

# THE SPIRITUAL PLACE OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION IN BUDDHISM

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It is now just about a hundred years since the Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic (*pramāṇavāda*) entered, as such, the view of the scholarly world. After the serious research-efforts of — roughly speaking — three generations of scholars, we are slowly entering into a new phase of research, which I wishfully think of as the phase when the great remaining philological tasks will be taken up, and when the individual theoretical achievements of the tradition's masters will finally be understood and judged in their value as contributions to the finding and solving of the relevant philosophical problems in detail. This, then, is a suitable moment, not only to survey and put in good order work done so far — and organize and prepare for future enterprises, but also to reflect in a more general sense on the validity and correctness of the hitherto gained concepts regarding this particular tradition's meaning within the context of Buddhist and Asian culture.

My following remarks are an example of such a reflection. The question I shall use as a leitmotiv — the question for the “spiritual place” — has already been answered, I think; but the scholarly development of this answer (the difficulties in seeing what was always there, the sometimes forcible misinterpretations etc.), its “prehistory” is a dramatic diagram showing the course of the reaction of the so-called “Western”, or as I prefer to say “modern”, scholar to a specific Buddhist cultural phenomenon.

Within its relatively smaller cultural significance for the history of modern scholarly emancipation, this case-history is certainly comparable to the only other one that has been studied so far, i.e. the history of understanding the concept(s) of *nirvāṇa* in Western scholarship.<sup>(2)</sup>

That I present this case to a learned Japanese audience has good reasons. The significant progress of our knowledge of the epistemological tradition during the last two or three decades is largely due to the effort of a few outstanding Japanese scholars. Without their work we could not hope today for any substantial further promotion of knowledge in the field. Some major studies have been written in this country in the last twenty years, and — what is equally important — an academic tradition has grown: a considerable number of young Japanese scholars seems to be devoted to the study of the epistemological tradition.

I am honoured and moved to have been given the chance to work with these colleagues and discuss my problems among them. And I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Japanese authorities and the University of Kyōto who made this visit possible, and to my colleagues and friends, above all to Prof. Kajiyama Y., Prof. Mimaki K., and Dr. Yuyama A., who took upon themselves all the troubles that accompany such an invitation.

A final preparatory remark seems appropriate: As to the main points, you will not find many new facts or aspects in my lecture. Most of the facts and interpretational ideas will be known to the specialists. It's the reconsideration, the attempt to state clearly how far our understanding of this tradition's cultural meaning has come, that will hopefully receive the honour of your kind interest.

## I

One of the causes for difficulty in understanding the features of particular cultural phenomena seems to be the situation that a scholar finds in his object of research something which he does not like to find. The evaluation of the long and fully developed tradition of Buddhist epistemology and logic has been marred by considerable interpretational injustice done by indological research, for the very reason that the appearance of the object and its context was not to the liking of the concerned scholars.

Nearly all Indian philosophical traditions after about the second century A.D. show a more or less distinct interest in epistemological problems. In the second phase of the great theoretical period of Brahmanical, Jinist, and Buddhist philosophy from about the fifth to the twelfth century A.D. these problems and their solutions provided the main directions and tasks of philosophical work.

Within Buddhism it is Dignāga who, in the first half of the 6th century, founded a distinct tradition of epistemology. Henceforth this tradition acted an important part in the development of Indian philosophical thought by being partner sometimes, often model, and mostly opponent to similar Brahmanical and Jainist traditions throughout the second half of the millenium, and it became extinct in India only with the disappearance of Buddhism. While there is no real continuation of the tradition in Chinese Buddhism, the Tibetans have become its heirs and keepers. For the main stream of Tibetan Buddhism the categories and theories of the tradition are still valid today.

The presence of such a tradition with its primary interest in analysis of cognition and its tendency to apply the epistemological results to the ontological level of the systems has puzzled its modern interpreters. This is mainly because of the apparent contradiction that was assumed to exist between this analytical approach and the clearly practical goal of all Indian speculation, particularly of Buddhist philosophy, which systematically and historically understands philosophical theory as a rational complement to the progress towards liberation.<sup>(3)</sup>

In short: It seemed to be incompatible that the Buddhist philosopher with his basically practical and religious goal would waste his efforts on investigations of seemingly purely theoretical, non-religious problems, such as the possibility and nature of perception, truth and falsity of cognition, logic, the meaning of words.

This seeming contradiction resulted in the peculiar fact that the question of whether this tradition assumed a spiritual status within Buddhism — if asked at all by scholars concerned — has usually been answered quite negatively. And the common denominator of these various negative attitudes is the opinion that the problems, intentions, work, and accomplishments of the tradition are essentially unbuddhistic, heterogeneous to the teachings of the Buddha, and that, with the development of such a tradition, “worldly” interest had gained a footing within a religion that aims for liberation and is of meditational practice.

In terms of the motive mentioned for a misinterpretation we can roughly distinguish two kinds of wrong, or at least heavily one-sided, evaluations of this Buddhist tradition's nature, both of which finally result in a misunderstanding of the tradition historically — within its context — and with regard to its spiritual function within the larger frame of Buddhist and then also of Asian culture in general. Both kinds of interpretations have been propounded by most eminent scholars in publications widely read and relied upon — which is a further reason why we should deal with this topic.

