટી.સાવલિયા

સામાન્ય રીતે માતૃકાઓની મૂર્તિઓ, સ્વતંત્રપણે સમૂહમાં મળતી હોય છે. અને એ સમૂહમાં સમમાતૃકા અથવા અષ્ટ માતૃકાઓનો ગણેશ અને વીરભદ્ર સાથેનો સમૂહ મળતો હોય છે. ઉપરાંત સમમાતૃકાઓના એક જ પથ્થરમાંથી કોતરેલા પટ્ટ પણ વિપૂલ પ્રમાણમાં મળી આવે છે. આ શિલાપટ્ટોમાં એક નોંધપાત્ર બાબત એ છે કે એમાં માતૃકાઓનું આલેખન આયુધો અને તેમના વાહનોને બાદ કરતાં લગભગ એક સરખું જણાય છે. વળી મોટાભાગના માતૃકાપટ્ટમાં બાળક સહિતની માતૃકાઓ જોઈ શકાય છે. માતૃકાપટ્ટ માટે કોઈ અલગ શાસ્ત્રીય મૂર્તિવિધાન મળતું નથી. પરંતુ પ્રત્યેક માતૃકા માટે શાસ્ત્રોમાં જે મૂર્તિવિધાન આપવામાં આવ્યું છે તે જ અહીં સ્વાભાવિક અપનાવાયાનું જણાય છે.^૧

અત્રે પ્રસ્તુત માતૃકાપટ્ટ ઠાંસલપુર (સા.કાં.) ગામમાંથી મળી આવ્યો છે. જે અગાઉ ગુજરાતમાંથી પ્રાપ્ત માતૃકાપટ્ટમાં ઉમેરો તો કરે જ છે, પરંતુ તેની કેટલીક ખાસ વિશેષતાઓને લીધે જુદો તરી આવે છે.

અહીં રેતિયા પથ્થરમાં સળંગ હરોળમાં સાત માતૃકાઓની સુંદર પ્રતિમાઓ કંડારેલી છે. બાળક સહિતની દરેક માતૃકા દ્વિભંગમાં ઊભેલી છે. પ્રત્યેક ચતુર્ભુજ માતૃકાઓના વસ્ત્રાભૂષણો સમાન છે.

પ્રત્યેક માતૃકાઓના મસ્તકે વિવિધ મુકુટ, કાનમાં કુંડલ, કંઠમાં એકાવલિ, જેની એક સેર બે સ્તન વચ્ચેથી છેક નાભિ સુધી લટકતી દર્શાવી છે. બાહુબલો, કટક વલય, બંને બાજુઓ પરથી નીચે સુધી લટકતી વનમાલા, કટિ પર ચાર સેરી

કમરબંધ અને યુસ્ત અધોવસ્ત્રને રેખાઓ દ્વારા વ્યક્ત કરેલ છે. બે પગ વચ્ચે ઢીંચણ સુધી લટકતી વસ્ત્રની પાટલી અને પગમાં કલ્લાં છે. પ્રત્યેક માતૃકાના ડાબા પગ પાસે પોતાનું વાહન દૃષ્ટિગોચર થાય છે.

સર્ળંગ હરોળમાં ઊભેલ માતૃકાઓમાં માહેશ્વરી, બ્રાહ્મી, વૈષ્ણવી, વારાહી, ઐન્દ્રી, કૌબેરી અને ચામુંડાની પ્રતિમાઓ જોઈ શકાય છે. (૧) માહેશ્વરીના મસ્તકે જટા મુકુટ છે. ચાર હાથમાં વરદ, ત્રિશૂલ, નાગ અને બાળક ધારણ કરેલ છે. ડાબા પગ પાસે વાહનની ઘસાયેલી આકૃતિ નજરે પડે છે. (૨) બ્રાહ્મીના મસ્તકે ત્રિકૂટ મુકુટ અને ચતુર્ભુજમાં અનુક્રમે વરદ, પુસ્તક, પદ્મ અને બાળક જોઈ શકાય છે. ડાબા પગ પાસે વાહન હંસ છે. (૩) વૈષ્ણવીના મસ્તકે અલંકૃત કરંડ મુકુટ, ચાર હાથમાં વરદ, ગદા, ચક્ર અને બાળક ધારણ કરેલ નિહાળાય છે. ડાબા પગ પાસે વાહન ગરુડ નમસ્કાર મુદ્રામાં બેઠેલ છે. (૪) વારાહીના વરાહ મુખનો આગળનો ભાગ ખંડિત છે. મસ્તકે ત્રિકૂટ મુકુટ છે. ચાર હાથમાં પરિક્રમાક્રમે જોતા બાળક, પદ્મ, ખટ્વાંગ અને ઘંટા કે મસ્તક જણાય છે. પગ પાસે વાહન મહિષ બેઠેલ છે. (૫) ઐન્દ્રી ચાર હાથમાં વરદ, શક્તિ, અંકુશ અને બાળકને ધારણ કરેલ છે. હાથીનું વાહન જોઈ શકાય છે. (૬) કૌબેરીના મસ્તકે ત્રિકૂટ મુકુટ છે. ચારહાથ પૈકી જમણો નીચલો હાથ વરદમુદ્રામાં અને ડાબા નીચલા હાથથી બાળકને તેડેલ છે. ઉપલા બંને હાથમાં દ્રવ્યની થેલી ધારણ કરેલ છે. માતૃકાના પગ પાછળ હરણની આકૃતિ નજરે પડે છે. (૭) ચામુંડા ના મસ્તકે જટાભાર છે. હાડપિંજર જેવી કાયા, જમણો પગ ઢીંચણથી વાળી પગની આંગળીઓ પર ટેકવેલ છે. દેવીના ચાર હાથ પૈકી ઉપલા બંને હાથમાં ત્રિશૂલ અને ખટ્વાંગ છે. જ્યારે નીચલા ડાબા હાથમાં કપાલ અને જમણા હાથમાં કપાલમાંનું માંસ ધારણ કરેલ છે. પગ પાછળ માનવ શબ પડેલું છે.

આ નોંધપાત્ર માતૃકાપટ્ટને લગતાં ઉપર્યુક્ત અભ્યાસને આધારે આ માતૃકાઓની કેટલીક વિશેષતાઓ નીચે મુજબ તારવી શકાય.

- (૧) આ શિલાપટ્ટમાં ગણેશ અને વીરભદ્રની પ્રતિમાઓ મૂકેલી નથી. અહીં પ્રથમ સ્થાને માહેશ્વરી છે. મોટાભાગના પટ્ટોમાં બ્રાહ્મી પ્રથમ હોય છે.
- (૨) અહીં પ્રથમ વખત જ સપ્તમાતૃકામાં કૌબેરીને માતૃકા તરીકે જોઈ શકાય છે. શાસ્ત્રોમાં માતૃકા તરીકે કૌબેરીનું વર્ણન ક્યાંય મળતું નથી. અગાઉ ગુજરાતમાંથી પ્રાપ્ત અન્ય માતૃકા પટ્ટમાં કૌબેરીની માતૃકા તરીકેની પ્રતિમા હજુ સુધી જોવામાં આવી નથી. કૌબેરીની સ્વતંત્ર કે કુબેરની પત્ની તરીકે યુગલ પ્રતિમાઓ પણ જવલ્લે જ મળે છે.
- (૩) વારાહી પ્રતિમાનું આલેખન અહીં વિશિષ્ટ રીતે જોઈ શકાય છે. અન્ય માતૃકા પ્રતિમાઓમાં બાળક ડાબા નીચલા હાથમાં ધારણ કરેલ છે. જ્યારે વારાહીએ જમણા નીચલા હાથથી બાળક તેડેલ છે. વળી આયુધ તરીકે ડાબા ઉપલા હાથમાં ખટ્વાંગ ધારણ કરેલ છે, જે નોંધપાત્ર છે. ઉત્તર ગુજરાતના મહુડી-કોટવર્કમાંથી મળેલ વારાહી પ્રતિમાના જમણા હાથમાં ખટ્વાંગ જોઈ શકાય છે.^૨ અન્ય કોઈ વારાહી પ્રતિમાના હાથમાં આયુધ તરીકે ખટ્વાંગ જોવા મળતું નથી. આયુધ તરીકે ખટ્વાંગ આ પ્રતિમાની ખાસ વિશેષતા ગણી શકાય.
- (૪) દરેક માતૃકાએ ધારણ કરેલ બાળકને માતાના સ્તન સાથે રમત કરતું અથવા સ્તનપાન કરવા ઉત્સુક બતાવ્યું છે. પ્રત્યેક માતૃકાની બાળક તરફની પ્રેમાળ દૃષ્ટિ શિલાપટ્ટને વિશેષ ધ્યાનાકર્ષક બનાવે છે.

આમ સમગ્ર રીતે આ શિલાપટ્ટની માતૃકાઓના ઉપસેલા નેત્રો, ગોળમુખ, ઉન્નત સ્તન, ઢળતું ઉદર, સપ્રમાણ દેહ અને અલંકરણની રચના અને કલા શૈલીની દૃષ્ટિએ આ માતૃકા પટ્ટ ઈ.સ. ૧૧ મી સદી જેટલો પ્રાચીન જણાય છે.

પાદ ટીપ

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शुभविजयगणिकृता प्रमाणनयतत्त्वप्रकाशिका स्याद्वादभाषा

संपा. नारायण म. कंसारा

अथ श्रीशुभविजयकृता स्याद्वादभाषा प्रारभ्यते ।

॥ ॐ ॥ श्रीहीरविजयसूरीश्वरगुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

(अथ प्रथमः परिच्छेदः ।)

श्रीमद्वीरजिनेशं प्रणम्य विज्ञानविशदवागीशम् ।

श्रीहीरविजयसूरिप्रसादमासाद्य पुनरतुलम् ॥ १ ॥

शिशुरपि वाञ्छति लघुधीरलसः स्याद्वादशास्त्रमध्येतुम् ।

तस्य कृतेऽल्पार्थयुता क्रियते स्याद्वादभाषेयम् ॥ २ ॥ युग्मम् ॥

जीवाजीवपुण्यपापास्रवसंवरनिर्जराबन्धमोक्षलक्षणपदार्थानां सम्यक् ज्ञानक्रियाभ्यां निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ॥ १ ॥ अस्य व्याख्या । जीवाजीवादिनवपदार्थानां सम्यग्ज्ञानं केवलज्ञानम् । सम्यक् क्रिया च यथाख्यातचारित्रं, ताभ्यां मोक्षावाप्तिर्भवतीति ॥ न च जीवाजीवादीनां सम्यग्ज्ञानं तावद्भवति यावदेषामुद्देशलक्षणपरीक्षा न विधीयते इति । तत्र संज्ञामात्रेण पदार्थप्रतिपादनमुद्देशः । स चात्रैव सूत्रे विहितः । लक्षणं त्वलक्ष्यव्यावृत्तस्वरूपकथनम्, यथा घटस्य पृथुबुध्नोदराद्याकारवत्त्वम् । यथालक्षितस्य लक्षणं घटते न वेतिविमर्शः^१ परीक्षा । तेनैते लक्षणपरीक्षे जीवाजीवादीनां सम्यग्ज्ञानार्थं विधातव्ये ॥ १ ॥

तत्र च मानाधीना मेयसिद्धिरितिन्यायादनुद्दिष्टस्यापि प्रमाणस्य पूर्वं लक्षणमुच्यते ।

स्वपरव्यवसायि^२ ज्ञानं प्रमाणम् ॥ २ ॥ अत्र प्रमाणं लक्ष्यं, स्वपरव्यवसायिज्ञानत्वं च लक्षणम् । यत्तु 'स्वापूर्वार्थव्यवसायि ज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणलक्षणम्', तन्न घटाकोटिमाटीकते, पूर्वाकारपरित्यागेनोतराकारपरिणाम-वत्त्वकार्यत्वमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्याप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् । प्रत्यभिज्ञानं च एकस्मिन्नेव घटे घटोऽयं घटोऽयमितिधारवाहिकज्ञानम् ।

नन्वत्र पूर्वपर्यायहान्युत्तरपर्यायोत्पत्तिमत्कार्यमिति कार्यलक्षणात् फलरूपज्ञानस्यापि कार्यत्वं, तथा च कार्यस्य कारणजन्यत्वनियमात्, यथा च्छिदायां दात्रजन्यत्वम्, अतः कारणं वक्तव्यम् । सत्यम् । संस्कारसंप्रयोगाभ्यां जन्यं ज्ञानं, यथा संनिकर्षः सोऽयं घट इति । स्वरपरव्यवसायिज्ञानं करणमेव, यथा तु च्छिदायां दात्रम् । किं पुनः करणम् ? 'साधकतमं करणम्' । अतिशयितं च साधकं साधकतमं प्रकृष्टकरणमित्यर्थः । ननु साधकं कारणहेतुरिति पर्यायाः, तदेवं न ज्ञायते किं तत्कारणमिति ? उच्यते - 'कार्यानुकृतान्वयव्यतिरेकि कारणम्' । तच्चात्मेन्द्रियाद्येव यथा मृत्पिण्डचक्रादिकं घटस्य । तच्च कारणं त्रिविधं परिणामिनिर्वर्तकनिमित्तभेदात् । तत्र परिणामिकारणमात्मा । यथा मृत्पिण्डो घटस्य, यतो मृत्पिण्डाद्येव घटादितया परिणमतीति घटे मृत्पिण्डः पटे तन्तव इत्यादि परिणामिकारणम् । ननु मृत्पिण्डसंबन्ध इव चक्रादिसम्बन्धोऽपि घटस्य घटते तत्कथं घटे मृत्पिण्डः पटे तन्तवो, न चक्रतुर्यादयः परिणामिकारणम् ? सत्यम् । द्विविधः सम्बन्धः संयोगोऽविष्वग्भावश्च ।

१ विचारः ।

२ निश्चायकम् ।

तत्र साध्यसाधनयोगुणगुणिनोरवयवावयविनोस्संबन्धोऽविष्वग्भावस्तादात्म्यं स्वरूपसंबन्ध इति यावत् । स्वरूपं संबन्धत्वं य संबन्धान्तरमन्तरेणापि विशिष्टप्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वमिति । न चात्र समवायसंबन्धः, तस्य भावद्वय-धर्मत्वादयुतसिद्धयोश्च संबन्धस्समवायः, अयुतसिद्धत्वं च "तावेवायुतसिद्धौ द्वौ विज्ञातव्यौ ययोर्द्वयोरविन-श्यदेकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते ॥" इति । तस्मान्मृत्पिण्डघटयोरविष्वग्भाव एव संबन्धः । मृत्पिण्डचक्रयोर्ना-विष्वग्भावस्तत्स्वरूपाभावात् । न हि मृत्पिण्डश्चक्रतया परिणमति नापि चक्रं मृत्पिण्डतया । अतस्तयोः संयोग एव संबन्धः । निर्वर्तकं कारणमात्मैव यथा कुम्भकारः घटस्य । निमित्तकारणं चक्षुर्घटादय उपग्राहकाः, यथा दण्डादयो घटस्य । तदुक्तं -

"निर्वर्तको निमित्तं परिणामी च त्रिधेष्यते हेतुः ।

कुम्भस्य कुम्भकारो धर्ता मृच्चेति समसंख्यः ॥" इति ।

निमित्तकारणं च द्वेषा, निमित्तकारणमपेक्षाकारणं च । यत्र दण्डादिषु प्रायोगिकी वैमलसिकी च क्रिया भवति तानि दण्डादीनि निमित्तकारणानि । यत्र च धर्मास्तिकायादिद्रव्येषु वैमलसिक्येव तानि निमित्तकारणान्यपि विशेषकारणताज्ञापनार्थमपेक्षाकारणान्युच्यन्ते ॥ २ ॥

हिताहितप्राप्तिपरीहारसमर्थं हि प्रमाणमतो ज्ञानमेवेदम् ॥ ३ ॥

तद्व्यवसायस्वभावं, समारोपविरुद्धत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

अतस्मिंस्तदध्यवसायः समारोपः ॥ ५ ॥

सच्च संशयविपर्ययानध्यवसायभेदात् त्रिधा ॥ ६ ॥

तत्र साधकबाधकप्रमाणाभावादनवस्थिततानेककोटिसंस्पर्शि ज्ञानं संशयः ॥ ७ ॥

यथायं स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वेति ॥ ८ ॥

विपरीतैककोटिनिष्ठकनं विपर्ययः ॥ ९ ॥

यथा शुक्तिकायामिदं रजतमिति ॥ १० ॥

किमित्यालोचनमात्रमनध्यवसायः ॥ ११ ॥

यथा गच्छतस्तृणस्पर्शज्ञानमिति ॥ १२ ॥

स्वोन्मुखतया प्रतिभासनं स्वस्य व्यवसायः, अर्थस्येव तदुन्मुखतया घटमहमात्मना जानामीति कर्मवत् कर्तृकरणक्रियाप्रतीतेः ॥ १३ ॥ यथार्थाभिमुख्येन प्रकाशनमर्थव्यवसायो ज्ञानस्य, तथा स्वाभिमुख्येन प्रकाशनं स्वव्यवसायोऽपि तस्येति ॥१३॥

को वा तत्रप्रतिभासितमर्थमध्यक्षमिच्छन् तदेव तथा नेच्छेत्प्रदीपवत् ॥ १४ ॥ यत्तु योगैरुक्तं समुत्पन्नं हि ज्ञानमेकात्मसमवेतानन्तरसमयसमुत्पदिष्णुमानसप्रत्यक्षेणैव लक्ष्यते न पुनः स्वेनेति, तदसत्, परापरज्ञानोत्पाद-परंपरायामेवात्मनो व्यापारादविषयान्तरं सञ्चारादिति ॥ १४ ॥

तत्प्रामाण्यं स्वतःपरतश्च ।

ज्ञानस्य प्रमेयाव्यभिचारित्वं प्रामाण्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

तदितरत्त्वप्रामाण्यमिति ॥ १६ ॥

तदुभयमुत्पत्तौ परत एव, ज्ञप्तौ तु स्वतः परतश्चेति ॥ १७ ॥ ज्ञानस्य हि प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं च द्वितयमपि ज्ञानकारणगतगुणदोषरूपं परमपेक्ष्योत्पद्यते । निश्चीयते त्वभ्यासदशायां स्वतः, अनभ्यासदशायां तु परत इति । तत्र ज्ञानस्याभ्यासदशायां प्रमेयाव्यभिचारि तदितरत्त्वास्तीति प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यनिश्चयः संवादकबाधक-ज्ञानमनपेक्ष्य प्रादुर्भवन् स्वतो भवतीत्यभिधीयते । अनभ्यासदशायां तु तदपेक्ष्य जायमानोऽसौ परत इति वस्तुगतिः ।

अत्र मीमांसका वदन्ति । स्वत एव सर्वथा प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यम् । तथाहि प्रामाण्योत्पत्तौ प्रगुणा गुणाः प्रत्यक्षेमानुमानेन वा मीयेरन् । यदि प्रत्यक्षेण तत्किमिन्द्रियेण वाऽतीन्द्रियेण वा ? नेन्द्रियेणाऽतीन्द्रियेन्द्रियाधिकरणत्वेन, तेषां तद् ग्रहणायोग्यत्वात् । नाप्यतीन्द्रियेण तस्य चारुविचाराभावात् । अनुमानेन ते निर्णयन्ते इति चेत्, कुतस्तत्र नियमनिर्णयः स्यात् ? न प्रत्यक्षाद्, अगुणेषु तत्प्रवृत्तेः परास्तत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानात्, तत एव निश्चितावितरेतराश्रयस्य, तदन्तरात्पुनरनवस्थायाः प्रसक्तेः । ततो न गुणास्सन्ति केचिदिति स्वरूपावस्थेभ्य एव कारणेभ्यो जायमानं प्रामाण्यं कथमुत्पत्तौ परतः स्यादिति ॥ निश्चयस्तु तस्य परतः, कारणगुणज्ञानाद्बाधकाभाव-ज्ञानात्संवादिज्ञानाद्वा स्यात् । तत्र प्राच्यं प्रकारं प्रागेव प्रक्षिप्तवन्तो, गुणग्रहणसमर्थप्रमाणपराकरणात् । द्वितीये तु तात्कालिकस्य कालान्तरभाविनो वा बाधकस्याभावज्ञानं प्रामाण्यनिश्चयकं स्यात् । पौरस्त्यं तावत् कूटहाटकनिष्ठकने स्पष्टमस्त्येव । द्वितीयं तु न चर्मचक्षुषां सम्भवति । संवादिज्ञानं तु सहकारिरूपं सत्, तन्निश्चयं विरचयेद्, ग्राहकं वा भवेत् । नाद्यभेदो, भिन्नकालत्वेन तस्य सहकारित्वासंभवात् । द्वितीयपक्षे तु, तस्यैव ग्राहकं सत् ताद्विषयस्य विषयान्तरस्य वा ? नाद्यः, प्रवर्तकज्ञानस्य दूरनष्टत्वेन ग्राह्यत्वायोगात् । द्वितीये त्वेकसन्तानं भिन्नसन्तानं वा प्रामाण्यं स्यात् । पक्षद्वयेऽपि तैमिरिकावलोक्यमानचन्द्रमण्डलद्वयदर्शिदर्शनेन व्यभिचारः, तद्धि चैत्रस्य पुनः पुनर्मैत्रस्य चोत्पद्यत एव । तृतीये पुनरर्थक्रियाज्ञानमन्यद्वा तद्वा भवेत् । नाग्रिमं, प्रवर्तकस्य प्रामाण्यानिश्चये प्रवृत्त्यभावेनार्थक्रियाया एवाभावात् । अन्यदपि विज्ञानमेकसन्तानं भिन्नसन्तानं वा ? द्वयमपि चैतदेकजातीयं भिन्नजातीयं वा ? चतुष्टयमपि चैतद् व्यभिचारदुःसंचरम् । तथाहि-एकसन्तानं भिन्नसन्तानं चैकजातीयमपि तरङ्गिणीतोयज्ञानं भिन्नजातीयं च स्तंभकुंभादिज्ञानं कूपपानीयज्ञानस्य न संवादकमिति न ज्ञप्तावपि प्रामाण्यं परतः । अप्रामाण्यं तूत्पत्तौ दोषापेक्षत्वाद् ज्ञप्तौ तु बाधकापेक्षत्वात्परत एवेति ॥ अत्र ब्रूमः यत्तावद् गुणाः प्रत्यक्षेणानुमानेन वा मीयेरन्नित्याद्युक्तं तदखिलं दोषेष्वपि वक्तुं पार्यते । अथ प्रत्यक्षेणैव चक्षुरादिस्थान् दोषान् निश्चिक्थिरे लोकाः, किं नैर्मल्यादीन् गुणानपि न ? अथ तिमिरादिदोषाभावमात्रमेव नैर्मल्यादि न तु गुणरूपमिति, कथं प्रत्यक्षेण गुणनिश्चयः स्यात् ? एवं तर्हि नैर्मल्यादिगुणाभावमात्रमेव तिमिरादि, न तु दोषरूपमिति विपर्ययकल्पना किं न स्यादिति ॥

यच्चावाचि निश्चयस्तु तस्य परत इत्यादि, तत्र संवादिज्ञानादिति ब्रूमः । कारणगुणज्ञानबाधकाभावज्ञानयोरपि च संवादज्ञानरूपत्वं प्रतिपद्यामहे ॥

