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ŚRAMAᅇA

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Emerging Western scholarship of Jainism



Pārśwanātha Vidyāpīᅇha, Varanasi

Established in 1937

पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ, वाराणसी

Namaskāra Mantra

| | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| नमो अरिहंताणं । | namo Arihantāṇaṃ |
| नमो सिद्धाणं । | namo Siddhāṇaṃ |
| नमो आयरियाणं । | namo Āyariyāṇaṃ |
| नमो उवज्झायाणं । | namo Uvajjhāyāṇaṃ |
| नमो लोए सव्वसाहूणं ॥ | namo loe Savvasāhūṇaṃ |
| एसो पंच नमुक्कारो । | eso pañca namukkāro |
| सव्वपावप्पणासणो । | sa vvapāvappaṇāsaṇo |
| मंगलाणं च सव्वेसिं । | maṅgalāṇaṃ ca savvesiṃ |
| पढमं हवइ मंगलं ॥ | paḍhamāṃ havai maṅgalaṃ |

I bow and seek inspiration from perfected human souls (Arihantas or Tīrthaṅkaras), liberated souls (Siddhas), enlightened ascetic leaders (Ācāryas), ascetic teachers (Upādhyāyas) and all monks and nuns (Sādhus and Sādhvīs) in the world who practice non-violence (Ahiṃsā), truthfulness (Satya), non-stealing (Acourya), celibacy (Brahmacarya) and non-possessiveness (Aparigraha) in their conduct, non-absolutistic viewpoint (Anekāntavāda) in their thinking.

Such praise will help to diminish my negative vibrations and sins.

श्रमण

ŚRAMAᅇA

(Since 1949)

जैन विद्या की त्रैमासिक शोध-पत्रिका

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Parshwanath Vidyapeeth : At a Glance

- 1935 Formed Shri Sohanlal Jain Dharma Pracharak Samiti, Amritsar.
- 1937 Established as an Institute of Indology in general and Jainology in particular in the memory of Punjab Keshari Sthanakwasi Jainacharya Pujya Sohanlal Ji Maharaj.
Formerly known as P.V. Research Institute, after few changes in its name finally named as Parshwanath Vidyapeeth.
- 1938 Established Shatawadhani Ratanchand Library.
- 1942 Established Jagannath Jain Hostel.
- 1944 Started Research activities.
- 1949 Introduced *Śramaṇa*, a Bi-lingual monthly Research Journal of Jainology.
- 1950 Registered Parshwanath Vidyapeeth under Society Registration Act 1860.
- 1968 The main building inaugurated.
- 1973 Recognized as an External Research Center from BHU.
- 1988 Parshwanath Vidyapeeth celebrated its Golden Jubilee.
- 1996 According to UGC recommendation PG course in four subject were taught (1996-1997)
- 1997 (i) Introduced a Project on Encyclopedia of Jaina Studies
(ii) Established Parshwanath Vidyapeeth Museum with donation from Shri Satyendra Mohan Jain.
- 1998 (i) Parshwanath Vidyapeeth celebrated its Diamond Jubilee.
(ii) Monthly Journal *Śramaṇa* converted into Bilingual Quarterly Research Journal.
- 2005 Prof. Cromwell Crawford visited the Institute to explore the possibility of running ISSJS courses.
- 2006 (i) Started at the campus Summer school by ISSJS.
(ii) Established Global Centre for Ahimsā and Indological Research (A joint venture of ISJS & PV)
(iii) Formed a committee for the financial support of PV named **Akhil Bhartiya Shravak Samiti** by the blessings of Param Poojya Acharya Shivmuniji Maharaj.
(iv) Formed New Management Committee headed by Dr. Shugan C. Jain.

- 2011 (i) Published and Inagurated Encyclopaedia of Jaina Studies Vol. I (Art & Architecture).
(ii) Proposed to open a new branch of Parshwanath Vidyapeeth at Delhi.
(iii) To introduce *Śramaṇa* online on our Website in 2011.
(iv) Upgradation of Parshwanath Vidyapeeth Website
(www.parshwanathvidyapeeth.org)
- 2012 Proposed Celebration of Platinum Jubilee of Parshwanath Vidyapeeth.

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Source of Inspiration: Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi, Pt. Bechardas Doshi, Padmabhusan Pt. Dalsukh Malvania and Prof. Sagarmal Jain.

Founder : Shri Lala Ratnachand Harjasrai Jain

Patrons : Shri Sohan Lalji Duggar, Shri Deepchand Gardi,
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Ph. D. awarded (63) : Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Dr. Indrachandra Shastri, Dr. Gulabchand Chaudhari, Dr. Mohanlal Mehta, Dr. Gokul Chand Jain, Dr. Komal Chand Jain, Dr. Sudarshan Lal Jain, Dr. Bashishth Narayan Sinha etc.

सम्पादकीय

सर्वप्रथम मैं अपने सुविज्ञ पाठकों से क्षमाप्रार्थी हूँ कि जनवरी-मार्च २०११ का अंक समय पर प्रकाशित नहीं कर सके। इसका प्रमुख कारण है विदेशी अजैन विद्वानों द्वारा लिखित लेखों का सम्पादन करना। हमारे बोर्ड ने निर्णय लिया है कि इस अंक में ISJS के अन्तर्गत जून-जुलाई २०१० में समागत विदेशी विद्वानों की दृष्टि में जैन धर्म-दर्शन की अवधारणाओं को आप तक पहुँचाया जाए और श्रमण का यह अंक एक विशेषांक का रूप ले। इस दिशा में डॉ० शुगन चन्द जैन जो श्रमण के शैक्षणिक बोर्ड के अध्यक्ष भी हैं, के अथक परिश्रम एवं सम्पादन का ही परिणाम है कि हम इसे कई मास की मेहनत के बाद सम्पादित कर सके। विशेषांक का उद्देश्य है विदेशी विद्वानों की भावनाओं का समादर करना तथा जैन विद्या के अध्ययन हेतु उन्हें प्रोत्साहित करना। इस अंक में ग्यारह लेख हैं जिनमें से सात लेख पूर्ण हैं तथा शेष चार का मात्र सारांश दिया गया है। इस अंक में हम अंग्रेजी लेखों का संस्कारित अति संक्षिप्त विवरण भी यहीं सम्पादकीय के बाद हिन्दी भाषा-भाषियों के लिए दे रहे हैं। इस योजना को आगे भी हम मूर्तरूप देने का प्रयास करेंगे ताकि हिन्दी और अंग्रेजी दोनों प्रकार के पाठकों को लाभ मिल सके।

श्रमण के इस अंक के विषय में डॉ० शुगन चन्द जैन ने अपने पुरोवाक् (Prologue) में निम्न विचार प्रकट किये हैं—

पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ और श्रमण ने विगत छः महीनों में जैन दर्शन और सामाजिक जीवन से सम्बद्ध अकादमिक गतिविधियों की गुणवत्ता और उसे गति प्रदान करने के लिये कई महत्त्वपूर्ण कदम उठाये हैं। श्रमण का यह अंक ISJS २०१० में सहभागी विदेशी विद्वानों के शोधपरक पत्रों की प्रस्तुति है। प्रस्तुत आलेखों में से कुछ आलेख विद्वानों के लघु शोध-प्रबन्ध हैं और कुछ विद्वानों की विषय विशेषज्ञता से सम्बन्धित हैं। जैन धर्मदर्शन के उभरते हुए विदेशी विद्वानों के प्रोत्साहन हेतु श्रमण का यह अंक प्रस्तुत है। आशा है विद्यापीठ का यह कदम जैन धर्मदर्शन के विकास मार्ग में मील का पत्थर साबित होगा।

लेखकों से निवेदन

हम विषय-विशेषज्ञों की संस्तुति (Review) के बाद ही आलेख छापना चाहते हैं। अतः लेखकों से निवेदन है कि लेख मौलिक, अप्रकाशित तथा शोधसन्दर्भों से सुसज्जित हो। किस संस्करण से सन्दर्भ लिए गए हैं? इसका उल्लेख अवश्य हो। हम देखते हैं कि कुछ लेखों के मूल सन्दर्भों को मिलाने में तथा उन्हें भाषा की दृष्टि से शुद्ध करने में बड़ी परेशानी होती है। लेख भेजते समय निम्न जानकारी अवश्य उपलब्ध कराएँ— लेखक का नाम, पद, पता, मोबाइल या फोन नं०, ई०मेल पता,

लेख पूर्व में प्रकाशित है अथवा अप्रकाशित है, कहीं अन्यत्र भी प्रकाशनार्थ भेजा है या नहीं। सन्थारा एवं ध्यान पर विशेषांक निकालने की योजना है अतः सुधि लेखकों से निवेदन है कि इन विषयों पर अपने लेख प्रेषित करें।

पाठकों से निवेदन

श्रमण के लेखों की गुणवत्ता के सन्दर्भ में आप अपने सुझाव अवश्य भेजें। हम उसे अगले अंक में आपके नाम के साथ 'पाठकों की दृष्टि में' शीर्षक के अन्तर्गत स्थान देंगे। इस विशेषांक के सन्दर्भ में आप अपने सुझाव अवश्य भेजें जिससे प्रेरित होकर हम जून-जुलाई २०११ में अध्ययनार्थ समागत विदेशी विद्वानों के लेखों के प्रकाशन पर विचार कर सकें।

समीक्षार्थ पुस्तक प्रेषकों से निवेदन

कृपया समीक्षार्थ पुस्तकों को भेजते समय उसकी दो प्रतियां भेजें क्योंकि एक प्रति हम समीक्षक को देते हैं तथा दूसरी पुस्तकालय में रखते हैं। एक प्रति भेजने पर हम समीक्षा नहीं करा सकेंगे, केवल साभार-प्राप्ति दिखा सकेंगे।

विदेशियों के अंग्रेजी लेखों को हमने उनकी ही भाषा शैली में प्रकाशित किया है। अतः उनकी प्रूफरीडिंग आदि में समागत त्रुटियों के लिए हम क्षमाप्रार्थी हैं। दिनांक १६ अप्रैल २०११ को आने वाली महावीर जयन्ती पर संपादक-मंडल की अग्रिम मंगल-कामना है।

इस विशेषांक के प्रकाशन में अपने सभी सहयोगियों का आभारी हूँ। डॉ. शुगनचन्द जैन का विशेष रूप से आभारी हूँ जिनकी लगन का यह परिणाम है। डॉ. श्रीप्रकाश पाण्डेय, संयुक्त सम्पादक ने अंग्रेजी लेखों की प्रूफ रीडिंग के साथ-साथ बड़े मनोयोग पूर्वक अंग्रेजी लेखों का हिन्दी में सारांश भी प्रस्तुत किया है, एतदर्थ वह निश्चय ही बधाई के पात्र हैं। सहयोग के लिये डॉ० नवीन कुमार श्रीवास्तव एवं डॉ० राहुल कुमार सिंह को भी मैं धन्यवाद देता हूँ। टंकण कार्य एवं सेटिंग के लिये श्री विमल चन्द्र मिश्र तथा सुन्दर एवं सत्वर मुद्रण हेतु श्री आनन्द कुमार जैन निश्चय ही धन्यवाद के पात्र हैं।

अंग्रेजी लेखों का संक्षिप्त हिन्दी रूप

१. जैन लोक-विज्ञान का सार्वकालिक महत्त्व

ओस्लो यूनिवर्सिटी के शोध छात्र श्री क्लूट आकलैंड को यह लेख लिखने की प्रेरणा दिगम्बर आर्यिका माता ज्ञानमती द्वारा स्थापित हस्तिनापुर के श्री दिगम्बर त्रिलोक शोध संस्थान में जैन लोक के स्वरूप की उत्कृष्ट झांकी को देखकर मिली। लेखक के मन में यह प्रश्न आना स्वाभाविक था कि जैन धर्म जिसके केन्द्रविन्दु में मोक्ष है

उसे लोकविज्ञान से क्या लेना देना? श्री आकलैंड का मानना है कि लोकविज्ञान एक ऐसा क्षेत्र है जिसकी जैन अध्ययन में उपेक्षा की गयी है जबकि यह मोक्षमार्ग, संस्कारित जीवन तथा धार्मिक संगठन से सीधा जुड़ा हुआ है और जैन धर्मदर्शन को उसके मूल रूप में समझने के लिये लोकविज्ञान का ज्ञान परम आवश्यक है। लेखक ने त्रिलोक में केवल मध्यलोक जहां मनुष्य रहते हैं, को अपने लेख का विषय बनाया है। लोक विज्ञान के सामान्य स्वरूप और आकार को प्रमुखता न देते हुए श्री आकलैंड ने केवल उन्हीं विन्दुओं पर प्रमुखता से विचार किया है जो जैन धार्मिक जीवन जीने के मुख्य आधार हैं। मध्य लोक में असंख्य द्वीप हैं जो जम्बूद्वीप के चारों ओर स्थित हैं। मोक्षार्थी को जम्बूद्वीप के भरतक्षेत्र में मोक्ष की प्राप्ति लगभग ८१५०० वर्ष (आगामी उत्सर्पिणी काल के तृतीय काल) से पहले सम्भव नहीं है जबकि विदेह क्षेत्र में यह सर्वदा सुलभ है। उत्सर्पिणी और अवसर्पिणी कालचक्र का सविस्तार वर्णन करते हुए लेखक ने बताया है कि महावीर की मृत्यु के बाद पांचवां आरा प्रारम्भ हुआ जिसमें इस संसारावस्था से मोक्ष सम्भव नहीं है।

सामयिक सन्दर्भ में लोकविज्ञान की प्रासंगिकता को रेखांकित करते हुए लेखक ने बताया है कि आज अधिकांश जैन उच्चशिक्षा प्राप्त हैं अतः वे यह जानना चाहते हैं कि लोकविज्ञान रूप जैन-सिद्धान्त हमारी वैज्ञानिक मान्यताओं से कहां तक साम्य और वैषम्य रखते हैं। वह इसलिये भी कि बाह्य जगत् विज्ञान का विषय है। अपने कथन के समर्थन में श्री आकलैंड ने जैन धर्म की एक समणी जो साधना अंगीकार करने से पहले बायोसाइंस में डिग्री ले चुकी हैं के कथन का उल्लेख किया है 'एक तरफ जिनेन्द्रदेव के सत् वचन हैं जिन्हें सत्यापित करने के साधन हमारे पास नहीं हैं, दूसरी और विज्ञान और तकनीकी हैं जो विश्व की व्याख्या अपने तरीके से करते हैं और उनकी स्थापनाओं को सत्यापित किया जा सकता है। फिर भी वर्तमान विज्ञान पूर्ण नहीं है क्योंकि पूर्ण तो केवल जिन ही हो सकते हैं, इसलिये जिनेन्द्रदेव के वचनों पर श्रद्धा रखनी चाहिये। विज्ञान ने अभी लोकविज्ञान के बहुत कम अंश को जाना है। ब्रह्माण्ड अनन्त है जो भौतिक विज्ञान की पहुंच से बहुत दूर है।

२. काल का स्वरूप और परिवर्तन के साथ उसके सम्बन्ध

श्रीमती एना बोलेक्वा ने काल और परिवर्तन के साथ उसके सम्बंधों को कुन्दकुन्द दर्शन के विशेष सन्दर्भ में व्याख्यायित किया है। जैन दर्शन की मान्यता है कि सभी द्रव्य परिवर्तन के विषय हैं और काल उसमें कारण है। यहां तक कि काल द्रव्य में भी परिवर्तन होता है। काल के सन्दर्भ में जैन दर्शन की यह मान्यता समस्त भारतीय दर्शन में अनूठी है। कुन्दकुन्द सत् को 'भंगोत्पादध्रौव्यात्मक' मानते हैं। दिगम्बर और श्वेताम्बर दोनों सम्प्रदायों में दिगम्बर सम्प्रदाय काल को एक स्वतन्त्र द्रव्य मानता है जबकि श्वेताम्बर इस सन्दर्भ में विभाजित से दिखते हैं। कुन्दकुन्द के

पंचास्तिकाय, प्रवचनसार, समयसार, नियमसार आदि ग्रन्थों के आधार पर लेखिका ने यह दर्शाने का प्रयास किया है कि काल एक अनस्तिकाय द्रव्य है तथा वह अणुरूप है। काल का भौतिक शरीर नहीं होता क्योंकि वह मात्र एक प्रदेशवाला है। काल अनन्त कालाणुओं के रूप में समस्त लोक में व्याप्त है। निश्चय काल और व्यवहार काल ये काल के दो भेद हैं। सभी द्रव्यों के परिवर्तन का कारण होने के कारण काल की विस्तृत व्याख्या भारतीय दर्शनों में की गयी है। न्याय-वैशेषिक आदि दर्शन काल को ईश्वर, आकाश तथा अन्य अपरिवर्तित रहने वाले द्रव्यों से समीकृत करते हैं किन्तु जैन दर्शन सभी द्रव्यों में एक औपचारिक अन्तःसम्बन्ध मानता है चाहे वह आत्मा हो या पुद्गलादि । जैन दर्शन मानता है कि सत्तामूलक घरातल पर सभी स्थिति और परिवर्तन के प्रत्ययों से युक्त हैं। अन्य भारतीय दर्शनों से यह जैन दर्शन की एक अलग विशेषता है।