1. For a scholar such as Edward Conze, who understands and explains Buddhism with an emphasis on its practical, religious ideas,<sup>(4)</sup> the phenomenon of a Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic has the distinct meaning of being a sign of a deplorable distortion and corruption of the basic ideas and values of Buddhism during the last phase of Buddhism in India. It seems that he would rather not deal with this product of Buddhist culture at all; but, he says as he introduces the chapter "The later logicians" of his influential book *Buddhist Thought in India*, London 1962: "Both because of their theoretical importance, and the current interest in logic, we must briefly allude to the principles of Buddhist logic as developed by the school of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara . . ." (264).

Conze's deprecating approach towards the tradition is conspicuously revealed by his later statements, e.g.: "At variance with the spirit of Buddhism, it can indeed be tolerated only as a manifestation of 'skill in means'. Logic was studied 'in order to vanquish one's adversaries in controversy', and thereby to increase the monetary resources of the order." (265), and later: "The importance, validity and usefulness of Buddhist logic is circumscribed by its social purpose, and the works of the logicians can therefore exhibit the holy doctrine only in a distinctly truncated form." (267).

This is the judgement of a scholar troubled by the historical fact of an epistemological tradition, because it does not fit into his picture of Buddhism.

2. We also have, however, the other, positive approach of Indological research to this tradition, but on the basis of the same estimation of the tradition as being unbuddhistic. This approach even culminates in celebrating the tradition as the philosophical achievement of India, but remains more or less uneasy about the fact that these philosophers did not try to shed their religious "adornment", that they were Buddhists after all.

It all started with Theodor Stcherbatsky. Stcherbatsky gave the first general philosophical interpretation of the tradition — in details obsolete, but as such still unsurpassed — in the four times<sup>(5)</sup> reprinted first volume of his *Buddhist Logic*, Leningrad 1932. The gist of his interpretation springs clearly from statements like: "The Buddhists themselves call this their science a doctrine of logical reasons (*hetuvidyā*) or a doctrine of the sources of right knowledge (*pramāṇavidyā*) or, simply, an investigation of right knowledge (*saṃyagjñānavyutpādanam*). It is a doctrine of truth and error. In the intention of its promoters the system had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path towards Salvation. It claims to be the natural and

general logic of the human understanding.” (2), and: “As a religion Buddhism remained in this period much the same as it has been in the preceding one. Some changes were introduced in the theory of Nirvāṇa, of the Buddha, and of the Absolute in order to bring it in line with the idealistic principles of the system. The greatest men of this period seem to have been free thinkers.” (13f.)

With Stcherbatsky the principal achievement of the tradition consisted in the development of a kind of liberal theory, emancipated from the religious background, although historically connected with it, and the basic ideas even of Buddhism in general seemed to him to be very near to modern world-views on scientific bases.

Stcherbatsky's attitude is representative of a period, when — until about 1928<sup>(6)</sup> — leading Buddhist circles in the Soviet Union were still convinced of among the religions of this world. Thus Stcherbatsky's emphasis on the dialectic was considered as a sufficient reason to grant to Buddhism an exceptional position among the religions of this world. Thus Stcherbatsky's emphasis on the dialectical and logical, and — in his opinion — “positive” tradition of Buddhism was therefore a timely one.

A similar attitude is extant in more recent interpretations with a background in contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophies which have taken the perspective of not accepting as “philosophy” anything that is not analytical and critical philosophy. Such interpreters are not particularly troubled by the “religious” component of our tradition for the simple reason that within the limits of the self-adjusted focus on their research-object they do not deal with this aspect at all.

A clear-cut proponent of this attitude is A.K. Warder in his *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, Delhi 1971.<sup>(7)</sup> Lovers of our tradition should rejoice over such an attitude's advantageous effects on the interest and literary space reserved for it — de Jong in his review<sup>(8)</sup> weighs nine lines for Śaṅkara against sixteen pages for Dignāga in Warder's book —; but this emphasis is for the wrong reasons, as I shall show. It therefore produces an unbalanced historical picture, and is thus in the long run rather an impediment to propagating a true understanding of the tradition's aims.

3. This positive approach is of course not limited to “Western” scholars; we find it with “Indian” scholars too. A good example is Sukumar Dutt who shares Stcherbatsky's opinion of the epistemological tradition in his book *Buddhist Monks and Monasteries of India*, London 1962, showing, however, a different motivation for his interpretation which I am tempted to term “nationalistic”.

Dutt takes the epistemological tradition totally at facevalue, i.e. as the

theoretical basis of Buddhist success in learned and polemical disputations. Beyond that he considers epistemology and logic to be one of the main characteristics of the period of the decline of Buddhism. The essential change of Buddhist monastic culture during the second half of the first millenium A.D. was a progress “from ‘Study for Faith’ to ‘Study for Knowledge’ ” (319). “A phenomenon, increasingly evident in the decline of Buddhism, is the gradual modification of the purely conventual character of the monasteries. From being seats of monk-life and monk-culture, they grew into centres of general learning and liberal scholarship.” (319). The centres of this development are those big monasteries (*mahāvihāra*) that are usually called “universities”. Dutt understands these establishments mainly as places for general education: “This traditional learning of the monasteries had been at its beginning a cloistered pursuit - learning in canonical lore for the benefit and use of monkhood. But it was progressively liberalized - extended and enlarged in its scope and contents and made available not to monks alone, but to all seekers after knowledge.”(319), “The monasteries, having grown up as seats of liberal learning, . . . . . They seem to have partaken of the character of *studia generalia*.” (325), and “Some of the monasteries which had grown into seminaries of learning . . . developed an organization entitling them to be classed as ‘universities’.” (327).