अथ बाधकादेवाप्रामाण्यनिर्णयो न पुनर्ज्ञाननिर्णयकाद्, एवं तर्हि संवादकादेव प्रामाण्यस्यापि निर्णयोऽस्त्विति तदपि कथं स्वतो निर्णीतं स्यात् ? निर्विशेषणं चेदर्थप्राकट्यमर्थापत्त्युत्थापकं तर्ह्यप्रमाणेऽपि प्रामाण्य-निर्णयकार्थापत्त्युत्थापनापत्तिः अर्थप्राकट्यमात्रस्य तत्रापि सद्भावादिति ध्येयम् ॥ १७ ॥

(इति प्रथमः परिच्छेदः ॥)

(अथ द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः ॥)

तद् द्विविधं, प्रत्यक्षं च परोक्षं च ॥ १ ॥

स्पष्टं प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ २ ॥ प्रबलतरज्ञानावरणवीर्यान्तराययोः क्षयोपशमात् क्षयाद्वा स्पष्टताविशिष्टं वैशिष्ट्यास्पदीभूतं यत्तत्प्रत्यक्षम् ॥ २ ॥

स्पष्टत्वं चानुमानाद्याधिक्येन विशेषप्रकाशनम् ॥ ३ ॥

तद् द्विविधं, सांख्यवह्नारिकं पारमार्थिकं च ॥ ४ ॥ बाह्येन्द्रियादिसामग्रीसापेक्षत्वादपारमार्थिक-मस्मदादिप्रत्यक्षम् । परमार्थं भवं पारमार्थिकं मुख्यमात्मसन्निधिमात्रापेक्षमवध्यादिप्रत्यक्षमिति ॥ ४ ॥

तत्राद्यमिन्द्रियनिमित्तमनिन्द्रियनिमित्तं च ॥ ५ ॥ इन्द्रियाणि चक्षुरादीनि । तत्र चक्षुर्वर्ज्यानि प्राप्यकारीणीति । ननु इन्द्रियज्ञाने मनोऽपि व्यापिपतीति कथं न तेन व्यपदेशः ? उच्यते-इन्द्रियस्यासाधारणकारणत्वान्मनः

पुनरनिन्द्रियज्ञानेऽपि व्याप्रियत इति साधारणं तत् । असाधारण्येन च व्यपदेशो दृश्यते, यथा पयःपवनातपादिजन्यत्वेऽप्यङ्कुरस्य बीजेनैव व्यपदेशः, शाल्यङ्कुरः कोद्रवाङ्कुरोऽमिति । अनिन्द्रियं मनोनिमित्तिमिति ॥ ५ ॥

एतद्द्वितयमवग्रहेहावायधारणाभेदादेकैकशस्वतुर्विकल्पम् ॥ ६ ॥

तत्र विषयविषयियोग्यदेशावस्थानानन्तरसमुद्भूतसत्तामात्रगोचरदर्शनाज्जातमाद्यमवान्तरसामान्याकार-
विशिष्ट वस्तुग्रहणमवग्रहः ॥ ७ ॥

अवगृहीतार्थविशेषाकाङ्क्षणमीहा ॥ ८ ॥

ईहितविशेषनिर्णयोऽवायः ॥ ९ ॥

स एव दृढतमावस्थापन्नो धारणेति ॥ १० ॥

कथंचिदभेदेऽपि परिणामविशेषादेशं व्यपदेशभेदः ॥ ११ ॥

क्रमोप्यमीषामयमेव, तथैव संवेदनादेवंक्रमाविर्भूतनिजकर्मक्षयोपशमजन्यत्वाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

अन्यथा प्रमेयानवगतिप्रसङ्गः ॥ १३ ॥

न खल्वदृष्टमवगृह्यते, न चाऽनवगृहीतं सन्दिह्यते, न चासंदिग्धमीह्यते, न चानीहितमवेयते, न चानवेतं धार्यते ॥ १४ ॥

क्वचित्क्रमस्यानुपलक्षणमेषामाशूत्यादाद्, उत्पलपत्रशतव्यतिभेदवदिति ॥ १५ ॥

पारमार्थिकं पुनरुत्पत्तावात्ममात्रापेक्षम् ॥ १६ ॥

तद्विकलं सकलं च ॥ १७ ॥ असंपूर्णपदार्थपरिच्छेदकत्वाद्विकलं तद्विपरीतं तु सकलम् ॥ १७ ॥

तत्र विकलमवधिमनःपर्यायज्ञानरूपतया द्वेषा ॥ १८ ॥

अवधिज्ञानावरणविलयविशेषसमुद्भवं भवगुणाप्रत्ययं रूपिद्रव्यगोचरमवधिज्ञानम् ॥ १९ ॥

संयमविशुद्धिनिबन्धनाद्विशिष्टावरणविच्छेदाज्जातं मनोद्रव्यपर्यायालम्बनं मनःपर्यायज्ञानम् ॥ २० ॥

सकलं तु सामग्रीविशेषतः समुद्भूतसमस्तावरणक्षयापेक्षं निखिलद्रव्यपर्यायसाक्षात्कारस्वरूपं केवलज्ञानमिति ॥ २१ ॥

तद्धानर्हन्, निर्दोषत्वात् ॥ २२ ॥

निर्दोषोऽसौ, प्रमाणाविरोधिवाक्यत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

तदिष्टस्य प्रमाणेनाबाध्यमानवत्वात्तद्वाचः, तेनाविरोधसिद्धिरिति ॥ २४ ॥

(इति द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः ।)

(अथ तृतीयः परिच्छेदः ।)

अस्पष्टं परोक्षम् ॥ १ ॥ प्राक् सूचितस्पष्टत्वाभावभ्राजिष्णु यत्प्रमाणं तत्परोक्षम् ॥ १ ॥

तच्च स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञानतर्कानुमानागमभेदात् पञ्चप्रकारम् ॥ २ ॥

तत्र संस्कारप्रबोधसंभूतमनुभूतार्थविषयं तदित्याकारं ज्ञानं स्मरणम् ॥ ३ ॥

तत्तीर्थकरबिंबमिति यथेति ॥ ४ ॥

अनुभवस्मृतिहेतुकं तिर्यगूर्ध्वतासामान्यादिगोचरं सङ्कलनात्मकं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ॥ ५ ॥
 यथा तज्जातीय एवायं गोपिण्डो, गोसदृशो गवयः, स एवायं जिनदत्त इत्यादि ॥ ६ ॥
 उपलंभानुपलंभसंभवं त्रिकालीकलितसाध्यसाधनसंबन्धाद्यालंबनमिदमस्मिन् सत्येव भवतीत्याकारं
 ज्ञानमूहापरनामा तर्कः ॥ ७ ॥

यथा यावान् कश्चिद्धूमः स सर्वो वह्नौ सत्येव भवतीति तस्मिन्नसति असौ न भवत्येवेति ॥ ८ ॥

अनुमानं द्विप्रकारं स्वार्थं परार्थं च ॥ ९ ॥

तत्र हेतुग्रहणसंबन्धस्मरणकारणकं साध्यविज्ञानं स्वार्थम् ॥ १० ॥

निश्चितान्यथानुपपत्त्येकलक्षणो हेतुः ॥ ११ ॥

इष्टमबाधितमसिद्धं साध्यम् ॥ १२ ॥

तद्विशिष्टः प्रसिद्धो धर्मी पक्षः ॥ १३ ॥

धर्मिणः प्रसिद्धिः क्वचिद्विकल्पतः, कुत्रचित्प्रमाणतः, क्वापि विकल्पप्रमाणाभ्याम् ॥ १४ ॥
 विकल्पोऽध्यवसायमात्रम् । विकल्पसिद्धे धर्मिणि सत्ता, इतरे साध्ये । अस्ति सर्वज्ञो, नास्ति खरविषाणम् ।
 प्रमाणोभयसिद्धे तु साध्यधर्मविशिष्टता, अग्निमानयं देशः, परिणामी शब्दो यथा ॥ १४ ॥

पक्षहेतुवचनात्मकं परार्थमनुमानमुपचारात् ॥ १५ ॥ पक्षहेतुवचनात्मकत्वं च परार्थानुमानस्य
 व्युत्पन्नमतिप्रतिपाद्यापेक्षयाऽत्रोक्तम् । अतिव्युत्पन्नमतिप्रतिपाद्यापेक्षया तु धूमोऽत्र दृश्यते इत्यादि
 हेतुवचनमात्रात्मकमपि तद् भवति । बाहुल्येन तत्प्रयोगाभावात्तु नैतत्साक्षात्सूत्रे सूत्रितम् । उपलक्षितं तु द्रष्टव्यम्,
 मन्दमतिप्रतिपाद्यापेक्षया तु दृष्टान्तादिवचनात्मकमपि तद् भवतीति ॥ १५ ॥

साध्यस्य प्रतिनियतधर्मिसंबन्धिताप्रसिद्धये हेतोरुपसंहारवत्पक्षप्रयोगोऽप्यवश्यमाश्रयितव्यः ॥ १६ ॥

यथा यत्र धूमस्तत्र धूमध्वजः ॥ १६ ॥

व्युत्पन्नं प्रति हेतुप्रयोगस्तथोपपत्त्याऽन्यथानुपपत्त्यैव वा ॥ १७ ॥

तथैव,

साध्यसंभवप्रकारेणैवोपपत्तिस्तथोपपत्तिः, अन्यथा साध्याभावप्रकारेणानुपपत्तिरेवान्यथानुपपत्तिः ॥ १८ ॥

ताभ्यामिति ।

यथाग्निमानयं प्रदेशः, तथा धूमवत्त्वोपपत्तेर्धूमवत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेर्वा ॥ १९ ॥

अनयोरन्यतरप्रयोगेणैव साध्यप्रतिपत्तौ द्वितीयप्रयोगस्यैकत्रानुपयोगः ॥ २० ॥

अन्तर्व्याप्त्या हेतोः साध्यप्रत्यायने शक्तौ, अशक्तौ च बहिर्व्याप्तेः, उद्भावनं व्यर्थम् ॥ २१ ॥

मन्दमतींस्तु व्युत्पादयितुं दृष्टान्तोपनयनिगमनान्यपि प्रयोज्यानि ॥ २२ ॥

प्रतिबन्धप्रतिपत्तेरास्पदं दृष्टान्तः ॥ २३ ॥

स द्वेधाऽन्वयव्यतिरेकभेदात् ॥ २४ ॥

साधनसत्तायां यथावश्यं साध्यसत्ता प्रदर्श्यते सोऽन्वयदृष्टान्तः ॥ २५ ॥

१. आदिशब्दात् सर्वदेशकालवर्तिवाच्यवाचकसम्बन्धोऽत्र गृहीतो द्रष्टव्यः ।

२. संस्कृतज्ञो व्युत्पन्नः ।

यथा यत्र धूमस्तत्र वह्निर्यथा महानस इति ॥ २६ ॥

साध्याभावे साधनस्याभावो यत्र कथ्यते स व्यतिरेकदृष्यन्तः ॥ २७ ॥

यथा वह्न्यभावे न भवत्येव धूमो यथा जलाशय इति ॥ २८ ॥

हेतोरुपसंहार उपनयः ॥ २९ ॥

यथा धूमश्चात्र प्रदेश इति ॥ ३० ॥

प्रतिज्ञायास्तूपसंहारो निगमनम् ॥ ३१ ॥

यथा तस्मादग्निरत्रेति ॥ ३२ ॥

एते पक्षादयः पञ्चाप्यवयवाः प्रकीर्त्यन्ते ॥ ३३ ॥

स हेतुर्द्विधा उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥ ३४ ॥

उपलब्धिर्विधिप्रतिषेधयोः, अनुपलब्धिश्च ॥ ३५ ॥

तत्र

विधिः सदंशः ॥ ३६ ॥

प्रतिषेधोऽसदंशः ॥ ३७ ॥

स चतुर्धा १ प्रागभावः, २ प्रध्वंसाभावः, ३ इतरेतराभावः, ४ अत्यन्ताभावश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

तत्र यन्निवृत्तावेव कार्यस्य समुत्पत्तिः सोऽस्य प्रागभावः ॥ ३९ ॥

यथा मृत्पिण्डनिवृत्तावेव समुत्पद्यमानस्य घटस्य मृत्पिण्ड इति ॥ ४० ॥

यदुत्पत्तौ कार्यस्यावश्यं विपत्तिः सोऽस्य प्रध्वंसाभावः ॥ ४१ ॥

यथा कपालकदम्बकोत्पत्तौ नियमतो विपद्यमानस्य घटस्य कपालमाला इति ॥ ४२ ॥

स्वस्पान्तरात् स्वस्पव्यावृत्तिरितरेतराभावः ॥ ४३ ॥

यथा पटस्वभावाद् घटस्वभावव्यावृत्तिरिति ॥ ४४ ॥

कालत्रयापेक्षिणी तादात्म्यपरिणामनिवृत्तिरत्यन्ताभावः ॥ ४५ ॥

यथा चेतनाचेतनयोरिति ॥ ४६ ॥

“क्षीरे दध्यादि यत्रास्ति प्रागभावः स उच्यते । नास्तिता पयसो दधि प्रध्वंसाभावलक्षणम् ॥ १ ॥

गवयेऽश्वाद्यभावस्तु सोऽन्योन्याभाव उच्यते । शिरसोऽवयवा निम्ना वृद्धिकाठिन्यवर्जिताः ।

शशशृङ्गादिरूपेण सोऽत्यन्ताभाव उच्यते ॥ २ ॥” इति ॥ ४६ ॥

उपलब्धेरपि द्वैविध्यमविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विरुद्धोपलब्धिश्च ॥ ४७ ॥

तत्राविरुद्धोपलब्धिर्विधिसिद्धौ षोढा ॥ ४८ ॥

साध्येनाविरुद्धव्याप्य कार्यकारणपूर्वचरोत्तरचरसहचरभेदात् ॥ ४९ ॥

ततो व्याप्याविरुद्धोपलब्धिः १, कार्याविरुद्धोपलब्धिः २, कारणाविरुद्धोपलब्धिः ३, पूर्वचरा-
विरुद्धोपलब्धिः ४, उत्तरचराविरुद्धोपलब्धिः ५, सहचराविरुद्धोपलब्धिः ६ चेति ॥ ५० ॥

१. निश्चितं ज्ञानं निगमनम्

२. साधयेनाविरुद्धानां व्याप्यादीनां मुपलब्ध्य इत्यर्थः ।

यथा परिणामी शब्दः, कृतकत्वाद् । यः कृतकः स परिणामी दृष्टो, यथा घटः । कृतकश्चायं तस्मात्परिणामी । यस्तु न परिणामी स न कृतको दृष्टो, यथा वन्ध्यास्तनन्धयः । कृतकश्चायं, तस्मात्परिणामी । १ । अस्त्यत्र पर्वते वह्निः, धूमसमुपलम्भात् । २ । अस्त्यत्र छाया, छात्रात् । ३ । उदेष्यति शकटं, कृत्तिकोदयात् । ४ । उदगाद् भरणिः, प्राक्कृत्तिकोदयात् । ५ । अस्त्यत्र सहकारफले स्पं, रसात् । ६ ॥ इति ॥ ५१ ॥

विरुद्धव्याप्याद्युपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधे षोढा ॥ ५२ ॥

तत्र विरुद्धव्याप्योपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्श, ऊष्णात् ॥ ५३ ॥

विरुद्धकार्योपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यस्य क्रोधाद्युपशान्तिः, वदनविकारात् ॥ ५४ ॥

द्वितीयोदाहरणं यथा नास्त्यत्र शीतस्पर्शः, धूमात् । २ । ॥ ५४ ॥

विरुद्धकारणोपलब्धिर्यथा नात्र शरीरिणि सुखमस्ति, हृदयशल्यात् । ३ । ॥ ५५ ॥

विरुद्धपूर्वचरोपलब्धिर्यथा नोदेष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं, रेवत्युदयात् । ४ ॥ ५६ ॥

विरुद्धोत्तरचरोपलब्धिर्यथा नोदगाद् भरणिः, मुहूर्तात्पूर्वं पुष्योदयात् । ५ ॥ ५७ ॥

विरुद्धसहचरोपलब्धिर्यथा नास्त्यस्य मिथ्याज्ञानं, सम्यग्दर्शनादिति । ६ ॥ ५८ ॥

अनुपलब्धेरपि द्वैस्वयमविरुद्धानुपलब्धिर्विरुद्धानुपलब्धिश्च ॥ ५९ ॥

तत्राविरुद्धानुपलब्धिः प्रतिषेधसिद्धौ सप्तधा ॥ ६० ॥

स्वभावव्यापककार्यकारणपूर्वोत्तरसहचरानुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥ ६१ ॥

ततः स्वभावानुपलब्धिः १, व्यापकानुपलब्धिः २, कार्यानुपलब्धिः ३, कारणानुपलब्धिः ४, पूर्वचरानुपलब्धिः ५, उत्तरचरानुपलब्धिः ६, सहचरानुपलब्धिः ७, चेति ॥ ६२ ॥

उदाहृतिर्यथा - नास्त्यत्र भूतले घटः, उपलब्धिलक्षणाप्राप्तत्वे सति अनुपलब्धेः १, नास्त्यत्र शिंशापा, वृक्षानुपलब्धेः २, नास्त्यत्राप्रतिबद्धसामर्थ्याग्निः, धूमानुपलब्धेः ३, नास्त्यत्र धूमः, अनग्नेः ४, नोदेष्यति मुहूर्तान्ते शकटं, कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेः ५, नोदगाद् भरणिः, मुहूर्तात्प्राक् कृत्तिकोदयानुपलब्धेः ६, नास्त्यस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानं, सम्यग्दर्शनानुपलब्धेः ७, इति ॥ ६३ ॥

विरुद्धानुपलब्धिर्विधौ पञ्चधा ॥ ६४ ॥

विरुद्धाकार्यकारणस्वभावव्यापकसहचरानुपलब्धिभेदात् ॥ ६५ ॥

ततश्च विरुद्धकार्यानुपलब्धिः । १ ।, विरुद्धकारणानुपलब्धिः । २ ।, विरुद्धस्वभावानुपलब्धिः । ३ ।, विरुद्धव्यापकानुपलब्धिः । ४ ।, विरुद्धसहचरानुपलब्धिः । ५ । चेति ॥ ६६ ॥

उदाहृतिर्यथा - अस्मिन् प्राणिनि व्याधिविशेषोऽस्ति, निरामयचेष्टानुपलब्धेः १ । अस्त्यत्र शरीरिणि दुःखम् इष्टसंयोगाभावात् २ । अनेकान्तात्मकं वस्तु, एकान्तस्वरूपानुपलब्धेः ३ । अस्त्यत्र छाया, औष्ण्यानुपलब्धेः ४ । अस्त्यत्र मिथ्याज्ञानं, सम्यग्दर्शनानुपलब्धेः ५ इति ॥ ६७ ॥ परंपरया संभवत् साधनमत्रैवान्तर्भावनीयम् । अभूदत्र चक्रे शिवकः, स्थासात्, कार्यकार्यमविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ यथा १ । नास्त्यत्र मृगक्रीडनं मृगारिशब्दात्, कारणविरुद्धकार्योपलब्धौ यथा २ । इति ॥ ६७ ॥

(इति तृतीयः परिच्छेदः ।)

(अथ चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः ।)

आप्तवचनाज्जातमर्थज्ञानमागमः ॥ १ ॥

उपचारादाप्तवचनं च ॥ २ ॥

यथा अस्त्यत्र निधिः १ । सन्ति मेवादयः २ ॥ ३ ॥

अभिधेयं वस्तु यथावस्थितं यो जानीते यथाज्ञानं चाभिधत्ते स आप्तः ॥ ४ ॥

स च द्वेधा लौकिको लोकोत्तरश्च ॥ ५ ॥

तत्र लौकिको जनकादिलोकोत्तरस्तु तीर्थकरादिः ॥ ६ ॥

सहजसामर्थ्यसङ्केताभ्यामर्थबोधनिबन्धनं शब्दः ॥ ७ ॥

अकारादिः पौद्गलिको वर्ण इति ॥ ८ ॥

(इति चतुर्थः परिच्छेदः)

(अथ पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः ।)

तस्य विषयः सामान्यविशेषाद्यनेकात्मकं वस्तु ॥ ११ ॥

अनुवृत्तव्यावृत्तप्रत्ययगोचरत्वात् पूर्वोत्तराकारपरिहारावाप्तिस्थितिलक्षणपरिणामेनार्थक्रियोपपत्तेश्च ॥ २ ॥
तस्य प्रमाणस्य विसीयन्ते निबध्यन्ते विषयिणोऽस्मिन्निति विषयो गोचरः परिच्छेद्यमिति यावत् । सामान्यविशेषौ
वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणावदिर्यस्य सदसदाद्यनेकान्तस्य तत्तदात्मकं तत्स्वरूपं वस्त्विति ॥ २ ॥

सामान्यं द्वेधा तिर्यगूर्ध्वतादिभेदात् ॥ ३ ॥ सदृशपरिणामस्तिर्यक् खण्डमुद्गादिगोत्ववत् ॥ ३ ॥

तत्र प्रतिव्यक्ति तुल्या परिणतिस्तिर्यक्सामान्यं शबलशाबलेयादिपिण्डेषु गोत्वं यथेति ॥ ४ ॥

परापरविवर्तव्यापिद्रव्यमूर्ध्वता, मृदिव स्थासादिषु ॥ ५ ॥

पूर्वापरपरिणामसाधारणद्रव्यमूर्ध्वतासामान्यं, कटककङ्कणाद्यनुगामिकाञ्चनवदिति ॥ ६ ॥

विशेषश्च द्वेधा पर्यायव्यतिरेकेण भेदात् ॥ ७ ॥

एकस्मिन् द्रव्ये क्रमभाविनः पर्यायाः, आत्मनि हर्षविषादादिवदिति ॥ ८ ॥

विसदृशपरिणामो व्यतिरेको, गोमहिषादिवदिति ॥ ९ ॥

(इति पञ्चमः परिच्छेदः ।)

(अथ षष्ठः परिच्छेदः ।)

अज्ञाननिवृत्तिर्हानोपादानोपेक्षाश्च फलम् ॥ १ ॥

यत्प्रमाणेन साध्यते तदस्य फलम् ॥ २ ॥

तद् द्विविधमानन्तर्येण पारम्पर्येण च ॥ ३ ॥

तत्रानन्तर्येण सर्वप्रमाणानामज्ञाननिवृत्तिः ॥ ४ ॥

पारम्पर्येण हानोपादानोपेक्षाबुद्ध्यश्च फलम् ॥ ५ ॥

तत् प्रमाणाद् भिन्नमभिन्नं च, प्रमाणफलत्वान्यथानुपपत्तेः ॥ ६ ॥

तस्यैकप्रमातृतादात्म्येन प्रमाणादभेदव्यवस्थितेः ॥ ७ ॥

प्रमाणतया परिणतस्यैवात्मनः फलतया परिणतिप्रतीतेः ॥ ८ ॥

यः प्रमिमीते स एव निवृत्ताज्ञानो जहात्याददात्युपेक्षते चेति प्रतीतेः ॥ ९ ॥

साध्यसाधनभावेन प्रमाणफलयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

कर्ता हि साधकः स्वतन्त्रत्वात्, क्रिया तु साध्या कर्तुर्निर्वत्यत्वादिति ॥ ११ ॥

प्रमाणस्वरूपादेरन्यत्तदाभासम् ॥ १२ ॥

अज्ञानात्मकानात्मप्रकाशकस्वमात्रावभासकनिर्विकल्पसमारोपाः प्रमाणस्य स्वरूपाभासाः ॥ १३ ॥

