

SOCIETY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC IN INDIAN TRADITION

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Jaipur (Raj.)

About the Book

Indian epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions as knowledge (*jñāna*) and organ of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). This book deals with both the dimensions along with the view point (*naya*) of a knower. It also discusses acquired knowledge (*aparā vidyā*) and self-manifested spiritual knowledge (*parā vidyā*), sensuous and super-sensuous knowledge, *nirvikalpaka* (devoid of verbal designation) and *savikalpaka* (determinate) knowledge, its five kinds according to Jaina philosophy as 1. *Matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge) 2. *Śruta jñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge) 3. *Avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance) 4. *Manahparyāya jñāna* (a knowledge reading mental modes of others) 5. *kevalajñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge). It describes definition of *pramāṇa*, its kinds as perception, inference, and testimony along with the establishment of recollection (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), inductive reasoning (*tarka*), as *pramāṇa*.

It mentions logic as a part of *pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* in the form of inference for others and also as inductive reasoning. Buddhist contribution in defining perception as *nirvikalpaka* (devoid of verbal designation) and the contribution of Jaina philosophers to Indian epistemology and logic has been enumerated.

It also discusses about the concept of society in world-renouncing philosophy of Jainism and Impact of Vedic culture on it. A chapter analyses the concept of consciousness according to Jaina scriptures which does have importance even in the modern scientific era and another chapter provides with solutions of conflicts prevailing in the minds of human beings and the society.

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Society, Epistemology and Logic in Indian Tradition With Specific Reference to Jainism

by **Dr. Dharmchand Jain**

PRAKRIT BHARATI ACADEMY, JAIPUR

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Publisher's Note

This book deals with the Indian epistemology and society. There are mainly three branches of philosophy i.e. (1) Ontology or metaphysics (2) Epistemology and logic (3) Ethics. Ontology or metaphysics is a core area which deals with the reality or physical existent elements in the universe. Epistemology discusses about the origination of knowledge, its nature, sources and validity; and logic is a science of argumentation and inference for others. Ethics covers the concept of sinful and virtuous conduct of a human being.

Indian tradition is quite rich in thoughtful and consistent ideas. Regarding epistemology and logic three schools are the foremost in India – Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist and Jaina school. Dr. Dharm Chand Jain has worked in the field of Buddhist and Jaina epistemology and logic. His two books are available in Hindi regarding Buddhist and Jaina epistemology. One is published from Parshvanath Vidyāpīṭha, Varanasi and another from the Buddhist Studies Centre, Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur. We have a pleasure to publish his English book which is a collection of his valuable research papers presented in National and International seminars in India and abroad. This book contains his six articles on Jaina and Buddhist epistemology and logic. He has discussed the subject in such a way that it touches the views of other philosophical schools also. Dr Jain accepts that epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions of philosophy i.e. *jñāna-mīmāṃsā*

(Theory of Knowledge) and *pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* (Theory of organ of valid cognition). He has written articles on both the aspects. In Indian philosophy logic is a part of *pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*.

Articles on knowledge, *naya* and *nāyabhāsa*, *nirvikalpatā* and *śrutajñāna* are related to epistemology. An article on concept of consciousness is important in the modern era which is also connected with the philosophical branch of epistemology. Two articles namely 'Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature' and 'Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism' are related mainly with Ethics.

We are happy to publish this book and hope its usefulness for the interested readers of Indian tradition and philosophy in general and Jaina and Buddhist schools of philosophy in particular.

D.R. Mehta

Founder & Chief Patron

Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur

Preface

Indian philosophy has a rich tradition of different ideas about metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which deals with nature of knowledge (*jñāna*), its origination, sources, validity and consistency and also it deals with an organ of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).

Every Indian philosophy proposes a goal to achieve a blissful life and emancipation from sufferings forever. Knowledge is a powerful resource to control and remove the feeling of sufferings. It is helpful in knowing and propounding the real truth of existent elements of the universe and the pious deeds.

In this book an article entitled "Knowledge in Jainism : an Overview" discusses the nature and kinds of knowledge and the contribution of Jainism to Indian philosophy. Knowledge is considered as an attribute or property of a soul. Nyāya philosophers consider it as a separate category of attribute which resides in a soul with inherence relation whereas Jaina philosophers consider knowledge as an essential, identical and natural attribute of a soul, without which consciousness cannot be defined in a soul. Vedānta philosophers also accept knowledge or cognitive function as an essential character of the soul or *brahma*.

Knowledge is not only acquired, it is also intrinsically manifested in a soul after removal of ignorance and subsidence-cum-destruction (*kṣayopaśama*) of knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvaraṇa*) *karma*. Sense organs, mind and intellect are the

means of acquiring knowledge and soul is a knower. This acquired knowledge is called as *aparāvidyā* in the *Upaniṣads*. In Jainism, it is called as *matijñāna*. A soul has an ability to know the objects directly without the help of sense organs and mind also. That knowledge is defined as supersensuous and spiritual knowledge which emerges within a soul after removal of ignorance and subsidence-cum-destruction of knowledge-obscuring *karma*. In the *Upaniṣads*, it has been called as *parāvidyā*. In Jainism, this knowledge has been considered as *avadhijñāna*, *manahparyāyajñāna* and *kevalajñāna*, *Śrutajñāna* is considered as a scriptural, verbal and spiritual knowledge.

Thinking about validity of knowledge is also a subject of epistemology. Yogācāra Buddhists and Jaina philosophers accept knowledge as illuminating the self and the object. Hence in their views, no other knowledge is required to determine the validity of that knowledge in the practiced position, but if the knowledge of an object is not familiar, then another knowledge is needed to verify its validity. Nyāya philosophers accept that validity of one knowledge is determined through some other valid knowledge. Mimāṃsaka philosophers have a different view. They accept that invalidity in a knowledge comes from other causes, knowledge itself is valid.

Jaina tradition has contributed in the field of Indian epistemology by propounding five types of knowledge viz- 1. *Matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge) 2. *Śrutajñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge) 3. *Avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance) 4. *Manahparyāyajñāna* (a knowledge reading mental modes of others) 5. *kevalajñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge).

Śrutajñāna is important, because of its utility in revealing *kevalajñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge). It is found in every living being in a right or perverted form, hence the prevalent meaning of *śrutajñāna* as a verbal or scriptural knowledge is insufficient. This fact has been pointed out and a wide meaning usable for achieving liberation has been investigated in the article entitled "Significance of *Śrutajñāna*".

Indian philosophers have developed a distinguished branch of epistemology and logic as *pramāṇa-śāstra* and *nyāya-vidyā*. An organ of valid cognition is called *pramāṇa* and an examination of a reality through *pramāṇas* is called *nyāya*. Method of inference for others using two to five organs (*avayavas*) is also called as *Nyāya*. In the western terminology it has been defined as logic. Every Indian philosophical school has accepted *pramāṇa* as an organ of valid cognition, but they have different opinions in their numbers. Cārvaka considers only one *pramāṇa* i.e. perception (*pratyakṣa*). Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist philosophers propound two *pramāṇas* including inference (*anumāna*) with it. Jainas also accept two, but they gave a different name to second *pramāṇa* as indirect (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇa*, in which they include recollection (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), inductive reasoning (*tarka*), inference (*anumāna*) and testimony (*āgama*) as its kinds. Sāṃkhya propound three *pramāṇas* as perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and testimony (*āgama*). Nyāya philosophers describe four *pramāṇas* keeping comparison (*upamāna*) as a different *pramāṇa*. Prabhākara Mimāṃsakas accept five including *arthāpatti* (presupposition) and Mimāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accept six *pramāṇas* propounding non-availability (*anupalabdhi*) as a different *pramāṇa*. The article on Jaina Epistemology and Logic gives a

brief account about the development of Jaina epistemology and its contribution to Indian epistemological tenets alongwith discussing the *pramāṇas* in general.

There is a discussion in Indian epistemology on perception (*pratyakṣa*), whether it is *nirvikalpaka* (devoid of verbal designation) or *savikalpaka* (determinate)? Buddhist philosopher Dignāga has propounded that perception through sense organs is always *nirvikalpaka*. *Kalpanā* (mental or verbal construction) is an addition to it, and that is not a part of perception. This concept of *nirvikalpatā* has been discussed in a separate article entitled "The concept of *Nirvikalpatā* in Buddhist Logic and the Indian Tradition" in this book. Here it is notable that Jaina philosophers accept *pramāṇa* as a determinate knowledge which is devoid of doubt, pervertedness and indeterminateness, hence *pramāṇa* should be *savikalpaka* (determinate) in their view. Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti has given arguments in favour of *nirvikalpaka* perception. Other schools of Indian Philosophy like Yoga, Nyāya and Mimāṃsā have also discussed *nirvikalpatā*.

Nayavāda is a specific original contribution of Jainism to the panorama of Indian epistemological doctrines. *Nayavāda* is a view point or stand point to know and to describe a reality. Jaina philosophers discuss mainly two and seven kinds of *nayas*, which have been described in an article on "*Naya*, *Nayābhāsa* and *Nikṣepa*." *Naya* is also a science to grasp the real meaning of sentence, whereas *nikṣepa* is a term to investigate the appropriate meaning of a word. *Naya* and *Nikṣepa* are related to linguistic aspect also. When a *naya* bears an absolutistic view point then it is treated as *nayābhāsa*.

An article entitled "The Concept of Consciousness in Jainism" presents the nature of consciousness, its various levels

as alertness (*apramattatā*), cognitive function (*upayoga*), vitality (*praṇa*), body-consciousness, *sañjñā* (eagerness to eat, feeling fear, sexual desire, desire of possessiveness), *vedanā* (feeling of pleasure and sorrow), *vīrya* (enthusiasm) etc. Science has reached in its research up to consciousness of brain, cells and genes, whereas Jainism accepts that these body parts are felt conscious due to the consciousness of a soul. According to Jainism consciousness is an essential and inseparable attribute of a soul, which could not be known through the empirical or materialistic instruments.

Jainism is considered as a world-renouncing religion, hence it is assumed often that society is neglected in it, but this assumption is not true. Lord Mahāvīra and other Tīrthāṅkars deliver their preaching for the welfare of the society and all living beings. A concept of fourfold ford (*caturvidha tīrtha* or *saṅgha*) gives a formation of society of religious persons in Jaina Philosophy. Although the followers of Jainism follow Hindu laws in respect of various social ceremonies. Vardhamānasūri (15th century) has propounded various sacraments for monks and house holders. Non-violence, theory of *Karma*, Non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*), non-possession (*aparigraha*), compassion of *tīrthāṅkara* also convey the social importance of all living beings. In this way this article proves the social significance of Jaina tenets. It also evaluates the impact of Hindu culture on Jaina thought of society and presents the social attitude of present Jaina society as well.

“Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism” is an article, which provides with a light to understand the causes of confrontation among the human beings and the solutions available in the Jainism with the views of *anekāntavāda*, *Nayavāda*, non-violence, theory of *karma* etc.

I am delighted to express my respect and gratitude to Dr D.R. Mehta, founder of Prakrit Bharati Academy for inspiring me to prepare this book. I bow to his honest dedication for service to humanity and love to valuable literature. I am also grateful to Prof. Peter flügel for his able guidance and permission to include the paper entitled "Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature" which was presented at Centre of Jaina Studies, SOAS, university of London in 2006. Paper on Buddhist *Nirvikalpatā* was presented in Lumbini International Research Institute, Lumbini, Nepal in 2013. I am obliged to Prof. Cüppers for permission and Prof. Jayendra Soni, Austria for editing it. I am also indebted to the organizers of various National and International seminars and lecture series (at Valiyanad-Kocchi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Delhi) who invited me to present the papers and for inclusion of them in the present collection. I heartily thank Prof. KalpanaPurohit and Dr. S.K. Harit who have gone through these articles and improved the language. I shall be satisfied, if it is proved useful to any interested reader.

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Society in Jaina Philosophy and Literature

Jainism is considered as a religion and philosophy that promotes world-renunciation. It might therefore be assumed that there are no rules for society in Jainism. Yet, this would be a misconception. Jaina philosophy and literature have enough citations to prove that welfare of all beings' society is always in focus in preachings of fordmakers (*tīrthaṅkara*). Society denotes mutual co-operation or inter-relationship of individuals which takes place in the path of salvation too. Ford (*tīrtha*) or four-fold religious order (*caturvidha-saṅgha*) is a significant evidence to confirm this notion.

This article aims to

- (i) explore the concept of society in Jainism,
- (ii) analyse the philosophical tenets from the point of view of their social significance,
- (iii) discuss the position of society in Jaina canonical and posterior literature,
- (iv) evaluate the impact of Hindu culture on Jaina thought of society,
- (v) present the social attitude of present Jaina society.

Concept of Society in Jainism

Human survival is nearly impossible without the existence of society. Although society is a changing phenomenon, it exists all the times. What is society? It is not merely a group of people, but it denotes the inter-relationship of individuals. The sociologists R. M. Maciver and Charles H. Page (1950: 6) state: "Society exists only where social beings

'behave' towards one another in ways determined by their recognition of one another." *Umāsvāti* says: "Souls render service to one another."¹ Nathmal Tatia explains *Umāsvāti*'s statement and the commentaries of *Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmī*, *Pūjyapāda* and *Siddhasenagaṇi* as follows:

"Worldly souls influence each other through service that may be favourable or unfavourable, beneficial or harmful. They cannot live independently of one-another. They have to share their pleasure and pains with others. They create a common environment and live together in weal and woe."²

This explains a wider concept of society of all beings. It keeps all souls in the view, propounding their relationship which includes the society of human beings also.

Jaina canons describe the concept of six categories of worldly souls (*ṣaḍ-nikāya*)³ and infinite number of souls. Jaina philosophy accepts every soul as an independent or separate entity. Every soul has its own identity. All the human beings also have their separate identity. Mutual interaction and relationship of these make a concept of society in Jaina philosophy and religion. In the *Bodhapāhuḍa*, the fourth chapter of the *Aṣṭapāhuḍa*, Kundakunda says that the religion stated by *tīrthaṅkaras* is beneficial for beings of all six categories.⁴

The central theme of Jaina religion and philosophy is spiritual purification, but it cannot be achieved without the

¹ TS 5.21: *parasparopagraho jīvānām*.

² Tatia (1994: 131).

³ *Ṣaḍnikāyas* are six categories of worldly souls: *prthvīkāyika* (earth bodied beings), *apkāyika* (water bodied beings), *tajaskāyika* (fire bodied beings), *vāyukāyika* (air bodied beings), *vanaspatikāyika* (vegetation) and *trasakāyika* (mobile beings with two or more sense organs). For details see ĀS 1.1.2-7.

⁴ *Bodhapāhuḍa*, verse 60: *chakkāyahiyaṅkaramuttaṃ*.

purification of behaviour of a soul towards the whole world of other souls. Mahāvīra, the 24th *tīrthaṅkara* of Jaina tradition is always concerned about the world of all beings in his teachings to the people.⁵ He established the equality of all human beings and other souls on the basis of their sensitivity. The *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra* tries to make a man sensitive towards the all beings of the world.⁶ It says: as you feel pain at the time of beating or torturing by others, so others also feel in that way if you torture them.⁷ This kind of preaching of non-violence (*ahiṃsā*) is not limited to the human beings; its sphere goes to all the living beings of the world. In *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra* non-violence has a social aspect, which motivates a man to become sensitive to others with compassion and friendliness.⁸ Violent behaviour is enemy for the society,⁹ but non-violence is a prerequisite friend for it. For co-existence and peace of the society non-violent and friendly behaviour is very much essential. *Praśnavyākaraṇa-sūtra* states that non-

⁵ 1) ĀS 1.2.3: *savvesiṃ jīvitam piyaṃ nāivāyejja kañcaṇaṃ*.
2) DK 6.11: *savve jīvāvi ichanti jīviuṃ na marijjiuṃ*.

⁶ a. SK 2.1.680: *savve pāṇā savve jīvā savve bhūyā savve sattā na haṃtavvā, na ajjāveyavvā na parighetavvā na paritāveyavvā, na uddaveyavvā*.

b. SK 1.1.4.9: *evam khu naṇiṇo sāraṃ jaṃ na hiṃsai kiñcaṇaṃ ahiṃsā samayaṃ ceva, etāvaṇitaṃ viyāṇiyā*.

⁷ SK 2.1.679: *se jahānāmaye mama assāyaṃ daṇḍeṇa vā atṭhiṇa vā [...] hiṃsākaraṃ dukkhaṃ bhayaṃ paḍisaṃvedemi, iccevaṃ jāṇa savve pāṇā jāva sattā daṇḍeṇa vā jāva kavāleṇa vā āuḍijjamāṇā vā hammamāṇā vā tajiijjamāṇā vā tādiijjamāṇā vā pariāvijjamāṇā vā kilāmiijamāṇā vā uddavijjamāṇā vā jāva [...] evaṃ na cā savve pāṇā jāva savve sattā na haṃmatavvā, na ajjāveyavvā, na parighetavvā, na paritāveyavvā, na uddaveyavvā*.

⁸ *Ācārāṅga*- and *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtras* stress on the sensitivity of a living being and propound that every living being wants to live, nobody wants sorrow, as ĀS 1.4.2 says: *savvesiṃ pāṇāṇaṃ savvesiṃ bhutāṇaṃ savvesiṃ jīvāṇaṃ savvesiṃ sattāṇaṃ asāyaṃ apariniivāṇaṃ mahābhayaṃ dukkhaṃ ti, tti bemi*.

⁹ ĀS 1.1.2: *taṃ se ahitāya taṃ se abodhie*.

violence is like a shelter for fearful persons, like a flying path for birds and like water for thirsty persons. It results in benefit for all beings, mobile (*trasa*) and immobile (*sthāvara*).¹⁰

Thus concept of society in Jainism can be formulated in the following words- "Society is a phenomenon of all living beings that exists on their mutual relations and behaviour." All human beings on the ground of humanity are equal and their purpose is achieving high goals of life. The perception of society in Jaina philosophy and religion is to strive for a condition of existence without fear in order render service to one another. It should be without exploitation and be beneficial for all.

Relevance of Society in World-Renouncing Jainism

Jainism is considered as a world-renouncing religion, hence someone may assume that concept of society in Jainism is difficult to sustain, but Jaina religion has both the qualities. It suggests the principle of renunciation of the worldly sensual pleasure for the sake of salvation from sorrows and also it inspires to engage oneself in doing welfare of others along with self-restraint from the sensual pleasure and sinful acts. The *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* explains:

"Refrain from one side and engage your self to other side, abstain from sinful acts and do the acts of self-restraint."¹¹

¹⁰ PV 2.1.3: *esā sā bhagavaī ahiṃsā jā sā bhīyāṇaṃ viva saraṇaṃ, pakkhinaṃ viva gamaṇaṃ, tisiyāṇaṃ viva salilaṃ, tsa-thāvara-savva-bhūya-khemaṇkarī.*

¹¹ Utt 31.2: *egao viraiṃ kujjā egao ya pavattaṇaṃ; asaṇjame niyattim kujjā, saṇjame ya pavattaṇaṃ.*

This statement inspires us to leave the bad acts and do the good acts. Good action may be of two types – first leads to self-purification and other one instructs in doing welfare of the society of all beings – including human beings. Upādhyāya Amar Muni (1966: 21) accepts that:

“The feeling of renunciation in personal life is prerequisite for fair social well-being. Emancipation from limitless lust and desires is essential ethical duty of a person for performing social service.”

Sukhlāl Saṅghavī (1957: Part 2/146) observes:

“A society neither can entirely sustain on the maze of reclusive principles, nor can it rely on worldly pleasures. People believing only in worldly pleasures can submerge in the whirlpool of physical and materialistic ambitions, it is also true that high and dry philosophical inclination towards renunciation can also alienate living society from the source of vitality. It is historical and philosophical fact that involvement and detachment are the two sides of the same coin. No one can escape from doing evils, if he does not make efforts for attaining virtues” (Translated from Hindī).

Sāgarmal Jain (1982 II: 140) comments:

“Both world engagement and renunciation are *relevant in their spheres*, but *mutual encroachments* may endanger the significance of each of these two” (Translated from Hindī).

These statements by leading exponents prove that Jainism is not only considered to be a world-withdrawing religion, but it is a religion of acts of welfare too, and offers numerous significant ideas related to society.

Opposition to the *brāhmaṇical* Caste System

In the Vedic tradition of Indian philosophy, the Hindu class system and system of stages of life (*varṇāśrama-dharma*) were governing factors of Hindu Society. There were four classes (*varṇa*) – Brahmin (*brāhmaṇa*), warriors (*kṣatriya*), merchants (*vaiśya*) and service class (*śūdra*) on the basis of profession and virtues of a person. As the *Bhagavadgīta* 4.13 says: “I created four *varṇas* on the basis of virtues and profession.”¹²

These four *varṇas*, after a period, were developed into four castes. Although the names of four *varṇas* and castes are the same, but the caste is considered by birth, whereas *varṇa* is considered by profession or conduct. A *varṇa* may change in to another *varṇa* e.g. a *kṣatriya* may become a *brāhmaṇa* by his conduct or profession, but caste does not change like it. A *kṣatriya* as a caste remains always a *kṣatriya* in his whole life.

Principle of caste system can create a complex of superiority and inferiority among the people. The *Uttarādhyayana* opposed the prevalent caste system of superiority and inferiority of human beings on the basis of different castes. As Pierre Paul Amiel (2008: 30) observes: “In Jainism, divisions in castes and sub-castes did not concern higher and lower classes like in Hinduism.” He also observes thereto: “In Jainism, when one speaks of castes and sub-castes, it is more questions of profession and geographical origin.”

Discrimination among them on the basis of caste, creed and colour is not justified according to the

¹² *cāturvarṇyam mayā sṛṣṭam guṇakarmavibhāgaśah.*

Uttarādhyayanasūtra. It opens the doors for everyone to attain salvation from sorrows. Harikeśī Cāṇḍāla, a man of very lower caste, assigned duty in cremation places, became a great monk and experienced the path of liberation. The *Uttarādhyayana* mentions an event of Harikeśī Muni who was denied alms by the *brāhmaṇas* indulged in performing a sacrificial rite (*yajña*).¹³ The scene depicted there in a few *gāthās* is really alarming. *Brāhmaṇas* having pride of their caste told Harikeśī muni- "Where did you come from? You are looking like a ghost; go from here, this food has been prepared only for *brāhmaṇas*. We cannot give it to you."

Muni was tortured with sticks and whips by the disciples of those *brāhmaṇas* and expelled from that place.¹⁴ It was really a formidable task to fight with such stubbornness of caste system at that time. Mahāvīra believed in the virtues of a man. He established the importance of virtues in spite of outer colour, caste and creed. As the victory of Harikeśīmuni over the *brāhmaṇa* attitude proves this fact. The essence of the chapter 'Harikeśiya' of the *Uttarādhyayana* has been presented in the following words: -

"The effect of penance is clearly visible, while effect of caste is barely seen."¹⁵

Caste is not important; the significance of penance is always experienced. A man becomes good or bad by his virtues and behaviour, as mentioned in another chapter of the *Uttarādhyayana*:

¹³ Utt: chapter 12.

¹⁴ Vide Utt : chapter 12.

¹⁵ Utt 12.37: *Sakkaṃ khu dīśai tayo viseso, na dīśai jāi visesa koi.*

“A person does not become a monk (*śramaṇa*) only by shaved head, equanimity makes him monk, by chanting *omkāra* nobody becomes *brāhmaṇa*, he becomes *brāhmaṇa* by virtues of celibacy (*brahmacarya*), only living in jungle does not make a monk, he needs real knowledge for it, a person becomes an ascetic by holding penance not by having grass garbs. A person becomes *brāhmaṇa* or *kṣatriya* or *vaiśya* or *sūdra* by his conduct.”¹⁶

Thus virtue or conduct is important in Jainism.

Jaina *ācāryas* have criticized the concept of caste system, Guṇabhadra says in *Uttarapurāṇa*:

“There is no difference in human beings on the basis of their shape as it appears between a cow and a horse.”¹⁷

Raviṣeṇa (7th C.) says in his *Padmapurāṇa*:

“No caste is vile, virtues are only the cause of welfare, a *Cāṇḍāla* performing vows has been known as *brāhmaṇa* by *jinendras*.”¹⁸

Āśādhara (13th century CE), in his *Sāgāradharmāmṛta*, says that a *sūdra*, person of lower caste can follow a religion after attaining a maturity of time (*kālalabdhi*).¹⁹

¹⁶ Utt 25.31-33:

*na vi muṇḍiyeṇa samaṇo, na omkāreṇa bambhaṇo;
na muṇī raṇṇa vāseṇaṃ, kusa cireṇa na tāvaso.
samayāe samaṇo hoi, bambhacereṇa bambhaṇo;
nāṇeṇa ya muṇī hoi, taveṇa hoi tāvaso.
kammunā bambhaṇo hoi, kammunā hoi khattio;
Vaiisso kammunā hoi, suddo havai kammunā.*

¹⁷ *Uttarapurāṇa* 74.492, quoted in Śāstri (1948: 348): *nāsti jātikṛto bhedo manuṣyāṇāṃ gavāśvavat.*

¹⁸ PP 11.203: *na jāti garhitā kācid, guṇāḥ kalyāṇakāraṇaṃ;
vratasthamapi cāṇḍālaṃ, taṃ deva brāhmaṇaṃ viduḥ.*

¹⁹ SD 2.22: *jātyā hīnopi kālādilabdhaḥ hyātmāsti dharmabhāk.*

The *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* suggests some virtues of *brāhmaṇa*, which are obviously the characteristics of a Jaina *śramaṇa*. For instance:

“A lotus flower originated in water does not get besmeared with water. Similarly who is not inflicted with passions is called a *brāhmaṇa*.”²⁰

Jainism does not support the *āśrama* system of the Vedic tradition.²¹ Efforts for liberation from worldly sorrows and evils are given top priority in the Jaina religion and philosophy. *Sthānāṅgasūtra* propounds three types of ages for adopting ascetic life in the first part of life, in the middle age and in the middle past life.²²

Jainas do not bear the viewpoints that *brāhmaṇa* born from the mouth of *brahma* as mentioned in Veda.²³ Prabhācandra (980-1065 CE) refutes this idea. He asks whether *brahma* is *brāhmaṇa* or not? If he is not, then how can a *brāhmaṇa* take birth from him? A human being cannot take birth from a non-human being. If *brahma* is *brāhmaṇa* then the question is whether he is *brāhmaṇa* with all his organs or only by mouth. If he is *brāhmaṇa* at all organs then all the beings of

²⁰ Utt 25.27: *jahā pommaṃ jale jāyaṃ, novalippai vāriṇā; evaṃ alittam kāmehiṃ, tam vayaṃ būma māhaṇaṃ.*

²¹ There are four stages of life (*āśrama*): (i) Life of a studentship (*brahmacarya* – up to age 25), (ii) Life of a householder (*grhastha* – up to the age of 50), (iii) Life of an anchorite (*vānaprastha* – up to age 75) and (iv) Life of an ascetic (*saṃnyāsa* – up to death).

²² Sth 3.2.122: *tihim vaehiṃ āyā kevalaṃ muṇḍe bhavittā agārāo aṇagāriyaṃ pavvaijjā, tanjahā-paḍhame vae, majjhime vāe, pucchime vae.*

²³ As *Puruṣasūkta* of the *Rgveda* 10.90.12 says: *Brāhmaṇa* has been born from the mouth of *brahma*, *kṣatriya* from his arms, *vaiśya* from his thighs and *sūdra* from his feet (in Telang & Chaubey 1973).

the world born from *brahma* come in the category of *brāhmaṇa*. If *brahma* is *brāhmaṇa* from mouth only, then other parts of the body come in the category of *sūdra*, hence *brāhmaṇas* should not bow their heads in the feet of *brahma*.²⁴

Jaina Ācāryas on Society

Haribhadrāsūri (700-770 CE) and Somadevasūri (10th century) have given some thoughts regarding the society from the Jaina point of view. Haribhadra propounds two kinds of religion for laity (*grhastha-dharma*): (1) Common and (2) Specific. Common *dharma* of a householder is to perform honestly the traditional graceful good works. Specific *dharma* of his is to follow twelve vows of a laity (*śrāvaka*).²⁵ He puts stress on honest earning “If a householder earns money honestly then it is beneficial for this world and for the other world of that person.”²⁶

Somadevasūri (11th century) has rightly described two types of *dharma*- worldly religion (*laukika*) and other worldly religion (*laukottara*). Worldly religion has been defined according to the Vedas and Smṛtis and other worldly religion has been defined as *śramaṇa-dharma* and *śrāvaka-dharma*.²⁷

A well-known Tamil work, *Thirukkurala* (author unknown), of the 1st century BCE, considered as a Jaina treatise

²⁴ NK commentary on verse 65: *kiñca brahmaṇo brāhmaṇyamasti na vā? yadi nāsti, kathamato brāhmaṇotpattiḥ? na hi amānuṣyāt manuṣyotpattiḥ pratīta. atha asti, kiṃ sarvatra mukhapradeśe eva vā?*

yadi sarvatra, sa eva prāṇinām bhedābhāvānuṣaṅgaḥ, atha mukhapradeśe eva, tadānyatrāśya śūdratvānuṣaṅgāt na viprāṇām tatpādayoḥ vandyatvaṃ syāt.

²⁵ Vide DB *prakaraṇa* 1 & 3.

²⁶ DB 1.4: *nyāyopāttaṃ hi vittamubhayalokahitāyeti.*

²⁷ *Yāśastilakacampu* 8.373, quoted in *Śāstrī* (1989: 64).

on the basis of its contents, is significant for every householder and monk. It guides a person to live a better personal and social life. It comprises three sections of religion (*dharma*), property (*artha*) and pleasure (*kāma*) and 133 chapters on various subjects related to personality development of a human being. We find various useful thoughts in *dharma* section on gratitude, impartiality, self-restraint, celibacy, patience, sinful acts, giving alms, vegetarianism, non-violence, truth-speaking etc.; in *artha* section on qualities of king, learning, illiteracy, gauging of power, choosing the proper time, duties, cruel rule, espionage, strenuous effort, method of action, essential elements of a state, agriculture, mendicancy, way of accumulating wealth, greatness of an army etc. and in *kāma* section on beauty, love, mutual desire, temporary quarrel etc. The three sections support the Vedic view of three goals of life (*trivarga*: *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*), but do not support the *varṇāśrama* system of Vedic tradition. It is also to be pointed out that there is explicit acceptance of the fourth goal of salvation (*mokṣa-puruṣārtha*) in *dharma* and *artha* sections of this treatise. Actually, the *Thirukkurala* requires a separate study to determine its significance from the social point of view.

Somdevasūri in his *Nītivākyāmr̥ta* has also discussed *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* along with penal code, polity, defence, war, ethical conduct etc. keeping in view the right path of Indian society.

Impact of Hindu Culture

Ācārya Jinasena (late 9th century CE) in his “*Ādipurāṇa*” has given place to *varṇāśrama dharma* system of Vedic tradition. He has mentioned that the king Ṛṣabhadeva

who became the first *tīrthaṅkara* established three *varṇas* namely *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* and *śūdra*.²⁸ His son Bharata established a new *varṇa- brāhmaṇa*.²⁹ Jinasena has referred to about marriage norms and other sacraments also.³⁰ He has divided *śūdras* into two kinds: artisan (*kāru*) and non-artisan (*akāru*). *Kāru-śūdras* were also of two types, one of them were untouchable to other persons.³¹ Such description in Jaina literature is considered as an impact of prevalent Vedic or Brāhmaṇical system.

According to the essence of Jaina philosophy the division of human beings in four *varṇas* of *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya* and *śūdra* is not real. It is only conventional. A person of low status (*nīca-gotra*) karma may attain high status (*ucca-gotra*) in the same lifespan by adopting great vows (*mahāvratas*) in real sense.³²

Mahāvīra, *gaṇadharas* and *ācāryas* did not propound separate social norms for Jaina followers, but they suggested some reformations in them. For example animal sacrifice (*paśu-bali*), ceremony performed in honour of departed spirits (*śrāddha*) and death feast (*mṛtyu-bhoja*) were not acknowledged by Jaina *ācāryas*. Although some Jaina families perform *śrāddha* after the death of their family members and they also organize feast after few days of the death due to effect of Hinduism on them. Marriage ceremonies with seven rounds

²⁸ ĀP: 16. 243-245.

²⁹ ĀP:16. 246.

³⁰ ĀP: 16. 247.

³¹ ĀP:16.185-186.

³² As discussed by Śāstrī (1989: 130).

are arranged according to Hindu rituals. Mostly the Hindu *Paṇḍitas* perform methodical ceremony of marriages except few instances in Khandelval Digambar Jains and some individuals of various Jain sects.

The *Ācāradinakara* written by Vardhamānasūri (15th century CE) a disciple of Abhayadevasūri (third) of Rudrapalligaccha is a notable Jaina work, which describes 16 sacraments (*saṃskāra*) of a householder, 16 sacraments of a saint and 8 sacraments common for the both.³³ It is the first book in Jain literature which elaborates the sacraments in a systematic way from the Jaina point of view. Sixteen sacraments of household person found in *Ācāradinakara* are as follows:

1. Conception sacrament (*garbhādhāna-saṃskāra*)
2. Male production sacrament (*pumsavana-saṃskāra*)
3. Birth sacrament (*janma-saṃskāra*)
4. Worshipping idols of sun and moon
(*sūrya-candra-darśana-saṃskāra*)
5. Milk feeding sacrament (*kṣīrāśana-saṃskāra*)
6. Worshipping mother deity (*ṣaṣṭhi-saṃskāra*)
7. Purification sacrament (*śucikarma-saṃskāra*)
8. Naming sacrament (*nāmakaraṇa-saṃskāra*)
9. Food giving sacrament (*annaprāśana-saṃskāra*)
10. Sacrament of piercing the ears to put earrings on
(*karṇavedha saṃskāra*)
11. Ceremony of tonsure (*cūḍākaraṇa-saṃskāra*)
12. Initiation sacrament (*upanayana-saṃskāra*)

³³ See *ĀD*, *pūrva pīṭhikā* and *udaya* 1-40.

13. Learning sacrament (*vidyārambha-saṃskāra*)
14. Marriage sacrament (*vivāha-saṃskāra*)
15. Vow adopting sacrament (*vratāroṇa-saṃskāra*)
16. Funeral sacrament (*antya-saṃskāra*)

These sacraments have some differences from the Vedic tradition of *saṃskāras*. *Garbhādhāna*- and *pūṃsavana-saṃskāras* are also different in nature to some extent. Vardhamānasūri has interpreted these sacraments from the Jaina point of view.

He mentioned 16 sacraments of a saint:³⁴

1. Celibacy adopting ceremony
(*brahmacarya-vratagrahaṇa-vidhi*)
2. Lower monk ceremony (*kṣullaka-vidhi*)
3. Initiation ceremony (*pravrajyā-vidhi*)
4. Ordaining ceremony (*upasthāpanā-vidhi*)
5. Ceremony for elevation of mind, speech and body
(*yogodvahana-vidhi*)
6. Lesson receiving ceremony (*vācanāgrahaṇa-vidhi*)
7. Permission ceremony for a teacher monk (*vacanānujñā-vidhi*)
8. Ordaining ceremony for religious teacher
(*upādhyāya pada-sthāpanā-vidhi*)
9. Ordaining ceremony for a preceptor (*ācārya-pada-sthāpanā-vidhi*)
10. A specific penance ceremony of a monk
(*bhikṣupratimā-udvahana-vidhi*)

³⁴ Vide ĀD, *udaya* 17-32.

11. Initiation ceremony of a nun (*sādhvī-dīkṣā-vidhi*)
12. Ordaining ceremony of a teacher nun
(*pravartinī pada-sthāpanā-vidhi*)
13. Ordaining ceremony of a chief nun
(*mahattarā pada-sthāpanā-vidhi*)
14. Daily routine of a monk (*ahorātri-caryā-vidhi*)
15. Routine in different seasons (*ṛtucaryā-vidhi*)
16. Religious death ceremony through diminishing the passions
(*saṃlekhanā-vidhi*)

These sacraments are related to a saint or a *sādhvī*, simultaneously these are having a social importance, because an *ācārya* and *upādhyāya* remain indulged in teaching and administration in their *gaccha* or *gaṇa*.

The eight common sacraments³⁵ for a householder (*śrāvaka*) and a saint are as follows:

1. Consecration ceremony of an idol (*pratiṣṭhā-vidhi*)
2. Peace making ceremony (*śāntika-karma*)
3. Nourishing ceremony for good deeds (*pauṣṭika-karma*)
4. Oblation ceremony (*bali-vidhāna-vidhi*)
5. Expiation ceremony (*prāyaś citta-vidhi*)
6. Ceremony for execution of essential deeds (*āvaśyaka-vidhi*)
7. Penance ceremony (*tapa-vidhi*)
8. Rank ordaining ceremony (*padāropana-vidhi*).

