

Ritual, State and History in South Asia  
Essays in Honour of J.C. Heesterman  
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SANSKRIT PRĀṆABHṚT OR  
WHAT SUPPORTS WHAT?

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1. The expression *prāṇabhṛt* is used by Pāṇini only once, viz. in 5.1.129: *prāṇabhṛjjātivayovacānodgātrādibhyo 'ñ* which is rendered by Böhtlingk<sup>1</sup> thus: "An Thiernamen, Altersbezeichnungen und an *udgātr* usw. wird *+/\_ a* angefügt". His interpretation of *prāṇabhṛt* is accepted also by S.C. Vasu<sup>2</sup> and Renou<sup>3</sup>; but S.M. Katre<sup>4</sup> takes a different path in that he translates it by "animate beings". As this sūtra of Pāṇini's is not even referred to in the Mahābhāṣya, quite naturally one looks into the Cāndravyākaraṇa (= CV) and the Kāśikā for examples for the application of this grammatical rule. In the Vṛtti<sup>5</sup> on CV 4.1.145 the first part of the sūtra is illustrated by the secondary noun *āśvam* occurring along with *aśvatvam* and *aśvatā*; the examples in the Kāśikā are (*aśvasya bhāvaḥ karma vā*) *āśvam*, *auṣtram*. Both these examples seem to warrant rather Böhtlingk's, and his followers', rendering of *prāṇabhṛt* than that of Katre.

Yet it has to be noted that Candragomin (perhaps following the example of Jainendravākyakaraṇa 3.4.119) has replaced Pāṇini's *prāṇabhṛjjāti-* by *prāṇijāti-*; most probably he, too, was of the opinion that has been explicitly voiced by Haradatta and Jinendrabudhi, viz. that *prāṇabhṛtaḥ* means *prāṇinaḥ*. If this equation is correct, the question arises why Pāṇini did not himself use the expression *prāṇin* also in this sūtra as in a number of others. For quite clearly the change of expression cannot be objected to as an infringement of the 'law of linguistic parsimony' since the *ardhamātralāghava-paribhāṣā* has not been observed by Pāṇini *sensu stricto*. Is the motive hence that pointed out by Haradatta<sup>6</sup>, viz. simply the wish to change the mode of expression for stylistic reasons? This explanation looks rather like a last resort desperately searched for; it is in any case not convincing enough to discourage the modern students of the Aṣṭādhyāyī from starting from the contrary assumption, viz. that it is difference of meaning which is at play here in reality.

1.1. The examination of those sūtras in which the word *prāṇin* occurs<sup>7</sup>, either as such or as a member of a compound, leads to the following observations. "Lebendes Wesen" (Böhtlingk) is too broad a concept to render *prāṇin*. Pāṇ. 4.3.135 (*avayave ca prāṇyoṣadhivṛkṣebhyaḥ*) shows with as much clarity as one can wish for that "herbs" and "trees", and thus ultimately plants in general, are not subsumed under *prāṇin*<sup>8</sup>; on the other hand it is equally clear that this sūtra cannot by any means be regarded as an instance of the application of the *brāhmaṇa-vaśiṣṭha-*

nyāya.<sup>9</sup> There is no reason whatsoever, be it factual or theoretical or grammatical, to call herbs and trees the most important living beings.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, Pāṇini can certainly be expected to have shared the view, prevailing as it was in Ancient India, to say the least, that plants are also living beings.

Vasu and Katre seem to have come to the same conclusion or to have had the same feeling, but their proposal to render *prāṇin* by "animal" likewise does not stand critical examination. It is true that in a number of cases names of animals are given as examples or counter-examples, in the Mahābhāṣya: *śvan*, "dog", *kāka*, "crow", *śuka*, "parrot" (MBhāṣya I 450.17ff)<sup>11</sup>, *kapota*, "pigeon" (MBhāṣya II 325.15f.<sup>12</sup> etc.) and other birds like *grdhra*, *caṣa* and *bhāsa* (MBhāṣya II 326.16f.), but also *śvāvidh*, "porcupine"<sup>13</sup> (MBhāṣya II 327.11f) and *matsya*, "fish" (MBhāṣya III 443.20f.). To these have to be added<sup>14</sup> *vyāghra*, "tiger" (CV 4.4.82)<sup>15</sup>, *srṅāla*, "jackal" (Kāś. on 2.3.17), birds like the "peacock" (*mayūra*) and the "partridge" (*tittiri*) (Kāś. on 4.3.135)<sup>16</sup> and, last but not least, *vānara*, "ape, monkey" (Kāś. on 5.4.97).

On the other hand, however, Pāṇini uses the expression *prāṇyaṅga*, "(constitutive) part of a *prāṇin*", viz. in 2.4.2 *dvandvaś ca prāṇitūryasenāṅgānām* (scil. *ekavacanam*, cf. 2.4.1), and there can not indeed be the least doubt that what he refers to are singular dvandva compounds like *pāṇipādaṃ* (CV 2.2.58 and Kāśikā) or *śirogrivam* (Kāśikā); at least the first of these examples is clear evidence of the fact that the notion *prāṇin* covers human beings, too. This conclusion is confirmed by a number of examples adduced to illustrate other sūtras of Pāṇini's. The first to be discussed is the compound *koṣaṇiṣada*, mentioned by Patañjali (MBhāṣya II 438.13f.)<sup>17</sup> in tacitly referring to 5.2.128 (*dvandvopatāpāgarhyāt prāṇisthād inih*); unfortunately this passage has not only been overlooked by the compilers of our dictionaries, but obviously the compound also is not attested in other texts; it is hence but a mere guess that particular pieces of clothes are referred to by this word.<sup>18</sup> Jinendrabuddhi, however, seems not to be in any doubt that what is denoted by this *dvandva* "belongs to or is worn by" (*prāṇistha*) a human being, i.e. a female.<sup>19</sup> This certainly holds good for the denotatum of the words given as examples in the CV and in the Kāśikā for Pāṇ. 5.2.128, viz. "bracelet and armlet" (*kaṭakavalayini*), "shell-bracelet(s) and anklet(s)" (*śaṅkhanūpurinī*, in the Kāś. only) and various diseases - perhaps also for "that which is to be held in contempt" (*garhya*).<sup>20</sup> Particularly clear in this regard is Pāṇ. 5.2.96 (*prāṇisthād āto laj anyatarasyām*), according to which the secondary suffix *la* is optionally added to a stem ending in *-ā*, provided that it denotes something which is *prāṇistha*, for most convincingly this rule is illustrated in the CV and in the Kāśikā by the examples *cūḍālah*, side by side with *cūḍāvān*, and in addition (in the Kāś.) by *kaṇikālah* - which can be replaced by *kaṇikāvān*, and vice versa: what these expressions mean is according to Haradatta "being characterized by a

lock of hair on the crown of the head" - in contradistinction to a person who wears a diadem or chaplet tied on the crown of the head - and "being characterized by a tubercle/large ears" (?) - in contradistinction to a person who wears ear-rings. But even if Haradatta is not to be trusted as regards his opinion that the suffix under discussion is met with, in the object language, in fact only as added to designations of "parts of the body" (*prāṇyaṅgād eva hiṣyate*), the first of the two examples is in any case of such a kind that there is no room for any doubt that what is referred to by *prāṇin* with reference to it is again a human being. Finally the examples found in the CV and Kāśikā respectively - which are meant to explain and justify the addition of the expression *aprāṇin* in Pāṇ. 2.4.6 and 6.3.77 -, viz. *brāhmaṇaḥṣatriyau* (CV 2.2.53) *brāhmaṇaḥṣatriyaṃśūdrāḥ* (Kāś.) and *ago vṛṣalah śitena* (CV 5.2.96 as well as Kāś. on 6.3.77), "the low/wicked man/the śūdra is stiff with cold"<sup>21</sup>, are further evidence of the fact that *prāṇin* does not, in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, also mean "animal", but quite evidently "breathing living being", i.e. that the term denotes a large category of living beings from man down to fish all of which can easily be observed to breathe, and as long as they are alive; significantly *prāṇin* does not include plants and most probably also not the lower animals<sup>22</sup>, i.e. animals which are not easily recognized as (equally) breathing.