यथा संनिकर्षाद्यस्वसंविदितपरानवभासकज्ञानदर्शनविपर्ययसंशयानध्यवसायाः ॥ १४ ॥

प्रमाणभासाः यथा द्विचन्द्रादिज्ञानं विभङ्गश्च प्रत्यक्षाभासम् ॥ १५ ॥

अतस्मिंस्तदिति ज्ञानं स्मरणाभासम् ॥ १६ ॥

यज्ञादत्ते स देवदत्तो यथा ॥ १७ ॥

सदृशे तदेवेदं तस्मिंश्च तत्सदृशमित्यादिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासं यमलज्ञानवत् ॥ १८ ॥ तुल्ये पदार्थे स एवायमित्येकस्मिंश्च तेन तुल्यमित्यादिज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानाभासम् । युगलजातज्ञानवदिति ॥ १८ ॥

असंबन्धे तद्ज्ञानं तर्काभासम् । यावांस्तत्पुत्र स श्याम इति ॥ १९ ॥ असत्यामपि व्याप्तौ तदाभासस्तर्काभासः ॥ १९ ॥

व्याप्तिरविनाभावो, यथा स श्यामो मैत्रतनयत्वादित्यत्र यावान्मैत्रतनयः स श्याम इति ॥ २० ॥

अनुमानाभासमिदं -

पक्षाभासादिसमुत्थं ज्ञानमनुमानाभासम् ॥ २१ ॥

अनिष्टादिः पक्षाभासः ॥ २२ ॥ अनिष्टो मीमांसकस्यानित्यः शब्दः । सिद्धः श्रावणः शब्दः । बाधितः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमलोकस्ववचनैः, अनुष्णोऽग्निरित्यादिवत् ॥ २२ ॥

असिद्धविरुद्धानैकान्तिका हेत्वाभासाः ॥ २३ ॥ प्रमाणेनासिद्धान्यथानुपपत्तिरसिद्धः, परिणामी शब्दश्चाक्षुषत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

तत्र यस्य प्रमाणेनासिद्धाऽन्यथानुपपत्तिः सोऽसिद्धः ॥ २४ ॥

स द्विविध उभयासिद्धोऽन्यतरासिद्धश्च ॥ २५ ॥

तत्र उभयस्य वादिप्रतिवादिसमुदायस्यासिद्धः उभयासिद्धो, यथा परिणामी शब्दः चाक्षुषत्वादिति ॥ २६ ॥

अन्यतरस्य वादिनः प्रतिवादिनो वाऽसिद्धोऽन्यतरासिद्धो, यथा अचेतनास्तरवो विज्ञानेन्द्रियायुर्निरोध-लक्षणमरणरहितत्वादिति ॥ २७ ॥

विपरीतान्यथानुपपत्तिर्विरुद्धः, अनित्यः पुरुष प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिमत्त्वात् ॥ २८ ॥ साध्यविपर्ययेणैव यस्यान्यथानुपपत्तिरवसीयते स विरुद्धः । यदा केनचित्साध्यविपर्ययेणाविनाभूतो हेतुः साध्याविनाभावभ्रान्त्या प्रयुज्यते तदासौ विरुद्धौ हेत्वाभासः ॥ २८ ॥

यथा नित्य एव पुरुषोऽनित्य एव वा प्रत्यभिज्ञानादिमत्त्वादिति ॥ २९ ॥

विपक्षेऽप्यविरुद्धवृत्तिरनैकान्तिकः (यथा) अनित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वात् ॥ ३० ॥

यस्यान्यथानुपपत्तिः सन्दिह्यते सोऽनैकान्तिकः ॥ ३० ॥

स च द्वेधा, निर्णीतविपक्षवृत्तिकः सन्दिग्धविपक्षवृत्तिकश्च ॥ ३१ ॥

निर्णीता विपक्षे वृत्तिर्यस्य स निर्णीतविपक्षवृत्तिको, यथा नित्यः शब्दः प्रमेयत्वादिति ॥ ३२ ॥
सन्दिग्धा विपक्षे वृत्तिर्यस्य स सन्दिग्धविपक्षवृत्तिको, यथा विवादपदापन्नः पुरुष सर्वज्ञो न भवति
वक्तृत्वादिति ॥ ३३ ॥

अन्वये दृष्टान्ताभासा असिद्धसाध्यसाधनोभयाः, अपौरुषेयः शब्दः मूर्त्त्वादिन्द्रियसुखपरमाणुघटवत् ॥ ३४ ॥

विपरीतान्वयश्च यदपौरुषेयं तदमूर्त्तं विद्युदादिनातिप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ३५ ॥

व्यतिरेकेऽसिद्धतद्व्यतिरेकाः, परमाण्विन्द्रियसुखाकाशवत् ॥ ३६ ॥

विपरीतव्यतिरेकश्च यन्नामूर्त्तं तन्नापौरुषेयमिति ॥ ३७ ॥

साध्यर्थेण दृष्टान्ताभासो नवधा ॥ ३८ ॥

तत्र साध्यधर्मविकलः १, साधनधर्मविकलः २, उभयधर्मविकलः ३, सन्दिग्धसाध्यधर्मा ४, सन्दिग्धसाधनधर्मा
५, सन्दिग्धोभयधर्मा ६, अनन्वयः ७, अप्रदर्शितान्वयः ८, विपरीतान्वयः ९, च ॥ ३९ ॥

तत्र साध्यधर्मविकलो यथाऽपौरुषेयः शब्दोऽमूर्त्तत्वात् दुःखवदिति १ ॥ ४० ॥

तस्यामेवप्रतिज्ञायां तस्मिन्नेव च हेतौ परमाणुविदिति साधनधर्मविकलः २ ॥ ४१ ॥

मूर्त्तत्वात्परमाणोः कलशवदित्युभयधर्मविकलः इति ॥ ४२ ॥

तस्यामेव प्रतिज्ञायां तस्मिन्नेव च हेतौ कलशदृष्टान्तस्य पौरुषेयत्वान्मूर्त्तत्वाच्च
साध्यसाधनोभयधर्मविकलता ३ ॥ ४३ ॥

तथा रागादिमानयं वक्तृत्वाद् देवदत्तवदिति सन्दिग्धसाध्यधर्मा ॥ ४ ॥ ४४ ॥

मरणधर्मायं रागादिमत्त्वान्मैत्रवदिति सन्दिग्धसाधनधर्मा ५ ॥ ४५ ॥

नायं सर्वदर्शी रागादिमत्त्वान्मुनिविशेषवदिति सन्दिग्धोभयधर्मा ६ ॥ ४६ ॥

रागादिमान् विवक्षितः पुरुषो वक्तृत्वादित्यनन्वयः ७ ॥ ४७ ॥

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद् घटवदित्यप्रदर्शितान्वयः ८ ॥ ४८ ॥

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद्, यदनित्यं तत्कृतकं घटवदिति विपरीतान्वयः ९ । इति ॥ ४९ ॥

वैधर्म्येणापि दृष्टान्ताभासो नवधा ॥ ५० ॥

असिद्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः १, असिद्धसाधनव्यतिरेकः २, असिद्धोभयव्यतिरेकः ३,
सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः ४, सन्दिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकः ५, सन्दिग्धोभयव्यतिरेकः ६, अव्यतिरेकः ७,
अप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकः ८, विपरीतव्यतिरेकः ९, च ॥ ५१ ॥

एषु भ्रान्तमनुमानं प्रमाणत्वाद्, यत्पुनर्भ्रान्तं न भवति न तत्प्रमाणं, यथा स्वप्नमित्यसिद्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः
स्वप्नज्ञानाद् भ्रान्तत्वस्यानिवृत्तेः । १ ॥ ५२ ॥

निर्विकल्पकं प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणत्वाद्, यत्तु सविकल्पकं न तत्प्रमाणं, यथा
लैङ्गिकमित्यसिद्धसाधनव्यतिरेको लैङ्गिकात्प्रमाणत्वस्यानिवृत्तेः २ ॥ ५३ ॥

नित्यानित्यः शब्दः सत्त्वाद्, यस्तु न नित्यानित्यः स न सन्, तद्यथा स्तम्भ इत्यसिद्धोभयव्यतिरेकः
स्तम्भान्नित्यानित्यत्वस्य सत्त्वस्य चाव्यावृत्तेः ३ ॥ ५४ ॥

असर्वज्ञोऽनाप्तो वा कपिलोऽक्षणिकैकान्तवादित्वाद्, यः सर्वज्ञ आप्तो वा स क्षणिकैकान्तवादी, यथा
सुगत इति सन्दिग्धसाध्यव्यतिरेकः ४ ॥ ५५ ॥

अनादेयवचनः कश्चिद्विवक्षितः पुरुषो, रागादिमत्त्वाद्, यः पुनरादेयवचनः स वीतरागः, तद्यथा शौद्धोदनिरिति सन्दिग्धसाधनव्यतिरेकः ५ ॥ ५६ ॥

न वीतरागः कपिलः, करुणास्पदेष्वपि परमकृपयानर्पितनिजपिशितशकलत्वाद्, यस्तु वीतरागः स करुणास्पदेषु परमकृपया समर्पितनिजपिशितशकलः, तद्यथा तपनबन्धुरिति सन्दिग्धोभयव्यतिरेकः ६ ॥ ५७ ॥

न वीतरागः कश्चिद्विवक्षितः पुरुषो, वक्तृत्वाद्, यः पुनर्वीतरागो न स वक्ता, यथोपलखण्ड इत्यव्यतिरेकः ७ ॥ ५८ ॥

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वादाकाशवदित्यप्रदर्शितव्यतिरेकः ८ ॥ ५९ ॥

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद्, यदकृतकं तन्नित्यं दृष्टं, यथाऽऽकाशमिति विपरीतव्यतिरेकः ९ ॥ ६० ॥ इति ।

उपनयाभासो यथा परिणामी शब्दः, कृतकत्वाद्, यः कृतकः स परिणामी, यथा कुम्भ इत्यत्र परिणामी च शब्द इति कृतकश्च कुम्भ इति चेति ॥ ६१ ॥ इह साध्यधर्म साध्यर्मिणि साधनधर्म वा दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि उपसंहरत उपनयाभासः ॥ ६१ ॥

निगमनाभासो यथा तस्मिन्नेव प्रयोगे तस्मात् कृतकः शब्द इति तस्मात्परिणामी कुम्भ इति चेति ॥ ६२ ॥ अत्रापि साधनधर्म साध्यधर्मिणि वा दृष्टान्तधर्मिणि उपसंहरतो निगमनाभासः ॥

अनाप्तवचनप्रभवं ज्ञानमागमाभासः ॥ ६३ ॥

यथा—मेकलकन्यकायाः कुले तालहिन्तालयोर्मूले सुलभाः पिण्डखर्जूरः सन्ति, त्वरितं गच्छत गच्छत शावकाः ॥ ६४ ॥

प्रत्यक्षमेवैकं प्रमाणमित्यादिसंख्यानं संख्याभासः ॥ ६५ ॥

सामान्यमेव विशेष एव तद्द्वयं वा स्वतन्त्रमित्यादिस्तस्य विषयाभासः ॥ ६६ ॥

अभिन्नमेव भिन्नमेव वा प्रमाणात् फलं तस्य तदाभासमिति ॥ ६७ ॥

(इति षष्ठः परिच्छेदः ॥)

(अथ सप्तमः परिच्छेदः ।)

प्रमाणप्रतिपन्नार्थैकदेशपरामर्शो नयः ॥ १ ॥

स्वाभिप्रेतादंशादितरांशापलापी पुनर्नयाभासः ॥ २ ॥

स व्याससमासाभ्यां द्विप्रकारः ॥ ३ ॥

व्यासतोऽनेकविकल्पः ॥ ४ ॥

समासतस्तु द्विभेदो, द्रव्यार्थिकः पर्यायार्थिकश्च ॥ ५ ॥

तत्राद्यो नैगमसङ्ग्रहव्यवहार भेदात् त्रेधा ॥ ६ ॥ तत्र अन्योन्यगुणप्रधानभूतभेदाभेदप्ररूपणो नैगमः ॥ ६ ॥

धर्मयोर्धर्मिणोर्धर्मधर्मिणोश्च प्रधानोपसर्जनभावेन यद् विवक्षणं स नैकगमो नैगमः ॥ ७ ॥ पर्याययोर्द्वयोर्द्वयपर्याययोश्च मुख्यामुख्यरूपतया यद्विवक्षणं स एवरूपः । नैके गमा बोधमार्गा यस्यासौ नैगमो नाम नयः प्रवचनप्रसिद्धनिलयनप्रस्थदृष्टान्तद्वयगम्यः ॥ ७ ॥

उदाहृतिर्यथा -

सच्चैतन्यमात्मनीति धर्मयोः ॥ ८ ॥

वस्तुपर्यायवद् द्रव्यमिति धर्मिणोः ॥ ९ ॥

क्षणमेकं सुखी विषयासक्तजीव इति तु धर्मधर्मिणोः, इति ॥ १० ॥

धर्मद्वयादीनामेकान्तिकपार्थक्याभिसन्धिर्नैगमाभासः ॥ ११ ॥

यथात्मनि सत्त्वचैतन्ये परस्परमत्यन्तं पृथग्भूते इत्यादि १ ॥ १२ ॥

सामान्यमात्रग्राही परामर्शः सङ्ग्रहः ॥ १३ ॥ सामान्यमात्रमशेषविशेषरहितं सत्त्वद्रव्यत्वादिकं गृह्णातीत्येवंशीलः समेकीभावेन पिण्डीभूततया विशेषराशिं गृह्णातीति सङ्ग्रहः ॥ १३ ॥

अयमुभयविकल्पः, परोऽपरश्च ॥ १४ ॥

तत्राशेषविशेषेष्वौदासीन्यं भजमानः शुद्धद्रव्यं सन्मात्रमभिमन्यमानः परसङ्ग्रहः ॥ १५ ॥

यथा विश्वमेकं सद्विशेषादिति ॥ १६ ॥

सत्ताद्वैतं स्वीकुर्वाणः सकलविशेषान्निराचक्षणस्तदाभासः ॥ १७ ॥

यथा सत्तैव तत्त्वं ततः पृथग्भूतानां विशेषाणामदर्शनादिति ॥ १८ ॥

द्रव्यत्वादीन्यवान्तरसामान्यानि मन्वानस्तद्भेदेषु गजनिमीलिकामवलंबमानः पुनरपरसङ्ग्रहः ॥ १९ ॥

यथा धर्माधर्माकाशकालपद्गलजीवद्रव्याणामैक्यं द्रव्यत्वाभेदादित्यादि ॥ २० ॥

द्रव्यत्वादिकं प्रतिजानानस्तद्विशेषान्निहनुवानस्तदाभासः ॥ २१ ॥

यथा द्रव्यत्वमेव तत्त्वं ततोऽर्थान्तरभूतानां द्रव्याणामनुपलब्धेरिति २ सद्द्विशेषप्रकाशको व्यवहारः ॥ २२ ॥

सङ्ग्रहेण गोचरीकृतानामर्थानां विधिपूर्वकं विभागेन स्थापनं येनाभिसन्धिना क्रियते स व्यवहारः ॥ २३ ॥

यथा यत्सत्तत् द्रव्यं पर्यायो वेत्यादि ॥ २४ ॥

यः पुनरपारमार्थिकं द्रव्यपर्यायप्रविभागमभिप्रैति स व्यवहाराभासः ॥ २५ ॥

यथा चार्वाकदर्शनमिति । ३ ॥ २६ ॥

पर्यायार्थिकश्चतुर्था । ऋजुसूत्रः शब्दः समभिस्तु एवम्भूतश्च ॥ २७ ॥

तत्र शुद्धपर्यायग्राही ऋजुसूत्रः ऋजुर्वर्तमानक्षणस्थायि पर्यायमात्रं प्राधान्यतः सूत्रयन्भिप्राय ऋजुसूत्रः ॥ २८ ॥

यथा सुखक्षणः सम्प्रत्यस्तीत्यादि ॥ २९ ॥

सर्वथा द्रव्यापलापी तदाभासः ॥ ३० ॥

यथा ताथागतमतमिति ४ ॥ ३१ ॥

कालादिभेदेन ध्वनेरर्थभेदं प्रतिपद्यमानः शब्दः ॥ ३२ ॥ कालादिभेदेन कालकारकलिङ्गसङ्ख्या-पुरुषोपसर्जनभेदेनेति ॥ ३२ ॥

यथा बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुतित्यादि ॥ ३३ ॥

तद्भेदेन तस्य तमेव समर्थयमानस्तदाभासः ॥ ३४ ॥

यथा बभूव भवति भविष्यति सुमेरुतित्यादयो भिन्नकालाः शब्दा भिन्नमेवार्थमभिदधति भिन्नकालशब्दत्वात् तादृक् सिद्धान्यशब्दवदित्यादि ५ ॥ ३५ ॥

पर्यायध्वनिभेदादर्थानानात्वनिरूपकः समभिस्तुः ॥ ३६ ॥ पर्यायशब्देषु निरुक्तिभेदेन भिन्नमर्थं

समभिरुहन् समभिरूढः । शब्दनयो हि पर्यायभेदेऽप्यर्थाभेदमभिप्रैति । समभिरूढस्तु पर्यायभेदे भिन्नानर्थानभिमन्यते, अभेदं त्वर्थगतं पर्यायशब्दानामुपेक्षते ॥ ३६ ॥

यथा इन्दनादिन्द्रः, शकनात्शक्रः, पूर्दारणात्पुरन्दर इत्यादिषु ॥ ३७ ॥

पर्यायध्वनीनामभिधेयनानात्वमेव कक्षीकुर्वाणस्तदाभासः ॥ ३८ ॥

यथा इन्द्रः शक्रः पुरन्दर इत्यादयः शब्दा भिन्नाभिधेया एव भिन्नशब्दत्वात् करिकुरङ्गशब्दवदित्यादि ६ ॥ ३९ ॥

क्रियाश्रयेण भेदप्ररूपणमेवम्भूतः ॥ ४० ॥ शब्दानां स्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाविशिष्टमर्थं वाच्यत्वेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नेवंभूतः ॥ ४० ॥

यथेन्द्रनमनुभवन्निन्द्रः शकनक्रियापरिणतः शक्रः पूर्दारणप्रवृत्तः पुरन्दर इत्युच्यते ॥ ४१ ॥

क्रियानाविष्टं वस्तु शब्दवाच्यतया प्रतिक्षिपन् तदाभासः ॥ ४२ ॥

यथा विशिष्टचेष्टाशून्यं घटाख्यं वस्तु न घटशब्दवाच्यं, घटशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तभूतक्रियाशून्यत्वात्, पटवदित्यादि ७ ॥ ४३ ॥

अत्र संग्रहश्लोकाः -

“अन्यदेव हि सामान्यमभिन्नज्ञानकारणम् ।

विशेषोऽप्यन्य एवेति मन्यते नैगमो नयः ॥ १ ॥

सदरूपतानतिक्रान्तस्वस्वभावमिदं जगत् ।

सत्तारूपतया सर्वं संगृह्णन् सङ्ग्रहो मतः ॥ २ ॥

व्यवहारस्तु तामेव प्रतिवस्तु व्यवस्थिताम् ।

तथैव दृश्यमानत्वाद् व्यापारयति देहिनः ॥ ३ ॥

तत्रर्जुसूत्रनीतिः स्याद् बुद्धिपर्यायसंश्रिता ।

नश्वरस्यैव भावस्य भावस्थितिवियोगतः ॥ ४ ॥

विरोधिलिङ्गसंख्यादिभेदाद्भिन्नस्वभावताम् ।

तस्यैव मन्यमानोऽयं शब्दः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥ ५ ॥

तथाविधस्य तस्यापि वस्तुनः क्षणवर्त्तिनः ।

ब्रूते समभिरूढस्तु संज्ञाभेदेन भिन्नताम् ॥ ६ ॥

एकस्यापि ध्वनेर्वाच्यं सदा तन्नोपपद्यते ।

क्रियाभेदेन भिन्नत्वादेवंभूतोऽभिमन्यते ॥ ७ ॥”

एतेषु प्रथमे चत्वारोऽर्थनिरूपणप्रवणत्वादर्थनयाः ॥ ४४ ॥

शेषास्तु त्रयः शब्दवाच्यार्थगोचरतया शब्दनयाः ॥ ४५ ॥

पूर्वः पूर्वो नयः प्रचुरगोचरः, परः परस्तु परिमितविषयः ॥ ४६ ॥

तत्र सन्मात्रगोचरसङ्ग्रहान्नैगमो भावाभावभूमिकत्वाद् बहुविषयः ॥ ४७ ॥

सद्विशेषप्रकाशकाद् व्यवहारात्, सङ्ग्रहः समस्तसत्समूहोपदर्शकत्वाद् बहुविषयः ॥ ४८ ॥

वर्त्तमानविषयादृजुसूत्राद् व्यवहारस्त्रिकालविषयावलम्बित्वाद् बहुविषयः ॥ ४९ ॥

कालादिभेदेन भिन्नार्थोपदर्शिनः शब्दादृजुसूत्रस्तद्विपरीतवेदकत्वान्महार्थः ॥ ५० ॥
 प्रतिपर्यायशब्दमर्थभेदमभीप्सतः समभिस्त्वात् शब्दस्तद्विपर्यायानुयायित्वात्प्रभूतविषयः ॥ ५१ ॥
 प्रतिक्रियं विभिन्नमर्थं प्रतिजाननादेवंभूतात्समभिस्त्वात्स्तदन्यथाऽर्थस्थापकत्वान्महागोचरः ॥ ५२ ॥
 नयवाक्यमपि स्वविषये प्रवर्तमानं विधिनिषेधाभ्यां सप्तभङ्गीमनुव्रजति ॥ ५३ ॥
 प्रमाणवदस्य फलं व्यवस्थापनीयमिति ॥ ५४ ॥

(इति सप्तमः परिच्छेदः ॥)

(अथाष्टमः परिच्छेदः ।)

अथोत्पादव्ययधौव्ययुक्ताः पदार्थाः ॥ १ ॥

ते चादीपमाव्योम समस्वभावाः ॥ २ ॥

तत्र चैतन्यलक्षणः परिणामी ज्ञानादिधर्मभिन्नाभिन्नः कर्ता साक्षाद्भोक्ता स्वदेहपरिमाणः प्रतिशरीरं
 भिन्नः पौद्गलिकादृष्टवैश्व जीवः ॥ ३ ॥ चैतन्यं साकारनिराकारोपयोगात्मकं लक्षणं स्वरूपं यस्यासौ
 चैतन्यलक्षणः १ । परिणमनं सुरनारकादिष्वपरापर्यायेषु गमनं प्रतिसमयपरापर्यायेषु गमनं वा परिणामः, स
 नित्यमस्यास्तीति परिणामी २ । ये ज्ञानदर्शनचारित्रसुखदुःखवीर्यभव्याभव्यत्वद्रव्यत्वप्रमेयत्वप्राणधारित्व-
 क्रोधादिपरिणततत्त्वसंसारित्वसिद्धत्वपरवस्तुव्यावृत्तत्वादयः स्वपरपर्याया जीवस्य भवन्ति, ते ज्ञानादयो धर्मा
 उच्यन्ते । तेभ्यो जीवो न भिन्नो नाप्यभिन्नः, किं तु जात्यन्तरतया भिन्नाभिन्नः । यदि हि ज्ञानादिधर्मभ्यो
 जीवो भिन्नः स्यात्तदाहं जानामि अहं पश्यामि अहं ज्ञाताऽहं दृष्टाऽहं सुखितोऽहं भव्यश्चेत्याद्यभेदप्रतिभासो न
 स्याद्, अस्ति च सर्वप्राणिनां सोऽभेदप्रतिभासः । तथा यद्यभिन्नः स्यात्तदायं धर्मा एते धर्मा इति भेदबुद्धिर्न
 स्याद्, अस्ति च सा । अथवा अभिन्नतायां ज्ञानादिसर्वधर्माणामैक्यं स्यादेकजीवाभिन्नत्वात् । ततः च मम
 ज्ञानं मम दर्शनं चास्तीत्यादिज्ञानादिमिथोभेदबुद्धिर्न स्याद्, अस्ति च सा । तथा ज्ञानादिधर्मभ्यो भिन्नाभिन्न
 एवाभ्युपगन्तव्यः ३ । करोत्यदृष्टादिकमिति कर्ता ४ । साक्षादनुपचरितवृत्त्या भुङ्क्ते सुखादिकमिति साक्षाद्भोक्ता
 ५ । स्वोपात्तवपुर्व्यापकः स्वदेहपरिमाणः ६ । प्रतिक्षेत्रं पृथक् प्रतिशरीरं भिन्नः ७ । पुद्गलघटितकर्मपरतन्त्रः
 पौद्गलिकाऽदृष्टवान् ॥