The above description about sacraments denotes that in the 15th Century A.D., Jaina *ācāryas* tried to describe sacraments (*saṃskāra*) in the framework of Jainism.

³⁵ Vide ĀD, *udaya* 33-40.

Samṣkāras related to *sādhus* are specific, which are not found in the Vedic tradition, but names of *saṃskāras* propounded for householders are almost similar like *garbhādhāna*, *pūṃsavana*, *nāmakaraṇa*, *annaprāśana*, *karmaṇavedha*, *cūḍākaraṇa*, *upanayana*, *vidyārambha*, *vivāha*, *antyeṣṭi* etc. but some separate sacraments have also been described, such as – *vratāropana saṃskāra*. This *saṃskāra* has been mentioned instead of *vānaprastha* and *saṃnyāsa saṃskāra* of the Vedic tradition. It has a provision of twelve *vratas* of a *śrāvaka* or *śrāvika*. The sacraments common for both monks and householders are also specific which are not found in the Vedic tradition.

This account of sacraments gives a path to social system of Jaina householders, monks and nuns, but we can say that it was a result of influence of the Vedic tradition of various sacraments mentioned in *Smṛti*-literature. However it proves that Jaina *ācāryas* have a concept of society in their mind when they talk about the separate sacraments for *sādhus* and householders. It also makes it clear that the Jaina *ācāryas* tried to develop a separate social system for Jaina community or society. In fact *Ācāradinakara* of Vardhamānasūri requires a separate article on it.

Jainism is a religion of salvation. Hence there is no much impact of *Ācāradinakara* on Jaina society. Monks follow the Jaina rules, but householders are still following the Hindu social rituals, because they are unaware of the basics and fundamentals of Jainism. Actually there is not much difference between Jaina sacraments and Hindu sacraments. Before Vardhamānasūri, Somadevasūri (11th century), the famous author of the *Yāśastilakacampu* was having a view that:

“Jaina tradition can accept all those Vedic social norms which are not inconsistent with right view (*samyaktva* or *samyagdarśana*) and do not corrupt the vows of a male laity (*śrāvaka*) or female laity (*śrāvikā*).”³⁶

This is a clear path for Jaina societies to follow the customs of prevalent Hindu tradition. It was a reason that Vardhamānasūri mentioned 16 sacraments with mild difference in Hindu sacraments or rites (*saṃskāra*). Some of the Jaina families have formulated new Jaina system for marriage ceremonies, but it is not being followed by a majority of Jainas. Thus Jaina tradition is not totally different from Hindu tradition regarding the social customs. This tendency of assimilation of Hindu customs by Jaina societies was one main reason of their stability in India. Still in modern India some judges of High Court and Supreme Court do not provide Jainas a cadre of minority. Here we can say that Jaina societies are different from Hindu societies from the religious point of view, but they are not so much different from the social point of view.

At present, several social customs of Jaina society such as marriage ceremony, birth ceremony and other rites are often performed in Hindu manner, but many festivals like *mahāvīra jayantī*, *paryuṣaṇa*, *saṃvatsarī*, *daśalakṣaṇa parva*, *jñāna-pañcamī* etc. are celebrated by Jaina norms. Although Jaina *paṇḍitas* have evolved separate book for performing marriage sacrament, there is a paucity of Jaina *paṇḍitas* to perform the marriage ceremony, so the *brāhmaṇa paṇḍitas* are called at the marriage occasions of Jaina families also.

³⁶ *Yāśastilakacampu* 8.34, quoted in :

*sarva eva hi Jainānām, pramāṇam laukiko vidhiḥ;
yatra samyaktva hānirna, yatra na vratadūṣaṇam.*

Organisation of the *Tirtha*

Mahāvīra did not propose any profession-based social organization, but like other *tīrthaṅkaras* he propounded fourfold (*caturvidha*) ford (*tīrtha* or *saṅgha*) for the followers. As mentioned in the *Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra*:

“*Tīrtha* comprises four categories of *saṅgha* – monks (*śramaṇa*) nuns (*śramaṇi*) laity (*śrāvaka*) and female laity (*śrāvikā*).”³⁷

The *tīrtha* is a religious organisation, which is meant for performing religious practice (*sādhana*) for the attainment of salvation, but there are also some rules for mutual behavior amongst *saṅghas*.

There are some stern provisions and codes of conduct for the mutual behaviour of monks (*samaṇa* or *sādhu*) and nuns (*samaṇi* or *sādhvī*). Four *Chedasūtras*³⁸ explain these rules elaborately. How a *sādhu* should behave with his *ācārya* and other colleagues, with *sādhvis*, *śrāvakas* and *śrāvikas* has been also propounded in the canonical literature.³⁹ Observing the five *mahāvratas*, fivefold self-regulation (*saṃti*) and threefold self-control (*gupti*), a Jaina monk or nun should take care to avoid improper conducts. For example a *sādhu* should not stop to talk to a *sādhvī* at cross roads and when alone. *Sādhus* and *sādhvis* cannot live together in their living places. Even they cannot do meditation (*kāyotsarga*) in one another's places. These

³⁷ VP: 20.8: *titthaṃ puṇa cāuvvaṇṇāiṇṇe samaṇa-saṅghe paṇṇtte, taṇṇjahā- samaṇā, samaṇi, sāvagā, savigāo.*

³⁸ The four *Chedasūtras* are: *Dasāśrutaskandha*, *Bṛhatkalpa*, *Vyavahāra* and *Nisītha*.

³⁹ *Utt I* & *BK* explain it at many places.

restrictions have been imposed with a view to protect their celibacy.⁴⁰ However, in case of calamities, they can give support and can touch each other to save their lives. If a *nirgrantha-sādhū* gives support to a slipping or falling *sādhvī* then he does not disobey the preaching of a *Jina*.⁴¹

Some more *sūtras* of the *Bṛhatkalpasūtra* say that for removal of a thorn, a piece of glass or a chip of stone, a *sādhū* can help a *sādhvī* and a *sādhvī* can help a *sādhū*.⁴² Rules regarding behaviour with *śrāvakas* and *śrāvikas* by the *samaṇas* and *samaṇīs* have also been mentioned in Jain canonical and later literature. *Śrāvakas* and *śrāvikās* are supposed like parents of *samaṇas* and *samaṇīs* for well support of their restraint and disciplined life and good conduct. All the codes of conduct have been laid down for the faultless accomplishment of the fourfold *saṅgha*. The codes of conduct support the spiritual advancement of the souls and their flawless behaviour to the world. Ācārya Samantabhadra (6th century) mentions as characteristic of the Jaina *tīrtha*:

“Your *tīrtha* is destroyer of all sufferings, and is eternal, and it leads to welfare of all beings.”⁴³

Theory of *karma* and Society

In the theory of Jaina *karma* philosophy concept of status-determining (*gotra*) *karma* is often defined that birth in a higher

⁴⁰ BK 3.1.73: *no kappai niggamṭhāṇaṃ, niggamṭhīṇaṃ uvassayaṃsi ciṭṭhitaye vā --- --- sajjhāyaṃ vā karittaye jhāṇaṃ vā jhāittaye, kāusaggaṃ vā thāittae.*

⁴¹ BK 6.7.180: *niggamṭhe niggamṭhini duggaṃsi vā visamaṃsi vā pavvayaṃsi vā pakkhalamāṇiṃ vā pavaḍamāṇiṃ vā giṇhamaṇe vā avalambamāṇe vā ṇaikkamai.*

⁴² Vide BK 6.3-18.

⁴³ YA 61: *Sarvāpadāmantakaraṃ nirantaṃ sarvodayaṃ tīrthamidaṃ tavaiva.*

race or descent is a result of high status (*ucca gotra*) *karma* and birth in a lower race or descent is a result of lower status (*nīca gotra*) *karma*, but it is to be clarified that according to the theory of Jain *karma* philosophy *nīca gotra karma* may change into *ucca gotra* in the same life-span.⁴⁴ Thus here 'gotra' word does not denote any caste or sub-caste, but it denotes the internal impressions (*saṃskāra*) of a person. If he does not have pride of his own caste, beauty, creed, richness, character, knowledge, penance and power, then he bears an *ucca gotra*, and if he takes pride in these then he becomes a person of *nīca gotra*.⁴⁵ In one life span one can have both the *gotras*.⁴⁶ Hence the concept of *gotra karma* in Jaina philosophy is not related to the birth in specific caste. It is related to the internal impressions of the attitude of a person. Question is - what is the social aspect of *gotra karma*? Here we can say that although it is related to the higher or lower impressions of a person, which is an internal matter, its effect is seen in outer world also. In the view of Jaina *karma* theory, a person who is possessed with pride is not great, but the person who is not possessed with superiority and inferiority complex is great.

The concepts of pleasure giving (*sātāvedanīya*) *karma* and grief or pain giving (*asātā vedanīya*) *karma* instruct the society in a right path that if you do good to others it will result in good to you and if you do bad to others it will bear bad

⁴⁴ KG 2:16: says that *nīcagotra karma* remains manifested up to fifth *guṇasthāna*, after that *ucca gotra* occurs in sixth and other higher *guṇasthānas*. When a person becomes a *sādhu*, he bears *uccagotra karma*.

⁴⁵ In the commentary of AN 2.88: *Jātirupakulaisvaryaśilajñānatapobalaiḥ; kurvānohankṛtīm nīcagotraṃ badhnāti mānavah*.

⁴⁶ Utt 12: Harikeśi Muni is an instance of this fact.

consequences to you. The causes of these *sātā-* and *asātā-vedanīya karmas* have been mentioned in the *Tattvārthasūtra* as follows:

“If a soul causes pain, grief, agony, crying, injury or lamenting to others then it attracts *asātāvedanīya* or pain *karma*, and if a soul generates compassion through charity to all living beings as well as to those observing religious vows, then it is a cause of *sātāvedanīya* or pleasure *karma*.”⁴⁷

Forbearance is also a cause of *sātāvedanīya*. The *Tattvārthasūtra* explains that if we are co-operative to others positively, then as a result it provides us pleasure or happiness. Negative behaviour results in pain or *asātā*. This is not just a theory of *karma*, but also a reciprocal theory of social norms. This guides the society towards the balanced and proper behavior, which in turn benefits the individual also.

***Triratna* and its Social Corollary**

Jainism is considered as the religion and philosophy of salvation. It underscores the value of right world-view (*samyagdarśana*), right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) and right conduct (*samyakcāritra*) for its attainment.⁴⁸ This path is quite individualistic, because it requires detachment from all worldly affairs. In spite of this *samyagdarśana*, an essential element of salvation bears a characteristic of kindness (*anukampā*).⁴⁹

⁴⁷ TS 6.12-13: *duḥkhaḥ-śoka-tāpākrandana-vadha-paridevanānyātma parobhayasthānyasadvedyasya. bhūtavratānukampādānaṃ sarāgasamyamādiyogaḥ kṣāntiḥ śaucamiti sadvedyasya.*

⁴⁸ TS 1.1: *samyagdarśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ.*

⁴⁹ TB 1.2: *tadevaṃ praśama-saṃveganirvedānukampāstikyābhivyaktalakṣaṇaṃ tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanam.*

Kindness is a very important aspect of an individual towards the society and other beings of the world. In the absence of kindness or compassion (*karuṇā*) one may not have *samyagdarśana* and in the absence of *samyagdarśana* eternal liberation from worldly sorrows does not occur according to Jainism.⁵⁰ Hence a right attitude with kindness towards other souls or societies of all beings is essential for liberation.

Right knower (*samyagjñānin*), a person having *samyagjñāna* changes his behavior from negative to positive towards the other human beings. When he proceeds in right conduct (*cāritra*), his attitude towards the society bears a radical change. His anger (*krodha*) changes into forgiveness (*kṣamā*), pride into politeness, deceit into simplicity and greed into contentment.⁵¹ His jealousy converts into love. He loves everybody. He does not love others for his own empirical pleasures, but for the purification of the self. This radical change towards the society occurs after the attainment of *samyagjñāna*. It controls the behaviour of a person to himself and to others. He understands that as I feel pleasure in favourable conditions, so do others in those conditions, and as I feel grief in unfavourable conditions, so do others. This thinking tilts a person for real welfare of the world. Rightly has been told in *Brhatkalpabhāṣya* 4584:

“What you desire for yourself, desire for others too;
and what you do not desire for yourself, do not desire

⁵⁰ Utt 28.30: *nādaṃsanissa nāṇaṃ, nāṇeṇa viṇā na hunti caraṇaguṇā; agūṇissa natthi makkho natthi amokkhassa nivvānaṃ.*

⁵¹ DK 8.39 : *uvasameṇa haṇe kohaṃ māṇaṃ maddavayā jīṇe; māyaṃ cājjavabhāveṇa lobhaṃ saṃtosao jīṇe.*

for others at all - this is the essence of preaching of Jina.”⁵²

This is echoed in Sanskrit literature also:

“A person should not behave with others adversely, which is meant adverse for himself.”⁵³

As we expect good conduct, graceful and respectful behavior from others, so should be our behaviour with others, protecting their self-esteem and dignity. What we do not like from others, we should not behave in that manner. This is an essential principle of social behaviour given in Jaina literature. It is also echoed in *Ācārāṅgacūṛṇi* in some different words:⁵⁴

“As I like pleasure and happiness, others also like these and as I dislike grief and sorrow, others also do not like them.”

This thinking can protect not only human rights, but can save the rights of every being of the world.

At present, there are more than fourteen thousand Jaina *sādhus* and *sādhvīs* in India.⁵⁵ The *Daśavaikālikasūtra* of the Śvetāmbara sect instructs that a *sādhū* should not be a burden on the society. His conduct of taking food from the houses of laypersons is compared with a black bee that takes nectar of flowers without torturing them. Like that an ascetic monk also

⁵² *jaṃ icchasi appaṇatto, jaṃ ca na icchasi appaṇatto;
taṃ iccha parassa vi, ettiyagaṃ jīṇasāsaṇaṃ.*

⁵³ *ātmanaḥ pratikūlāni pareṣāṃ na samācāret* (a renowned verse).

⁵⁴ *AC 1.1.6: jahā me iṭṭhāṇiṭṭhe suhāsuhe tahā savvajīvāṇaṃ.*

⁵⁵ Babulal Jain (2010: 116).

takes food from the householders without harming them.⁵⁶ This kind of behaviour of an ascetic has two aspects - the first is his own spiritual practice (*sāadhanā*) and another is not to give trouble to others. This gives a message to us to behave in such a way that others should not be troubled for the sake of our cause.

Importance of Others' Life

A famous motto of Jainism is: "Live and let live." We can say that Jainism is a philosophy that gives importance to others life also. We should understand that every worldly soul wants to live, and we should protect his or her right to live as much as possible. *Āaāraṅgasūtra* (1.2.3) says:

"All worldly souls love their life, they wish to relish pleasure, loathe misery, hurt or injury is not desired by anybody, life is dear to all, and they want to live. Life is dear to all beings."⁵⁷

If understood at the level of human beings, this fact will lead to positive change in the attitude and behaviour towards the society.

Mahāvīra suggested that no living being should be killed, governed, made slave, tortured and made restless.⁵⁸ *Ahiṃsā* is not merely non-violence. It has its positive social aspect and that can be called as friendliness (*maitrī*) to all living beings. Amitagati in *Sāmāyikapāṭha* (verse-1) says:

⁵⁶ DK 1.4-5 : *vayaṃ ca vittiṃ labbhāmo, na ya koi uvahammai; ahāgaḍesu rīyaṃte, pupphesu bhamaro jahā. mahugārasamābuddhā, je bhavanti aṇissiyā; nāṇāpīṇḍarayādaṃtā, teṇa vuccanti sāhuṇo.*

⁵⁷ *savve pāṇā piyāyā suhasāyā dukkhapaḍikūlā appiyavahā piyajīviṇo, jīviukāmā savvesiṃ jīviyaṃ piyaṃ.*

⁵⁸ *ĀS 1.4.1: savve pāṇā savve bhūtā savve jīvā savve sattā ṇa haṃtavvā, ṇa ajjāvetavvā, ṇa parigheṭavvā, ṇa paritāveyavvā, ṇa uddaveyavvā.*

“Friendliness towards all beings, delight in the qualities of virtuous ones, utmost compassion for afflicted beings, equanimity towards those who are not well disposed towards me, May O Lord! my soul have such dispositions as these forever.”⁵⁹

Non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) and Society

Non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) is the central philosophy of Jainism. It defines reality as universal-cum-particular.⁶⁰ Society is also of this nature. Maciver and Charles Page (1990: 7) say:

“Society involves both likeness and difference. If people were all exactly alike, merely alike, their social relationship would be as limited, perhaps, as those of the ant or bee.”

Thus *anekāntavāda* itself defines the nature of society. *Anekāntavāda* has its ethical value also. It provides an opportunity to understand the other's views through theory of different standpoints (*nayavāda*). It is very much useful for social communication and mutual harmony. Prejudices close the doors to understand other's views rightly. *Anekāntavāda* is a base of human behaviour as the eminent Jaina philosopher Siddhasena (5th century) says:

“I bow to the *anekāntavāda*, a teacher of the world, without which behavior of the world cannot run.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ *sattveṣu maitriṃ guṇiṣu pramodaṃ, kliṣṭeṣu jīveṣu kṛpāparatvaṃ;
mādhyasthabhāvaṃ viparītavṛttau,
sadā mamātmā vidadhātu deva. ?*

⁶⁰ PT 5.1: *tasya viśayaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣādyanekāntātmakam vastu.*

⁶¹ SP 3.69: *Jeṇa viṇā logassa vi vavahāro savvahā na nivvaḍai;
tassa bhuvaneḷḷekaguruṇo ṇamo aṇegantavāyassa.*

Thus, *anekāntavāda* is the root of social behaviour. This point of view goes well with post-modernist perception of social welfare imbibing the principle of diversity and respecting its existence. In recent decades the western world has seen rise of authoritarian ideologies. Jainism with its emphasis on diversity in society provides apt answer to such authoritarian tendencies.

Language and Society

Language is a principal instrument for communication among the human beings and maintaining social relations. Jaina *tīrthaṅkaras* delivered their sermons in the Ardhamāgadhī language,⁶² which was a language of common people at that time. Although every language has its social importance, a language of common people has crucial and sometimes central role to play in social transactions. The use of Ardhamāgadhī by Mahāvīra denotes the belief in proper communication in the maximum people of society.

Social Importance of the *Aṇuvratas*

Jaina code of conduct for laypersons mentions twelve vows, out of which five vows of partial renunciation (*aṇuvrata*) are very important for a good citizen of any country and for the avoidance of unnecessary conflicts in the society. The five *aṇuvratas* that are mentioned concern: the abstinence from killing a living being (*prāṇātīpātā-viramaṇa*), abstinence from falsehood (*mṛṣāvāda-viramaṇa*), abstinence from stealing (*adattādāna-viramaṇa*), satisfaction with own spouse only (*svadāra* or *svapati-santoṣa-parimāṇa*), and limiting the

⁶² SS 34.22: *bhagavaṃ ca ṇaṃ addhamāgahīe bhāsāe dhammamāikkhai.*

possession (*parigraha-parimāṇa*) or limiting the desires (*icchāvidhi-parimāṇa*) (UD Chapter 1). These *aṇuvratas* have social, moral and spiritual values. A person pursuing these *aṇuvratas* cannot be harmful to the society. He may be beneficial in some respect. He bears humanity in him and behaves with compassion and restraint. According to first *aṇuvrata* a person is not allowed to keep others in captivity, to beat or kill them, to mutilate, to overload and to deprive them of food and drink.⁶³ This shows the necessity of compassion and equality towards other living beings of the world. It involves the recognition to life of all and their equal right to live.

The second *aṇuvrata* is related to control the speaking of untruth. Liars are not to be harboured in society:

“Falsehood is censured by saints in the world. It is a cause of mistrust among the people, hence it should be avoided.”⁶⁴

One should speak harmless truth. Nothing should be told in such a manner that it might cause embarrassment, anxiety or unhappiness to others.⁶⁵ The third *aṇuvrata* demands abstaining from the inclination for theft.⁶⁶ Taking a thing that has not been granted or given by the owner, comes under the category of theft. Refraining from theft shows respect for others' property and rights. It involves abstinence from all deceptive practices such as bribery that lead to social disintegration. This *aṇuvrata*

⁶³ UD 1.45: *bandhe vahe chavicheye aibhāre bhattapāṇaviccheye.*

⁶⁴ DK 6.13: *musāvāo ya logammi, savva saḥūhiṃ garahio.*
avissāso ya bhuyāṇaṃ, tamhā mosam vivajjae.

⁶⁵ TB 7.9: *hiṃsāpāruṣyaṃ paśūnyādiyuktāṃ vācāṃ satyamapi garhitamanṛtameva bhavātīti.*

⁶⁶ TS 7.10: *adattādānaṃ steyam*

has a wide power to control economic corruption in the society. Fourth *vrata* is important for restraint of sexual corruption. It has at least three benefits: - (1) Increase in mental and spiritual power, (2) control over sexual corruption in the society and (3) control over some diseases like AIDS.

The fifth vow (*vrata*) puts limits to the desires of a man or woman for possessing more and more things. It weakens or dissolves the greed towards acquisition of worldly things. Most of the conflicts arise in the society due to money, land, properties, power etc. This *parigraha-parimāṇa vrata* keeps a person tensionless because of the limit of desire. Jaina philosophy says:

“Even, if the whole world is given to a person, he will not be satisfied by it, hence the worldly things cannot contend a soul.”⁶⁷

The modern society is heading towards the final critical stage of capitalism and facing the danger of the greed of acquiring materialistic things. Jainism does not oppose the science and scientific development, but it makes us cautious about the attachment towards the materialistic world. If we do not want to suffer from tension, depression, or bodily diseases then we must avoid extreme ambition for possession of materialistic goals. *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* points out:

“If the whole world is yours, whole money is yours, then also it is not sufficient for you, and it cannot protect you.”⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Utt 8.16: *kaśiṇaṃ pi jo imaṃ loyaṃ, paḍipunṇaṃ daliṇṇa ikkassa; teṇāvi se ṇa saṃtusse, ii duppūrae ime āyā.*

⁶⁸ Utt 14.39 : *savvaṃ jaggaṃ jai tubbhaṃ, savvaṃ vā vi dhaṇaṃ bhavē; savvaṃ pi te apajjattaṃ, neva tāṇāya taṃ tava.*

This message was given by Queen Kamalāvātī to King Isukāra in the *Uttarādhayanasūtra*, which is relevant in the modern society also. It is the eternal truth that the allurements of materialistic world cannot ultimately protect our lives.

The Jaina religion and philosophy also propound that the outer world or materialistic world is not the cause of grief or sorrows, our inner world is the real cause of our own sorrows. Mahāvīra says:

“The materialistic world is not the cause of equanimity (*śamatā*) and inequanimity (*vikṛti*), but the inner world of aversion (*pradveṣa*) and possession (*parigraha*) through delusion or attachment (*moha*) generate sorrows or deformity in human beings.”⁶⁹

Although this teaching of Mahāvīra is directly related to an individual, its impact goes to the society. Society changes through the fundamental thoughts regarding life.

Attitude of the Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras

Tīrthaṅkaras of Jaina religion reflect compassion towards all beings of the world. They preach their sermon for the benefit of the beings of the world, as depicted in *Praśnavyākaraṇasūtra*:

“Reverend *tīrthankara* has given his sermon for the protection and compassion of all beings of the world.”⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Utt 32.101 : *na kāmabhogā samayaṃ uventi, na yāvi bhogā vigaiṃ uventi; je tappaosī ya pariggahī yā, so tesīṃ mohā vigaiṃ uvei.*

⁷⁰ PV 2.1 : *savva-jagajīva-rakkhana-dayaṭṭhayaē bhagavayā pāvayaṇam sukaḥiyam*

In the *Śakrastava*,⁷¹ a eulogy performed by the Indras, many such adjectives of *tīrthaṅkaras* are available which express their benevolent attitude towards the world. For example Lord of the world (*loganāhāṇam*), Benefactor of the world (*logahiyāṇam*), Lamp of the world (*logapaivāṇam*), Revelator of the world (*logapajjoyagarāṇam*) are the words which depict that the persons enlightened with pure complete knowledge *kevalajñāna* always do good for others. The *Caturviṃśatistava*,⁷² a eulogy of the 24 *tīrthaṅkaras* depicts a *tīrthaṅkara* as a person who enlightens the world with his knowledge. Knowledge is not useful only for oneself; it is useful for enlightening others also.

Some Ethical Doctrines and Society:

The concept of religious giving (*dāna*) in Jainism is having an important aspect of social behavior. Umāsvāti says that for the welfare of others if something is given with relinquishing one's ownership then it is called *dāna*.⁷³ Action of *dāna* cannot sustain without the assertion of the concept of society. *Dāna* is of many kinds. It mainly deals with food, knowledge, medicine and fearlessness or protection (KA 362). This concept of *dāna* is very important for the positive inter-relationship of human beings and all other beings. Conception of *dāna* is doubly beneficial. Donors as well as receivers both are benefited by *dāna*. Donor is benefited with dissociation of his sinful *karma*

⁷¹ It starts with the word *namotthuṇam*. It is called *praṇipātasūtra* also. It is a part of the *Sāmāyikapāṭha*.

⁷² Vide ĀvS chapter 2.

⁷³ TS₁ 7.33: *anugrhārthaṃ svasyātisargo dānam*.

and with earning of meritorious (*punya*) *karma*. Receiver is benefited by getting the things, knowledge and fearlessness. It has also a socio-cultural impact on human society.

In modern society we talk about free will. Jaina philosophy accepts the idea of free will because of the independence and self-doership of every soul, but it suggests keeping a control of rationality on our mind.

“The mind is like a wicked horse, it runs everywhere, and so by understanding a real *dharma*, control over it, is possible.”⁷⁴

Jaina philosophy enlightens that one should keep control on his mind, speech, body and belongings.⁷⁵ He should do good activities and leave bad activities.⁷⁶ One should think good for others, speak well and do activities for the welfare of mankind.

In Jaina ethics, social aspects of religion have been given suitable importance. *Sthānāṅgasūtra* mentions 10 kinds of *dharma*s:⁷⁷ (i) observance of custom of a village (*grāma-dharma*) (ii) observance of customs of a city (*nagara-dharma*) (iii) duty towards a nation (*rāṣṭra-dharma*) (iv) religion of a renouncer (*pākhaṇḍa-dharma*) (v) conduct of descents or monks of the same teacher (*kula-dharma*) (vi) observance of customs of a republic (*gaṇa-dharma*) (vii) conduct of fourfold order (*saṅgha-dharma*) (viii) observance of religion of scripture (*siddhānta-dharma* or *śruta-dharma*) (ix) observance

⁷⁴ Utt 23.58: *maṇo sāhasio bhīmo duṭṭhasso paridhāvai;
taṃ sammaṃ tu nigihṇāmi dhamma sikkhāi kaṃthagam.*

⁷⁵ Sth 4.2: *maṇasaṃjame, vayasamjame, kāyasaṃjame, uvagaraṇasaṃjame.*

⁷⁶ BD 45: *asuhādo viṇivittī suhe pavittī ya jāṇa cārittam.*

⁷⁷ See Sth chapter 10.

of religion of conduct (*cāritra-dharma*) and (x) Properties of extensive substances (*astikāya-dharma*). Out of these ten *dharma*s first seven are completely related to the society. Except for the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* we do not find such description of *dharma*s in Jaina canonical literature. This division of ten *dharma*s seems a later addition to the *Sthānāṅgasūtra*, but it has established the importance of these sectors of work for a smooth social life. Duties pertaining to *grāma*, *nagara* etc. also need the purity of mind, speech and activities of a person.

Description of polite conduct (*vinaya*) or of a disciple towards his teacher has been described elaborately in Jaina literature.⁷⁸ Polite conduct is a symbol of educated society.

There is a concept of rendering services to others (*veyāvacce* or *vaiyāvṛtya*) in Jain canonical literature. It is a service rendered by a monk to another monk, reverend saint, a *gaṇa* or *saṅgha*. Jaina canonical literature considers it as a penance, which is a means of dissociation (*nirjarā*) of old *karmas*. *Vyavahārasūtra* (*uddeśaka* 10) mentions ten types of service:

1. Service rendered to a preceptor of the order
(*ācārya-vaiyāvṛtya*)
2. Service rendered to a religious teacher of the order
(*upādhyāya-vaiyāvṛtya*)
3. Service rendered to an aged monk, a senior monk or learned monk (*sthavira-vaiyāvṛtya*)
4. Service rendered to a monk practicing penance (*tapasvī-vaiyāvṛtya*)

⁷⁸For example, see Utt chapter 1.

5. Service rendered to a newly initiated monk indulged in learning (*śaikṣa-vaiyāvṛtya*)
6. Service rendered to a sick monk (*glāna-vaiyāvṛtya*)
7. Service rendered to a monk of the same religious tradition (*sādharmika-vaiyāvṛtya*)
8. Service rendered to monks related to same teacher-lineage (*kula-vaiyāvṛtya*)
9. Service rendered to monks related to the same preceptor (*gaṇa-vaiyāvṛtya*)
10. Service rendered to the religious order (*saṅgha-vaiyāvṛtya*)

These ten types of service (*vaiyāvṛtya* or *veyavacce*) prove the social aspect of a *sādhu* or *sādhvī*. *Vaiyāvṛtya* is a penance and hence it is a means of *karma*-dissociation. Although the word *vaiyāvṛtya* has been used for the service rendered by *sādhus* or *sādhvis*, it is implied that a householder should also render his services to the needy persons, families and to a *saṅgha*.

The *Āvaśyakavṛtti* of Hārībhadrā propounds the importance of *vaiyāvṛtṭya* in the following words:-

“Oh lord! One who serves a patient (monk or nun) is thankful or one who visits you? Gautam! One who serves a patient (monk) is thankful.”⁷⁹

In the *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* two works of a monk (*sādhu*) or nun (*sādhvī*) are considered top priority: (1)

⁷⁹ ĀvN folio 61-62: *kiṃ bhante! jo gilāṇaṃ paḍiyarai se dhaṇṇe udāhu je tumāṃ daṃsaṇeṇa paḍivajjai? goyam! je gilāṇaṃ paḍiyarai.*

svādhyāya (study) and (2) *dhyāna* (meditation),⁸⁰ but there is a provision in another *sūtra* that if a *sādhu* of that group is ill or suffering from malady etc, then, with the permission or order of *ācārya*, a monk should first render his services to the sufferer and afterwards he should study (*svādhyāya*) or perform meditation (*dhyāna*). *Svādhyāya* and *vaiyāvṛtya* both are similarly important in ascetic life, *vaiyāvṛtya* or rendering of services to ill saint should be without any hate.⁸¹ Concept of selfless service to ailments is available in the Jaina texts. *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra* says:

“A monk should serve an ill saint, without any hate or reluctance.”⁸²

Some penal codes have been defined in Jaina canonical literature and in latter literature. In the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* smugglers have been defined as culprit and some penal codes have been proposed for them.⁸³ *Āvaśyaka nirukti* narrates three penal codes as (i) to aware someone of his wrong doing (*hākāra*), (ii) to prohibit someone from his wrong doing (*mākāra*) and (iii) to condemn someone wrong doing (*dhikkāra*).⁸⁴ These penal codes also prove the attentiveness of Jaina *ācāryas* towards the well being of the society.

Modern Jaina Society and Social Services by Jains

In modern times Jaina society seems very active in religious and as well as in social sector of life. Jainism is open for all the

⁸⁰ See Utt 26.12, 18.

⁸¹ Utt 26.10.

⁸² SK 3.4-21: *Kujjā bhikkhū gilāṇassa, agilāe samāhite*.

⁸³ See Utt chapter 21.

⁸⁴ NS, ĀvN v. 167.

castes and classes. After becoming a monk caste is neglected, but for a house holder caste remains important especially for marriage purpose. For instance, if a Jaina is Khandelval by caste then he needs a Khandelval girl to marry. Therefore, caste system in Jain followers is still prevailing. It is a social requirement of Jainas. Agustín Pániker (2001: 295) stresses:

“The important thing to retain in all this explanation of castes and classes is that Jainism does not eliminate castes.”

But Pániker's observation compels us to perceive that Jainism is a philosophical or religious term and that does not make any difference between two castes (*jāti*). The rise of Jainism occurred in the context of socially troubled India and appeared to offer a far more unifying theology. However, in contemporary India prevailing social tendencies and habits have proved for stronger determinants than the liberal tenets of Jainism. Though on theoretical level a society without caste barriers is accepted by all and preached by its *ācāryas*, in practice it has not been found to be translated into reality. This is true of all idealistic philosophies and not of Jainism alone. Yet with changing times the narrow sectarian and caste outlook is far rapidly being changed and more and more Jain polity is trying to remove these narrow barriers.

It has mainly two facets - One is religious in which caste, class, creed, colour have no place and another is of many kinds, such as- based on caste, business, clubs etc.

It does not need mention that presently several Jaina followers and social organizations are dedicated in the field of

charity and social services. They have built many schools, hospitals, hostels and they are managing them efficiently. Paul Dundas (2002: 198) has rightly mentioned:

“Outward piety and restraint, a propensity towards religious giving in the form of building hospitals, temples and educational establishments, and a general reticence about family and business affairs have tended to remain features of Jain lay life.”

It is to be clarified that self-purification is primary and the welfare of the society is secondary. It is difficult to change others without the positive change in us. Sometimes a man indulges in the social services, but he increases his pride, anger, deceit and greed. Jaina philosophy suggests that do social services but do not increase the evils within you. It is also an aspect of religious practice that sometimes social services are successful in reducing evils like pride, anger, deceit and greed. Although there is an impact of Hindu social norms on Jains of India and abroad, Jains have their own identity with their Śvetāmbara, Digambara, Sthānakavāsī and Terāpantha sects. They perform religious rituals with major or minor differences. They have developed distinguished societies in the view of other religious followers. The prevalent Jain schools, *gana*, *gaccha* and the social and religious practices have attracted the scholars from abroad for studies and research.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that society in Jainism is not limited merely to human beings, but it encompasses all the beings of the world. It is not merely anthropomorphic,

ethnocentric and culture specific, but it is universal or global due to mutual relations and interactions with all the living beings of the world. Human society is a part of that larger global society. When bird flu or mad cow diseases expand in a country all the human beings become terrorized with its effect on them. At subtle level all beings of the world are inter-connected. This broad thinking of Jaina religion and philosophy makes a human society vigilant to the whole universe. But in narrow sense Jainism talks about the human society also. It considers all human beings equal without discrimination of caste, creed and colour. Human society is only one,⁸⁵ as says Jinasena in his *Ādipurāṇa*. The Jaina philosophy accepts society as real and suggests reformations to eradicate the evils prevalent at the different times. It accepts that self-purification is not possible without the right attitude of kindness (*anukampā*) towards the all beings of the world.⁸⁶

Metaphysics, ethics and the epistemology of Jaina philosophy are correlated with society. The Jaina system has discussed the independence of every soul and their mutual relationship. The Jaina theory of *karma*, the theory of non-absolutism (*anekāntavāda*) and the ethics of religious giving (*dāna*), polite conduct (*vinaya*), service (*vaiyāvṛtya*), forgiveness (*kṣamā*), friendliness (*maitrī*) elucidate the concept of society in Jainism. The discussion of *varṇa-vyavasthā* and *saṃskāras* in *Ādipurāṇa*, *Anagāradharmāmṛta*, *Yasastilakacampu* and in *Ācāradinakara* seems the impact of

⁸⁵ ĀP 38.45: *manuṣyajātīrekaiva jātīnāmodayādbhavā*.

⁸⁶ *Anukampā* is a characteristic of *saṃyagdarśana* without which a path of liberation does not proceed ahead. There are five characteristics of *saṃyagdarśana* as: *śama*, *saṃvega*, *nirveda*, *anukampā* and *āstikya*. (TB: 1.2).

brahmanical culture on Jinasena, Somadevasūri, *Āśādhara* and Vardhamānasūri. Vardhamānasūri's *Ācāradinakara* is an important work which discusses about the sacraments of house holders and saints from the Jaina point of view. Concept of fourfold *saṅgha* or *tīrtha* is a religious organization, but it is intermingled with the society in many forms. Its social aspects cannot be denied.

Concept of society is quite wide ranging and logical in Jaina philosophy and religion rather than the other philosophies of Indian and western tradition. Jainism is considered as world-withdrawing religion due to its emphasis on the attainment of salvation, but it gives proper attention on the right activity of a person towards the society of all beings of the world including the society of human beings.