1.2. Now, if *prāṇabhṛt* - of 5.1.129 - is not synonymous with *prāṇin*, in the strict sense of having exactly the same meaning, its meaning could indeed be "animal", i.e. it could denote the category of all (breathing) living beings except for men, and perhaps for lower animals, too. Yet, the examples given in the CV and in the Kāśikā point to a somewhat different direction. It is not, of course, by any means certain that these examples - apart from being representative, perhaps, of a (much) larger group of words covered by the grammatical rule - may be regarded as nevertheless circumscribing and thus determining the kind of animals referred to in 5.1.129. But if this latter assumption is made tentatively and *argumenti causa* -, what suggests itself is quite clearly that what is referred to by *prāṇabhṛt* are particular animals only, i.e. that the "horse" (*aśva*) and the "camel" (*uṣṭra*) are mentioned because they are typical representatives of this special group; and this group cannot then but be that of domestic animals. This assumption cannot, however, be verified with the help of the Aṣṭādhyāyī itself as there are no further occurrences of the word *prāṇabhṛt* in it. But quite clearly a method can be applied that has proved successful in other cases, too, viz. that of taking into consideration the testimony of Vedic literature. After all Pāṇini's own language, even his meta-language, cannot be regarded as an island completely isolated from the mainland of contemporary Old Indo-Aryan which in its turn has developed out of the Vedic idiom(s) and dialects.

2. There is an additional strong reason to examine the Vedic occurrences of *prāṇabhṛt* - and some of those in classical texts, too -, and this is the corresponding entry in the Larger Petrograd Dictionary; for it reads thus:

"... adj. 1) *das Leben erhaltend: devāḥ prāṇabhṛtaḥ prāṇam māyī dadhatu* TS 3,3,2,1. *anna Śat.Br. 8,1,2,1.* - 2) *Leben in sich tragend, lebendig; m. ein lebendes Wesen: Mensch yat kiṃ cedam prāṇabhṛt Śat.Br. 14,6,1,12,...* 3) *Bez. gewisser Backsteine bei der Schichtung des Altars TS. 5,2,10,3...*"

For this shows that Böhtlingk and Roth assume a change of diathesis and accordingly a difference of meaning. However, as they do not, viz. s.v. *prāṇa* as well as s.v. *bhar*, quote a single instance of the syntagma *\*prāṇam/prāṇān bharate*, meaning "bearing life within oneself" at that<sup>23</sup>, a nagging doubt arises whether what they say is really true. And this doubt is intensified by the observation that the meaning which Böhtlingk assumes for Pāṇ. 5.1.129 is not even mentioned in the Dictionary. One could, of course, think of comparing the other Vedic compounds with the posterior member *-bhṛt*<sup>24</sup>, but it is easily realized that this avenue does not lead us to our goal; for even if all the other compounds of this kind show that the root has its active meaning, the possibility cannot be precluded with absolute certainty that in the case of *prāṇabhṛt* it is the middle voice which is expressed by *bhr*.

2.1. As for the passage TS 3.3.2.1 quoted in the Larger Petrograd Dictionary the epitheton *prāṇabhṛtaḥ* of the "gods" (*devāḥ*)<sup>25</sup>, i.e. Vāyu, Agni, Prajāpati, Bṛhaspati, Viśve Devāḥ, the Maruts and Indra, is explained by the remaining part of the mantra: They are requested, or prompted, to bestow breath/vital breath on the speaker in so far as it is their very nature "to support breath", to draw on Keith's translation.<sup>26</sup> In this case it is perfectly clear that the "breath" (*prāṇa*) they support is not their own and that it is a human being who wants *prāṇa* to be supported in himself; and he expresses this wish not because he is about to be born and to breathe for the first time in his life, but because he is aware of the fact that his breathing, i.e. life, is a finite phenomenon, or because he is afraid of breathing his last in not too distant a future. It is also noteworthy that the prior member of the compound *prāṇabhṛtaḥ* is resumed as it were by the singular *prāṇam*. Now, this example for the use of *prāṇabhṛt* is not at all without parallels. Thus AV(P) 4.12.3(ab) reads thus:

*ūrjabhṛtaṃ prāṇabhṛtaṃ prajānām uta tarpaṇam /;*

this refers, if I am not mistaken, to the plant called *prṣṇipamī*, whatever its botanical identity may be<sup>27</sup>, which is used in a magical

rite. In the given context there can not again be the least doubt that the expression in question means "supporting [another person's or living being's] vital breath". That it is a particular plant which is qualified here as being *prāṇabhṛt* does not, of course, warrant the conclusion that vegetable life as such comes under the category of "breath supporting" entities. It may well be that this plant only indirectly supports breath, e.g. in that it wards off some evil which in its turn endangers the life of a person or some other living being.

The line AV(P) 16.71.8 (cd), viz. *saṃ prāṇena prāṇabhṛtaṃ sṛjāmi saṃ vīryeṇa payasāśiṣā /*, where *odana* seems to be the object referred to, deserves attention not only because of the singular *prāṇena*, but also because of the fact that here "breath" is not spoken of as the result, so to say, of the beneficent activity of a *prāṇabhṛt*, but is meant to explain together with other 'Kraftsubstanzen' the "breath supporting" capacity of the *odana*. Last but not least it has, of course, to be noted that it is a particular dish in this case, which is predicated of as *prāṇabhṛt*: most probably it performs this its life-supporting function in a direct manner.

I should follow now with the second of the passages referred to by Böhtlingk and Roth, but not without first drawing attention briefly to VādhŚS 3.53.1 where in a mantra used during the Vājapeya the 17th *graha* is addressed, at the end, with the words *ātmā pītā prāṇabhṛṇ me 'si pītā*<sup>28</sup>, a statement which resembles TS 3.3.2.1, apart from the fact that here it is a special sacrificial, and sacred, substance, viz. the *soma*, to which the priest turns.<sup>29</sup> ŚB 8.1.3.1, to finally focus attention on this passage, reads thus:

*tād āhuḥ / kiṃ prāṇāḥ, kiṃ prāṇabhṛta itī prāṇā evā prāṇā āngāni prāṇabhṛtya<sup>30</sup> āngāni hī prāṇān bibhṛati prāṇās tv evā prāṇā ānnaṃ prāṇabhṛd ānnaṃ hī prāṇā: bibhṛti //.*

The ritual act referred to is that of building the sacred fire-altar, for which among others bricks called *prāṇabhṛt* are used. This passage is indeed noteworthy, but not only because of the 'identification' of *prāṇabhṛt* and *anna* "food", as Böhtlingk and Roth would seem to have thought; what deserves our attention is the way the compound is paraphrased, viz. by *parasmaipada* verb forms throughout and the plural *prāṇān*. Two, obviously alternative, explanations are here given both of which regard the meaning of *prāṇāḥ* as not calling for any comment; they differ, however, from each other as regards the 'identification' of the *prāṇabhṛts*; yet both the 'identifications' are equally well intelligible; the limbs of the body, or which taken together form the body, evidently of a human being, are no less important than food for its survival, *prāṇa* in the narrower sense of a particular type of breath being in any case included in the plurality of vital forces called *prāṇāḥ* here.