३. उपोसथ और पोसह : जैन एवं बौद्ध दर्शन के प्रारम्भिक इतिहास के परिप्रेक्ष्य में

प्रोफेसर क्रिस्चियन हेस्केट ने जैन एवं बौद्ध आचार दर्शन में उपोसथ एवं पोसह के सिद्धान्त को उनके प्रारम्भिक इतिहास के आलोक में व्याख्यायित किया है। ये दोनों शब्द जैन एवं बौद्ध आचार में अनशन या उपवास के अर्थ में प्रयुक्त हैं जिन्हें कर्मों की निर्जरा का एक साधन माना गया है। उपोसथ और पोसह के सिद्धान्त का विकास इस बात के द्योतक हैं कि ब्राह्मण संस्कृति और श्रमण संस्कृति दोनों संस्कृतियाँ एक दूसरे से स्वतन्त्र रूप से विकसित हुईं किन्तु कुछ ऐसे पद हैं जिनका प्रयोग दोनों परम्पराओं में लगभग समान अर्थों में हुआ है। वैदिक परम्परा में उपोसथ के लिये 'उपवसथ' शब्द का उल्लेख मिलता है, वैदिक जिसका प्रयोग अनशन व्रत के रूप में सोमयज्ञ की तैयारी के समय करते थे। किन्तु जैन उपोसथ और बौद्ध पोसह इस उपवसथ का ही विकसित रूप है, ऐसा नहीं कहा जा सकता। एक तो उपवसथ पूरे दिन के लिये रखा जाता है दूसरे उसमें कुछ वर्जनायें होती हैं किन्तु जैन उपोसथ और बौद्ध पोसह किसी यज्ञ या अनुष्ठान की तैयारी हेतु नहीं किये जाते हैं। सम्राट् अशोक के समय में पोसह और उपोसथ व्रत किये जाने के उल्लेख मिलते हैं। अतः ये दोनों क्रमशः जैन एवं बौद्ध धर्म से सम्बन्धित नहीं हैं, यह मानने के लिये कोई अवकाश नहीं रह जाता। लेखक ने स्कोन्थल के विचारों का उल्लेख करते हुए यह सम्भावना जताई है कि यदि उपोसथ पोसह से उद्भूत है, ऐसा माना जाये तो पोसह के भी उपवसथ से उद्भूत होने की सम्भावना से इनकार नहीं किया जा सकता। वस्तुतः कौन किससे विकसित है, निश्चय पूर्वक नहीं कहा जा सकता है।

४. जैन दर्शन में मुक्त जीवों का वैशिष्ट्य

श्री सीन बट्लर ने अपने लेख में जैन दर्शन में मुक्त जीवों की विशिष्टता पर प्रकाश डाला है। जैन दर्शन में जीव को द्रव्य संज्ञा से अभिहित किया गया है जो अपनी सत्ता के लिये किसी बाह्य वस्तु पर निर्भर नहीं है। डा० ज्योतिप्रसाद जैन ने जीव को ज्ञान कहा है तथा अहिंसा को जीव की प्रकृति कहा है। द्रव्यसंग्रहकार ने जीव की परिभाषा देते हुए उसे सम्यग्दर्शन कहा है। इस प्रकार जीव के अनेक लक्षण बताये गये हैं। फिर भी दिये गये सभी लक्षण जीव के सुख, ज्ञान, चेतना और वीर्य गुण को केन्द्र में रखकर किये गये हैं। संसारी (बद्ध) और मुक्त द्विविध वर्गीकरण वाले जीवों में से मुक्त जीव का वर्णन करते हुए पश्चिमी विचारक लाइब्रिन्टज मानते हैं कि मुक्त जीव का लक्षण कुछ विशेष होना चाहिये अन्यथा वह बद्ध जीव के साथ अपने को अलग कैसे कर पायेगा। जैन साहित्य के अनुसार मुक्त जीव अन्य विशेषताओं के साथ अपने अन्तिम शरीर का (१/३ कम) आकार कायम रखता है जो एक विशेषता है। लेखक ने इस महत्त्वपूर्ण विषय पर एक परियोजना ली है। प्रस्तुत लेख में लेखक ने कुछ प्रश्नों को पाठकों की तरफ उछाला है ताकि उनका समुचित समाधान प्राप्त होने पर वह उन्हें अपनी परियोजना में स्थान दे सके।

५. समाधिमरण : जीवन आसक्ति के त्याग का एक निरपेक्ष आदर्श
डा० सीन हिलमैन ने इस लेख में जैन धर्मदर्शन के प्रसिद्ध सिद्धान्त समाधिमरण को इच्छामृत्यु के रूप में लिया है जो युक्तियुक्त नहीं है क्योंकि समाधिमरण अंगीकार करनेवाले जीव को न मरने की इच्छा होती है और न जीने की। समाधिमरण के लिये जैन धर्म में तीन शब्द व्यवहृत हुए हैं- सल्लेखना, संथारा तथा समाधिमरण। सल्लेखना का अर्थ है- शरीर और कषाय को आन्तरिक और बाह्यतप के माध्यम से निर्जरित करना अथवा नष्ट करना, संथारा का अर्थ है- संस्तारक बनाकर उसपर मृत्यु को अंगीकार करना तथा समाधिमरण का अर्थ है समत्वभाव में मृत्यु का वरण करने के लिये शारीरिक प्रयासों/क्रियाओं को बन्द करना। 'पइण्णय सुत्ताइं' में मृत्यु को एक महोत्सव मानते हुए उसे सांसारिक जीवन का अन्तिम क्षण माना गया है जब समस्त शरीर के पुद्गलाणु विघटित हो जाते हैं। लेखक ने मृत्यु के- पंडित-पंडित मरण, पंडित मरण, बाल-पंडित मरण, बालमरण एवं बाल-बाल मरण आदि प्रकारों का समुचित उल्लेख किया है। समाधिमरण की प्रक्रिया में अनशन, तप और कायक्लेश के महत्त्व को बताते हुए लेखक ने क्रमशः अन्नदि के त्याग रूप अनशन को समाधिमरण के लिये अधिक आवश्यक माना है और अपने मत के समर्थन में आचारंग आदि आगमों से कतिपय सन्दर्भों को उल्लिखित किया है। समाधिमरण को अंगीकार करने वालों की योग्यता बताते हुए लेखक ने कैथोलिक हेल्थ एथिक्स गाइड की कुछ धाराओं का उल्लेख किया है तथा यह स्थापित करने का प्रयास किया है कि समाधिमरण और आत्महत्या में पर्याप्त अन्तर है।

६. अभव्य : समकालीन जैन विज्ञान में कुन्दकुन्द की अन्तर्दृष्टि

सुश्री ब्रायन डोनाल्डसन ने अपने इस लेख में अभव्य के सिद्धान्त को जैन दर्शन का एक वैज्ञानिक सिद्धान्त बताते हुए कुन्दकुन्द के निश्चय और व्यवहार की अन्तर्दृष्टि को समकालीन जैन विज्ञान के परिप्रेक्ष्य में देखने का प्रयास किया है। यहां लेखक ने भ्रान्त और द्वन्द्वात्मक अन्तर्दृष्टि का शीर्षक में प्रयोग किया है जो उचित नहीं है। कुन्दकुन्द के अनुसार व्यवहारनय की दृष्टि से ज्ञान, दर्शन और चारित्र ये ज्ञाता आत्मा के गुण हैं किन्तु निश्चय नय से वह अमूर्त-एक-शुद्ध-चेता मात्र है; उसमें कोई भेद नहीं है। व्यवहार से कुन्दकुन्द का तात्पर्य है जो भेदयुक्त, विशेष, अशुद्ध, आकस्मिक, असत्य और स्थूल आदि है। जैन दर्शन में अभव्य उस जीव को कहा गया है जिसमें मोक्ष-प्राप्ति की योग्यता नहीं है। भव्यजीवों की तुलना जैसा कि पद्मनाभ जैनी ने उल्लेख किया है, सड़े हुए बीज से की गयी है जिसमें अंकुरण या नये वृक्ष के रूप में उत्पन्न होने का सर्वथा अभाव है। किन्तु कुन्दकुन्द के अनुसार अभव्य एक समर्पित जैन भी हो सकता है जो जिनप्ररूपित समिति, गुप्ति, व्रत और तप का पालन भी कर सकता है। अभव्य जीव धर्म का पालन करता है किन्तु धर्म उसके कर्मों का पूर्ण प्रहाण नहीं कर पाता जिससे उसे मोक्ष प्राप्त नहीं हो पाता- जैसे सभी निमित्तों के होने पर अंकुरोत्पादन में असमर्थ बीज या पुत्रोत्पन्न करने में असमर्थ स्त्री। कुन्दकुन्द के अनुसार अभव्य जीव ज्ञान की निम्न अवस्था का प्रतिनिधित्व करता है।

७. जैन साहित्य में चरितकथा

श्री आल्ड्रिक ट्रिम क्रैग ने अपने इस लेख में प्रारम्भिक जैन साहित्य में चरित कथाओं का सविस्तार वर्णन किया है। श्री क्रैग के अनुसार यदि हम प्रारम्भिक जैन साहित्य का अवलोकन करें तो पता चलता है कि चरित कथायें और प्रभावक कथायें केवक धार्मिक महापुरुषों तक ही सीमित थीं। ११ वीं शताब्दी में एक नया मोड़ आया और साहित्यकार प्रबन्धों की रचना करने लगे। यह बदलाव जैन और बौद्ध साहित्य में एक साथ आया। प्रारम्भिक जैन साहित्य में महावीर तथा कुछ अन्य तीर्थकरों के चरित उपलब्ध होते हैं। आगमों का उल्लेख देखें तो आचारांग जो श्वेताम्बर आगम साहित्य का सर्वाधिक प्राचीन अंग आगम (ई.पू. ३सरी-२सरी शती) है के प्रथमश्रुतस्कंध में महावीर के जीवन के उल्लेख दिये गये हैं जो बाद के चरितकाव्यों एवं कथासाहित्य के लिये आधार का कार्य करते हैं। व्यवस्थित रूप में महावीर चरित सबसे पहले कल्पसूत्र में मिलता है जिसमें महावीर के साथ पार्श्वनाथ, नेमिनाथ और ऋषभ का चरित वर्णन किया गया है तथा अन्य तीर्थकरों का केवल नामोल्लेख किया गया है। चौथी शताब्दी में दिगम्बर आचार्य यतिवृषभ ने 'तिलोयपण्णत्ति' की रचना की जिसमें ६३ शलाकापुरुषों का उल्लेख प्राप्त होता है।

६३ शलाकापुरुषों में २४ तीर्थकर, १२ चक्रवर्ती, ९ वासुदेव, ९ बलदेव तथा ९ प्रतिवासुदेवों का वर्णन किया गया है। इसके बाद पुराणों- (महापुराण, आदिपुराण) में तीर्थकरों के जीवन चरित का वर्णन मिलता है। बाद में १४वीं शताब्दी में आचार्य हेमचन्द्र ने त्रिशष्टिशलाकापुरुषचरित नामक विशेष कृति का प्रणयन किया जिसमें सभी ६३ शलाकापुरुषों का जीवन चरित उपलब्ध है। इसके अतिरिक्त परिशिष्टपर्वन, महावीरचरित, स्थविरावलीचरित, धर्मशर्माभ्युदय, प्रभावकचरित, प्रबन्धकोश, आख्यानकमणिकोश, कहावली, पुरातनप्रबन्धसंग्रह, प्रबन्धचिन्तामणि, सोमसौभाग्यकाव्य आदि ऐसे ग्रंथ हैं जिनके प्रमुख विषय चरितकथाएं हैं।

८. जैन विकास: धार्मिक एवं विकासगत चुनौतियां

प्रोफेसर नाथन आर. वी. लोएन ने जैनों द्वारा किये जा रहे विकास के कार्यों में धर्म की प्रतिबद्धता को एक अलग नजरिये से देखने का प्रयास किया है। स्कूल, हास्पिटल, विश्वविद्यालय आदि का निर्माण तथा विकास के अन्य कार्य समाज में सम्मान पाने के लिये किये जाते हैं जो जैन धर्म के सिद्धान्तों के सर्वथा अनुरूप नहीं हैं। जैन धर्म तीर्थकरों के समय से ही हमेशा मानवता से जुड़ा रहा है। सभी तीर्थकरों ने मानव का ही प्रतिनिधित्व किया है। प्रो० लोएन ने इस लेख में पं. जुलकिशोर मुख्तार द्वारा रचित 'मेरीभावना' नामक भजन का भी उल्लेख किया है जो जैनों द्वारा चलाये जा रहे अधिकांश स्कूलों की प्रार्थनाओं में गाया जाता है। मेरी भावना दूसरों के कल्याण का संदेश देती है जिसमें सुशासन, सामाजिक न्याय, रोगादि से मुक्ति, मानवजीवन के उत्थान की भावना अनुस्यूत है। जैन भारत के विकास में एक महत्वपूर्ण रोल अदा करते हैं। निःसन्देह जैन तेजी से विकास कर रहे हैं।

९. तीन सौदागरों की नीतिकथा

श्री जोसेफ बार्सटोसेक ने उत्तराध्ययन में आये हुए तीन सौदागरों की कथा की तुलना न्यू टेस्टामेन्ट (मैथ्यू और लुकास आदि की अन्य कहानियों) के तीन दासों की कथा से करते हुए यह बताने का प्रयास किया है कि यदि आप निम्न योनि में पैदा हुए हैं तो आप अपने सद्प्रयासों से कर्मबन्धन-मुक्त होकर सिद्धशिला की ऊंचाई तक पहुंच सकते हैं।

उत्तराध्ययन की कथा में दर्शाया गया है कि तीन सौदागर यात्रा पर एक निश्चित पूंजी के साथ निकलते हैं। प्रथम सौदागर जितनी पूंजी ले गया था उसे गंवाकर लौटता है, दूसरा जितना ले गया था वह उतना ही लौटाकर लाता है और तीसरा जो कुछ ले गया था उससे अधिक कमा कर लौटता है। यहां पूर्व धन (कैपिटल) मानव जीवन है, अधिक कमाना स्वर्ग है तथा नुकसान उठाना नरक है। जैन दर्शन के अनुसार जीवन आपके पूर्व जन्मों की अपनी कमाई है। यह किसी की देन नहीं है। जो सौदागर अपनी

पूँजी गंवा कर लौटता है वह घातिया कर्मों के कारण निम्न योनि में उत्पन्न होता है, वह व्यक्ति जो अपनी पूँजी बचाकर लौटा लाता है वह मनुष्य जन्म पाता है। तीसरा सौदागर जो अपनी पूँजी बढ़ाकर लाता है वह शुभ एवं अच्छे गुणों के कारण सुख दुःख का नाश करता है। न्यू टेस्टामेन्ट की कथा कुछ इसी प्रकार की है जिसमें एक व्यक्ति जो यात्रा पर जाता है अपने तीन दासों को बुलाता है उन्हें अलग-अलग धन देता है तथा उनके बुद्धि की परीक्षाकर उन्हें तदनुसार पारितोषिक देता है।

१०. भारतीय चिन्तन में अहिंसा की अपरिहार्यता

सुश्री कायला कीहू ने इस लेख में यह दर्शाने का प्रयास किया गया है कि अहिंसा का जो रूप आज हमारे सामने है- चाहे सिद्धान्त हो में या व्यवहार में हो, वह वस्तुतः श्रमण परम्परा की देन है। धार्मिक अवधारणा के रूप में जैन दर्शन ने अहिंसा को अपनाया। अहिंसा आर्यों की विरासत है। लेखिका का विचार है कि वैदिकों द्वारा यज्ञ-यागादि में की जाने वाली हिंसा से मुक्ति दिलाने के लिये ही पार्श्वनाथ, महावीर और गौतम बुद्ध जैसे महापुरुषों का आविर्भाव हुआ। यहां यह ध्यातव्य है कि पार्श्वनाथ आदि का अवतार नहीं हुआ है अपितु वे क्रमशः अपने सद्कर्मों से ईश्वरत्व को प्राप्त हुए हैं। जैन धर्म के साधकों ने अनेकविधियों से अहिंसा के सिद्धान्त का पोषण किया है, उसकी अवधारणा को पूर्ण बनाया तथा उसे अपने जीवनव्यवहार में उतारा है चाहे वह साधु-साध्वी हों या श्रावक।

११. जैन श्रमण परम्परा में अरण्यवास : समकालीन सन्दर्भ में

ईसा पूर्व पाचवीं शती नयी धार्मिक क्रान्ति के काल के रूप में जानी जाती है। उस समय लोगों का उद्देश्य मोक्ष प्राप्ति था। साधक को ब्रह्मचर्य व्रत का निर्विघ्न पालन करने के लिये घर-द्वार या सामाजिक जीवन छोड़कर यायावर साधु के रूप में जंगलों में निवास करना पड़ता था। ऐसे साधुओं को श्रमण कहा गया। जैन एवं बौद्ध इसी परम्परा के अंग हैं। श्रमण आन्दोलन ने साधकों को श्रावकों से अलग अरण्यवास की प्रेरणा दी जहां सामाजिक मूल्य, परिग्रह, समाजिक स्तर, परिवार सबका सर्वथा अपलाप हो जाता था। साधकों के मानव बस्तियों से दूर रहने को अरण्यवास, विविक्त शैय्यासन, जिनकल्प आदि का नाम दिया गया। इस लेख की लेखिका श्रीमती क्रेट क्रेग ने महावीर से लेकर आज तक की श्रमण परम्परा द्वारा किये गये तप आदि के अभ्यास का मूल्यांकन कथा साहित्य के आलोक में करने का प्रयास किया है जिसमें उसने श्रवणबेलगोला में भगवान् बाहुबली की तपसाधना का उल्लेख किया है। बाहुबली के शरीर में लता, वल्लरियां आदि आवेष्टित हो गयी थीं। लेखक का मानना है कि त्यागपूर्ण जीवन के लिये अरण्यवास का वर्णन करने वाली कथाएं आज भी प्रासंगिक हैं।

Prologue

'Supporting Emergence of Overseas Scholarship of Jainism'

We, at Parashwanath Vidhyapeeth 'PV' and *Śramaṇa*, had taken several steps in the last six months to enhance the delivery and quality of our academic services concerning Jain philosophy, way of life and sociology.