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- ĀvN* *Āvassayanijjutti* (Āvaśyakaniryukti) of BHADRABĀHU. In: Śrīmad-Ācāryavarya-Bhadrabāhu-kṛta-Niryuktiyutaṃ Pūrvadhar-Ācārya-Vihita-Bhāṣya-Bhūṣitaṃ Śrīmad-Bhavaviraha-Haribhadrāsūri-Sūtrita-Vṛtty-Alaṅkṛtaṃ Śrīmad-Āvaśyakasūtram (Prathamō & Pūrva Vibhāgaḥ). Prakāśakaḥ Javherī Cunīlāla Pannālāla-Datta-Kiñcid-Adhikārga-Dravya-Sāhāyena Śāha-Verīcanda-Sūracanda Asyaikaḥ Kāryavāhakaḥ. Iḍaṃ Puṣṭakaṃ Mumbayyāṃ Nirṇayasāgaramudraṇāspade Kolabhāṭavīṭhyāṃ 23 Tame Gṛhe Rāmacandra Yesū Śeḍagedvārā Mudrayitvā Prakāśitaṃ, 1916 (Āgamodayasamitisiddhāntasaṃgrāhe Āṅkaḥ 1).
- ĀvS* *Āvaśyakasūtra*. Prakrit. Hindī Translation and Annotation by Sādhvī Suprabhā 'Sudhā.' Byāvar: Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1985.
- BhG* *Bhagavadgītā*. Gorakhpur: Gītāpress V. S. 2040 (=1983).
- BB* *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya*. Vol 1-5. Edited by Caturavijaya and Puṇyavijaya. Bhāvanagara: Ātmānanda Jaina Sabhā, 1933.
- BD* *Bṛhadhravyasaṃgraha* of Nemicaṇḍra. Prakrit. Sanskrit Commentary by Brahmadeva and Hindī Translation by Javāharlāla. Agāsa:: Paramaśruta Prabhāvaka Maṇḍal, Śrīmad Rājacandra Āśrama, 1989.
- BK* *Bṛhatkalpasūtra* (*saṭikam*). Prakrit. Edited by Ācārya Hastimal, with Sanskrit Commentary of Unknown Writer. Second Edition with Hindī Translation by: Dharmachand Jain. Jaipur: Samyag-Jñāna Pracāraka Maṇḍala, 1950/2007.
- DK* *Daśavaikālikasūtra*. Prakrit. Edited and Translated into Hindī by Ācārya Hastīmala and Śaśikānta Jhā. Jaipur: Samyag-Jñāna Pracāraka Maṇḍal, 1983.
- DB* *Dharmabindu* of Haribhadrāsūri. Ahmedabad: Nāgaṇī Bhūdhara kī Pole, 1951.

- KG *Karmagrantha* of Devendrasūri. Vol. 2. Byāvar: Marudhara Kesari Sāhitya Prakāśana Samiti, 1975.
- KA *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* of Svāmīkumāra. Third Edition. Agāsa: Parama Śruta Prabhāvaka Maṇḍala, 1990.
- NK *Nyāyakumudacandra* of Prabhācandra. Edited by Mahendra Kumār. Bombay: Māṇikyacandra Digambara Jaina Granthamālā, 1941.
- NS *Niryukti Saṃgraha (Āvaśyakaniryukti)* of Bhadrabāhu. Edited by Ācārya Vijayajinendrasūri. Jāmanagar: Harṣa Puṣpāmṛta Jaina Granthamālā, Lakhābāvala, 1989.
- NV *Nītivākyāmṛtam* of Somadeva Sūri, with Hindī Translation by Sunder Lāl Śāstrī. Byāvar: Ācārya Jñāna Sāgara Vāgartha Vimarśa Kendra, 1996.
- PP *Padmapurāṇa* (Part I). Edited and Translated by Pannā Lāl Jain. Second Edition. Delhi: Bhāratīya Jñāna Pītha, 1977.
- PT *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* of Vādidevasūri. Third Edition, Ahmadanagara: Tilokaratna Sthānakavāsī Jaina Dhārmika Parīkṣā Board, 1980/2000.
- PV *Prāśnavyākaraṇasūtra*. Prakrit. Translated into Hindī by Muni Pravīṇa Ṛṣi and Edited by Śobhā Candra Bhārilla. Byāvar: Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1983.
- SāP *Sāmāyikapāṭha* or *Paramātmadvātriṃśikā* of Amitagati. In: *Nirgrantha-Bhajanāvalī*. Jaipur: Samyag-Jñāna Pracāraka Maṇḍal, 1997.
- SD *Sāgarādharmāmṛta* of Āśādhara. Edited by Kailāśacandra Śāstri. Sixth Edition. New Delhi: Bhāratīya Jñānapītha, 2007.
- SK *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra* (Part I-II). Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindī by Śrīcanda Surāṇā “Saras.” Second Edition. Byāvar: Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1991.
- SP *Sanmatiprakaraṇa* of Siddhasena. Prakrit. Annotated by Sukha Lāl Saṅghavī in Hindī, Ahmedabad: Gyānodaya Trust, 1969.
- SS *Samavāyāṅgasūtra*. Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindī by Hīrālāl Śāstri. Second Edition. Byāvar: Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1982/1991.

- Sth *Sthānāṅgasūtra*. Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindī by Hirālāl Śāstri. Second Edition. Byāvar: Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1981/1992.
- TS₁ *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti. Hindī Commentary and Annotation by Sukhlāl Saṅghavī, Third Edition, Varanasi: Pārśvanātha Vidyāpīṭha, 1985.
- TS₂ *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmī. English Translation by Nathmal Tatia as "That Which Is.", Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1994/2007.
- TB *Tattvārthabhāṣya (Sabhāṣyatattvārthādhigamasūtra)* of Umāsvāti. Hindī Translation by Khoobacandra Śāstri. Third Edition, Agāsa: Paramaśruta Prabhāvaka Maṇḍal, 1975/1992.
- TK *Thirukkurala* with English and Hindī Translation. Second Edition, Jaipur: Prakrit Bharati Academy, 2006.
- TC *Trīṇi Chedasūtrāṇi (Dasāśrutaskandha, Bṛhatkalpa and Vyavahārasūtra)*. Prakrit. Translation and Annotation in Hindī by Muni Kanhaiyā Lāl 'Kamal' and Triloka Muni.. Byāvar: Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1992.
- UD *Uvāsagadasāo*. Prakrit. Hindī Translation and Annotation in Hindī by Editor Chhagan Lāl Śāstri. Byāvar: Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1980/1989.
- Utt *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* (3 Vols.) Prakrit. Hindī Translation by Ācārya Hastīmal and Śaśikānt Jhā. Jaipur: Samyag-Jñāna Pracāraka Maṇḍal, 1983-1989.
- VP *Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra*. Prakrit (Translated and Annotated in Hindī by Śrī Amar Muni. Series Editor: Pt. Śobhā Candra Bhārilla. Byāvar: Śrī Āgama Prakāśana Samiti, 1986.
- YA *Yuktyānuśāsana* of Samantabhadra. Hindī Translation and Commentary by Jugal Kiśora Mukhtāra 'Yugavīra.' Sarasāvā: Vīra Sevā Mandira, 1951.

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Knowledge In Jainism : An Overview

Knowledge is a key of upliftment of our present life, development of values and salvation from sufferings. Hence, in the *Upaniṣads* two kinds of knowledge (*vidyā*) are propounded as *parāvidyā* and *aparā vidyā* (*Muṇḍakopaniṣad* 1.1.4-5). *Aparā vidyā* is a kind of knowledge which is earned and useful for elevation and success of a human being in his empirical life, where as *parāvidyā* is a knowledge which is intuitively emerged and manifested in a soul by which ultimate truth is achieved and spiritual upliftment is experienced. This *parāvidyā* is solicited for liberation from sufferings and sorrows forever. Both of these are also useful for generating human values. *Parāvidyā* generates eternal values whereas *aparāvidyā* can generate contextual values.

Vaiśeṣika philosophy discusses about *vidyā* and *avidyā*¹. *Avidyā* is of four kinds² as - doubt (*saṁśaya*), perverted knowledge (*viparyaya*), undetermined (*anadhyavasāya*) and dream (*svapna*) and *vidyā* is also of four types³ as 1. Perception (*pratyakṣa*) 2. Inference (*anumāna* / *Laingika*), 3. Recollection (*smṛti*) and testimony (*ārṣa* / *śābda*). Vaiśeṣikas mention *vidyā* as a quality (*guṇa*) which remains in a soul with relation of inherence.

¹*Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* (11) also mentions these two:

*vidyām cāvidyām ca yastad vedobhayam saha.
avidyayā mṛtyuṁ tīrtvā vidyayāmṛtamaśnute.*

²*Prāśastapādabhāṣya, guṇavaidhāimya prakaraṇa* (In *Vyomavatī*, vol. 2 p.115): *tatrāvidyā caturvidhā saṁśaya-viparyayānādhyavasāya-svapna-lakṣaṇā.*

³*Ibid.*: *Vidyāpi caturvidhā, pratyakṣa-laingika-smṛtyārśalakṣaṇā.* (In *Vyomavatī*, vol. 2, p.137)

In Vedānta philosophy complete destruction of ignorance has been accepted as a means of eternal liberation (*mokṣa*)⁴ and knowledge (*vidyā*) is the means for achieving it. Sāṃkhya Philosophy accepts two kinds of knowledge. One is referred as *buddhi* or *mahat* which is a product of *prakṛti* (unconscious element) and another is referred as a characteristic of a *puruṣa* (conscious element) in the form of *Viveka* (distinguishing Knowledge) which is helpful in obtaining salvation from sufferings forever. Sensuous knowledge is an activity of *prakṛti* gaining a shadow of *puruṣa* whereas distinguishing knowledge is a characteristic of conscious *puruṣa*.

Knowledge : a characteristic of a soul

In Jaina philosophy knowledge (*jñāna*) is accepted as an essential, natural, identical and inseparable characteristic of a soul. Jaina philosophers do not accept a soul without knowledge. It is an inevitable characteristic of a soul, which represents the consciousness and without consciousness a soul cannot be defined. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophies, knowledge is not considered as a natural characteristic of a soul. They consider it as an attribute which remains in a soul-substance due to relation of inherence and in the state of salvation this attribute of consciousness vanishes from that soul. Jaina philosophers refute this notion. The Jaina philosophers have similarity to some extent with the Vedāntins. Vedāntins define *Brahma* or *Atman* as '*Saccidānanda*' (*Vedāntasāra*, 33). Here '*cit*' (*cid*) is the synonym of knowledge and consciousness. According to Jaina text *Uttarādhyayana*

⁴Nyāyamakaranda p. 336: *avidyāstamayo mokṣaḥ*.

sūtra (28.11) a soul bears the following characteristics :

nāṇaṃ ca daṃsaṇaṃ ceva carittaṃ ca tavo taḥā.

vīriyaṃ uvaogo ya, eyam jīvaṣṣa lakkaṇaṃ.

“A soul has characteristics like- knowledge, intuition (darśana), conduct (*cāritra*), austerity (*tapa*), enthusiasm (*vīrya*) and consciousness (*upayoga*)”.

Thus Jaina propound some more characteristics of a soul than Vedāntins accept, but these two philosophies agree on the point that knowledge is an essential characteristic of a soul.

Jaina philosopher Umāsvāti propounds '*Upayoga*' (consciousness) as the main characteristic of a soul in his renowned work *Tattvārthasūtra* (2.8). *Upayoga* is of two kinds- (i) *Jñāna* (articulate cognition) and (ii) *Darśana* (in-articulate cognition). These two are the categories of cognition. *Jñāna* is an articulate cognition (*Sākāropayoga*) and *Darśana* is an in-articulate cognition (*Anākāropayoga*). *Darśana* and *Jñāna* have an essential order. *Darśana* or *anākāropayoga* occurs first and then after *Jñāna* or *sākāropayoga* takes place.

The Jaina conception of knowledge has its most significant place in the sphere of Indian philosophy. According to Jaina philosophy no one soul can exist without knowledge. All the souls of the world including the organisms like tree, fire, water etc. having only one sense of touch, also have the characteristic of knowledge. Even liberated souls do have knowledge. They have complete knowledge which is called *kevalajñāna* and the worldly souls have atleast two types of knowledge namely *matijñāna* and *srutajñāna*. Here, one thing is to be clarified that knowledge in Jainism is accepted either as

samyak (right) or as *mithyā* (wrong or perverted). If the souls have right view or *Samyagdarśana* then they have right knowledge and if they are possessed of perverted attitude then they have *mithyājñāna* or *ajñāna*. The word '*ajñāna*' in Jaina system does not denote the complete absence of knowledge, but it indicates the pervertedness of the knowledge. In this way the living beings bearing one sense-organ of touch are possessed of *ajñāna*, but it is true that the phenomenon of cognition is also found always there. The creatures like caterpillar, ant, termite, butterfly also have knowledge in the form of *ajñāna*. Thus knowledge or cognition is an essential and inseparable characteristic of a soul in Jainism.

Jñānāvaraṇa karma: An obstruction in manifestation of knowledge

Jaina thinkers accept that every *bhavya* (having potential for ultimate emancipation) soul has a capability of becoming omniscient, but the bondage of *jñānāvaraṇa* (knowledge covering) *karma*⁵ is an obstruction in its manifestation. Whenever a soul completely destructs the *Karma*-bondage of *jñānāvaraṇa*, the pure and complete knowledge *Kevalajñāna* arises at the moment. Before arising of *kevaljñāna*, *mohanīya karma* (deluding *karma*) is destructed. *Darśanāvaraṇa* (intuition covering) *karma* and

⁵There are eight *karmas* in Jainism which obscure or obstruct the manifestation of real attributes of a soul. They are (i) *jñānāvaraṇa* (obscures knowledge) (ii) *darśanāvaraṇa* (obscures sensitivity or intuition) (iii) *vedanīya* (provides pleasure and sorrows) (iv) *mohanīya* (deducing *karma*) (v) *āyusya* (*karma* related to life-span) (vi) *nāma* (provides body, sense organs etc) (vii) *gotra* (provides higher or lower life-values) (viii) *antarāya* (obstructs the qualities of generosity etc.).

antarāya (Obstructive) *karma* also got destructed altogether with *jñānāvaraṇa*. Umāsvāti says-

“Pure and perfect knowledge (omniscience) arises when deluding *karma* is eliminated and as a result, knowledge-covering, intuition-covering and obstructive *karma* are eliminated.”⁶

It means knowledge is affected by deluding *karma*. Whenever delusion in our views arises, the right knowledge is affected. Hence for manifestation of right knowledge destruction of *mohanīya* (deluding) *karma* is needed.

Causation of knowledge

According to Jaina philosophy knowledge does not come from outside. It always manifests in a soul after the destruction (*kṣaya*) or subsidence-cum-destruction (*Kṣayopaśama*) of *Jñānāvaraṇa Karma*. Although we know the objects through sense-organs and quasi-sense (mind), but these are only the instruments. The knowledge does not manifest in them. Knowledge is an attribute of a soul. In the view of Jaina thinkers light and objects are not the real causes of the origination of a knowledge. Although their presence helps in the manifestation of a knowledge to us, but these are not needed for a person who has supersensuous intuition, therefore the Jaina philosophers do not accept the direct causation of light and object. *Ācārya* Hemacandra says (In brief) :-

⁶*Tattvārthasūtra*, 10.1 : *Mohakṣayāj-jñāna-darśanāvaraṇāntarāyākṣayācca kevalam.*

“Light and object are the general causes like space and time. These are not the direct causes of generating knowledge in a living being.” Further Hemacandra says- “In the mirage we know water inspite of its absence. some animals like cow, cat, etc. can see in the night without light, hence light and object are not the real causes of the knowledge. Yogins know the objects of past, present and future, but causation of the objects is not seen there.”⁸

Self and Object - illuminating (*Sva-para-Prakāśakatva*)

Jaina philosophers propound that knowledge illuminates itself and the object. Self illuminating and the object illuminating (*Svapraprakāśakatva*) is a natural characteristic of a knowledge. In the view of Jaina philosophers, if a knowledge does not illuminate itself, then it cannot illuminate the objects also. They give an example of the sun, which illuminates itself and the objects as well.⁹

Naiyayikas accept that a knowledge can not illuminate itself, it can illuminate, its object only. For illumination of a knowledge an another knowledge is required. Buddhist Vijñānavadins do not accept any existence other than of vijñāna (knowledge). Hence they accept a knowledge self-illuminating only.

⁸ *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* 1.1.25 *vṛtti*: *Nārthāloka Jñānasya nimittama-vyatirekāt. Bāhyo viśayaḥ prakāśaśca na caḥsurjñānasya sāksāt Kāraṇam; deśakāladivattu vyavahitakāraṇatvam na nivāryate, jñānāvaraṇādikṣayopaśamaśmagryā-mārādūpakārit-venānjñānādiva- ccaḥsurupakāritvena cābhyupagamāt.*

⁹ See *Pramāṇa mīmāṃsā* 1.1.25 *vṛtti*

⁹ *Niyamasāra, tātparyavṛtti*, 159 and *Pramāṇanaya-tattvāloka* 1.17

Samyagjñāna : two forms

We find two forms of *samyagjñāna* (right knowledge) in Jaina literature. First form of *samyagjñāna* is included in the trio-jewels (*samygijñāna*, *samyagdarśana* and *samyak cāritra*) which lead to the path of salvation. This *samyagjñāna* is linked with *samyagdarśana* (right view). In the presence of right view the existing knowledge converts into *samyag-jñāna* (*Sarvārtha siddhi*, 1.1.7). On the contrary in the presence of *mithyādarśana* or *midhyātva* (deluded view) the existing knowledge is called as *ajñāna* or *mithyā-jñāna*. *Mithyādarśana*: is a perverted or deluded view of a soul which leads to mundane world and *samyag-darśana* leads a soul to the path of salvation.¹⁰ This is the first form of *Samyag-jñāna* found in Jaina canons and latter literature.

The second form of *samyag-jñāna* is found only in the epistemological literature, when Jaina philosophers define *pramāṇa* (an organ of valid knowledge) as *samyag-jñāna*—“*Samyag-jñānam pramāṇam*.”¹¹ Vidyānanda (775-840 A.D.) and Abhinava-dharmabhuṣaṇa have given definition of *pramāṇa* as *samyagjñāna*, but here *samyag-jñāna* is not linked with the inevitable presence of *samyag-darśana*. In defining *pramāṇa* *samyag-jñāna* has another characteristic i.e. devoidness of doubt (*saṁśaya*), illusion (*viparyaya*) and indeterminateness (*anadhyavasāya*). The knowledge determining the self and the object and devoidness of doubt, illusion and indeterminateness is called *pramāṇa*.¹²

¹⁰ *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, 1.1

¹¹ *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā*, p.1 & *Nyāya-dīpikā*, p.9.

¹² *Pramāṇāmīmāṃsā* 1.1.1. *Ṛtti & Nyāya-kumuda-candra*, Vol. I p.4.8: *Prakarṣeṇa saṁśayādi-vyavachedena mīyate parichidyate vastutattvam yena tat pramāṇam pramāṇam sādhatamam*.

Thus *samyag-jñāna* defined as *pramāṇa* is different from the *samyag-jñāna* leading to liberation. The basic difference in these two is of inner view. First one right knowledge is leading the path of salvation and another one is guiding our empirical behaviour. First one may be compared with *parāvidyā* of *Upaniṣadas* and second one with *aparāvidyā*. Vattakera in *Mūlācāra* defines *samyag-jñāna* as follows:-

“By which the truth is known, by which the mind is restrained and by which the soul is purified is the knowledge in Jaina-teachings.”

By which a man abstains from attachment, by which he engages himself in welfare and by which friendly behaviour with everybody takes place is the knowledge in Jaina-teachings.¹³

This knowledge is one of the jewels in trio-jewels leading to the path of liberation, but Jaina scholars accepted the empirical world as a reality, hence they developed their own epistemological fundamentals which are more practicable.

Knowledge as *pramāṇa*

Jaina logicians propounded *pramāṇa* for uncontradictory behaviour of a person. The foremost Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara says in his *Nyāyāvatāra*- “This system of valid cognitive criteria is having neither any beginning nor any end, also it is well known to all people in daily life, even though it is propounded here.”¹⁴

¹³ *Mūlācāra*, Verses 267-268

¹⁴ *Nyāyāvatāra*, 32: *Pramāṇādi-vyavastheyamanādinidhanātmikā*
Sarvasaṃvyavahartṛ nāṃ prasiddhāpi prakīrtitā||

Pramāṇa is a part of daily cognitive life. Without *Pramāṇa* knowing process may remain unsuccessful or invalid. Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti also says- “Validity of knowledge is proved through daily behaviour”¹⁵

Jaina logicians created many works for the establishment of Jaina *pramāṇa vidyā* and for refutation of other systems in this regard. They developed *pramāṇa śāstra* and logic on the basis of knowledge and its kinds enumerated in the Jaina canons. They kept an empirical view in the development of *pramāṇa-śāstra*, hence they considered the sensuous knowledge after wards as perception and established *smṛti* (recollection), *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition) and *tarka* (inductive reasoning) as indirect (*parokṣa*) *pramāṇa*. They included *kāraṇa*, *pūrvacara* and *uttaracara* probans in the list of right probans (*sadhetus*).¹⁶

Right Knowledge and *mohanīya karma*

In Jaina philosophy, it is notable that the right knowledge leading to the path of liberation is not only connected with the subsidence or destruction of knowledge-covering (*jñānavaraṇa*) *karma*, but it also has relation with the subsidence or destruction of the view-deluding (*darśana mohanīya*) *karma*. The righteousness of knowledge (*jñāna*) depends on the destruction or partly destruction and subsidence of deluding-karma (*mohanīya*). *Mohanīya karma* is mainly of two types - (1) View-deluding *karma* (*darśana mohanīya*) and (2) conduct-deluding (*cāritra mohanīya*) *karma*. *Darśana mohanīya karma* represents the deluded inner view of a person

¹⁵*Prāmāṇyam Vyavahāreṇa - Pramāṇa vārtika*, 1.7

¹⁶A separate chapter of this book on ‘Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines’ is discussing on *Pramāṇa* and *hetus*.

towards the life and the world. *Cāritra-mohanīya* is linked with the perverted activities of a soul, e.g. anger (*krodha*), proud (*māna*), deceit (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*) are conduct-delduing passions. Each of these are of four types, viz-*Anantānubandhi* (tenacious), *Apratyākhyānāvaraṇa* (non-abstinent), *pratyākhyānāvaraṇa* (partially abstinent) and *sañjvalana* (flickering passions). When the category of *anantānubandhi krodha, māna, māyā* and *lobha* are subsidised or destructed alongwith the category of *darśana mohanīya* the right-view emerges in a soul and the existing perverted knowledge changes into right knowledge.

This righteousness of knowledge depends on the subsidence, subsidence-cum-destruction or destruction of some part of *mohanīya karma*. Another very important relation between them is manifested when the total destruction of *mohanīya karma* leads to complete destruction of *jñānavaraṇa karma* and then *kevalajñāna* emerges in a soul. In this way destruction of *mohanīya karma* is a cause of destruction of *jñānāvaraṇa karma* after which complete and perfect knowledge *kevalajñāna* arises.

Types of Knowledge

Five types of knowledge found in *Rājaprasṅgīya*, *Uttarādhyayana*(28.4) *Sthānāṅga*(5.3.464) *Anuyogadvāra sūtra*(sūtra,1), *Nandisūtra*(sūtra,1) and *Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra* (8.2.23) are as follows:-

1. *Ābhinibodhika jñāna/mati jñāna* (sensuous knowledge)
2. *Śrutajñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge)
3. *Avadhijñāna* (visual intuition/clairvoyance)
4. *Manahparyāya jñāna* (intuition of mental modes)
5. *kevalajñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge/omniscience)

These five types of knowledge are the specific contribution of Jaina wisdom to the Indian epistemological sphere. In *Nandisūtra* (sūtra 2) this fivefold knowledge has been divided into two kinds- (1) *pratyakṣa* (direct) (2) *parokṣa* (indirect). This broad division of knowledge has been accepted by Jaina logicians in the division of *pramāṇa* also. The knowledge which requires the sense-organs and quasi-sense in its manifestation, comes under the category of indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge and the knowledge which occurs only through a soul without the help of sense organs and mind is called direct (*pratyakṣa*) knowledge.

In this respect the Jaina view is different from the other Indian systems because all other systems of Indian philosophy consider the sensuous knowledge as direct knowledge where as the early Jaina thinkers accept it as indirect knowledge. The Jaina logicians including Jinabhadragaṇi (6th century CE), Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720-780 CE) introduce sensuous knowledge as empirical perception (*sāṃvyaavahārika pratyakṣa*). This was a latter development in the Jaina philosophy.

Matijñāna or Ābhinibodhikajñāna

Generally *matijñāna* or *ābhinibodhika jñāna* is considered as sensuous knowledge. Somewhere it occurs through sense-organs only, somewhere through sense-organ and quasi-sense, and somewhere it occurs through quasi-sense (mind) only. In *Nandisūtra* (sūtra 71) we find synonyms of *ābhinibodhika jñāna* as- *īhā*, *apoha*, *vīmamsā*, *maggaṇā*, *gaveṣaṇā*, *saṇṇā*, *saī*, *maī* and *paṇṇā*. These synonyms present a vide perspective of *matijñāna* or *ābhinibodhika jñāna*.

Thinking, reasoning, memory, intellect are also the forms of *abhinibodhikajñāna*. *Jāti-smaraṇa jñāna* (knowledge of former birth) is also included in the *ābhinibodhika jñāna*. Thus it is having a vast area of knowledge. Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* (1.14) has defined it as the knowledge which is generated or manifested by the sense-organs and quasi-sense. He has given five synonyms¹⁷ of it as sensuous knowledge, memory, recognition, argument and inference. All these are the kinds of *matijñāna* or *ābhinibodhika jñāna* which were approved as the base of development of Jaina logic. Bhaṭṭa Akalanka considered. 'mati' as sensuous perception and quasi-sensuous perception and developed new *pramāṇas* as *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñāna*, *tarka* and inference *pramāṇa* from the memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*sañjña*), thinking (*cintā*) and *abhinibodha* words.

This *ābhinibodhika* knowledge has been divided into two types-(1) *śrutaniśrita* and (2) *aśrutaniśrita*. *Aśrutaniśrita matijñāna* is divided into four kinds of *buddhis*-(1) *autapattikī* (2) *vainayikī* (3) *karmajā* and (iv) *pāriṇāmikī*.

Autpattikī buddhi is an intellectual exercise of highly and quickly right decision, about the situations and things which were never seen, heard or otherwise known before. *Vainayikī buddhi* is the intellect of finding out a right solution in a complicated matter after getting some guidance. *Karmajā* is the intellect developed through practice in a particular work. The *pāriṇāmikī* intellect is attained through inference, reasoning and other such methods after seeing a result of prior-

¹⁷ Tattvārtha sūtra, 1.13: matiḥ smṛtiḥ sañjña, cintā-bhinibodha ityanarthāntaram.

action. These four types of *buddhis* are mentioned in the *Nandisūtra* with examples (*sūtra* 48-52) and in the *Sthānāngasūtra*(4.4) by names. This division of *āśrutaniśrita* is not available in Digambara tradition. In Śvetāmbara tradition this division is not found in the *Bhagavatī*, *Prajñāpanā*, *Āvaśyaka niryukti* and *Anuyogadvāra sūtra*.

Śrutaniśrita matijñāna is of four kinds- (i) *Avagraha* (ii) *īhā* (iii) *avāya* and (iv) *dhāraṇā*. These four types of *matijñāna* are actually the four stages which occur in a certain order and have a significant value in the theory of knowledge in Indian System.

Avagraha is a non-specific cognition of mere existence of an object, *īhā* is a further step in which the knowledge is inclined towards ascertainment of that object. It is different from doubt because during the doubt, knowledge hangs towards two things while in *īhā* the knowledge is inclined towards one of them. '*Avāya*' is the ascertained knowledge of the object. *Dhāraṇā* is retention or impression of the judgement which becomes the cause of memory. In the *Nandisūtra*, commentaries of the *Tattvārtha sūtra* and in the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* of Jinabhadraganin a detailed account of these four stages of *matijñāna* is available.

Here, it will be an important note that these stages may be helpful in strengthening the learning process of human being. The things which we want to recall, the learning process of them should go upto *dhāraṇā* (retention) stage. *Dhāraṇā* is the cause of memory. In this way study and application of these four stages namely *avagraha*, *īhā*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā* might

have been proved fruitful in the field of educational psychology for moderating the learning process of children.

***Śrutajñāna* (Scriptural Knowledge)**

The Nandisūtra says that where *ābhinibodhika jñāna* is present, *śrutajñāna* is also there, and where *śrutajñāna* is present, the *ābhinibodhika jñāna* is also there.¹⁸ Both of these are found together. One characteristic of *śrutajñāna* is quoted everywhere in Jaina literature that *śrutajñāna* occurs after *matijñāna* :- *śrutam. matipūrvam*.¹⁹ Nandisūtra says- '*maipuvvaṃ jeṇa suyaṃ*'.²⁰

Generally *śrutajñāna* is defined as scriptural Knowledge or verbal knowledge, but it has been accepted in Jaina literature that every living being bears at least two knowledges as - *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna*. Hence a question arises here that when every living being possesses *śrutajñāna* alongwith *matijñāna*, then it cannot be a scriptural knowledge, because a soul like one-sensed being has no knowledge of scriptures or canons. Although canonical literature of *aṅgapraviṣṭa* and *anāṅgapraviṣṭa* comes under the roof of *śruta-jñāna*, but there must be some other characteristics of *śrutajñāna* or *śruta-ajñāna* as it is found in every worldly soul.²¹ *śrutajñāna* is like a directive knowledge to lead a life. It is an inner voice of the self, depending on the experience occurred through *matijñāna*.

¹⁸ Nandisūtra, 45 : *jattha ābhinibohinānaṃ tattha suyaṇāṇaṃ, jattha suyaṇāṇaṃ tattha ābhinibohinānaṃ dovi eyāiṃ aṇṇamaṇṇamaṇugayāiṃ*.¹

¹⁹ Tattvārthasūtra, 1.20

²⁰ Nandisūtra, 45

²¹ A separate article on 'Significance of *śrutajñāna*' is available in the book for detailed discussion.

Somewhere in Jaina canons *śrutajñāna* is considered as equal to *kevalajñāna* in some respect. Gommatasāra of Nemicandra says-

“In the respect of knowing all the objects *śrutajñāna* and *kevalajñāna* are equal, but *śrutajñāna* is considered as *parokṣa* (indirect) and *kevalajñāna* is always *pratyakṣa* (direct).”²²

This statement glorifies the significance of *śrutajñāna*. Kundakunda says-

“The person who knows a soul in the pure form with the help of *śrutajñāna*, is considered as *śrutakevalin*, by the *yogins* who illuminate the world with their knowledge.”²³

***Avadhijñāna* (visual intuition/clairvoyance)**

Avadhi is the knowledge of material objects directly emerged through a soul, in a soul, without the help of sense-organs and mind. It is of two types - (i) *Bhava-pratyaya* (ii) *Guṇa pratyaya* (*kṣayopaśamanimittaka*). *Bhava-pratyaya avadhijñāna* is found by birth. It is accepted in the souls of hell and heaven. *Guṇa-pratyaya avadhijñāna* is found in human beings and animals. It is attained by austerity, observing vows etc. In an *avadhijñāna* one can know a very small fraction of a material and he can also know the all material objects of the world. *Guṇa-pratyaya avadhijñāna* is of six types-

- (i) ***Ānugāmika***- It follows the owner of *avadhi* even if he leaves the place of its manifestation.
- (ii) ***Anānugāmika***- It does not follow the owner if he leaves that particular place where *avadhijñāna* was experienced.

²² Gommatasāra, Jīvakāṇḍa, 369

²³ Samayasāra, 9

- (iii) *Hīyamāna*- It shrinks gradually after its appearance.
- (iv) *Vardhamāna*- It increases continuously after its manifestation.
- (v) *Avasthita*- It remains steady upto attainment of *kevalajñāna* or up to the end of life.
- (vi) *Anavasthita*- It decreases or increases or may disappear after its manifestation.

Manahparyāya jñāna

Manahparyāya jñāna is also a direct knowledge in which the modes of mind of others are known lucidly. It is a result of subsidence - cum - destruction of *manahparyāya jñānāvaraṇa*. It is different from *avadhijñāna* on the following points according to *Tattvārthasūtra*, (1.26) :-

- (i) *Manahparyāyajñāna* is more vivid and lucid than *avadhijñāna*.
- (ii) Area of manifestation of *manahparyāyajñāna* is only two and half *dvīpa* land, where human beings live. Minimum area of manifestation of *avadhijñāna* is the small fraction of an *aṅgula*(finger) and maximum area is complete world (*loka*).
- (iii) An owner of *manahparyāyajñāna* can only be a human being especially a monk standing in seventh *Guṇasthāna*, while owner of *avadhijñāna* may be a soul from any four *gatis* (types of living beings).
- (iv) An object of *avadhijñāna* may be all materialistic substances and their modes of the universe, while in *manahparyāya jñāna* object is only the modes of mind of others.

Manahparyāya jñāna is of two types - (i) *rjumati* and (ii) *vipulamati*. *Vipulamati* is more lucid and vivid than *rjumati*. *Vipulamati* is infallible where as *rjumati* may disappear after certain period. *Vipulamati* turns into *kevalajñāna*. (*Tattvartha sūtra* 1.25)

There are two opinions about the object of *manahparyāya jñāna*, *Paṇḍita* Sukhalāl Saṅghavī has mentioned these in his notes on *Pramāṇa mīmāṃsā* (p.37) :

- (i) According to the *Nandisūtra*, *Avaśyaka-niryukti* and *Tattvārthabhāṣya*, in *manahparyāya jñāna*, alongwith the modes of *manas* (mind) the substances and their modes of which thinking is prevailing are also known.
- (ii) According to the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* and *Nandi-cūrṇi*, only mental modes of others are perceived through *manahparyāya jñāna* and the things of which thinking is prevailing are known through inference.

Kevalajñāna

Kevalajñāna is a complete and perfect knowledge after which nothing remains to know. It is a knowledge by which all substances and their modes of present, past and future are known directly and lucidly. It never needs sense-organs and mind for its manifestation. After complete destruction of *jñānāvaraṇa karma* along-with *mohaniya*, *darśanāvaraṇa* and *antarāya karma*-bondage, this perfect, pure and complete knowledge appears in a soul. It is also defined as omniscient knowledge. Jaina thinkers give many cogent arguments in favour of omniscience of *kevalin* or *kevalajñānin*. Ācārya Hemacandra says-“The degree of knowledge should rest at the

extreme. This extreme of knowledge is *kevalajñāna* which is considered as omniscience.”²⁴

Some more arguments are as follows:-

- (1) The things subtle, hidden and far are assumed as perceptive by someone, because of their knowability. In *kevalajñāna* all the things are known lucidly.²⁵
- (ii) Many times the statements of astrologers are seen true, It means it is enough possible to know the things which are not perceptive by the sense-organs.²⁶
- (iii) There is not any contradictory *pramāṇa* against omniscience.²⁷

In the respect of omniscience a question arises that what the purpose of knowing everything of the universe is? The Jaina philosophers reply that it is a nature of pure soul that every object is known by it. Some of the Indian systems do not agree with the concept of omniscience of a person. Especially, Mīmāṃsakas criticise the notion of omniscience at a length. Buddhist philosophers agree with the concept of omniscience. Aśvaghoṣa says- “(Buddha) saw the whole universe (in his knowledge) like in a clean mirror.”²⁸, but a pioneer Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti denies the purpose of omniscience as he says:-

“Knowledge of distant objects is not important, if it is so then we should worship vultures who see the objects at a very high distance.”²⁹

²⁴ *Pramāṇa - mīmāṃsā* 1.1.16: *prajñātiśaya- viṣrāntyādi-siddhestat-siddhiḥ*.

²⁵ *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā vṛtti* 1.1.16

²⁶ *Ibid.* 1.1.16

²⁷ *Ibid.* 1.1.16

²⁸ *Dadarśa nikhilam lokamādarśa iva nirmale. - Buddhacaritam* 14.8

²⁹ *Pramāṇavārtika*, 1.35

Therefore Ācārya Kundakunda propounds that the knowledge of all substances and their modes is possible with an empirical standpoint, but in the view of absolute reality a *kevalin* knows only the self.³⁰

Regarding omniscience we get one sentence in *Acārāṅgasūtra* (1.3.4). "One who knows one, knows all and one who knows all knows one."³¹ Jaina philosophers took it as a proof for the concept of omniscience. Dr. Nathmal Tatia (1951 : 70) has explained this statement of *Ācārāṅga* in this way- "The Jainas hold that each and every entity is related to all entities other than itself in the universe in some relation or other. These relations are called *paryāyas* (modes) of the entity. In order to know as entity completely, these relations or *paryāyas* are to be completely known. And hence, it follows that the complete knowledge of one entity involves the complete knowledge of other entities as well. If the relations are real and if it is also possible to know these relations, it logically follows that omniscience is possible."³²

In this way there are two views regarding omniscience. One is empirical, in which *kevalajñānin* knows directly every thing of the world with its all modes of past, present and future. The another view is of absolute reality in which *kevalin* knows completely the self with it's all modes. Here one more explanation may be added that *kevalin* is omniscient in the sense that nothing is remained to be known by him. He knows every thing in that sense.