In short: Dutt tries to transform these Buddhist monasteries into old Indian universities.<sup>(9)</sup> But although the development of a university character is quite distinct — e.g. participation of laymen in the general education —, Dutt’s emphasis on phenomena of secularization in general and on the purely secular utility of our tradition’s achievements in particular is biased in accordance with his aims.<sup>(10)</sup>

All these “secularistic” interpretations take the superficial appearance and practical function of the Buddhist epistemological tradition as the sole basis for an interpretation of its cultural meaning. They praise it highly for the very reason that it is assumed to present a development of rational secularization within Buddhist monastic culture, or — to put it in an exaggerated way for clarity’s sake — for the reason that it presents dawning of “modern, Western” progress within the “dark ages” of traditional religious India. On the other hand, scholars with inclinations towards the religious, practical, and mystical components of Buddhism tend to scorn this same tradition for the very same reasons.

The assumption common to all these approaches is that the epistemological tradition presents an essential deviation from the spirit of Buddhism. And the methodical fault common to all these approaches is that none of them

raises the question of the tradition's self-understanding.

But precisely this self-understanding, the tradition's awareness of its own character, aims, and motivations, is clearly formulated from the very "beginning" of the tradition, i.e. the composition of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and it has not only never been lost by Dignāga's followers, but has rather been developed and deepened. A historical and critical answer to the question of the spiritual place and cultural function of the epistemological tradition within Buddhism, therefore, has to take its cue from the specific answer given by the tradition itself.

## II

This answer can be found in the Maṅgala-verse of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. It was conceived with a stroke of genius around 530 A.D., and can be considered the cornerstone that marks the historical border between the dialectical and the truly epistemological period of our tradition. Its importance is not only underlined by the literary masses written as a commentary to it, but also by the attitude toward it in later Buddhist history.<sup>(11)</sup> The verse, together with Dignāga's own explanation, is well known thanks to Prof. Hattori's brilliant philological work, the edition, translation and explanation of the whole first chapter.<sup>(12)</sup> With gratitude I take advantage of his work and would like to refer to the Appendix II which shows the logical structure of the first half of the verse in accordance with Prof. Hattori's scheme<sup>(13)</sup> of p.74 and his translation.

Let me first quote the translation of the verse, which deviates only slightly from Prof. Hattori's, since I prefer to translate the term *pramāṇabhūta* in its technical meaning<sup>(14)</sup>:

"Saluting Him, who has become a means of valid cognition, who seeks the benefit of all living beings, who is the teacher, the *sugata*, the protector, I shall, for the purpose of establishing the means of valid cognition, compose the (Pramāṇa-)samuccaya, uniting here under one head my theories scattered (in many treatises)."

Dignāga explains the meaning of the Buddha's attributes in the verse's first part as follows: The fact that the Buddha has become a means of valid cognition is the result of the development of certain qualities to perfection. These qualities are further differentiated as perfections in cause (*hetu*) and perfections in effect (*phala*), where the two terms "cause" and "effect" bear the meaning they have as categories of describing the career of a Bodhisattva. There is a causal relation between these qualities and the status of having become a means of valid cognition (*hetuphalasampattyā pramāṇabhūtatva-*). The first two perfections, his perfection in intention (*āśayasampad*) and his perfection in practice (*prayogasampad*), guarantee that the Buddha does not teach anything that is deceitful and wrong; that means, he does not lie, and what he has seen himself he transmits to other beings without distortions. The second two perfections, his perfect attainment of his own objectives as well as of those of other beings (*svaparārthasampad*), guarantee that what he has seen is of value for others; for he has not only gone the whole path, but he also knows exactly the needs of all other living beings. These qualities together constitute the fact that the Buddha's words are not only valid, but also valuable.

Due to the lack of pre-Dharmakīrtian commentaries on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* we have, I think, no way of knowing for sure whether Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the causal relation between the qualities of perfection in cause and effect on the one side, and the Buddha's having become a means of valid cognition on the other side, as a logical relation is in accordance with Dignāga's original intentions. Or, in other words, whether it is true that Dignāga's intention was to conceal a veritable inference or proof in the garb of a series of five successive attributes in the dative. A reader unbiased by the later understanding would take the meaning to be that Dignāga emphasizes *pramāṇabhūta* as a new attribute, adding to it the causes for this quality summarized in the four other attributes. He then would say Dignāga's purpose in writing the book is to establish the means of valid cognition, to explain what a means of valid cognition is, how many there are, and so on. On the other hand, this problem is minor, since we must take the understanding of the later tradition as the decisive one; and that understanding has been shaped by Dharmakīrti.