जीवः प्राणभाक्, प्राणाश्च द्रव्यभावभेदाद् द्विविभेदाः, तत्र द्रव्यप्राणाः पञ्चेन्द्रियत्रिविधबलोच्छ्वासनिः-
 श्वासायूरूपाः । भावप्राणास्तु ज्ञानदर्शनोपयोगरूपाः । एभिः प्राणैरजीवद् जीवति जीविष्यति चेति जीवः । आत्मा
 प्रत्यक्षादिगम्यः गुणप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । प्रयोगश्च - आत्मा प्रत्यक्षः स्मृतिजिज्ञासाचिकीर्षाजिगमिषासंशयविज्ञानविशेषाणां
 तद्गुणानां स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षत्वात् । इह यस्य गुणाः प्रत्यक्षाः स प्रत्यक्षो दृष्टो यथा घट इति । प्रत्यक्षगुणश्च
 जीवः तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षः । अनुमानगम्योऽपि, यथा जीवच्छरीरं प्रयत्नवताधिष्ठितमिच्छानुविधायिक्रियाश्रयत्वात् १ ।
 श्रोत्रादीन्युपलब्धिसाधनानि कर्तृप्रयोज्यानि, करणत्वात्, कुठारादीव २ । देहस्यास्ति विधाता,
 आदिमत्प्रतिनियताकारत्वात्, घटवत् । यत्पुनरकर्तृकं तदादिमत्प्रतिनियताकारमपि न भवति, यथाऽभ्रविकारः ।
 यश्च देहस्य कर्ता स जीवः ३ । तथा इन्द्रियाणामस्त्यधिष्ठाता, करणत्वात्, यथा दण्डचक्रादीनां कुलालः ४ ।
 विद्यमानभोक्तृकं शरीरं, भोग्यत्वात्, भोजनवत् । यश्च भोक्ता स जीवः ५ । तथा रूपादिज्ञानं क्वचिदाश्रितं,
 गुणत्वात्, रूपादिवत् ६ । तथा ज्ञानसुखादिकमुपादानकारणपूर्वकं, कार्यत्वात्, घटादिवत् ७ । तथा
 प्रतिपक्षवानयमजीवशब्दः, व्युत्पत्तिमत्, शुद्धपदप्रतिषेधात् । यत्र व्युत्पत्तिमतः शुद्धपदस्य प्रतिषेधो दृश्यते स
 प्रतिपक्षवान्, यथाऽघटो घटप्रतिपक्षवान् । अत्र हि अघटप्रयोगे शुद्धस्य व्युत्पत्तिमतश्च पदस्य निषेधोऽतोऽवश्यं
 घटलक्षणेन प्रतिपक्षेण भाव्यम् । यस्तु न प्रतिपक्षवान् न तत्र व्युत्पत्तिमतः शुद्धपदस्य प्रतिषेधो, यथा
 अखरविषाणशब्दः अडित्थ इति वा ॥ ८ ॥

तथा स्वशरीरे स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षमात्मानं साधयित्वा परशरीरेऽपि सामान्यतोदृष्टानुमानेन साध्यते यथा

परशरीरेऽप्यस्यात्मा इष्टानिष्टयोः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् यथा स्वशरीरे । दृश्येते च परशरीरे इष्टानिष्टयोः प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती, तस्मात्तत्सात्मकं, आत्माभावे तयोरभावात्, यथा घटे ॥ ९ ॥

नास्ति जीव इति योऽयं जीवनिषेधध्वनिः स जीवास्तित्वेनान्तरीयक एव, निषेधशब्दत्वात्, यथा नास्त्यत्र घट इति शब्दोऽन्यत्र घटास्तित्वाविनाभाव्येव । प्रयोगश्चात्र, इह यस्य निषेधः क्रियते तत् क्वचिदस्त्येव, यथा घटादिकं, निषिध्यते च भवता, तस्मादस्त्येवासौ । यच्च सर्वथा नास्ति तस्य निषेधोऽपि न दृश्यते, यथा पञ्चभूतातिरिक्तषष्ठभूतस्येति ॥ १० ॥

स च द्विविधो मुक्तः सांसारिकश्च । तत्र मुक्तः सकलकर्ममलक्षयभाग् एकप्रकारः । सांसारिकश्चतुर्विधः सुरनारकमनुष्यतिर्यग्भेदात् । तत्र सुरा भवनपतिव्यन्तरज्योतिष्कवैमानिकभेदाच्चतुर्विधाः । नारकारत्नप्रभापृथिव्याद्याधिकरणभेदेन सप्तधा । मनुष्या द्विप्रकारा गर्भजसम्मूर्च्छजभेदात् । तिर्यचोऽप्येकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चचेन्द्रियभेदात्पञ्चविधाः ॥

तत्रैकेन्द्रियाः पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतिभेदात्पञ्चप्रकाराः ।

ननु भवतु जीवलक्षणोपेतत्वाद् द्वीन्द्रियादीनां जीवत्वं, पृथिव्यादीनां तु जीवत्वं कथं श्रद्धेयम् ? व्यक्ततल्लिङ्गस्यानुपलब्धेरिति चेत् ? सत्यम् । यद्यपि तेषु व्यक्तं जीवलङ्गं नोपलभ्यते तथाप्यव्यक्तं तत्समुपलभ्यते एव । यथा हृत्पूरव्यतिमिश्रमदिरापानादिभिर्मूर्च्छितानां व्यक्तलिङ्गाभावेऽपि सजीवत्वमव्यक्तलिङ्गैर्व्यवहियते, एवं पृथिव्यादीनामपि सजीवत्वं व्यवहरणीयम् । ननु मूर्च्छितेषु च्छ्वासादिकमव्यक्तं चेतनालिङ्गमस्ति, न पुनः पृथिव्यादिषु तथाविधं किञ्चिच्चेतनालिङ्गमस्ति । नैतदेवम् । पृथिवीकाये तावत् स्वस्वाकारावस्थितानां लवणविदुमोपलादीनां समानजातीयाङ्कुरोत्पत्तिमत्त्वम्, अर्शोमांसाङ्कुरस्येव चेतनाचिह्नम्, अस्त्येव । अव्यक्तचेतनानां हि संभावितैकचेतनालिङ्गानां वनस्पतीनामिव चेतनाऽभ्युपगन्तव्या । वनस्पतेश्च चैतन्यं विशिष्टर्तुफलप्रदत्वेन स्पष्टमेव, साधिष्यते च । ततोऽव्यक्तोपयोगादिलक्षणसद्भावात्सचित्ता पृथिवीति स्थितम् । प्रयोगश्च – विदुमशिलादिरूपा पृथिवी सात्मिका छेदे समानधातूथानात्, अर्शोङ्कुरवत् । ननु च विदुमपाषाणादिपृथिव्याः कठिनपुद्गलात्मिकायाः कथं सचेतनत्वमिति चेन्नैवम् । उच्यते—यथाऽस्थि सरीरानुगतं सचेतनं कठिनं च दृष्टमेवं जीवानुगतं पृथिवीशरीरमपीति । अथवा पृथिव्यप्तेजोवायुवनस्पतयो जीवशरीराणि छेद्यभेद्योत्क्षिप्यभोग्यध्रेय—रसनीयस्पृश्यद्रव्यत्वात् सास्नाविषाणादिसङ्घातवत् । न हि पृथिव्यादीनां छेद्यत्वादि दृष्टमपहनोतुं शक्यम् । न च पृथिव्यादीनां जीवशरीरत्वमनिष्टं साध्यते, सर्वपुद्गलद्रव्यस्य द्रव्यशरीरत्वाभ्युपगमात् ।

जीवसहितत्वाऽसहितत्वं च विशेषः । अशस्त्रोपहतं पृथिव्यादिकं कदाचित्सचेतनं, सङ्घातत्वात्, पाणिपादसङ्घातवत् । तदेवं, कदाचित्किञ्चिदचेतनमपि, शस्त्रोपहतत्वात्, पाण्यादिवदेव । न चात्यन्तं तदचित्तमेवेति ॥ १ ॥

अथ नाष्कायो जीवस्तल्लक्षणायोगात्प्रश्रवणादिवदिति चेन्नैवं, हेतोरसिद्धत्वात् । तथा हि – हस्तिनः शरीरं कललावस्थायामधुनोत्पन्नस्य द्रवं सचेतनं च दृष्टमेवमपकायिकस्यापि । यथा वाऽण्डके रसमात्रसमं जातावयवमनभिव्यक्तचञ्च्वादिप्रविभागं चेतनावद् दष्टम् । एषौवोपमाऽब्जीवानामपि । प्रयोगश्चायं – सचेतना आपः शस्त्रानुपहतत्वे सति द्रवत्वात् हस्तिशरीरोपादानभूतकललवत् । हेतोर्विशेषणोपादानात्प्रश्रवणादिव्युदासः १ । तथा सात्मकं तोयमनुपहतद्रवत्वाद् अण्डकमध्यस्थितकललवदिति २ । इदं वा प्राग्वज्जीवच्छरीरत्वे सिद्धे सति प्रमाणम् । सचेतना हिमादयः क्वचिदपकायत्वादितरोदकवदिति ३ । तथा क्वचन चेतनावन्त्यापः खातभूमिस्वाभाविकसम्भवात् दर्दुरवत् ४ । अथवा सचेतना अन्तरिक्षोद्भवा आपोऽभ्रादिविकारे स्वत एव सम्भूयपातात् मत्स्यवदिति । तथा शीतकाले भृशं शीते पतति नद्यादिष्वल्पेऽल्पो बहौ बहुर्बहुतरे च बहुतरो य ऊष्मा संवेद्यते स जीवहेतुक एवाऽल्पबहुर्बहुतरमिलितमनुष्यशरीरेष्वल्पबहुर्बहुतरोष्मवत् । शीतकाले

जलेषूष्णस्पर्श उष्णस्पर्शवस्तुप्रभव उष्णस्पर्शत्वात्, मनुष्यशरीरोष्णस्पर्शवत् । न च जलेष्वयमुष्णः स्पर्शः सहजः, अप्सु स्पर्शः शीत एवेति वैशेषिकादिवचनात् । तथा शीतकाले शीते स्फीते निपतति प्रातस्तटाकादेः पश्चिमस्यां दिशि स्थित्वा यदा तटाकादिकं विलोक्यते तदा तज्जलान्निर्गतो बाष्पसंभारो दृश्यते सोऽपि जीवहेतुक एव । प्रयोगस्त्वित्थं - शीतकाले जलेषु बाष्प उष्णस्पर्शवस्तुप्रभवो बाष्पत्वात् । शीतकाले शीतलजलसिक्तमनुष्यशरीरबाष्पवत् । प्रयोगद्वयेऽपि यदेवोष्णस्पर्शस्य बाष्पस्य च निमित्तमुष्णस्पर्शं वस्तु तदेव तैजसशरीरोपेतमात्माख्यं वस्तु प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । जलेष्वऽन्यस्योष्णस्पर्शबाष्पयोर्निमित्तस्य वस्तुनोऽभावात् । न च शीतकाले उत्कुरुडिकाऽवकरतलगतोष्णस्पर्शेन तन्मध्यनिर्गतबाष्पेन च प्रकृतहेतोर्व्यभिचारः शङ्क्यः । तयोरप्यवकरमध्येत्पन्नमृतजीवशरीरनिमित्तत्वाभ्युपगमात् ।

ननु मृतजीवानां शरीराणि कथमुष्णस्पर्शबाष्पयोर्निमित्तीभवन्तीति चेत् ? उच्यते । यथाऽग्निदग्धपाषाणखण्डिकासु जलप्रेक्षेपे विध्यातादप्यग्नेरुष्णस्पर्शबाष्पौ भवेतां तथा शीतसंयोगे सत्यप्यत्रापि । एवमन्यत्रापि बाष्पोष्णस्पर्शयोर्निमित्तं सचित्तमचित्तं वा यथासम्भवं वक्तव्यम् । इत्थमेव शीतकाले पर्वतनितम्बस्य निकटे वृक्षादीनामधस्ताच्च य ऊष्मा संवेद्यते सोऽपि मनुष्यवपुरूष्मावज्जीवहेतुरेवावगन्तव्यः । एवं ग्रीष्मकाले बाह्यतापेन तैजसशरीररूपानेर्मन्दीभवनात् जलादिषु यः शीतलस्पर्शः सोऽपि मानुषशरीरशीतलस्पर्शवज्जीवहेतुकोऽभ्युपगमनीयः । तत एवंविधलक्षणभाक्त्वाज्जीवा भवन्त्यपकायाः २ ॥

यथा रात्रौ खद्योतकस्य देहपरिणामो जीवप्रयोगनिर्वृतशक्तिराविश्चकास्ति, एवमङ्गारादीनामपि प्रतिविशिष्टप्रकाशादिशक्तिरनुमीयते जीवप्रयोगविशेषाविर्भावितेति । यथा ज्वरोष्मा जीवप्रयोगं नातिवर्त्तते, एषैवोपमाऽऽग्नेयजन्तूनाम् । न च मृता ज्वरिणः क्वचिदुपलभ्यन्ते । एवमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामग्नेः सचित्तता ज्ञेया । प्रयोगश्चात्र आत्मसंयोगाविर्भूतोऽङ्गारादीनां प्रकाशपरिणामः शरीरस्थत्वात्, खद्योतदेहपरिणामवत् १ । तथा आत्मसंयोगपूर्वकोऽङ्गारादीनामूष्मा शरीरस्थत्वात्, ज्वरोष्मवत् । न चादित्यादिभिरनेकान्तः, सर्वेषामुष्णस्पर्शस्यात्मसंयोगपूर्वकत्वात् २ । तथा सचेतनं तेजो यथायोग्याहारोपादानेन वृद्ध्यादिविकारोपलम्भात् पुरुषवपुर्वत् ३ । एवमादिलक्षणैराग्ननेयजन्तवोऽसेयाः । ३ ।

यथा देवस्य स्वशक्तिप्रभावान्मनुष्याणां वाञ्छनविद्यामन्त्रैरन्तर्धाने शरीरं चक्षुषाऽनुपलभ्यमानमपि विद्यमानं चेतनावच्चध्यवसीयते । एवं वायावपि चक्षुर्ग्राह्यं रूपं न भवति, सूक्ष्मपरिणामात्, परमाणोरिव वह्निदग्धपाषाणखण्डिकागताऽचित्ताग्नेरिव वा । प्रयोगश्चायं - चेतनावान् वायुरपरप्रेरिततिर्यगनियमित-दिग्गतिमत्त्वात्, गवाश्वदिवत् १ । तिर्यगेव गमननियमात् अनियमितविशेषणोपादानाच्च परमाणुना न व्यभिचारस्तस्य नियमितगतिमत्त्वात् 'जीवपुद्गलयोरनुश्रेणि गतिः' इति वचनात् । एवं वायुरशस्त्रोपहतश्चेतनावानगवगन्तव्यः ४ ॥

बकुलाशोकचम्पकाद्यनेकविधवनस्पतीनामेतानि शरीराणि न जीवव्यापारमन्तरेण मनुष्यशरीरसमानधर्मभाञ्जि भवन्ति । तथाहि - यथा पुरुषशरीरं बालुकुमारयुववृद्धतापरिणामविशेषत्वात् चेतनावदधिष्ठितं प्रस्पष्ट-चेतनाकमुपलभ्यते, तथेदं वनस्पतिशरीरमनवरतं बालुकुमारयुवावस्थाविशेषैः प्रतिनियं वर्द्धते, तथेदमपि वनस्पतिशरीरमङ्कुरकिशलयशाखाप्रशाखादिविशेषैः प्रतिनियतं वर्द्धते इति । तथा यथा मनुष्यशरीरं ज्ञानेनानुगतं एवं वनस्पतिशरीरमपि, यतः शमीप्रपुन्नाटसिद्धेरसकासुन्दकवच्छूलागस्त्यामलकीकडीप्रभृतीनां स्वापविबोधतस्तद्भावः । तथाऽधोनिखातद्रविणराशेः स्वप्ररोहणावेष्टनं, तथा वटपिप्पलनिम्बादीनां प्रावृट्-जलधरनिनादशिशिरवायुसंस्पर्शादङ्कुरोद्भेदः, तथा मत्तकामिनीसनूपुरसुकुमारचरणताडनादशोकतरोः पल्लवकुसुमोद्भेदः, तथा युवत्यालिङ्गनात् पनसस्य, तथा सुरभिदिरागण्डूकसेकाद्बकुलस्य, तथा सुरभिनिर्मलजलसेकाच्चम्पकस्य, तथा कटाक्षवीक्षणान्तिलकस्य, तथा पञ्चमस्वरोद्गारात् शिरीषस्य विरहकस्य च पुष्पविकिरणं, तथा पद्मादीनां प्रातर्विकसनं, घोषातक्यादिपुष्पाणां च सन्ध्यायां, कुमुदादीनां तु चन्द्रोदये,

तथासन्नमेघवृष्टौ शम्या अवक्षरणं, तथा वल्लीनां वृत्त्याद्याश्रयोपसर्पणं, तथा लज्जालूप्रभृतीनां हस्तादिसंस्पर्शात् पत्रसङ्कोचादिका परिस्फुटा क्रियोपलोभ्यते । अथवा सर्ववनस्पतेर्विशिष्टतुष्वेव फलप्रदानम् । न चैतदनन्तराभिहितं तरुसंबन्धि क्रियाजालं ज्ञानमन्तरेण घटते, तस्मात् सिद्धं चेतनावत्त्वं वनस्पतेरिति । तथा यथा मनुष्यशरीरं हस्तादिच्छिन्नं शुष्यति तथा तरुशरीरमपि पल्लवफलकुसुमादिच्छिन्नं विशोषमुपगच्छद् दृष्टं, न चाचेतनानामयं धर्म इति । तथा यथा मनुष्य शरीरं स्तनक्षीरव्यूज्जनौदनाद्याहाराभ्यवहारादाहारकं, एवं वनस्पतिशरीरमपि भूजलाद्याहाराभ्यवहारादाहारकं, न चैतदाहारकत्वमचेतनानां दृष्टम्, अतस्तद्भावात्सचेतनत्वमिति । तथा यथा मनुष्य शरीरं नियतायुष्कं तथा वनस्पतिशरीरमपि । तथा यथा मनुष्यशरीरमिष्टानिष्टाहारादिप्राप्त्या वृद्धिहान्यात्मकं, तथा वनस्पतिशरीरमपि । तथा यथा मनुष्यशरीरस्य तत्तद्दोगसंपर्काद्दोमपाण्डुत्वोदरवृद्धिशोफकृशत्वाङ्गुलिनासिकानिम्नीभवनविगलनादि, तथा वनस्पतिशरीरस्यापि तथा रोगोद्भवात्पुष्पफलपत्रत्वगाद्यन्यथाभवनपतनादि । तथा यथा मनुष्यशरीरस्यौषधप्रयोगाद् वृद्धिहानिक्षतभुग्नसंरोहणानि, तथा वनस्पतिशरीरस्यापि । तथा यथा मनुष्यशरीरस्य रसायनस्नेहाद्युपयोगाद्विशिष्टकान्तिरसबलोपचयादि, तथा वनस्पतिशरीरस्यापि विशिष्टेष्टनभोजलादिसेकाद्विशिष्टरसवीर्यस्निग्धत्वादि । तथा यथा स्त्रीशरीरस्य तथाविधदौहृदपूरणात् पुत्रादिप्रसवनं, तथा वनस्पतिशरीरस्यापि तत्पूरणात् पुष्पफलादिप्रसवनमित्यादि । तथा च प्रयोगो - वनस्पतयः सचेतनाः बालकुमारवृद्धावस्था - (१) प्रतिनियतवृद्धि - (२) स्वापप्रबोधस्पर्शादिहेतुकोल्लाससङ्कोचाश्रयोपसर्पणादिविशिष्टानेकक्रिया - (३) छिन्नावयवम्लानि - (४) प्रतिनियतप्रदेशाहारग्रहण (५) वृक्षायुः (६) अभिहितायुष्के- ष्विष्टानिष्टाहारादिनिमित्तकवृद्धिहानि - (७) आयुर्वेदोदिततनूरोग (८) विशिष्टौषधप्रयोगसंपादितवृद्धिहानिक्षतभुग्नसंरोहण - (९) प्रतिनियतविशिष्टशरीररसवीर्यस्निग्धत्वरूक्षत्व (१०) विशिष्टदोहद - (११) आदिमत्त्वान्यथानुपपत्तेर्विशिष्टस्त्रीशरीरवत् ।

अथवैते हेतवः प्रत्येकं पक्षेण सह प्रयोक्तव्याः । अयं वा संगृहीतोक्तार्थप्रयोगः-सचेतना वनस्पतयो जन्मजरामरणरोगादीनां समुदितानां सद्भावात् । अत्र समुदितानां जन्मादीनां ग्रहणात् जातं तद्दधीत्यादिव्यपदेशदर्शनाद् दध्यादिभिरचेतनैर्न व्यभिचारः शङ्क्यः । तदेवं पृथिव्यादीनां सचेतनत्वं सिद्धम् आप्तवचनात्सर्वेषां सात्मकत्वसिद्धिरिति ।

द्वीन्द्रियाः शङ्खशुक्तिकादयः, त्रीन्द्रियाः पिपीलिकादयः, चतुरिन्द्रिया मक्षिकाभ्रमरपतङ्गादयः, पञ्चेन्द्रिया गोमहिष्यादयो गर्भव्युत्क्रान्ताः संमूर्च्छजाश्चेति ॥ ३ ॥

एतद्विपरीतोऽजीवः ॥ ४ ॥

स च धर्माधर्माकाशकालपुद्गलभेदात्पञ्चविधः ॥ ५ ॥

तत्र धर्मो लोकव्यापी नित्योऽवस्थितोऽरूपिद्रव्यमस्तिकायोऽसङ्ख्यप्रदेशो गत्युपग्रहकारी च । १ ॥ ६ ॥

अधर्मो लोकव्यापी नित्योऽवस्थितोऽरूपिद्रव्यमस्तिकायोऽसङ्ख्यप्रदेशः स्थित्युपग्रहकारी च । २ ॥ ७ ॥