³⁰ *Jānadi passadi savvaṃ, vavahāraṇaṇa kevalī Bhagavaṃ* |.

Kevalaṇṇī jānadi passadi ṇiyameṇa appāṇam | . -*Niyamasāra*, 158

³¹ *Acārāṅgasūtra* 1.3.4: Je egaṃ jāṇai se savvaṃ jāṇai, je savvaṃ jāṇai se egaṃ jāṇai.

³² *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 70

Nayavāda

One important point about knowledge in Jainism is *nayavāda* or the concept of standpoint of knowing. The object according to Jain philosophy, is multidimensional or multifaceted. We cannot know it completely at a time. We know it by one standpoint or another. Our knowledge of the object may be true from some standpoint. This *nayavāda* has a significant place in Jainism regarding its theory of knowledge. It is related mainly with *śrutajñāna*.

Acquiring of knowledge

Although knowledge is an essential characteristic of a soul, and its manifestation depends on subsidence-cum-destruction (*kṣayopaśama*) or on complete destruction (*kṣaya*) of *jñānāvaraṇa karma*, but it is notable that scriptural knowledge or informative knowledge is acquired by a soul through sense organs, mind and intellect. In the eleventh chapter of *Uttarādhyayanā sūtra* five obstructions have been defined in achievement of such knowledge, i.e. - (i) Pride (ii) anger (iii) carelessness (iv) illness (v) idleness.³³ Alongwith this, eight assisting causes are also mentioned for acquiring knowledge- (i) politeness (ii) restrain (iii) silence at other's secrets. (iv) well-conduct (v) avoidance of mis-conduct (vi) avoidance of ardent desire(greed) (vii) victory on anger (viii) interest in the truth.³⁴ A disciplined desciple is quite able to enrich knowledge as it is clear from the first and the eleventh chapter of *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra*. A student who lives near a teacher with self restrained mind and activities, performing

³³ *Uttarādhyayana*, 11.3

³⁴ *Uttarādhyayana*, 11.4-5

penance, acting affectionately and speaking kindly can get knowledge or education.³⁵ In the *Nandisūtra* a process for acquiring knowledge has been described with the help of eight qualities of *buddhi*-

“A desciplined student (i) intends to listen to the teacher (ii) asks real questions (iii) listens the answers carefully (iv) understands them (v) thinks over them (vi) determines the meaning (vii) takes it for further memory (viii) tries to practice them in life.”³⁶

In this way a student can acquire knowledge, but it is possible only in the position of subsidence-cum-destruction of *Jñānāvaraṇa karma*.

Svādhyāya (self-study) is also a means of acquiring knowledge and for destruction of *jñānāvaraṇa karma*. *Uttarādhyayan sūtra* (29.18) says- “Through self-study one can destruct the knowledge- obscuring- *karma*.”

The person having scriptural knowledge may get light in life at every moment, as stated in a different way-

“A person having knowledge of scriptures does not loose himself in the world, as a needle with thread fallen on ground is never lost.”³⁷

Conclusion

Knowledge is identical with a soul and it can't be separated from that soul. If it is perverted, it is called *mithyā*,

³⁵ *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* 11.14

³⁶ *Nandisūtra, gāthā* 95: Sussūsai padipucchai suṇai gīṇhai ṭhae vāvi|
tato apohae vā, dhārei karei vā kammaṇ.

³⁷ *Uttarādhyayan*, 29.56 :

jaha suī sasuttā padiyā vi na viṇassai|
evam jīve sasutte saṃsāre na viṇassai||

and in the presence of right view (*samyagdarśana*), it is considered as right (*samyak*). *Samyagjnāna* can only lead the path of liberation with the help of *samyag-darsana* and *samyak cāritra*.

By accepting *Anekantavāda* and *Nayavāda* Jaina Philosophers consider the empirical world and its knowledge as a real fact.

Five types of knowledge are the peculiarity of Jaina system which exclude Jaina epistemology from other Indian systems. A vast Jaina literature is available to understand the nature of knowledge and its development into *pramāṇa*. Jaina philosophers have specific views regarding the concept of knowledge and its manifestations.

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Significance of *Śrutajñāna*

In the Vedic tradition four Vedas are also named as '*śruti*' and in the Jain tradition, scriptural knowledge is generally named as *śruta* or *śrutajñāna*. But when we study Jain texts, we find that all living beings, even one sensed to four sensed beings not having auditory organ also bear *śruajñāna*. They bear its perverted form as *śruta-ajñāna*. Here a doubt arises, how one sensed living beings are supposed to have scriptural knowledge, even when they cannot hear and understand scripts containing sermons of enlightened persons.? Which kind of *śrutajñāna* exists therein? This paper proposes to discuss this problem and tries to find out a solution from the original Jaina texts. Another point, to be discussed in this article is to differentiate *śrutajñāna* from *matijñāna*, which is also found in every living being and occurs before *śrutajñāna*. Third point to be discussed herein is to find out the importance of *śrutajñāna* for salvation or liberation from sufferings and sorrows. On the basis of Jaina canonical literature fourteen and twenty types of *śrutajñāna* are also to be mentioned.

Jaina tradition propounds five types of knowledge:- 1- Sensuous knowledge (*matijñāna*), 2. Scriptural knowledge or knowledge of the self (*śrutajñāna*), 3. Clairvoyance or visual intuition (*avadhijñāna*), 4. Intuition of mental modes (*manahparyāya-jñāna*), 5. Pure and perfect knowledge (*kevalajñāna*). Here, we will discuss only the concept of *śrutajñāna*.

Meaning of *Śruta* and *Śrutajñāna*

Śrutajñāna or *śruta* word has the following meanings:-

- 1- What is heard with auditory sense organ is *śruta*. (*śrūyate 'iti śrutam.*)
- 2- Preachings of a trustworthy person are meant as *śruta*, because they are also heard. A collection of their preachings in the form of canons (*āgamas*) is also *śruta*. This is the source and instrumental cause for generating real *śrutajñāna* in a soul.
- 3- The knowledge which elevates a soul after listening to trustworthy persons or after study of canons is also considered as *śrutajñāna*.
- 4- Which is heard by a soul is *śruta śrūyate ātmana taditi śrutam* (Maladhārī Hemacandra *vṛtti*, on Viśeṣaśaṣyakabhāṣya, verse 81.) This knowledge is helpful in the salvation from sufferings and sorrows.

Difference between *Śrutajñāna* and *kevalajñāna*

Śrutajñāna has been compared with pure and perfect knowledge '*kevalajñāna*', with a slight difference that *kevalajñāna* is a direct perceptual knowledge, whereas, *śrutajñāna* is considered as indirect (*parokṣa*) knowledge. Its importance has been mentioned by Kundakunda in *Samayasāra*¹ and in *Pravacanasāra*² that a

¹*Samayasāra*, 1.9 :

*jo hi suyeṇāhigacchai appāṇaminam tu kevalam suddham ।
tam suyakevali-misiṇo bhaṇanti loyappaivayarā. ॥*

²*Pravacanasāra*, 1.33:

*jo hi sudeṇa vijānadi appaṇam jānagam sahāveṇa. ।
tam suyakevalimisiṇo bhaṇanti loyappadivayarā. ॥*

person who knows a pure soul through *śrutajñāna* is considered as *śrutakevalin* by enlightened persons. *Kevalin* directly knows all the substances and their modes whereas *śrutajñānin* knows these through *śrutajñāna*.³ *Śrutajñāna* is a wishful knowledge for a living being which directs him to the right path of liberation.

Dravyaśruta and Bhāvaśruta

Umāsvāti provides synonyms of *śrutajñāna* in *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* as- ‘*āptavacana, āgama, upadeśa, eitihya, āmnāya, pravacana, jinavacana*’⁴. All these synonyms establish that the sermons of *jināś* [who have conquered attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*)] or the perfect authentic persons are considered as *śrutajñāna*. This is a *dravyaśruta* (*śruta* in the form of preachings) and it can lead to *bhāva-śrutajñāna* (manifested knowledge in the self through preachings) in a person who conceives the meaning of that *dravyaśruta*.

Śruta and Śruti

The word ‘*śruta*’ bears resemblance with the word ‘*śruti*’ used for *Vedas*. Both of these have the same characteristic of verbal testimony. According to Mīmāṃsakas, there is no creator of *śruti* or *Vedas*, whereas Naiyāyikas consider that the God is the creator of *Vedas*, but in Jaina philosophy when a *Kevalin* or *Tīrthankara* expresses the truth for the welfare of all living beings, then it

³ *Gommaṣasāra, Jivakāṇḍa*, verse, 369:

*sudakevalaṃ ca nānaṃ, doṇṇi vi sarisāṇi honti bohādo ।
sudaṇaṇaṃ tu parokkhaṃ, pacchakhaṃ kevalaṃ. nānaṃ ॥*

⁴ *Śabhāṣya-tattvārthādhigamasūtra*, 1.20 : “*śrutam āptavacan-āgama-upadeśa-eitihyaṃ-āmnāyaṃ pravacanaṃ jinavacanamityanarthānataram*”

is called as *śruta* or *dravyaśruta* and when its meaning or message is experienced by someone, then it is called *śrutajñāna* or *bhāvāśruta*. One more interesting point is that *śruti* is not considered in every living being as an essential element, whereas *śrutajñāna* is essentially accepted in every living being. It is another thing that due to perverted attitude it may be *śruta-ajñāna*.

Matijñāna* precedes *Śrutajñāna

It has been accepted that *śrutajñāna* takes place after *matijñāna*. In the *Tattvārthasūtra*, its commentaries and in the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, it has been propounded that *śrutajñāna* takes place after *matijñāna*.⁵ *Matijñāna* has been considered as an efficient cause of *śrutajñāna*. Here, a question has been raised by Pūjyapāda Devanandin in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* that if *śruta* is manifested after *matijñāna* then it should also be *matī*, because '*kāraṇasadrśaṃ hi loke kāryaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ*', an effect comes out similar to its cause, but in the view of Pūjyapāda Devanandi it is not always true, for instance stick (*daṇḍa*) is an instrumental cause for making an earthen pot but the stick (*daṇḍa*) does not turn into a pot. Similarly, *matijñāna* is not converted into *śrutajñāna*, but it becomes instrumental cause for producing *śrutajñāna*. Even in the presence of *matijñāna*, *śrutajñāna* may not appear due to effect of *śrutajñānavaraṇa Karma*. Subsidence-cum-destruction of *śrutajñānavaraṇa karma* is also essential for the manifestation of *śrutajñāna*.⁶

⁵(i) *Tattvārthasūtra* : 1.20- *śrutaṃ matipūrvam dyanekadvādaśabhedam*:

(ii) *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, verse 105: *maipuvvaṃ suyaṃ uttaṃ*

⁶*Sarvārthasiddhi*, p. 85

In the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* Jinabhadragaṇin kṣamāśramaṇa supports the notion that *śrutajñāna* is preceded by *matijñāna*- '*maipuvvaṃ suyaṃ*' and he applies various meanings of word '*purva*' which is derived from the root *pr pālanpūraṇayoḥ*. He says that word '*pūrva*' may be used to denote the meaning of causing, guarding, nourishing, protecting etc. *Matijñāna* is an efficient cause of *śrutajñāna* and it also nourishes and protects the same. He also says that *śruta* is obtained, and it can be distributed to others through *matijñāna*. In the absence of *matijñāna*, *śrutajñāna* cannot be preserved or sustained.⁷

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka in his *Tattvārthavārtika* raises a question that if *śruta* is caused by *mati*, then there is a beginning of *śruta* and which has a beginning, has its end also. In this way canonical notion that '*śruta* has no beginning and no end' is defeated. Here he answers that for a particular person or situation it may have beginning but in universal point of view, *śruta* is always present.⁸

Although *śrutajñāna* has been defined as verbal cognition conceived from the words known through *matijñāna*, but it is not limited upto the cognition of words. Vidyānanda explained it that knowledge manifested through sense organs and quasi-sense is instrumental cause of *śrutajñāna*. In this way knowledge manifested through touch-sense, gustatory sense, olfactory sense and sense of

⁷ *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, verse 105 and 106:

maipuvvaṃ suyaṃuttam na mā suyaṃvviyā viśeso'yaṃ |
puvvaṃ pūraṇa-pāṇa-bhāvāo jaṃ mā tassa
pūrijjai Pāvijjai dijjai vā jaṃ māie nāmāina |
palijjai ya māie gahiyam iharā paṇasejjā ||

⁸ *Tattvārthavārtika*, 1.20.7

vision may also lead to *śrutajñāna*.⁹ *Śrutajñāna* is a later stage of *matijñāna*. Even a knowledge originated through mind can also lead to *śrutajñāna*. It is also different from memory, recognition, concomitance and inference. *Śrutajñāna* is indirect pure knowledge by which a person becomes able to know the obstructed, distant and the subtle substances. Due to this characteristic of knowing, a knower is called a *śrutakevali*.

Difference between *Matijñāna* and *Śrutajñāna*

Umāsvāti, in his *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* differentiating *śrutajñāna* from *matijñāna* clarifies that *matijñāna* or *ābhinibodhika jñāna* deals with only the present existing things, whereas *śrutajñāna* deals with the objects of all three times i.e. present, past and future.¹⁰ A question arises here that memory (*smṛti*) is also a kind of *matijñāna* and it deals with the past, then how it can be said that *mati* is limited upto present objects? Haribhadra replied to this question in his *Tattvārthavṛtti* that memory (*smṛti*) is nothing than the knowledge of the things known in previously present.¹¹

One more characteristic of *śrutajñāna* has been pointed out by Umāsvāti that it has more clarity than *matijñāna*.¹²

⁹Tattvārtha ślokaavartika : 1.20.10

maṣisāmānya-nirdeśānna śrotra-matipurvakaṃ |
śrutam niyamyate aśeṣamatipurvasya vīkṣaṇāt ||

¹⁰Tattvārthabhāṣya, 1.20

*“utpannāvinaśārtha-grāhakaṃ sāmpratākālaviṣayaṃ matijñānam Śrutajñānam
tu trikālaviṣayaṃ. Utpannavinaśānūtpannārth-agrāhakaṃ”*

¹¹Hāribhadriya Tattvārtha vṛtti on Tattvārtha sūtra. 1.20 p. 99

*“smṛteratītaviṣayatvānna sarvamevaṃvidhamiti cet, na, sāmprata-kālagṛhītātirikṭasya
kasyacidasmaraṇāt.”*

¹²Sabhāṣyatattvārthādhigamasūtra 1.20 :

śrutajñānam tu trikālaviṣayaṃ viśuddhataraṃ ceti.

Haribhadra explains that *śrutajñāna* may deal with the obstructed, distant and subtle objects, hence that has more clarity.¹³

One another differentiating characteristic between these two knowledges, according to *Tattvārthabhāṣya* is that *śrutajñāna* has wider objectivity than *matijñāna*.¹⁴ It gives two arguments in the support: the first, that *śrutajñāna* is produced by an omniscient and the second, that it deals with infinite knowables.

Śrutajñāna is quite different from *matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge). *Matijñāna* has stages of *avagraha*, *īha*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇa* knowledge and it requires sense organs, mind or both for its manifestation whereas *śrutajñāna* requires an inner light which leads a person to understand and experience the momentariness of worldly things. It is a self-knowledge by which a person becomes able to discriminate between the good (*śreya*) and covetable (*preya*). It tends a person to a real spiritual development. He can renunciate the worldly attractions. It can be called as *prajña* (wisdom). In other words *matijñāna* is a knowledge and *śrutajñāna* is a wisdom.

***Bhāvaśruta-jñāna* : Essential in Every Living Being**

According to canonical notion every living being has at least two knowledge, i.e. *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna*. In the absence of right view (*samyaktva*) these are called as *matijñāna* and *śruta-ajñāna*. If we consider *śrutajñāna* as verbal or scriptural knowledge, then it never appears in one

¹³ *Hāribhadriya Tattvārtha vṛtti* 1.20, p.103

¹⁴ *Sabhāṣyatattvārthādhigamasūtra* 1.20 : *sarvajñapraṇītatvād-ānantyacca jñeyasya śrutajñānam. matijñānān mahāviṣayam.*

sensed to four sensed living beings and in some of five sensed beings also. A few human beings can have this scriptural *śrutajñāna*. Jinabhadra, in his *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* has given a solution to this problem that every living being can have *bhāva-śrutajñāna*. He propounds two kinds of *śrutajñāna* as *drāvya-śrutajñāna* and *bhāva-śrutajñāna*. *Dravya-śrutajñāna* is a verbal knowledge and *bhāva-śrutajñāna* is experienced through it in a soul, but somewhere *bhava-śrutajñāna* is experienced without *dravyaśruta* also, as in the case of one sensed to four sensed living beings. It is also propounded as *labdhyakṣara śrutajñāna*. This kind of *akṣarśrutajñāna* is a minimum qualification for a soul without which a soul cannot remain a living being. It may turn into non-living thing.¹⁵

Significance and Nature of *Śrutajñāna*

Śrutajñāna is important for emancipation. When right view, right knowledge and right conduct are considered as the path of emancipation, role of *śrutajñāna* as right knowledge is considered significant. Although *matijñāna*, *avadhijñāna* and *manahparyāya-jñāna* are also the right knowledge but *śrutajñāna* is more important for the achievement of *kevalajñāna* and emancipation from sorrows. *Śrutajñāna* may be defined as *ātma-jñāna* or knowledge of the self. *Matijñāna* has a limit to know the outer world, but it can help in manifestation of *śrutajñāna* which is an instrument to know the self. It is not produced through sense-organs. *Tattvārthasūtra* says-

¹⁵ see, *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, verses 110 to 117

“*śrutamanīndriyasya*”.¹⁶ Here ‘*anīndriya*’ word denotes a mind and a soul. It can be called as *ātma-jñāna*. Thus *śrutajñāna* is produced through mind and soul. It is the only knowledge which is important for conquering one self. It shows us that attachment and aversion are not beneficial for a soul. *Samaṇasuttam* Mentions:

“The knowledge by which ultimate truth is known, mind is restrained and soul is purified, is the right knowledge in Jaina tradition. The knowledge, by which a person gets detachment from worldly things and is attracted towards auspicious things and friendliness to the all beings is considered as right knowledge in Jain tradition.”¹⁷

This knowledge can be named as *śrutajñāna*. *Śrutajñāna* is an inner light of one self which leads him to right conduct. *Acārāṅga sūtra* says:-

“A soul is a knower and a knower is a soul”.¹⁸

Knowledge is a quality and power of a soul to cognize the things and oneself and it is never destroyed.

It is important to note that *śrutajñāna* is never fully obscured. It is experienced by every soul to some extent. It has been accepted in *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgama* and *Gommaṭasāra* that an infinitesimal part of *kevalajñāna* or *śrutajñāna* is always un-obscured in a soul.¹⁹

¹⁶ *Tattvārthasūtra* 2.22

¹⁷ *Samaṇasuttam*, verse 252 and 253

jeṇa taccam vibujjhejja, jeṇa cittam nirujjhadi |
jeṇa attā visujjhejja, tam nānam jīnasāsane ||
jeṇa rāgā virajejja, jeṇa seasu rajjadi |
jeṇa mitti pabhāvejja, tam nānam jīnasāsane ||

¹⁸ *Acārāṅga sūtra*, 1.5.5 sūtra 177 “Je ātā se viṇṇātā, je viṇṇātā, se ātā”,

¹⁹ (1) *Śaṭkhaṇḍāgam* 5.5.48 : *akkharassānantimo bhāgo niccugghadio*.

(2) *Gommaṭasāra* (*Jīvakāṇḍa*, verse 320) : *havadi hu savva-jahaṇṇam niccugghadam nīrāvaraṇam*.

Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya propounds that *śrutajñāna* is actually a soul.²⁰ In the view of Tīrthaṅkaras, it is a characteristic of a soul as Maladhāri Hemcandra says *śrutajñāna* is a mode (*paryāya*) of a soul.²¹

Kinds of *Śrutajñāna*

The *Nandīsūtra* and *Āvaśyakaniryukti* mention the following fourteen categories of *śrutajñāna*:

1. *Akṣara śruta* - It is imperishable and divided into three types- *saṃjñākṣara*, *vyañjanākṣara* and *labdhyākṣara*. *Saṃjñākṣara* means a particular shape and form of a letter of script. All the words of different languages with particular meaning are called *vyañjanākṣara*. *Labdhyākṣara* is the minimum characteristic of a living being and it is considered as *bhāva śruta*.
2. *Anakṣaraśruta*- It is defined as the symbols of bodily activities. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka includes inferential knowledge in it.
3. *Samjñīśruta*- It is defined as mental power of retaining the past experiences and speculation for future plans etc.
4. *Asamjñīśruta*- Contrary to *saṃjñīśruta* is called *asamjñīśruta*
5. *Samyak śruta*- The scriptures composed by the *Gaṇadharas* or other *ācāryas* having the knowledge of 10 *pūrvas* is called *samyak śruta*.

²⁰ *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, verse 99 “*suyam tu paramatthao jīvo* ”,

²¹ Vṛtti of Maladhāri on *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*, verse 98 - *ātmanah pariṇāmaśca śrutajñānamisyate*,

6. *Mithyāśruta* - Non-Jaina scriptures like the *Mahābhārata*, the *Rāmāyaṇa* are called as *mithyāśruta*, but this is not a proper notion. In the absence of right view, every scripture may turn into *mithyāśruta*.
7. *Sādi śruta*- According to the stand point of modes (*paryāyārthika naya*) *śrutajñāna* may have a beginning.
8. *Anādi śruta* - According to the stand point of substance (*dravyārthika naya*) *śrutajñāna* is not having any beginning.
9. *Saparyavasita* - In the view of *paryāyārthika naya* it can have an end.
10. *Aparyavasita*- In the view of *dravyārthika naya* it is endless.
11. *Gamika*- The *śruta* which repeats the same text again and again is known as *gamika śruta*. *Drṣṭivadā* is considered in this category.
12. *Agamika*- The *śruta* composed in various meters and prose is *agamika*. It is also known as *kālika śruta*.
13. *Aṅgapraviṣṭa*- Twelve *āgamas* composed by *Gaṇadharas* are called as *aṅgapraviṣṭa śruta*.
14. *Anaṅgapraviṣṭa*- The *āgamas* composed by the *ācāryas* other than *Gaṇadharas* are called as *anaṅgapraviṣṭa śruta* or *aṅgabāhya śruta*.

Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama defines *śrutajñāna* on the basis of alphabets and their mutual combination and provides 20 types of *śrutajñāna* as-1. *Paryāya*, 2. *Paryāya samāsa*,

3. *Akṣara*, 4. *Akṣara samāsa*, 5. *Pada*, 6. *Pada samāsa*, 7. *Sanḥāta*, 8. *Sanḥāta samāsa*, 9. *Pratipatti*, 10. *Pratipatti samāsa*, 11. *Anuyogadvāra*, 12. *Anuyogadvāra samāsa*, 13. *Prābhṛta Prābhṛta*, 14. *Prābhṛta prābhṛta samāsa*, 15. *Prābhṛta* 16. *Prābhṛta samāsa*, 17. *Vastu*, 18. *Vastu samāsa*, 19. *Pūrva* and 20. *Pūrva samāsa*.²²

Here, Virasena (9th century) in his *Dhavalā* commentary defines *akṣara śrutajñāna* as eternal knowledge which is never obscured even in *labhdhyaparyāptaka nigoda* being.²³ *Labhdhyakṣara* knowledge is found incessant in every living being. In *Gommaṭasāra Jīvakāṇḍa*, it has been categorized under *paryāya śrutajñāna*.²⁴ *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbara* texts accept that this knowledge is always un-obscured in a living being and it is pre-requisite for every living being. This fact proves the eternal nature of *śrutajñāna*.

Modern scholar Nagin J shah (2003 : p. 37) thinks that concepts of *matijñāna* and *srutajñāna* have been developed on the basis of Vedic thought of *śravaṇa* and *manana*. This thought of Nagin J Shah does not seem proper in the context of Jainism, because in Jainism *matijñāna* precedes *śrutajñāna* while in the Vedic tradition *śravaṇa* precedes *manana*. one more point discards his view. In Jainism *matijñāna* is considered as a sensuous knowledge, but in Vedic tradition

²² *Ṣaṭkhandāgama* 5.5.48, Detail about these kinds may be seen in its commentary 'Dhavalā'.

²³ *Dhavalā* commentary on *Ṣaṭkhandāgama* 5.5.48: *akkharassāṇantimabhāgo nīccugghadio*.

²⁴ see, *Gommaṭasāra (Jīvakāṇḍa)*, verse 320

manana is limited up to mind's activity. Kanhaiya Lal Lodha (2010 : p.16) propounds that *śrutajñāna* is a knowledge which differentiates between wished and unwished, acceptable and to be abandoned elements. It is a natural knowledge of a soul and helpful in eternal liberation.

Conclusion

1. *Śrutajñāna* is an essential characteristic of every worldly soul. In the presence of right view (*samyagdarśana*) it is considered as *samyag śrutajñāna* and in the presence of perverted view (*mithyātva*) it is considered as *śruta-ajñāna*.
2. Generally *śrutajñāna* is considered as a verbal testimony. It includes scriptures, canons or sermons of an authentic teacher and the knowledge originated through them.
3. It is preceded by *matijñāna*. *Matijñāna* is manifested through sense organs and mind, whereas *śrutajñāna* requires the prior occurrence of *matijñāna*. This *śrutajñāna* comes into action after acquiring ability through the subsidence-cum-destruction of *śrutajñānavaraṇa karma*.
4. It is not generated only by verbal cause; every *matijñāna* may lead to *śrutajñāna*. *Matijñāna* is an instrumental cause (*nimitta karaṇa*) and a soul itself is a natural cause for (*upādāna kāraṇa*) manifestation of *śrutajñāna*. According to Jinabhadragani, *avadhijñāna* and *manaḥparyāya jñāna* may also be the instrumental causes of *śrutajñāna*.

5. *Śrutajñāna* is the only knowledge which has a similarity with *kevalajñāna* and which can lead to the emancipation from all sorrows and the manifestation of *kevalajñāna*.
6. If *śrutajñāna* is accepted as verbal or scriptural knowledge, it is not possible in one-sensed to four-sensed living beings and in some of the five-sensed beings also. Hence, there must be a different nature of *śrutajñāna*. Jinabhadraṇi has suggested that *bhāva śrutajñāna* is found in the one sensed to four sensed living beings which can occur directly without *dravyaśruta* in those living beings.
7. *Śrutajñāna* is the knowledge which leads a person to decide distinction between the real needs and the futile wants in life. It enables a person in attaining detachment from the worldly allurements and motivates him to proceed towards the salvation from sorrows. It is a big power for spiritual development of a soul. When it is obscured or perverted, a soul cannot decide the right path.

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Jaina Epistemology and Logic : Development and Doctrines

[Part I of this article gives an account of the historical development of the Jaina logic and epistemology and Parts II deals with the contributions of Jaina philosophers regarding epistemological doctrines.]

PART - I

A BRIEF SURVEY OF LITERARY CONTRIBUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAINA EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC

Epistemology : Theory of knowledge

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy which deals with origination of knowledge, its nature, sources and validity etc. and logic is a core area of epistemology which deals with valid arguments and inference for others and the concepts of consistency, inconsistency, truth and falsity. The term epistemology encompasses mainly two dimensions of philosophy, i.e. *Jñānamīmāṃsā* and *Pramāṇa mīmāṃsā*. To some extent, both the dimensions are intermingled. *Pramāṇa* is not absolutely different from knowledge or cognition. Particularly in Jaina tradition, *pramāṇa* is always accepted as a kind of cognition or knowledge. Hence, all the descriptions made in Jaina canons regarding knowledge come under the scope of *pramāṇa*. When we discuss *pramāṇa*, we have to resort to the theory of knowledge.

There is only one difference in *pramāṇa* and right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) that the right knowledge depends on right view (*samyag darśana*), where as *pramāṇa* does not require any such condition.

Introduction to *Pramāṇa*

Pramāṇa is an instrumental knowledge which is devoid of doubt (*saṁśaya*), illusion (*viparyaya*) and indetermination (*anadhyavasāya*).¹ In Jaina philosophy *pramāṇa* has been accepted as a definitive cognition of knowable thing and knowledge itself.² The Jaina logicians are almost unanimous on this characteristic of *pramāṇa*. Although at the early time of *Tattvārthasūtra*, there was no such difference between *pramāṇa* and right knowledge. Umāsvāti, the author of *Tattvārthasūtra* had clearly divided five types of knowledge³ into two kinds of *pramāṇa* without mentioning any difference between right knowledge and *pramāṇa*. He kept *matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge) and *śrutajñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding *matijñāna*) under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa* (indirect organ of valid cognition), and the other three types of knowledge i.e. *avadhijñāna* (visual intuition), *manahparyāya jñāna* (intuition of mental modes) and *kevalajñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge) were placed in the category of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* (perception).⁴

¹Hemacandra, vṛtti on PM 1.1.1 : *prakarṣeṇa saṁśayādivyavachedena mīyate parichidyate vastutattvaṃ yena tat pramāṇaṃ pramāyāṃ sādhakatamam.* (also in NKC of Prabhacandra, Vol. I p. 48.10)

²PT 1.2: Svaparavyavasāyi jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ.

³Five types of knowledge are : 1. *Matijñāna* (Sensuous knowledge) 2. *Śrutajñāna* (Scriptural knowledge and knowledge of the self) 3. *avadhijñāna* (Visual intuition or clairvoyance) 4. *Manahparyāyajñāna* (intuition of mental modes of others) 5. *Kevalajñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge)

⁴TS, 1.10.12 Tat *pramāṇaṃ, ādye pavokṣam, pratyakṣamanyat.*

Tattvārthasūtra is the first work of the Jaina system which propounded right knowledge as *pramāṇa* (an organ of valid cognition) and divided it into two types, *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. This division of *pramāṇa* is based on the process of knowledge. The right knowledge which occurs directly through a soul was called *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* (perception) and the right knowledge which occurs through sense organs and quasi sense was called as *parokṣa pramāṇa* (other than perception or indirect knowledge)

In Indian philosophy all the systems other than Jaina, consider that the knowledge acquired through sense organs comes under the category of perception, but the view of earlier Jaina thinkers like Umāsvāti and Pūjyapāda Devanandin who followed the notion of Jaina canonical literature, considered it in the category of *parokṣa*. They explain that the knowledge that occurs directly through a soul without the help of sense organs comes under the concept of *pratyakṣa* or direct cognition and the knowledge occurs through sense organs and mind is kept in the category of indirect cognition (*parokṣa pramāṇa*).

The Jaina logicians, after interaction with other schools, accepted the sensuous knowledge under the category of empirical perception (*sāṃvyāvahārika pratyakṣa*). This development is seen first in the *Vīśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* of Jinabhadraṅgaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa. He says *jaṃ indiyamaṇobhavaṃ taṃ saṃvavahāra-paccakkhaṃ* (*Vīśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 95) which means knowledge occurring through sense organs and quāsi sense is *sāṃvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (empirical perception). Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka and other

Jaina logicians followed him. Hence, they considered two types of *pratyakṣa* as *mukhya pratyakṣa* and *sāmvyāvahārika pratyakṣa*. The perception that occurred directly through a soul comes under the category of *mukhya pratyakṣa* and the perception that occurred through sense organs and mind comes under the category of *sāmvyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (empirical perception). At this stage, the Jaina logicians entered into a dialogue with other Indian logicians.

Pramāṇa in canonical literature

It may be noted that in *sthānāṅgasūtra* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra*, the word *pramāṇa* was used in the meaning of measurement and we find four types of that *pramāṇa* there in i.e. *dravyapramāṇa* (measurement as substance), *kṣetrapramāṇa* (measurement as space), *kālapramāṇa* (measurement as time) and *bhāvapramāṇa* (measurement as modes). Somewhere in the *Bhagavatīsūtra* (also known as *Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra*) and *Anuyogadvārasūtra* the four types of *pramāṇa* propounded by the Nyāyasūtra are also mentioned as *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison) and *āgama* (testimony)⁵. These four types of *pramāṇa* were also mentioned in *Upāyahṛdaya* an old text of Buddhism.⁶ It sounds that Buddhist and Jaina philosophers developed their own *pramāṇaśāstra* after Nyāya philosophy.

In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* these four types of *pramāṇa* are mentioned as the four types of *hetu* - (*Sthānāṅgasūtra*, 245,

⁵Bhagavatisūtra 5.3.192 (In ST) Pamāṇe cauvihe pāṇṇatte, tamjahā paccakkhe anumāṇe ovamṇe āgame, Jahā aṇuogadare.

⁶UH, p. 13 :

Atha katividhaṃ pramāṇaṃ? caturvidhaṃ pramāṇam.

Pratyakṣamanumānamupamānamāgamaśceti.

Suttāgame, p. 215). *Sthānāṅgasūtra* has also mentioned three types of *vyavasāya* i.e. *pratyakṣa*, *prātyayika* and *anugāmī* - (*Sthānāṅgasūtra*, 245). Paṇḍita Dalsukha Mālvanīyā (1966 : 138-139) has mentioned that these three types of *vyavasāya* have got a place in Siddhasena's *Nyāyāvatāra* and Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatākā* as the developed form of *pramāṇa* i.e. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*.

It is true that the seeds and roots of the Jaina concept of *pramāṇa* are found in Jaina canons. The *Anuyogadvārasūtra* and *Sthānāṅgasūtra* have great importance in this context. In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* perception is divided into two types i.e. *kevala* and *nokevala*. In the later development of *pramāṇasāstra* the Jaina logicians termed these types as *sakala* and *vikala* perception. In the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* and *Nandisūtra* perceptual knowledge is divided into two types, i.e. *indriya pratyakṣa* and *no-indriya pratyakṣa*. This division shows that in the later canonical literature the knowledge occurred by sense organs was included in perception.

This division of perception is not mentioned in the *Tattvārthasūtra*. So it seems that this addition was made in the canons at a later stage. It is possible that Jinabhadraganin (6th century) developed a concept of *sāṃvyaṅvahārika pratyakṣa* as mentioned earlier, on the basis of the above mentioned division of perception in the *Nandisūtra* and *Sthānāṅgasūtra*.

Contribution of Jaina Logicians before Akalaṅka

Jaina epistemology regarding *pramāṇa* was actually systematized by Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka in the eight century CE. The main contribution of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka was to establish *smṛti* (recollection), *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition) and *tarka*

(inductive reasoning) as independent *pramāṇas* under the category of *parokṣa*. This is also one of the main contributions of Jaina epistemology to Indian philosophy.

Before the advent of Akalaṅka (720 - 780CE), Umāsvāti (2nd - 3rd century CE), Pūjyapāda Devanandin (5th century) Siddhasen Divākara (5th century) Samantabhadra (6th century), Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa (5th century), Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa (6th - 7th century), Siṃhasūri (7th century), Sumati (7th - 8th century), Pātrasvāmī (7th century), Śrīdatta, Kumāranandin (7th century) and Haribhadrāsūri (700 - 770 CE.) also contributed their mite to the Jaina epistemology to some extent. Ācārya Kundakunda attempted to prove the nature of knowledge illuminating itself and the object.

Umāsvāti (or Umāsvāmī) systematized the Jaina epistemological doctrines to some extent. As earlier stated Umasvāti, in his *Tattvārthasūtra* mentioned two types of *pramāṇa* - *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. He accepts the cognition that occurred directly through a soul, without any help of sense organs and quasi sense is perception (*pratyakṣa*) and rest of cognition is *parokṣa*. On this basis *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* were kept into *parokṣa pramāṇa* and the other three kinds of knowledge (*avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*) into the category of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. Pūjyapada Devanandin, in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* has explained the views of Umāsvāmī.

Siddhasena Divākara was a great logician who flourished before Akalaṅka in the fifth century CE. and wrote an independent work on Jaina logic known as *Nyāyāvatāra*. It is a systematic work comprising 32 *kārikās* (stanzas), which presents a brief description of Jaina *pramāṇa śāstra*. S.C.

Vidyābhuṣaṇa mentioned Siddhasena Divākara as the father of Jaina Logic and recognized his *Nyāyāvatāra* as the first work on Jaina logic. (A History of Indian Logic p. 173). Hence it is an important work for Jaina Logic. Siddharṣigaṇin, a philosopher of the ninth century wrote a comprehensive commentary on it. Siddhasena Divākara tells about *pramāṇa-prameya-vyavasthā* (systematization regarding organ of valid cognition and knowable objects), that although it is eternal and famous for all its users, it is presented again to remove ignorance about its nature.⁷

"This system of valid cognitive criteria is having neither any beginning nor any end, also it is well known to all people in daily life, even though it is propounded here."

"Objective of defining these famous valid organs of knowledge, is to remove delusions or illusions of the people of deluded minds."