2.2. This passage thus not only reminds us of AV(P) 16.71.8(cd), just discussed, but may also serve as a most welcome transition to TS 5.7.10.2. For, the question implicitly raised by ŚB 8.1.3.1, viz. what food is, is answered in the Samhitā: In the context of an 'identification' of the *prāṇabhṛt* bricks with the heads of domestic animals (*paśuśiṣṇāṇi*) it is expressly stated ... *ānnaṃ paśāva(h)*..., "[for] domestic animals are food/the food". And the same 'identification' is met with among others<sup>31</sup> at ŚB 8.3.3.4. It would, of course, be pretty naive to regard this statement as reversible and as a definition of what is called *ānna* in Vedic Sanskrit; numerous passages disproving this assumption could easily be pointed out<sup>32</sup>, e.g. in the same Brāhmaṇa (ŚB 8.2.3.6) ... *ānnaṃ vā āpó* ...

Nor can passages like TS 5.7.10.2 be simply brushed aside as lacking any significance - as it has ultimately been done by the compilers of the Larger Petrograd Dictionary. The ideas connected with the designation of particular clay bricks as *prāṇabhṛt* are, quite on the contrary, of palpable importance as the terminological use of the word *prāṇabhṛt* is, as is to be expected, viewed by the Vedic 'theologians' as directly related to the meaning it has in everyday language. A particularly clear proof is ŚB 8.1.4.1 ... *yāt prāṇāṃ bībhṛati tasmāt prāṇabhṛta īti* ...

It is hence necessary to inspect all relevant passages, i.e. passages where this type of bricks is mentioned. Among them are some which prove to be 'unproductive': quite understandably the authors of the Brāhmaṇas, etc., did not deem it necessary to give a 'theological explanation' in each and every case the name of a ritual utensil is mentioned in passing, so to say. Such passages are KapS 31.18 (= KāthS 21.3); ŚB 8.1.4.2; 8.2.3.6; 9.5.1.36; 10.2.4.8; 10.4.3.14-16; ĀpŚS 16.32.1f; 17.1.4; 17.2.3; 20.19.12; HiŚS 11.8.6f; KŚS 17.6.3; 17.8.12f; 17.9.11 and ŚYV Anukramaṇikā 2.177.

On the other hand there is also no dearth of passages which come up to our expectations in that they throw considerable light on what the Vedic Indians thought of when these bricks were mentioned. The association with food, already observed above, is attested also at ŚB 8.1.1.3 where the *prāṇas* and Prajāpati are said to have created *anna* which is then equated with the *prāṇabhṛts*.<sup>33</sup> Not surprisingly this name is not seldom 'identified' with *prāṇāḥ*, the breath(s) and other vital forces, and these, or rather the breath(s) in its/their turn, with wind (*vāyu*).<sup>34</sup> Significantly, however, the idea connected with the laying down of these bricks is that the officiating priest thereby bestows the vital breath(s)/forces upon somebody else or something different from the bricks themselves, e.g. the altar (*agni*), etc. See e.g. TS 5.3.1.2: ŚB 8.1.1.1, 8.1.4.10 and 8.3.2.14, or 8.2.3.3: *yād evā prāṇabhṛta upadādhati āsv evaitāt prajāsu prāṇān dadhāti* ...

Already by their number, however, those passages stand out in which it is the concept of cattle (*paśu*) that is associated with the designation *prāṇabhṛt*. Thus at TS 5.2.10.3 we read:

*prāṇabhṛta ūpa dadhāti rētasya evā prāṇān dadhāti tasmā  
vādan prāṇan paśyan śṇivān paśūr jāyate*<sup>35</sup>

"he puts down the breath-supporting (bricks), verily he places the breaths in the seed; therefore an animal is born with speech, breath, sight and hearing".<sup>36</sup> Apart from containing an explanation of the meaning of the plural *prāṇāḥ*,<sup>37</sup> this statement is interesting also because it immediately follows upon the description, and exegetical interpretation, of the laying down of the "water bricks" (*apasyā*)<sup>38</sup>: One is almost given the impression that the sequence water - cattle is a deliberate one, i.e. connected with the successive laying down of these two types of bricks in view of the real dependence of cattle, and animal life in general, upon water, i.e. in view of the fact that the former by necessity presupposes the latter. And this impression is confirmed by TS 5.3.1.3 where it is stated that the priest should change the sequence, i.e. lay down first the *prāṇabhṛts* and then the *apasyās*, if he wants somebody to become *apaśu*, but that he should observe the 'normal' sequence if he wishes that somebody should become a *paśuman!* And in TS 5.2.10.6 the particular manner of putting down bricks transversely is recognized to be the reason of the movement of limbs characteristic of (certain) animals (*paśu*).<sup>39</sup> The connection between the *prāṇabhṛts* and *paśu*, or rather the latter's breathing and certain cognitive and 'communicative' capacities, is expressed (more concisely than at TS 5.2.10.3 quoted above) at MS 3.2.8:

*āthaitāḥ prāṇabhṛtas tasmīn paśāu sambhūte prāṇāṃ cākṣuḥ  
śrōtraṃ vācam tāni dadhāty* ...

In order to avoid the objection of laying too much stress on statements which could be denounced as being just an outcome of the desperate endeavour of the authors of these texts to ascribe a deep and secret significance to the smallest details of complex ritual acts, I shall confine myself to a 'minimal' exploitation of the material presented in the foregoing. That is to say, what I propose to regard as an important testimony is nothing but the fact that in all cases in which a substantial statement is provoked by the name of the *prāṇabhṛt* bricks, it is quite evidently taken for granted or even expressly said that they support, or have the function of supporting the *prāṇa/prāṇas* of something/somebody different from themselves. Therefore there cannot be the least doubt that the authors of these texts considered the technical term *prāṇabhṛt* to be what has later been called by Indian grammarians an *anvartā samjñā* and that they took the appellative noun to mean "that which supports the *prāṇa(s)* [of another entity/being]".