आकाशमपि लोकालोकव्यापकमनन्तप्रदेशं नित्यमव्यस्थितमरूपिद्रव्यमस्तिकायोऽवगाहोपकारकं च वक्तव्यम् । ३ ॥ ८ ॥

कालोऽर्द्धतृतीयद्वीपान्तर्वर्ती परमसूक्ष्मो निर्विभागः एकः समयः ॥ ९ ॥

स चास्तिकायो न भण्यते, एकसमयरूपस्य तस्य निष्प्रदेशत्वात् ॥ १० ॥ आह च - "तस्मान्मानुषलोकाव्यापी कालोऽस्ति समय एक इह । एकत्वाच्च स कायो न भवति, कायो हि समुदायः ॥" स च सूर्यादिग्रहनक्षत्रोदयास्तादिक्रियाभिव्यङ्ग्यः एकीयमतेन द्रव्यमभिधीयते । स चैकः समयो द्रव्यपर्यायोभयात्मैव द्रव्यार्थरूपेण प्रतिपर्यायमुत्पादयत्यधर्मापि स्वरूपानन्यभूतक्रमाक्रमभाव्यनाद्यपर्यवसानानन्त-सङ्ख्यपरिणामोऽत एव च स स्वपर्यायप्रवाहव्यापी द्रव्यात्मना नित्योऽभिधीयते, अतीतानागतवर्तमानावस्थास्वपि

कालः काल इत्यविशेषश्रुतेः । यथा ह्येकः परमाणुः पर्यायैरनित्योऽपि द्रव्यत्वेन सदा सन्नेव न कदाचिदसत्त्वं भजते तथैकः समयोऽपीति । तथा 'द्ववपरियद्वरूवो जो सो कालो हवेइ ववहारो । परिणामाइलक्खो वट्टणलक्खो अ परमट्ठो' जीवपुद्गलपरिवर्तो नवपुराणादिस्तेन लक्ष्यः द्रव्यपर्यायरूपो व्यवहारकालः ।

स्वोपादानरूपेण स्वयमेव परिणममानानां भावानां कुम्भकारचक्राधस्तनशिलावत् शीतकालाध्यापनेऽग्निवत् पदार्थपरिणमने यत्सहकारित्वं सा वर्तना सैव लक्षणं यस्य स कालाणुद्रव्यरूपो निश्चयकालः । ततोऽन्यः कालाणुद्रव्यरूपनिश्चयकालो नास्ति । अत्रोत्तरोत्तरमुत्पन्नध्वंसित्वात्समयः पर्यायः, पर्यायो द्रव्यं विना न भवति । उक्तं च - "द्रव्यं पर्यायवियुतं पर्याया द्रव्यवर्जिताः । क्व कदा केनचित्किंवा दृष्टा मानेन केन वा" । ततः समयरूपपर्यायोपादानभूतेन कालाणुरूपनिश्चयकालद्रव्येण भाव्यमेव, यथा इन्धनाग्निसहकारि-कारणोत्पन्नौदनपर्यायस्य तण्डुलोपादानकारणवत् कुम्भकारचक्रचीवरादिबहिरङ्गनमित्तोत्पन्नस्य मृन्मयघटपर्यायस्य मृत्पिण्डोपादानं, नरकादिपर्यायस्य जीवोपादानम् । तदपि कस्मात् ? उपादानकारणसदृशं कार्यं भवतीतिवचनात् । अयमनन्तसमयादिकालपर्यायाणां कालद्रव्यमुपादानं न भवति, किंतु समयोत्पत्तौ मन्दगतिपरिणतपुद्गलपरमाणुः, निमेषोत्पत्तौ नयनपुटविघटनं, घटिकाकालोत्पत्तौ घटिकासामग्रीभूतजलभृतभाजन-पुरुषहस्तादिव्यापारः, दिवसादौ दिनकरबिम्बमुपादानादिकरणम् । उपादानत्वं च पूर्वकारपरित्यागाजहद्वृत्त्युत्तराकारोपादानत्वम्, नैवं उपादानकारणसदृशं कार्यमिति वचनात्कालाणुद्रव्यमेवेति । ४ । ॥ १० ॥

पुद्गलाः स्पर्शरसगन्धवर्णवन्तः ॥ ११ ॥ अत्र स्पर्शग्रहणमादौ स्पर्शं सति रसादिसद्भावज्ञापनार्थम् । ततोऽबादीनि चतुर्गुणानि स्पर्शित्वात् पृथिवीवत्, तथा मनः स्पर्शादिमद्, असर्वगतद्रव्यत्वात्, पार्थिवाणुवद् इतिप्रयोगौ सिद्धौ ॥ ११ ॥

तत्र स्पर्शा मृदुकठिनगुरुलघुशीतोष्णास्निग्धरूक्षाः ॥ १२ ॥ अत्र च स्निग्धरूक्षशीतोष्णाश्चत्वार एवाणुषु संभवन्ति । स्कन्धेष्वष्टावपि यथासंभवं वक्तव्याः ॥ १२ ॥

रसाः तिक्तकटुकषायाम्लमधुराः ॥ १३ ॥ लवणो मधुरान्तर्गत इत्येके, संसर्गज इत्यपरे ॥ १३ ॥

गन्धौ सुरभ्यसुरभी ॥ १४ ॥ कृष्णादयो वर्णाः ॥ १५ ॥ तद्वन्तः पुद्गला इति । न केवलं पुद्गलानां स्पर्शादयो धर्माः शब्दादयश्चेति दर्शयन्ते ।

शब्दबन्धसौक्ष्म्यस्थौल्यसंस्थानभेदतमश्छायातपोद्योतवन्तः पुद्गलाः । अत्र पुद्गलपरिणामाविष्कारी मतुप् प्रत्ययो नित्ययोगार्थं विहितः । तत्र शब्दो ध्वनिः १ । बन्धः परस्परश्लेषलक्षणः प्रयोगविभ्रसादिजनितः, औदारिकादिशरीरजतुकाष्ठादिश्लेषवत्, परमाणुसंयोगवद्वेति २ । सौक्ष्म्यं सूक्ष्मता ३ । स्थौल्यं स्थूलता ४ । संस्थानमाकृतिः ५ । भेदः खण्डशो भवनम् ६ । तमश्छायादयः प्रतीताः सर्व एवैते स्पर्शादयः शब्दादयश्च पुद्गलेष्वेव भवन्तीति ।

पुद्गला द्वेधा परमाणवः स्कन्धाश्च ॥ १६ ॥

तत्र परमाणोर्लक्षणमिदं -

"कारणमेव तदन्यं सूक्ष्मो नित्यश्च भवति परमाणुः । एकरससवर्णगन्धो द्विस्पर्शः कार्यलिङ्गश्च १ ॥ १७ ॥

एते धर्माधर्माकाशकालपुद्गला जीवैः सह षड् द्रव्याणि ॥ १८ ॥ एष्वानि चत्वार्येकद्रव्याणि, जीवाः पुद्गलाश्चानेकद्रव्याणि, पुद्गलरहितानि तानि पञ्चामूर्त्तानि, पुद्गलास्तु मूर्त्ता एवति । २ ।

सत्कर्मपुद्गलाः पुण्यं सन्तः, तीर्थकरत्वस्वर्गादिफलनिर्वर्तकत्वात् ॥ १९ ॥ प्रशस्तकर्मणां पुद्गला जीवसम्बन्धाः कर्मवर्गणाः पुण्यमित्यर्थः ३ ॥ १९ ॥

तद्विपरीतं तु पापम् ॥ २० ॥ तुर्भिन्नक्रमे । तस्मात्पुण्याद्विपरीतम् । नरकादिफलनिर्वर्तकत्वादप्रशस्ता जीवसंबन्धाः कर्मपुद्गलाः पापमित्यर्थः ४ ॥ २० ॥

बन्धस्य मिथ्यात्वाऽविरतिकषाययोगलक्षणहेतव आस्रवः ॥ २१ ॥ असदेवगुरुधर्मेषु सदेवादिबुद्धिर्मिथ्यात्वम् । हिंसाद्यनिवृत्तिरविरतिः । प्रमादो मद्यविषयादिः । कषायः क्रोधादयः । योगा मनोवाक्कायव्यापाराः । बन्धस्य ज्ञानावरणीयादिकर्मबन्धस्य हेतवः कारणानि, आस्रवति कर्म येभ्यः स आस्रवः । ततो मिथ्यात्वादिविषया मनोवाक्कायव्यापारा एवाशुभकर्मबन्धहेतुत्वादास्रव इत्यर्थः ५ ॥ २१ ॥

तन्निरोधः संवरः ॥ २२ ॥ तेषां मिथ्यात्वाविरतिकषाययोगानामास्रवणां सम्यग्दर्शन-विरतिप्रमादपरिहारक्षमादिगुप्तित्रयधर्मानुप्रेक्षादिभिर्निरोधो निवारणं स्थगनं संवरः । पर्यायकथनेन व्याख्या । आत्मनः कर्मोपादानहेतुभूतपरिणामाभावः संवर इत्यभिप्रायः । स च देशसर्वभेदाद् द्वेधा । तत्र बादरसूक्ष्मयोगनिरोधकाले सर्वसंवरः, शेषकाले सम्यक्त्वप्रतिपत्तेरारभ्य देशसंवरः ६ ॥ २२ ॥

जीवस्य कर्मणा अन्योन्यानुगमात्मा संबन्धो बन्धः ॥ २३ ॥ तत्र बन्धनं बन्धः, परस्पराश्लेषो जीवप्रदेशपुद्गलानां, क्षीरनीरवत् । अथवा बध्यते येनात्मा पारतन्त्र्यमापाद्यते ज्ञानावरणादिना स बन्धः पुद्गलपरिणामः ७ ॥ २३ ॥

बद्धस्य कर्मणः शाटो निर्जरा ॥ २४ ॥ बद्धस्य जीवेन सम्बद्धस्य कर्मणो ज्ञानावरणादेः, शाटः शाटनं द्वादशविधेन तपसा विचटनं, सा निर्जरा । सा च द्विविधा सकामाकामभेदात् । तत्राद्या चारित्रिणां दुष्करतपश्चरणकायोत्सर्गकरणद्वाविंशतिपरीषहपरीषहणपराणां लोचादिकायक्लेशकारिणामष्टादशशीलाङ्गरथधारिणां बाह्याभ्यन्तरसर्वपरिग्रहपरिहारिणां निष्प्रतिकर्मशरीरिणां भवति । द्वितीया त्वन्यशरीरिणां तीव्रतीव्रतरशारीरमानसाने-कदुस्सहदुःखशतसहस्रसहनतो भवति ॥ ८ ॥

देहादेरात्यन्तिको वियोगो मोक्षः ॥ २५ ॥ देहादेः शरीरपञ्चकेन्द्रियायुरादिबाह्यप्राणपुण्या-पुण्यवर्णगन्धरसस्पर्शपुनर्जन्मग्रहणवेदत्रयकषायादिसङ्गाज्ञानासिद्धत्वादेरात्यन्तिको विरहः पुनर्मोक्ष इष्यते । यो हि शश्वद् भवति न पुनः कदाचिन्न भवति स आत्यन्तिकः ।

अत्र परः प्राह-ननु भवतु देहस्यात्यन्तिको वियोगस्तस्य सादित्वात्, परं रागादिभिः सहात्यन्तिको वियोगोऽसंभवी, प्रमाणबाधनात् । प्रमाण चेदं, यदनादिमत् न तद्विनाशमाविशति, यथाकाशम्, अनादिमन्तश्च रागादय इति । उच्यते - यद्यपि रागादयो दोषा जन्तोरेनादिमन्तस्तथापि कस्यचिद्यथावस्थितस्त्रीशरीरादिवस्तुतत्त्वावगमेन तेषां रागादीनां प्रतिपक्षभावनातः प्रतिक्षणमपचयो दृश्यते । ततः संभाव्यते विशिष्टकालादिसामग्रीसद्भावे भावनाप्रकर्षतो निर्मूलमपि क्षयः, निर्मूलक्षयानभ्युपगमेऽपचयस्याप्यसिद्धेः । यथा हि शीतस्पर्शसंपाद्या रोमहर्षादयः शीतप्रतिपक्षस्य वह्नेर्मन्दतायां मन्दा उपलब्धा, उत्कर्षे च निरन्वयविनाशिनः, एवमन्यत्रापि मन्दासद्भावे निरन्वयविनाशोऽवश्यमेष्टव्यः ।

अथ यथा ज्ञानावरणीयकर्मोदये ज्ञानस्य मन्दा भवति तत्प्रकर्षे च ज्ञानस्य न निरन्वयो विनाशः, एवं प्रतिपक्षभावनोत्कर्षेऽपि न रागादीनामत्यन्तमुच्छेदो भविष्यतीति । तदयुक्तम् । द्विविधं हि बाध्यं सहभूस्वभावं सहकारिसंपाद्यस्वभावं च । तत्र यत्सहभूस्वभावं तन्न बाधकोत्कर्षे कदाचिदपि निरन्वयं विनाशमाविशति । ज्ञानं चात्मनः सहभूस्वभावम् । आत्मा च परिणामिनित्यः । ततोऽत्यन्तप्रकर्षवत्यपि ज्ञानावरणीयकर्मोदये ज्ञानस्य न निरन्वयो विनाशः । रागादयस्तु लोभादिकर्मविपाकोदयसंपादितसत्ताकाः, ततः कर्मणो निर्मूलमपगमे तेऽपि निर्मूलमपगच्छन्ति । प्रयोगश्चात्र - ये सहकारिसंपाद्या यदुपधानादपकर्षिणः ते तदत्यन्तवृद्धौ निरन्वयविनाशधर्माणः, यथा रोमहर्षादयो वह्निवृद्धौ । भावनोपधानादपकर्षिणश्च सहकारिकर्मसंपाद्या रागादयः । १९॥

(इत्यष्टमः परिच्छेदः ॥)

(अथ नवमः परिच्छेदः ।)

इति प्रमाणनयतत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्य वस्तुनिर्णयार्थं वादमाह -

विरुद्धयोर्धर्मयोरेकधर्मव्यवच्छेदेन स्वीकृततदन्यधर्मव्यवस्थापनार्थं साधनदूषणवचनं वादः ॥ १ ॥
विरुद्धयोरेकत्र, प्रमाणेनानुपपद्यमानोपलम्भयोर्द्धर्मयोर्मध्यादिति ॥ १ ॥

तत्प्रारम्भकश्चात्र जिगीषुस्तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुश्च ॥ २ ॥ तत्र जिगीषुः प्रसह्य प्रथमं च वादमारभते प्रथममेव च तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुरिति द्वावपि प्रारम्भकौ भवतः ॥ २ ॥

तत्र स्वीकृतधर्मव्यवस्थापनार्थं साधनदूषणाभ्यां परं पराजेतुमिच्छुर्जिगीषुः ॥ ३ ॥ स्वीकृतो धर्मः शब्दादेः कथंचिन्नित्यत्वादिर्यस्तस्य व्यवस्थापनार्थं यत्सामर्थ्यात्स्यैव साधनं, परस्य च दूषणं ताभ्यां कृत्वा परं पराजेतुमिच्छुर्जिगीषुरित्यर्थः ॥ ३ ॥

तथैव तत्त्वं प्रतिष्ठापयिषुस्तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुः ॥ ४ ॥ तथैव स्वीकृतधर्मव्यवस्थानार्थं साधनदूषणाभ्यां शब्दादेः कथंचिन्नित्यत्वादिरूपं तत्त्वं प्रतिष्ठापयितुमिच्छुस्तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुरित्यर्थः ॥ ४ ॥

अयं च द्वेषा स्वात्मनि परत्र च ॥ ५ ॥ अयमिति तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुः । कश्चित्खलुपहतचेतोवृत्तिः स्वात्मनि तत्त्वं निर्णेतुमिच्छत्यपरस्तु परानुग्रहिकतया परत्र तथेति द्वेषाऽसौ तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुः । सर्वोऽपि च धात्वर्थः करोत्यर्थेन व्याप्त इति स्वात्मनि परत्र च तत्त्वनिर्णयं चिकीर्षुरित्यर्थः । तदिदमिह रहस्यम् । परोपकारैकपरायणस्य कस्यचिद्वादिवृन्दारकस्य परत्र तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषोरानुषङ्गिकं फलं जयो, मुख्यं तु परस्त्वावबोधनम् । जिगीषोस्तु विपर्यय इति ॥ ५ ॥

प्रारम्भकप्रत्यारम्भकावेव मल्लप्रतिमल्लन्यायेन वादिप्रतिवादिनौ ॥ ६ ॥

प्रमाणतः स्वपक्षस्थापनप्रतिपक्षप्रतिक्षेपावनयोः कर्म ॥ ७ ॥

वादिप्रतिवादिसिद्धान्ततत्त्वनदीष्णत्वधारणाबाहुश्रुत्यप्रतिभाक्षान्तिमाध्यस्थैरुभयाभिमताः सभ्याः ॥ ८ ॥

वादिप्रतिवादिनोर्यथायोगं वादस्थानककथाविशेषाङ्गीकारेणाप्रवादेत्तरवादनिर्देशः । साधकबाधकोक्ति-
गुणदोषवधारणं यथावसरं तत्त्वप्रकाशेन कथाविरमणं यथासंभवं सभायां कथाफलकथनं चैषां कर्माणि ॥ ९ ॥

उभयोस्तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुत्वे यावत्तत्त्वनिर्णयं यावत्स्फूर्तिं च वाच्यमित्येकः ॥ १० ॥ स्वात्मनि तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषुः परश्च परत्र द्वौ वा परस्परमित्येवं द्वावपि यदा तत्त्वनिर्णिनीषू भवतः, तदा यावता तत्त्वस्य निर्णयो भवति तावत्ताभ्यां स्फूर्तौ सत्यां वक्तव्यम् ॥ १० ॥

अनिर्णये वा यावत्स्फुरति तावद्वक्तव्यम् ॥ ११ ॥

एवं च स्थितमेतत् -

“स्वं स्वं दर्शनमाश्रित्य, सम्यक् साधनदूषणैः ।

जिगीषोर्निर्णिनीषोर्वा वाद एकः कथा भवेत् ॥ १ ॥

भङ्गः कथात्रयस्यात्र निग्रहस्थाननिर्णयः ।

श्रीमदरत्नाकरग्रन्थाद्धीधनैरवधार्यताम् ॥ २ ॥”

श्रीहीरविजयसूरीश्वरचरणाम्भोजचञ्चरीकेण ।

शुभविजयाभिधशिशुना दृन्धा स्याद्वादभाषेयम् ॥ ३ ॥

॥ इति नवमः परिच्छेदः ॥

इति श्रीहीरविजयसूरीश्वरशिष्यपण्डितशुभविजयगणिना श्रीविजयदेवसूरीश्वरनिर्देशात्
प्रमाणनयतत्त्वप्रकाशिकाऽपरनाम्नी स्याद्वादभाषा विरचिता ॥

॥ इति श्रीशुभविजयकृता स्याद्वादभाषा समाप्ता ॥

ચૌલુક્ય ભીમદેવ બીજાનું અપ્રસિદ્ધ તામ્રપત્ર (વિ.સં. ૧૨૬૩)

લક્ષ્મણભાઈ ભોજક

ચૌલુક્ય રાજા ભીમદેવ બીજાએ આપેલા ભૂમિદાનનાં બે તામ્રપત્રો પ્રાપ્ત થયાં છે. એમાંનું એક તામ્રપત્ર અણહિલપુર પાટણમાંથી વિક્રમ સંવત ૧૨૬૩ માં પ્રસારિત કરવામાં આવેલ છે. આ તામ્રપત્રમાં ઉત્તર-ગુજરાતમાં વાલમ, દેશપ, ભાંડુ તરલ વગેરે ગામોનો તથા વાલમમાં શ્રી અરિષ્ટનેમિ દેવ વાટિકાનો ઉલ્લેખ પણ મળ્યો છે.

આ તામ્રપત્રની પ્રશિષ્ટ વાચના નીચે મુજબ છે :

(પ.૧) દં । સ્વસ્તિ રાજાવલી પૂર્વવત્સમસ્તરાજાવલીવિરાજિતપરમભટ્ટારકમહારાજાધિરાજ પરમેશ્વશ્રીચામુન્ડરાજદેવપાદાનુધ્યાતપરમભટ્ટારક— (પં.૩) મહારાજાધિરાજપરમેશ્વરશ્રીદુર્લભરાજદેવ— પાદાનુધ્યાતપરમભટ્ટારકમહારાજાધિરાજપરમેશ્વરશ્રીભી (પં.૪) મદેવપાદાનુધ્યાતપરમભટ્ટારક— મહારાજાધિરાજપરમેશ્વરત્રૈલોક્યમલ્લશ્રીકર્ણદેવપાદાનુધ્યાતપર— (પં.૫) મભટ્ટારકમહારાજાધિરાજ— પરમેશ્વરાવંતીનાથત્રિભુવનગંડબર્બરકજિષ્ણુસિદ્ધચક્રવર્ત્તિશ્રીજયસિંહદે— (પં.૬) વપાદાનુધ્યાત— પરમભટ્ટારકમહારાજાધિરાજપરમેશ્વરમાપતિવરલબ્ધપ્રસાદપ્રૌઢપ્રતાપસ્વભુજવિક્ર— (પં.૭) મરણાંગણ— વિનિર્જિતશાકંભરીભૂપાલશ્રીકુમારપાલદેવપાદાનુધ્યાતપરમભટ્ટારકમહારાજાધિરાજપ— (પં.૮) રમેશ્વર— પરમમાહેશ્વરપ્રબલબાહુદંડદર્પ્પરૂપકંદર્પ્પકલિકાલનિષ્કલંકાવતારિતરામારાજ્યકરદીકૃત— (પં.૯) સપાદલક્ષમાપાલશ્રીઅજયપાલદેવપાદાનુધ્યાતપરમભટ્ટારકમહારાજાધિરાજપરમેશ્વરાહવપરાભૂ— (પં.૧૦) તદુર્જ્જયગર્જ્જયગર્જ્જનકાધિરાજશ્રીમૂલરાજદેવપાદાનુધ્યાતપરમભટ્ટારકમહારાજાધિરાજપરમેશ્વરા— (પં. ૧૧) મિનવસિદ્ધરાજશ્રીમદ્ભીમદેવઃ સ્વભુજ્યમાનવિષયપથકાંતઃપાતિનઃ સમસ્તરાજપુરુષાન્ બ્રાહ્મણો— (પં.૧૨) ત્ત્રૌસ્તન્નિયુક્તાધિકારિણો જનપદાંશ્ચ બોધયત્યસ્તુ વઃ સંવિદિતં યથા । શ્રીમદ્વિક્રમાદિત્યોત્પાદિતસંવત્સ— (પં.૧૩) રશતેષુ દ્વાદશસુ ત્રિષષ્ટિઉત્તરેષુ લૌકિકમાર્ગમાસે કૃષ્ણપક્ષનવમ્યાં રવિવારેઽત્રાંકતોપિ ॥ સંવ— (પં.૧૪) ત્ ૧૨૬૩ માર્ગ વદિ ૧ રવાવસ્યાં સંવત્સર— માસપક્ષવારપૂર્વિકાયાં તિથાવદ્દેહ શ્રીમદળહિલપાટકેઽ— (પં.૧૫) થૈવ ધનસંક્રાંતિપૂર્વ્વિણિ સ્નાત્વા ચરા(ચર)ગુરું ભગવંતં ભવાનીપતિમધ્યર્ચ્ય સંસારાસારતાં વિચિંત્ય નલિની— (પં.૧૬) દલગતજલલવતરલતરં પ્રાણિતવ્યમાકલય્યૈહિકમામુષ્મિકં ચ ફલમંગીકૃત્ય પિત્રોરાત્મનશ્ચ પુ— (પં.૧૭) ણ્યયશોઽભિવૃદ્ધયે વાલીમ્યગ્રામે ગ્રામપશ્ચિમદિગ્ભાગે કુટુંબ સીધાઉરાઉતભૂમિ પાયલ । ૨॥ આસિયારા— (પં.૧૮) ગુભૂમિ પાયલાં ૨॥ કુમરમોહણભૂમિ પાયલાં ૧ વાલસૂરસાઢાભૂમિ પાયલાં । ૨ એવં ભૂમિ પાયલાં ૮ (પં.૧) કૃતે ભૂમિહલ ૨ તથા કુરુલીગ્રામે પટ્ટં મોખરાવલાયાં ભૂમિ વિ ૧॥ પટ્ટં સોમેશ્વરવલાયાં વલાકુયા— (પં.૨) ક્ષેત્રે ભૂમિ વિ ૧॥ પ્રતાપમલ્લવલાયાં ભૂમિ વિ ૧॥ જગદેવવલાયાં એવં ભૂમિ વિ ૧॥ એવં ભૂમિ વિ ૬ જાત ભૂ— (પં.૩) મિ હલ ૨ ઉભયગ્રામદ્વયે પાયલ ૮ વિશા છ ષટ્ વિશોપકૈરષ્ટપાયલકૈશ્વ જાતભૂમિહલં ૪ હ— (પં.૪) લચતુષ્ટયભૂમિ ગૃહતલકલકસમન્વિતા ચ સ્વસીમાપર્યંતા સવૃક્ષમાલાકુલા સહિરણ્યભાગભો— (પં.૫) ગા કાષ્ટતૃણોદકોપેતા સર્વ્વાદાયસમેતા બાહ્ય નાગરજ્ઞાં કવલાણાગૌતમસગોત્રાય બ્રાહ્મ. જ્યોતિ. ન— (પં.૬) વાસૂતસૂમિગાય શાસનેનોદકપૂર્વ્વમસ્માભિઃ પ્રદત્તા વાલિમ્યગ્રામહલદ્વયભૂમિરાઘાટા યથા । પૂર્વ્વસ્યાં આ (પં.૭) જપાલમોહણયોઃ ખલકાનિ । ગ્રામસેરડિકા આસરાખલકં ચ । દક્ષિણસ્યાં