M.A. Dhaky (1995 : 43-46) is of the view that Siddharṣigaṇin, the commentator of *Nyāyāvatāra*⁷ was himself the writer of *Nyāyāvatāra*, but his opinion does not seem acceptable, because if Siddharṣigaṇin (9th century) would have written it, then he must have mentioned *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñāna* and *tarka* as *pramāṇa* because before the advent of Siddharṣigaṇin, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka emphatically established them as *pramāṇa*. Piotr Balcerowicz (2008 : Preface) has assumed that the author of *Nyāyāvatāra* is Mahamati

⁷NA verse 32 and 3 :

*Pramāṇādi - vyavastheyamanadinidhanātmikā,
Sarva saṃvyavaharatrṇām prasiddhāpi prakirtitā.
Prasiddhānām pramāṇānām lakṣaṇoktau prayojanam
Tadvyāmohanivṛtiḥ syād vyāmudhā manasāmiha.*

Siddhasena, who lived between circa 710-780 and who is different from Siddhasena Divākra, the authour of the *Sammati-tarka-prakarana*, a work composed before Dignāga (480-540). According to him Siddhasena Mahamati was probably slightly senior to Akalaṅka (720-780). Balcerowicz has given arguments to prove his notion. Here it can be said that *Nyāyāvatāra* was constructed before Akalaṅka's works, because it does not mention about *smṛti*, *pratyabhijñāna* and *tarka pramāṇa* ; but it was written after Dignāga (480-540) and Dharmakīrti (600-660), because *Nyāyāvatāra* criticizes them.

Śāntisūri of Purṇatalagacchīya wrote a *varttika* and commentary on *Nyāyāvatāra* , which is also an important work for the study of development of Jaina logic. Śāntisūri defined perception as clarity of knowledge and propounded three types of it i.e. *indriya pratyakṣa* (sensuous perception), *anīndriya pratyakṣa* (quasi-sensuous perception) and *yogaja pratyakṣa* (*Nyāyāvatāra vārttika* 17). He defined vividness (*vaiśada*) of knowledge as the apprehension of its content as 'this' (*Nyāyāvatāra vārttika*, 17). This definition has been followed by Hemacandra in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* (1.1.14)

Sanmatitarka-prakarana of Siddhasenasūri is also an important treatise consisting of three chapters namely - *Naya mīmāṃsā*, *Jñānamīmāṃsā* and *Jñeya mīmāṃsā*. Siddhasena was a great philosopher who contributed to the establishment of the theory of non-absolutism.

One of the prominent philosophers, Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa flourished in the fifth century A.D. discussed all the main philosophical tenents in his famous work

Dvādaśāra-nayacakra. He refuted several times the epistemology of other systems. Simhasūri's commentary on it is also an authoritative work for understanding *Dvādaśāranayacakra*.

Like Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra's main contribution was to establish *Anekāntavāda* or non absolutism, but occasionally he discussed some concepts of *pramāṇa śāstra* also. His *Yuktyanuśāsana*, *Āptamīmāṃsā* and *Svayambhūstotra* are the main works.

Sumati, Pātrasvāmī, Śrīdatta and Kumāranandin were such prominent philosophers of the 7th and 8th centuries, whose works are mentioned by Buddhist and Jaina logicians, but the works have not yet been found. Sumati and Pātrasvāmī were renowned philosophers whose names are referred by the Buddhist logician Śāntarakṣita (8th century) in his work *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Pātrasvāmī's *Trilakṣaṇakadārdhana* was a famous treatise in which the *hetulakṣaṇa* of Buddhist philosophy was refuted vehemently. Vidyānanda mentioned in *Tattvārthaśloka-vārttika* about *Jalpanirṇaya* the work of Śrīdatta and in *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā*, he mentioned *Vādanyāya*, the work of Kumāranandin.

In the eighth century Haribhadra Sūri (700 - 770), an original thinker and profound philosopher, authored several works. His famous philosophical works are *Anekāntajayapatākā*, *Śāstrāvārtā samuccaya* and *Śaddarśana śamuccaya*. Commentary of Guṇaratnasūri is famous on *Śaddarśana- samuccaya* and commentary of Yaśovijaya (17th century) is also renowned on *Śāstrāvārtā samuccaya*.

Thus from Umāsvāti down to Haribhadrāsūri, the predecessors of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka developed and enriched the Jaina epistemology.

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka's contribution

The advent of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka had a great significance from the point of view of systematization of Jaina logic and epistemology. He flourished during the period from 720 to 780 CE as is upheld by Paṇḍita Mahendra Kumār Nyāyācārya in the introduction to his *Akalaṅkagranthatrayam*. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka has critically examined the views regarding metaphysics and epistemology of previous Indian philosophers like Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, Karṇakagomī and Kumārilabhaṭṭa. He authored two commentaries entitled *Tattvārthavārtika* and *Aṣṭaśatī* on *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti and *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra respectively. In the *Tattvārthavārtika* Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka has discussed the definition of *pramāṇa* and accepted that *pramāṇa* (organ of valid cognition) is valid even after it cognizes the object previously cognized. He gave the instance of a lamp which illuminates the object even after the moment it is lit. Although the main subject matter of *Tattvārthasūtra* is not intended to propound epistemology, in the context of description of knowledge, commentator Akalaṅka discussed the definition of *pramāṇa* propounded by other Indian systems also. *Aṣṭaśatī* is a precise commentary having the size of eight hundred anuṣṭubh metres. Deep sense, few words and logical acumen are the specialties of Akalaṅka's style and they are more distinct in *Aṣṭaśatī*. Akalaṅka included some new topics in the commentary and threw light on *pramāṇaśāstra* explaining the Karika No. 101 of

Āptamīmamsā. He seems impressed by the Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa* also, because he used the term *avisamvāda* for defining *pramāṇa*. He says that *pramāṇa* is a kind of cognition devoid of discrepancy (*visamvāda*) and indetermination.

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka wrote four independent works viz. *Laghīyastraya* along with the *vr̥tti*, *Nyāyā-viniścaya* along with the *vr̥tti*, *Pramāṇa-saṃgraha* and *Siddhiviniścaya* along with the *vr̥tti*. All these four works mainly deal with epistemology and logic. *Laghīyastraya* is a composite work having three manuals (*prakaraṇas*) viz. (i) *Pramāṇa praveśa* (ii) *Naya praveśa* (iii) *pravacana praveśa*. *Pramāṇa praveśa* contains four chapters on (i) nature of *pramāṇa* (ii) classification (iii) object, and (iv) resultant. *Naya praveśa* is mainly devoted to the description of *Nayas*. *Pravacana praveśa*, though it begins with the definition of *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa*, mainly deals with *śrutajñāna*, a kind of *parokṣa pramāṇa*.

Nyāyaviniścaya, another work of Akalaṅka, has three chapters on perception, inference and testimony.

Pramāṇa-saṃgraha, an important work of Akalaṅka, deals with every aspect of epistemology in nine chapters. *Siddhiviniścaya* is also an important work regarding epistemology and logic. He defines here *pramāṇa* as *siddhi*. This treatise comprises twelve chapters which are indicative of their subject matter. Akalaṅka says here that every knowledge is valid due to its corresponding nature and it is invalid due to its discrepancy - (*Siddhiviniścaya* 1.19)

If we summarize the contribution of Akalaṅka on the basis of his above mentioned four works, then we can point out his views as follows:

1. It was he who for the first time established recollection (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) and inductive reasoning (*tarka*) as *pramāṇa*. He placed these under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. He propounded that if these cognitions are indiscrepant and devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination (*anadhyavasāya*), then these are very much the means of valid cognition.
2. He upholds two types of *pratyakṣa* as *sāmvyāvahārika* (empirical) and *mukhya* (transcendental). The types of *matijñāna* such as *avagraha* (receiving), *ihā* (speculation) *avāya* (perceptual judgement) and *dhāraṇā* (retention) were included by him in *Sāmvyāvahārika-pratyakṣa* and he has accepted their sequential position as propounded in canonical literature.
3. He accepted differences between *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* according to the canonical tradition and placed *śrutajñāna* under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. *Śrutajñāna* is known in epistemology as *āgama pramāṇa*.
4. He included *upamāna pramāṇa* (comparison) in the recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) of similarity which he conceptualized taking *Samjñā* of Umāsvāti's, *Tattvārthasūtra* (1.13) as its basis.
5. He discussed all the epistemological terms, such as *hetu*, (*probans*) *sādhya* (*probandum*), *drṣṭānta*, *vyāpti* etc.
6. He introduced some new *hetus* such as *kāraṇa* (cause) *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara* and *sahacara*.
7. Akalaṅka discussed *naya* and *nikṣepa* also which have formed an integral part of epistemology.

Philosophers after Akalaṅka

The Jaina philosophers contributing to Indian epistemology after Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka are : Vidyānanda, Anantavīrya, Māṇikyanandin, Vādirāja, Abhayadevasūri, Prabhācandra, Vādidevasūri, Hemacandra, Abhinava Dharmabhūṣaṇa, Guṇaratnasūri, Malliṣeṇa, Vimaladāsa and Yaśovijaya. Since it is not possible to discuss the contributions of all these logicians, it would be proper to appraise the contributions of the prominent logicians.

Vidyānanda (775-840), the first commentator of Akalaṅka, was a profound philosopher deeply acquainted with Jaina and other systems of Indian philosophy. He put forth a step to establish the Jaina *pramāṇa śāstra* logically. He wrote three commentaries viz. *Tattvārthaślokavārttika* on the *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti, *Aṣṭasahasrī* on *Aṣṭaśati* of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka and *Yuktyanuśāsanālaṅkāra* on *Yuktyanuśāsana* of Samantabhadra.

In these commentaries he has cogently established the Jaina philosophy and has refuted other systems. *Tattvārthaślokavārtikā*, a commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, presents an exhaustive description of Jaina epistemology. He has discussed all the five types of knowledge. He also deals with perception, recollection (*smaraṇa*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), reasoning (*tarka*), inference (*anumāna*) and testimony (*āgama*). *Āṣṭasahāsī* having thousand stanzas expounds *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra and *Aṣṭaśatī* of Akalaṅka, but *Aṣṭasahasrī* has become a *kaṣṭasahasrī*, having thousands troubles because its comprehension is an uphill task. *Yuktyanuśāsanālaṅkāra* is an important work for understanding the Jaina philosophy in general.

Apart from his commentaries, Vidyānanda wrote six independent works, viz. *Vidyānandamahodaya*, *Āptaparīkṣā*, *Patraparīkṣā*, *Satyaśāsana -parīkṣā* and *Śṛipurapārśvanāthastotra*. All these works are important for the study of Jaina philosophy, particularly his *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā* is fully devoted to discuss the different aspects of epistemology. Herein Vidyānanda defines *pramāṇa* as right cognition. He repudiated the concept of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* mainly propounded by Buddhists. He says that perception is a kind of valid cognition and every valid cognition is regarded as determinate cognition. Vidyānanda has also discussed the definition of probans (*hetu*) and refuted the position of Buddhists and Naiyāyikas who consider *hetu*'s *trairūpya* (having three forms) and *pāñcarūpya* (having five forms) respectively as its essential characteristics.

Pramāṇa-parīkṣā is really the first composite and systematic work which explains the complete Jaina epistemology and logic briefly.

The second commentator of Akalaṅka was Anantavīrya. There are four Anantavīryas referred to in Jaina literature, but he was the third Anantavīrya who flourished during A.D. 950 to 990 and wrote commentaries on *Pramāṇa-saṃgraha* and *Siddhiviniścaya* of Akalaṅka. Commentary on *Pramāṇasaṃgraha* is known as *Pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣya* and commentary on *Siddhiviniścaya* is known as *Siddhiviniścayatīkā*. *Pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣya* is not yet available, but its reference is found in the *Siddhiviniścayatīkā*. It is an important commentary for understanding the development of Jaina thinking regarding epistemology.

Māṇikyanandin (993 -1053 CE) was the first logician who wrote an aphoristic treatise entitled *parikṣāmukha* which present the Jaina system of epistemology in a nutshell. Prabhācandra, a prominent philosopher wrote a voluminous commentary on it entitled *Prameyakamala- mārtaṇḍa*. *Laghu Anantavīrya's prameyaratnamālā*, Cārukīrti's *Prameyaratnālaṅkāra* and Śāntivarṇi's *Prameyakaṇṭhikā* are also famous commentaries on *Parikṣāmukha*. All these commentaries depict the importance of this first aphoristic treatise of Jaina logic.

Vādirāja (1025 CE) was also a commentator of Akalaṅka. He wrote a commentary on *Nyāyaviniścaya* of Akalaṅka known as *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa*. This is a big commentary comprising the size of twenty thousand *anuṣṭubh* stanzas. It discusses the doctrines of several Indian philosophers like Kumārila. Prabhākara, Maṇḍanamiśra, Vyomaśiva, Bhāsarvajña etc. and refutes them cogently. Another work of Vādirāja on Jaina epistemology is *Pramāṇa-nirṇaya*. It is an independent work on Jaina logic (*nyāya*). Vādirāja propounds only two types of *parokṣa pramāṇa* as inference and testimony and includes recollection, recognition and reasoning as the subdivisions of inference.

Abhayadevasūri, the commentator of Siddhasena's *Sanmatitarka-prakarāṇa* was a disciple of Rājagacchiya Pradyumnasūri. Paṇḍita Sukhalāla Saṅghavī and Paṇḍita Becaradāsa Dosi have placed him during the second half of the tenth century and first half of the eleventh century. Mahendra Kumāra Nyāyācārya considers him belonging to the last part of the eleventh century of Vikrama Samvat, but he does not clearly say who was earlier, between Abhayadevasūri and

Prabhācandra. It seems that Abhayadevasūri's commentary on *Sanmatitarka* was written earlier than the works of Prabhācandra because the issues raised in the *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* (commentary on *Sanmatitarka*) are found more systematic in the works of Prabhācandra. The commentary of Abhayadeva, explains *naya*, *jñāna* and *jñeya* extensively. Abhayadevasūri was a well versed commentator on Jaina epistemology. He has a penetrating view when he refutes the other systems. The second part (*kāṇḍa*) of his commentary mainly deals with epistemology.

Prabhācandra, a renowned Jaina logician, has contributed a lot by writing two voluminous commentaries entitled *Nyāya-kumudacandra* and *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*. *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* is a commentary on *Parīkṣāmukha* of Māṇikyanandin and *Nyāyakumudacandra* is a commentary on *Laghīyastraya* of Akalaṅka. Paṇḍita Kailāśacandra Śāstrī places him during 950 to 1020 CE in the introduction to the first part of *Nyāya-kumudacandra* and Paṇḍita Mahendra Kumar *Nyāyacārya* has fixed him with a minor modification during 980 to 1065 CE. Prabhācandra has given many new cogent arguments to refute the other systems and to establish the Jaina philosophy. He has discussed prima facie views (*pūrvapakṣa*) of other works like *Tattvārthavṛtti*, *Śākaṭāyana-nyāsa*, *Śābdāmbhojabhāskara*, *Pravacāṇa-sārasarobjabhāskara*, *Gadyakathakośa*, *Mahāpurāṇa-ṭippaṇa*, *Ratnakaraṇḍaṭīka*, *Kriyākalāpaṭīka* and *Ātmānuśāsanatīlaka*, but scholars have divergent opinions about the authorship of some of these works.

Although *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* comes under the

category of a commentary, it seems to be an independent original work. Prabhācandra has also discussed all the other Indian systems in detail and has subjected them to devastating criticism.

In his other commentary *Nyāyakumudacandra*, Prabhācandra discussed some new topics and presented new arguments to establish the Jaina theory of epistemology. There is no doubt that he has explained all the aspects of *pramāṇa* in a systematic and logical style in both the commentaries.

Like Māṇikyanandin, A Digambar Ācārya, Vādidevasūri was the first Śvetāmbar Ācārya who wrote an aphoristic treatise on Jaina logic entitled *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*. Vādidevasuri differs from Māṇikyanandin on the topics of *kevali-kavalāhāra*, emancipation of a woman etc. Vādidevasuri's *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* comprises eight chapters having two more chapters than *Parikṣāmukha*, dealing with *naya* and *vada* also. Vādidevasuri was the first logician who systematized the rules of *vada* according to Jaina views. Chapter on *naya* summarizes the Jaina perspective of *naya*. A profound philosopher of the seventeenth century, a celebrated Jaina philosopher Ācārya Yaśovijaya, has followed his *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* in his *Jaina Tarka Bhāsā*. Vādidevasuri himself wrote a valuable commentary on *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* as *Syādvāda-ratnākara*. It is a voluminous commentary having eighty-four thousand anuṣṭubh-metres. The title *Syādvāda-ratnākara* is significant by its subject-matter. Vādidevasuri discussed those topics too which could not be taken up by Prabhācandra. The language of the work is very lucid and attractive. *Syādvādaratnākara* is of

paramount importance since it goes one step further in developing Jaina epistemological doctrines. He was the first and the last commentator among the Jaina sects who wrote such a big and authoritative commentary on Jaina epistemology. He dealt with all the philosophical aspects and cogently proved the validity of *kāraṇa*, *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara*, *sahacara* and *vyāpya hetus* (Probans) and coined the two new terms *tiryak sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā sāmānya* in the context of *Pratyabhijñāna* of prameya.

Hemacandrasūri, known as *Kalikālasarvajña*, was not only a logician, but also a poet, rhetorician, grammarian, lexicographer etc. His unique work *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* has established him as an original thinker in the field of epistemology. He defines *pramāṇa* as an authentic definitive cognition of an object.⁸ He does not feel any necessity of inserting 'sva' word in the definition of *pramāṇa*, because in the opinion of Hemacandra 'Svanirṇaya' does not distinguish it from illusory cognition.⁹ Prior to Hemcandra *pramāṇa* was defined as *svaparavyavasāyi*, *svaparāvabhāsaka* etc. which means *pramāṇa* is a definitive cognition of an object and of the self. Thus Hemacandra has his own views whereas Manikyanandin inserted the word 'apūrva' in the definition of *pramāṇa*.¹⁰ Hemacandra repudiates his insertion and says that a cognition taking note of an object previously cognized does not lack the status of *pramāṇa* exactly as the cognition which takes

⁸PM 1.1.2 *Samyagarthanirṇayaḥ pramāṇam*

⁹PM 1.1.3 *Svanirṇayaḥ sannapyalakṣaṇam, apramāṇe'pi bhāvāt*

¹⁰PMk 1.1. *Svāpūravārtha-vyavasāyātmakam jñānam pramāṇam.*

¹¹PM 1.4 *Grahīṣyamānagrāhiṇa iva grhītagrāhiṇopi nāpramāṇyam.*

note of what is to be cognized in future"¹¹. He proposes that with the point of view of modes cognition of a previously cognized object is not possible, because a substance is changing every moment from the angle of its modes.

Jineśvarasūri's *Pramālakṣma* (10th-11th centuries CE) Candrasenasūri's *Utpādādisiddhi*, Abhinavadharmabhūṣaṇa's *Nyāyadīpikā*, Narendrasena's *Pramāṇa prameyakalikā* are also important works which have enriched the Jaina epistemological literature.

In the seventeenth century Ācārya Yaśovijaya, who emerged as a prominent philosopher, wrote more than a hundred works. His works mainly related to Jaina epistemology are *Jainatarkabhāṣā*, *Jñānabindu*, *Aṣṭasahasrītātparyavivaraṇa* and *śāstravārtāsamuccayaṭīkā*. Among these works the former two are independent treatises and the latter are the commentaries. *Aṣṭasahasrītātparyavivaraṇa* is a commentary on *Aṣṭasahasrī* of Vidyānanda and *Śāstravārtāsamuccayaṭīkā* is a commentary on *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* of Haribhadrāsūri.

To conclude, we can say that the Jaina epistemology has completed a long journey of development ranging from the second century CE to the seventeenth century CE. It has been enriched by a huge literature comprising aphoristic treatises, commentaries, *varttikas*, *bhāṣyas* and independent works. It goes without saying that both from the point of view of volume of literature and quality of philosophical discussion it is not less advanced, (if not more), than the Nyāya logic and Buddhist logic. Some points are noted here:

- A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambar and Śvetāmbar joined their hands to develop the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jaina philosophers were well versed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for the Jaina system was accepted. Their refutation of opponents' views was based on cogent reasons.
- B. If the works of Sumati, Kumāranandin and Patrakesari are found available, then the history of the development of Jaina epistemology may be rewritten.
- C. Umāsvāti was the first philosopher who recognized right knowledge as *pramāṇa* and classified the *pramāṇa* into two types i.e. *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *parokṣa*. After the establishment of right knowledge as *pramāṇa* all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of *pramāṇa*.
- D. The division of knowledge as *indriya pratyakṣa* and *no indriya - pratyakṣa* as found in the *Nandisūtra* seems a later development.
- E. Although *Nyāyāvatāra* is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṇa more systematized it. He included recollection, recognition and reasoning as *pramāṇa* under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. He introduced *kāraṇa*, *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara* and *sahacara hetus* as valid probans.
- F. The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (*sāṃvyaṅvahārika*


pratyakṣa) by Jinabhadraṇin. Earlier it was mentioned as *indriyapratyakṣa* in the *Nandisūtra*. In the *Nandisūtra* the concept of *anīndriya pratyakṣa* (quasi sense) is not mentioned. The *Nandisūtra* mentions about *no - indriya pratyakṣa*, but this term was used to denote *transcendental* perception.

- G. The *Mukhya pratyakṣa* was given a new name as *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* by Vādidevasūri. He further divided it into two types as *sakala* and *vikala pratyakṣa* on the basis of a division found in the *Sthānāṅga sūtra* as *kevala* and *no-kevala*.
- H. The Śvetāmbar logicians are unanimous in accepting the validity of cognition which cognizes the object previously cognized. Whereas Digambar logicians like Akalaṅka, Māṇikyanandin and Prabhācandra were of the opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a *pramāṇa* that it must cognize the object which is previously not cognized.
- I. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable of knowing the all objects. Umāsvāti says that mind is only an instrument of *śrutajñāna*.

As stated in the beginning of the article, Jaina philosophers maintained Jaina epistemology on the foundation of description of knowledge found in Jaina canons. A brief survey regarding the development of the division or types of *pramāṇa* is as follows:


Development Regarding Division of *pramāṇa*



(1) In The *Anuyogadvārasūtra*



Note :- *Bhagavatisūtra* (5.3.192) and *Sthānāṅgasūtra* (430) also quote above four types of *pramāṇa*. The division found in *Anuyogadvārasūtra* is much identical with that of *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotam and the Buddhist text *Upāyahrdaya*.

(2) In The *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmi (2nd century CE)



(3) In The Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena (5th or 8th Century CE)**(4) Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (8th Century CE)**

Note :-Almost all the posterior Jaina philosophers maintained above division of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka with minor moderation as below :-

1. Vidyānanda propounded two types of *Pratyabhijñāna* : *ekatva* and *sādrśya*. Māṇikyanandin added two more types-*vailakṣaṇya* and *Prāṭīyaugika*.
2. Vādidevasūri used a new word '*Pāramārthika*' *pratyakṣa* in place of '*Mukhya*' and provided its two kinds- (I) *Sakala*

and (ii) *Vikala. Sakala pāramāṛthika* perception is *Kevalajñāna* and *vikala pāramāṛthika* perception is of two types - (i) *Avadhijñāna* (ii) *Manahparyāyajñāna*.

PART II

AN APPRAISAL OF CONTRIBUTION TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOCTRINES

The fivefold knowledge i.e. *matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge), *śrutajñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge), *avadhijñāna* (visual intuition), *manahparyāyajñāna* (intuition of mental modes) and *kevala-jñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge) is an original contribution of Jaina tradition which was maintained by the Jaina logicians by including it in the twofold *pramāṇas*.

Now we should highlight the points on which Jaina logicians contributed to the Indian epistemology and logic regarding *pramāṇa*. The main contributions of the Jaina logicians are as follows:

- (i) Definition of *pramāṇa* and its nature illuminating the self and the object.
- (ii) Establishment of recollection (*smṛti*) as an independent *pramāṇa*.
- (iii) Establishment of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) as an independent *pramāṇa*.
- (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (*tarka*) as an independent *pramāṇa*.
- (v) Definition of probans (*hetu*) as incompatibility with the contradictory (*anyathānupapatti*).

- (vi) Establishment of new probans such as *kāraṇa*, *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara* and *sahacara*.
- (vii) Particular view about the members of syllogism (*parārthānumāna*)
- (viii) Theory of standpoints (*nayavāda*) and sevenfold predication.
- (ix) Nature of *prameya* (object) is substance-cum-mode *dravyaparyāyātmaka* or *sāmānyaviśeṣātmaka*.

Now we shall discuss the above and clarify the thoughts of the Jaina logicians about these points.

(i) Definition of *pramāṇa*:

Regarding the definition of *pramāṇa* Jaina philosophers are unanimous in propounding it as definitive cognition. The other characteristic of *pramāṇa* accepted by them is the nature of illuminating the self and the object. Some definitions given by Jaina logicians are as follows :

- (i) *pramāṇaṃ svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ
bādhavivarjitam—Nyāyāvatāra, 1*

Pramāṇa is a cognition revealing itself and the other object without any hindrance.

- (ii) *Svaparāvabhāsakaṃ yathā pramāṇaṃ bhuvi
buddhilakṣaṇam.—Svayambhūstotra., 63*

Pramāṇa is a knowledge illuminating itself and the other object in the world.

- (iii) *Vyavasāyātmakaṃ jñānamātmārthagrāhakaṃ
matam.—Laghīyastraya, 60*

The knowledge which determinates the self and the other object is *pramāṇa*.

(iv) *Svaparavyavasāyi jñānaṃ*

pramāṇam.—*Pramāṇanayatātvāloka*, 1.2

The knowledge determining itself and the object is
pramāṇa.

(v) *Samyagarthanirṇayaḥ pramāṇam.*—*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*,
1.1.2

Right judgement of an object is *pramāṇa*.

(vi) *Svāpūrvārthavyavasayātmakam jñānaṃ pramāṇam.* —
Parīkṣāmukha, 1.1

Judgemental knowledge of the self and the other object
hitherto unknown, is *pramāṇa*.

(vii) *Avisaṃvādakam pramāṇam.*—*Laghīyastryavṛtti*, 22

Judgemental knowledge (free from wrongness) is
pramāṇa.

With above definitions, it is clear that Jaina logicians accept *pramāṇa* as definitive cognition, which is always *savikalpaka*. It is illuminating the self and the object.

The Jaina logicians uphold that the contact of the sense-organ and an object never can be a *pramāṇa*. They say that like another object, the sense-object contact also cannot be a pre-eminent cause in generating valid knowledge, because both of them are non-revelatory.¹² Therefore Jaina thinkers propound that *pramāṇa* is useful for accepting the desired object and rejecting the undesirable one, hence it must be a cognition.¹³ They also accept that a valid cognition through a *pramāṇa* does not require to prove its validity, because the knowledge is

¹² LTv 1.3 : *sannikarṣāderajñānasya prāmāṇyamanupapannaṃ arthāntaravat*.

¹³ PMk 1.2 : *hitāhitapṛāptiparihārasamarthaṃ hi pramāṇaṃ tato jñānameva tat*.

always of the nature of illuminating the self and the object. They give an example of the sun or a lamp which illuminates itself and the object.¹⁴ It is true in our experience also that we know what we know. The *Naiyāyikas* accept that a cognition can illuminate only its object and *Vijñānavādins* say that a knowledge always illuminates the self. The Jaina logicians clearly accept that a knowledge is possessed of both the qualities in its nature. About its nature of determinate, the Jaina logicians are firmly determined. Hence, they have refuted the Buddhist definition of *pratyakṣa* which is devoid of determination due to its *nirvikalpatā*.

(ii) Establishment of recollection (*smṛti*) as *pramāṇa* :

Recollection is a knowledge which arises after the stimulation of memory-impression and is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (*tad*). Manifestation of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation of memory impression. Hemcandra defines recollection as such:- *vāsanod-bodha-hetu kā-tadityākārā smṛtiḥ* (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*. 1.2.3) Almost all the philosophers from Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka down to Vādidevasūri define recollection almost in the same manner. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka says that recollection is a resultant of retention, but it is also a *pramāṇa*, because of its resultant (*pramāṇa-phala*) as recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*)¹⁵.

Although Praśastapāda has mentioned recollection as a kind of *vidyā* (right knowledge),¹⁶ but he did not accept it as an

¹⁴ PT 1.16-17

¹⁵ LTv in AGT p.5: *avisamvādasmrteḥ phalasya hetutvāt pramāṇaṃ dhāraṇā smṛtiḥ samjñāyāh*.

¹⁶ He accepts four kinds of *vidyā* as *pratyakṣa*, *Laiṅgika*, *smṛti* and *ārṣa* in the *pratyakṣa prakaraṇa* of *Praśastapādabhāṣya* p. 153

independent *pramāṇa*. *Nyāyasūtra* mentions it as an attribute of a soul¹⁷, but none other system than Jaina has accepted it as an independent *pramāṇa*. The Mīmāṃsā philosophy does not consider it as *pramāṇa*, because it cognizes the object previously cognized and *pramāṇa*, in their opinion always cognizes the object previously not cognized. Buddhist philosophers also give the same argument, but they present some more arguments, such as (i) it is not generated by an object, so it does not correspond to the object, (ii) if recollection is considered as *pramāṇa* then intention, repugnance (*dveṣa*) etc. will also be considered as *pramāṇa* and it will create an infinite regress, (iii) recollection deals with the past object. Jaina logicians have refuted all these arguments.

The Jaina logicians Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra and Vāḍidevasūri put forth many cogent arguments to establish recollection (*smṛti*) as an independent *pramāṇa*. Some of them are presented here.¹⁸

1. Recollection is an organ of valid cognition, because it is an indiscrepant cognition. Whenever the recollection is found discrepant then it comes under the pseudo-organ of valid cognition. The recollection which is corresponding to an activity (*arthakriyā*) is an indiscrepant knowledge.
2. If recollection is not regarded as a separate organ of valid cognition, because it cognizes the object previously cognized, then it is not a valid reason, because the recollection also cognizes partly unknown object from the point of view of time as Māṇikyanandin accepts in his *Parīkṣāmukha*.

¹⁷ *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.40

¹⁸ For reference of arguments see Jain, Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 297 to 307

3. Inference cannot be an organ of valid cognition without having recourse to recollection of invariable concomitance. Every philosopher who accepts inference as a means of valid cognition has to invariably resort to recollection of invariable concomitance. For example, when we perceive smoke on a mountain the impression of our previous cognition of smoke pervaded by fire in kitchen is awakened and we recollect it immediately.
4. Vidyānanda says that without accepting the validity of recollection, the validity of recognition does not exist. If recognition is not valid then inductive reasoning cannot take place. Without the help of valid inductive reasoning the inference cannot occur. If inference does not take place then validity of perception cannot be proved. In this way, in absence of the *pramāṇas* object cannot be proved. Thus if we do not accept the validity of recollection all the organs of valid cognition and the knowable things will not exist in the world of reality.
5. Recollection is a valid organ of cognition because it is a means of knowledge like a perception. The intelligent people cannot behave without the validity of recollection. If we do not accept its validity then we cannot even reach our homes. All the transaction of money will be stopped. The students will not be able to write anything in their answer sheets at the time of examination. Thus the validity of recollection is duly established in all our empirical activities.
6. If recollection is understood as invalid cognition on account of its occurrence after perception then it is also not legitimate because inference also occurs after perception.

7. As inference is a valid organ of cognition because it is devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination, so is the recollection, because it also has the same quality.
8. Without the memory of probans (*hetu*) and probandum (*sādhya*) the invariable relation between them cannot be established.
9. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* says that recollection is not invalid because of the cognizance of the object previously cognized, but it is invalid because it is not generated by the object.¹⁹ The reason of the invalidity of recollection pointed out in the *Kārikā* by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is also corresponding to the Buddhist view. Vidyānada replies to the Buddhist philosophers that in the Buddhist view even the perception also, is not generated from the object because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness.²⁰ Prābhacandra replies in a different way that we the Jains do not accept the perception generated from the object. It is true that in Jaina philosophy the knowledge is a result of subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma obscuring knowledge. Ācārya Hemcandra gives a different argument that recollection is a valid organ of cognition even without its emergence from an object, for example *yogijñāna* (perception by a yogi) is also a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object.

¹⁹Quoted in PM p. 5 : na smṛter apramāṇatvaṃ grhīta-grāhitā -kṛtam I
api- tvanartha-janyatvaṃ tad aprāmāṇya-kāraṇam II

²⁰TSv1.13.27 :narthāj janmopapadyeta pratyakṣasya smṛteriva I
Tadvat sa eva tadbhāvād anyathā na kṣaṇa-kṣayaḥ II

(iii) Establishment of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) as *pramāṇa*:

Another contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the establishment of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) as an independent organ of cognition. According to the Jaina logicians recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection. Akalaṅka has used the term *saṃjñā*, *saṃjñāna* and *pratyabhijñāna* for recognition. The Jaina philosophers have included the comparison (*upamāna-pramāṇa*) under recognition as one of its kinds. They did not accept comparison as a separate organ of valid cognition. The Jaina logician Vidyānanda propounded two types of recognition i.e. knowledge of oneness (*ekatvajñāna*) and knowledge of similarity (*sādrśya jñāna*).

When the object previously perceived and recollected now is the same at the time of recognition, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of oneness and when the object is similar to the object being perceived and recollected, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of similarity.²¹ He is the same Devadatta (*so'yaṃ devadattaḥ*) is the example of knowledge of oneness and as an ox so the *gavaya* (*go-sadrśo gavayaḥ*) is the example of knowledge of similarity.

Māṇikyanandin, a profound scholar of Jaina epistemology, goes a step further and recognizes recognition on its various aspects. He says that the recognition can be manifold. Some examples are: it is identical with that, it is similar to that, it is different from that, it relates to that.²² Former two types of recognition have already been mentioned above. A buffalo is different from a cow is the example of *tad-*

²¹ PP p. 42 : tadevaṃ ityekatva-nibandhanam tādṛśam evedaṃ iti. sādrśya-nibandhanam.

²² PMk 3.5 : tadevedaṃ tat-sadrśam, tadvilakṣaṇam, tat-pratīyogīty

vilakṣaṇatva and 'this is away from that' this is near to that', are the examples of *tat pratiyogītva*. Ācārya Hemcandara corroborates the kinds proposed by Māṇikyanandin.

Vādidevasūri, the author of *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* and *Syādvādaratnākara* used the new terms of *tiryak sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* relating to the definition of recognition. *Tiryak sāmānya* means the similarity amongst the objects and *ūrdhvatā sāmānya* means the identity of the same entity at different stages, for example the *gavaya* is like cow denotes *tiryak sāmānya* and he is the same Devadatta denotes *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*.²³ In Indian philosophy Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Kāśmīra Sāivism also discuss the concept of recognition, but they include it in perception and do not recognize it as a separate organ of valid cognition. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa a foremost Naiyāyika, accepts the validity of recognition under perception, because it is generated by sense object contact with the help of latent trace (*saṃskāra*). But the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that recognition cannot be a *pramāṇa*, because of infinite regress, illusory knowledge having no object and uncorresponding nature of it.²⁴ For establishment of recognition as independent valid organ of cognition the Jaina logicians have given many arguments. The main arguments are being presented here.²⁵

1. Recognition is neither merely a recollection nor merely a perception, but it is different from the both and is possessed of being a new *pramāṇa*, because it has to cognize a different object which is not cognized by mere perception

²³ PT 3.5 and 5.4

²⁴ See Jain Dharm Chand, p. 310

²⁵ For original references of arguments see Jain, Dharm chand pp. 311 to 318

and mere recollection. So recognition is an independent organ of cognition.

2. It is a *pramāṇa*, because it is found indiscrepant in behaviour. Ācārya Hemacandra says that without accepting the recognition as independent *pramāṇa* (valid organ of cognition) the logical justification of bondage and emancipation would become absolutely impossible. If it is the self same person who suffers from bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person can try to achieve the joy of freedom.²⁶
3. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka maintains the sequence of recollection, recognition and inductive reasoning. He says that recognition is the resultant of recollection and inductive reasoning is the resultant of recognition. He tells that the meaning of a word can be known only if the validity of recognition is accepted.
4. Perception is not experienced capable to differentiate between distant and near, short and long etc., only through recognition we can do so.
5. Vidyānanda says that without the acceptance of recognition we cannot know that I am the same who was child, teenager, young and adult before and now have become an old man.²⁷ He says that without accepting its validity of recognition Buddhists would not be able to consider the oneness between two momentary objects or *svalakṣaṇa*. It is necessary to accept the validity of recognition for the knowledge of similarity also.

²⁶ PM vṛiti 1.2.4

²⁷ TSv, 1.13.46.

6. Recognition is different from inference because it recognizes the probans (*hetu*) only and inference is a later process.
7. The object of recognition is not cognized by recollection and perception separately, hence it cognizes the object which is not cognized by any other *pramāṇa*.
8. There is no contradictory cognition which affects its validity.