This first part of the verse, then, has been interpreted as a proof in the commentarial tradition shaped and determined by Dharmakīrti.<sup>(15)</sup> The Buddha, subject of the proof, is said to be an authority, a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). The logical reason is twofold, consisting on the one side of his self-acquired knowledge of the final goal and of the path towards it, and on the other side of a certainty — itself due to his perfect compassion — that he does not deceive other beings



in mediating this knowledge of the goal and the path to them. The first elaborate explanation of the verse as such a proof<sup>(16)</sup> is to be found in the chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* which is entitled “establishment of the means of valid cognition” (*pramāṇasiddhi*).

The import of this proof of the Buddha’s being a means of valid cognition, or, in other words, of the authority of the Buddha’s words, for a Buddhist theory of valid cognition seems evident. But the relation between the theory of valid cognition as such and the words of the Buddha hidden in this verse and its commentaries has to be determined as precisely as possible if we suspect some general cultural significance in it.

In a recent article<sup>(17)</sup> Prof. Nagatomi quotes the introductory general statement of Prof. Hattori in the latter’s notes on this verse.<sup>(18)</sup> According to Prof. Hattori Dignāga shows himself to be a true heir of the “critical attitude” of the Buddha: “Unlike his predecessors, Dignāga does not accept the unconditional authority of Scripture. According to him, the words of the Buddha must be subjected to critical test before they are accepted as valid.” (my spacing). While this statement is certainly correct with regard to Dignāga in its general terms, it cannot be taken — and was not intended to be taken, I think — as a statement referring to the relation between the validity of the means of valid cognition and the words of the Buddha.

If it is taken as an interpretation of this relation, wrong conclusions will be drawn. The possible source of such misinterpretation is the expression “critical test”. For “critical test” in this context can have two meanings: It can be understood as a critical test of the assumption that the Buddha’s words are valid, i.e. as an investigation and finally an argumentative establishment of their validity, a “*pramāṇasiddhi*”; or it can be understood as a critical test of the validity of the Buddha’s words, i.e. a process to judge whether these words are true or false.

Prof. Nagatomi took it in this latter meaning, and develops the following scheme: “The testing of the validity of the Buddha’s words requires a tool which was for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti the *pramāṇa*, the valid means of cognition. Such a tool, at least in principle, may be expected to be one which is universally acceptable to all and free from dogmatic premises and presuppositions . . . . . We must note, however, that the final authority by which they claimed the validity of their *pramāṇa* system was none other than the Buddha’s words which they accepted as authentic by faith. Thus the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system and the authenticity of the Buddha’s words stood, in reality, in a reciprocal relation: the structuring of the former was done within the limits of the latter, and the latter

was meant to be supported by the former.”<sup>(19)</sup> (my spacing)

Nagatomi rightly concludes that the epistemological methodology of Dignāga was intended “to articulate the nature of the Buddhist *ways of knowing* by translating their prototypes drawn from the Buddha’s words into the vocabulary of epistemology, logic and semantics.”<sup>(20)</sup> He also has the right feeling about a reciprocity of the relation in question, but his interpretation of this reciprocity remains on the surface, and his statement that they, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, accepted the Buddha’s words as authentic by faith comes as a considerable shock to the reader who has just been informed by Hattori’s words and Nagatomi’s paraphrase that these philosophers did not accept an unconditional authority of the scriptures. Thus according to Nagatomi’s explanation there is in fact no real reciprocity in the relation between “the Buddhist *pramāṇa* system and the authenticity of the Buddha’s words”. For his scheme means that a tool, the *pramāṇa*, is used to test the validity of the Buddha’s words. But this testing is not taken seriously: Since the validity of the tool is derived from the Buddha’s words, Prof. Nagatomi thinks that these are only “meant to be supported by the former” (*ibid.*), their real authority being accepted by faith.

In short, this conception of the relation between the theory of valid cognitions and Buddhist revelation is insufficient. Is there a better one? Yes. Even though another scholar, L.W.J. van der Kuip, regrets in the beginning of another recent article<sup>(21)</sup> that “the *Pramāṇavārttika* and its position within the continuum of Buddhist philosophy which, despite the efforts of a handful of scholars, have not been adequately treated up to the present day” (6) and that “the position of logic within Buddhist philosophy and the answer to the question whether it should play a role in Buddhism at all has been ignored by Western scholars . . .” (6; my spacing), this is not true at all.

Not only have there been clear answers as I tried to show in the beginning — without, for various reasons, — also asking the question — but a fully acceptable explanation of our problem has been elaborately presented by Tilmann Vetter in his book of 1964, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*.

### III

Vetter’s explanation, of course, is one of Dharmakīrti’s “profound re-

elaboration” (*loc.cit.*, 9) of Dignāga’s position. If Dharmakīrti, however, decided to develop a theory of valid cognition taking his stand on Dignāga’s Maṅgala-verse,<sup>(22)</sup> and if the following tradition considers itself as being determined by this interpretation, we have to take this interpretation of Dharmakīrti as the source for an understanding of the answer to the question we are asking; an answer that must be admitted to be — with respect to our possibilities of a critical, contextually secured interpretation — enigmatically hidden in this Maṅgala-verse for lack of pre-Dharmakīrtian sources commenting upon it.