This issue of *Śramaṇa* is dedicated to a cause very close to our mission, i.e. support the emergence of Young scholars in India and overseas specializing in Jain academic studies. PV had been working very closely with International School for Jain Studies 'ISJS' since 2008. PV had also set up a Global Centre for Research in *Ahimsā* and Indic Studies with ISJS.

A word about ISJS will not be out of place here. ISJS was established in 2005 to provide experiential and academic exposure to scholars and students of the universities of the North America primarily to Jain studies, way of life, history, art, culture etc. in a comprehensive manner. Since its inception more than 250 students and scholars have attended its summer residential programs of three to eight weeks. The program is now accredited by the universities in India and abroad for earning credit hours by participants for their undergraduate/ postgraduate studies at their home universities. ISJS also publishes papers (available on its website) and holds national and international seminars on various topics of importance to Jainism and its relevance today. ISJS has a vast network of universities in India and leading Jain scholars to form ISJS faculty and resource base. Similarly Jain institutions, academic, religious and social all over India, extend their support to ISJS in conducting their programs.

In 2010 summer, a group of eleven post graduate students, research scholars and faculty members from the universities of USA and Canada came to PV for eleven days of study and research. This stay

was a part of the six weeks residential program for Jaina studies offered by ISJS as ISSJS2010. These participants included three professors with serious interest to pursue Jaina studies.

At the end of their research they presented a research paper on a topic related to Jaina Studies. The present issue of *Śramaṇa* has five full papers by the attending scholars while summaries of the remaining papers are given. The papers whose summaries are given are available with us and can be sent to those interested separately. We are also trying to get these unpublished papers published either in *Śramaṇa* or other leading Jaina journals in India in the near future as well. The limited selection of full papers for publication has no reflection as to the quality of research but simply to observe constraints of the size of the journal. The topics covered were very diverse, depending upon the academic background of the participant as well as his area of interest in Jaina studies. Just to give an example, one participant after writing the paper has made it as a topic for her Ph.D. dissertation. Another candidate had made this research as a major area of his academic activities and doing comparative studies with Buddhism.

In this issue of *Śramaṇa*, dedicated to promote emerging western scholars in Jaina academic studies has seven full papers prepared by the attending scholars, for the remaining papers, we are presenting only the summary of each paper. A word of caution is necessary. The views expressed in the papers are those of the authors only and are based on their limited exposure to Jaina philosophy during ISSJS2010 and research undertaken by them as a part of the same. ISJS and *Śramaṇa* have not edited them and hence are not responsible for the views and analysis presented therein.

We invite comments from you, the readers about these papers and *Śramaṇa* in general. Your interactions will help us in making *Śramaṇa* to meet your standards of academic requirement. As you might have noticed, we have enlarged our editorial board and the academic board by inducting several renowned Indian and International scholars of Jainism. We are also planning to put

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Śramaṇa online on our website. Please let us know the scholars and institutions to whom we can include in our mailing list for sending electronic version of *Śramaṇa* or who will like to subscribe to the hard copy of *Śramaṇa*. We also intend to proactively invite senior researchers to write papers for *Śramaṇa*. Simultaneously we have enhanced the full time academic resources (manpower) at PV to contribute research papers for *Śramaṇa*.

I, as President of PV and Chairman of Academic board of *Śramaṇa* invite you to join us to contribute to the resurgence of quality research and dissemination of Jaina academic studies. You can contact me at isjs_pv@yahoo.com or svana@vsnl.com or our editor at pvpvaranasi@gmail.com for comments/inquiry or contribute to our efforts.

Wishing you all the best for an enjoyable reading of *Śramaṇa* and interactions with us and support further research on Jaina Studies and emergence of young western and Indian scholars of Jaina studies.

Dr. Shugan Chand Jain

(Chairman of Academic Board of *Śramaṇa*)

The Enduring Significance of Jaina Cosmography

Knut Aukland

Introduction

During Cāturmās in 1965 in Śravaṇa Belgolā, the well-known Digambara nun Jnanamati Mataji had a vision in which she saw the entire structure of the universe, including the various islands, continents, and oceans that make up the middle part of the universe (*madhyaloka*). She later discovered that what she had seen was a perfect match to the cosmographical details laid out in Jaina scriptures (Candanamati 2010: 6). In 1972 she helped establish the Digambara Jaina Institute of Cosmographic Research (Digambara Triloka Śodha Sansthāna) in Hastinapur which would spend much effort and energy in the field of Jaina cosmography, exploring texts as well as physically manifesting Jaina cosmography in various building projects. The opening question that led me to this particular topic was simply "why?" Why this focus on cosmography? And further, how does it relate to religious practice? If Jainism is a religion that revolves around soteriology, a technique of salvation that puts focus on the individual's actions and soul, why should one spend time on painstakingly detailed descriptions of the geography of the outer physical world?

I suggest that cosmography is an overlooked area in the study of Jainism. Though typically treated as background material for understanding Jaina ontology and soteriology or simply as eccentric historical remains from pre-modern times, Jaina cosmography has had an enduring significance for the Jaina community that continues up until this very date (Dundas 2002: 92). It has implications for religious life in general and for a set of Digambara rituals that are conducted three times yearly in particular. Its relevance covers soteriology, ritual life, and establishment of religious authority. I will further argue that

cosmography is a contested area in contemporary Jainism related to the ever-demanding presence of modern science.

In tune with my interest in Jainism as a lived tradition my presentation of Jaina cosmography will be based on works of the Digambara Jaina Institute of Cosmographic Research.¹ The short presentation of the middle world that I provide here will not do justice to the near endless details found in Jaina scriptures on cosmography. Jaina cosmography is distinguished by a meticulous systematic and mathematical approach (Bossche 2000: 1); my presentation will not reflect this flavor. I have deliberately left out all details of size and length which takes up significant portions in original Jaina cosmographic material, and so also of all the names of various areas, rivers, mountains, oceans, and islands in the various oceans, gods and buildings on the islands in these oceans, etc. Instead I have tried to highlight those details that are important in shaping Jaina religious life and understanding.

Jaina cosmography: A map of Islands, times and ritual activity

Jains have showed a remarkable interest in cosmography compared to their Buddhist and Brahmanic counterparts (Bossche 2007: xi). One happy outcome of this interest has been the many Jaina versions of the board game that was later to be known as Snakes and Ladders in the west, an often forgotten Jaina contribution to the world. In terms of sources, basic Jaina cosmography is laid out already in Āgamic literature, but the majority of cosmographical works and detailed expansions on the topic are post-canonical (*ibid*: xi-xii)². The Digambaras have divided their canon into four main parts known as "expositions" (*anuyogas*) that are supposed to cover the entire Jaina doctrine. It is notable that the 2nd exposition, *Karāṇa* ("calculation"³), is in large parts devoted to cosmography. The Jaina doctrine and religion therefore, cannot be understood properly without studying Jaina cosmography. In the words of Bossche, "Jaina cosmography and geography form an essential part of Jainism as a religion" (*ibid*: 1).

In secondary books on Jainism the descriptions of Jaina cosmography are typically focused on various versions of the cosmic man, the keyhole shaped model of the three layers (hellish, human, celestial) with the abode of the liberated souls on its very top. The stylized version of this shape, with a *svastika* and a hand, has become a standard symbol for the Jaina community in the last thirty-five years (Dundas 2002: 92). The cosmographical details of the middle part of this model (*madhyaloka*), in which human beings are found, are typically skipped or only briefly mentioned. Jaini's classic work on Jainism, *The Jaina Path of Purification*, does mention the first two-and-a-half islands (*adhādvīpa*) in this middle world, but does not go beyond this (1998: 29-32). The same is true of Cort's *Jains in the World* (2001: 20-1) and Dundas' *The Jains* (2002: 90-1). One reason for this is simply that human beings cannot live outside these two-and-a-half islands. But to conclude that the remaining parts outside the two-and-a-half islands are unimportant because humans cannot go there or because salvation is not possible there is erroneous and we will soon see why. Further, the soteriological implications of how these two-and-a-half islands are understood should interest us, for although the twenty-four Jinas of our age and place have passed, there are still areas in which living Jinas are operating in this very moment: The Jinas are alive!

The middle world in which we live is believed to consist of innumerable islands which lie in concentric circles around the central island Jambūdvīpa. Jains distinguish between innumerable and infinite. These islands are not infinite in number, and Jaina texts give the name of the first thirteen or more islands and the last sixteen, between which there are innumerable other islands. Between each island there is an ocean, and the last island is encircled by the ocean Svayambhūramaṇa. Our world as we know it (i.e. the countries found on planet Earth) is found in the south of the innermost and central island Jambūdvīpa. Its size is only a 190th part of the entire island. Human beings are not only found here, but also in other areas of Jambūdvīpa. Jambūdvīpa is divided into

seven Major Areas (*kṣetra*), which again are divided into various Minor Areas (*khaṇḍa*, *bhūmi*).

In the south of Jambūdvīpa we find the Major Area Bharata which is again divided into six Minor Areas, the south most being Āryakhaṇḍa in which India and the city Ayodhya is found. Bharata is but one of the seven Major Areas of the whole of Jambūdvīpa, but it is special because it undergoes certain changes over time that follow a specific pattern. This pattern consists of six periods or "spokes," and their names reflect the general state that prevails during each spoke. This cyclic pattern has always existed, and will continue to do so forever. The first spoke of a declining series of these six spokes (*avasarpinī*) is known as happy-happy. In this time period people experience continuous pleasures, do not need to work for a living, live for very long and have no worries. After happy-happy the following five spokes are happy (second), happy-unhappy (third), unhappy-happy (fourth), unhappy (fifth) and finally unhappy-unhappy (sixth)⁴. In this last period humans experience pain and chaos and live for short time periods. It is only when we are in the third and fourth spokes that we can attain salvation and it is during this time that we will have the twenty-four Jinas. These are periods in which true religious actions are possible because they have a suitable mix of pleasures and pains. In all other periods the experience of pain or pleasure is too strong, as is the case in the various heavens and hells where the hellish and celestial beings dwell. Hence, it is not only that humans are the only beings that can reach salvation; they also need to live in the right time to be able to achieve it.

If we divide Jambūdvīpa horizontally in half into a southern and northern part, we will find that it is symmetrical in its two parts. Hence the southern and northern Major Areas, Bharata and Airāvata, look alike and they are the only two Major Areas on Jambūdvīpa that undergo the changes of the six spokes. Hence Airāvata will have its own respective twenty-four Jinas during the passing of the third and the fourth spoke.

According to Jaina cosmography a cycle of six degenerating spokes (*avasarpinī*) will be followed by six new spokes in which the conditions will gradually increase in quality and go through the six spokes in the reversed order (*utsarpinī*): from unhappy-unhappy and all the way up to happy-happy. Shortly after the last Jina of Bharata, Mahāvīra, reached *mokṣa*, that is final liberation at the time his physical body expired, we entered the fifth spoke and hence the last to reach liberation in our series of six spokes (*avasarpinī*) was a disciple of Mahāvīra named Jambū. This means that liberation is in fact impossible at this moment of time in our world. The fifth and sixth spokes each last 21,000 years. After these 42,000 years have passed we will start on the first spoke of the upward moving series of spokes (*utsarpinī*) starting again with unhappy-unhappy, followed by unhappy. This means 42,000 new years until we finally reach a time period in which the conditions are sufficiently balanced between pleasant and unpleasant so that salvation is attainable. Since this is not just a matter of eccentric details known only by a few mendicants and scholars, but actually widely believed and known in the Jaina community, we can conclude with the rather remarkable fact that although Jainism started out as a soteriology, at present it is a religion that actually does not offer any salvation to the individual person in this world, or at best puts it on a 81.500 yearlong hold.

If one wishes to attain the Jaina salvation in India, one must wait 81,500 years, but India is a small part of the Major Area Bharata which again is but one of seven Major Areas in the first island of the two-and-a-half islands on which, humans can be born. These two-and-a-half islands are known as the abode of man (*manuṣyaloka*). As mentioned, the first island is Jambūdvīpa. The next one-and-a-half islands are each twice the size of Jambūdvīpa. So far we have learned of Bharata and Airāvata, the two Major Areas, which go through the six spokes, but what of the five other Major Areas? There is an enormous strip covering the central area of Jambūdvīpa in the middle of which we have Mt. Meru. This strip is the Major Area known as Videha and Mt. Meru is the mountain to which the

gods bring every new born Jina to bathe and celebrate him.

The Major Area Videha does not go through the six spokes as in Bharata and Airāvata. In fact time stands still, qualitatively speaking, in the sense that it remains in the unhappy-happy spoke always. Time still exists, people are born and die, but the quality of life remains in a stable mix of happiness and unhappiness. All the remaining Major Areas remain in spokes of pleasures and are therefore known as enjoyment lands (*bhoga-bhūmis*). This is also the case in the central part of Videha, but the rest of Videha remains in the fourth spoke in a declining series (*avasarpinī*). Since it always remains in the fourth spoke it is a land where moral choices or "actions" are possible (*karma-bhūmi*). This is also true for Bharata and Airāvata when they are in the third and fourth spoke as well.

This means that although salvation in Bharata is put on an 81,500 year long hold, salvation is always possible in Videha and there are always living Jinās there who preach the true doctrine of Jainism. So far we have only discussed the first island Jambūdīvā, but there are still one-and-a-half islands on which humans are born. Each of them also has Bharata, Airāvata and Videha areas, but unlike Jambūdīvā which only has one each of these Major Areas, these two next islands have two of each. Hence there are in total five Bharatas, five Airāvatas and five Videhas in which humans live. While the Videhas always have living Jinās on them, the Bharatas and Airāvatas will each have twenty-four Jinās during one series of six spokes. At a Jaina Digambara pilgrimage site close to Moradabad known as Ahikṣetra—the place where Pārśvanātha is said to have had his epic encounter with Kamaṭha. The five Bharatas and Airāvatas are in fact displayed in the form of five huge lotus-shaped sculptures showing the twenty-four Jinās of the past, present and future series of the six spokes in all ten areas.

Although humans can only inhabit the first two-and-a-half islands, Jaina texts mention the first thirteen islands. The reason why these thirteen are mentioned is that this is where we find the 458 Natural Jina Temples (*akṛtrima jinacaityālaya*). These are temples that have

always existed, and that always will exist. They are true testaments to the fact that in the Jaina perspective, Jainism did not start with Mahāvīra, or even the "first" Jina Ṛṣabha. Jainism is eternal. Hence, when the Digambara nun Mataji discovered that the school books in India presented Mahāvīra as the founder of Jainism she was "deeply hurt" (Mataji 2007: xxxviii). The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) and even the Prime Minister were contacted by her in order to correct this misconception (*ibid.*: xxxix).

The exact whereabouts of the 458 Natural Jina Temples are given and each one of them has 108 Jina figures. Most of them, 398 to be exact, are found within the two-and-a-half islands. As many as fifty-two are found on the eighth island Nandīśvara, and the remaining on the eleventh and thirteenth islands. The eighth island, Nandīśvara, is of major importance to the ritual life of Digambara Jains.

Babb has rightly argued that to conclude that gods (in the sense of heavenly beings that live in the upper part of the universe) are unimportant in Jainism simply because they are not liberated and because they have not created the world is a mistake (1996: 76ff.). In Jainism they function as ritual role models for lay devotees. When Jains perform bathing and other rituals on Jina idols they dress up as the gods and re-enact Indra's bathing of the new-born Jina (*ibid.*: 79). In the cases Babb explores, Jaina devotees were re-enacting deeds that were done or will be done to Jinās, but on the eighth island Nandīśvara, such rituals are performed by the gods every year.