Thus the Jaina logicians have established the recognition as an independent *pramāṇa*. It is to be noted that they include *upamāna pramāṇa* (comparison) the category of the knowledge of similarity under recognition.

(iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (*tarka*) as *pramāṇa* :

It is also a significant contribution of the Jaina logicians that they established *tarka* as an independent *pramāṇa*. They propound that invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between probans (*hetu*) and probandum (*sādhya*) can be known only by *tarka pramāṇa*. *Tarka* or inductive reasoning expresses the universal necessary concomitance between probans and probandum. Hemacandra says that inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non observation.²⁸

In the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama *tarka* (reasoning) has been used for presumptive cognition (*Arthāpatti*). It is only the Jaina logicians who considered *tarka* as a knowledge of universal concomitance. Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra,

²⁸ PM, 1.2.4

Vādidēvasūri and Hemcandra are the logicians who advanced cogent arguments for the establishment of *tarka* as an independent *pramāṇa*.

The main arguments are :²⁹

1. The object which is cognized by *tarka* is not cognized by any other *pramāṇa*. *Tark* is knowledge of universal concomitance. No other *pramāṇa* can do so, neither perception nor inference.
2. The validity of inference depends on *tarka*, because it is the knowledge of necessary concomitance and without the knowledge of necessary concomitance inference cannot arise.
3. It has a corresponding nature.
4. It is not conceivable that perception is competent to discharge the entire series of operations that are involved in the knowledge that whatever is a case of smoke is invariably the product exclusively of fire in all places and times, and not of anything else. The reason that it is not discursive and owes its genesis to the inference exerted by a datum that is present.
5. If inference is competent to know the necessary concomitance then it will result in infinite regress, because an inference will require another inference.

Thus the Jaina logicians have established *tarka* as an independent *pramāṇa* by presenting cogent arguments. This shows their innovative thinking about the system of epistemology and logic.

²⁹ For references see Jain Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 322 to 330

(v) Definition of probans (*hetu*):

One important contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the definition of reason or probans (*hetu*). Probans is a necessary means for the occurrence of inference. Inference is the knowledge of probandum on the strength of probans. All the Indian philosophers who accept inference as an organ of valid cognition, unanimously agree that probandum (*sādhya*) can be known by probans (*sādhana, hetu*) as in the case of probandum fire on mountain can be known by probans smoke. But regarding the definitions of probans the Indian philosophers have divergent views.

The Buddhist philosophers propound three characteristics of a valid probans :- its subsistence in the subject (*pakṣa-dharmatva*), its subsistence in the homologue (*sapakṣa-sattva*) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (*vipakṣāsattva*).³⁰ These three characteristics of probans are also mentioned in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya* of Vaiśeṣika philosophy.³¹ But the Nyāya philosophy admitted two new characteristics apart from the above three which are : the absence of contradiction of the probandum (*abādhitaviśayatva*) and the absence of a countervailing probans (*asatpratipakṣatva*). The Jaina logicians have given a new idea about the characteristics of probans that it bears only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility (*anyathānupapatti* or *avinābhāva*) of the one in the absence of the other.³² Probans cannot exist in the absence of probandum.

³⁰ Nyāyapraveśa p. 1 : *hetustrirūpaḥ kiṃ punastrairūpyam? pakṣadharmatvaṃ, sapakṣe sattvaṃ vipakṣe cāsattvaṃ iti.*

³¹ see *anumāna prakaraṇa* of *Praśastapādabhāṣya* : *yadanumeyena sambaddhaṃ prasiddhaṃ ca tadanvite. tadabhāve ca nāstyeva tallingamanumāpakam.*

³² PT 3.11 : *nīcītānyathānupapattye kalakṣaṇo hetuḥ.*

This is the only characteristic of probans; for example, smoke a probans cannot exist in the absence of a probandum fire.

The Jaina philosophers have refuted the notion of triple characteristics (*trairūpya*) and five characteristics (*pāñca-rūpya*) of probans maintained by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas respectively. The Jaina philosophers right from Siddhasena down to Yaśovijaya have indifferently propounded that a probans has only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility of that (probans) in the absence of probandum. It is having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Pātrasvāmin was profound logician who wrote a separate book *Trilakṣanakadāṛṭhāna* to refute the Buddhist view. Buddhist logician Śāntarakṣita has criticized the view of Pātrasvāmin, but the Jaina logicians have firmly defended their views. The main arguments of the Jaina philosophers are as follows:³³

1. The sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum is sufficient for defining probans. Three or five characteristics are not required for a valid probans. There are some probans (*hetus*) possessed of three characteristics, but devoid of validity, e.g. he must be swarthy in complexion since he is the son of Maitreyī (a woman of swarthy complexion). It is an instance of a defective probans,³⁴ although, here triple characteristics have been used. '*Tatpūtratvāt*' probans remain in maitreī's son which is subject (*pakṣa*), other

³³For references of arguments see Jain, Dharm Chand (1995) pp. 223 to 234

³⁴(i) TSn 1369 : *Sa śyāmās tasyā putratvād dṛṣtā śyāmā yathetare |*
Iti tri-lakṣaṇo hetur na niscityai pravartate ||

(ii) PP p. 45 : *sa- śyāmaḥ tat-putratvād tasyānyaputratvat .*

sons are homologue (*sapakṣa*) and that probans does not go into hetrologue (*vipkṣa*). But it is not necessary that every son of Maitreyī will be swarthy in complexion. So in the absence of necessary factor of universal concomitance the three characteristics are useless.

2. There are many probans which are not possessed of triple characteristics but they are competent, because of having a unitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum; for example tomorrow will be Thursday because today is Wednesday. *Śakaṭa* constellation will arise after some time (*muhūrta*), because the *kṛttika* constellation has just arisen,³⁵ are such probans which do not have triple characteristics (*Trirūpatā*), but competent enough for the inferential cognition of a probandum. The only one characteristic of *Anyathānupapatti* is needed to define a probans. Pātrakesarin says - (As quoted in *Tattvasaṅgraha* (verse 1368) of Buddhist Philosopher Śāntarakṣta)

anyathā-nupapannattvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim.
nānyatha-nupapannattvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim.

Vidyānanda gives two arguments to prove the illegitimacy of triple characteristics of probans as under :³⁶

- (i) It is found in fallacious probans also.
- (ii) It is not a differentia to distinguish a probans from a pseudo-probans.

³⁵Clavel has disscised in her paper presented at Lumbini Seminar (12-15 March 2013) that this inference may not happen right in some cases. See proceedings as 'Buddhist and Jaina Studies'.

³⁶TSv part 3 p. 273 *na ca trairūpyasyāsādhāraṇatā tadhetau tadābhāsepi tasya samudbhavāt. tato na tadhetulakṣaṇaṃ yuktam.*

Ācārya Hemacandra says that refutation of triple characteristics (*trairūpya*) will also serve as a refutation of the five characteristics (*pāñca-rūpya*). Since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance.

Thus it is a new perspective of Jaina logic which speaks of the deep and penetrative thinking of Jaina logicians.

(vi) Establishment of new probans (such as *kāraṇa* etc.):

The Jaina logicians propounded four new probans also, namely *kāraṇa* (cause), *pūrvacara*, (predecessor), *uttaracara* (successor), *sahacara* (simultaneous). These kinds of probans have not been accepted by other Indian systems. The Jaina logicians propose so many examples of these probans as means of inference. “There would be rain, since a particular type of clouds is seen” is an example of *kāraṇa hetu*. “Śakaṭa constellation would rise because otherwise the rise of *kṛttikā* would not have been there” is an example of *pūrvacara* hetu. Here, after the rise of *kṛttikā* the rise of the *śakaṭa* takes place immediately after it, without exception, and therefore, the *kṛttikā* indicates the rise of the *śakaṭa* as its predecessor reason. “*Bharaṇī* rose before, because *kṛttikā* is rising” is an example of *uttaracara* probans. Here the rise of *kṛttikā* which succeeds the rise of *Bharani* indicates it. These Two *pūrvacara* and *uttaracara* are different from the cause and effect as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. “The fruit of mango should be possessed of a colour because the fact of being possessed of taste”-is an example of *sahacara hetu*. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the colour being not justified in its absence indicates it. All these probans are valid because of their invariable concomitance with their probandum.

Ācārya Māṇikyanandin clarifies that there are two types of *avinābhāva* : *saha-avinābhāva* and *krama-avinābhāva*.³⁷ *Kāraṇa*, *kārya*, *pūrvacara* and *uttaracara* *hetus* are found valid because of their *krama-avinābhāva* and *sahacara* *hetu* is found valid because of its *saha-avinābhāva*. In this way the concept of *vyāpti* has also been developed by the Jaina logicians. It shows their logical acumen.

Right from Akalaṅka down to Yaśovijaya almost all the Jaina logicians have accepted the validity of aforesaid four new probans (*hetus*).

Philosophers of other systems do not consider a cause as *hetu*, because cause is possible even without its effects, therefore it is not a perfect indicator of the effect. The Jaina logicians reply this question that where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also cooperating and there is no hindrance in its capability, then alone the cause can be the perfect indicator of effect. We can give examples to support their thinking as - milk is sweet, because sugar has been added to it, balloon will fly up because hydrogen gas has been filled up. If a cause is capable to make an effect and it is devoid of hindrance then it may be a valid probans, but in the respect of definition of probans as propounded by the Jaina logicians that probans never remains in the absence of effect, contradicts in the case of *kāraṇa* *hetu*, because *kāraṇa* *hetu* remains even in the absence of effect. In *pūrvacara* *hetu* also the same situation is happened. When a sequence of the incidences is definitive then *pūrvacara* and *uttaracara* probans are useful for a common man. *Sahacara* probans is also common in our daily

³⁷PMk 3.12 *sahakramabhāvaniyamo avinābhavaḥ*.

life. For example: back part of a wall is inferred by perceiving front part of it.

It seems clear that the Jaina logicians have accepted these probans, because of their corresponding nature in behavior. It is also clear that they are very precise in defining the probans (*hetu*) but they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of probans (*hetu*).

Regarding the members of syllogism (*parārthānumāna*), the Jaina logicians have propounded that *pakṣa-vacana* (the statement of the thesis) and *hetu* (probans) these two members are sufficient for an inference for others (*parārthānumāna*), but for the dull minded persons, they have accepted five members³⁸ including *udāharaṇa* (illustration with concomitance), *upanaya* (statement of probans in the place of probandum) and *nigamana* (conclusion). One more contribution of Jaina logicians is to introduce a concept of *antarvyāpti*, where invariable concomitance of probans is found in probandum only.

Theroy of standpoints (*nayavāda*) :

Nayamīmāṃsā is also a dimension of epistemology which has been discussed extensively by Jaina philosophers. *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* and *nayamīmāṃsā* are not absolutely different from *jñānamīmāṃsā*. The *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti propounds clearly that knowledge of an object is attained by *pramāṇa* and *naya*³⁹. Herein it is also clear that *adhigama* (knowledge) is a resultant and *pramāṇa* and *naya* are the means. *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* are the terms which are

³⁸PT 3.28 and 3.42

³⁹TS 1.6 : *pramāṇa-nayairadhigamaḥ*.

commonly found in all the systems of Indian philosophy, but the concept of '*naya*' is a peculiar contribution of Jaina system to Indian epistemology. Although '*naya*' is a part of *śrutajñāna*, it has been developed by the Jaina logicians as a separate branch of knowledge which denotes the different standpoints of a knower. It includes the standpoints of a speaker also. There is wide discussion on theory of *naya*, and its kinds in canonical and other later literature. *Saptabhaṅginaya* is related to the standpoints of a speaker. Theory of '*naya*' and sevenfold predication are the result of thought of *anekāntavāda* (non-absolutism) and *syādvāda*. For deciding the right meaning of a word Jaina thinkers have given a concept of *nikṣepa*. There are four kinds of *nikṣepa* as- *nāma*, *sthāpanā*, *dravya* and *bhāva*. *Tīrthaṅkara* Mahavīra replies many questions with the view of *dravya*, *kṣetra*, *kāla* and *bhāva*, which also denotes the epistemic view of Jaina tradition.

Conclusion

The view of non-absolutism helped Jain logicians in developing the epistemological doctrines and they formed many new technical terms such as: *sāṃvyavahārika pratyakṣa*, *tīryak sāmānya*, *ūrdhvata-sāmānya*, *saha-avinābhāva*, *krama-avinābhāva*, *antarvyāpti*, *bahirvyāpti* etc. The Jaina epistemological literature is undoubtedly of paramount importance for understanding the development of Indian and Jaina thinking of epistemology. The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to Indian epistemology in many ways. They discussed about every aspect of Indian epistemology and logic. It seems that they have a deep study of other systems also. It is noteworthy that they developed the epistemology regarding *pramāṇa* upholding the canonical views, but they

have given due significance to the empirical view also.

The Jaina epistemological literature is having importance for the understanding of the epistemological thinking of other systems also, because the Jaina philosophers have presented their opponents' view honestly and systematically.

The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to the development of epistemological doctrines which can be summed up as follows :

- A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambara and Śvetāmbara joined their hands to develop the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jain philosophers were well-versed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for Jaina system was accepted. Their refutation of opponent's views is based on cogent reasons.
- B. They cogently established recollection, recognition, and inductive reasoning as independent *pramāṇas*.
- C. They are very precise in defining the probans (*hetu*), but they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of probans (*hetu*).
- D. They established the nature of *pramāṇa* illuminating itself and the object.
- E. If the works of Sumati, Kumāraṇandin and Pātrakesarī are found available, then the history of the development of Jaina epistemology may be rewritten.
- F. Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmin was the first philosopher who recognized right knowledge as *pramāṇa* and classified the *pramāṇa* into two types i.e. *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *parokṣa*. After establishment of right knowledge as

pramāṇa all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of *pramāṇa*.

- G. Ācārya Kundakunda has proved the nature of knowledge as illuminating the self and the object.
- H. Although *Nyāyāvatāra* is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka has contributed a lot. He included recollection, recognition and reasoning as *pramāṇa* under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. He introduced *kāraṇa*, *purvacara*, *uttaracara* and *sahacara hetus* as valid probans.
- I. The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (*sāṃvyaavahārika pratyakṣa*) by Jinabhadraṇin. Earlier it was mentioned as *indriyapratyakṣa* in the *Nandīsūtra*.
- J. The *Mukhya pratyakṣa* was given a new name as *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* by Vādidevasūri. He further divided it into two types as *sakala* (complete) and *vikala* (partial) *pratyakṣa* on the basis of a division found in the *Sthānanga-sūtra* as *kevala* and *no-kevala*.
- K. The *Śvetāmbara* logicians are unanimous in accepting the validity of cognition which cognizes the object previously cognized, Whereas *Digambara* logicians like Akalaṅka, Māṇikyanandin and Prabhācandra were of opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a *pramāṇa* that it must cognize the object which is previously not cognized.
- L. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable to know all the objects. Umāsvāti says that mind is an instrument of *śrutajñāna*.

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The Concept of *Nirvikalpatā* in Buddhist Logic and the Indian Tradition

Nirvikalpatā is a concept that is discussed in the context of *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* (perception as a means of valid cognition) and *samādhi* (intense meditation). The Buddhist philosophers Dignāga (470-530 CE) and Dharmakīrti (620-690 CE) are the pioneer stalwarts who consider *kalpanāpohatā* or *nirvikalpatā* (absence of verbal designation) as an essential property of *pratyakṣa* (perception). Philosophers of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools also accept *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (perception without verbal designation) but they propound a kind of *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* (perception with verbal designation) also. It is noteworthy that these schools entered into the discussion about defining *nirvikalpatā* after Dignāga's time. Jaina philosophers do not accept *nirvikalpatā* in *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*. They have the notion of *darśana* or *darśanopayoga* which is always *nirākāra* and *nirvikalpaka*, but it is not included in the category of *pramāṇa*. This paper aims to discuss the concept of *nirvikalpatā* and its development in the Indian tradition with reference to specific texts in order to bring out the remarkable contribution of Buddhist philosophers to the panorama of Indian epistemology and logic. Jaina views will also be considered wherever appropriate.

In the Indian tradition Buddhist logicians seem to have been the first to have discussed the concept of *nirvikalpatā* in the context of *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* (perception as a means of valid cognition) There after it is mentioned in the epistemology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools as well. Jaina thinkers consider it as a characteristic of *darśana* or *darśanopayoga* which occurs before determinate knowledge i.e. *jñānopayoga* and they do not accept it as a *pramāṇa*. In the *Yogasūtra* the term *nirvikalpatā* can be regarded as being a characteristic of *nirvitarka* and *nirvicāra samādhi* (see *Yogasūtra* 1.43-44). In this way *nirvikalpatā* has been discussed widely in the Indian tradition.

Dignāga's contribution.

In the field of Indian logic and epistemology, the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (470-530 CE), the pioneer stalwart and founder of Buddhist logic, is considered to be the thinker who introduced the concept of *nirvikalpatā* as an essential property of perception. He propounds two types of valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) namely perception and inference and two types of their respective objects as unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and general character (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). In his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* he defines perception as a means of valid cognition which is devoid of verbal designation (*Kalpanāpohatā*).¹ Dignāga defines *kalpanā* as a construction or an arrangement of name (*nāma*) genus (*jāti*), quality (*guṇa*), function (*kriyā*) and

¹ *Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyadi samyutam. -Pramāṇasamuccaya*, 1.3

appurtenances (*dravya*) to the direct cognition.² For example, if we perceive a thing with our eyes, without any name etc., then it comes in the category of perception, and if we give it a name, then that is a *kalpanā* or a construction of verbal designation. Naming a perceived thing is not a part of perception. It is a result of our previous experience and a retention or memory of it.

Dignāga mentions examples of *kalpanā* as follows-
 “*namnā viśito'rtha ucyate diṭṭha iti. jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaurīti guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti, kriyā śabdeṣu kriyāyā pācaka iti, dravya- sabdeṣu dravyeṇa danḍi viṣāṇīti.*”³ 'this is *diṭṭha* is *nāma Kalpanā*, this is a patch of white colour is *guṇa kalpanā*, this is a cow is *jāti kalpanā*, this is a cook is *kriyā kalpanā*, this is a staff bearer is *dravya kalpanā*. All these are the examples of verbal designation to the cognition of an object. It is not the characteristic of perception. Stcherbatsky in his Buddhist Logic says :-

This can be called the epistemological form of judgment and every judgment reduces to this form, since it is a known fact, admitted now in European Logic, that in every real judgment a reference to some reality is always understood, cp. Sigwart Logik3, p.67. It can be also viewed as construction, a division, a bifurcation, an imagination (*vikalpa*) etc., since every such judgment suggests in its predicate a division of the whole into the predicate and its counterpart, e.g. blue and not-blue, cow and not-cow etc. Cp. about *vikalpa Mādhy. vṛtti*, p. 350.12” (vol.2, p.21 fn.)

² *Atha keyaṃ kalpanā. nāma jātyādiyojanā.* Dignāga's *vṛtti* before 1.3

³ Dignāga's *vṛtti* to 1.3, Dignāga, on Perception, p.12

An object of perception in Buddhism is a unique particular or thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*). The unique particular is momentary and it does not proceed to a different place nor exists in another moment, nor it is in fact expressible by words. It is the real entity i.e. *paramārtha-sat*.

The concept of *nirvikalpatā* as an essential property of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* is a brilliant contribution of Dignāga to Indian philosophy. He might have developed the notion on the basis of the old texts of Buddhism. Two statements to this effect are found in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: (1) *cakṣurvijñāna-samaṅgī nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlamīti*. (2) *arthe'arthasamjñī natvarthe dharmasañjīti*.⁴ These two statements reflect that when a person cognizes *nīlārha* (blue matter) with his eyes and does not think that 'it is *nīla*', then it is devoid of mental construction or *kalpanā*, but knowledge in the form 'it is *nīla*' is considered to be a *kalpanā*. When a real thing is known without any attribute and verbal designation, then it is considered as *nirvikalpatā*.

Influence on Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

The Mīmāṃsaka philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (6th-7th century) entering in the field of dialogue, has refuted various notions of Dignāga, but he accepts two types of perception as *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. While accepting the concept of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, he seems influenced by Dignāga. He defines *nirvikalpatā* in the following words-

⁴Hattori, Dignāga, on perception, *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, Da, a-2, *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, p.64,22-23; *Dvādaśāraṇa Nayacakram*, vol.I, pp. 60-61

*asti hyālocanājñānaṃ prathamam nirvikalpakaṃ ।
bālamūkādi vijñānasadrśaṃ śuddha-vastujaṃ ॥*

-Ślokavārtika, pratyakṣa sūtra, 112

He says that after a sense-object contact, first of all indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) perception is experienced which is bare perception, similar to the perception of a baby and a dumb person. This is the perception produced by the object and it is devoid of verbal designation. This definition of *nirvikalpatā* has affinity with that of Dignāga.

Kumārila explains the adjective *śuddha-vastujaṃ* as follows:-

*na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīm anubhūyate. ।
tayoṛ ādhārabhūtā tu, vyaktir evāvasīyate. ॥*

-Ślokavārtika, pratyakṣa sūtra, 113

“The cognition per se that arises through the object can not differentiate and generalise that particular object. There is a mere cognition of an object, of something, which then becomes the basis of generality and particularity.”

In his critique of Indian realism D.N. Shastri 1976 (P 437-438) says that a clear-cut distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perception was introduced for the first time in Indian philosophy by Dignāga. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa seems to have been influenced by Dignāga when he defines *nirvikalpaka* as *śuddhavastujaṃ*. (produced from pure form of reality)

In Kumārila's view, after an indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka*), a determinate perception also occurs which is also a valid cognition. Here it is to be noted that according to Dignāga determinate perception is not a

valid cognition, Where as according to Kumārila determinate perception is also a valid perception.

Dharmakīrti's view

Dharmakīrti (620-690 CE), a profound commentator of Dignāga, is of view that sometimes a direct perception (*nirvikalpaka*) might be illusive due to disease or deformation in the sense organs, hence a perception must be devoid both of construction and of illusion.⁵ He goes a step further and defines *kalpanā* as- “*abhilāpasamsargayogyā- pratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā* (*Nyāyabindu* 1.5)

Stcherbatsky explains this aphorism of *Nyāyabindu* as “construction (or *judgment*) implies a distinct cognition (*Pratīti*) of a mental reflex (*pratibhāsa*) which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation.” (*Buddhist Logic, vol II, p.19*)

Dharmottara (700CE), a commentator of Dharmakīrti explains the statement : -

“*abhilapyate aneneti abhilāpaḥ vācakaḥ śabdaḥ, abhilāpena samsargaḥ ekasmin jñāne abhidheyākārasy abhidhānānākāreṇa saha grāhayākāratayā milanam. tato yadaikasmin jñāne abhidheyābhidhānākārau sanniviṣṭau bhavatas tadā samsrṣṭe abhidhanābhidheye bhavataḥ.*

Stcherbatsky translates explanation of Dharmottara in this way.

⁵ *Tatra Kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntaḥ. pratyakṣam- Nyāyabindu, 1.4 ; (2) Avikalpakam ekaḥ ca pratyakṣābham. - Pramāṇavārtika, 2.288*

“A verbal designation is a word of speech through which something is denoted. To coalesce with a word means (such a condition when) the denoted aspect of the object and its verbal aspect are mixed up in its apprehended aspect. Thus, when denoted fact and the word denoting it have entered in to one act of cognition, then the word and object have coalesced.” (Buddhist Logic, vol II, p.19)

Dharmottara's view

Dharmottara explains the importance of the word ‘*abhilāpa-sāṃsarga-yogya*’ and says that there are two types of cognition : (1) one is associated with a word, as in the case of *ghaṭa-jñāna* (knowledge of a pot) of a person having conventional knowledge of *ghaṭa* (pot), (2) another cognition which is not yet associated with a word, but seems capable of being associated with it, as in the case of a baby, who is unaware of conventional knowledge. Both of these cognitions come under the category of *kalpanā*⁶. Here the word ‘*yogya*’ (capable) includes the second category of a cognition above which forms the definition of *kalpanā*. Although a new-born baby has no verbal association with a cognition of mother's breast, but if capable of giving a name to that, then that also may be considered as *kalpanā*.

Here a question arises : how is the capability for verbal designation is decided? Dharmottara answers this question by saying that the verbal designation is not produced by the object actually apprehended and, therefore, it is not a restricted mental reflex, since the factor corresponding to it does not exist; it is created by the

⁶*Nyāyabindutīkā*, p.44

synthesis of productive imagination.⁷ According to Buddhist logic the perceived object is the real cause of restricted mental reflex (*niyata pratibhāsa*) but verbal designation or the capability of it is not caused by object and so it can not be a restricted mental reflex.

Dharmottara explains that *vikalpa* does not require an object for its manifestation.⁸ If a *vikalpa* arises after a *nirvikalpakā* cognition due to recalling a previously cognised object, then also it is *aniyata pratibhāsa*. *Niyata pratibhāsa* is the deciding factor of *nirvikalpatā* according to Dharmottara, and that occurs in the presence of an object only.

The definition of *kalpanā* as given by Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara refutes the definition of *nirvikalpatā* given by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. In his *Ślokavārtika* Kumārila considers the cognition of a baby and dumb person as belonging to the category of *nirvikalpatā*, but Dharmakīrti says that a cognition of a baby and a dumb person would come under the category of *kalpanā*, if that cognition would have the capability of coalescing with a verbal designation.⁹

Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara prove the fact that concept of *nirvikalpatā* as an essential property of perception is found not only in *indriya pratyakṣa*, but also in the other kinds of perception as in *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, *svasaṃvedana* and *yogi-pratyakṣa*. Dharmottara says

⁷ *Asaty-abhilāpa-saṃsarge kuto yogyatāvasitir iti cet, Aniyatapratibhasatvāt.- Nyāyabindutīkā* 1.5, p.45

⁸ *Arthasannidhi-nirapekṣatvāt.- Nyāyabindu tīkā*, 1.5, p. 46

⁹ See, *Nyāyabindutīkā*, 1.5, pp. 44-46

regarding *yogī-pratyakṣa* that it is *nirvikalpaka* because of its vividness (*sphutābhatā*)¹⁰ Dharmakīrti also thought : - *na vikalpānubaddhasyāsti sphutārthāvabhāsītā* (*Pramāṇāvārtika*, 2.283). If we add nothing to pure knowledge, then it is called *nirvikalpakatā*. In the case of perception through the ears (*Śrotra vijñāna*), if a conventional meaning is not understood, then that perception can also be *nirvikalpaka*. Prajñākaragupta (8th century) defines *kalpanā* in a different way :

“*viśeṣaṇādi-sambandha-vastu pratibhāsā-pratītiḥ kalpanā* (*Pramāṇavārtikabhāṣya*, p. 245)

“If an object is known with its attributes or quality then that cognition is called *kalpanā*. ”

This definition has been adopted by the Navya Naiyākas when they say :- *saprakāraṇaṁ jñānaṁ savikalpakaṁ* or in other words when they say *vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi jñānaṁ savikalpakaṁ*.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

The Buddhist logicians Śāntarakṣita (705-764 CE) and Kamalaśīla (8th century) supported the views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Śāntarakṣita defines *kalpanā* as- *abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā* (*Tattvasaṃgraha*, 1213)

This definition includes the ones given by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The Word *abhilāpinī* includes verbal association and the mental reflex having capability for verbal designation.¹¹

¹⁰ *Sphutābhatvādeva ca nirvikalpakaṁ* - *Nyāyabindutīkā*, 1.11, p. 66

¹¹ *Sabdārtha-ghaṭanā योग्या वृक्षा इत्यदिरूपताह ।
या वācām aprayogepi sābhilāpeva jāyate.* - *Tattvasaṃgraha*, 1214

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla suggested a modification in the definition of *kalpanā* given by Dignāga. Kamalaśīla says :- *tatra heyā jatyadiyojanā paraprasiḍdhā kalpanā*. (*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, 1220, p- 451). He accepts that all verbal associations are included in *śabdayojanā*, hence there is no need to accept *jātyādiyojanā* which is accepted by other philosophers. He stresses the word ‘ucyate’ when he says- *śabdayojanayā sarvā yojanā vyāpta* (*Tattva saṃgrahapañjikā*, p. 455)

***Nirvikalpatā* in Nyāya - Vaiśeṣika School**

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school has also discussed the concept of *nirvikalpatā* on the basis of word ‘avyapadeśya (unnamable) used in the definition of perception given by Gotama (150 CE) in the *Nyāyasūtra*.¹² Vācaspati Miśra (9th century) and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th Century) have developed the notion of *nirvikalpatā* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Vācaspati Miśra propounds two types of perception as indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*) on the basis of the words ‘avyapadeśya’ and ‘vyavasāyātmaka’ used in the *Nyāyasūtra* by Gotama. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is also of this view. They consider *nirvikalpaka* perception to be without a verbal element and so have an affinity with Kumārila.

In the Vaiśeṣika school Praśastapāda, prior to Dignāga uses the term ‘*Svarūpālocana-mātra*’¹³ which means a mere apprehension of a reality is a perception, but

¹² *Artha-sannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam-Nyāyasūtra*, 1.4

¹³ *Praśastapādabhaṣyam*, p.443

the development of this concept into *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perception was made by the commentators of Prāśastapādabhāṣya. Śrīdhara in his *Nyāyakandalī* says that in indeterminate perception, particular and universal *dharma*s are not apprehended, while in determinate perception these *dharma*s are apprehended.¹⁴ This view has an affinity with the theory of Dignāga, and also with that of Kumābila. Udayana (10th century) says in his *Kiranāvalī* that only the individual or the substratum of universal is apprehended at the *nirvikalpaka* stage. Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* has made a clear distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perception. According to him, *savikalpaka* perception is differentiated and qualified knowledge (*saprakāraḥ jñānam*) and *nirvikalpaka* perception, on the other hand, is devoid of the relation between a substance and its attribute.¹⁵

Jaina View

Jaina philosophers accept *nirvikalpaka* cognition in the form of *darśana*, but they do not consider it as *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*. They have refuted the validity of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, because it is not useful in daily life (*vyavahāra*). Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Anantavīrya, Abhayadeva, Prabhacandra, Hemacandra did not accept the validity of *nirvikalpaka* perception for practical life or empirical behavior, because a determinate or *savikalpaka* knowledge would be a means to decide what is acceptable,

¹⁴Ibid. p. 446-447

¹⁵*Tatra nāma jaty-ādiyojanā-rahitam vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi niṣprakāraḥ nirvikalpakaḥ. -Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 809

not acceptable and what are the objects which should be disregarded.¹⁶

Here it is to be noted that Buddhist philosophers were also aware of this fact, hence, Śantarakṣita in *Tattvasaṃgrah* says :

*avikalpakamapi jñānaṃ vikalpotpattiśaktimatī
niśśeṣa-vyavahārāṅgaṃ taddvāreṇa bhavatyataḥ. ||*

- *Tattvasaṃgraha*, 1305

Nirvikalpaka perception can produce a *vikalpa*, and that *vikalpa* becomes a part of every *vyavahāra*. Kamalaśīla explains that the perception has a capacity to produce a determinate knowledge and that is considered as practicable in our life.

Nirvikalpatā in *Samādhi*

Before Dignāga, Patañjali had defined *samādhi* as “*tadevārtha-mātra-nir-bhāsaṃ svarūpa-śūnyam iva samādhi (Yogasūtra, 3.3)*. Only a reality is apprehended in *samādhi* without any verbal designation or a bifurcation of the object and the meditator. Vacaspati Miśra in his commentary *Tattva-vaiśāradī* has clearly mentioned that apprehension of pure form of reality is devoid of *kalpanā*.¹⁷

Conclusion

It is clear that concept of *nirvikalpatā* is well defined in the Indian tradition and it can also be announced loudly that Buddhist logicians with their philosophical acumen have contributed significantly in defining perception very

¹⁶ See e.g. Vālidevasūri : *abhimatānabhimata-vastu-svīkāra-tiraskāra-kṣamaṃ hi pramāṇaṃ ato jñānaṃ eva tat. -Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*, 1.3

¹⁷ *Tattva-vaiśāradī* on *Yogasūtra*, 2.3

minutely. Deliberations held with Buddhist logicians by other systems created a path to the development of this concept, as with many other philosophical tenets in the panorama of Indian Philosophy.

By establishing the concept of *nirvikalpatā* Buddhist logicians inspired other philosophers to think about and accept the notion in their philosophical deliberations. The Mīmāṃsaka and Nyāya-Vaiśiṣika philosophers were obviously influenced by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but Jaina philosophers do not seem to have been influenced in any significant respect, most probably because of their notion of *darśana* which is defined as *nirākāra* and *nirvikalpaka*.¹⁸ Although the seeds of the notion of *nirvikalpatā* were available in the *Yogasūtra*, Jaina canons, *Nyāyasūtra* and *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, the evolution making a clear-cut distinction between determinate and indeterminate knowledge was pioneered by Buddhist logicians.

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¹⁸ *Goyamā! Sāgare se ṇaṇe bhavai, anāgāre se damsane bhavai.* (*pañṇavana*, chapter 30, *Dravyānuyoga*, vol.I, p. 568).

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Naya, Nayābhāsa and Nikṣepa

Anekāntavāda, Syādvāda and Nayavāda

Nayavāda is an epistemological tenet, *Anekāntavāda* is a metaphysical theory and *Syādvāda* is a method of faultless statements. According to Jainism real entity is multi-faceted. It has multi-characteristics. Modes of a real entity are infinite. To accept a real entity with multi-faceted characteristic attributes and modes is called '*anekāntavāda*'. A real entity having two or more attributes is called as *anekadharmātmaka* (multi-faceted or multi-attributed) substance.

In Jainism, a real entity *sat* is defined as - "Which bears origination (*utpāda*) cessation (*vyaya*) and persistence (*dhrauvya*) is a real entity (*sat*)¹." In a real entity these three characteristics are found simultaneously - a new mode is originated, present mode becomes past and the substance remains persistent (*dhruva*). Origination and cessation of modes approve non-eternity and persistence shows eternity of that reality. This characteristic of reality (*sat*) is also mentioned as a nature of substance-cum-mode. Substance is eternal and modes are non-eternal or impermanent. Hence, *sat* is eternal-cum-non-eternal. Substance is considered as generic and modes are considered as particular, hence a reality can be mentioned as generic-cum-particular.

Knowing of a reality needs the different standpoints and those standpoints are called '*naya*' in Jainism. From the

¹*utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvyayuktaṃ sat. - Tattvārthasūtra 5.29*

standpoint of substance a reality is persistent and from the view-point of modes that reality is changing or non-eternal. In this way in the process of knowing and also in describing a reality view points (*nayas*) are needed. These view-points have importance in proper understanding and describing the truth.

Syādvāda is an indefective method of describing or mentioning the truth using word 'syāt' or 'syād'. Here 'syat' word is an indeclinable which denotes a meaning of a certain view-point. In this way a statement using word 'syāt' is a statement in some perspective. In the Jaina canon *Vyākhyāprajñapti Sūtra* Lord Mahavīra has used this word often in answering with different view points of substance (*dravya*), space (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and modes (*bhāva*). Hence it can be said that *syādvāda* is a theory of explaining the reality in an indefective way. If 'syat' word is not used in a sentence then it may be defective in a sense to deny the existing other facts, but word 'syāt' keeps other facts in a view neglected or latent at that moment.

Syādvāda, *anekāntavāda* and *nayavāda* are mutually interlinked. *Anekāntavāda* is understandable through *nayavāda* and expressed through *syādvāda*. Expressing power is in *syādvāda* which also expects *nayavāda* for its proper expression. *Nayavāda* has two aspects- 1. Knowing and 2. Expression. What is the intention of a speaker is *naya* and what is intended by a knower is also *naya*. *Nayas* are also expressed using word 'syat'. Hence 'syādvāda' is used in expression of *nayas* also. Thus 'syat' word is a relative term which depicts a certain viewpoint.

Pramāṇa and Naya:

The concept of *naya* is as important as the concept of *pramāṇa* in Jainism. Both of these are the means of knowledge. As Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* clearly mentions “Valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the standpoints (*naya*) are the instruments for understanding the real elements.”² Thus *naya* is also a means to know the reality. Generally *naya* is understood as a part of *pramāṇa* and related to verbal testimony (*āgamapramāṇa*) as Vāḍidevasūri defines *naya*:- “After knowing a reality with *śrutajñāna*, a characteristic or a mode of that reality is known by a knower becoming indifferent to other characteristics and modes of that reality is called *naya*”³. Hence

(i) *naya* is a part of *pramāṇa* due to knowing point of view.

(ii) *naya* is a kind of *śrutajñāna*.

(iii) a characteristic or a mode is known with a *naya* of a reality. Somewhere more characteristics and modes are also known with a particular view point (*naya*).