3. This view is not, of course, necessarily correct, i.e. we can not still be absolutely sure, that this, and only this, was the meaning which Old Indian *prāṇabhṛt* had in common parlance. But it is certainly legitimate to make this very assumption as part of an experiment to be continued hereafter by a corresponding semantic study. The solution that almost forces itself on one's mind is then that what is referred to by *prāṇabhṛt* are certain animals with regard to their singular importance of supporting, and ultimately, making possible, *h u m a n l i f e* : They support and provide for the life of human beings by the various products they yield, by their meat, but clearly by rendering other services, too, i.e. as sacrificial or draught animals. Since already the poets of the Rgveda can be shown to have been fully aware of the fact that animal life depends upon vegetable life and that the latter in its turn upon rain, i.e. water in general, the existence of an expression like *prāṇabhṛt*, provided the interpretation given proves to be correct, cannot be regarded as indicating a change of the 'Weltbild', at least not in this regard; but, to be sure, it is clear evidence of the fact that the keeping of cattle and in general of livestock has been regarded in Vedic India as the most important basis of subsistence: In the consciousness of the people, and not only of the priests<sup>40</sup>, in the common system of values, both mundane and religious, those animals upon which the Vedic Indian depended in a very concrete sense of the word, have played an outstanding role and were therefore given the highest rank. The expression *prāṇabhṛt* is hence but another piece of evidence for a fact already well-known as regards Vedic culture and economy, and the 'ideology' that grew around it; and indeed putting such an extraordinary value on livestock is almost natural in a society which has for centuries been in motion, so to say, the members of which were not settled in the strict sense of establishing somewhere a permanent residence for generations - but cannot also, on the other hand, be called nomades or transhumants. If this interpretation of *prāṇabhṛt* is correct, there is great likelihood that at least originally only, or at least first of all, domestic animals were referred to by this word. As the *prāṇa* they support is, according to our sources, that of man<sup>41</sup>, the expression by itself testifies to a marked, albeit naive, anthropocentrism: These animals are not important for their own sake, or that of 'nature', the universe, etc., but because they serve man as means of his subsistence.

4.1. The essential question to be discussed now is of course whether there is any evidence in Vedic texts that *prāṇabhṛt* used as an appellative has in fact this meaning. I think, this question can safely be answered in the affirmative. For, at AiĀ 2.3.1 what we read is among others:

... *tasmin yo 'nnaṃ cānnādaṃ ca vedāhāsminn annādo jāyate bhavaty asyānnaṃ, oṣadhivanaspatayo 'nnaṃ prāṇabhṛto 'nnādaṃ oṣadhivanaspatin hi prāṇabhṛto 'danti,*

rendered thus by Keith<sup>42</sup>: "to him who knows food and feeder a feeder is born, and food is his. Plants and trees are food, animals the feeder, for animals eat plants". That this translation is correct, at least as regards the interpretation of the word *prāṇabhṛt* - and that he did right not to believe Sāyaṇa<sup>43</sup> is proved by the subsequent part of the text, viz.:

*teṣāṃ ya ubhayatodantāḥ puruṣasyānuvidhā vihitās, te 'nnādā annam itare paśavas tasmāt ta itarān paśūn adhiva caranty adhiva hy anne 'nnādo bhavati*

"of animals, those who have teeth above and below and are for me d like men<sup>44</sup>, are feeders, the rest food. They overcome therefore the other animals, for the feeder is over the food".<sup>45</sup>

It is not less clear that *prāṇabhṛt* means "animal" in the next *khaṇḍa* also, i.e. AiĀ 2.3.2:

*oṣadhivanaspatayo yac ca kiṃca prāṇabhṛt sa ātmānam āvistarāṃ vedauṣadhivanaspatiṣu hi raso dr̥ṣyate cittam prāṇabhṛtsu / prāṇabhṛtsu tv evāvistarāṃ ātmā, teṣu hi raso 'pi dr̥ṣyate na cittam itareṣu / puruṣe tv evāvistarāṃ ātmā sa hi prajñānena saṃpannatamo vijñātaṃ vadati vijñātaṃ paśyati veda śvastanaṃ veda lokālokau martyeṇāmṛtaṃ ipsaty evaṃ saṃpannaḥ / athetareṣāṃ paśūnāṃ aśanāpipāse evābhivijñānaṃ na vijñātaṃ vadanti na vijñātaṃ paśyanti na viduḥ śvastanaṃ na lokālokau ta etāvanto bhavanti yathāprajñāṃ hi sambhavā //.*

"There are plants and trees and animals, and he knows the self more and more clearly (in them). For in plants and trees sap only is seen, in animals consciousness. In animals the self becomes more and more clear, because in them sap also is seen, while thought is not seen in others. The self is more and more clear i n m a n. For he is most endowed with intelligence, he says what he has known, he sees what he has known, he knows tomorrow, he knows the world and what is not the world. By the mortal he desires the immortal, being thus endowed. A s f o r t h e o t h e r , a n i m a l s , hunger and thirst comprise their power of knowledge. They say not ... They go so far, for their experiences are according to the measure of their intelligence".<sup>46</sup>

That is to say, in these two cases the context itself contains elements that quite clearly indicate that the concept of *prāṇabhṛt* does not include man, too. These fascinating passages - which have already attracted the attention of scholars<sup>47</sup>, but should nevertheless be studied

again for various reasons among which their significance for the Indian theories about non-human life and nature, should perhaps be mentioned first -, are highly instructive for the problem at issue also because of the following observations they allow us to make: The words *prāṇabhṛt* and *paśu* are used here as synonyms; *prāṇabhṛt* meaning "animal(s)" is opposed here to *oṣadhivanaspatayaḥ* which latter compound has to be regarded as intending "plants, vegetable life"; finally the phrase *yac ca kiṃca prāṇabhṛt*, "and all that supports breath" > "all that belongs to the animal kingdom" is worthy of note. For in the light of these observations one will not hesitate to assume that *prāṇabhṛt* means "animal", and not just "living being" or even "man", in JB 3.87, too:

*bhūr iti vyāhṛtiḥ / tad ayaṃ loka 'gnir devatā ... rathantaraṃ  
sāma vasavo devatā vanaspatayaś cauśadhayaś ca / bhuva iti  
vyāhṛtiḥ / tad idam antarikṣaṃ vāyur devatā ... vāmadevyaṃ  
sāma rudrā devatāpaś ca prāṇabhṛc ca / ...*<sup>48</sup>

The situation is slightly different as regards JB 3.359: It is highly probable that *yat kiṃca prāṇabhṛt saśarīram* occurring there should not be dislinked from the phrase as it is attested in the AīĀ; but as the corresponding *yat kiṃcābhṛtam aśarīram* contains the hapax *abhṛta* and is not therefore clear, at least not to me, a doubt remains.<sup>49</sup>

4.2. We can hence be sure that Vedic *prāṇabhṛt* "supporting the breath(s) [of somebody else]" is - apart from being a designation of particular bricks - used, most probably as a substantive, to denote certain animals in view of their importance for the survival of man. Yet the remaining passages from Vedic texts referred to in the Larger Petrograd Dictionary have still to be examined, viz. those with regard to which Böhtlingk and Roth deemed it necessary to assume a second, different meaning, viz. "*Leben in sich tragend, lebendig; m. ein lebendiges Wesen; Mensch*".

4.2.1. But before taking this step it is necessary to emphasize that the meanings "living, a living being" and "human being", provided they are really attested in the sources, could be accounted for also by simply assuming a semantic development, viz. in the form of, first, an extension of meaning which would, then, have been followed by restriction. That is to say, the meaning "living, living being" could be explained without inferring from it a change of diathesis of the final member of *prāṇabhṛt*.

Among the references given in the Larger Petrograd Dictionary there is one which is of particular interest at this point of our discussion, viz. Raghuv. 2.42, where Dilipa says to the speaking lion who has introduced himself as Kumbhodara, a servant of Śiva (but in reality is the god himself, a fact, however, still unknown to the king):

*saṃruddhaceṣṭasya mrgendra kāmāṃ  
hāsyāṃ vacas tad yad ahaṃ vivakṣuḥ /  
antargataṃ prāṇabhṛtāṃ hi veda  
sarvaṃ bhavān bhāvam ato 'bhidhāsyē //*

"O king of the beasts, what I, kept as I am from moving, want to say may be laughed at [by other people]; [but] I am going to speak, for you know each and every internal intention of the *prāṇabhṛts* [and therefore also that my words are true]".