The two paragraphs of Vetter’s explanation most important for our context are translated in the appendix I to this paper. I would like to repeat his results in accordance with the structural lines given by our problem:

Valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*, *samyagjñāna*) are a necessary presupposition of meaningful human action.<sup>(23)</sup> The Buddhist’s actions are orientated towards the goal of emancipation. This goal and the path leading towards it have been shown by the Buddha. The Buddha thus offers a goal and guidance for human activity that cannot be derived from ordinary means of cognition, i.e. perception and inference. However, that he is an authority for this has to be proven, for faith alone is an insufficient motive to be a Buddhist. The words of the Buddha can be accepted as an authority only when it has been demonstrated that they are words of somebody who shows through his conduct that he does not lie, and who because of the development of his experience has something to tell us that cannot be mediated to us in another way. For the last goal of human actions, which also is the only point of orientation for everyday human practice, has to be indicated by such an authority, since it is never immediately present — or it would not be a “last goal”. This is the gist of Vetter’s explanation.

The structural scheme of these ideas of Dharmakīrti turns out to be a true circle: The decisive defining characteristic of a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is the demand that it must stand the test of meaningful practice (*avisaṃvāda*), and connects it with the Buddha as the one on whose authority one knows what meaningful practice is. The reciprocity then is brought about by the need to prove this authority of the Buddha. For the words of the Buddha (*āgama*), as such, have neither guarantee for their truth nor for success on following their advice. Their validity has to be accounted for, and it is accounted for by the Buddha himself: “The statement that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition is proven through reference to the means by which he has become one.”<sup>(24)</sup>

This is the program of Dignāga as expounded by Dharmakīrti. It offers the answer to our question of the spiritual place of an epistemological tradition

within Buddhism. Dignāga's program contains the idea of a philosophical foundation of Buddhism, understood as human practice orientated by the words of the Buddha. Historically this means nothing else but that Buddhism, too, takes its part in that general philosophical development in India, from about the 3rd and 4th century A.D. onwards, that is characterized by an ever increasing interest in problems of dialectics, logic, and general epistemology.

The motive for such interest essential to our context can be found for the first time in the epistemology of the Sāṃkhya-teacher Vṛṣagaṇa<sup>(25)</sup> from the beginning of the 4th century A.D., according to Frauwallner. Vṛṣagaṇa seems to have been the first in India not only to consider epistemology as a prerequisite for the elaboration of his systematic philosophy, but also to establish his system methodically on, and by means of, this epistemology by creating a theory of inference which was such that the actual inferences used as a philosophical tool permitted the argumentative derivation of the system's metaphysical principles.

Already this case of Vṛṣagaṇa shows what is valid for all other epistemological traditions, too: that the respective epistemology is developed, being linked up with the philosophical system. That — in other words — there is in India no emancipation of epistemology from the respective systematic ideas, and that epistemology nowhere becomes a "positive science" in the sense of Th. Stcherbatsky.

The Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic thus presents another clear example of the relativity of epistemological thought. Buddhist epistemology turns out to be related to a certain order of the values and goals that govern human practice; it therefore cannot be investigated and evaluated without reference to this order, as if it were separated from it. The epistemological achievements of this Buddhist tradition thus not only have their truly deserved position in the general history of Indian philosophy, and so of the history of the human mind, but also in the history of Buddhism as a religion.

APPENDIX. I : A translation of T. Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*. Wien 1964.

p.27 "The means of valid cognition have to procure cognition for action. The


definition that something new is cognized by these (PV II 5c) raises perception to the primary source of cognition. The definition that cognitions have to hold good (*avisaṃvādana*, PV II 1) puts the truth of every cognition to the test of success in action, and offers the opportunity to designate the Buddha as a means of valid cognition, although nothing new is cognized through words as such. The Buddha, however, is not equated with perception and inference. He is considered as a means of valid cognition, because his authority legitimates the authenticity of perception and inference. For the Buddha gives goal and guidance of action, which perception and inference cannot give, and which would be disposed of only by a superficial rationality (*flache Aufklärung*). That he is an authority on this has yet to be proven. For nobody is a Buddhist simply on trust. This results in a historical-factual circle, which Dharmakīrti has rightly not avoided.”

p.31f.: “When inference has been made available, the question of the Buddha as a means of valid cognition can be asked. Not in anyway is the transmitted word of the Buddha, as such, to be considered as an authority only because somebody who passes for holy uttered it, or because it is considered by many as an authoritative transmitted record (*āgama*). Not until it is shown that these words originate from somebody who proves through his conduct that he does not lie and who has something to say that is not at everybody’s disposal, not until then, can he be accepted as a means of valid cognition. The highest goal of action has to be given by such an authority; for it is not immediately present, or it would not be the highest goal, since as soon as the highest goal has been reached there is no need for any further activity, except if one aims for the highest goal of other beings too.

The Buddha is the subject of which it is predicated that it knows this goal, and that it acts (= makes known) only for the sake of others. The reason for this is its conduct. Only a conduct that is pervaded by the possession of the highest goal can be of a kind as the Buddha’s. But that alone would not be sufficient. The Buddha is also the subject of which it is predicated that it knows the means that lead towards this goal. The reason for this is the process of its development.