सादाखलकं भांडुयग्रामरा- (पं.८) जमार्ग ३॥ पश्चिमायां तडागवडिला । तथा श्रीअरिष्टनेमिदेववाटिका ब्रा. विठडगांगिलयोः क्षेत्रे च । उत्तर- (पं. ९) स्यां क्षेत्राणां सेरिका तथा कोचाखलकं च । कुरुलीग्रामे दलद्वयभूमेराघाटा । पूर्वतः कुट्टं. गोगाउवासु- (पं.१०) देवक्षेत्रं । दक्षिणतः त्रिवहग्रामसीमा । पश्चमतो राजमार्गः । उत्तरतो रिसियातडागिका तथा पतितकूपिका दी- (पं.११) णिपग्रामराजमार्गश्च । तथा ग्रामयोः सत्क गृहतलकयोः खलकयोश्च स्वमर्यादाप्रमाणं । एवममीभिराघाटैरु- (पं.१२) पलक्षितां भूमिमेताभवगम्य तद्भूमिखेटकैर्यथादीयमानभागभोगकरहिरण्यादिसर्वं सर्व्वदाज्ञाश्रवणविधेयै (पं.१३) भूत्वाऽमुष्मै ब्राह्मणाय समुपनेतव्यं । सामान्यमेतत्पुण्यफलं मत्वाऽस्मद्वंशजैरन्यैरपि भाविभोत्कृभिरस्मत्प्रद - (पं. १४) त्त ब्रह्मदायोऽयमनुमंतव्यः पालनीयश्च ॥ उक्तं च भगवता व्यासेन । षष्ठिं वर्षसहस्राणि स्वर्गं तिष्ठति भूमिदः (पं. १५) आच्छेत्ता चानुमन्ता च तान्येव नरके वसेत् । १ स्वदत्तां परदत्तां वा यो हरेत वसुंधरां स विष्टायां कृमिभूत्वा पितृ- (पं. १६) भिः सह मज्जति । २ । बहुभिर्व्वसुधा भुक्ता राजभिः सगरादिभिः यस्य यस्य यदा भूमि तस्य तस्य तदा फलं । ३ द(पं. १७) त्वा भूमिं भाविनः पार्थिवेदान् भूयो भूयो याचते रामभद्रः सामान्योऽयं दानधर्मो नृपाणां स्वे स्वे का- (पं. १८) ले पालनीयो भवद्भिः । लिखितमिदं शासनं मोढान्वयप्रसूतमहाक्षपटलिक ठ. श्रीकुमरसुत ठ. वो- (पं. १९) सरिणा । दूतकोऽत्र महासन्धिविग्राहिक ठ. श्री सुरइति ॥ श्री भीमदेवस्य ॥

REVIEWS

N. M. Kansara

*Prof. K. D. Bajpai Commemoration Volume 2, edited by
Dr. A. L. Shrivastav. Pañchāla Shodh Samsthāna Kanpur, 1993. Rs. 50/-*

This is the sixth issue of 'Pañchāla', a bi-lingual journal of the Pañchāla Shodh Samsthāna, Kanpur, published in commemoration of the Late Professor Krishnadatt Bajpai, in the passing away of whom the indological world has suffered an irreparable loss in the field of archaeological and epigraphical studies and research. Born in Raipur in the Raibarely District in the Uttar Pradesh, Dr. Bajpai had established a high standard by his knowledge in the field of archaeology, history and epigraphy. He had developed his deep interest in this field from the Kashi Hindu Vishvavidya, where he came to study under veteran scholars like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Prof. A. S. Altekar, Dr. Ramashankar Tripathi, Dr. Ramchandra Shukla and Pandit Baldev Upadhyay. He learned the secrets and technic of archaeological excavations by working at Taxila excavations under the guidance of Sir Mortimer Wheeler. For fifteen years he proved his mettle in the Luknow and Mathura Museums and at the instance of Pandit Dwarika Prasad Mishra and Acharya Nandadulare Bajpai, he joined the Sagar University, where he stayed to the last, though during his last years he was invited by the Shantiniketan. It is said that if there had not been Dr. K. D. Bajpai, there would not have developed a scholar like Dr. Vakankar. Similarly, if Prof. Bajpai had not taken initiative in discovering the Karumaru caves, his contemporary Dr. Vakankar would not have revealed the mysteries of the prehistorical sites and Bhimabetika and hundreds of other caves in the same district of the Narmada region. In fact these two scholars were complementary to each other and were the forerunners of the prehistorical studies with the Indian insight. Besides historical and archaeological research which was his main field, he often composed Sanskrit stanzas on the spur of the moment. He guided more than sixty scholars in their doctoral researches.

The volume is divided into three parts, viz., articles of reminiscences, research papers and miscellanea. Scholars like Prof. Govindchandra Pandey, Dr. A. L. Shrivastav, Prof. Balram Shrivastav, Prof. Chandrabhushan Trivedi, Dr. Raghavendra Bajpai, and others have contributed eleven articles in which they have touched upon various aspects of the personality of Prof. K. D. Bajpai. In the research section, twenty-six scholars, like Dr. A. L. Shrivastav, Dr. K. K. Tripathi, Dr. K. P. Sinha, Dr. Surendrasinh Chauhan, Dr. S. K. Jaiswal, Dr. U. N. Upadhyaya, Prof. A. M. Shastri, and others have contributed learned articles on archaeological and allied topics pertaining to the Kanauj Art, Behta, Buxar and Dandiyakheda, Ruhelkhand, Pañcāla history, Suka-krīdā sculptures, humanistic impressions on the Pañcāla coins, chronology of Harsa Samvat, Varāhamihira, epigraphs of Bundelkhand, history of Ekacakrā, Śiva, Nagapurā Śiva

temple, Viṣṇu temples at Chhapara District, Manuscript and archives in the Vidarbha region and Agni in Ancient Indian Numismatic Art. The third part gives a report on the work being carried on in the Pañchāla Shodh Saṁsthāna, some opinions about the K. D. Bajpai Commemoration Volume1, and reviews of some of the publications that are the doctoral dissertations assessed by Prof. K. D. Bajpai. N. M. K.

Samskṛta Śataka-Paramparā Aura Ācārya vidyāsāgara-ke Śataka in Hindi
by Shrimati Dr. Ashalata Mallaiya. Jayashri Oil Mill,
Durga (M.P.), 1989, pp.28 + 472. Rs. 120/-

This is the doctoral dissertation of Smt. Ashalata Malaiya, accepted by the Sagar University, Sagar (M.P.) for Ph.D degree, in 1984. She worked under the guidance of the late Prof. Dinesh Diskshit, Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi and Dr. K. R. Halve.

In her introductory 'Āmukha', the author has rooted her concept of poetry in the Śabdabrahman and sprouted the seed of Śabda-tattva into two tiny leaves of Nāda and Śabda. From Nāda the Further development is Saṅgīta, while that from Śabda is Kāvya. And, since Brahman is Sat, Cit and Ānanda, the element of joy and entertainment has been invariably percolated in both music and literature. This Śabda is the Great Bull (Rsabha) referred to in the Ṛgveda and the Goddess of Speech is known to be Cidrūpā for this very reason. Nāda manifests through the notes of a lute, while Śabda manifests through the Veda. And, being the effect of Śabda, Veda or the Knowledge par excellence is the first manifestation of literature. Self-expression is the motive force behind all manifestations. Poetry is but one of the basic form of this manifestation, in which both the word and the meaning combine to express the sentiment; this transforms the Vākya into Kāvya. Just as Man is the best among all the created things, Kāvya is the best among the things created by Man. Delineation of Sentiments is the very life-force of lyric poetry (gītikāvya). Sanskrit lyric poetry is very rich so far as variety of subjects delineated is concerned, and the type of Sanskrit lyrics known as Śataka is but a form of lyric poetry.

Ācārya Samantabhadra, a profound Pandita and revolutionary philosopher of the Digambara Jaina tradition is said to be the first Jaina author the Śataka form of Sanskrit poems; he is placed in the 2nd century A. D. The present work has taken up 51 Śatakas for discussion. From the narrative view-point they are divide into four types, viz., Stuti, Vairāgya, Nīti, and Śṃgāra, Dr. Malaiya has given an account of 21 such Śatakas in the second chapter of her thesis, the first one being devoted to general topics like the nature of Gīti-Kāvya, the tradition of Mukta-kāvya, essentials of the Sanskrit Gīti-kāvya, and its peculiarities, and the place of the Sanskrit Śatakas in Gīti-kāvya. The third chapter gives an account of five Vairāgya Śatakas, viz., Samādhi-śataka of Ācārya Pūjyapāda, two Vairāgya-śatakas of Bharṭhari and Padmānanda, respectively, Śānti-śataka of Śilhana Miśra and Samyaktvasāra-śataka of Ācārya Jñānasāgara; and the it also gives an account of twelve Nīti-śatakas, viz., two Nīti-śatakas of Bharṭhari and K. Bhujabali Shastri, the Bhallaṭa-Śataka of Bhallaṭa, the Cāṅkya-śataka of anonymous author two

Anyāpadeśa-śatakas of Nīlakaṅṭha Dīkṣita and Madhusudana, respectively, Upadeśa-śataka of Gumāna Kavi, Anyokti-śataka of Bhaṭṭa Vīreśvara, Dṛṣṭāntakālikā-śataka of Kusumadeva, Sabhārañjana-śataka of Nīlakaṅṭha Dīkṣita, Brahmācārya-śataka of Medhavrata and Gurukula-śataka of Medhavratacārya. In the fourth chapter, the author of the thesis has given an account of nine Śṛṅgāra Śatakas, viz., the Amaru-śataka of Amaru, the three Śṛṅgāra-śatakas of Bhartṛhari, Narahari and Janārdana Bhaṭṭa, the Sundarī-śataka of Utpreśāvallabha, Bhāva-śataka of Nāgarāja, Kāvya-bhuṣaṇa-śataka of Kṛṣṇavallabha, Asleṣa-śataka of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita and the Adhara-śataka of Nīlakaṅṭha Dīkṣita.

The fifth chapter is devoted to the life, date and works of Ācārya Vidyāsāgara, while the sixth chapter gives the contents of the five Sanskrit Śatakas of Vidyāsāgara, viz., Śramaṇa-śataka, Bhāvanā-śataka, Nirañjana-śataka, Pariśahajaya-śataka and Sunīti-śataka. The seventh and the eighth chapters are devoted to the poetic appreciation and Alaṅkāra and Metres utilised in these five Śatakas of Vidyāsāgara. And, the ninth chapter presents by way of an epilogue the discussion about the peculiarities, philosophy of life, and importance of the Sanskrit Śataka tradition, both in general and also in particular about Vidyāsāgara's Śatakas.

In his 'Bhūmikā', Ācārya Vimal Prakash Jain of the Sanskrit-Pali-Prakrit Department, R.D.V.V. Jabalpur, has presented an appreciation and comparative estimate of the Hindi lyrics of Ācārya Vidyāsāgara, and shown how he has inherited the spiritual and poetic tradition of ancient India.

The bibliography gives a list of about 111 reference works and five articles, and the book concludes with list of so far extant works of Acaraya Vidyāsāgara. The dissertation thus provides interesting and valuable material on Sanskrit Śatakas in general and those of Vidyāsāgara in particular. N. M. K.

***The Clever Adulteress and Other Stories : A Treasury of Jain Literature,
edited by Phylis Granoff. Mosaic Press, Oakville, Ontario,
Canada, 1990, pp. 290/-.***

The history of the Jain religion is traceable back through a series of twenty-four Jains or 'Conquerors', otherwise called the Tīrthaṅkaras or "Ford-maker" sanctified founders of the Jainism, the last of whom was Mahāvīra; he was a contemporary of the Buddha. The teachings of these Jinās, particularly of Mahāvīra has been canonised. From the beginnings Jains told stories to illustrate their religious teachings. Stories fill their existing canon, and many of the commentaries to canonical texts are veritable treasure houses of stories. Indeed in later medieval times some of these stories form the canon and the commentaries were gathered together with other popular tales into a large and often diverse collections that were aptly called "treasure houses of stories."

While most of the stories presented here are from the Śvetāmbara Jain tradition, the

Digambara Jains also told and collected stories in Sanskrit and other Indian languages. It is in all of these Jain writings that much of the medieval India story literature as a whole has been preserved, and without them we would know much less than we do of the popular culture of the medieval India.

The present book is but a collection of translations of some of these Jain stories that were originally written either in Sanskrit or in one of the older vernacular languages, known by the collective name of Prakrits, related to Sanskrit. Most of the translations in this volume are of the stories in the Śvetāmbara Jain tradition.

The material in the Jain canon, its commentaries, and the story collections that grew from this older tradition is often didactic. But, in addition to avowedly didactic stories, Jains also recounted the lives and deeds of people who were important to their tradition. They also collected and told stories about their holy places. The boundary line between Jain “biographies” in particular and the didactic story is admittedly fluid; on the one hand, biographies may incorporate didactic stories, they may, on the other hand be used as didactic stories. At the same time biographies could be preserved in didactic story collections and yet lack a clear didactic purpose. Jain biography collections also from time to time include stories about famous poets and kings who were not specifically connected with the Jain tradition. Collection of the deeds of monks and nuns, pious laymen and women, appear regularly from the 12th century onwards. Biographies of the Jinas, the founding teachers of Jainism, have a longer history, but they continued to be a popular subject in medieval times.

The book is divided into two parts; the first part being a selection of didactic stories of manners and morals, while the second part consists of stories of peoples and places from the biography collections and a pilgrimage text. Part I comprises three chapters. Chapter 1 contains a parable, entitled “The Peacock’s Egg”, from the *Nāyādhammakahāo*, translated by Willem Bollee. Chapter 2 contains stories from the Āvaśyaka commentaries translated by Nalini Balbir. She has presented these stories by dividing them in three sections, viz., (A) How can Sāmāyika be gained, (B) Definitions and illustrations of repentance, and (C) A collection of 32 catchwords defining Jaina Yoga. Section A contains 11 stories, and sections B and C contain 8 and 32 stories, respectively. Chapter 3 comprises stories from the later didactic story collections, presented again into three sections. Section A contains the story of the Faithful Wife Rohinī from the *Ākhyānakamaṇikośa* translated by Prem Suman Jain. Section B contains stories on “Giving” from the *Mūlasuddhiprakaraṇa*, translated by Phyllis Granoff. Section C contains the story of Yaśodhara about Karmic retribution from the *Brhatkathakośa*, translated by Friedhelm Hardy. Part II comprises five chapters. Chapter 1 presents the stories of monks, poets, faithful wives and other, like Bhadrabāhu and Varāha, Āryanandila, Jivadeva, Āryakhapaṭācārya, the poet Harṣa, Madanakīrti, and two biographies of Mallavādin; all these stories being translated by Phyllis Granoff. Chapter 2 comprises two stories of Ambika and Kapardin in which mortals become gods, from

a medieval pilgrimage text, both translated by Phyllis Granoff. Chapter 3 gives the story of the minister Cāṇakya from the *Parīṣiṣṭaparvan* of Hemacandra, translated by Rosalind Lefebber. Chapter 4 narrates the story of kings and sages, from the *Ādipurāṇa*, translated by Ralph Strhl. And, Chapter 5 presents selections from a medieval pilgrimage text about the Jain sacred cosmos, translated by John Cort.

The logic behind the above arrangement of Parts Sections and chapters therein is that Dr. Bollee's translation of a parable from one of the eleven *aṅgas* takes us back to the very starting point of the Jain story literature. This is followed by a long section from the story tradition that is preserved in the commentaries to the *Āvaśyakaśūtra*. The prominence given to the *Āvaśyaka* stories here is an accurate reflection of their importance within the Jain tradition. The *Āvaśyaka* commentaries are the life-blood of the didactic story tradition in Śvatāmbara Jainism; they preserve an enormous number of stories and were one major source for the many later collection of stories. By translating a block of stories Dr. Balbir has given the English reader the unique opportunity to see the range of stories functioned in their original setting. The section on didactic stories continues with examples from later didactic story collections, some of which are rooted in the *Āvaśyaka* tradition. Dr. P. S. Jain, who has translated the story of the faithful wife Rohinī, has chosen to retain much of the verse from the original, which gives the reader the chance to see just how varied in style Jain stories can be. Dr. Phyllis Emily Granoff has translated several stories on a single theme, making gifts to monk and nuns. The section on didactic stories concludes with a story that illustrates karmic retribution; it comes from the Digambara tradition and is translated by Dr. Firedhelm Hardy. Part II offers selections of another significant throughout the history of Jainism. In chapter 1 of Part II of this book Dr. Granoff has translated biographies from a number of major Jain biography collections. For chapter 2 Dr. Granoff has given two accounts of lay devotees who became demi-gods. These accounts come from a text on Jain holy places. In chapter 3 Dr. Lefebber has translated the humorous account of the minister Cāṇakya, whom Jain, Hindu and Buddhist sources alike celebrate as the power behind the throne of India's first great empire. Chapter 4 contains the translation by Dr. Strohl of the story of Bharata and Bāhubalī narrated in three chapters of the Digambara *Ādipurāṇa* describing the conflict between these two brothers and between secular and religious authority. Chapter 5 is a selection of translations from the same pilgrimage text that records the deeds of the lay devotees become gods, in chapter 2. Here Dr. Cort has selected several accounts of medieval holy places. Some of these are miracle stories or stories of the origins of the holy site; others are more descriptive in nature and still others belong more properly to the class of literature we would call hymns. By providing samples of all these types, Dr. Cort has given the English reader the chance to see the kind of religious world his stories inhabit.

The title of the book, viz., "The Clever Adulteress and Other Stories" seems to have been chosen with an eye on the sale of the book which would arouse the curiosity of the interested readers, interested more in fun that the story provides than its antiquity and

sources. The editor has given a clue to the source of inspiration for this title; it is a tale of a clever woman who outwits both her husband and the divine being who tests her chastity. Though the definite story has not been pointed out it most probably seems to be No. 17, on pp. 56-57, in which Priyaṅgu, the wife of the minister Dharmghoṣa seems to have been referred to by the editor who has indicated “a tale of a clever woman who outwits both her husband and the diving being who tests her chastity.”

Jaina story literature as a whole is characterized by a plurality of styles and a freedom of invention that surely contributed to its lasting appeal. Some stories read like simple folk-tales, others read more like the bare framework for a sermon while still others seem more like courtly romances. In the original each of the stories that are translated in this collection has an unmistakable and unique stamp. Although they all appear here in English, these stories in the original are not even in the same language. A single story may even be in more than one language, for it is not unusual for the stories to switch from one language to another, using Sanskrit and Prakrit side by side. Some of the stories that appear here were written entirely in prose, while others were in verse or in mixed prose and verse. The stories have been translated by several scholars, and no attempt has been made to achieve an uniform translation style. This was a deliberate decision of the editor; the originals themselves exhibit great diversity and it was hoped that at least an impression of that richness might be conveyed by the strikingly different translations that each scholar has made. The freedom of the translators included the choice of adding footnotes or incorporating necessary background information into the text. The originals themselves exhibit the same wide range of tone, from scholarly and erudite to popular and easily accessible. Several translators kept to the popular vein; others have added notes that will be of great interest to specialists as well as general readers. These translations offer only a brief glimpse into what is an enormous body of literature, and the availability of these stories in English will help stimulate interest in this warm and lively literature. As such Dr. Granoff deserves our greetings for editing this treasury, so well. And this should surely inspire veteran scholars in India to take up a similar project on a bigger scale, incorporating many more tales and covering a wider field. N.M.K.

Materials for an Edition and Study of the Piṇḍa- and Oha-Nijjuttis of the Śvetāmbara Jain Tradition by Willem B. Bollee. Beitrage zur Sudasienforschung, Sudasien-Institut, Universitat Heidelberg, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1991, pp.xv + 160.

According to tradition, the Piṇḍa-nijjutti and the Oha-nijjutti were canonized at the Council of Valabhī in the 5th century of our era, They are, yet, not considered to belong to the old Siddhānta by Western Jainology, because, as Leumann pointed out, the former text originally followed the Āyāraṅga-Nijjutti 315, where there is a gap now, whereas the latter, in an earlier version, had its place between Āvassaya-Nijjutti VI and VII. They are, therefore considered to have been composed later than Bhadrabāhu's Nijjuttis, which

refer to the canonical texts of diverse content, whereas the Mūlasuttas under discussion deal with specific subjects.

These Nijjuttis are quoted by Haribhadrasūri, or are drawn upon sometimes pāda-wise as in Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya. Scholars working on these texts find it very difficult to trace the passages of these works when they are quoted by such later writers. And the identification of the exact place and the critical reading of the passage is the basic requirement for such studies. In the absence of carefully compiled Indices, such scholars are extremely hampered in the progress of their studies. Scholars like Professor K. R. Norman have expressed their requirement of a complete pāda index, because many partial parallels exist which cannot be traced by an index of first pādas only. They have further required a reverse index of the pādas, since frequently parallels to a portion of a pāda can be found, not necessarily including the first word. Thus what we essentially need are the pāda index and also the reverse pāda index of each individual text. Thus, e.g. in the pāda index a text is : “*Ega-duga-tiga-caukkaga* ON 316.a” the same text in the reverse pāda index would be : “*Ega-duga-tiga-caukkaga*- ON 316 a”; but their order in the Sanskrit alphabetical index will be under “e” in the case of the former, while under “a” in the case of latter, thus facilitating the researcher easy location and identification.