Thrice a year various Indras and gods gather to worship the Jinās in the Natural Jina Temples on Nandīśvara. They continue this worship for eight days and hence this period is known as the Eight Day Festival (*aṣṭāhnikā*). The Eight Day Festival is also celebrated by Digambara Jains, for they have developed the habit of worshipping the Jinās simultaneously with the gods on Nandīśvara. The actual execution of these three festivals has not yet been studied, but from what I have been told it is similar to other annual

Jaina rituals in that the different parts of the ritual are auctioned off to the laity. Hence a layman can bid to perform a specific ritual to a specific set of Natural Jina Temples during this time, and if he wins he will dress up as one of the Indras, while his wife dress as Indra's wife. Specific ritual manuals, such as the *Nandiśvara-dvīpa-pūjā*,⁵ are used in the execution of the rituals. While religious rituals often work as re-enactments of ancient deeds and actions (Eliade 1959: 50ff.), the Eight Day Festival is a synchronized ritual in the sense that humans worship Jinas simultaneously with the gods. These rituals are performed by both humans and gods in honor of beings that are considered to be completely beyond this world and any possible appreciation of these actions.

Viharamāna Tirthaṅkaras, religious authority and soteriological implications

It is widely believed by Buddhists in Theravādin countries that final liberation is virtually impossible to reach in this age and time, but the authorized closing of the soteriological door, as found in Jaina scriptural teachings, is not found in the Theravāda canon. What could have been the consequences of the doctrine of the six spokes and the establishing of our times as belonging to the fifth spoke? One could speculate that entering the fifth spoke makes our time and place in the universe less important, soteriologically speaking. While the Theravāda canon also mentions that there were Buddhas before Siddhārtha Gautama, the Jains were the only of the two to really explore this theological opportunity. The enduring significance of cosmography and the consistent geographical understanding of it as an actual map of the universe, and not as a symbolic representation-as found for instance in Tibetan Buddhism-is perhaps also related to the doctrinal restriction of our world and the importance of time in terms of soteriology. If the Major Area Bharata is in the fifth spoke, it "makes sense" to focus on other areas in time and space where salvation is possible.

The doctrine that no salvation is possible at the present time could perhaps be linked to Max Weber's idea of routinization (1978:

246ff.). If it is established that no new man can be enlightened, religious authority in terms of doctrine will be fixed in the scriptures and new doctrinal inventions are hampered. Authority and legitimacy can more easily be fixed. However, the concept of our times as belonging to a stage of spiritual and societal degeneration is widespread in South Asia and not specific to the Jains.

The doctrine of the six spokes and how they relate to different parts of the two-and-a-half islands closes certain possibilities while opening others. Since it is established that we entered the fifth spoke at the time of Mahāvīra's death, salvation is not possible in this world. In the region of Videha however, time is qualitatively stable, remaining in the fourth spoke forever. This is where we can find the so-called Viharamāna Tīrthaṅkaras, Jinas that are living at the present moment. Viharamāna refers to the fact that they are "wandering". The idea of Viharamāna Tīrthaṅkaras is an exciting thought, and considering that there are five Videhas, there can potentially be many living Jinas at this very moment. The question is whether or not this has any significant place in the religious imagination of Jains, and to what extent Jains have explored these soteriological possibilities in actual religious life.

It is now believed that the Major Area Videha in Jambūdvīpa has four Viharamāna Tīrthaṅkaras and their names are Sīmaṅdhara, Yugamaṅdhara, Bāhu and Subāhu. It seems that the first of these four, Sīmaṅdhara, is the only one to have developed a proper cult. In terms of textual materials his name appears in both Śvetāmbara and Digambara works as early as the sixth century AD and one such text describes the possibility of visiting him in Videha in order to seek advice on doctrinal matters (Dundas 2002: 305 n.75). This became a possibility that both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras would explore. In later material Sīmaṅdhara is claimed to have helped various authors with their compositions and portions of the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* are also said to have been retrieved from him (*ibid*). Even complete texts were attributed to him (*ibid*). Sectarian inventions could also claim authority through him.

The existence of Sīmaṇdhara could effectively be used to establish the religious authority of a given author or text. Ultimately, authority in doctrinal matters is anchored in the omniscience of a Jina. At the present time and place the last Jina was Mahāvīra and his teaching was recorded by fourteen disciples known as the *gaṇadhara*s. Both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras agree that certain parts of these original works were lost. The Digambara sources even go as far as claiming that almost all the original material from Mahāvīra, that is the fourteen ancient *Pūrvas*, completely disappeared (*ibid* : 79), and hence authority in doctrinal matters becomes somewhat uncertain. Since all the great Jaina philosophers such as Hemacandra and Kundakunda composed their works long after the time of Mahāvīra and the possibility of gaining omniscience had passed, one could always question their authority. In the case of Kundakunda, a solution to this was to claim that he had visited Sīmaṇdhara in person and heard his sermon in Videha (*ibid* : 269). A similar strategy was used by the important 20th century Jaina reformer Kanji Svami who proclaimed that he had been present in Videha when Kundakunda had come to hear Sīmaṇdhara in his previous life (*ibid* : 268). His female spiritual heir would also proclaim her presence at this meeting in her former life, and a model of the magical meeting place where Sīmaṇdhara held his sermon (*samavasaraṇa*) was built in Songadh under her guidance, not unlike the constructions in Hastinapur led by Mataji (*ibid* : 270).

Besides being a potential source of establishment of religious authority, Sīmaṇdhara, or more precisely Videha, the Major Area in which he lives, is a place where liberation can be achieved. Human beings can be born within the two-and-a-half islands, and the soteriological journey can always be finalized in the Videha areas. One need not wait 81,500 years, instead one can simply be reborn in one of these areas. As far as I know Jains have not developed a specific technique to achieve this goal. Mahāyāna Buddhism saw the development of so-called Pure Lands. Similar to the Jaina view, the general idea that nurtured these developments in

Buddhism, was that reaching liberation was becoming increasingly difficult as a result of general degeneration. Instead of striving for salvation in this world, therefore, one could rather be reborn in the Pure Land of a Buddha where salvation would be guaranteed. There are indications of this theological possibility having been developed already in the second century AD in India⁶, and it was later developed in various branches of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In this way several cults around a specific Buddha and his Pure Land evolved, and the method of reaching his land was typically through devotional practices.

Considering the development of the Videhas and the Viharamāna Tīrthaṅkaras, one is led to wonder if Jainism also developed cults similar to the Pure Land Buddhisms. To my knowledge this has not been the case and there could be several reasons as to why. First of all, Jaina Tīrthaṅkaras were never given the same agency as Mahāyāna Buddhas. Sīmaṅdhara may be a living Jina preaching at this moment, but Jaina theology would not allow him to respond to devotional practices, for if he did, it would imply that he wants to help us and hence he would not be free from passions (*vītarāga*) which, after all, is a defining characteristic of someone who has reached omniscience. Further, to be reborn in Videha does not mean that one automatically will achieve salvation or bump into a Viharamāna Tīrthaṅkara as in the Pure Lands of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Videhas are areas that remain in a state that makes salvation possible. Our world was also in this state a few thousand years ago, but that did not mean that all who were born in that period reached salvation. Far from it, only a few will be able to achieve that final state of omniscience.

This does not mean, however, that Sīmaṅdhara did not evolve a cult of his own. In fact, one of the biggest temples built in Gujarat in recent times is dedicated to him (Dundas 2002: 269). Dundas also recorded a curious anecdote related to a famous Terāpanthī monk in which a layman committed suicide in order to be reborn in the presence of Sīmaṅdhara (*ibid*: 306 n75). Still, the Videhas have not

and cannot evolve into Jaina Pure Lands unless significant doctrinal alterations are made.

The question of how one can reach the Videhas and their Viharamāna Tirthaṅkara remains open. Rebirth is one possibility. Jains have both claimed to have been in the presence of Sīmaṅdhara in a past life, and also that one can be reborn there. In the case of Kundakunda, it is said that he "visited" Videha and came back within one life. How can this be possible? One answer can be found in the doctrine of the five bodies. They include from the crude, physical body (*audārika-śarīra*) that we perceive in everyday life to the more fine and subtle ones that not everyone necessarily has. The third body, for instance, is known as the "projectile body" (*āhāraka-śarīra*) and it can only be created by certain ascetics through their practice, and this body can be used to travel long distances while the physical body remains still until one returns (Glasesapp 1999:195).

There is also the concept of the *vaikriya-samudghāta*, which refers to a method of achieving the same type of body that heavenly beings have. The *Āgama Bhagavatī Sūtra*⁷ describes how the trained mendicant can travel long distances in such a body (Sikdar 1964: 459). Contemporary Jains have tried to harmonize such ideas with modern space travel, arguing that trained individuals can acquire a spiritual shield of sorts - not unlike "the shield" of a space shuttle - enabling them to travel into space (Mahaveer 2007 : 122-6). This interaction between Jaina doctrine as found in scriptures and modern science is the next topic to be discussed.

Jaina cosmography as a contested area

In the following I will suggest that cosmography is a contested area in contemporary Jainism. Modern Jains are generally highly educated, and hence very exposed to modern science and its claims to legitimacy. As a consequence Jains have become very eager to show how their religion and science complement each other. In fact, much of Jaina intellectual energy of today is invested in conjoining discoveries of modern science with certain ideas found in Jaina scriptures (Laidlaw 1995: 72). Both publications and conferences are initiated to this end and the idea of Jainism as being scientific is

widespread in the community. Certain ideas in Jaina scriptures are easier to combine with science than others; cosmography is not one of them. The reason for this is that Jaina cosmography deals with the outer physical world, the geography of the universe, an area in which modern science has a lot to say for itself. To take one example, Jaina cosmography holds that the earth is flat. Mataji suggests that the earth might have evolved a bulging shape, and that this could help explain why there is difference in length in night and day in India and America (2010b: 46). The problem of reconciling Jaina cosmography with modern science, I argue, can be understood through a model were a scriptural⁸ Jainism is analytically separated from what I will call modernized Jainism.

When sketching up these two categories we should remember that they are etic as opposed to emic in nature. Most Jains experience them as harmonious and two sides of the same coin most of the time, yet when it comes to cosmography the experience can be very problematic, leading to disbelief and even "disrobing". The purpose of separating them is analytical and can help us see why Jaina cosmography might be a contested area among Jains today. There is a great deal of overlap between the two and the separation between them must be recognized as one that is idealized, simplified and somewhat caricatured. I suggest that they are two important streams in contemporary Jainism that meet at many points, but diverge at others. One is ancient, the other modern. The difference between them can be seen in various areas, but here it will suffice to look at some few aspects, namely orientation, interpretation of *anekāntavāda* and *ahiṃsā*, and finally the use of scriptures in relation to modern science.

Scriptural Jainism is undoubtedly the older of the two streams. Its main aim is soteriological and its orientation is other-worldly (*lokottara*). Its main bearers and propagators are the mendicants. This is the *mokṣa-mārga*. It views Jainism as the true religion because it follows *anekāntavāda* (the doctrine of manifold aspects). This concept is crucial in epistemology and ontology and is a part of a method that proves the validity of Jaina doctrine above other non-

Jaina religious and philosophical doctrines. *Ahiṃsā* (non-violence) is first and foremost related to soteriology and the karmic influx onto the individual's soul, hence it is typically formulated in the negative. Many scriptures, canonical and post-canonical, are viewed as containing the absolute truth and they are not to be doubted. Such doubt would violate the proscribed right faith (*samyak-darśana*) that one should seek in one's practice. These scriptures are to be taken literally. Statements in these scriptures are to be discovered or verified by science, not the other way around.

Modernized Jainism is more this-worldly (*laukika*) in its focus. It seeks to formulate ethics for the everyday life of lay Jains and typically manifests itself in, for example, seminars on business ethics. Its propagators are often well educated within secular institutions. *Anekāntavāda* is understood to be a way of appreciating the opinions of others and general diversity. It is the opposite of being dogmatic and can even be used to relativize the Jaina doctrine in relation to other doctrines. *Ahiṃsā* is presented as a rational ethics related to economy, ecology, health and general politics. Here *ahiṃsā* is more about helping others, hence it is formulated positively. Modernized Jainism⁹ is inclined to extract certain parts of the scriptures while ignoring other. Such parts are found to be in harmony with modern science; those that fly in the face of it can be overlooked, understood symbolically or seen in their historical contexts, the latter typically involving arguments about Hindu-influence or general degeneration due to the spokes of time. In Modernized Jainism, scriptural statements are not all true by necessity and some of them can be discarded.

I believe the combination of these two streams of Jainism to be felt as unproblematic and mutually fulfilling in the Jaina community. When we turn to cosmography however, the two can hardly be united at all. The Jaina cosmography, as described in Jaina scriptures, cannot be combined with the Copernican model of the universe. Not unlike how the Catholic Church would not accept that the earth was round, there are still Jains that staunchly defend their view of the universe and titles such as 'Is the Earth round?', 'Did

apollo go to the moon?' have been published by the community (Cort 2001: 213 n.12). Religious and secular education presents Jains with two very different models of our cosmos and their reconciliation is sometimes problematic enough to cause individuals to quit their ascetic careers (Dundas 2002: 93). In the case of cosmography, scriptural and modernized Jainism clashes.

In one of the forewords to *Jaina Bharati*, written by a young female ascetic who before joining the Jaina community of ascetics completed a degree in biosciences from a secular university, we see how scriptural and modernized Jainism meet:

Whatever has been said by the Lord Jinendra Deva is the ultimate truth. If we see the other side, the development by the modern science & technology is also introducing itself to the whole world most remarkably. Then, what to do? If we should accept the principles stated by the Lord even when we cannot testify them or we should fully tune ourselves on the line of modern science, which is present before us with full proofs. Although the latter option is the most approachable for all of us, yet we should accept that modern science is not complete in itself. Completeness lies with the soul who has attained Omniscience. Thus, we have to be guided by the norms stated Jinendra Deva and should be fully convinced about what he has said. We have not to question whether Sumeru mountain, heavens or hells are there or not, yes! They are there because the Omniscient Lord has seen them (2007: xxxvii-viii).

The statement is interesting since it comes from an individual who stands between the two orientations, knowing both modern science and Jaina scriptures. Undoubtedly she is familiar with modern geography of the world and the Copernican model of the universe, but having become a Jaina ascetic, scriptural Jainism is given precedence. In the end, modern science can never beat the omniscience of a Jina.

References:

1. This material includes *Jaina Bharati* and *Jaina Geography* by Jnanmati Mataji and papers presented by the Digambara Jaina Institute of Cosmographic Research in June 2010 (see Bibliography).¹ See- Preface and Bibliography in Bossche 2007.
2. This name reflects the fact that the lengths and sizes of various parts of the world are given thorough mathematical treatment (See e.g. Bossche 2007:68-73).
3. The translation of *kṣetra* into 'Major Area' and *khaṇḍa* and *bhūmi* into 'Minor Area' is not philologically correct, but I have chosen them in order to make the matter as simple and understandable as possible.
4. The terms for *happy* and *unhappy* are *suṣamā* and *duṣamā*.
5. By Mahopadhyay Vinya Sagar (nd), Prakrit Bharati Academy, Jaipur.
6. See depiction of *Sukhavati* in JAS (Calcutta), vol. 43, no. 4 (2001), p. 26.
7. Also known as the *Vyākhyāprajñapti*, the fifth limb of the Śvetāmbara canon.
8. The use of the term "scriptures" can be misleading in the Jaina context (See Dundas 2002:60-3).
9. For some examples of *Modernized Jainism* see articles from the New York based *Jain Study Circle* .web page (<http://www.jainstudy.org/>, accessed 08.02.2011), e.g. Jain 2007 and Machwe 2008.

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The Concept of Time and its Relationship to Change in Kundakunda's Philosophy

Ana Bajzelj Bevelacqua

The following article deals with the topic of time in the broader framework of Kundakunda's ontology of change¹. Kundakunda was chosen as a representative of the Jaina philosophers who pronounced time as a substance that occasions change in other substances. After an introduction into the Jaina ontology of dynamic realism, various aspects of Kundakunda's view on time are laid out. Several problems, proposed solutions and directions for further research are considered.