The wider context and the verse as it stands clearly shows that Dilipa himself (as a human being) is included in what is called *prāṇabhṛt* here; it is hence entirely convincing that its meaning is "living being" here. Neither is the capacity to express themselves by words, or sounds, confined to human beings - and this very 'story' of the Raghuvamśa is itself evidence enough - nor is the special cognitive faculty of this particular lion likely to be effective with regard to men only.

The existence of the meaning "living being" of *prāṇabhṛt* in classical Sanskrit can not therefore be denied. It is confirmed in its way also by the Middle Indo-Aryan *tadbhavas*, e.g. Pali *pāṇabhū*, *pāṇabhūta* "a living creature".<sup>50</sup>

A statement like that of the Trisikha-Brāhmaṇopaniṣad (2.148), ... *prāṇaḥ prāṇabhṛtāṃ varāḥ*, made with reference to a particular *nāḍī*, however, testifies to the fact that even in later times the formation and literal meaning of this compound was fully understood<sup>51</sup>, viz. that it has 'correctly' been taken to mean "supporting breath/life" - and to call *prāṇa*, "breath" itself a life supporting force (*prāṇabhṛt*), or to be more precise the best of the life supporting forces, is as justified as it is witty. An even clearer proof is offered by the Brahmasūtras; for at 1.3.4 *prāṇabhṛt* is clearly used to denote the "individual 'soul'/self" (*vijñānātman*). Now, this is, no doubt, a philosophical reinterpretation, but a reinterpretation which was possible only because the original meaning was clear to the person who wanted to use *prāṇabhṛt* in order to denote that which in the final analysis, i.e. philosophically, has to be recognized as the ultimate, i.e. only real basis, and origin, of biological life, viz. the permanent 'soul'/self'.<sup>52</sup>

4.2.2. In view of this evidence it is, it would seem to me, hardly possible to keep to the assumption that the starting point of this semantic development can not but have been a *prāṇabhṛt* meaning "*Leben in sich tragend*"; for even authors of classical texts quite evidently have still paraphrased it as *prāṇam bharati*. The development must hence have been a different one; and indeed I don't see any reason why we should not assume that the meaning "certain animal(s)" has been broadened via "animal(s)" to "living being(s)/creature(s)"<sup>53</sup> - which is practically identical with that of *prāṇin* at a later stage of the semantic

development of the latter word - including men<sup>54</sup> and, although no clear evidence for this can be brought forward, plants, too.<sup>55</sup> On the contrary, I regard this development as particularly plausible if the following considerations are taken into account. Already in Vedic times the use of *prāṇabhṛt* to denote certain animals did not correspond to the stage of knowledge about the (inter)dependence of different forms of life, but was based on an emotional - and traditional - high regard for livestock, rather than on soberly balanced reflection. In any case, the cultural and economical development of ancient Indian society took a course which cannot but have made at least a large part of the population aware of the extraordinary and direct importance of the vegetable kingdom as a means of subsistence for man. And for any word meaning "vegetable and animal life" the step is but short to its assuming the still broader meaning of "living beings", including men; in the case of *prāṇabhṛt*, however, it is important to note that this latter step in its semantic development has meant at the same time the loss or at least an essential alteration of its (original) anthropocentric background; but one may well doubt if this was felt by later Sanskrit authors. On the other hand, it is important to see clearly that this semantic development was in itself not influenced by the fact that the word was even in later times now and then rightly recognized to be paraphrasable by *prāṇaṁ bharati* (and that it offers itself accordingly for a play of words or can be reinterpreted): the conventional lexical denotation of a word, and its development, are one thing; its derivational meaning, and the possibilities it offers to those who are aware of it, are something quite different.

It is in this particular connection that I should like to draw attention to a remark of Patañjali's, the Mahābhāṣyakā's. At the end of his discussion of Pāṇ. 1.2.63 (*tiṣyapunarvasvor nakṣatradvandve bahuvacanasya divivacanam nityam*, "in a Dvandva compound formed from names of asterisms ... of *tiṣya* 'a single asterism' and *punarvasu* 'twin star asterisms' the dual ... necessarily ... replaces the plural ...")<sup>56</sup>, the question is raised what purpose is served by the expression *bahuvacanasya* in the sūtra. The answer is: to prevent the application of Pāṇ. 1.2.63 to the singular *dvandva* compound *tiṣyapunarvasu*. This leads to the next question, viz. the justification of the singular, which is answered by referring to Pāṇ. 2.4.6 (*jātir aprāṇinām [dvandvaḥ: 2.4.2 ekavacanam: 2.4.1]*). This argument is refuted by the counterargument that asterisms do not belong to the category of *prāṇins*. This objection is in its turn refuted by a rule of interpretation, viz., *sarvo dvandvo vibhāṣayaikavad bhavati*<sup>57</sup>, and - alternatively - by stating (MBhāṣya I 232.6f.): *athavā nātrabhavantah prāṇinah, prāṇā evātrabhavantah* /, "or/or rather their Honours<sup>58</sup> (i.e. asterisms like *tiṣya*, *punarvasu*, etc.) are not breathing living beings; their Honours are in fact *prāṇas*". This is explained by Kaiyaṭa in his Pradīpa (II 70 a 24ff.)<sup>59</sup> thus: *athaveti: na hy eteṣu loke prāṇivyavahārah prasiddha iti bhāvah / prāṇā eveti: tadābhīrāsthītivāt prāṇinām eta eva prāṇā ucyaṇte* //. That is to say,

asterisms such as *tiṣya* are called - and to wit by the learned -<sup>60</sup> "life force", i.e. are classed with the life forces, because the existence of (breathing) living beings, first of all human beings, depends on them: The use of *prāṇāḥ*, albeit in the Śāstra only, with reference to certain celestial bodies is, I think, an interesting parallel to the extension of meaning observed with regard to *prāṇabhṛt* so as to include human beings, too, in so far as in both these cases a new, i.e. historically later, 'knowledge', viz. of the influence of asterisms on life on earth and of the role played by man himself in supporting life, has been, or rather may<sup>61</sup> have been taken into account.

4.2.3. When Nārada thus addresses God Vāyu at Mbh. (ed. Poona) 12.151.4(ab): *jānāmi tvām ahaṁ vāyo sarvapraṇabhṛtām varam* /, a much more convincing interpretation<sup>62</sup> than "(as) the best of the living beings", obviously favoured by Böhtlingk and Roth, would certainly be "(as) the best of [the deities/forces] who support life [upon earth]". And it would not also be necessary then, although possible, to assume that this Vedic epitheton of gods was still known as such to the Epic poet because the 'etymology' of *prāṇabhṛt* has clearly remained comprehensible in later times also.

This leads us back to the passages referred to in the Larger Petrograd Dictionary which have still to be scrutinized. Almost all of them are found in later Vedic texts so that it cannot be entirely precluded that *prāṇabhṛt* is used in them in a sense already somewhat removed from the original one. But it is, I think, methodically legitimate to make this assumption if and only if the old(er) meaning is clearly not compatible with what is said in the corresponding sentence and/or section, i.e. wider context.