The second chapter (*pramāṇasiddhi*) of the PV mainly deals with this proof of the Buddha’s authority. Through his authority, in turn, the authenticity of perception and inference are legitimated. If in this way a Buddhist system expresses in full awareness where it takes its foundations from, it is able, on the other hand, to modify these foundations by a logical procedure, measuring these foundations with the measure of reason.”

## APPENDIX. II : Causal/logical scheme of PS I, lab



## NOTES

- (1) This lecture has been delivered during the Spring-semester 1982 at the University of Tōkyō, of Kyōto, of Kyūshū, and at Waseda University.
- (2) Cf. G.R.Welbon, *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and Its Western Interpreters*. Chicago 1968, and J.W.de Jong's review in *JIPh* 1, 1972, 396–403.
- (3) Cf. L. Schmithausen, Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus. *Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religionswissenschaft* 3, 1973, 161–186.
- (4) Cf. e.g. Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels, *PhEW* 13, 1, 1963, 9–23 (reprint in *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*, Oxford 1968, 213).
- (5) The Hague 1958, New York 1962, Osnabrück 1970, Tōkyō 1977.
- (6) Cf. Heinz Bechert, Der Buddhismus in der heutigen weltpolitischen Situation. *Marxismusstudien* 6, 1968, 46f.
- (7) Cf. his "preliminary definitions" p.1f.; J.W.de Jong in his review (*IJJ* 16, 1975, 147–149) rightly stresses the incongruity of Warder's approach.
- (8) *loc.cit.* 148.
- (9) Concerning the motives of these monasteries' promotion through the Gupta kings he says: "To build monasteries and provide for their upkeep was regarded more as a service rendered to the cause of learning and culture than to the cause of Buddhism." (331)
- (10) For the purpose of explaining the educational position of the "science of logic (*hetuvidyā*)", e.g., he makes use only of sources that present it as one of the traditionally secular sciences (323f.): the two Chinese records, and Bu-ston who follows the secularistic interpretation of the early Sa-skya-pa. He then explains what I-tsing describes as the first, general level of the dialectical and logical education (transl. Takakusu, 176f), but does not deal with the "higher level" of these studies at all (cf. *ibid.*, 186), unaware, however — or leaving us uninformed — of any such differentiation.

- (11) cf. the legendary report of its composition in Bu-ston's history (transl. Obermiller, 150).
- (12) *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣāpariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions*, translated and annotated by Masaaki Hattori, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
- (13) First drawn by M. Nagatomi (cf. note 22), 266.
- (14) In accordance with Hattori's note 1.3.
- (15) cf. T. Vetter, *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*. Wien 1964, 32f. (translated in the appendix).
- (16) However, I have not seen so far a real formulation (*prayoga*) of this proof, or a series of such formulations - comparable, e.g. with the formulations in dGe-lugs-pa-exegeses of the *pramāṇa-siddhi*-chapter (cf. my paper: Tshad ma'i skyes bu. Meaning and Historical Significance of the Term, *Proceedings of the Csoma de Kőrös Symposium Velm-Wien*, Wien 1983, n.19) - earlier than the "commentarial" text from the appendix to the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, 521, 5-13 (cf. T. Kimura, *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi-shō ni tsuite. Tōhoku Indogaku Shūkyōgakkai, Ronshū* 2, 1970, 64ff.
- (17) M. Nagatomi, *Mānasa-Pratyakṣa: A Conundrum in the Buddhist Pramāṇa System*, *Sanskrit and Indian Studies*, ed. M. Nagatomi et al., Boston 1979, 243-260.
- (18) *loc.cit.* 246; the quotation is from Hattori, *loc.cit.*, 73.
- (19) *loc.cit.*, 246
- (20) *ibid.*; cf. Vetter, *loc.cit.*, 33, where he refers to Dharmakīrti's derivation of the truth about the means of valid cognition from the words of the Buddha in the four concluding verses of the *pramāṇa-siddhi*-chapter (PV II 282-285).
- (21) Introductory notes on the *Pramāṇavārttika* Based on Tibetan Sources, *The Tibet Journal* 4.2, 1979, 6-28.
- (22) The whole *pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* presents itself as a commentary on this verse. Cf. E. Frauwallner, Die Reihenfolge und Entwicklung der Werke Dharmakīrti's, *Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller*, Leipzig 1954, 143f.; M. Nagatomi, The Framework of the *Pramāṇavārttika* Book I, *JAOS* 79, 1959, 263-266; T. Kimura, *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi-shō ni tsuite. Tōhoku Indogaku Shūkyōgakkai, Ronshū* 2, 1970, 54-68.
- (23) Cf. the introductory sentences in *Pramāṇavārttika(śva)vṛtti* (ed. Gnoli) 1, 8f., and *Pramāṇa-viniścaya I* (ed. Vetter) 30, 12f.
- (24) Vetter, *loc.cit.*, 32.
- (25) Cf. E. Frauwallner, Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-systems, *WZKS* 2, 1958, 84-139.