The present paper sets out to study a small section of the broader topic of change (*bheda* or *pariṇāma*) in Jaina philosophy, this area of interest being the notion of time (*kāla*) in relation to change in Kundakunda's philosophy. However, the study is presented in a broader context of Jaina philosophical proposals that seek to answer the question of time. By nature this will include various other views on the topic addressed. There are four main reasons why *kāla* was chosen as the central topic of concern of this short academic research. Firstly, the study of Jaina conceptions of time, being often somewhat problematic, as will be shown below, exposes many intriguing philosophical quandaries. Secondly, the topic has been marginalized, in Jaina study circles as well as in comparative or contrastive studies of Indian philosophies in general. Thirdly, it is precisely theories of time that illustrate how philosophers have tried to understand the universal experience of change. Solutions to queries that originate from observing change² always interact with the corresponding ontology of time which usually fits into a broader philosophical system of a certain tradition. Jaina post-canonical texts often refer to *kāla* as the underlying foundation of change. Therefore, the concept of time proves to be an essential foundation for the Jaina dynamic ontology, since modification is - according to many Jaina

philosophers - occasioned by it. Jains found themselves divided concerning the question of whether time exists independently of other substances or not. Kundakunda was chosen for this paper as a notable representative of the former view on time. Lastly, Jainism radicalized the notion of change by applying it to all the substances, including time itself. By doing so, despite it leading to several problems, Jaina philosophy distinguished itself from other Indian philosophical systems.

The reason why Jaina philosophers in many cases accepted a robust theory of time is their presupposed ontology of change, i.e. the fact that they propounded change as being as equally real as identity. It is upon this underlying foundation that this paper rests. This idea is briefly introduced before Kundakunda's theory of time is presented.

Jainism introduces an approach to reality that can be described as dynamic realism. It proposes an identity-in-difference model of reality that coordinates rather than subordinates its essential elements of permanence (*dhrauvya*, *dhruvatva* or *anvaya*) and change (*bheda* or *pariyāya*), meaning that neither identity nor difference prevails in their understanding of reality. Both elements of being³ and becoming⁴ are interrelated and form a coordinated relationship. Kundakunda stated that the substances "though manifesting themselves diversely; maintain their permanency." (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*-6). Similarly also the "Six *Dravyas* though mutually interpenetrating, and accommodating one another, and though getting mixed up in view of occupying the same space, yet they always maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, general as well as special" (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*-7).

The *gāthā* 8 of *Pañcāstikāyasāra* in which Kundakunda introduced the basic elements of reality is one of the most significant *gāthās* for the understanding of Jaina ontology as an identity-in-difference system of reality (*arthasāmānya*). "Substance is one (as a class). It is the inherent existence of all things. It manifests itself through diverse forms. It undergoes infinite modifications. It has the triple characteristics of creation, destruction and permanence. It also has the antithetical qualities, that is, it may be described by the

opposites." (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*-8) The coordinated relationship of permanence and impermanence is implicit in the grammatical structure of the *gāthā*. The word compound that introduces elements of reality (*bhaṅgotpādadhrauvyātmikā*) does not subordinate either concept. "That which, whilst it does not forsake its innate nature, is connected with origination, annihilation and stability and which possesses qualities and modifications, they call a substance." (*Pravacanasāra*- II.2)

Kundakunda insisted that identity cannot be the only real and developed many arguments against this presumption. This began with the basic knowledge of experiential reality which consistently disproves any dominating ontological interpretation. The above mentioned *gāthās* introduce reality as many-sided and suggest *anekāntavāda*, the philosophy of manifold aspects, as an ontological stand in the light of which difference is never subordinated to identity. Reality is one and many. Therefore, substances or *dravyas* incorporate identity as well as difference. The word *dravya* stems from the root *dru*, meaning "to flow" and the very etymology of the noun implies the existential persistence in the context of perpetual change, just as water persists in the river flow. The *dhrauvya* element of a substance is the element of identity, generality, permanence, persistence, continuous existence (*sthiti*)⁵. *Dravyas* are furthermore identified as having intrinsic/essential qualities or attributes (*guṇa*) and extrinsic/accidental qualities or modes (*pariyāya* or *bhāva*), the difference being that intrinsic qualities (*guṇas*) are constant and co-exist with the substances whereas extrinsic qualities, (*pariyāyas*) are temporal in character and are constantly changing in a momentary succession. Therefore, in a *dravya* persistence is always accompanied by origination (*utpāda*) and disappearance/destruction (*vyaya* or *bhaṅga*) and these two happen in the extrinsic attributes or modes. "Whatever has substantiality, has the dialectical triad of birth, death and permanence, and is the substratum of qualities and modes is *Dravya*." (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*-10)

The extrinsic attributes or *pariyāyas* in fact exist in both the *dravyas*, i.e. substances, and the *guṇas*, i.e. the intrinsic qualities of *dravyas*. Furthermore, is important to note that Āgamas actually refer to both *guṇas* and *pariyāyas* as *pariyāyas*. Therefore, *dravya*, *guṇa* and *pariyāya* are not three different and completely separate entities but they are rather three objective aspects of the same reality, three elements that characterize one reality⁶.

As long as the substance remains, so long the qualities will also remain and without them the substance would cease to be the substance that it is and *vice versa*. "There is no coming-into-existence without destruction; there is no destruction devoid of origination; neither origination nor destruction can truly be without stability." (*Pravacanasāra*- II.8)

If we take the example of the soul (*jīva*) as a *dravya*, consciousness is one of its intrinsic qualities, i.e. *guṇas*, and different forms of sentiency (hellish, animal, human or divine) are its extrinsic qualities, i.e. *pariyāyas*. In the case of matter (*puḍgala*), colour is one of its intrinsic qualities and yellow is one of its extrinsic qualities.

According to the Jaina ontological theory there is an infinite amount of substances, however, they can be grouped into five⁷ or six categories. They are soul (*jīva*), matter (*puḍgala*), medium of motion (*dharmā*), medium of rest (*adharma*), space (*ākāśa*) and time (*kāla*)⁸, (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*- 6). Of these, the latter five belong to the category of *ajīva*.

The first five (all substances apart from *kāla*) are generally referred to as *astikāyas* (*atthikāyas*). "*Astī*" or "*atthī*" means "exists" whereas "*kāya*" means "a body", "an extensive magnitude" or "a conglomerate". An *astikāya* is therefore a substance that firstly, exists and secondly, has a bodily extension, so it is an existent that has an extensive magnitude, an ability to occupy space¹⁰. As a conglomerate⁹ an *astikāya* consists of small indivisible units, namely *pradeśas*. "Extensive substances occupy many spatial units,

as mentioned in the Jaina scriptures." (*Niyamasāra*- 34). These spatial units are not separate and can therefore be combined. The fact that an *astikāya* is extensive means that its particles are not units of exclusively one series but are at the same time units of another or multiple series of elements. (Kundakunda, 2001, xxxix). This gives *astikāyas* a multiple dimension (*tiryakpracaya*). The *astikāyas* are eternal and fill all the three worlds, *ūrdhva* (upper), *madhyama* (middle) and *adhah* (lower).

Kundakunda does not consider time to be an extensive substance and therefore does not categorize it under *astikāyas* for reasons that will be further clarified below. "Souls, material-aggregates, *dharmā*, *adharma* and space possess innumerable infinitesimal-spatial-units; but in time these are absent." (*Pravacanasāra*- II.43) "Excepting Time, (the other five) of these substances (are known) as 'Extensive substances' (*Astikāya*)" (*Niyamasāra* -34).

If we look at the Āgamic works¹¹, the *Āvaśyaka-cūṛṇi* refers to three different views on time: firstly, time as a quality;¹² secondly, time as modes of substances; and thirdly, time as an independent substance. The Digambaras accept *kāla* as an independent substance whereas the Śvetāmbara tradition remains divided regarding the topic. The Śvetāmbaras that do not agree with the substantialist theory of time understand time as a modal modification of the other five substances, meaning that time is not different from the changing object and does not have an independent existence¹³. According to this view the changes that substances undergo originate from substances themselves. Therefore modification is inherent to a substance and does not need an independent underlying support to take place.

Kundakunda introduced the substance of time and its function in various works. *Pravacanasāra* (II. 42) states that the "quality of time is the rolling on (of events) (*vartana*)."¹⁴ It is similarly said in the *Niyamasāra*. "That by the help of which, all substances, soul etc., are altered in their own modifications, is 'Time'. The four substances, the medium of motion, (the medium of rest, space and

time) have (only) their own natural attributes and modifications." (*Niyamasāra* 33) It is likewise said in the *gāthā* 23 of *Pañcāstikāya-sāra*: "That on account of which these existences, the *Jīvas*, material bodies, the *Dharma* and *Adharma* undergo changes is called real time or *Kāla-Dravya*." The description continues in the next *gāthā*. "What is without the five colours, and the five tastes, without the two smells, and eight contacts; what is neither heavy nor light and has the character of introducing changes in other things is time" (*Pañcāstikāyasāra* 24). Time is thus characterized as immaterial and presented as a support for modal modifications that happen in substances¹⁴.

Furthermore, the above mentioned *gāthā* 23 introduces not merely the notion of time but describes time as being real. In fact many Jaina philosophers that accepted time as a substance distinguished between two levels of time, this being real on the one hand and conventional on the other¹⁵. It must be immediately pointed out, though, that Jainism has not proposed a dualist theory of time and this theory of two levels of time seems to be a way of trying to subsume various aspects and experiences of time under a single temporal model.

Initially we will expand the idea of real time. The real, ideal, ascertained, elementary, underlying or absolute time (*niścaya-kāla*, *mukhya-kāla*, *paramārtha-kāla* or *dravya kāla*) is considered to be an unconditional, independent substance. The word *niścaya* refers to a viewpoint that considers entities from the perspective of a *dravya*. The function of *niścaya-kāla* is, as has been implied above, to allow change, to support the origination and decay, the oldness and newness of substances¹⁶ brought about through the changing succession of *pariyāyas*¹⁷. In that sense it can be said that real time is potent and acts as an assisting agent in modal changes of substances despite the fact that it is technically a non-active substance. *Kāla* is therefore some sort of an efficient, auxiliary or instrumental cause of modal modifications (*pariṇāma*). This instrumental account for change was perhaps the main reason for Jains to introduce time as a

substance; the underlying logic being that if change is real, then time also must be real and not only conventional. However, Chatterjee points out that, in fact, *kāla* is a causal condition of a special kind. It is an instrumental cause of change, however, it is a very indirect and passive instrumental cause, like a potter's wheel is an instrumental cause of a pot. (Chatterjee, 1954, 102) Time merely acts as foundation for change whereas it cannot cause a thing to bear change.

It has already been pointed out that Kundakunda conceived time as a non-extensive substance (*akāya-dravya*) which does not contain *pradeśas*. "The infinitesimal-particles contained by substances are either one, two, many, or transcending number, or endless (in number). But in the case of time the moments are so." (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*- 49) However, that does not mean it is devoid of elements. On the contrary, Kundakunda's notion of time as an independent substance is atomic. "(Time-points) which are packed full in the universe, are (called the real 'Time')." (*Niyamasāra* 32) This sort of a time theory seems to be an attempt to try to fit an ontology of time in an otherwise spatially understood reality. For a broader picture of the Jaina cosmos reveals the following basic elements: instants as the smallest units of *kāla*, space-points (*pradeśas*) as the smallest units of *ākāśa* and atoms (*paramāṇus*) as the smallest units of *pudgala*.

The time atoms that Kundakunda introduced are known as *kalāṇus* or instants¹⁸ each one of which is a substance. They are simple, discrete, dimensionless and eternal. They do not possess physical qualities like material atoms. Consequently we cannot perceive them or measure them. They also generally differ from the particles of *astikāyas*. Since they are motionless, they occupy one space-point only. Therefore they are separated and distinct and can never be combined. Consequently, they do not form aggregates like material atoms, nor do they unite into a unified whole like space-points. Therefore time has no body or spatial extension (*tiryakpracaya*). "Time, space, *dharma* and *adhama*, matter and

jīva: these things are called *dravyas*. Of these to time alone there is no *kāyatva* (body-'ness')" (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*-102). Instead, particles of time are elements of one series only which is a continuous one-dimensional (*ūrdhvapracaya*) linear sequence of distinct units. Since this sequence consists of discrete, independent units that are eternal, it is itself eternal, and notions of past, present and future do not pertain to it. To conclude, Kundakunda distinguished between two different conglomerations, a multidimensional or transverse on the one hand and a vertical on the other. The former one does not apply to the substance of time, as *kāla* possesses one *pradeśa* only whereas the other substances have conglomerations in multiple directions, including the vertical. To further embellish on this point let us look at the Amṛtacandra's commentary to *Pravacanasāra* II.49. "The vertical conglomeration is not excluded from any substance, since the occurrence of all substances, in its connection with the three aspects (*koṭi*) (of time), possesses parts. But there is this difference: the vertical conglomeration of the substances other (than time) is a conglomeration whose occurrence is characterized by the time-moments; but the vertical conglomeration of time is a conglomeration of the time-moments themselves. For the occurrence of the other substances, being something else than the moment (*samaya*), has qualification by the moment; but the occurrence of time, being identical with the moment, has not that." (Kundakunda, 1935, 116)

As has been stated, one atom of time is located in each space-point of the cosmos and since spatial points in the universe are innumerable, atoms of time are also innumerable, filling the entire cosmos. Hence for Kundakunda time exists in the whole of *lokākāśa*. "Space is in the universe and in the beyond; *dharma*, *adharma* are stretched over the world; so is time, in dependence upon the remaining substances; these remaining substances are the souls and material-components." (*Pravacanasāra* II.44) The "dependence" refers to modal modifications of time that will be further examined below. However *kālāṇus* do not exist in the *alokākāśa*. This results in a problem when regarding *alokākāśa* as a

substance. Since time occasions change, how can *alokākāśa* be considered a substance if time does not exist there and therefore does not allow change which is one of the elements defining substance¹⁹?

A further problem, which is one of the main philosophical arguments against the concept of a real time, is the seeming contradiction between temporal continuity and infinity on the one hand and the idea of discrete time units (*kalāṇus*) on the other. This is a problem that pertains to space and matter as well since they all also consist of individual units. However, it seems that the paradox is somewhat greater when it comes to time since the Jaina theory of substances specifically points out that *kalāṇus* are discrete and therefore, can not even be combined²⁰ unlike other particles. Chakravarti Nayanar points to the contemporary solutions to the problem by Cantor, Peano, Frege etc, (Kundakunda, 2001, 86) which will not be addressed here due to the limited scope of this article.

Another problem refers to the modifications of modes, which occur in *kalāṇus* as substances since *kāla* as a substance must by definition undergo change like all other substances. This question is of immense importance and is touched upon in the above-mentioned *gāthā* 116 of the *Pravacanasāra*. Primary time has been defined as a support that occasions change in other substances in the Digambara as well as partly in the Śvetāmbara tradition. As it is itself a substance and therefore by definition also undergoes change via the modification of its modes, there seems to be a missing factor, this being an underlying support for change that occurs in time as a substance and allows the modification of its own *pariyāyas*. However, the solution is not that straightforward as setting another foundation would again need its own support and so on into infinity.

Therefore, some Jaina *ācāryas* have simply discarded the concept of primary time due to its problematic nature and denied it the status of a substance, describing it as a mode of other substances. A

different solution has been proposed by some Digambara *ācāryas* positing that changing modes of time are not discrete and that *kāla* in fact has temporal extension through which it pervades its modes. This proposal is based on the idea that time-atoms are unlike other substances since they do not need a support that occasions their modal modifications. Instead they generate their own changes. However, the same logic could be applied to other substances. (Shah, 2001, 1292)

Kundakunda responded to this problem with a proposition that in the case of a time-atom, origination, permanence and destruction are simultaneous and therefore happen at the same moment, this being an occurrence part of a time-object²¹. "In one moment exist the things (*arthas*) which are called origination, permanence and disappearance of time (*samaya*); at all times, therefore, this forms the existence (*sadbhāva*) of the time-atom." (*Pravacanasāra* II.51) Similarly, "The substance is inhered in at one and the same moment (*samaya*) by objects (i.e. objective relations, *arthas*), called its arising, remaining and annihilation. Therefore, this threefold set is the substance." (*Pravacanasāra* II.10) So change theoretically does not require temporal extension. Moreover, *Pravacanasāra* reads: "If origination and annihilation within one moment are found in any *samaya*, then that *samaya* (time-object) stands fast in its own nature." (*Pravacanasāra* II.50) Therefore it is precisely the fact that origination as well as annihilation belong to the occurrence part of the time-object that an existence of a time-object is inferred. In the commentary *Tattva-dīpikā*, Amṛtacandra Sūri expands on this point. "The moment, indeed, is the occurrence-part of the time-object (*samaya-padārtha*); in this moment we necessarily find the origination and annihilation of something; because, as arising though the traversing (*vyatipatata*) of a material-atom, it is preceded by a cause. Should these two belong to the occurrence-part, does this then happen simultaneously or successively? If simultaneously, there is no simultaneity, because two contradictory qualities of one thing cannot occur together. And, if successively, there is no

succession, since there is no division (*vibhaga*) in the occurrence-part, owing to its fineness (*sūkṣmatva*). Therefore, we must necessarily search for something that has the occurrence (*vṛttimat*); and this is the time-object." (Kundakunda, 1935, 117) With the application of multiple viewpoints²², simultaneity of origination and annihilation is possible²³. "If thus origination and annihilation occur in the one occurrence-part, how is there absence of identity in the time-object? For, even though, as qualified by the precedent and subsequent occurrence-parts, it simultaneously acquires annihilation and origination, why should it not possess permanence owing to its not being annihilated or produced in innate nature? So we have proved that origination, annihilation and permanence belong to the time-object in one occurrence-part." (*Ibid.*)

In order to clarify the logic behind this argument, it is necessary to expound Kundakunda's understanding of relative time. It is also referred to as conventional, apparent, derivative, secondary or relative time (*vyavahāra-kāla*)²⁴. It is related to the third *naya*, namely the *vyavahāra-naya*²⁵ (of the seven *mūla-nayas*), which refers to the empirical, everyday knowledge of a particular present object and in the framework of which entities are considered from the perspective of *pariyāyas*.