ŚB 14.6.1.12 = BĀU 3.1.7:

*Yājñavalkyeti hovāca - katibhir ayaṁ adyargbhir hotāsmīn yajñe kariṣyati / tiṣṭbhir iti / katamās tisra iti / puronuvākya ca yājyā ca śasyaiva tṛtiyā / kim tābhir jayati / yat kim cedam prāṇabhṛd iti* /. Böhtlingk<sup>63</sup> renders the last sentence by "alles, was hier Leben hat"; but I don't see any necessity to assume that the formula *yat kim cedam prāṇabhṛt* should have been used here in a sense different from that it has in the AiĀ, especially since the *puronuvākya* etc. are subsequently, viz. at BĀU 3.1.10, 'identified' with the *prāṇa*, *apāna* and *vyāna*. The indirect relation between the *prāṇa*, etc., and the *prāṇabhṛts* need not consist in the idea that the latter "bear" the former "within themselves"; both can be viewed as equally plausibly related to each other by the fact that the animals called *prāṇabhṛt* "support" these "breaths".

Yet it has to be admitted that at least in the passage to be discussed now, viz. ŚB 11.2.6.2, there seems to be more to this relation; for this passage reads thus: *prāṇā evāsyedhmāḥ / prāṇēna hīdāṁ sārvaṁ iddhām yāt prāṇabhṛm nimiśād yād ējati sā vidyād āham evaiśā idhmā itī* //. <sup>64</sup> The statement that what is called *prāṇabhṛt* is "kindled by breaths" does



not, however, by any means imply that the compound has to be taken here to mean "bearing breath within oneself"! On the contrary, there is sufficient proof that the Vedic thinkers were fully aware of the fact that the particular animals subsumed under the concept *prāṇabhṛt*, and not only man himself whose life they are destined to support, are in principle equally, though to a lesser degree, endowed with *prāṇa*, "breath", and the other *prāṇas*. This is most clearly shown by some of the passages studied in sections 2.1 and 2.2. It is in the case of ŚB 11.2.6.2 hence not at all necessary to assume that *prāṇabhṛt* is not used in the sense of "animal", or rather, in view of *nimiśād yād éjati*, of certain animals, i.e. livestock; but it is on the other hand possible that the author has deliberately played with the two words *prāṇa* and *prāṇabhṛt* or wished to explain that the latter are able to fulfil their task of supporting breath only because they themselves breathe, are alive because of constant breathing.

The observations made with regard to this passage are of relevance for the interpretation of ŚB 9.2.1.15, too, where it is said, to wit, of the *prāṇāḥ*, that *naivā té divi ná prthivyām yād prāṇabhṛt tasmims tā iti*. For this is clearly a statement about the location of the *prāṇas*; but we are again not justified in drawing the conclusion that the compound *prāṇabhṛt* is used here in order to express that the *prāṇas* reside in the living being denoted by it, or, in other words, that these living beings are called *prāṇabhṛt* because of their having these *prāṇas*, or "bearing" them "within themselves", - just as there is no real need to assume that the author intended a statement about all the loci of the *prāṇas* and hence thought of human beings also. On the other hand, I don't want to overstate my position and entirely deny the possibility - to some it may still appear to be even a more probable interpretation - that (here as well as at ŚB 11.2.6.2) "man" is intended, too, then however only marginally. This holds equally good for at least the first of the two passages now to be discussed where human beings, if at all included in the expression *prāṇabhṛt*, are again not, in my view, the centre of attention.<sup>65</sup>

Similarly I am reluctant to agree with Böhtlingk's interpretation of *prāṇabhṛt* at ŚB 14.4.3.22 = BĀU 1.5.14: *sa eṣa saṃvatsarah prajāpatiḥ ṣoḍaśakalāḥ / tasya rātraya eva pañcadaśa kalāḥ / dhnivaivāsyā ṣoḍaśi kalā / sa rātribhir evā ca pūryate apa ca kṣiyate / so 'māvāsyām rātrim etayā ṣoḍaśyā kalayā sarvaṃ idaṃ prāṇabhṛd anupraviśya tataḥ prātar jāyate / tasmād etāṃ rātrim prāṇabhṛtaḥ prāṇaṃ na vicchindydā<sup>66</sup> api kṛkalāsasyaitasyā eva devatāyā apacityai //* It is, of course, true that not only animals, but also human beings sleep at night and that a god can therefore be conceived of as entering them, in a particular night, and being born from them again at dawn, etc. But what counts is not that what is possible, or what we Western interpreters of the modern age regard as possible, but what the text itself says, and nothing else. It is certainly possible, in theory at least, that the

hierarchy of living beings the lowest one of which is the lizard or chameleon<sup>67</sup>, starts from man at the top. But by what part of the passage is this indicated? Is there not, on the contrary, found here a statement which quite clearly points to the opposite direction, viz. that man is not included here in the category of *prāṇabhṛts*? What I have in mind is the phrase *prāṇaṃ na vicchindydā*; for should we really assume that the author thought of the possibility of homicide and deemed it hence necessary to forbid it during the night of the new moon? And, finally, one should not - as Böhtlingk apparently did in that he renders *prāṇabhṛt* here by "lebendes Wesen"<sup>68</sup> - be misled by the juxtaposition of *prāṇabhṛt* and *prāṇaṃ*: To speak of the breath of a *prāṇabhṛt* does not by any means imply that this word characterizes living beings as "bearing breath within themselves"! This seems to have been Böhtlingk's and Roth's central error, and to be the ultimate reason of entry 2) s.v. *prāṇabhṛt* in their Dictionary. That is to say, in this case, too, we should not deviate from "animals (in general)"; and thus this passage rather testifies to the first step in the broadening of the meaning of the compound in question.

Similarly, the last of the Vedic passages, viz. KauśS. 135.9, does not stand critical examination, i.e. is not sufficiently clear as a proof of *prāṇabhṛt* being used in the sense of "living being (including man)". For it reads thus:

*bahavo 'sya<sup>69</sup> pāśā vitatāḥ prthivyām  
asaṃkhyeyā aparyantā anantāḥ/  
yābhir<sup>70</sup> vaṃśān abhinidadhāti prāṇinām  
yān kāmścemān prāṇabhṛtām jighāmsan //*

Most of the arguments advanced by me in the preceeding discussion of BĀU 1.5.14 apply to this passage, too, but I don't think it is necessary to repeat them. Really new is only the juxtaposition of *prāṇin* and *prāṇabhṛt*. But can we be sure that these terms are here exactly of the same extension? The answer cannot but be in the negative; for, even if *prāṇin* means "(breathing) living being (including man)", it is not only possible that *prāṇabhṛt* refers to the partially different group of "animals (in general)" or "livestock", but there is also greater likelihood that the latter expression is not semantically a mere, and hence redundant, repetition of the expression preceding it in the relative clause.