This volume is intended as aid for further studies of the Piṇḍa-Nijjutti and the Oha-Nijjuti as begun by further studies of the Piṇḍa-Piṇḍ’esaṇā (Mainz, 1974). It lists for the first time the quarter stanzas (*pāda*) of the two Nijjuttis dealing with the Jain ascetics’ daily alms-round (*gocari*) as dealt with in the OhaN, and the transgressions they may incur during these, (as in PiṇḍaN) in order to facilitate a comparison of these two texts with each other and with other Nijjuttis of a similar content like those belonging to the Āvassaya, Āyāraṅga and Dasaveyaliya and also to facilitate the identification of quotations. Dr. Bollee decided to set about these Mūlasuttas because of the start made by Professor Mette and because of their thematic unity, though it would have been far better to first deal either with the ĀvassayaN or the ĀyāraṅgaN. As to the former, Professor Balbir has been working on it with a edition and a glossary. Work on Dasaveyāliya was done by E.Leumann and W. Schubring. The ĀyāraṅgaN, however, has not yet found an editor in the West, but preparations are in course there.

Dr.Bollee has frankly admitted that, as the slips were written at irregular intervals from the early 80’s onward, small orthographical discrepancies have remained, but Prākṛta scholars are accustomed anyway to looking up under *ikka* what they do not find under *ekka* or *ega*; *-gara/ -yara*; *attha*; *attha*; *-ṇ- / -nn-* etc. Uniformity was not aimed at. For practical reasons, the listing was done mechanically, i.e. even *pādas* sometimes begin with a monosyllable like *ca*, *tu*, *pi*, or *hi*, which is, in fact, against the rule of the metre. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the material presented here will surely prove useful. And, Dr. Bollee has already published such indices on other canonical works, too. The only peculiarity which rather draws our attention is that he has refrained from, or rather omitted the text- reference in his Reverse Pāda Index, and for that one has to refer to his Pāda Index. **N. M. K.**

The Astrological Works of Daśabala by David Pingree. Aligarh Oriental Series No.9. Viveka Publications, Aligarh, 1988, pp. 60, Rs. 50/-, \$ 10/-

This is the second volume of a series of medieval Sanskrit astronomical texts, the first being the Rājamṛgāṅka of Bhojarāja edited by Dr. Pingree and published in the Aligarh Oriental Series at No. 7, in 1987.

The two extant works of Dasabala (11th Cent. A. D.) edited in this book are entitled *Cintāmaṇi*, a set of *tithi*, *nakṣatra* and *yoga* tables (*sāraṇikā*), and *Karaṇa-kamala-mārtanḍa*, a *karaṇa*.

Dasabala was the son of Virocana and a younger brother of Ratnasambhava, as well as Vālabha, taken by Kosambi to mean a resident of Valabhī in Sāurastra. It seems to Pingree, on the basis of a reference to 'Vālabhānvaya' in the Karaṇa-kamala-mārtanḍa (10.19) and Tilakwāḍā Copper Plate of 1046, that this name does not indicate Daśabalas residence, though it may be connected with the place of his family's origin. The colophones of the *Cintāmaṇi* call Daśabala a Bodhistva. He was a contemporary of Bhojadeva.

The epoch of the *Cintāmaṇi* (1.15-17 and 5.2-3) is mean *Meṣa-saṅkrānti* of Saka 977, i.e. March 25, 1055 A. D., when Bhoja was ruling the earth. The epoch of the Karaṇa-kamala-mārtanḍa is the beginning of Caitra of Saka 980 (1.4 and 9-10), i.e. February 25, 1858 A.D.

This edition of *Cintāmaṇi* published here is based on the manuscripts of the work preserved in the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, and on another one in Oxford, as also the previous edition of Kosambi, which provides the frequently corrupt readings. The order and, in part, the working of text in the *Vṛtti* of Mahaeva. The text of this first work is entitled '*Atha Daśabala-viracitā Cintāmaṇiḥ. Sāraṇikā*'. It consists of five *Paricchedas*, called *Tithiprakaraṇam*, *Nakṣatraprakaraṇam*, *Yogaprakaraṇam*, *Prakī-rṇaprakaraṇam* and *Samvatsarānayanam*, respectively. The first pariccheda consists of 62 verses, the second of 20 verses, the third of 21 verses, the fourth of 36 verses and the fifth of 4 verses; the whole work thus comprising 143 verses in all.

Along with this work the *Daśabala-vṛtti* of Mahādeva has also been given separately after the text of the *Cintāmaṇi*. Mahādeva, the son of Luṅiga, completed his *Vṛtti* on Daśabala's *Cintāmaṇi* on Monday in the month of Fālguna of Saka 1180, i.e. sometime between January 27 to February 17, 1219 A. D. Mahādeva's father Luṅiga was the grandson of Bandhuka of the Janyālaya-vaṃśa, a companion of the Cālukya king Karṇa, who reigned from ca. 1066 till ca. 1093. Furthermore, our commentator's uncles were Amaraṛaja the commentator of Brahmagupta's *Khaṇḍakhādya*, and Arjuna (*ayājī*), a companion of the Cālukya king Bhīma II, who reigned from ca. 1178 till ca. 1241. The Daśabala-vṛtti quotes from Brahmagupta's *Brahmasphuṭa-siddhānta* and *Khaṇḍakhādya*, Bhojarāja's *Āditya-pratāpa-siddhānta* and Varāhamihira's *Brhatsamhitā*.

The second work is entitled '*Atha Daśabala-viracito Karaṇa-kamala-mārtanḍah*.' It

is divided into ten adhikāras, viz., Madhyama-grahānayana, consisting of 20 verses, the second Sphuṭa-grahānayana of 56 verses, the third Tripraśna of 33 verses, the fourth Candragrahaṇa of 30 verses, the fifth Sūryagrahaṇa of 15 verses, the sixth Udayāsta of 12 verses, the seventh Śṃgonnati of 20 verses, the eighth Varṣānta-sāmyānayana of 23 verses, the ninth Grahayuti of 49 verses, and the tenth Sphuṭādhimāsaka-saṃvatsarānayana of 20 verses; the whole work, thus consisting of 278 verses in all.

As was already recognized by S. B. Dikshit in his Bhāratīya Jyotihsāstra, Daśabala has borrowed phrases from Bhoja's Rājamṛgāṅka. Pingree has based this edition of the KKM on the only extant manuscript preserved in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.

Although the author has not mentioned to which of his predecessors he has been indebted, it is evident, to S. B. Dikshit, that the Madhyameṣa-saṃkramaṇa-kāla and the Tithi-suddhi tally with the Bīja-samskṛita-brahma-siddhānta-māna as detailed in Bhoja's Rājamṛgāṅka. Similarly, the Mandoccas, Nakṣatra-dhruva and Pāta of Dasabala also tally with Bhoja's same work. This doubly proves that the work is comparable to Bhoja's *Bīja-samskṛita-brahma-siddhānta*.

The speciality of Dasabala's work is that the *Bīja-samskāra* has not been spelt out separately, but the *Gatis* are calculated after including it therein. Further, in contrast to the works of his predecessors, such as the Pañca-siddhāntikā, the Kaṇḍakhādyaka and the Rāja-mṛgāṅka wherein the Madhyama-graha-sādhana is calculated on the basis of Ahargaṇa, the procedure is rather lengthy and complicated, while that in Daśabala's work is far easy and can be calculated in short time with the help of the Varṣa-gaṇa or the tables. Not only that, to save labour Daśabala has given ready tables. Daśabala rightly deserves our compliments for this so far as his KKM is concerned. And, Dr. Pingree too deserves our compliments for bringing out a fairly correct critical editions of both the works of Daśabala along with the commentary on the first one. N. M. K.

Siñjiniyam (A Sanskrit drama) by A. S. Subbukrishna Srowthy. A. S. Pavali Srinivasan, Madras, 1990. pp. xxx + 96, Rs. 30/-.

This modern Sanskrit drama, entitled '*Siñjiniyam*' (i. e. the story of the Anklet) is based upon the Tamil epic poem '*Ślappadhikāram*' composed by the great poet-saint Elango Adigal (2nd Cent. A. D.).

The original Tamil work comprises three parts, viz., *Pugar Kāṇḍam*, *Mathurai Kāṇḍam* and *Vanchi Kāṇḍam*, each part being named after the capitals of Chola, Pandya and Chera kingdoms, respectively. The main story comes to a close with the second part and the third part is only a narrative one. The author of the *Siñjiniyam* has adopted only the main story portion for dramatisation, and has introduced some minor deviations from the original story for the sake of suitability for the stage.

The drama consists of ten *Añkas*, and may possibly be regarded as a sort of a *prakaraṇ* type of Sanskrit *rūpaka* or *drśya-kāvya*. The drama, being presented in the traditional style, begins with a *Nāndī*, a prayer in praise of Truth- a flame of Supreme Being - that governs the Moon, the Sun and the Rain. It is followed by the exposition in the conventional form of a *Prastāvanā*. The theme of the play is also indicated in the *Nāndī* sloka. Although the author has devised *Viṣkambha* etc., he has not strictly followed all the conditions laid down by Bharata. The use of *Prākṛta* has been avoided for obvious reasons. So it can be called a modern purely Sanskrit drama, following as closely as possible the traditional or conventional; aspects of the Classical Sanskrit Drama. It ends with the *Bharata-vākya* in the traditional style.

The title of the drama is based on the central theme of the anklet of the heroine around which the entire story is woven. The anklet of the heroine *Kaṇṇaki* becomes instrumental in the destruction of the capital city of the *Pāṇḍya* king, consequent to the curse of the heroine whose really innocent husband *Govala* was hastily executed on the unproved charge of the theft of his queen's anklet which in reality belonged to *Kaṇṇaki*.

In his Sanskrit *Prāstāvika*, Dr. C. R. Swaminathan of Madras has rightly pointed out to the extreme devotion of *Kaṇṇaki* for her husband *Govala*, who fell in love with *Mādhavī* a dancer in the city, and betrayed her. Further, although the author is a Vedic Pundit profound in his scholarship, he has in a way falsified the poetic claim of *Kālidāsa* that one who has become totally immune to emotions due to Vedic Studies cannot create such a beautiful drama ! Although the number of verses in the whole drama does not exceed sixty in all the acts, his poetic genius is evident in many of them and the poet has exhibited his skill in Sanskritising many idioms of his Tamil original *N.M.K.*

Bhoja and Haravijaya of Sarvasena by Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, with Introduction, Definitive Text, Translation and Notes. Saraswari Pustak Bhandar, Ahmedabad (in Saraswati Oriental Series No.5), 1991, pp. vii + 100, Rs. 90/-.

In his *Harivijaya* (the Victory of Hari, i.e. *Kṛṣṇa*), an epoch making classical *Maharaṣṭri Prākṛta* epic, the poet *Sarvasena* restructures the famous *Parijata* episode depicted in the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (10.59) around the rivalry between the two consorts of *Kṛṣṇa* and his attempt to appease the hurt party, viz., *Satyabhāmā* against *Rukmiṇī*. The erotic thus gains an upper hand over the heroic *rasa*.

The importance of *Sarvasena* lies in the fact that the great Sanskrit rhetoricians like *Ānandavardhana* of the *Dhvani* fame and *Kuntaka* of the *Vakrokti* fame have placed him on par with *Kālidāsa*, and quote from the *Harivijaya*, as from the *Raghuvamśa*, the *Kumārasambhava*, etc., to support his viewpoint that preoccupation with emotion (*bhāva*) and the generation (*niṣpatti*) of aesthetic experience (*rasa*) is the essential method of literature. *Kuntaka* chooses *Sarvasena*, along with *Kālidāsa*, as representative of the *sukumāra mārga*, the old *Vaidarbhi* style.

This epic was thus famous for a long time in past, but it has now been irretrievably lost, except some of its passages as preserved by Bhoja the Great of Dhārā in his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa and the Sarasvatīkaṅṭhābharaṇa. And in the present monograph Dr. Kulakarni has taken great pains to present a careful and critical study of this lost epic from its fragments preserved by Bhoja, and one passage preserved by Ānandavardhana, too.

In all the Text presented here in part I contains 25 Prākṛta verses, along with their Sanskrit *chāyā*, and English translation of all the verses; part II contains 95 Prākṛta verses, with Sanskrit *chāyā* and English translation. In the footnotes, Dr. Kulakarni has given the sources of these verses with their exact context in Bhoja's work and in that of Ānandavardhana in the case of the one verses, the first, in part I. More details are presented in Notes (pp. 23-34 of Part I and the Notes (pp. 81-94) of Part II. In the Appendix, the problem of the sources of Sarvasena's Harivijaya are indentified in the *Harivamsa*, the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and the *Bhāgavata*, giving the account of the narratives in each of them; however, since the account of the incident of Pārijātaḥaraṇa occurs in Vijayadhavaja's Padaratnāvalī on the Bgp and not in the in body of that Purāṇa as in the case of the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, Dr. Kulakarni has concluded that we may be justified in regarding the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* as the source of the *Harivijaya*.

In part I the editor has reproduced the verses which could be definitely ascribed to *Harivijaya* on the strength of external or internal evidence, and in part II he has presented those verses which he felt are probably drawn from the *Harivijaya*. As for the works of Bhoja, viz., the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* and the *Sarasvatīkaṅṭhābharaṇa* he has used the Mysore edition of the former and the N. S. edn, 1934, of the later. Due care has been taken in restoring the corrupt passages through his own experience evolving definite principles of emendation, spelt out (pp. vi-vii) in his Preface. It is not clear, if the idea of suggesting the probable location of the passages in their narrative order in the story has cured to the editor, since he does not seem to have touched the point nor has he suggested the order of the passages from narrative point of view, thus trying to restore the epic though in a fragmentary shape, as a sort of an antique piece. N. M. K.

The Dharma-ratna-karaṇḍaka of Vardhamānasūri by Muncandravijaya

'Basket of the Jewels of Dharma' along with its Sanskrit auto-commentary was composed by Vardhamānasūri in Vikrama Saṃvat 1172 (approx. 1229 A. D.). Vardhamānasūri was a disciple of Abhayadevasūri, the famous author of commentaries on nine Aṅga texts, of Jainism. According to the Śvetāmbara tradition he was the 39th Ācārya as counted from Mahāvira, the twenty-fourth Tirthaṅkara. Vardhamānasūri composed two more works, in Prakrit, viz., the Manoramākahā in 140 V. Sam. (1197 A. D.) and the Jugāijjinacariya in 1207 V. Sam. (1207 A. D.), also. Both these latter works have been edited by Pt. Rupendrakumar Pagaria and published by the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, in 1983 and 1987, in the L. D. Series as Nos. 93 and 104, respectively.

Vardhamānasūri is also said to have composed an astrological work entitled Śakuna-ratnā valī.

Municandravijaya has consulted for this edition the following manuscripts : (1) The plam-leaf ms. of Sri Ātmānanda Jaina Jnānabhaṇḍāra, Vaḍodarā; (2) a paper ms. of Sri Hemacandrasūri Jnānamandar, Pātan dated V. Sam. 1880; (3) a paper ms. of Sri Jainānanda Pustakālaya, Surat, dt. V. Sam. 1970; (4) a paper ms. of the same place dt. 1954 V. Sam. ; a paper ms. of Pātan, of 20th Cent. V. Sam. He has bases his critical text on the Surat ms., and for variants compared it with the mss. listed above at numbers one, three and four, while the last two mss. have been used only sparingly.

The work comprises twenty Adhikāras, entitled (1) *Dharmādharmā-svarūpa*, (2) *Jinapūjā*, (3) *Gurubhakti*, (4) *Paropakāra*, (5) *Santoṣa*, (6) *Samśāra*, (7) *Śoka*, (8) *Kaṣāya*, (9) *Loka-viruddha*, (10) *Dāna*, (11) *Śīla*, (12) *Tapa*, (13) *Bhāvanā*, (14) *Śīṣṭa-saṅga*, (15) *Vinaya*, (16) *Viṣaya*, (17) *Viveka*, (18) *Mṛdu-bhāṣita*, (19) *Dayā*, and (20) *Saṅgha-Pūjā*. The text proper of the DRK comprises 376 Anuṣṭubh verses, which are taken to be *gāthās* by the editor, in Sanskrit, including the *Maṅgala* at the commencement and conclusion at the end. The extent of the whole work including the auto-commentary is calculated, on the basis of the hand-written mss., to be 9300 Anuṣṭubh verses, traditionally.

In this DRK, Vardhamānasūri has just referred to in passing the story meant to be illustrated, and the elaborate story is narrated in his Sanskrit auto-commentary, e.g. the story of Malayasundarī (pp. 15-17), of three sons of a businessman (pp. 18-23), of Ratnacandra (pp. 40-43), of Ratnasundara (pp. 54-63), and so on. At times he also quotes long Prakrit passages from the Jaina scriptural texts like the *Prajñāpanā-sūtra*(p.8), from Haribhadrasūri's *Pañcāśaka* (pp. 29-36), Jinacandrasūri's *Samvega-raṅgasālā* (pp. 42-44), from Pradyumnasūri's *Vicārasāra-prakaraṇa* (pp. 136-137), and etc.

The auto-commentary, which thus contains numerous stories, parables and folklore, is a veritable mine for the study of mediaeval narrative literature of the thirteenth century A.D.

The editor has presented ample proofs to the effect that he is conversant with the modern norms of editing mediaeval Sanskrit and Prakrit texts, and as a result he has presented us with this edition which is but the first critical edition, in contrast to the one previously published in the form of an old-styled pothi. N. M. K.

A TREASURY OF JAIN TALES, edited by Prof. V. M. Kulkarni, Publ. Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre, Ahmedabad, 1994, pp. xxxix + 368 + N 41. Rs. 200/-.

Inspite of the fact that Prakrit narrative literature is the richest among world literatures, it is poorly known to the people at large, both in the East and more in the West. What is available in English is very meagre. In view of this situation, and possibly taking a clue from a similar project taken up in the West, the Prakrit Text Society

undertook to get prepared a treasury of select Jain Tales. For financial assistance they approached Shri Shrenikbhai Sheth, Chairman of Shri Jain Swtamber Murtipujak Boarding Trust, Ahmedabad with a proposal of preparing and brining out in English translation a few collections of representative illustrative stories from the Jain literature in Prakrit language. On getting a very enthusiastic response from Shi Shrenikbhai, Dr. H. C. Bhayani, the President, and Pandit Dalsukbhai Malvania, the Secretary, of the Prakrit Text Society, Ahmedabad, approached Prof. V. M. Kulkarni, whose boundless love for Prakrit literature was surely expected to allow him not to hesitate in accepting their request to work as the editor of the project. Prof. Kulkarni prepared a detailed plan for the work. His determination and heroic perserverence have succeeded at long last in completing the present volume of the Treasury of Jain Tales which, no doubt can be looked upon as another gem in the crown of his scholarly achievements. The credit for the few illustrations that highlight the key situations in some stories goes to Shri Shrenikbhai's perceptive suggestions.

Dr. J. C. Jain, Dr. P. M. Upadhye, Prof. R. P. Nipanikar, Prof. S. T. Nimkar, Dr. (Mrs.) Nirmala Chheda and Dr. G. S. Bedagkar cooperated with the editor-in translating the Prakrit tales, presented here. Dr. Bedagkar edited the English translation of all the tales.

The book contains an exhaustive Introduction (pp.i-xixxx), 124 stories, Notes on all the stories, select bibliography (as Appendix), and a list of six contributors who translated the Prakrit tales into English. The stories have been classified into four sections, viz., (A) Legends of Famous Persons (stories 1-16); (B) Biographical Sketchies (stories 17-20); (C) Tales of Wit and Wisdom (stories 22-87); and (D) The Twelfth Voyage of Mākandī Brothers and Other Tales (stories 88-124). As is evident from the number of stories in this volume, sections C contains about 53% of the stories, and section D contains about 30% of the stories, while the rest of the sections A and B contain only 17% of them. The Treasury is thus very interesting, entertaining, and at the same time highly instructive and informative.

In his Introduction, Dr. Kulkarni has discussed the following topics : Kathā and its varieties as given in Prakrit works and in Sanskrit works on Poetics. And, he has given a brief survey of Jain Narrative Literature comprising the canonical works, commentaries on canonical works known by the names Bhāṣya, Mahābharata and Harivaṃśa, Caritas, Purāṇas and Mahāpurāṇas of sixty-three Śalakāpuruṣas, counterparts of Bṛhatkathā, quasi-historical Prabandhas, Dharmakathās, Campūs, Ornate Poems and Kathākośas.

Dr. Kulkarni has drawn our attention to the narrative literature of the Śvetāmbaras which is a veritable storehouse of folktales, fairy-tales, beast-fables, parables, illustrative examples, apologues, allegories, legends, novels, funny stories and anecdotes. A large number of such stories and parables and legends occur in the Jain Canon itself; and the number of tales occuring in the commentaries on the canon is legion. The Jain writers have created new stories and legends of their own, no doubt. But generally speaking they

relate the old stories as have been handed down to them by literary and popular tradition. The only significant addition they make is the sermon of the Kevalin (accomplished monk, possessor of the perfect knowledge, the completely enlightened) at the end of the story explaining the cause or causes for the misfortunes suffered or prosperity enjoyed by the characters in the story. The Jain monks were very shrewd and practical-minded. They made full use of the inborn love for stories on the part of Jain laity for the propagation of their Dharma.

In the various types of works, excepting some of the semi-historical works (*prabandhas*), certain traits arrest our attention as they are hardly noticed in other branches of Indian literature. These traits are : (i) Pages after pages are devoted to the past and future births; (ii) the inexorable law of *karman* plays a very conspicuous role; sermons with dogmatic details are introduced; and (iv) parables and illustrative tales are added here and there. The spirit of asceticism is writ large throughout the texts, and almost as a rule every hero retires from the world to attain better status in the next life.

In whatever situation the stories describe, they are all genuinely human, even when a certain story goes on to condemn in outright terms the common human weakness to submit to the pleasures of the senses or be willing to be carried away by worldly happenings and the feelings they arouse or when it highlights passions that hold the mind and soul of man in their tight grip, or when it openly recommends a path of self-abnegation. These stories present saintly characters caught up in moments of temptation as well as men and women of weaker mettle that would like to give up pleasures and live a life of simplicity and purity, but really cannot. They also tell us how very difficult it is to give up pleasures, and how impossible it is to give up desire for them. The story of Brahmadata, an unfortunate prince who failed to achieve what his friend succeeded in achieving, has been chosen for treatment of a theme that is daringly modern; it is chosen from the same branch of knowledge, viz., Heredity, from which the French novelist Emil Zola chose his themes.

Many of the stories selected here are based on the typical Indian metaphysical belief of which *karma* is the sine qua non, and inevitably confines human life in a deterministic framework, and every such story spreads over an enormous time span easily covering a couple of life times, and relying on Rebirth. To modern readers rebirth may look like a prologue to the bigger theme of evolution. It need not be, therefore, concluded that the Indian story looks down upon the ephemeral happenings and passing moments. There are at least four stories here that describe how a man suddenly develops the wisdom of the Buddha through a casual event like the sight of a faded garland or of an old bull that was once a very symbol of virility and youth. A passing moment transforms itself into a moment of discovery, of enlightenment, and a common man into a New Buddha.