Pañcāstikāyasāra explains: "Relative time is determined by changes or motions of things. These changes themselves are the effect of time absolute. The former time is ephemeral (having beginning and end). The latter is eternal, such are the characteristics of the two" (*Pañcāstikāyasāra*- 100). The practical, secondary time is based on the absolute time and is not eternal. It has a beginning and an end. In Kundakunda's understanding of time, relative time is in fact modification of the modes (which are infinite in number) of time-atoms, this being modal changes of real time (*vyāvahārika pariyāyas*).

The recently quoted *gāthā* additionally mentions that relative time is determined by changes or motions of things. It refers to different divisions and periods of *vyāvahāra-kāla*, a long list of which is put

forward in *Pañcāstikāyasāra*- 25. "*Samaya, Niṣa, Kāṣṭhā, Kalā, Nāli*, then (*Muhūrta*), day, month, season, *Ayana*, and, *Sarivatsara* and other periods of Time are all *Vyavahāra* or conventional time. These are determined by other objects." All these periods divide the otherwise undivided series of *kālāṇus* of real time. These units of measurement are therefore not absolute, intrinsic, and independent but are conditioned (*parayatta*) by the external factors, i.e. changes in the physical world, like movements of the astral world (celestial bodies) etc. In order to work with these units of time we must necessarily rely on convention, which takes as its foundation different motions and changes in the world, such as the movements of the sun, the moon, the wink of an eye, etc. Relative time is then a modal modification of the real time. In that sense it is as real as the permanent element of the substance of time and thus participates in its independent existence. Despite that it is said that *vyavahāra kāla* is determined by other objects or dependent on them (*parayatta*). On account of this double perspective, Nayanar proposed a phrase "somewhat conditioned" (*kathāñcit parayatta*) to describe conventional time.

Furthermore, the changes and motions of things that determine and measure relative time are, as has been shown above, themselves occasioned by primary time. To sum up, on the one hand we have real time and on the other hand the relative time as its modal modification. The latter is measured by conventions or standards that are based on the motions and changes of objects in the world. "Duration of time either long or short is impossible apart from a standard of measurement. The standard of measurement also has no meaning apart from material objects. Hence conventional or relative time is brought about by extraneous conditions" (*Pañcāstikāyasāra* 26).

Let us examine in more detail the individual units of conventional time that were put forward above. The smallest unit of conventional time that is measurable is called a *samaya*²⁶, translated as a moment. Innumerable *samayas* compose the next measuring unit, a

nimiṣa, fifteen of which compose a *kāṣṭhā*, thirty of which compose a *kalā*, a little over twenty of which compose a *nāli*, two of which compose a *muhūrta*, thirty of which compose day and night, thirty days compose a month, two months compose a season, three seasons half a year or *ayana*, and two *ayanas* compose a year or *saṁvatsara*.

The definition of the smallest unit or a *samaya* is the time it takes an atom to move from one space-point to the nearest space-point²⁷. "The moment (*samaya*) lacks infinitesimal-spacial-units; it occurs (*varṭate*), while a material substance (*dravya-jāta*) which covers only one infinitesimal-space-unit traverses an infinitesimal-unit of the space-substance" (*Pravacanasāra* II.46). "A moment (*samaya*) is what is equal to the (movement) of (an ultimate material-atom) traversing a particle. The object (*artha*) which is before and after that (moment) is time. The moment is 'originated' (*utpanna*) and subject to annihilation." (*Pravacanasāra* II.47) As the motion of a material atom is present throughout the entire *loka*, the concept of *samaya* pertains to the whole of *loka* as well. However, Shah points out that the divisions of time are limited to the abode of human beings. (Shah, 2001, 1292) The cosmographical border beyond which time cannot be measured, as there are no planetary movements (there being no planets, suns, stars etc.), is called *samaya-khetta* (Viy 164b). In that sense it can be said that outside of the human realm, time stands still. However, this only refers to relative, secondary time whereas primary time as a substance exists in the entire *loka*. Moreover, if time has modifications in the entire *loka* this means that relative time must also be everywhere. Therefore, the idea of immeasurable time simply refers to the impossibility of the construction of a human measuring convention used to divide relative time. This is due to the absence of planetary movements. If there is a difference between relative time as an actual modification of a substance and a perceiver's convention to measure it, then the simultaneous appreciation of the impossibility of temporal measurement and the existence of relative time is not paradoxical.

One of the most interesting premises for further research inspired by the early Jaina definitions of time, like Kundakunda's, is the application of the definition of a substance as a changing entity to *kāla*. The theory of *kāla* being, like the other five substances, subject to change, is perhaps a pioneering theory in Indian philosophy. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, for example, also accepted time as a substance, but in their ontologies *kāla* is immutable, comparable to god, space and other eternal non-changing substances. Jainism on the other hand retains a formal relationship between all the substances, be it a soul (even liberated), matter or time, as they share a similar ontological structure consisting of elements of identity and change. With this distinction Jainism retains its uniqueness within Indian philosophical understandings of time.

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1. The author would like to thank the organizers of the ISSJS for making the publication of this paper and the research leading up to it during the ISSJS 2010 possible. Newly gained insights will be incorporated into studies carried out by the research project *Philosophical Relevance of Death and Dying* funded by the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Slovenia.
2. Is time independent of a changing entity? Is time independent of the observer? Does only present time exist? Is there continuity? Is time finite or infinite?
3. Y. J. Padmarajah numbers several names that are used to refer to the identity component. Beside those already introduced, several others should be mentioned: substratum, non-difference, continuity, continuance, unity, oneness, the continuant, statism, endurance, persistence. (Padmarajah, 1963, 127, f.n. 2)
4. Other terms that are sometimes used for change are: modification, discreteness, plurality, manyness, manifoldness, the occurrent and dynamism. *Ibid.*
5. Nathmal Tatia suggests that it is better to use the term persistency rather than staticity for the Jaina concept of substance, since that allows a distinction between a persistent flow of the former and the

inability to change of the latter. (Tatia, 1951, 24)

6. Let us take an example of a definition of the existent as “*sat dravyalakṣaṇam*” by Ācārya Umāsvāti (Umāsvāmi) in *Tattvārtha sūtra* V.29. The commentaries imply two different interpretations. Firstly, if the compound is taken as a *tatpuruṣa*, the meaning indicates that existence is a characteristic of *dravya* (*saḍ eva dravyasya lakṣaṇam*). Secondly, if the compound is taken as a *bahuvrīhi*, the meaning implies that existence has a characteristic that is substance (*yasya dravyam lakṣaṇam tad dravyalakṣaṇam. tasmāt sat lakṣaṇam dravyam*). A. Chakravarti Nayanar’s commentary to Kundakunda’s *Pañcāstikāyasāra*- 9 gives an important note regarding the topic. He recognizes that Kundakunda distinguished between *sattā* and *dravya*, however he also attributed the same characteristics to them and stated that they are in fact not different. “*Sattā* or substance is distinguished from *Dravya*. *Dravya* means that which flows or changes. While changing through its different qualities and modifications its essential nature persists. But such development is also the characteristic of a substance. Hence according to Jaina attitude *Dravya* is not entirely different from *Sattā* or substance.” Drawing parallels with Hegel’s philosophy, the commentator adds “*Dravya* refers to facts of experience. *Sattā* refers to existence or reality. One may be abstracted from the other but it is not different from the other as a fact.” (Kundakunda, 2001- 6). For convenience this paper refers to *dravya* as a substance. See also: *Pravacanasāra* II.17-18.
7. Some Śvetāmbara Jains do not accept time as a substance.
8. The Prakrit names for the substances are *jīva*, *poggala*, *dhamma*, *adhamma*, *āgāsa* and *kāla*.
9. Walther Schübring translated *atthikāya* as a “mass of all that is”. (Schübring, 1962, 126)
10. *Jīva* might seem like a problematic substance to fit this category. A. Chakravarti Nayanar in a commentary to *Pañcāstikāyasāra* explains that the “soul is also considered to be an *Astikāya* because of its organic nature. *Jīva* exists as an organism and as such it is related to body and hence the spatial quality.” (Kundakunda, 2001, 3). Chatterjee similarly states that: “Though [the soul] it has no form (*mūrti*), it acquires like a light the size and form of the body wherein it lives. It is in this sense that a *jīva*, though formless, is said to

occupy space or possess extension.” (Chatterjee, 1954, 95). Naturally this leads to the question of whether a liberated soul (*siddha-jīva*) can still be considered an *astikāya*.

11. The canonical texts (e.g. *Bhag.* 201) refer to time as *addhā-kāla* (the eternal time), listed alongside the civil time measure, the amount of life-time and the time of death.
12. Nagin J. Shah states that he could not find any references to such a view in Jaina literature. (Shah, 2001, 1289)
13. One of the arguments for the independent existence of time states that if *kāla* is to be rejected as an independent substance, the same logic would also discredit *dharma* and *adharmā* as independent substances as they perform as efficient causes (for motion and rest). However, it can be argued that motion and rest are unlike time as they are only temporary and it is possible to observe the transitions between the two which implies an underlying support for motion and inertia. Conversely, modal changes that time is supposed to occasion are eternal and have no beginning. Therefore there is no reason to introduce a new causal substance for it. (Shah, 2001, 1290)
14. “The perduration is defined as the assisting cause in the transformation of modes of the various realities.” (Jnanmati Mataji, 2007, 137).
15. See also: “*Kāla* is of two kinds: namely primary and practical.” (*Tattvārtha-sūtra*-IV.14)
16. Additional to the characterization of time as a substratum for change, it should be considered as a support for identity as well, since duration and continuation of an entity also presume a temporal momentary succession.
17. See also: “*Kāla* has the functions of “setting in motion” (*vartanā*), “change” (*pariṇāma*), “motion” (*kriyā*), and “the before-and-after” (*paratvāparatve*)” (*Tattvārtha-sūtra* 5.22).
18. Barend Faddegon translated *kālāṇu* as a time-stream which gives it a different connotation. (Kundakunda, 1935, 117, f.n. 1)
19. The commentary to *Tattvārtha-sūtra* offers an explanation though, posing an argument that *ākāśa* as a substance is one indivisible continuum. “Therefore the transformation going on in cosmos due to the existence of time there should be considered as that in trans-cosmos also.” (*Tattvārtha-sūtra* V.9.5)
20. For a further illustration of the discreteness of time-units see

Dravyasaṃgraha 22: “All those which in each and every space point of the world space remain one by one (i.e. distinct) like a heap of jewels, (are) atoms of time. They are innumerable substances.”

21. It must be noted that *Pravacanasāra* sometimes uses the expressions *kāla* and *samaya* interchangeably.
22. See also: “Every substance is, according as one chooses the point-of-view-of-modification (*paryāyārthikena*) or the point-of-view-of-substance (*dravyārthikena*), other and not other; for during a certain time it possesses a certain nature.” (*Pravacanasāra* II.22)
23. that same which,
in regard to something, which has occurrence
is, in its occurrence-part,
as qualified by that occurrence-part, origination
is for the same object which has occurrence,
in its occurrence-part,
as particularized by the precedent occurrence-part, annihilation.
(Kundakunda, 1935, 117)
24. Prakrit: *vavahāra*. The term *vyavahāra* is otherwise older and does not necessarily appear in a pair with *niścaya*.
25. For a detailed study on the terms *niścaya* and *vyavahāra*, see: Johnson, 1995.
26. A *samaya* is cognizable only to an omniscient being.
27. It is important to point out here the difference between modal (*paryāya*) change and activity (*kriyā*), the former being origination and decay and the latter movement from one space-point to the other.

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Uposatha and Posaha in the Early Histories of Jainism and Buddhism

Christian Haskett

In the study of India's ancient history, the notion of the primacy of the *Vedas* and their originatory role in virtually all Indic religions has played a role entirely out of proportion to its reliability. This theory, an accepted fact within much of the Hindu tradition, has led us to accept suggestions such as Jaina as a caste within the Hindu community and Buddhism as a reform and heretical offshoot of Hinduism. Why this should be the case differs, to some extent, from one case to another, but at least in part we can point to the role of Brāhmaṇas in the early study of Sanskrit literature as translators, instructors, and commentators. Recent scholarship has challenged this view as a whole¹ and piecemeal, from the perspectives of the Hindu tradition² and from the perspective of Buddhism and Jainism.³ The present paper further advances the challenge to Vedic origins theories by arguing that the Jaina *posaha* and the Buddhist *uposatha* differ from one another in ways sufficient to rule out the possibility of a mutual source such as the *Vedas* and their *upavasatha*⁴. Instead, I will argue for *posaha* as a broader cultural phenomena which was gradually adapted and factionalized by Buddhists and Jains.

Throughout, I propose that the development of *uposatha* and *posaha* prove the theory that Vedic and Śramaṇic culture emerged, grew, and evolved independent of one another for a very long time, and that Buddhism and Jainism are each more properly viewed as outgrowths of an earlier Śramaṇic culture than as reforms or offshoots of Hinduism. This culture, which I will call early Śramaṇism, lacked texts, institutions, or formalized rules, and we may also be sure that it was fairly amorphous and not very coherent or contiguous. We also have very little direct evidence of it or its character, but we shall hope to detect the echoes of it in the earliest Jaina and Buddhist Literature.

Some problems with the upavasatha ->posaha / uposatha theory

In earlier research (Haskett 2010a, 2010b) I have considered the question of *uposatha* and *posaha* descending from *upavasatha* more fully, and of course this paper also offers an alternative explanation for the derivation of *posaha*. Thus, I will only briefly review some of the arguments that have been made by myself and others against sourcing the Buddhist and Jaina observances in the Vedic ones.

1. The Vedic tradition does not necessarily hold historic precedent. The earliest mention of *upavasatha* is in the *Brāhmaṇas*, which are roughly contemporaneous with the births of Buddhism and Jainism.
2. Linguistically, we cannot derive *uposatha* from *upavasatha* because while in Pāli *ava* does become *o*, it only does so in the case of an *upasarga* verbal prefix. There are no other cases where an *ava* occasioned by the union of *a + va* produces an *o*. This holds true in cases where the *a* is a precative as well as when it is not.
3. The Pāli *uposatha* occurs frequently beside the verb *upavasati*. If the *o* of *uposatha* is the result of a *samprasāraṇa*, why did the same *samprasāraṇa* not take place in *upavasati*, thus giving us *uposati*?
4. As Schonthal argued (57-60), the content of the *uposatha* day much more closely resembles the *posaha*. In each, laypersons take temporary vows which approximate those of their monastic counterparts as a means of generating virtue and eliminating bad *karma*. The *upavasatha* is a fast with some abstentions, but in preparation for a pending sacrifice. The Buddhist and Jaina days include no preparatory aspect whatsoever.

An additional problem is raised by Johannes Bronkhorst in his book *Greater Magadha* (2007) which shows that the Brāhmaṇa migration

eastward did not reach the Magadha region until some time after the advent of Buddhism and Jainism. We have evidence that *posaha / uposatha* was practiced at the time of Aśoka, and no reason to suspect that it was not a part of the earliest manifestations of both Buddhism and Jainism.

Posaha->upavasatha?

Two paths offer a way out of a connection between the Vedic *upavasatha* and the Śramanic *posaha/uposatha*: a linguistic argument separating the terms, and a historical argument concerning the contents and function of the rites. By one we can vitiate the connection between them, but by the other we can demonstrate an alternate causality. Ultimately a full revision of the history should involve both; however, an alternate causality already exists which must be examined, tested, and verified, and in the process we may have a chance to learn something important about the history of the 'early' Śramanic movement⁵. In point 4. above I mention Schonthal's theory that the Buddhist *uposatha* derives from *posaha*, and in this section I examine this theory more closely. No matter what the outcome of this investigation, though, we should observe that even if we show that *uposatha* evolves from *posaha*, we still have the possibility that *posaha* came from *upavasatha* and then subsequently gave rise to *uposatha*, and that is a theory that I ultimately want to critique, if not discard, for reasons already mentioned.