5. Returning now, at the end of these remarks, to Pāṇ. 5.1.129, it has to be admitted that the result of the rather long exploratory tour for the solution of the problem posed by this sūtra is rather disappointing. For, we are still not in a position to instantly decide what is meant by *prāṇabhṛt* here, because in addition to the semantically closely related expression *prāṇin* what has to be taken into account is the similar



problem whether, and if so, how *prāṇabhṛt* is semantically distinguished from *paśu*, which latter word is translated by Böhtlingk as "Hausthier" and as "Opferthier", in one case.<sup>71</sup> But if this is really the meaning of *paśu* in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, why does Pāṇini then use the expression *grāmyapaśu* in order to exclude wild animals, in 1.2.73?<sup>72</sup> A more plausible conclusion would seem to be that *paśu* means "animal", both domestic and wild.<sup>73</sup> Provided that our basic assumption is correct, viz. that Pāṇini thoroughly observes semantical distinctions and strictly avoids the use of synonyms, the solution which suggests itself now, and as a most natural one at that, is that *prāṇabhṛt* refers to animals which are of foremost importance for man in that they "support his life", i.e. to "domestic animals", as has been suspected already at the outset.<sup>74</sup> Böhtlingk's translation of 5.1.129 is, however, exemplary at least in one regard, viz. in that he omits the definite article. For, what Pāṇini quite evidently wants to say is that the secondary suffix is added - not to the designations of domestic animals, but - to some of them, the only examples being *āśvam* and *auṣṭram*.<sup>75</sup> But even with regard to present-day India, it would be correct to say that horses and camels still belong to those animals on which the life of many a human being depends. However, I am afraid, the presence or absence of the concept *prāṇabhṛt*, in Vedic times and modern India respectively, has but very little influence on the manner in which members of these species are treated: in practice a matter-of-fact anthropocentrism has held and still holds sway! But the Vedic Indians at least have been aware of it, and admitted it with winning, albeit naive, frankness - a trait this which my friend Jan C. Heesterman will have perceived long ago and reacted to with sympathy.<sup>76</sup>

## NOTES

1. *Pāṇini's Grammatik...*, Leipzig 1887, repr. Hildesheim 1964.
2. *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini...* 2 Vols., Allahabad 1891, repr. Delhi-Varanasi-Patna 1962.
3. *La Grammaire de Pāṇini...*, 2 Vols, Paris 1966.
4. *Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini...*, Austin 1987, first Indian ed. Delhi-Varanasi (etc.) 1989.
5. Regarding the difference of authors of the Sūtra and the Vṛtti on them see now: Th. Oberlies, *Studie zum Cāndravyākaraṇa. Eine kritische Bearbeitung von Candra IV.4.52-148 und V.2*, Stuttgart 1989, and his article "Verschiedene neu-entdeckte Texte des Cāndravyākaraṇa und ihre Verfasser (Studien zum Cāndravyākaraṇa II)" to be published in StII 16/17 (1992).

6. The reference is to the sentence *prāṇigrahaṇam eva na kṛtaṁ vaicityārtham* in the *Padamañjari* on Kāś. on Pān. 5.1.129.
7. Cf. Pān. 2.4.2; 4.3.135; 154; 2.3.17; 2.4.5; 5.4.97; 6.2.134(f.); 6.3.77 and 8.3.72. (Note that in S.M. Katre's *Dictionary of Sanskrit*, 3 Pts., Poona 1968, the references 2.3.2 and 3.3.17 are incorrect.)
8. Cf. also Pān. 5.2.96 and 128.
9. Cf. G.A. Jacob, *Laukikanyāyāñjaliḥ. A Handful of Popular Maxims...*, Pt. 1, Bombay 1907, p. 38.
10. Note that in CV two sūtras, viz. 3.3.104 (*vrkṣauṣidbhyo 'mīse ca*) and 105 (*prāṇibhyo 'ñ*), correspond to Pān. 4.3.135.
11. Cf. MBhāṣya III 232.1 and 318.26f.
12. I have dealt with this passage in my article "Paralipomena zum Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda. (I). Mahābhāṣya zu Pān. 4.3.155 und seine einheimischen Erklärer", *WZKS XXVI* (1982), 149-166.
13. On this word see H. Lüders, *Philologica Indica...*, Göttingen 1940, p. 177ff.
14. Note that here I ignore words which have already been mentioned.
15. On this sūtra cf. Oberlies, o.c. (fn. 5), p. 82f.
16. Cf. Kāśikā on 4.3.154.
17. In the Kāś. on the sūtra discussed in the MBhāṣya, viz. on Pān. 5.4.68, the secondary noun *koṣaṇiṣadini* is merely mentioned among others, and Haradatta too does not offer any help in that he confines himself to giving the *vigraha* of the basic *dvandva* (*koṣaś ca niṣac ca*).
18. Cf. the meaning "cover, covering" attested for *koṣa* also according to B.J. Sandesara's and J.P. Thaker's *Lexicographical Studies in 'Jaina Sanskrit'*, Baroda 1962, p. 123.
19. It has, however, to be admitted that his explanation *koṣaṇiṣadam asyā astīti (dvandopatāpāgarhyāt prāṇisthād inir bhavati)* could be based on nothing but a correct linguistic analysis of the formation of *koṣaṇiṣadini* and that he himself did not any longer know the meaning of the word.
20. The examples given in the Kāś. (on 5.2.128) to explain this word of the sūtra, viz. *kakudāvartī* and *kākatāluki*, can equally not be styled as fully understandable.
21. Cf. Oberlies, o.c. (fn. 5), p. 236.
22. Cf. Pān. 2.4.8 *ṣudrajanantavaḥ*. In Pāṇini *jantu* could well be the corresponding generic term for "animal (in general)".
23. The meanings given in the Larger Petrograd Dictionary for the *ātmanepada* in particular are "sich schnell hinbewegen", "mit sich nehmen; für sich davon tragen, gewinnen".
24. These compounds could easily be identified with the help of the *Reverse Index of Old Indian* (Wiesbaden 1974-78) or the *Index II (Ab Ultimo) of the Consolidated Indices of the Vaidika-Padāmukrama-Koṣa* (Hoshiapur 1965). On these compounds cf. also Wackernagel-Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik II 2*, Göttingen

- 1954, p. 17 and 25.
25. As for the syntax, I take *prāṇabhṛtaḥ* to be used predicatively here and would hence translate it literally "in as much as they are supporters of breath".
26. *The Veda of the Black Yajur School entitled Taittiriya Saṁhita...*, Pt. I (HOS 18), Cambridge, Mass. 1914, p. 255.
27. Cf. R.P. Das, *Das Wissen von der Lebensspanne der Bäume. Surapālas Vṛkṣāyurveda ...*, Stuttgart 1988, pp. 284ff., 289, 324, 444, 446 and 450.
28. Cf. W. Caland, "Eine dritte Mitteilung über das Vādhūlasūtra" in *AO IV* (1926), p. 162 = *Kleine Schriften* hrsg. von M. Witzel, Stuttgart 1990, p. 345.
29. The fact that the indicative is used, and not another mood, does not, of course, diminish the probability that what is ultimately intended is a plea (the essential difference being that the indicative expresses the idea that the plea has already being fulfilled: hope dressed as certitude, a significant element of religious speech).
30. Cf. Wackernagel-Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik III ...*, Göttingen 1931, p. 65.
31. As for parallel passages, cf. *Brāhmaṇoddhara-koṣaḥ (Brāhmaṇic Citations) ...*, Hoshiapur 1966, p. 96.
32. Cf. e.g. the book just mentioned in fn. 31, p. 93ff.
33. Cf. also ŚB 8.1.2.11.
34. E.g. ŚB 8.2.3.1ff.
35. Cf. KāthS 20.9 and KapS 31.11.
36. This is Keith's translation, o.c. (fn. 26), p. 415.
37. On which see also ŚB 5.3.2.2(f.).
38. Note that according to Wackernagel-Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik II,2 ...*, p. 412f. this name is however derived from *apas*, "work".
39. Cf. also MS 3.2.8 and KāthS 20.9. This is a basically correct zoological observation as the normal sequence of steps (of terrestrial vertebrates) is right foreleg, left hind leg, left foreleg, right hind leg; cf. D. Müller-Schwarze, "Fortbewegung bei Tieren" in: *Praktikum der Verhaltensforschung*, hrsg. von Stokes u. Immelmann, Frankfurt-New York 1978, p. 8-14.
40. That is to say, I don't think that *prāṇabhṛt* was coined as an insider word for a coterie of the learned.
41. See e.g. the passages discussed above in section 2.1.
42. *The Aitareya Āraṇyaka...*, Oxford 1909, p. 216.
43. Who explains: ... *oṣadhivānaspatinām annatvaṁ prāṇabhṛtām manuṣyagavāśvādīnām bhoktrivaṁ ca loke prasiddham iti dyotayitūṁ hīṣabdhāḥ* I.