The story of the Mākandī brothers' voyage should find a worthy place in the voyage literature of the world, by the side of Haklyut's Voyages and many other Spanish and Italian accounts. The terrible Indian witch, called Ratnadvīpadevatā, who charms the

sailors by her beauty and youth but destroys them by her demands, has her counterpart in Homer's Circe. The story also works up a fabulous atmosphere which clearly sends ripples of the Arabian Nights in our minds.

This collection of stories should prove how very inadequate it is to describe Prakrit writing as merely didactic and religious, It may mainly be so, but not entirely. It presents quite a variety of situations that should remind readers of Boccaccio or Balzac; for instance, the story called 'Water from the Roof'. The story of Mūladeva and the courtesan Devadattā is equally secular and sympathetically human. The story of Rohiṇī- that offers comments on the basic human types should not be read only as a defence of the *varna* system in Indian society. The criminals that appear in some of the stories bring in a landscape that is rich in psychologically meaningful symbols such as underground dwellings, dilapidated temples, deep wells and beautiful but wicked women. Other stories describe retailers traders that are not very scrupulous with simple minded villagers, cheats, unfaithful husbands and equally dishonest women: the whole lot of humanity has crowded up in this panorama of life and the Indian story literature has tried to capture for us the kaleidoscopic and elusive beauty that we call human nature. Two other women, besides Rohiṇī- stand out prominently in this display of the complex pattern of human contradiction. One of them is the poor young woman whom a king marries. She becomes an object of satire of the other queens in the palace in spite of the dignity with which she conducts herself. But she is never lost to what she considers the basic reality of her life; everyday she spends some time in the privacy of her room and puts on once again the same old rags in which the king has picked her up, stands in front of the mirror and reminds herself of the transitoriness of the surrounding pomp and glory and of the reality of the poverty in which she was born. The other remarkable lady is the famous Princess Malli who has the distinction of becoming the only Tirthankar. She too has a firm hold on reality which teaches her that the golden sheen of the outside of the body very much depends on the unhampered, unrepressed and uninhibited functioning of the internals. Her suitors were misguided as much as most of us. Actually she is a fully integrated personality for which, as Carl Jung would approvingly suggest, gold is the right symbol. No wonder Malli leaves behind her status of gold, with no element of corrupt materials.

Almost all stories presented in English translation in this book, carry a brief descriptive note at the beginning. This note tries to bring out the bearing that the story has on life as we experience it. Originally, the context of the story was different. A reference to the Note on the sources will easily show it. It is a characteristic of good literature that it operates on various levels and conveys much wider meaning than was initially intended. It is earnestly hoped by the President and the Secretary of the Prakrit Text Society, Ahmedabad, that scholar and lover of Indian Classical literatures will appreciate and find instructive the stories presented here. **N.M.K.**

BRIEF NOTICES

N. M. Kansara

Upadhyāya Yaśovijaya Svādhyāya Grantha (Guj.), edited by Pradyumnaviyay Gani, Jayant Kothari and Kantibhai B. Shah. Shri Mahavir Jain Vidyalay, Bombay, 1993, pp. 18 + 344, Rs. 150/-.

In memory of the completion (in V. Sam. 2043) of the 300th year of the demise (*kāladharma*) of Upādhyāya Yaśovijaya (in V. Sam. 1743) who wrote more than 110 works and consequently earned the epithet of 'Laghu Haribhadrācārya' in the Jaina tradition, this book of the collection of research articles by scholars of Gujarat on different aspects of the works of Yaśovijaya has been issued. It gives exhaustive account of various aspects of the scholarly personality of Yaśovijaya Upādhyāya. The book opens with two photographs, one of them presenting his Caraṇa-pādukā in the Samādhi-mandira in Dabhoi, near Vadodarā (Gujarat), and another one a facimile of his handwriting. The first four articles cover the biography and scholarly personality of the celebrity, while next thirty-seven give a detailed study, or treat some particular aspect of his particular work. The last one, 42nd comprises a bibliography listing 173 books presenting some or other of Yaśovijays's works, 9 books about Yaśovijaya and 10 articles about Yaśovijaya published previously, all in Gujarati. **N. M. K.**

Mahāvīra-carita Mīmāṃsā : Pūrvārdha (Guj.) by Dalsukh Malavania. Ramesh Malavania, 8 Opera Society, Ahmedabad-380 007 India, 1992, pp. 136, Rs.36/-.

This book has its roots going back to more than twenty years, when, Pt. Malavania wrote down its essence in the form of a book published by the Saurashtra University, Rajkot, in 1972, with the title '*Prabhu Śrī Mahāvīrsvāmi-no Jīvana Saṃdesa*'. The author then went on revising the contents and decided to present the material from the point of view of modern researchers, in the sequence of the later developments in the narration of the events of the life of Mahāvīra, the last Jaina Tīrthaṅkara.

The work is divided into several chapters like the following:

Tīrthaṅkara-carita-nī Mātrkāo-num Mūla, i.e., the Sources of the biographies of the Tīrthaṅkaras (pp. 1-11); *Bhagavāna Mahāvīra-nā Prācīna Varnako*, i.e. Ancient Narratives about Mahāvīra (pp. 12-23); *Pūrvabhavo*, i.e., Past Births; *Bh. Mahāvīranā Kalyāṇako*, i.e., Auspicious Occasions of Mahavirs (pp. 53-54), *Bh. Mahāvīranum Kūla*, i.e. the geneology of Mahāvīra; *Garbhāvatarāṇa*, i.e., descent in the embryo, and the consequent indicatory dreams seen by the mother of Mahāvīra; and so on upto his meeting with Gośālaka. The author has drawn upon all the Āgamic sources and discussed in an orderly fashion each of the minute event as it developed at each successive stage of narration from time to time with the composition of *Cūrṇis*, *Niryuktis*, *Tikās*, *Bhāṣyas*, and later texts, This book is in Gujarati, but it would be more widely useful to reearchers, if it is translated into English and Hindi, thus made available to wider national and international readership. **N. M. K.**

Ahicchatra Through the Ages, edited by K. D. Bajpai. Foreword by A. K. Chatterjee. Panchal Research Institute, Kanpur, pp. 175 + 19 photo plates, Rs. 95/-.

From the Vedic times, through the Mahābhārata and later Purānic times, the region known by the name *Pāñcalas* is well-known. The Vedic king Sudāsa of the Dāśarājñā-war fame, the Pāṇḍavas in the Mahābhārata, the Purānic Kingdoms of Magadha, Kosala and Vatsa are all connected with the Pāñcala region in one way or other. Paricakrā, Kāmpilya (or Kampila) and Ahiccatrā are the important cities in Pāñcala that have been mentioned in the Vedic and Purānic texts. Ahiccatrā has been indentified with a ruined city of the same name near Modern Ramnagar in the Bareilly district. The city was still considerable in extent when visited by the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-Tsang in the 17th century.

The present volume is devoted to the researches about this ancient city. It contains eighteen research articles in all by veteran scholars like B. N. Pandey, N. P. Joshi, S P. Shukla, Jayanti Bhattacharya, Bhagavatilal, A.L. Shrivastava, Bhamvarlal Nahta, and others, some of them (2-7) in English and the rest (8-18) in Hindi. The first article is in fact the medieval Prakrit text, entitled '*Ahicchatta-kappa*' (Skt. *Ahicchatrā-nagarī-kalpa*) of Jinaprabhasūri. The plates at the end of the book, give a Map of Western Uttar Pradesh and therein the location of the city of Ahicchatrā, copper coins of various royal dynasties, earthen image of Mātṛdevī, of Bodhisatva Maitreya, of the heads of Śiva and Parvatī, of the bust of Viṣṇu, and so on.

As a consolidated collection of researches on the topics connected with the ancient city of Ahicchatra, this is most welcome publication of the Pāñcala Research Institute, Kanpur. The only point that strikes a careful reader is that the editor has scrupulously refrained from giving the year of publication of this volume, perhaps in a bid to make it of eternal timeless value ! N. M. K.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Studies in South Indian Jainism, Part II, by B. Sheshagiri Rao. Sri Satguru Publications, Delhi, (2nd Edn.), 1982.

Rāula-vela of Rodā, (A Rare poem of c. twelfth century in early indo Aryan) Edited by H. C. Bhayani. Parshva Prakashan, Ahmedabad, 1994, pp.xi + 32, Rs. 50/-.

एतिहासिक संदर्भमें शाकतंत्र ले. मुनीशचन्द्र जोशी. प्रका. नेशनल पब्लिशिंग हाउस, नयी दिल्ली. पृ. १३ + ६९ पू.स.४०/-

पंचाल - प्रो. कृष्णदत्त वाजपेयी स्मृति विशेषांक २, सम्पा. डॉ. ए.एल.श्रीवास्तव, प्रका. पंचाल/शोध/संस्थान, कानपुर १९९३.पृ-१६६ पू. ५०

काव्यालोक-हरिप्रसादकृत, सम्पा. डॉ. रमा गृप्ता, प्रका. पब्लिकेशन स्कीम. जयपुर, १९८३. पृ १५+४६६. पू. रु. ३५०/-

मूक मारी : एक दार्शनिक महाकृति, लेय डॉ. भागचन्द्र जैन 'भास्कर' बनयारीलाल बंशीधर जेजानी चेरिटेबल ट्रस्ट, नागपुर, १९९२. पृ १९०, रु. २५/-.

Obituary

Prof. Jagdish Chandra Jain, now the Late Dr. J.C. Jain, has been well known as an authority in Prakrit language and Literature, though basically he was a creative artist and a philosopher who loved, and lived for, the welfare of mankind as a whole. Though born in a remote village called Baseda of the Muzaffarnagar district in the Western Uttar Pradesh, lost his father the tender age of two and half years, studied in a very small school in the village, his life took a turn when, at his age of nine, he was admitted in the *āśrama* at Hastinapur, where he learned his first lessons of rigorous discipline of life and some aspects of Jaina doctrine. At the age of 14, in 1923, he came to Varanasi and got admitted to Syadvada Jain Mahavidyalaya and studied Sanskrit, Ayurveda, English and went to Delhi where he passed his Matriculation of the University of Punjab. Although he joined the science course, he changed over to arts course and obtained B. A. degree of the Banaras Hindu University in 1930, and joined the M. A. course with philosophy as his subject of study. But when Mahatma Gandhi launched his Satyagraha movement very shortly in that very year, Jagdish Chandra left his studies, joined the movement and went to his village to work among the people. Before one year prior to this he was married in 1929. So, as the movement eventually subsided, he got a scholarship to work as a research scholar in the Visvabharati University at Santiniketan, in West Bengal. The free life of this place brought a radical change in the life of both Jagdish Chandra and his wife. As the tenure of his scholarship ended, he got a job of a Manager of the Sthanakavasi Jain Conference in Bombay, and besides his official work, he looked after their Gujarati weekly '*Jaina Prakāśa*'. In 1936, he edited the *Syādvadāmañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa with introduction, Hindi translation and several appendices, and also published a critical edition of the *Jambūsvāmicarita* from a Sanskrit manuscript. These publications established him as a scholar and enabled him to join the Ramnarain Ruia College of Bombay as a professor of Sanskrit, where he also taught Ardhmāgadhī and Hindi, and guided Ph. D. students though he had not obtained his own doctorate degree by that time. In 1942 he joined the freedom movement, went to jail, became a leftist due to his contact there with Bhupendra Chakravarty, and after the end of world war II as the political atmosphere changed and he was released, he went back to teaching in the same college. He was awarded the Ph. D. degree for his *Life in Ancient India as Depicted in Jain Canons*, by the Bombay University, in 1945. As he had given advance information to the Bombay Government about a conspiracy to kill the Mahatma Gandhi, he had to appear in the Gandhi murder Trial at Red Fort in Delhi as the chief prosecution witness on behalf of the Government of India. In spite of his repeated requests to the Government, the latter was not serious about it, and the Mahatma was shot dead after ten days. Dr. Jain exposed the callousness of the government in this regard in his book *I could not save Bāpu*. After 1950, during the heydays of Sino-Indian relationship, he was invited to join the Peking University as Professor of Hindi. After six years, when he returned to India, he was appointed as a Professor of Prakrit and Jainology in the Vaisali Institute, Muzafferpur,

but after serving a few years there he returned to his own Ruia College at Bombay and worked there till he retired in 1968. It was during these years at Bombay that he wrote his *Jaina Āgama-sāhitya mem Bhārātīya Samāja* (1965), *Jaina Sāhitya kā Brhad Itihāsa* (1966). In 1970 he delivered a series of lectures in the L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, which appeared in the form a book entitled *Prākṛta Jaina Kathā Sāhitya* (1971). The same year he was invited by the University of Kiel (West Germany) where he worked as research scholar for four years (1970-74), on the *Vasudevahindī*, and came in contact with distinguished scholars like Ludwig Alsdorf, D. Schlingloff K. Bruhn and others, and delivered lectures in South Asian Institute at Heidelberg, in Orientalistic Seminar at the University of Freiburg, in the Institute of Oriental Languages at the Stockholm University, Sweden, and in the School of Oriental and African Studies the University of London. In 1980 he went to Brazil to deliver lectures on Indian philosophy at Sao Paulo. From there he went to U. S.A. and delivered lectures in the University of California, Berkeley, University of Wisconsin, Madison, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, and also in New York and Toronto, the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, El Salvador University and in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In 1981 he published his '*Prakrit Narrative Literature*'. His another great work of 700 pages, '*History and Development of Prakrit Literature*' is in press. Even in 1991, his two works viz., the '*Jain way of Life*' and '*Studies in Early Jainism*' have been published. He was awarded the Prakrit Jñanabhārātī award from Bangalore in 1990 and the Ahimsa International Deputy Jain Memorial Award from Delhi in 1991. His published books number 39 and articles 30 in English, besides numerous articles in outstanding Hindi magazines and journals. N. M. K.

Courtesy : 'Editor's Note' by N. M. Bhattacharya in 'Jainism and Prakrit in Ancient and Medieval India', New Delhi, 1994.

श्रद्धांजलि

डॉ. जगदीशचन्द्र जैन से मुझे सर्व प्रथम परिचय तब हुआ जब मैं शान्तिनिकेतन पढने गया था। वहाँ वे बनारस युनिवर्सिटीसे एम.ए. करके विशेष अध्ययन के लिए आये थे। उसी अरसे में उनकी नियुक्ति बम्बई में 'जैन प्रकाश' के हिन्दी विभाग के संपादक के पद पर हुई। मैं भी अपना अभ्यास पूर्ण करके बम्बई में "जैन प्रकाश" की ऑफिसमें नियुक्त हुआ, और वहाँ फिरसे मेरा जगदीशचन्द्रजी से मिलन हुआ। बाद में तो वे बम्बई की खालसा कॉलेजमें हिन्दी के प्राध्यापक के नाते नियुक्त हुए। ततः पश्चात् वे जर्मनीकी कोल युनिवर्सिटी में प्राध्यापक के नाते नियुक्त हुए। उन्होंने जैन साहित्यमें, विशेषतः कथा साहित्य में खास तौर पर अध्ययन किया और अनेक प्राचीन कथाग्रंथ संपादित और प्रकाशित किये। उन्होंने जैन प्राकृत कथा-साहित्य के विषय में भी अनेक ग्रंथ लिखे हैं, और वे हिन्दी एवं अंग्रेजीमें प्रसिद्ध हुए हैं। उनकी मृत्यु से जैन साहित्य के क्षेत्र में जो क्षति हुई है उसकी पूर्ति होना संभवित नहीं है। उनके आदर्श कलकत्ता युनिवर्सिटी के प्राध्यापक डॉ. एन. एन. भट्टाचार्यने 'जैनीज़्म् एण्ड प्राकृत इन एंश्यण्ट एण्ड मिडिएवल इण्डिया नामका अभिनन्दत ग्रंथ संपादित किया है, जो इस वेष दिल्ली से उनके स्वर्गवास के कुछ महीनों पूर्व प्रकाशित हुआ है।

RESOLUTION

The following resolution was passed at the condolence meeting held on 5th August 1994, at the L. D. Institute of Indology to mourn the sad demise of Dr. Jagdishchandra Jain, an eminent Scholar of Jainology and Prakrit studies.

“We express our deep sense of sorrow at the passing away of Dr. Jagdishchandra Jain, who during his academic carrer extending over several decades made numerous valuable contributions to the study of Jainology and Prakrit literature. In his sad demise we have lost a devoted senior scholar of Indology. We convey our condolence and sympathy to his bereaved family.”

L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad.
Prakrit Text Society, Ahmedabad
Shri Sharadaben Educational Research
Institute, Ahmedabad.
Prakrit Vidya Vikas Fund, Ahmedabad.
Prakrit Vidya Mandal, Ahmedabad.

Professor S. T. Nimkar

Shridhar Tukaram Nimkar was born on the third January 1936. He passed his B. A. examination of the University of Bombay from Wilson College, Bombay securing first class in Sanskrit and Fellowship of the same college in 1956. he was a double M. A. of the University of Bombay. He had offered Sanskrit and Ardhamāgadhī as his subjects in 1958 and History and Politics in 1976. He obtained the Diploma in Linguistics of the University of Bombay in 1969.

He started his career as Lecturer in Sanskrit. He worked for some years at Wilson College of Bombay and Khalsa College, Bombay, before in joined Mithibai College Andheri (Bombay) in 1964 where he taught Sanskrit and History for several years. He was a Visiting Lecturer of the Department of Sanskrit Pali and Prakrit of the University of Bombay, since 1971 and taught Sanskrit and Prakrit to the M. A. Students.

He had command of Sanskrit and Ardhamāgadhī, Marathi and English languages. He knew fairly well Hindi and Gujarati as well.

He used to participate actively in Symposia, Seminars and Sessions of All India Oriental Conference and read reserch papers. He also wrote and published a number of book reviews through periodicals. He was fond of composing poems and songs in Sanskrit for various occasions.

He has translated with notes in English Kouhala's Litāvāī (A Romntic Kāvya In Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit extending over 1300 gāthās). It is published by Prakrit Vidya Mandal, Ahmedabad.

He has on the invitation of the Editor, Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, contributed a number of tales from the commentaries on Jain Āgama texts by rendering them in English for A

Treasury of Jain Tales, recently published by Shardaben Chimanbhai Educational Reserch Centre, Ahmedabad-380004

Professor Nimkar was a sincere, conscientious teacher. The interests of his students were always uppermost in his mind. he was very popular among his students. He was their friend and guide. Over and above their studies he used to guide them in their preparation for debates, dramatics, social gatherings and other similar activities.

Professor Nimkar was sociable, amiable and loveable. On 21st October 1994 he breathed his last. In his death the students have lost an affectionate guide and his colleagues a lovable persoanality.

May he attain *sadgati* !

— V. M. Kulkarni

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FORM IV

(See Rule 8)

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Place of publication | Ahmedabad |
| 2. Periodicity of its publication | Yearly |
| 3. Printer's Name | |
| Nationality | Indian |
| Address | |
| 4. Publishers Name | Jitendra B. Shah |
| Nationality | Indian |
| Address | Honorary Director,
L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad - 380 009. |
| 5. Editors' Names | 1. Dr. Jitendra B. Shah
2. Dr. Narayan M. Kansara |
| Nationality | Indian |
| Address | L. D. Institute of Indology,
Ahmedabad - 380 009. |
| 6. Name and addresses of
Individuals who own the
newspaper and partners or
shareholders holding more
than one-percent of the
total Shares. | |

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TRANSLITERATION CONVENTIONS**

Textual quotations (Sanskrit, Ardhamāgadhī and other Prākṛtas including the Apabhraṃṣa etc.) and inscriptions (or quotations therefrom) as well as words borrowed or used from languages other than English in the articles or papers are also to be rendered in Roman script and with the diacritical marks pertinent to the language concerned. (Here we suggest those for the Saṃskṛta (classical), the Prākṛta, the Apabhraṃṣa and the Dravidic languages. For other languages, namely Arabic, Persian and the modern European languages, the current international conventions of transliteration may be followed.)

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā ई ī ऊ ū ए, ऐ e (long)
ओ o (N. B. e and o are for syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ri; (long ऋ, which rarely figures, may be rendered ṛ)

Nasals

anusvara

(.) m and not ṁ

anunasikas

इ ñ ञ ñ ण ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visara

(:) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭ ठ ṭha ड ḍa ढ ḍha

Sibilants

श ṣa ष ṣa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa

Compound characters

क्ष	kṣa	and not ksha	ज्ञ	jña	and not djna
ल्	ḷ	and not l	ळ्ह	ḷha	and not ḍha

General Examples

<i>kṣamā</i> and not <i>kshamā</i>	<i>jnāna</i> and not <i>djñāna</i>
<i>kṛṣṇa</i> and <i>krishṇa</i>	<i>sucāru chatra</i> and not <i>suchāru chhatra</i> , etc. etc.
<i>galha</i> and not <i>gadha</i>	

Dravidic (conjuncts and specific) characters

ॡ ॢ ॣ ।

Examples

ॡḷaṅ-Gautaman	Coḷa (and not Choḷa)	Munnuṛuvamaṅgalam
Māraṅ	Nāṭṭaruppokku	Tirukkurālam, etc, etc.

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced :

e.g. *jāṇai* and not *jāṇai* *Seṭṇa* and not *Seṇa*

Also for English words showing similar or parallel situations:

e.g. preeminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence.
cooperation and not cooperation or co-operation.

For the Sinhalese, excepting where the words are in Samskr̥ta, the conventions of rendering Sinhalese in Roman are to be followed:

e.g. dagaba and not dagaba veve or veve and not vev

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be shown in Nāgarī script. (The Western writers may render these in Roman script which will be re-rendered in Nāgarī by the editors.)

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Place Names

To be diacriticised, excepting modern:

Examples:

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References to published works

Pertaining to articles, books, etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or foot-notes or annotations, or otherwise

Book:

Author's name (begining with his initials, title, edition (if any) used, place with year of publication without a period between, page or pages from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made but without qualifying it with p. or pp.:

Example: K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *The Colas*, sec. ed., Madras 1968, 102-154.

Article in a compilation :

(*Felicitation or a Commemoration* volume, collection of papers of an individual scholar, etc.)

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Article in a Journal :

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Books or articles, when quoted again, the initials of the author must be dropped, the title of the work or article must be abbreviated, the place and year of publication (in case of a compilation) or volume or the issue or the particular number of the journal (in case of an article) must also be dropped, though age number(s) is/are to be cited :-

Examples

Book:

Nilakantha Sastri, *The Colas*, 197.

Article in a felicitation or a commemoration volume

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Misra, "Some Early.", *JASI*, 169-170.

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The editor's name, the title of the text, the book-series in which the work has appeared, the place and year of publication, page number(s), sutra or padya or gatha number etc.

Example

Ed. Muni Jambuvijaya, the *Ayaranga-suttam*, Jaiiiiiiiin-Agama-Series No. 2 (1), Shri Mahavira Jain Vidyalaya, Bombay 1976, I. 5.3/35, (Sk.I)

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Fig. (number such and such), for a drawing referred to in the text.

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For half-tone (or colour) illustraations: Place, name of the building, identity of the sculpture, regionl style, period or absolute (if known) or approximate date (as surmised from the content or context of an inscription or by style-evaluation or both.)

Example.

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Bhubaaneshwar. Ekamuka linga, Kalinga style, A.D. 1054.

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