Naya is a part of *pramāṇa* as- Puṣyapāda Devanandī quotes in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*, “*Naya* is that which grasps a part of the content comprehended by *Pramāṇa*.”⁴ When *pramāṇa* is contrasted with *naya*, then ‘*pramāṇa*’ means complete knowledge or holistic knowledge and *naya* means partial knowledge. *Naya* is not a false cognition or erroneous cognition. So it is said that *naya* is neither *pramāṇa* (which

²*Tattvārthasūtra* 1.6: *Pramāṇa-nayairadhigamaḥ*.

³*Nīyate yena śrutākhyapramāṇa-viśyīkṛtasyāṁśastaditarāṁśaudāsīnyantaḥ sa pratipatturabhiprāya-viśeṣo nayaḥ*. - *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, 7.1

⁴*Śarvārthasiddhi* on 1.6 p.24: *Sakalādeśaḥ pramāṇādhiṇo vikalādeśo nayādhiṇaḥ*.

means complete knowledge) nor *apramāṇa* (which means erroneous or false cognition), but it is *pramāṇāmśa* (partial knowledge). Yaśovijaya says “A part of an ocean is neither an ocean, nor not-ocean, similarly a *naya* is neither *pramāṇa* nor *apramāṇa*”.⁵ Being partial knowledge, *naya* represents a particular stand-point or a particular perspective through which one understands an object. While doing so it does not deny that there are other stand-points or other perspectives. *Naya* and *pramāṇa* are different because of their objects. An object of *pramāṇa* is *anekānta* and the object of *naya* is *ekānta*.⁶ Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka has propounded that right *anekānta* is *pramāṇa* and right *ekānta* is *naya*.⁷

Definition of *naya*

The definition of *naya* as given by Prabhācandra explains its nature:

“*Naya* is the intention of the knower which cognises a part of the reality without negating the contrary view-points.”⁸

In another words “A *naya* can be defined as a particular opinion or viewpoint which does not rule out other different view points and is thereby, expressive of a partial truth about an object.” (Padmarajiah, 1963:310)

⁵(i) *Yathāhi samudraikadeśo na samudro nāpyasamudrastathā nayā api na pramāṇam, na vā apramāṇamiti. Jainatarkabhāṣā, nayaparicheḍa,*

(ii) *nāpramāṇam vā, nayo jñānātmako mataḥ. syātpramāṇaikadeśastu sarvāthāpyavirodhataḥ - Tattvārthaślokaṇṭikā, nayavivaraṇa, verse 16*

⁶*Kim ca na pramāṇam nayāḥ, tasyānekānta viśayatvāt. na nayāḥ pramāṇam tasyaikāntaviśayatvāt - Virasena, Dhavalā commentary, Jainendra siddhānta kośa, Vol. 2, p.516*

⁷*Tattvārthavārtika, 1.6 : Samyagekānto naya ityucyate. samyaganekāntaḥ pramāṇam.*

⁸*“anirakṛtapratipakṣo, vastvaṁśagrāhi jñāturabhiprāyo nayāḥ.” -*

Prameyakaṁalamārtaṇḍa, Vol.3 p.657

Yaśovijaya says in *Jainatarkabhāṣā*:

“*Nayas* are the specific determinate cognitions which grasp a single aspect of the reality, without denying other aspects, the reality consisting of infinite characteristics which is known through *pramaṇa*.”⁹

Naya expresses a particular partial or relative standpoint and does not deny others. But it does not recognise other standpoints either. It is said to be indifferent (*udāsīna*) about other standpoints.¹⁰ This is how it can be distinguished from *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* recognises the existence of many standpoints from which a thing having infinite characteristics can be understood. When for example one who has understood the nature of soul in its totality says “From a view point soul is eternal”, (“*Syāt jivaḥ nityaḥ*”), he is not only expressing a standpoint, namely substantial standpoint from which soul is permanent, but also indicating that it is not the only standpoint, but there are other standpoints from which soul is non-eternal and so on.

In fact three ways of approaching the reality are available to us. One has a holistic and non-absolutist approach in which one expresses a standpoint while acknowledging the existence of other standpoints. Second one expresses a standpoint without denying other standpoints but by being indifferent to them. Third one has an absolutist approach in which he expresses a standpoint as if it is the only correct standpoint and others are wrong. The first approach can be called *pramāṇa* which is

⁹“*pramāṇapariicchannasya anantādharmātmakasya vastuna ekadeśagrāhiṇaḥ taditarāmiśa- pratikṣepiṇo'dhyavasāyaviśeṣā nayāḥ*”-*Jaina Tarka Bhāṣā*, *Nayaparicheda*

¹⁰“...itaramiśaudāsīnyataḥ....”, *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka*, 7.1

expressed through *syādvāda*, the second one can be called the approach of *naya*. The third approach is called a *bad naya* or pseudo-*naya* (*durnaya* or *nayābhāsa*). Hemacandra in *Anyayogavyavacchedadvātriṃśikā* expresses the three approaches lucidly as:

“A thing is cognized in three ways: through a perverse view-point (*durnaya*) as “It is real only”, through a partial view-point (*naya*) as “It is real” and through right knowledge (*pramāṇa*) as “In a way, it is real”.¹¹

Classifications of *Naya*

As we have seen above, *naya* is regarded as a part of *śrutajñāna*. Hence *naya* is not only a way of knowing, it is also a way of describing. Siddhasena-Divākara says: “There are as many view-points (*nayas*) as there are ways of speaking.”¹²

Since things have innumerable characteristics, there can be innumerable view-points and consequently innumerable descriptions of things. However the Jaina texts classify *nayas* in different ways. One broad classification is into *dravyārthikanaya* and *paryāyārthikanaya*. *Dravyārthikanayas* are those which focus on enduring characteristics of objects; and *paryāyārthikanayas* are those which focus on the changing characteristics of objects. This gives us a notion of reality as a synthesis of permanent and impermanent characteristics. In fact the reality according to Jainas is the synthesis of many binaries - one and many, identity and difference, particular and universal,

¹¹ “sadeva, sat, syāt saditi tridhārtho, mīyeta durnītinayapramāṇaiḥ /
yathārthadarśi tu nayapramāṇapathena durnītipatham tvamāsthah//
”Anyayogavyavaccheda-dvātriṃśikā, verse. 28

¹² Jāvaīyāvayanapahā tāvaīyā ceva hunti nayavāyāl, Sanmatitarka, 3.47

permanence and impermanence. Out of the two poles of a binary, a *naya* focuses on one of the two poles and neglects the other.

The seven-fold classification of *nayas* is most commonly accepted in different texts. *Anuyogadvāra* clearly mentions seven *nayas*: *naigama*, *saṅgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta*.¹³ In Śvetāmbara version of *Tattvārthasūtra* (1.34) only first five are counted as the kinds of *naya*. But then *śabdanaya* is subdivided into three kinds: *śabda*, *samabhirūḍha* and *evambhūta*. The reading of *Tattvārthasūtra* accepted in Digambara tradition mentions all the seven *nayas*.¹⁴ Siddhasenasūri in *Sanmatitarka* (1.4-25) mentions six *nayas* excluding *naigamanaya*. He subdivides *naigama* into two kinds: universalistic and particularistic. He reduces the former to *saṅgrahanaya* and the latter to *vyavahāranaya*. A fifth century Jaina thinker Mallavādī Kṣmāśramaṇa wrote *Dvādaśāranayacakra* in which he introduced the wheel of twelve *nayas*. He explains this twelve-fold classification in terms of the two-fold classification into *dravya* and *paryāya* and also the well-known sevenfold classification.

The other broad classification is *arthanaya* and *śabdanaya*. *Arthanaya* is about the thing's own characteristics. *śabdanaya* is about the characteristics caused by the association of the thing with language. Through the broad category of *śabdanaya* Jains indicate the fact that many a time our

¹³*Satta mūlanayā paṇṇattā, tamjahā - negame, saṅgahe, vavahāre, ujjusue, sadde, samabhirūḍhe evambhūte. - Anuyogadvārasūtra, sūtra 606*

¹⁴*Naigama-saṅgraha - vyavahārarjusūtra - śabda - samabhirūḍhaivambhūtā nayāḥ Sarvārthasiddhi, 1.33*

understanding of things is coloured by the linguistic categories imposed on them.

Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra introduces another classification namely *niścaya-naya* (true view-point) and *vyavahāra-naya* (conventional view-point).¹⁵ Kundakunda used this classification in his theorisation of spiritual view point as *niścaya naya* and empirical view point as *vyavahāra naya*. This classification is comparable to the Buddhist classification of truths between *paramārthasat* and *lokasaṃvṛti-sat* and the Vedānta classification between *pāramārthika-sattā* and *vyāvahārika-sattā*.

Sevenfold Classification:

Sevenfold classification is quite old in Jaina literature, as it is found in the *Anuyogadvāra sūtra*. Among these seven *nayas* *naigama*, *saṅgraha* and *vyavahāra nayas* are the expansion of *dravyārthika naya* and the rest four *nayas* - *rjusūtra*, *śabda*, *sambhirāḍha* and *evambhuta nayas* are the part of *paryāyārthikanaya*. Here a brief introduction to the seven *nayas* is presented:-

i)Naigamanaya (Goal-oriented viewpoint or pluralistic view-point): The term *naigama* is derived in two ways and accordingly *naigama-naya* is interpreted in two ways.(1) *naigama* is derived from *nigama* which means intention (*saṅkalpa*) for achieving an aim or goal. When someone is performing an action with some aim or goal, the action can be described as actualisation of that goal. For example a person is going to jungle with an axe in hand in order to cut wood and

¹⁵See, *Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra*, śataka 18, uddeśaka 6

produce a wooden measuring pot called *prasthaka*. When asked what he is doing, he may simply answer, “I am making a *prasthaka*.” This answer shows an intention of that person.¹⁶ When a student intends to go to college and at the time of wearing clothes his father asks him - ‘What are you doing?’ He answers - “I am going to college.” The student’s goal is to go to college and wearing clothes is a part of that goal, hence student’s statement is right according to *naigamanaya*. (2) The term *naigama* is derived as “*naika-gamo* (not one understanding) *naigamaḥ*.” Accordingly *Naigama* means considering a thing in plural or diverse ways. *Naigama* involves focusing on different general and specific characteristics of things by treating one of the characteristics as main and the other as subordinate.

ii) Saṅgrahanaya (Collective view-point): When something is described in terms of its general characteristic shared by other things, having a collective view-point is called *saṅgrahanaya*. It is concerned with the general or common attributes of a class or group of identical objects. For example word ‘*dravya*’ includes all six categories of *dravya* in it with *saṅgraha naya*. *Saṅgrahanaya* is of two kinds: *parasāṅgraha* (comprehensively collective view-point) and *aparasaṅgraha*, (Non-comprehensively collective view-point) Comprehensively collective view-point says that all the things in the world share a common characteristic namely that they are real. Non-comprehensively collective view-point describes things in terms of lower universals such as substance-ness, quality-ness etc.

¹⁶The example of *prasthaka* is found in *Anuyogadvārasūtra*. On the basis of this example ĀcāryaPūjyapāda gives this interpretation of *Naigamanaya* in his *Sarvārthasiddhi*, 1.33, p.100 : *anabhinirvṛttārtha - saṅkalpamātragrāhī- naigamaḥ*.

iii) Vyavahāranaya (Particularist or differential view-point):

Whereas *saṅgrahanaya* emphasises unity and commonness, *vyavahāranaya* is the view-point which emphasises particularity and diversity. It cognises things as having many kinds. For example when it talks about a soul, it immediately classifies souls into liberated ones and transmigrating ones. The transmigrating souls are again classified into mobile (*trasa*) and immobile (*sthāvara*) ones, or those into one-sensed, two-sensed etc. up to five-sensed and also mind possessing souls and so on.

iv) Rjusūtranaya (Immediate view-point): *Rjusūtranaya* focuses on an immediate present mode of object. It ignores enduring or substantial aspects of things and concentrates on their momentary and immediately available aspects. Under this *naya* we do not consider, though we do not deny that the same object had some modes in the past and would have some modes in future. We may describe such an object by using the expressions as 'this is red' or 'here now yellow' or 'here is now the feeling of pleasure'¹⁷.

v) Śabdanaya (Syntactical view-point): One who is using *śabdanaya* is focusing on the influence of the grammatical form of words on the meaning of the description. Tense of the sentence, the case-endings of the words, the genders of the nouns, singularity or plurality and suffixes of the word-forms are the factors which are responsible for the difference in meaning of a sentence. One who is applying *śabdanaya* emphasises these factors for example "Rāma was a king of *Ayodhyā*" this sentence gives its meaning that Ram was a king in the past, not in the present. This reflects '*śabdanaya*'.

¹⁷"*sukhavivartaḥ sampratyaṣṭi*", *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka*, 7.29

vi) **Samabhirūḍhanaya (Etymological view-point):** One who is using *samabhirūḍhanaya* emphasises that the meaning or the shade of the meaning of a word changes according to the etymology of the word. For instance the three Sanskrit synonyms *Indra*, *Sakra* and *Purandara* denote the same mythological person namely the king of gods. But the connotations of these words change according to their etymologies. So 'Indra'¹⁸ means prosperous, 'Śakra'¹⁹ means powerful and 'Purandara'²⁰ means destroyer of the cities. Still use of these words for the same person can be regarded as a case of *samabhirūḍhanaya*.

vii) **Evambhūtanaya (Functionalist view-point):** *Evambhūta* literally means “(which) exists in this way”. According to this view-point a word is applied to a thing when the thing is performing the function indicated by the word. This view-point is also concerned with etymology, but here the focus is on whether the present function of the object tallies with the etymology of the word used for referring to it. For example one may prefer to call a person a lecturer only at the time when he or she is lecturing.

Expansion of *Naya* theory in daily life

In the beginning *naya* theory was limited to grasp the suitable meaning of canonical sentences. Hence, it was put in the category of *śrutajñāna* or *śrutapramāṇa*. Later on, its sphere developed to understand the real meaning of sentences spoken by a scholar and a layman. *Nayas* are very much helpful in understanding the reality consisting of multi attributes

¹⁸Derived from the root \sqrt{ind} = to prosper

¹⁹Derived from the root $\sqrt{śak}$ = to be able to

²⁰Derived from the *pur* (= city) + root \sqrt{dr} (= to destroy)

(*aneka-dharmātmaka vastu*). It is very much useful to understand the truth with various aspects. *Nayas* are used in daily life now in understanding the others' views and expressing our own views. Theory of *naya* is helpful in synthesizing the philosophical ideas applying view points in them. This theory is also a solution to the problems of obstination and harshness in behaviour. It develops an art of speaking with avoiding confrontations and also understanding the things in a way to solve the problems which generate confrontations. Hence *naya* theory is very much useful in our daily life.

The doctrine of *Nayābhāsa*:

When a view point excludes and rules out another view points, then it is called as '*nayābhāsa*'. *Nayābhāsa* can be defined as absolutistic fallacy which consists in treating a relative truth as absolute truth. Since different philosophical systems understand and describe reality in different ways, different *nayas* can be correlated to different philosophical systems. The doctrine of *naya* in this way is a meta-philosophical doctrine. In the history of Jainism Siddhasenasūri (5th century) compared Indian philosophical systems with *nayas*. Afterwards Akalaṅkabhāṭṭa (8th century) described those systems as the cases of *nayābhāsa*. The idea was that though different systems of philosophy understand and describe reality from a partial view-point, they regard their understanding and description as absolute and complete truth. As a result their view-point becomes a pseudo-view-point (*nayābhāsa*) or a defective view-point (*durnaya*). Vāḍidevasūri (12th century) has given examples of different doctrines of various Indian philosophies as *nayābhāsa*, due to their

absolutistic view. Malliṣeṇasuri (15th century) clearly categorises the Indian philosophies in different *nayābhāsas*. *Upādhyāya*, *Yaśovijaya* (17th century) has supported him. Which Indian system comes under the category of which *nayābhāsa* is shown below:

<i>Nayābhāsa</i>	Philosophical system
<i>Naigamābhāsa</i>	Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
<i>Para-saṅgrahābhāsa</i>	Advaita-Vedānta
<i>Apara-saṅgrahābhāsa</i>	Sāṅkhya
<i>Vyavahārābhāsa</i>	Cārvāka
<i>Ṛjusūtrabhāsa</i>	Buddhism
<i>Śabdanayābhāsa</i>	Vyākaraṇa
<i>Samabhirūdhābhāsa</i>	Vyākaraṇa
<i>Evambhūtābhāsa</i>	Vyākaraṇa

This classification of *nayābhāsa* was discussed by Malliṣeṇasūri in his *syādvādamāñjarī*²¹ and by Yaśovijaya in his *Adhyātmasāra*.²²

Explanation Regarding *Nayābhāsas*:

In our language there are different words for substances, qualities, motions and relations. *Naigamanaya* consists in describing them as different. But Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika accept different categories (*padārthas*) as absolutely distinct from each other like substance, quality, action, universal etc. Hence the Jainas accuse the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas for committing the fallacy called *naigamābhāsa* (Pseudo-pluralistic view).

Corresponding to each type of *saṅgrahanaya*, Jainas conceived of the corresponding *saṅgrahabhāsa*. For example

²¹Syādvādamāñjarī, p.248

²²Adhyātmasāra, verse 879.

Parasangraha consists in understanding and describing everything as real. But Jainas observed that Advaita-Vedāntin treats this understanding and description as absolute and says that everything is real and real alone, and all the other properties are delusory. This comprehensive reductionism of Vedāntins amounts to the fallacy called *parasangrahābhāsa* (Pseudo-comprehensively-collective view). On the other hand, Jainas observed, Sāṃkhyas do not reduce everything to 'real', but they divide the world to two basic categories, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* and describe all objects of the world as manifestations of *prakṛti*. This non-comprehensive reductionism of Sāṃkhyas can be called *apara-sangrahābhāsa*.

Generally Cārvākas are accused of committing *vyavahārābhāsa*. But the reason is not clear. A possible reason is that whereas Cārvākas accept empirical reality (*Vyāvahārika-sattā*) they do not accept the so-called ultimate reality (*Pāramārthika-sattā*) beyond that. This is an absolutist or exclusivist approach to *vyavahāra* which Jainas seem to be interpreting as the fallacious view-point called *vyavahārābhāsa* (Pseudo-empirical view-point). In fact Jainas interpret *vyavahāranaya* as particularist view-point. In that case treating particularity as absolutely real and universal features as unreal will be the pseudo-particularist view-point which can be called *vyavahārābhāsa*. Jainas could have attributed it to the Buddhists who accept only unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) as real and universals (*sāmānya*) as unreal.

The Jainas claim that the Buddhists treat this immediate view-point as absolute. They regard only immediate *momentary experiences as real and others as illusory. Therefore*

Buddhism according to them exemplifies the fallacious view-point called *ṛjusūtrābhāsa*.

Śabdanaya emphasises the role of words in determining the nature of reality. Vyākaraṇa school overemphasizes this role and gives the word the status of *Brahman*. Jains call this absolutist approach to word as *Śabdanayābhāsa* (Pseudo-syntactical view-point).

If we consider *śabdanaya* as a broad category, then *samabhirūḍhanaya* and *evambhūtanaya* can be taken to be the special cases of *Śabdanaya*. Hence fallacies of these *nayas* can be treated as special cases of *Śabdanayābhāsa*. *Samabhirūḍhanaya* stands for emphasis on etymological meanings of words. Hence overemphasis on etymological meaning of words would amount to *Samabhirūḍhābhāsa* (Pseudo-etymological view). So if someone insists that a person can be named as '*Indra*' only if he is prosperous, as '*Śakra*' only if he is powerful and as '*Purandara*' only if he is destroyer of the cities then the claimant is committing the fallacy called *Samabhirūḍhābhāsa*. *Evambhūtanaya* emphasises application of a word to a thing only at the time when the object performs the function indicated by the word. Now overemphasis on functionalist meaning of a word would be a case of *evabhūtābhāsa* (Pseudo-functional view). For example if one insists that someone can be called a teacher only at the time when he or she is teaching, and that he or she ceases to be a teacher when he/she comes out of the class, then one is committing the fallacy called *evabhūtābhāsa*.

Pradeep Gokhale (1989) has accepted the application of *nayābhāsa* in western Philosophical field also. He says "The

doctrine of *nayābhāsa* has wider applicability which goes beyond the domain of Indian philosophical systems. It can be applied to absolute dogmatic views held by some western philosophers as well. For example Platonism which holds only universal ideas as real and empirical objects as appearances would amount to *aparasaṅgrahābhāsa*. Phenomenalism which accepts only immediately given sense datum as real would amount to *rjusūtrābhāsa*. Cartesian view of absolute distinction between mind and matter would be a case of *naigamābhāsa*. ”

Jaina Doctrine of *Nayābhāsa* in this way can be appreciated as an important contribution to non-formal logical thinking in Indian philosophy.

Saptabhaṅgi-naya

Theory of *Sabtabhaṅginaya* is an expansion of *naya* theory. Predications about any thing can be seven in nature. If we say about existence of a soul then the statements may be made as follows :-

1. Relatively Rāma exists (*syādasti Rāmaḥ*) This relativity refers to present substance, space, time and mode about Rāma.
2. Relatively Rāma does not exists (*syād nāsti Rāmaḥ*) - This also refers to some relative term that ancient Rāma, son of Daśaratha does not exist.
3. Relatively Rāma exists and does not exist (*syād asti, syād nāsti Rāmaḥ*) (if statement is made in a certain order then both the facts may be said in this way)
4. Relatively it is in-expressible (*syād avaktavyaḥ*) - if we say simultaneously about Rāma's existence and inexistence, then it is in-expressible.

5. Relatively from the view point of present Rām, he exists and simultaneous view point it is in-expressible. (*syād asti avaktavyaḥ*).

6. From the present viewpoint past Rāma does not exist and from the simultaneous point of view it is in-expressible (*syād nāsti avaktavyaḥ*).

7. From the point of view of present Rāma, he exists, from the point of view of past Rāma he does not exist and if we say simultaneously, then it is in-expressible (*syādasti nāsti avaktavyaḥ*). In this way seven kinds of predications are made. The basic kinds are three - Exists (*asti*), does not exists (*nāsti*) and inexpressible (*avaktavyaḥ*). By permutation of these three, seven kinds of predications come out in to existence.

Nikṣepa

Nikṣepa is a technical term for a method by which proper meaning of a word in the relevant context is grasped. There is a minor difference between *naya* and *nikṣepa*. *Naya* deals with a sentence and *nikṣepa* deals with a word. *Naya* conveys the proper meaning of a sentence and *nikṣepa* conveys suitable meaning of word in the context. There are four types of *nikṣepa* - 1. *Nāma* (name) 2. *Sthāpanā* (symbol) 3. *Dravya* (potentiality) and 4. *Bhāva* (actuality).

1. Nāma Nikṣepa - A word used to name some person, thing etc. is *nāma nikṣepa*, This name does not require its etymological meaning. for example a name Mahāvīra is used for a person who is coward by *nāma nikṣepa*. A blind person may be Jyotiprakash (enlightened) by his name. *Arihanta* may be a name for a new born baby or for a building by *nāma nikṣepa*.

2. *Sthāpanā Nikṣepa* - When a word is used for an artificial identity of a person, thing etc. representing its original identity then it is called '*Sthāpanā nikṣepa*'. Through this *nikṣepa* a real character is understood in its image, picture, role etc. For example Rāma was a son of king Dasharatha, but through *Sthāpanā nikṣepa* Rāma word can be used for his statue or for a dramatist playing a role of Rāma. By this *nikṣepa* a child understands a picture of peacock as a real peacock. An idol of Mahāvīra is treated as Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra by this *nikṣepa*.

3. *Dravya nikṣepa* - In *dravya nikṣepa* word is used for a person, thing etc. on the basis of its past and future state. For example a student studying in a medical college may be called doctor on the basis of his future position. A *patavārī* (a person serving in a village for farms measurement etc.) even after his retirement called as *patavārī* on the basis of his past position.

4. *Bhāva nikṣepa* - when an activity is also performed according to the use of a word then that is called *bhāva nikṣepa*. for example when a person is engaged in teaching, then the use of teacher word is proper in the light of *bhāva nikṣepa*. Thus use of word dancer is quite proper at the time of a person's dancing activity.

The concept of *nikṣepa* is useful for finding a proper meaning of a canonical word, but it is also useful in our daily life as well.

Conclusion

Theory of *naya* is ancient, unique and an original contribution of Jaina thinkers to the Indian tradition. It is clearly found in Anuyogadvāra sūtra and Tattvārthasūtra. Application of *drayārthika naya* and *paryāyārthika naya* is very much

available in *Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra* when lord Mahāvīra replies to the various questions of inquisitive persons. For example in *Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra* a question was arose - Are souls eternal or non-eternal? Mahavīra replied that from the point of view of substance the souls are eternal. They are never generated, but from the point of view of modes they are non-eternal, because souls get different modes of living beings of the hell, the heaven and on the earth as animals, birds, insects, human beings, etc. This type of answering was prevalent in the canonical literature.

Concept of *nikṣepa* is also an original contribution of Jainism to Indian tradition. It gives a view to investigate the proper suitable meaning of a word in the prevailing context.

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Concept of Consciousness In Jainism

Philosophy is the root cause of origination and development of science, because philosophy gives ideas for inventions and experiments. But there is a basic difference between science and philosophy ; science has made its field of experiments on matter (*pudgala*) only, whereas philosophy has much wider field of knowledge and formless entities like soul. If we think about the concept of Consciousness according to the various branches of science, then consciousness can be defined as the activity of sense-organs, mind, brain and the cells, on one hand and when consciousness is defined according to Jaina philosophy then it is an attribute of a soul, which could not be known through the empirical or materialistic instruments on the other hand.

Consciousness and soul

The word 'consciousness' is used mainly in two meanings – 1. Alertness (awareness) 2. Feeling of livingness (*cetanā*). In Jainism 'apramāda' word is used in the sense of alertness and '*upayoga*', '*prāṇa*', '*sañjñā*' for the feeling of livingness. In Jainism, a soul is considered as the ultimate source of consciousness. Consciousness is the very nature of a soul with or without body. If the soul departs from the body, sense organs and brain do not work; the body is called dead. So it is a question for the scientists that how the consciousness arises and how it vanishes. Where does it come from and where does it go? Except the Cārvāka thinkers, all the branches of Indian philosophy accept a concept of soul which is the source

of consciousness. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers mention soul as omnipresent, but they accept its consciousness limited to body. Vedānta philosophers propound omnipresent *brahma* and living beings as its part (*caitanyāṃśa*). Buddhist philosophers do not accept soul as eternal entity. They accept a flow of consciousness which is called *vijñāna* or *citta*.

Jain philosophy is specific in this regard. It stresses that the soul of living beings resides within the body. Every living being is having a different or independent soul. A soul is a knower; sense organs, mind and brain are the instruments for knowing the objects. This soul has a nature of consciousness which serves consciousness in different parts of the body including brain, nervous system and every cell.

It is difficult to define a soul, but consciousness is the very nature of a soul. According to Uttārādhyaṇasūtra knowledge (*jñāna*) intuition or observation (*darśana*), conduct (*cāritra*), penance (*tapa*), internal power (*vīrya*) and cognitive application (*upayoga*) are the nature of a soul¹. We can know a soul through its attributes or activities. Knowledge (*jñāna*) and observation (*darśana*) are the main characteristics of a soul. In Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra, it is stated that soul is knowledge (right or perverted) and knowledge is soul. Soul is *darśana* and *darśana* is soul². In this way the nature of a soul can be defined as knowledge (*jñāna*) and observation or intuition (*darśana*). Application of these two is called as *upayoga*. This *upayoga* is consciousness.

¹ *Nāṇaṃ ca dāṃsaṇaṃ ceva carittaṃ ca tavo taḥā.*

vīriyaṃ uvaogo ya eyaṃ jīvaṣṣa lakkhaṇaṃ – Uttārādhyaṇasūtra, 28.3

² *Goyamā āyā siya nāṇe, siya annāṇe, nāṇe puṇa niyamaṃ āyā*
Goyama āyā niyamaṃ dāṃsaṇe, dāṃsaṇe vi niyamaṃ āyā. – Vyākhyāprajñapti
sūtra, Sataka 12, Uddeśaka 10, Sūtra 10-18

There are eight types of soul – 1. A soul as a substance (*dravyātmā*) 2. A soul with passions (*kaṣāyatmā*) 3. A soul with activities of mind, speech and body (*yogātmā*) 4. A soul with cognitive activity (*upayogātmā*) 5. A soul with attribute of knowledge (*jñānātmā*) 6. A soul with attribute of intuition (*darśanātmā*) 7. A soul with conduct (*cāritrātmā*) and 8. A soul with attribute of internal power (*vīryātmā*)³. Basically a soul is a substance, but when it exhibits any of the above characteristics or it enjoins passions etc. then it is addressed by respective names.

Consciousness and its various levels

Consciousness can be technically termed as '*upayoga*' in Jainism. *Upayoga* is an application of cognitive and intuitive ability of a soul. Consciousness includes an attitude, vision and conduct of a living being. Cognition of happiness and sorrow also denote consciousness. There are many levels of consciousness; we can put them in the following categories :

- 1) Consciousness as *apramattatā* or alertness.
- 2) Consciousness as *upayoga* or knowing activity.
- 3) Consciousness as *prāṇa* (active ability of sense organs, mind, speech, body, respiration and life-span).
- 4) Consciousness in mind
- 5) Consciousness in body
- 6) Consciousness as *sañjñā* (eagerness to eat, feeling fear, sexual desire, desire of possessiveness).
- 7) Consciousness as *vedanā*
- 8) Consciousness expressed in *vīrya* or enthusiasm.

³ *Vyākhyāprajñaptisūtra*, Śataka 12, Uddeśaka 10, Sūtra 1

In this way, there are many levels or kinds of consciousness experienced by a living being. A pure and complete consciousness is found in the liberated souls (having destroyed the eight *karmas*⁴) and in pious souls having destroyed the four *ghāti* karmas (namely *jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *mohaniya* and *antarāya*).

Variations in Consciousness and *apramattatā*

Mostly living beings on the earth are having karmic bondage, hence the consciousness is not fully manifested in them. There are six categories of the living beings on the basis of variation in manifestation of the consciousness. The living beings having only one tactile sense organ are the lowest in manifestation of their consciousness. Two sensed beings can manifest more consciousness than one sensed, three sensed beings more than the two sensed beings; In this way five sensed beings are able to manifest more consciousness. The being having mind with the five sense organs are quite more able in expressing consciousness. The human beings possessing a right view can express more consciousness. The degree of consciousness increases in experience of pious conduct and character. In Jainism a holy monk with five *mahāvratas* ((i)abstinence from violence (ii) abstinence from falsehood (iii) abstinence from theft (iv) abstinence from sexual desire (v) abstinence from possessiveness), five *samitis* or vigilances (in movement, speaking, eating, handling things and evacuation) and three *guptis* (as control of mind, speech and body) bears more vividness in consciousness. A monk having alertness in

⁴ Eight *karmas* are – *jñānāvaraṇa*, *darśanāvaraṇa*, *vedanīya*, *mohanīya*, *āyuṣya*, *nāma*, *gotra* and *antarāya*.

every activity expresses more consciousness. In this way living with alertness shows high level of consciousness. A laity man having five small vows is also on the path to live with better consciousness than a lay man, if he is alert in doing activity with awareness.

Consciousness as *upayoga*

'*Upayoga*' denotes the cognitive function of a living being. It includes knowing through sense organs, mind and directly through a soul.

- *Upayoga* is of two kinds
 - i) Knowing in a constructive or articulate form i.e. (*jñāna*)
 - ii) Knowing in *nirvikalpaka* or in-articulate form i.e. *darśana*.

Jñāna and *darśana* are the key factors of *upayoga* or cognitive function. In Nandisūtra and other texts of Jain philosophy five types of knowledge are mentioned as *matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge), *śrutajñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge), *avadhijñāna* (visual intuition), *manaḥparyāya jñāna* (intuition of mental modes) and *kevaljñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge). Among these knowledges *matijñāna* appears in a soul through sense-organs, or mind or by both. Sense organs and mind are the instruments; consciousness comes in these organs from the soul. *Matijñāna* or *ābhinibodhika jñāna* includes recognition, thinking, reasoning, intellect and inference in it. Knowledge of former birth (*jāti smaraṇa jñāna*) is also a phenomenon of *matijñāna*. Four types of intellect (*autpāttikī*, *vainayikī*, *karmajā* and *pārīṇāmikī*) are also the part of *matijñāna*. All intellectual activities of a person denote consciousness. *Śrutajñāna* appears

in a living being as verbal knowledge or as discriminative knowledge (*vivekajñāna*). Discriminative knowledge is a significant nature of consciousness. *Avadhijñāna*, *manahparyāyajñāna* and *kevalajñāna* appear directly in a soul. Through *avadhijñāna* material world can be known without the use of sense organs and mind. *manahparyāyajñāna* is also direct knowledge, by which mental modes of others are known by a conscious monk. *Kevalajñāna* is a pure and perfect knowledge with which everything and its every mode is perceived lucidly.

Knowledge illuminates itself as well as the object. In Niyamasāra Ācārya Kundakunda propounds the self-luminosity of knowledge. He says –

"Knowledge is not without a soul and soul is not without knowledge. It is doubtless, hence, knowledge is self and object illuminating. *Darśana* is also self and object illuminating like knowledge."⁵

Darśana is also a significant term in Jain scriptures to denote consciousness. It is an in-articulate cognition, which is succeeded by articulate-cognition i.e. knowledge. There are four types of *darśana*- (a) *cakṣu-darśana* (in-articulate cognition through eyes) (b) *Acakṣu-darśana* (in-articulate cognition through mind and sense organs other than eyes) (c) *Avadhi-darśana* (in-articulate cognition directly by soul succeeded by *avadhi-jñāna*) (d) *Kevala-darśana* (in-articulate cognition or intuition directly by a soul succeeded by *Kevalajñāna*).

⁵ *appāṇaṃ viṇu nāṇaṃ, nāṇaṃ viṇu appago na saṃdeho* |

tamhā saparapayāsaṃ nāṇaṃ tahā dāṃsaṇaṃ hodi || - Niyamasara, 171

Every soul has an essential attribute of in-articulate cognition and articulate cognition. Both of these cognitive attributes are manifested as consciousness in a sequence of in-articulate and articulate manner. The scientists have explored the system of knowing through sense organs and their link with the nervous system and brain, but they do not have reached up to the source of consciousness.

There are four stages of knowing the material objects through sense organs i.e. *avagraha*, *īha*, *avāya* and *dhāraṇā*. *Avagraha* is a primary knowledge in which an object is known without its specific properties. *īha* is a knowledge having inclination to know the object with its property, and the ascertaining knowledge about the object is called *avāya*. When that *avāya* knowledge goes into retention, then it is named as *dhāraṇā* knowledge. These four stages are very important in learning process. Why children do not learn the lesson properly? Its answer is lying in the Jaina principle of learning through stages of *matijñāna*. This principle is useful in the educational psychology. This is a psychological science of learning that if a learning process is up to retention, then memory takes place. Without retention memory cannot take place.

Consciousness as *Prāṇa*

Prāṇa (vitality) is another technical term in Jaina scriptures which shows consciousness in a living being. This '*prāṇa*' word has a different meaning from the meaning which is referred in Yoga philosophy. In Yoga philosophy *prāṇa* word has been used for vital airs which are of five kinds- *prāṇa* (air inhaled and exhaled), *apāna* (air goes out through anus), *vyāna*

(air pervaded in the whole body), *udāna* (air in the throat), *samāna* (air in the stomach). In Jainism *prāṇas* are of 10 types 1. Auditory sense 2. Visual sense 3. Olfactory sense 4. Gustatory sense 5. Tactile sense 6. Mental force 7. Power of speech 8. Power of body 9. Respiration and 10. Karma related to life span (*āyusya karma*). The *Prāṇas* depict the living power of the five sense organs, body, speech, mind, respiration and *āyusya karma*. Every sense organ has power to work. If that sense organ is damaged or harmed then that does not work as knowing instrument. A person can live life even in the non-working position of some sense organs, but the working power of sense organs denotes consciousness. I hear a word. I see a bird, I smell a flower, I taste a candy. I touch a chair- all these knowing activities show consciousness of sense organs and also of a knower. A knower remains the same in knowing process with the help of different sense organs. We feel consciousness in the functioning of mind and speech. We feel consciousness in the whole body also. In the violence these *prāṇas* are affected and at the time of death these *prāṇas* are destroyed. According to Jainism sense organs, body, mind, speech are made of *pudgala* or material contents, but these are having consciousness due to association with the conscious soul.

Consciousness in Mind

In Jainism, mind is made of matter (*pudgala*), but it has a quality of thinking and desire, hence mind also bears consciousness. A conscious mind is very useful for the real development of a human being. If it is controlled or restrained, then it is useful for spiritual development, if it is uncontrolled or wanton, it is a big cause for fall of a person. Neurologists talk about brain and accept that mind is a product of brain.