The *posaha ->uposatha* argument rests on two points: the Buddhist *uposathavastu* in the Pāli *vinaya* and *poṣadhavastu* in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya* both acknowledge that the Buddhists borrowed the idea for the *uposatha* from another sect of renunciates. Schonthal gives this perfectly serviceable translation of the relevant passage:

At that time wanderers (*paribbājakā*) from other sects (*tittihiyā*) gathered on the fourteenth, fifteenth and eighth days of the lunar fortnights and spoke of *dharma*.

People went to them to hear *dharma* [and] they acquired affection (*pemañ*) for wanderers of other sects; they acquired faith (*pasādam*) [in them]; [and in turn] wanderers of other sects acquired adherents. Then when king, general Bimbisāra of Magadha, had gone into seclusion and was meditating, thus a consideration arose in his mind that, "wanderers of other sects now assemble on the fourteenth, fifteenth and eighth days of the lunar fortnight and recite *dharma*. People approach them to hear *dharma*. They acquire affection for wanders of other sects; they acquire faith [too]. Wanderers of other sects acquire adherents. Well now, those noble ones, as well, should meet on the fourteenth, fifteenth and eighth of the lunar half-month." (Oldenberg 1977, 1:101, 2; translation Schonthal 2006, 56)

Let us pause here. The proposed proof should be transparent enough-the Buddhists take their observance from other sects, and these are even called *titthiyā*, or *tīrthāḥ*. However, note that these are here only *paribbājaka* (Skt: *parivrājaka*), which is a generic name for renouncers. Both the Pāli *vinaya* and the early Jaina literature suggest that there were plenty of other renouncer groups operating in the Magadha area at this time, and in fact, we know that they were long after as well (see *Harṣacarita* for example). Thus, there is no reason (yet) why we should think of these particular renunciates as Jains and in fact, there is a good and important reason for us to suspect that these are not Jains, or if they are, they are not doing *posaha*.

In the above *vinaya* passage we see the other renouncers observing the fourteenth, fifteenth, and eighth day ceremonies, and also that these are attended by laity. The dates pose no difficulty, except in as much as they are also potential dates for the Vedic observance. This description does not square with the Jaina version of the *posaha*, though, when it has the monks as the main actors, and the laypeople as passive observers. The Jaina *posaha* is now and always has been

a lay observance.

Jaina doctrine holds that only renunciates can maintain perfect and complete morality, or even a version of it, in the form of the *mahāvratā* (Great Vows); laypeople can only hope for an approximation of these in the form of the *aṇuvratā* (Lesser Vows). The *posaha* gives the laity an opportunity to live, at least morally, as monks for a defined period of time:

The Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some followers of Śramaṇas who have made this declaration: we cannot submit to the tonsure, renounce the life of a householder and enter the monastic state, but we shall strictly observe the *Posaha* on the fourteenth and eighth days of each fortnight, (on the new-moon, and) full-moon days, we renounce gross ill-usage of living beings, grossly lying speech, gross taking of things not given, (unlawful) sexual intercourse, (unlimited) appropriation of property; we shall set limits to our desires in the two forms and the three ways. They will also make the following renunciation: "neither do nor cause anything (sinful) to be done for my sake." Having (on *Posaha*-days) abstained from eating, drinking, bathing and using beds or chairs may they, on their decease, be said to make a (righteous) end of their life? "Certainly, they do make such an end of their life." (SK, trans. Jacobi 1968, 2:429-31)

It is for this very reason that the *posaha* becomes a *Śikṣā Aṇuvratā*, or training vow for the laity, but never appears anywhere as an obligation for monks. In fact, for Jains the *posaha* always involves laity and we see no mention whatsoever of monks actively participating in *posaha* in any canonical text or any other writing, even into the early modern period. *In the next section I will present a range of evidence from various Jaina literary sources which should serve to cement that fact.*

Proṣadha: a Śrāvaka observance

The above citation from the oldest strata of the Jaina Āgama clearly makes the *posaha* a layperson's observance. Modern iterations of *posaha* also indicate that it is a lay holiday. Is there any evidence to indicate that, at any point in time, the *posaha* was observed in some way by renunciate members of the Jaina *tīrthas*?

To date, I have not identified any scriptural sources which portray renunciate participation in *posaha*. Earlier I alluded to Schonthal's proposal, based on Deo (1956, 153) that on the *posaha* monks recited their vows in a fashion similar to the Buddhist *prātimokṣa*, but that portion of Deo only mentions the monastic *pratīkramaṇa*, and that it can take place fortnightly. That fortnightly recitation mostly likely did take place on the same dates assigned for the *posaha*, and there is even some evidence to suggest that monks sometimes made confessions using laity as confessors (Caillat 1973, 126), but nowhere do we find any use of the word *posaha* in this context, nor any indication that this was thought of as part of the *posaha*. On the other hand, we have abundant direct and indirect evidence from several different periods of Jaina literary history that householders should observe the *posaha*.

The *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvaka-cāra* is one of the earliest Jaina texts, dating to 2nd c. CE, and is also remarkable for being one of the few documents accepted by both Digambara and Śvetāmbara authorities. Locating a description of the *posaha* there already serves to show that it was a lay observance, since the text teaches the path of conduct proper to householders. When the RKŚ says that the practitioner should abandon perfume, flowers, and other adornments, as well as bathing, in addition to food restrictions⁶, it can only be speaking of householders, because these have already been forbidden for monks and nuns. Similarly, when it takes the fast of the *posaha* to mean only eating once⁷, it would make little sense to prescribe such restrictions for monks and nuns who are already restricted to a single daily meal.

Ācārya Kārtikeya⁸, writing in the third century, makes a similar point in writing that :

the *Śrāvaka* who always, on both holy days, abstains from bathing, unguents, ornaments, association with women, perfume, incense, lamps, etc; and, who ornamented with the ornaments in the form of passionlessness, fasts or eats only once, or eats only 'blameless' (*nirvikṛti*) food, his is the so-called *posaha* training vow⁹.

The *Pāiasaddamaḥaṇṇavo* also specifically terms the *posaha* and *posahovavāso* as *śrāvaka kā*, or 'of or belonging to the householders' in each of its entries, citing over a half dozen texts in support of this position¹⁰. The *posaha* is the twelfth vow of householders. Thus, we find a total unanimity in all the literature we have seen so far indicating that the *posaha* is a rite for householders.

We should next, however, entertain the objection that we have only considered Digambara sources, and largely those which specifically address the conduct and concerns of householders. This literature also belongs to a later strata, having been actually composed from the first century onward, whereas the Śvetāmbara canon, whatever its date of redaction, purports to derive from the time of Mahāvīra, and was passed down orally until its final rescension¹¹. Close attention to detail will not only reveal that the Śvetāmbara and Digambara texts concur almost exactly, but will also reveal a number of points that allow us to triangulate the Jaina *posaha vis-a-vis* other fortnightly ritual observations of other sects in ancient India.

Let us first return to the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* passage we reviewed earlier:

The Venerable One spoke thus: "There are some followers of Śramaṇas who have made this declaration: we cannot submit to the tonsure, renounce the life of a householder and enter the monastic state, but we shall

strictly observe the Posaha on the fourteenth and eighth days of each fortnightē. (SK 2:249, transl. Jacobi 1968).

The juxtaposition could demonstrate more if differently worded, but even as it stands, we can see first that in this oldest layer of Jaina literature, the *posaha* was observed by laity and not by monastics. In fact, the phrasing further alerts us to the *posaha* as an opportunity for *Śrāvakas*, who cannot maintain full monastic discipline, to temporarily approximate it. As with the iterations we discussed earlier, it makes little sense for monks to observe a day of avoiding things which they have already promised to avoid for life. Observe here as well that the practitioners that Mahāvīra identifies are not necessarily Jains, but followers of the *Śramaṇas*. Here we have the first direct suggestion from the Jaina side of the *posaha* as a rite shared with other sects, a fact which will eventually become crucial to my total argument. The *Uttarādhyayana*, in V.23, also says that faithful householders ought never miss the observance. We still seem to have a total agreement on the exclusive participation of the laity in the *posaha*.

Another early source, the *Kalpasūtra*, attempts a separate and, I propose, wholly innovated and novel explanation of the source of the *posaha*:

In that night in which the venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra died & C (all down to) freed from all pains, the eighteen confedrate the King of Kāśī and Kośala. The nine Mallakis and Licchavis on the day of new moon instituted an illumination on the *Posadhā*, which was a fasting ay; for they said: 'Since the light of intelligence is gone, let us make an illumination of material matter!' (KS trans. Jacobi 1974 [1884] 266).

It seems that the Jains accept the existence of an already-founded *posaha* at the time of Mahāvīra. I do not know of any claim that Mahāvīra instituted the *posaha*, and in fact, in later literature it is claimed to have also existed at the time of Supārśvanātha, the 9th

Tīrthānkara, as well¹². Further research into the biographies (*cariya*) of earlier *tīrthānkaras* might undergird the notion that the Jains understand the *posaha* to be an ancient, or perhaps eternal part of their religion. This would not be surprising, since Jains understand Jainism itself to be eternal, even if some components do vary from the teaching of one *tīrthānkara* to the next.

Are there, then, any remarks at all about renouncers and the *posaha*? Does the Jaina canon never mention them, except as a foil for the imperfect laity in the emulation of whom the *posaha* is conducted? Obviously, a conclusive and exhaustive search of the total canon is beyond both my capabilities and the scope of this paper; however, we can find at least one source that mentions monks and their involvement with the *posaha*, but only in a very negative light.

A monk or a nun on a begging-tour should not accept food, &c., in the following case: when, on the eighth or *paushadha* day, on the beginning of a fortnight, .. many Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, guests, paupers, and beggars are entertained with food, &c., out of ..pots, baskets, or heaps of food ; such-like food which has been prepared by the giver, & c., (all down to) not tasted of, is impure and unacceptable. But if it is prepared by another person, &c. (see first lesson, 13), one may accept it; for it is pure and acceptable. (AS, trans. Jacobi 1964 [1884], 92)

The relevant portion of the Prakrit passage reads *se bhikkhu vā gāhāvātikulaṃ piṇḍavātapāḍiyāe aṇupaviṭṭhe samāṇe se jjaṃ puṇa jāṇeja asaṇaṃ vā aṭṭhamiposaḥiesu vā*.¹³ We can observe a few things from this passage, which gives us a rare glimpse into the culture of ancient India and its operations. First, monks quite obviously can eat on the *posaha* day, so long as they observe certain restrictions which are the standard ones about not eating food which has been prepared with them in mind¹⁴. The separation of the preparer from the donor evidently places enough distinction in intention to suffice. Secondly, and quite remarkably, it looks as

though at this point in time, whenever that may have been, members of several religious groups joined together to be feted at the *posaha*, in the form of a great festive meal to feed all types of recipients of donated alms.¹⁵ The observance, and thus presumably the corresponding sociological formations, were not separated into the communal divisions we have at present. Our assumption that those sectarian formations were in force, or would have to have been, is an uncareful projection of later and present situations into the past.

The Hindi commentary which accompanies the *Ācārāṅga* is noteworthy here as well, because it says, regarding '*samaṇa*' (Skt: *śramaṇa*); 'there are five types of *śramaṇas*: Knotless (Jain), *Śākyan* (Buddhist), Ascetic, White, and *ājīvika* (followers of Gośālaka' (*śramaṇa pañca prakāra ke hote hain*: (1) *nirgrantha* (jaina), (2) *śākya* (Bauddha), (3) *tāpas*, (4) *gaurika aura* (5) *ājīvika* (*gośālakamatiya*)¹⁶. In addition, the *ĀS* lists *brāhmaṇas* (the Hindi commentary calls these 'those who show up for food!'), beggars, the destitute, and guests, thus depicting an activity which more closely resembles the later celebrated *mahādāna* than anything else. In light of all this, the *posaha* appears to have been a community-wide festival of donations to the less fortunate, or to worthy recipients of alms without any regard for sectarian identity. We might also surmise, then, that it was celebrated by the greater community at large, and if that is the case, we have some serious reconfiguration of our account of the descent of the *posaha* ahead of us.

Lastly, we might wonder what the *Brāhmaṇas* mentioned both in the root text and in the Hindi commentary are doing at the *posaha*, since they are supposed to be off somewhere keeping busy with their own *upavasatha*? Even if we give the Vedic view as charitable a treatment as we can, and suppose that the observance described here is the *Brāhmaṇa upavasatha*, we still have to wonder why the *Ācārāṅga* has the *Brāhmaṇas* eating at the *posaha*, since the *upavasatha* requires them to fast?

Some conclusions

The early *posaha*, as it is remembered in the ĀS, was not a Jaina *posaha*, or a Buddhist *posaha*, or any other sect's. This may reflect as well that no one thought of the members of these and other various sects as necessarily distinct from one another, at least not in the sense that we think of them today. Indeed, the ancient Indian conception of 'religion' may well have viewed all '*dhārmika*' strivers as unitary in one sense, even though they followed different teachers and thus observed different customs. Jains and Buddhists as such, and Jaina and Buddhist fast day observances as such, emerged much later.

This being the case-that there was a broader understanding and pervasion of the ideals of Śramaṇic culture and not one bound to any one tradition or religion-we can actually confirm what the Jaina and Buddhist sources have claimed for over 2,000 years. The Buddha studied with other ascetics. Mahāvīra continued a tradition that stretched back far before him. Whether or not we can accept Pārśvanātha as an historical personage (and I do not think we can, simply because we don't have sufficient evidence from the putative time period), we have mutually confirming accounts from two ancient sources which show a widespread, well-established Śramaṇic culture which had rites and rituals, holidays and festivals, and-perhaps ironically given later contention between *Śramaṇas* and *Brāhmaṇas* from all sides-a peaceful coexistence and integration between this culture and that of the *Brāhmaṇas*.

The Vedic argument turns on the point, or at least assumes and require, that on a vast and open landscape, there existed only the Vedic religion, and then along came Jainism, as a total and unitary reified entity, which then appropriated the *upavasatha* and renamed it. The evidence simply does not support this sort of situation. What seems far more likely is that this Śramaṇic culture, or the Śramaṇic movement and a culture which gradually grew to be influenced by it, had flourished and developed in the Magadha area for at least some centuries before the time of Mahāvīra and the

Buddha, and it was the *Brāhmaṇas* who migrated into this cultural region. The Vedicism we have today, including its *upavasatha*, developed in the context of Śramaṇism-not the other way around.

This seems like a radical proposition, but I would suggest that it only seems that way because of our consistent and untested presumption that the *Vedas* are primary. That assumption has a history, and it is a recent one. When the supremacy of the *Vedas* is held to one side, perhaps a clearer, more accurate picture of ancient India and her history may emerge, as I hope it may have begun to here.

Abbreviations

| | |
|------|--------------------------------|
| ĀS | <i>Ācārāṅga Sūtra</i> |
| JSK | <i>Jaina Siddhānta Kośa</i> |
| KĀ | <i>Kārtikeyānuprekṣā</i> |
| KS | <i>Kalpasūtra</i> |
| MDhś | <i>Mānavadharmasāstra</i> |
| MIA | <i>Middle Indo-Aryan</i> |
| PSM | <i>Pāiasaddamahāṅgavo</i> |
| RKS | <i>Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvākācāra</i> |
| SK | <i>Sūtrakṛtāṅga</i> |

References:

1. See Bronkhorst 2007.
2. See, for example, Olivelle's interpretation of *varṇāśramadharmā* in *The Āśrama System* (2000) and elsewhere, demonstrating that the renunciate traditions are encapsulated and agglomerated onto Hinduism in the latter 'Forest-dweller' and 'Wandering Ascetic' stages described in the *dharmasāstras*; also Bronkhorst's *Two Sources of Vedic Tradition* (1993).
3. See Chapters 3 and 5 of Haskett 2010; also, Schonthal 2006 convincingly shows that the *uposatha* should not have descended

from the *upavasatha* but is instead more related (in its content) to the Jaina *posaha*. My argument in my dissertation takes a more linguistic turn; this paper makes some synthesis of the two approaches, but also extends the application of the argument separating *uposatha* and *posaha* not only from *upavasatha*, but also from each other. For an additional theory, proposing Iranian sources for the original *uposatha*, see Pryzluski 1936.