## 「佛教認識論の系譜の精神的地位」

### ——解 説——

清水 公 庸

シニタインケルナー博士は佛教認識論、とりわけ7世紀頃に活躍し、以後佛教内外に多大な影響を及ぼしたダルマキールティの専門家として知られている。佛教認識論なる研究分野は、近代にはいり西欧人たちにより近代的な研究、特に言語的文献的なところに手が加えられ、サンスクリット（梵語）・パーリー語・チベット語などそれまで全くといっていい程手がつけられていなかった文献が研究されるようになり、中国・日本には伝わらなかった6世紀以降の認識論・論理学を中心とする佛教が知られるようになって開拓された分野である。新しい学問分野ではあるが、今や百年二世代の交替を経て除々に新しい段階へと移行しつつある。博士はこの段階を将来に向っての計画をたてるというだけではなく、従来なされてきた研究を再検討するのを通じた時期と見做され、佛教認識論を佛教における位置付けという点から検討しようとされたのがこの講演の目的である。

紀元後二世紀頃よりインド哲学全般に認識論の萌芽が見られるが、五世紀頃には高度に論理化した段階にはいり、その後の思想発展の方向がこれにより決定付けられた。佛教に於いては六世紀前半にディグナーガ（陳那）が現われ、それまでの弁証論＜古因明＞の時代と真に認識論的＜新因明＞な時代とに一線を画した。この後、この系譜は十二世紀のイスラム侵攻によりインドにおいて佛教が滅亡するまで、他学派に対し規範となりつつも論敵として続いていった。この系譜は真の意味では中国に引き継がれなかったが、チベット佛教においては今でもその整合性を保って引き継がれている。

さて、宗教である筈の佛教に、純理論的であり宗教とは別なところにしか存在しえぬような認識論の系譜が存在し、ということに我々は少なからず異和感を覚えるのだ。こういったところに佛教認識論は佛教内部に於いてどう位置付けられるのか、という疑問がでてくる。これについて博士は二つのとらえ方があったことを指摘されている。

つまり、E. コンゼのような学者は、解脱という実践的宗教的な性格を強調するあまり、認識論の系譜を、

佛教の基本的姿勢や価値を歪曲し腐敗をもたらしたものととする。逆に著名な『佛教論理学』を著わしたT. スチエルパツキーは、マルクス・レーニン主義の風潮の中でこの系譜を宗教的なものとは別な科学的基盤にたつ現代的な世界観に近いものと見做し、S. ダットも彼のインド文化論の立場から、伝統的宗教的なインドに西欧的現代的な意味で知の解放をもたらしたものとして賞讃する。併し、このような見解は全て佛教認識論の系譜が佛教の伝統から遊離したものと見做し、それぞれの立場からこの系譜を自分の見解に都合のよい様に批難或は評価しているのであって、そのどれもがこの系譜に対する誤解をひきおこしてきたと博士は評されている。

ではこの問題を解く糸口は何かということについて博士は、彼らが問題にしていなかったこと、つまりこの系譜の学匠達が自らの性格や目的・動機といったことをどう意識していたかといったことを検討することによって得られる、これは佛教認識論の基礎を築いたディグナーガにより意識され、その後の学匠達に承継がれ発展せしめられてきたことだから、とされ、ディグナーガの著『プラマーナ・サムッチャヤ（集量論）』の帰敬偈（<sup>ききようげ</sup> 佛への敬礼という形でその意趣を述べる偈）を検討されている。

“プラマーナ〔正しい認識手段〕となっておられ、全有情の利益を追求され、師であり善逝であり、（諸悪からの）擁護者たる彼（の佛陀）に敬礼し、私（ディグナーガ）は正しい認識手段を確立せんとして、（多くの著作中に）散在している私の理論をここで一つの思索のもとに統合することによりこの『プラマーナ・サムッチャヤ』を編んだのである。”

ここで問題にされるのは、佛陀の五つの特質としてあげられている中の一つ、「プラマーナとなっておられる」ということである。ディグナーガはこれを註して、佛陀は誤っていたり疑わしいことを一切言わぬということを保障する因位における決意と実践の成就、又佛陀のとらえたことは他の有情にとって価値あるものであることを保障する果位における自利と利他の成就を發展させることにより「プラマーナとなっておられる」のだとしている（Appendix II）。これら因位果位の成就という資質は菩薩の修行段階を述べているのだが、これらの資質とプラマーナであるという特質との間には因果関係が存在する。



ディグナーガの理解にみがきをかけたダルマキールティ及びその後の伝統ではこれを証明としてとらえ、佛陀は「プラマーナとなっておられる」という命題は二つの論証理由——究極的な目標とそれに至る道を知り得たという自証の知の側面と、その目標や道程を求める他の有情を欺かないという完全なる慈悲に根ざした確実さ——に依って証明されるとする。ダルマキールティが、証明という関係でとらえようとしたことについてシュタインケルナー博士は、「佛陀が正しい認識根拠であるということ、換言すれば佛陀の言葉の権威というものを証明することが、佛教の正しい認識の理論にとって重要であることは明らかであると思える」とされながらも、更に服部・永富博士の見解を引かれて追求されている。