According to Śvetāmbara Jain texts this mind is a separate entity and pervaded in the whole body, whereas Digamber texts, accept its shape as eight feathered lotus flower and its residence is in the heart only. But mind is used in every knowing activity of sense organs and its own. In Vyakhyāprajñapti sūtra a question has been raised that a mind is conscious (*sacitta*) or unconscious (*acitta*)? Answer has been given that mind is not conscious, it is unconscious⁶. Here it is to be clarified that mind is different from a soul⁷ and it is made of matter or *pudgala*⁸, hence it is not conscious, but it is found only in living beings⁹ and formed at the time of thinking only¹⁰.

A sense organ is associated with an object, mind is associated with that sense organ and the soul is associated with the mind. This is the procedure of knowing the objects through sense organs. Somewhere a soul can know the objects directly through the mind. Sorrow and happiness can be known in this manner. Psychologists accept mind as a separate entity and Freud mentions three types of mind as- conscious, unconscious and sub-conscious. We are aware of the conscious mind. A big part of our mind remains unconscious, which has a store of imprints of our unfulfilled wants and *saṃskāras*. Sub-conscious mind has a function to get some feelings or desires from conscious mind to unconscious mind and from unconscious mind to conscious mind.

⁶ *Sacitte bhante! maṇe? Goyamā! No sacitte maṇe, acitte maṇe. - Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra, Śataka 13 Uddeśaka 7, Sūtra 11(2)*

⁷ *Āyā bhante! Maṇe? Aṇṇe maṇe? Goyamā! No āyā maṇe, aṇṇe maṇe - Ibid, sūtra 10*

⁸ *Rūvi bhante! maṇe arūvi maṇe ? Goyamā rūvi maṇe, no arūvi maṇe - Ibid, sūtra 11(1)*

⁹ *Jīvāṇaṃ bhante maṇe, ajīvāṇaṃ maṇe ? Goyamā! jīvāṇaṃ maṇe no ajīvāṇaṃ maṇe - Ibid sūtra 11(4)*

¹⁰ *Puvviṃ bhante maṇe, maṇṇijjamāṇe maṇe? Maṇa-samaya-vīkkante maṇe ? Goyamā! No puvviṃ maṇe, maṇṇijjamāṇe maṇe no maṇa-samaya-vīkkante maṇe - Ibid, sūtra 12*

Consciousness in body

Jaina scriptures enumerate five types of bodies as {1} Gross body (*audārika*) {2} Protean body (*vaikriya*) {3} Translocational body (*āhāraka*) {4} Luminous body (*taijasa śarīra*) {5} Karmic body (*kārmaṇa śarīra*). In these five types of body, we are aware of the gross body only. All human beings, animals, birds, insects, plants etc. are having gross or *audārika* body. This body is made of gross material. *Vaikriya* body is found in heavenly bodies (*devas*) and hell bodies (*nārakas*) by birth. In human beings this body may enjoin the gross body after some required spiritual achievement. This body can have different modes on the will of its owner. *Āhāraka* or translocational body is a subtle body which is used by a monk having a vast knowledge of 14 *purvas*. This body is used to get answers from a Tīrthaṅkara residing in a distant place like Mahāvīdeha. This subtle body comes out from the gross body and after getting answer, it enters again at its place. This body may be a mystery for the biologists. *Taijasa* and Karmic bodies are more subtle and these are not obstructed by any obstacle. These two bodies are found in every non-liberated soul. Karmic body is a store house of *Karma*-bondage, and Luminous or *Taijasa* body maintains a level of energy and it is helpful in the procedure of digestion etc. These two subtle bodies live with a soul even in the way of getting a new birth.

Biologists have done experiments on gross body, but they do not know about *vaikriya*, *āhāraka*, *taijasa* and karmic bodies. In present human beings *vaikriya* and *āhāraka* bodies are often unavailable, but *taijasa* and Karmic bodies are liable for investigation. If something is known after experiments that might be a pace in the biological science, knowing the mystery of life.

Consciousness as *Sañjñā*

An instinct desire or *sañjñā* also indicate consciousness in a living being. There are four famous *sañjñās* - 1. Eagerness for food (*āhāra sañjñā*) 2. Feeling of fear (*bhaya sañjñā*) 3. Sexual desire (*maithuna sañjñā*) 4. Desire of possessiveness (*parigraha sañjñā*). These four *sañjñās* are experienced in every living being including in the plants. Every living being feels hunger and wants to take food. It makes an effort for gaining food. The feeling of fear is also a characteristic of worldly living beings. All living beings fear from death, harm etc. This fear is found only in the worldly soul. Sexual desire is also a phenomenon of consciousness. This desire may have three forms – 1. Desire of intercourse of a male with female. 2. Desire of intercourse of a female with male. 3. Sexual desire of hermaphrodite. This is a desire of reproduction. Possessiveness is also found in conscious beings. Human beings, insects and even plants bear this phenomenon. The non-living things do not bear these four *sañjñās*.

Consciousness as *Vedanā*

Vedanā is another technical term of Jainism, which denotes an experience of happiness and sorrow, coldness and hotness etc. by a living being. This '*vedanā*' is felt on the level of mind and body. It may be a result of the karma-bondage. Pleasure or comfort may be felt through five sense organs and mind.

Consciousness as *Vīrya*

Enthusiasm (*vīrya*) is also a significant nature of consciousness. A living being feels enthusiasm with in him to

do something. Where does from this enthusiasm come? Generally it is accepted that enthusiasm comes from the food which we eat. Vaidic statement '*annam vai prāṇāḥ*' proves it. It is true that without food body cannot run for a long time. Food is the source of energy to work through body. Body is made of matter (*pudgal*), so materialistic (*pāudgalika*) food is required to sustain it. Soul has its own enthusiasm or power which is expressed in mental power and in emotional balance. Soul gives consciousness to body, but it has to leave the body, if that is not *capable to sustain with consciousness. If the body is decayed and prāṇas are arrested then soul leaves that body and goes to take birth in a new body with two subtle bodies namely taijas and kārmaṇa.*

Conclusion

Science has reached in its research up to consciousness of brain, cells and genes and it has proved that cells of the body are changing every moment. Body cells are renewed in a certain time interval; hence food is needed for this activity of change. This gross body cannot survive without food. According to Jainism, animation in gross body, brain, genes etc. is found due to consciousness of the soul. In the presence of a soul all of these work consciously.

Science has done experiments on the matter or *pudgala* having eight touch qualities¹¹. Gross body, blood, brain, genes are the matter of eight touch qualities. Jaina scriptures propound a matter of four touch quality and two touch quality also. *Kārmaṇa* and *Taijas* bodies are the example of four touch

¹¹ Eight types of touch are – cold, hot, smooth (positive charge), rough (negative charge), light, heavy, soft and hard.

quality matter. These should be taken up for an experiment by the scientists. *Paramaṇu* or atom in Jainism has been propounded with a quality of two touches of smooth (positive charge) or rough (negative charge) and hotness or coldness. Matter can be the part of experiment by instrument, but the real consciousness of soul is difficult to come under the purview of experiments. Its approval has three sources according to Jaina philosophers-

1. Self-perception or self-realization
2. Inference- There are many logical arguments by which an entity of soul is approved. In *Rājaprasāṅgyasūtra* *Keśīśramaṇa* has given so many arguments to king *Pradeśhi* for establishment of a soul which is different from a body. Sense organs, mind are the instruments; someone should be the user of these instruments and that user is a soul.
3. Canonical literature- The enlightened souls have told about the independent existence of a soul, by which consciousness is felt in a body.

It is interesting to know that violence of *prāṇas*, falsehood, theft, sexual copulation, possessiveness, anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, aversion etc. 18 sins appear in a soul¹², but these are having a characteristic of subtle *pudgal* having five colours, two odours, five tastes and four touches (cold, hot, smooth and hard). Scientists have done experiments on subtle matter, but still they have to do experiments on the intensity of anger, pride, deceit, greed, attachment, aversion etc.

¹² *Vyākhyāprajñapti Sūtra*, Śataka 20, Uddeśaka 3, Sūtra 1

These experiments will help a human being in understanding the intensity of these passions and disorder. Knowing the intensity a person will be aware enough to reduce these sinful emotions and activities. At present the examination of blood, sonography, MRI, CT scan are quiet helpful in the physical health. The examination of anger etc. will be quiet helpful for mental and spiritual health.

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Conflict Removing Vision of Jainism

Today, we have conflicts in our life regarding mutual relations and behavior. Conflicts arise due to our wrong beliefs and misunderstandings. We adhere to our thoughts and opinions but discard others thoughts and opinions because of narrow mindedness and prejudices. Although the religions in the world have a motto to unite the people of the world in brotherhood and love, but due to mal-intentions of the leaders and staunchness of the followers, some conflicts prevail among the religions. The humanity suffers from mutual aversion of the followers towards other religions. Conflict is not bad, if it gives rise to the development of human values, philosophy and the nation^{*}, but it is shocking when it converts into fundamentalism and intolerance. It is well known from the history that countless wars have been fought in the name of the religions. Many staunch followers do not understand the real essence of the religion and they consider themselves better than other religious followers. Hence, they hate others. This tendency is prevalent everywhere, among the family members, society and between the nations.

Future of the human world depends on education, which a person gets at home and through various courses and

^{*}Somewhere conflict inspires and motivates a person to become better in thoughts and deeds. He makes efforts to surpass his competence by increasing qualities within him. Hence sanskrit poet Bhāravi says- 'Conflict with great pure-hearted persons is good : (*varam virodhopi samam mahātmabhiḥ, Kirātārjunīyam*, 1.8)

curriculum taught at various institutes. Education has a very significant role in developing and building the mental understanding of a human being. If a person is lacking spiritual and moral values in education, then, conflicts among the people arise more frequently. For maintaining peace, harmony and mutual cooperation with positive attitude towards all human beings and the other living beings of the world, spiritual and moral values must be included in the world education. A person faces conflicts in his own life due to his mismanagement of thought process and misunderstanding about the reality and priority order of the works to be done. In this respect, proper education with spiritual and moral values can help.

Jain religion and philosophy has many tenets for development of right understanding and deciding the right conduct to avoid conflicts in the minds of the people. A few of them are- non-absolutism, non-violence, tolerance, forgiveness, truthfulness, honesty, celibacy, limiting the possessions, theory of karma etc. All of these provide vision and can change the mentality of a person to remove the conflict. These can also help in bringing peace, harmony and solutions to many man-made problems.

Vision of Anekāntavāda And Nayavāda

Jaina philosophy has given us a thought of non-absolutism i.e. *anekāntavāda* which establishes unity in diversities and harmony among the people of different ideologies. It gives an idea to honour others ideology. In the world, reality is one and the same, but the philosophers view it from different visions and mention the truth in different

ways. We can't say that the views of one philosopher are right while others are wrong. They may be true from their angle, hence the harmony towards the persons of different ideas should be maintained. We can have an example of the photographs of a building taken from different angles. Every photograph is true from an angle, but we can't say that photograph taken by me is only true and other photographs are wrong. Here, all the photographs depict a photo of the same object from the different angles; hence all the photographs may be correct from different points of view. We have to examine the truth or true value of all the photographs. Similarly all the religious and philosophical thoughts have some truth or true value, but we have to examine and then accept them. This is the message of *anekāntavāda* of Jain philosophy.

Anekāntavāda suggests us that the thoughts of different individuals may have some component of truth, hence we should try to understand and respect others point of view. It will help us avoiding many possible conflicts and resolving them in a harmonious atmosphere.

Tirthāṅkara Mahāvīra has propounded many views to know and to examine the objects. In Jaina canonical text *vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra*, a question was raised about the universe (*loka*) - Is the *loka* endless or has an end? Mahāvīra replied this question from four points of views - from the point of view of substance (*dravya*) the universe is finite. From the point of view of space also it is finite. From the point of view of time it is endless and from the view of modes

(*paryāya*) also it is infinite.¹ This technique of understanding and explaining the things is found in Jain canonical literature. Many questions have been replied from the different views. A question was raised as to whether the worldly souls are eternal or non-eternal? Mahāvīra replied that from the substantial point of view souls are eternal but from the view of modes (or change) they are non-eternal.² This method of answering has been accepted widely in Jain canonical literature. So in the case of conflicts we have to look at the problem from different viewpoints.

Non-absolutism of Jaina philosophy prevents an individual to be dogmatic and one sided in approach. It pleads for a broader outlook and an open mindedness which can resolve the conflicts that emerge from differences in ideologies and faiths. A renowned Jaina philosopher Siddhasen Divākara (5th Century) has rightly said-

“All schools of thought (*nayas*) are valid when they are understood from their own standpoints and as far as they do not discard the truth or true value of others”.³

Jainism has developed frameworks of *nayas* to observe the object in *Anekāntavād*. A *naya* can be defined as a standpoint to know the object. It does not rule out other different view-points and expresses a partial truth about an object.⁴ These *nayas* or standpoints may be many in number, but Jaina philosophers have discussed mainly two *nayas* as 1.

¹Vyākhyāprajñapti-sūtra (vol.1) Śataka 2, Uddeśaka 1, Sūtra 24

²Ibid, Vol. 2, Śataka 7, Uddeśaka 2, Sūtra 36

³Sanmatitarka, 1.28 :

*niyaya vayanijjasaccā savvanayā paraviyālaṇe mohā.
te uṇa ṇa diṭṭhasamao vibhayai sacce va alie vā.*

⁴Laghiyastraya, verse 52 : *nayo jñāturabhīprāyo.*

Substance stand point (*dravyārthika naya*), 2. Mode view point (*paryāyārthika naya*).⁵ These two *nayas* solve the problems of eternity and non-eternity of reality, which are propounded respectively by Vendāntists and Buddhists. Both these schools have confrontation about defining the reality. Vedānta philosophy propounds reality as eternal and Buddhism explains it as non-eternal. Jaina philosophy solves this problem by giving theory of standpoints. According to Jainism, reality is eternal from the viewpoint of substance and it is non-eternal from the viewpoint of modes. This *naya* theory weaves together the two opposite philosophical tenets and accepts that every substance of the world can be thought to have two opposite characters. From the view point of substance everything is permanent, but from the viewpoint of modes everything is changing every moment.⁶ In Jaina view, every entity of the world has multiple characters and we do not perceive all the characters at the moment. Hence, logically it will be wrong to deny the existence of characteristics that we do not perceive. The real entity is the same for all the viewers but there is a difference due to their own perspective. In other words we can say that unity and diversity are the two facets of the same reality. Reality itself is unity in diversity. From the generic point of view, unity is perceived and from the specific point of view diversity is observed.

⁵*Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7.5 : *saṁāsatastu dvibhedo dravyārthikāḥ paryāyārthikaśca.*

⁶*Syādvādamāñjarī*, p.10.16 (on verse 5) : *sarve hi bhāvā dravyārthikanayāpekṣayā nityāḥ, paryāyārthikanayādeśāt punaranityāḥ.*

Jainism also propounds two standpoints in a different way - *nīścaya naya* (spiritual viewpoint) and *vyavahāra naya* (empirical viewpoint). *Nīścaya naya* leads a person to the spiritual truth, whereas *vyavhāra naya* puts him forward for a good conduct. These two viewpoints are complementary to each other. If a person stresses only on *nīścaya naya* then he may sideline the code of conduct and proper behavior. And if he stresses on *vyavahāra naya* then he may derail from his ultimate goal. Hence there is a need of both the *nayas* for real progress towards the ultimate goal.

Jaina Philosophers also propounded seven standpoints as *naigama naya*, *saṃgrahanaya*, *vyavahāranaya*, *ṛjusūtranaya*, *śabdanaya*, *samabhirūḍhanaya* and *evambhūtanaya*.⁷ Out of these seven standpoints first three are substance viewpoints and next four depict the viewpoint of modes.⁸ In another classification first four of these are considered as *artha naya* and rest three are classified as *śabda naya*.⁹ These *nayas* help in understanding the motif of a speaker. Apart from these seven *nayas*, theory of sevenfold predication also exists. In these predications a word 'syat' is used in a determinate perspective as *syād asti*, *syad nāsti*, *syād asti-nāsti*, *syād avaktavya*, *syād asti avaktavya*, *syad nāsti avaktaya*, *syād asti-nāsti avaktavya*.

⁷ *Anuyogadvārasūtra* : 606, p. 467 : *se kim taṃ nāe? satta mūḷanayā paṇṇattā. taṃ jahā ñe game saṃgahe vavahāre ujjusue sadde samabhirūḍhe evambhute.*

⁸ *Pramāṇanayatattvāloka* 7.6 and 27 : *ādyo naigama-saṃgrahavyavahārabhedat tredhā. paryāyārthikaścaturdhā ṛjusūtraḥ śabdaḥ samabhirūḍha evambhūtaśca.*

⁹ *Laghīyastraya*, verse 72 :

*catvāro-arthanayā hyete jīvādyarthavyapāśrayāt.
trayaḥ śabdanayāḥ satyapadavidyām samāśritāḥ.*

Here it is to be quotable that Jaina philosopher Malliṣeṇa (13th century) and Yaśovijaya (17th century) have categorically mentioned that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers represent *naigama naya*, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta philosophers represent *saṃgrahanaya*, Cārvāka view point represents *vyavahāranaya*, Buddhist philosophy represents *ṛjusūtranaya* and the philosophers of grammar may represent *śabda naya*.¹⁰ In this way Jaina philosophers perceive the various Indian philosophies from the different points of views and give regard to them to establish harmony. A person should leave the attitude of obstinacy that he is only true and rest of the people are wrong. If a view point denies other viewpoints then that is counted as fallacious. Yaśovijaya says :-

“A true non-absolutism does not disdain any faith but treats all the salvation oriented faiths equally as a father behaves to his sons.”¹¹

¹⁰(1) *Syādvāda-mañjarī* of Malliṣeṇa, p. 248: *tatha hi naigamanaya-darśanānusārīṇau Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣikau. saṅgrābhīprāyapravṛttāḥ sarvepyadaivatavādā sāmkhya-darśaṃca. vyavahāranayānupāti prāyaścārvāka-darśanam. ṛjusūtrākūta- pravṛttabuddhayaś-tāthāgatāḥ. śabdādinayāvalambino vaiyākaraṇādayaḥ.*

(2) Yaśovijaya says in *Adhyātamāsāra* : verse 879: *bauddhānāmṛjūstrato matamabhūd vedāntinām saṃgrahāt | sāmkhyanām tata eva naigamanayād yogāśca vaiśeṣikāḥ || śabdabrahmavidō'pi śabdanayataḥ sarvairnayairgumhitā | Jainī dṛṣṭiritiḥ sārataratā pratyakṣamudvīkṣyate ||*

¹¹ *Adhyātmopaniṣad*, verse 69-70: *yasya sarvatra samatā nayeṣu tanyeṣviva. tasyānekāntavādasya kva nyūnādhikaśemukhī. tena syādvādamālambya sarvadarśana-tulyatām. mokṣoddesāviśeṣeṇa yaḥ paśyati sa śāstravit.*

Jaina philosophers have assimilated *Anekāntavāda* in their thinking, hence they regard other thinkers with equal respect. Ācārya Haribhadrāsūri says :-

“I possess no bias for Mahāvīra and no aversion against Kapila and other saints and thinkers. Whosoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted”¹².

Haribhadra says again :- “I venerate all those who are free from all vices and filled with virtues, be they Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva or Jina.”¹³.

Ācārya Hemcandra proclaims :-

‘I worship him who have destroyed attachment and aversion, the seeds of birth, be he Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva or Jina’¹⁴

This is the liberal attitude of Jaina philosophers towards other religions or sects. They give stress on perfection which denotes the eradication of attachment and aversion. Jaina worship the merit of a person. In the sacred *namaskāra-mantra* of Jainas, veneration is paid to the spiritual posts such as *arhat*, *siddha*, *ācārya*, *upādhyāya* and *sādhu*.¹⁵

¹² *Lokatattvanirṇaya*, verse 38 :

*pakṣapāto na me vīre na dveṣaḥ, Kapilādiṣu
Yuktimaḍ vacanaṃ yasya, tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ.*

¹³ *Lokatattvanirṇaya*, verse 40

*yasya nikhilaścā doṣā na santi sarve guṇāśca vidyante.
brahmā vā viṣṇur vā jino vā namastasmai.*

¹⁴ *Śrī Mahādeva-stora*, 44

*bhavabījāṅkurajanānā rāgādyā kṣayamupāgatā yasya.
brahmā vā viṣṇur vā haro jino vā namastasmai.*

¹⁵ *Vyākhyāprajñapti sūtra*, Vol. 1.1.1 :

*Namo arahaṃtāṇaṃ, namo siddhāṇaṃ, namo āyariyāṇaṃ, namo
uvajjhāyāṇaṃ, namo loye savva sāhuṇaṃ.*

Jain philosophers have consistently shown reverence to other ideologies and faiths. *Śūtrakṛtāṅga*- the second earliest Jaina work, mentions that those who praise their own faith and views and disregard those of their opponents, possess, malice against them and hence remain confined to cycle of birth and death.¹⁶ A famous Jaina old text the *Isibhāsiyaim* comprises the teaching of 45 saints of *śramaṇa* and *Brāhmaṇa* traditions such as Nārada, Bhāradvāja, Maṅkhali Gosāl and many others have been presented with due regards of Arhat Rsi.¹⁷

Vision of Non-Violence

Non-violence (*Ahiṃsā*) is another tenet of Jainism which bears universal value and has a capacity to resolve conflicts. The concept of non-violence is accepted by almost all religions of the world, but Jainism observes it minutely. Jainism prohibits not only killing of human beings and animals but of the vegetable kingdom as well.¹⁸ Harming the plants, polluting water and air are also the acts of violence. Jainism has favoured non-violence for co-existence of all living beings. It cares not only the life of human beings, but it also cares for the life of animals, birds, insects, serpents, plants, aquatic kingdom etc. Mahāvīra suggested that no

¹⁶Śūtrakṛtāṅga 1.1.2.23 :

*Sayaṃ sayaṃ paśaṃsaṃtā garaḥaṃtā paraṃvayaṃ,
je u tattha viussaṃti, saṃsāraṃ te viussiṃyā.*

¹⁷Devanāradena arhatā isiṇā buiyaṃ- Isibhāsiyāim, 1.1 and in other chapters also refer it.

¹⁸Jainism accepts six categories of worldly souls as- earth bodied (pṛthvikāyika), water bodied (apikāyika), fire bodied (tejaskāyika), air bodied (vāyukāyika), vegetables (vanaspatikāyika) and mobile beings having two sense organs to five sense organs and mind (one word for all these is trasakāyika).

living being should be killed, governed, made slave, tortured and made restless.¹⁹ All these are considered as violence in the view of Jainism. Hence violence is not just killing a living being but any form of torture, exploitation, mental or physical harm is also violence. Violence may occur through our mind, speech and actions. Not only this, but to motivate or support others for violence is also considered as violence. In this way non-violence has a much broader connotation. It provides directive ways to think, speak and behave in such a manner that doesn't hurt anyone. First of all, violence generates in our mind, and then it comes to our speech and actions giving rise to conflicts. Hence, non-violence can act as an important instrument in conflict removal. Firstly, it will avoid many possible conflicts, and in case of remaining conflicts the broader form of non-violence can guide us to the best remedy for conflict removal.

Ahiṃsā is not merely non-violence, it has its positive social aspect and that can be called as friendliness (*maitrī*) to all living beings. Amitagati in *Sāmāyika pāṭha* says :

“Friendliness towards all beings, delightedness on the qualities of virtuous ones, utmost compassion for afflicted beings, equanimity towards those who are not well disposed towards me, May O Lord! my soul have such dispositions as these forever.”²⁰

¹⁹ *Ācārāṅgasūtra* 1.4.1: *savve pāṇā savve bhūtā savve jīvā savve sattā ṇa haṃtāvā, ṇa ajjāvetāvā, ṇa parighetāvā, ṇa paritāveyavvā, ṇa uddaveyavvā.*

²⁰ *Paramātma-dvātriṃśikā* 1:
sattveṣu maitriṃ guṇiṣu pramodaṃ,
kliṣṭeṣu jīveṣu kṛpāparatvaṃ;
mādhyasthabhāvaṃ viparītavrtau,
sadā mamātmā vidadhātu deva.

Ācārāṅga sūtra establishes an importance of other's life. It mentions :

‘All worldly souls love their life, they wish to relish pleasure, loathe misery, hurt or injury is not desired by anybody, life is dear to all, and they all want to live. Life is dear to all beings.’²¹

This statement gives a message to understand and protect others life and their right to live. Every living being wants to live, nobody wants to be killed. We should honour their right to live and we should adopt our lifestyle without killing or lesser killing. This lifestyle will help us in removing mutual conflicts among the people and the living beings. Today, a person wants to increase his power by adopting violent attitude and behaviour. He forgets the value of others life and emotions. Jaina canonical literature describes the concept of six categories of worldly souls (*ṣaḍṇikāya*)²² and infinite number of souls. Jaina philosophy accepts every soul as an independent or separate entity. Every soul has its own emotions, passions and virtues.

Sutrakṛtāṅga sūtra tries to make a man sensitive towards all beings of the world. It says:

“As you feel pain at the time of beating or torturing by others, so others also feel in that way”.²³

This kind of preaching of non-violence (*ahiṃsā*) is not limited to the human beings; its sphere goes to all the beings of the world. In *Ācārāṅga* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* non-violence

²¹ Ācārāṅgasūtra 1.2.3 : *savve pānā piyāuyā suhasāyā dukkhapadikulā appiyavahā piyajīviṇo, jiviukāmā savvesiṃ jiviyam piyam*

²² Mentioned in the footnote 18

²³ *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 2.1.19

has a social aspect that motivates a man to become sensitive to others with compassion and friendliness.²⁴ Violent behaviour is enemy for the society,²⁵ but non-violence is a friend for it. For co-existence and peace of the society, non-violent and friendly behaviour is essential. It applies for all the beings - be it mobile (*trasa*) or the immobile (*sthāvara*).²⁶ In this way by developing empathy for other living beings, non-violence can play a big role in removal of conflict.

There is a misconception in our minds that violence and wars are the instruments for bringing peace in our life, but it is notable that violence can never bring peace in our minds and hearts. This thinking generates conflicts in our minds many times with other human beings, but a spot of blood on a cloth never can be washed by blood. Only non-violence is helpful in establishing internal equanimity and peace. Actually impure thought injures the real nature of a soul by disturbing its equanimity. This is called *sva-himsā* i.e. violence of the self. This violence is more harmful, because it harms one own self and the others too. External violence occurs after internal violence. Hence, first we have to control the violence on internal level. Weapons and wars are not actual instruments for establishing peace. Ācārāṅga

²⁴ Ācārāṅga and Sūtrakṛtāṅga sutras stress on the sensitivity of a living being and propound that every living being wants to live, nobody wants sorrow, as ācārāṅga (1.4.2) says- *savvesiṃ pānānaṃ savvesiṃ bhutānaṃ savvesiṃ sattānaṃ asāyaṃ aparivivānaṃ mahābhayaṃ dukkhaṃ ti, tti bemi.*

²⁵ Ācārāṅgasūtra : 1.1.2 : *taṃ se ahitāya taṃ se abodhiye.*

²⁶ Prāśnavyākaraṇa 2.1.3 : *esā sā bhagavaī ahimsā jā sā bhīyānaṃ viva saraṇaṃ, pakkhinaṃ viva gamaṇaṃ tisiyaṇaṃ viva salilaṃ tasa-thāvara-savva-bhūya-khemaṇkarī.*

sūtra explains that weapons may be superior to each other, but nothing is superior to non-violence.²⁷

Although complete non-violence is difficult for a householder, but he can avoid killing as much as possible. Dr Sagarmal Jain has rightly said :

“According to Jaina point of view, all the beings have equal right to lead a peaceful life. Though violence is unavoidable, yet it cannot be the directive principle of our living, because it goes against the judgments of our faculty of reasoning. If I think that nobody has any right to take my life, on the same ground I have no right to take another’s life”.²⁸

He further says :

“Though in our worldly life complete non-violence is not possible, yet our motto should be- ‘Lesser violence is better living’”.²⁹

Right Attitude, Right Knowledge And Right Conduct

Jainism is a religion and philosophy of salvation from sorrows. Fallacious view, nescience (wrong knowledge) and misconduct are the causes of suffering. Fallacious view is the cause of wrong knowledge and wrong knowledge is the cause of misconduct which includes passions (emotions) of anger, pride, deceit and greed. All these passions put a person into sorrows. Such a person remains tensed and creates tension for others. It generates confrontation with other people. This confrontation may be avoided by developing right view, which is helpful in

²⁷ *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* 1.3.4 : *Atthi satthaṃ pareṇa paraṃ, natthi asatthaṃ pareṇa paraṃ.*

²⁸ Peace, Religious Harmony and Solution of World Problems from Jaina perspective, p.57

²⁹ *Ibid*, p.57

understanding the nature of the world and reality.

Jainism underscores the value of right world-view (*samyagdarśana*), right knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) and right conduct (*samyakcāritra*) for the attainment of salvation³⁰ and removal of conflicts forever. This path is quite individualistic, because it requires detachment from all worldly affairs. *Samyag darśana* bears an essential characteristic of kindness (*anukampā*).³¹ Kindness is a very important aspect of an individual towards the society and other beings of the world. In the absence of kindness or compassion (*karuṇā*) one may not have *samyagdarśana* and in the absence of *samyagdarśana* eternal liberation from worldly sorrows does not occur according to Jainism.³² Hence a right attitude with kindness towards other souls or societies of all beings is essential for ultimate liberation and liberation from conflicts.

Right knower (*Samyagjñānin*), a person having *samyagjñāna* changes his behavior from negative to positive towards the other human beings. When he proceeds in right conduct (*cāritra*), his attitude towards the society bears a radical change. His anger (*krodha*) changes into forgiveness (*kṣamā*), pride into politeness, deceit into simplicity and greed into contentment.³³ His jealousy converts into love. He loves everybody. He does not love

³⁰ *Tattvārthasūtra* 1.1: *samyagdarśana jñānacāritrāṇi mokṣamārgaḥ*.

³¹ *Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya* 1.2: *tadevaṃ praśama-amveganirvedānukampā-stikyābhivyaktīlakṣaṇaṃ tattvārthaśraddhānaṃ samyagdarśanaṃ*.

³² *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra* 28.30: *nādaṃsaṇissa nāṇaṃ, nāṇeṇa viṇā na hunti caraṇaguṇā. aguṇissa natthi makkho natthi amokkhassa nivvāṇaṃ*.

³³ *Daśavaikālikasūtra* 8.39: *uvasameṇa haṇe koḥaṃ māṇaṃ maddavayā jīṇe; māyaṃ cājjavabhāveṇa lobhaṃ saṃtosao jīṇe*.

others for his own empirical pleasures, but for the purification of the self. This radical change towards the society occurs after the attainment of *samyagjñāna*. It controls the behaviour of a person towards himself and to others. He understands that as I feel pleasure in favourable conditions, so do others in those conditions, and as I feel grief in unfavourable conditions, so do others. This thinking tilts a person for real welfare of the world. Rightly has been expressed in *Bṛhatkalpabhāṣya* (4584) :

“What you desire for yourself, desire for others too; and what you do not desire for yourself, do not desire for others at all- this is the essence of preaching of Jina”.³⁴

This is echoed in Sanskrit literature also - “A person should not behave with others adversely, which is meant adverse for himself”.³⁵

As we expect good conduct, graceful and respectful behavior from others, so should be our behaviour with others, protecting their self-esteem and dignity. What we do not like from others, we should not behave in that manner. This is an essential principle of social behaviour given in Jaina literature. It is also echoed in *Ācārāṅga cūrṇi* in some different words- “As I like pleasure and happiness, others also like these and as I dislike grief and sorrow, others also do not like them.”³⁶

³⁴ *Bṛhatkalpa bhāṣya* 4584 : *jaṃ icchasi appaṇatto, jaṃ ca na icchasi appaṇatto; taṃ iccha parassa vi, ettiyagaṃ jīṇasāsaṇaṃ.*

³⁵ *ātmanah pratikūlāni pareṣāṃ na samācāret.* (a renowned verse).

³⁶ *Ācārāṅgacūrṇi* 1.1.6: “*Jahā me iṭṭhāṇiṭṭhe suhāsuhe tahā savvajīvāṇaṃ*”

This thinking can protect us from indulging in conflicts with the people we deal with.

Conduct of Five *Aṇuvratas*

Five vows of partial renunciation (*aṇuvratas*) are also helpful in removal of conflicts and preparing good citizens of any country. Five *aṇuvratas* are mentioned as abstinence from killing a life (*prāṇātīpātaviramaṇa*), abstinence from falsehood (*mṛṣāvāda-viramaṇa*), abstinence from stealing (*adattādāna-viramaṇa*), satisfaction with own spouse only (*svadāra or svapati-santoṣa parimāṇa*) and limiting the possession (*parigraha parimāṇa*) or limiting the desires (*icchāvidhiparimāṇa vrata*).³⁷ These *aṇuvratas* have social, moral and spiritual values. A person pursuing these *aṇuvratas* cannot be harmful to the society. He may be beneficial in some respect. He bears humanity in him and behaves with compassion and restraint. The main benefits of these partial vows can be summarised as below.

1. Compassion and equality towards other living beings be observed in this manner that their equal right to live is safe.
2. Nothing should be told in such a manner that it might cause embarrassment, anxiety or unhappiness to others.³⁸
3. Refraining from theft shows respect for other's property and rights. This *aṇuvrata* has a power to

³⁷ See, *Uvāsagasaśao*, chapter 1

³⁸ *Tattvārthadhigamabhāṣya* 7.9: *hiṃsāpāruṣyapaisūnyādiyuktam vacaḥ satyamapi garhitamanṛtameva bhavattīti.*

restrict bribery and deceptive practices in the economic world.

4. Control over sexual practices can increase mental and spiritual power, can overcome sexual corruption and can overcome diseases like AIDS.
5. Most of the conflicts arise in the society due to money, land, properties, power etc. The fifth vow puts limits to the desires of a man or woman for possessing more and more things. It weakens or dissolves the greed towards acquisition of worldly things. If we do not want to suffer from tension, depression or bodily diseases, then we must avoid extreme ambition for possession of materialistic goals.

Vision with Theory Of Karma

In the view of Jaina *Karma* theory, a person gets result of his own deeds. The concepts of pleasure giving (*sātāvedanīya*) *karma* and grief or pain giving (*asātā vedanīya*) *karma* instruct the society in a right path that if you do good to others it will result in good to you and if you do bad to others it will bear bad consequences to you. The causes of these *sātā* and *asātā vedanīya karmas* have been mentioned in *Tattvārtha Sūtra* as follows :-

“If a soul causes pain, grief, agony, cry, injury or lamenting to others then it attracts *asātāvedanīya* or pain *karma*, and if a soul generates compassion through charity to all living beings as well as to those observing religious vows, then it is a cause of *sātāvedanīya* or pleasure *karma*.³⁹

³⁹ *Tattvārthasūtra* 6.12-13:

dukkhaḥ-śoka-tāpākrandana-vadha-paridevanānyātma-parobhayāsthānyasad-vedyasya. bhūtavratānukampādānaṃ sarāgasamyamādiyogaḥ kṣāntiḥ śaucamiti sadvedyasya.

Forbearance is also a cause of *sātāvedanīya*. The *Tattvārtha Sūtra* explains that if we are co-operative to others positively, then as a result it provides us pleasure or happiness. Negative behavior results in pain or *asātā*. This is not just a theory of *karma*, but also a reciprocal theory of social norms. This guides the society towards the balanced and proper behavior, which in turn benefits the individual also.

Although regarding ontology or metaphysics *sāṃkhya*, *Vedānta*, Buddhism and Jainism are different, but all of these guide a person to be detached from worldly allurements and have to control over the sense organs, mind and the thought process tilting towards wrong doing. All of these thoughts may be different in their approaches in defining the reality, but these preach to achieve the same goal of emancipation from sorrows forever. Thus goal is same but methods to achieve the goal are different. They may be different, but still there are similarities that all of these instruct a path to remove attachment from the worldly attractions. Hence, according to Jainism, we should find out the path which leads us to achieve the goal of eternal happiness, peace and harmony towards all the beings of the world.

Conclusion

Thus Jainism has propounded non-absolution (*anekānta-vāda*), non-violence (*ahiṃsā*), conduct of *aṇuvratas* including the tenet of limiting the possession, concepts of *triratna*, theory of *karman* etc. to remove conflicts of our minds which are by product of our

misunderstanding or ignorance. Right view and right knowledge are the guiding factors of our right attitude and conduct; we have to understand the limits of knowledge which occurs through sense organs, mind and intellect. A real knowledge comes out directly from the soul after a radical change in our internal views. We have to make our mind pure with positive change in thought process, we should develop a vast understanding of the reality and evolve the education system incorporating the spiritual and moral values through learning the *anekānta-vāda*, *nayavāda*, non-violence, theory of *karma* etc. in resolving the conflicts and live a peaceful and progressive life with co-existence of all the diversities of all beings in the world.

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
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