44. The spacing is mine. - Note that e.g. TS 2.2.6.3 shows that the expression *ubhayadat* as such may refer to man, too, but that its (narrower) meaning is made clear here by the subsequent *puruṣasyānuvidhā vihītās*.
45. Cf. also, though rather with regard to later developments of the dichotomy "food" and "eater", R. Geib's article "Food and Eater in Natural Philosophy of Early India", *JORI*, Baroda, XXV, 3-4 (1976), 221-235.
46. Quoted from A.B. Keith, o.c. (fn. 41), p. 216f.
47. Cf. e.g. R.N. Dandekar's contribution ("Der Mensch im Denken des Hinduismus") to the book *Sein als Offenbarung in Christentum und Hinduismus*, hrsg. v. A. Bsteh, Mödling 1984, p. 139-179.
48. Although man is conspicuous by his absence on the next, i.e. third, level (for which see the continuation of the passage quoted by me).
49. Should one perhaps read *amṛtam* instead?
50. On which cf. K.R. Norman, "Eleven Pāli Etymologies", *JPTS XV* (1987), p. 39f. and L. Schmithausen's monograph "*Plants as Sentient Beings in Earliest Buddhism?*" published 1991 in Tokyo by The International Institute for Buddhist Studies; see also below fn. 65.
51. Quite in contradistinction to the corresponding word in Pāli.
52. Cf. e.g. also Mahābhārata (Poona) 12.326.34:  
*na vinā dhātusamghātām śarīraṁ bhavati kvacit /*  
*na ca jīvaṁ vinā brahman dhātavaś ceṣṭayanty uta //*
53. Of the passages referred to in the Larger Petrograd Dictionary it is the following ones which have to be mentioned in this connection: *Suśrutasaṁhitā* I. 175.3 (i.e. *Sūtrasthāna* 45.48), *Spr(üche)*: 2599 and 3709, *Varāh. BS* 7.5 and *Prabodhacandrodaya* 35.18 (= 2.32).
54. Man alone is, however, meant in *Spr(üche)* 1299 and *Varāh. BS* 67.97 (= 68.96). Cf. also *Yuktidipikā* (ed. Pandeya), p. 8 l. 26f: ... *yeyam asati viśeṣe sarvaprāṇabhṛtām āsurer eva bhagavato duḥkhatrayābhigātabuddhir bhavati ...* where the meaning "man", even if it is not the only one intended, is yet what the author primarily has in view; cf. also *YD* p. 38 l. 17.
55. *Varāh. BS* 8.14 could be referred to here; yet *Manu* 5.28 has to be mentioned, too, in that it reads:  
*prāṇasyānnam idaṁ sarvaṁ prajāpatir akalpayat /*  
*sthāvaraṁ jaṅgamaṁ caiva sarvaṁ prāṇasya bhojanam //*  
(It has only been briefly mentioned by L. Alsdorf, *Beiträge zur Geschichte von Vegetarismus und Rinderverehrung in Indien*, Wiesbaden 1962, p. (20) = 576, but would in my view deserve closer a study.)

56. Katre's rendering of *tiṣya* is problematic at least as regards the etymology on which see B. Forssman, 'Apaoṣa, der Gegner des Tiṣṭriia', KZ 82 (1968), p. 37-61.
57. Cf. Paribhāṣā 34 in Nāgeśa's Paribhāṣenduśekhara (ed. Kielhorn p. 59f., transl. Kielhorn p. 171ff.) and see Kaitaṭa's Pradīpa (NSP-ed.) II 70 a 5ff.
58. Cf. also Nāgeśa's Uddyota (NSP-ed.) II 70 a 29-31: *na hy eteṣv iti / āpomayaḥ prāṇa* [ChU 6.7.1] *iti śruter adbhir vinā glāyamānaprāṇā eva loke prāṇina ity ucyante, idam eva pūjyatvam bhāṣye 'trabhavacchadenocyata iti bhāvaḥ //*.
59. The reference is to the NSP-edition.
60. Uddyota II 70 a 31f.: *loke prāṇa iti vyavahārasyāpy abhāvād āha - tadadhīneti /*.
61. For I do not want to contend that the semantic development which is clearly recognizable, can only be accounted for by this assumption.
62. Especially because the context is that of the lack of respect which is due to God Vāyu.
63. *Bṛhadāraṇjakopaniṣad in der Mādhyānīdina-Recension*, St. Petersburg 1889, p. 38.
64. Cf. ŚB(K) 3.2.10.2.
65. Note that in early Pali verses *pāṇabhū* / *-bhūta* means "living being" (cf. Vin. I 3.27ff.\*, AN III 213.21\*), but that human beings (Ja V 79.17ff.\*), men and women (JA IV 494.26ff.\*) and plants (Sn 146) are included or may be referred even to in the first place.
66. Cf. ChU 6.7.1 for the idiom *prāṇam vi-cchid*.
67. It is not at all probable that one and the same word should denote lizards in general and a very peculiar family of the infraordo Inguania at the same time. But I can't enter here into a discussion of the meaning of *kṛkalāsa*.
68. O.c. (fn. 62), p. 18.
69. Scil. *mṛtyoḥ!*
70. Read *yebhir?*
71. Viz. in 2.4.12, 3.2.25, 3.3.69, 1.2.73 and 5.3.51 respectively.
72. The discussion of the sūtra in the Mbhāṣya is of particular interest in that it allows us to look at the actual treatment of cattle in those days (I 252.13ff.): *ayam api yogaḥ śakyo 'vaktum / katham gāva imāś caranti ajā imāś caranti / gāva utkālitāpumiṣkā vāhāya ca vikrayāya ca / striya evāvaśiṣyante !/*
73. Quite evidently Pāṇini uses the expression *grāmyapaśu* and not *prāṇabhṛt*, because the difference between domestic and wild (forms of) animals is of relevance here and because the character common to both is not denoted by *prāṇabhṛt*.
74. See section 1.2 above.

75. Note that the expression *kauñjara* n. "a particular method of sitting" which Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, is rather an adjective to which *āsana* has to be added by association.
76. In my view *prāṇabhṛt* at Manu 8.295 and 296 also does not include man; but the problems posed by these two verses, or rather, the whole section 8.293-296, have to be reserved for another occasion.