服部博士は、ディグナーガは自らを佛陀の批判的精神の真の継承者であるとし、彼によれば經典は無条件に確実なものとは認めえず、(他学派ではこれを「聖教量」として無条件にみとめるが、佛教認識論ではこれを排除し、「現量<知覚>」「比量<推理>」しか認めていない)、佛陀の言葉の正当性を認めるには「批判的検証」が必要である、と言われている。シュタインケルナー博士は、この言明は一般的なものとしては正しいが、佛陀の言葉と正しい認識手段の正当性との関係としてとらえることは出来ず、もしそう考えれば誤った結論を導き出してしまふ。それは「批判的検証」という表現であり、これが二つの意味——佛陀の言葉というものが正当であるという命題を考察し議論を通して確立すること、或はそれらの言葉が真であるのか偽であるのかを判断する手続き——に解しうるからだ、とされている。服部博士の言を受け後者の意味を採られた永富博士は、佛陀の言葉を検証するにはプラマーナという手段が必要であったが、これは独断を離れ万人に普遍的に認められるようなものでなければならない。しかし一方でそのプラマーナの体系の正当性を主張するとき基づいた最終的な権威は「信仰により権威が認められた」佛陀の言葉に他ならず、「したがってプラマーナの体系と佛陀の言葉の権威の間には、前者は後者の範囲の中でなされ、後者は前者によって支えられるべくあるというような『互恵的な関係』がある」とされ、「ディグナーガの認識論的方法論は、『知恵の探究』ということ、佛陀の言葉から引き出されたその原型を認識論や論理学・意味論の語彙に翻訳することにより明瞭に表現しようとしたものである」と結論されている。

永富博士が「互恵性」を感じられたのも或いは当然かも知れぬが、その説明は表面的でしかない。博士が、「信仰により」佛陀の言葉が権威あるものとされたと言われたことと、ディグナーガやダルマキールティは佛陀の言葉が無条件では認めなかったと博士や服部博士が言われたこととは明確な食い違いがある。博士の論旨は、ディグナーガ達はプラマーナを使って佛陀の言葉の真偽判断をしようとしたということであり、ただその手段としてのプラマーナについてその正当性が佛陀の言葉から抽出され、これについては信仰によって認められていたということである。そして結局博士は、佛陀の権威はプラマーナの体系によって与えられていたと考えておられるのである。故に「正しい認識の理論と佛教の解脱ということとの関係についての理解は不充分である」とシュタインケルナー博士は評される。しかし実はこれ以前にダルマキールティの註釈に従ったT・フェッターが十全なる説明をしていたのである。

シュタインケルナー博士はT・フェッターの解説を引用し<Appendix I>、概ね次のように説明されている。

佛教徒の活動は解脱という目標に向けられているが、この目標に至るには確実で正しい認識というものが必要とされる。佛教認識論にとって「正しい認識手段<プラマーナ>の特質を明確にしようとする、それが有意義な活動(avisamvādāna)であるかどうかという検証に耐えねばならない。」勿論解脱という目標もそれに至る道も佛陀によって提示されたものであり、又知覚や推理という普通の認識手段によって導き出せるものでもない。しかし佛陀の言葉というだけでは、それが真実であるとは限らぬし、そういうことだけで佛陀の言葉に従ったところで成功は保障されない、つまり有意義であるとは限らない。したがって有意義な活動であるかどうかということは「佛陀——その人の権威により人は何が有意義な活動であるのかを知りうる、そういう人——と関係づけられなければならない。」つまり佛陀自身によって証明されねばならないのであり、そして事実なされていたのである。即ち、ダルマキールティは佛陀の権威を「佛陀はプラマーナとなっておられる」という命題の証明として追求したのであるが、実はこの証明は佛陀が佛陀となられたその過程——二つの論証理由として示されたものの、ディグナーガでは因位果位の成就——に言及する

### 「仏教認識論の系譜の精神的地位」（清水）

ことによりなされていたのである。そして‘互恵性’はこういったところにもたらされるのである。

以上の考察を通してシュタインケルナー博士は当初の問題に次のような解答を与えられている。ディグナーがプラマーナの体系を構築しようとしたとき「その構図には、佛陀の言葉によって指示された人間活動と解釈される佛教、そういうものの哲学的な基盤への思索が含まれている。歴史的にはこのことは弁証論・論理学・一般認識論に対する興味が増すことによって発展してきた3～4世紀以降の一般哲学に佛教も参与した、ということとしかない。」しかし「認識論は体系的な哲学を細密に説明するための必須条件」であった。この体系化を最初に行ったのはサーンキヤ（数論）学派のヴルシャガナ（4世紀初）と目されるが、

その哲学体系からインド諸哲学派の認識論が発展したとされている。そしてこれらの認識論は全て各々の体系的思索から遊離することはなかった。そして先述の如く「佛教認識論も人間活動を決定付ける価値や目標についての特定の秩序と関係している」のであり、ステルバッキーの言うような非宗教的で価値観を排除した‘実証科学’となることはなかった。したがって又このような佛教認識論の性格を無視して研究・評価されてはならない。

そして最後にシュタインケルナー博士は、「佛教認識論はインド哲学史や人間の心の歴史においてだけでなく、宗教としての佛教の歴史においても真に相応しい地位を得ている。」としめくくられている。

（しみず・こうよう 南都佛教編集委員）