4. Buddhists and Jains used a variety of terms to refer to their fast day observances. In this paper, I use *upavasatha* to refer to the Vedic rite; *uposatha* to refer to the Buddhist; and, *posaha* to refer to the Jaina. Any deviations from this scheme should be obvious and noted. Authorities in the modern era differ in their (re-) Sanskritization of *posaha*, and we find *proṣadha*, *pauṣadha*, and other variants as well.
5. By early I here mean at the birth of Jainism and Buddhism. In fact this is probably more properly termed the early middle period, particularly since in this paper I will eventually put forth the idea of a prehistory of Śramaṇism, one that extends back as much as several centuries before Jainism and Buddhism coalesce into stable social formations.
6. RKŚ 16-18, ad cit JSK 163.
7. RKŚ 108 ad cit JSK 163. JSK's translation, *cāra prakāra ke āhāra kyā tyāga upavāsa hai. eka bāra bhojana karnā proṣadha hai* confirms the sense of RKŚ *caturāhāravisarjanasupavāsaḥ proṣadhaḥ sakṛdbhuktiḥ*.
8. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* 358-59, ad cit JSK 163.
9. According to the Hindi translation, this is a *Śikṣāvṛata*; KĀ reads *jo kuṇadi evamāi tassa vayaṁ posahaṁ vidīyaṁ*.
10. PSM 618.
11. Many sources point to the oral transmission of both the Pāli and Prakrit scriptures as a weak spot, suggesting that the lack of a stable written text made it far more likely that emendations and fabrications could creep into the literature. Scholarly opinion, at present, is entirely opposed to this notion. Gombrich points out that group recitation maintains the text because any changes are immediately evident and cannot be easily made permanent without unanimous consent (1990). Texts travel away from the communities in which they originated, and historically we know that the

Mahāyāna literature expanded exponentially in the years after its advent. We also have strong evidence, in the form of the *Vedas*, that oral transmission of memorized texts maintains linguistic material with remarkable uniformity, a fact that does not apply at all to any manuscriptural tradition extant in the world today. Manuscripts are also subject to copy errors and environmental degradation. While errors and emendations may have crept into the Jaina literature in the years after it was written down, we can be much more certain that they did not make their way into memorized texts before that.

12. I assume this is the case; however, I do not presently have access to vol. III of *Supārśvanāthacarita* referenced by the *Pāiasaddamahāṇava* (618).
13. *Ācāraṅga Sūtra*, Beawar, Rajasthan: Sri Agama Prakashan Samiti, p. 22.
14. The Buddhist *vinaya* also speaks of the *uposatha* and *poṣadha* meals, which make little sense if there is to be a fast.
15. This point also furthers my suggestion, made elsewhere, about the etymology of *posaha* derived from *poṣadha*, conjecturally meaning *yasmin dine poṣam dhīyate*, on which day nourishment is put or placed, therefore *poṣam* (food) + *dhā* (put) = *poṣadha*. The contraction of *dhā* to *dha* in the final member of a compound, a form of *samprasāraṇa*, is altogether common in Sanskrit. We might also note here that the shift from *tha* to *dha* in MIA is not at all usual, especially since nasalization of dentals is a far more frequent occurrence, but *dha* -> *ha* is standard. *tha* -> *ha* is possible as well.
16. At ĀS 2.1.2, *sūtra* 334, p 18 of Beawar edition: *Śramaṇa pāñca prakāra ke hote hair*: (1) *nirgrantha* (jain), (2) *śākya* (baudhd), (3) *tāpas*, (4) *gaurika aura* (5) *ājīvika* (gośālakamatīya).

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On the Identity of the Liberated Jīva in Jainism

Sean Butler

The philosophical mind is not satiated by doctrinal assertions. The philosopher requires rational explanations. As a student of Western philosophy studying Jainism I have had some difficulty coming to understand the Jaina concept of the soul, particularly as regards its identity. I presume that the difficulties I have faced are not uniquely my own for there seem to be some philosophical problems with the Jaina doctrine of the soul. In this paper I will explore what I take to be the problems with the identity of the soul in Jainism. Further, I will demonstrate that Jaina philosophy has a solution to most, but not all, of these problems and their caveats. Essentially this paper has two purposes: 1) to demonstrate that the identity of the soul in Jainism is coherent, and 2) to put forward philosophical problems with the identity of the soul in Jainism that remain unsolved.

Before we discuss the philosophical problems of the soul in Jainism, it is prudent to first discuss the Jaina concept of the soul. In Jainism, each individual soul (*jīva* from now on) is understood as a substance. Now there are two ways of understanding this term 'substance'. Jains describe substance as identity in difference¹ whereas "when philosophers discuss 'substance', [.. it] is the concept of object, or thing,"² or that which is capable of independent existence. Both of these understandings of 'substance' work for the Jaina concept of *jīva*, however as the identity of the *jīva* is concerned, we will be using the philosophical understanding of substance for two reasons: 1) defining substance as identity in difference is problematic in that it posits both a substance and the modes of the substance; thus defining substance in terms of substance, and 2) because Jainism does in fact endorse the distinct individuality of *jīvas* that do not depend on anything exterior to themselves for their existence.

Before we continue, I feel it is necessary to first defend my above assertion that ‘identity in difference’ is not a valid definition of a substance. I claimed above that such a definition posits both substance and its modifications. Dr. S.C. Jain seems to agree when he states, “The same entity has to be doubly designated as permanent and impermanent, the substance and the modes.”³ Dr. Jain is correct when referring to entities but seems to conflate ‘substance’ with ‘thing’. If we are talking about ‘things’, we must acknowledge that they change. However, if we are defining things (entities such as *jīvas*) as substances, then we ambiguously use the terms ‘substance’ and ‘thing’. If we were to adopt Dr. Jain’s explanation of identity in difference, we would be equating substances with things, and then defining things in terms of substance, or the other way around. Now, to be fair, Dr. Jain finds reason for his position in the Jaina notion of *anekāntavāda*, a topic too complex to delve into here. Let it be sufficient to know that *anekāntavāda* remains an inconsistently championed concept in the literature. That is to say, a consensus has not been reached that sufficiently explains the concept.⁴

Now the term ‘*jīva*’ is ambiguous, referring both to the pure, liberated, *jīva* and to the obstructed, mundane *jīva*. The mundane *jīva* is embodied and bound by *karmas* whereas the liberated *jīva* is free of *karmas*.⁵ Mundane *jīvas* are also said to have extrinsic attributes such as mood, body, and age whereas liberated *jīvas* do not.⁶ Because it is the intrinsic attributes that matter for identity, for the sake of simplicity we will be focusing here on liberated *jīva*. So what is a *jīva*? Let us look at what Jaina scholars have had to say about the identity of the *jīva*.

Dr. Jyoti Prasad Jain identifies the *jīva* as knowledge itself.⁷ This is, however, not precisely the case for Dr. Jain also states that the soul’s nature is *ahimsā* (non-harm).⁸ Dr. Helmuth Von Glasenapp identifies the *jīva* in terms of its characteristics. He maintains that the *jīva*’s primary characteristic is cognition⁹ but the *jīva* also has the characteristics of *vīrya* (energy or activity),¹⁰ and *saṃyag-*

darśana (right belief).¹¹ Dr. Padmanabh S. Jaini claims there are innumerable qualities of a *jīva*, four of which are central: “perception, knowledge, bliss and energy.”¹² The *Tattvārthasūtra* claims that “functional consciousness/ sentience is the differentia (distinguishing characteristic) of the soul.”¹³ And the *Dravyasaṅgraha* claims that the sentient substance (*jīva*), “from the absolute point of view is that which has consciousness.”¹⁴ The *Dravyasaṅgraha* also states that the definition of the soul is right faith.¹⁵ Though clearly there is no single, set definition of *jīva* in the literature, one can see that the identity of a *jīva* involves faith, activity, knowledge, bliss, and cognition. In fact the strict identity of a *jīva* is perfection in these qualities.

Now the primary problem I am raising regarding the identity of the *jīva* has to do with Leibniz’s Law, also known as the identity of indiscernibles. The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* explains:

The Identity of Indiscernibles is a principle of analytic ontology first explicitly formulated by Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz in his Discourse on Metaphysics, Section 9 (Loemker 1969: 308). It states that no two distinct substances exactly resemble each other. This is often referred to as ‘Leibniz’s Law’ and is typically understood to mean that no two objects have exactly the same properties...¹⁶

From this principle an argument can be made for shared identity of all *jīvas*, especially after liberation when external properties do not differentiate *jīvas* from one another. Such an argument would (1) establish that discerning properties do not exist as regards the intrinsic attributes of a *jīva* and (2) that liberated *jīvas* do not have extrinsic properties, and are therefore indistinguishable. It would follow that (3) *jīvas* lose their identity upon liberation. Such an argument would not be hard to construct. In fact there are scholars who endorse both 1 and 2 above and would therefore be logically committed to 3. Subhash Jain makes such claims in his book *Rebirth of the Karma Doctrine*.¹⁷ Perhaps this is why the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, for example, has made the claim that

personal identity is lost for Jains upon liberation.¹⁸ Jyoti Prasad Jain seems to encourage such a conclusion when he claims that all souls are alike.¹⁹ The Āgama *Bhagavatī* or *Vyākhyā-prajñapti*, as reported by J. C. Sikdar, equates the soul of an elephant and that of an insect, claiming that they are the same.²⁰ Also adding to the confusion is the Jaina position that “all diversity among beings, though real, exists simply on the level of modes.”²¹ Now ‘the same’ is understood by Jains to mean similarity rather than identity, but the amount of evidence that suggests identity rather than similarity is striking. Let us consider what John E. Cort has had to say about the issue:²²

The biography of each Jina is marked by five beneficial events known as *kalyāṇakas*: conception, birth, mendicant initiation, enlightenment, and bodily liberation at the moment of death. The ontological content of these events is largely identical in the life of each of the Jinas. The biography of each Jina, therefore, is not the story of a unique life, but is rather an ever-repeated story. [...] At a fundamental level, nothing new ever happens in the universal history, and the identities of the Jinas elide into a composite identity as the Jina, God. The individual qualities of an individual that go to make up a personality, what Heinrich Zimmer (1951: 234,41) calls the “mask of the personality”, are part of the material world (*ajīva*), part of the realm of *karma*, not part of the eternal soul (*jīva*), and so are shucked off along with the body when the Jina attains final liberation at the moment of death.²³

Cort understands the identity of the Jinas (liberated *jīvas* in Jaina history), and therefore the identity of the liberated *jīva*, as singular. What differentiates the *jīvas*, in Cort’s view, are inconsequential details (extrinsic attributes). It seems then that Cort would agree that *jīvas* lose their identity upon liberation. It should be taken into consideration when evaluating the identity of the *jīvas* that the lives of the Jinas in Jaina historical accounts are documented and thought to be valuable but virtually nothing is said about their identity as individuals after liberation. Perhaps that is because they share an

identity as Cort has stated or perhaps it is because they lose their identity upon liberation. In any case, this is not the case according to many Jains.

It has been said that upon liberation *jīvas* are like cups of water that mix together yet somehow retain their identity.²⁴ Now we will see how that is possible. We have now seen that it is not uncommon for Jaina scholars to identify the *jīva* as one rather than many. Reasoning seems to suggest that the *jīvas* either lose their identity upon liberation or never had a unique identity to begin with, but many Jains insist that *jīvas* retain their identity. How is this possible? Leibniz's Law demands that the individual liberated *jīvas* have some discernability, or unique properties by which they can be differentiated. So what properties are unique to the individual *jīva*? The mundane *jīvas* clearly have discernable properties such as their unique bodies, but the liberated *jīvas* seem to be identical with one another. So the question becomes: do liberated *jīvas* have unique properties? There are two answers in the literature to this question: 1) it is maintained that *jīvas* retain the form of their last body,²⁵ and 2) it is maintained that the extrinsic properties of one's past history differentiate them.²⁶ As will be demonstrated, the first of these two responses is philosophically problematic, though doctrinally sound; the second response is the most coherent response but will prove to be more complicated than it seems at first glance.

Jīvas are said to retain the form of the last body they occupied. This form functions as the property by which liberated *jīvas* are differentiated. Liberated *jīvas*, from this perspective, are identical in nature, but differentiable from one another and therefore individuals. This response seems like a good solution to the problem raised above but it is rather complicated and warrants clarification. Jaina cosmological doctrine claims that upon liberation a *jīva* immediately migrates to the upmost portion of the cosmos, which has a distinct shape and size.²⁷ It is the fixed size of the home of the liberated *jīvas* that seems to force a position for the Jaina philosopher. At first glance it seems that the Jaina philosopher

must choose between a fixed form of the liberated *jīva* or the fixed size of the cosmic realm that they inhabit. It seems that the Jaina philosopher must make this choice of doctrinal interaction with the belief in beginningless past.

According to Jaina cosmology, the universe was never created and has existed for an infinite past. The Jains also maintain that there are repeating periods of incline and decline that repeat their cycle for infinite time in the past and the future. Each period produces 48 Tīrthaṅkaras, 24 in the upward part of the cycle and 24 on the downward. Now if 48 Tīrthaṅkaras are produced every time cycle and there are infinite time cycles, then there are infinite multiples of 48 Tīrthaṅkaras. Infinite multiples of 48 Tīrthaṅkaras yields an infinite number of Tīrthaṅkaras, each retaining the form of its last bodily incarnation. If there is an infinite number of Tīrthaṅkaras and each has a form then one would think that they would take up an infinite amount of space. No matter how small the form of each Tīrthaṅkara, so long as they are infinite in number, it would seem that they cannot be restricted to a determinate space regardless of how large the space may be. Thus it appears that *jīvas* either retain a form after liberation or the space that they occupy is not fixed.

There is, however, a problem with the above position. Ana Bajzelj has pointed out that the form of the liberated *jīvas* may overlap.²⁸ This is a very keen insight to the problem, but requires some explanation. One might object that an infinite number of center points would produce an infinite special volume, but this is not the case. If the forms of the liberated *jīvas* overlap then they are, according to contemporary mathematics, able to occupy a fixed volume so long as their center points remained distinct from one another and the form of the largest *jīva* was the same size or smaller than the special volume in which it resides. In mathematical theories of infinity, there can be a fixed space with infinite points. Let us take a moment to properly understand this solution.

In order to fully understand the above solution we must take a mathematical detour. What we must accomplish here, albeit in an unjustifiably short amount of time, is the modern mathematical understanding of orders of infinity. Of course to understand the modern mathematical understanding of orders of infinity we must first understand the modern mathematical understanding of infinity:

Infinity, in mathematics, that which is not finite. A sequence of numbers, a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots , is said to “approach infinity” if the numbers eventually become arbitrarily large, i.e., are larger than any number, N , that may be chosen at will. The term infinity is used in a somewhat different sense to refer to a collection of objects that does not contain a finite number of objects. For example, there are infinitely many points on a line, and Euclid demonstrated that there are infinitely many prime numbers. The German mathematician Georg Cantor showed that there are different orders of infinity, the infinity of points on a line being of a greater order than that of prime numbers (see transfinite number).²⁹

So the question that we are challenged with is whether or not the infinite number of liberated *jīvas* is a greater infinity than the infinite number of points in a fixed volume of space. As it turns out, according to contemporary mathematical understanding, they are in fact identical, demonstrated here:

Transfinite number, cardinal or ordinal number designating the magnitude (power) or order of an infinite set; the theory of transfinite numbers was introduced by Georg Cantor in 1874. The transfinite cardinal number \aleph_0 (aleph-null) is assigned to the countably infinite set of all positive integers $\{1, 2, 3, \dots, n, \dots\}$. This set can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with many other infinite sets, e.g., the set of all negative integers $\{-1, -2, -3, \dots, -n, \dots\}$, the set of all even positive integers $\{2, 4, 6, \dots, 2n, \dots\}$.

$2n, \bar{e}$ }, and the set of all squares of positive integers $\{1, 4, 9, \bar{e} n^2, \bar{e}\}$; thus, in contrast to finite sets, two infinite sets, one of which is a subset of the other, can have the same transfinite cardinal number, in this case, \aleph_0 . It can be proved that all countably infinite sets, among which are the set of all rational numbers (any number that can be expressed as a ratio of two integers e.g. $1/10, 2/35987, \bar{e}$) and the set of all algebraic numbers, have the cardinal number \aleph_0 . Since the union of two countably infinite sets is a countably infinite set, $\aleph_0 + \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$; moreover, $\aleph_0 \cdot \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$, so that in general, $n \cdot \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$ and $\aleph_0^n = \aleph_0$, where n is any finite number. It can also be shown, however, that the set of all real numbers (includes irrational numbers such as π or the square root of 2), designated by c (for “continuum”), is greater than \aleph_0 ; the set of all points on a line and the set of all points on any segment of a line are also designated by the transfinite cardinal number c . An even larger transfinite number is $2c$, which designates the set of all subsets of the real numbers, i.e., the set of all $\{a,b\}$ -valued functions whose domain for a and b is the real numbers. Transfinite ordinal numbers are also defined for certain ordered sets, two such being equivalent if there is a one-to-one correspondence between the sets, which preserves the ordering. The transfinite ordinal number of the positive integers is designated by ω ³⁰

Thus Bajzelj has her point. An infinite number of *jīvas* can occupy a fixed amount of space so long as their centerpoints are distinct from one another, their forms overlap, and the size of the largest form is not larger than the space it occupies. The addition of any number to \aleph_0 is still \aleph_0 . That is, no matter how many *jīvas* are liberated, the volume of their residence does not have to change to accommodate them.

There remains, however, another issue with the liberated *jīvas* retaining their identity through retaining their form. The form of the liberated *jīva* remains an extrinsic property and extrinsic properties do not seem to matter for identity because they are accidental. That is to say it is logically possible that the form could have been very different, even identical to that of another *jīva* and therefore functions only as a method of differentiation between different substances, but says nothing when applied to a singular substance.

Now there remains a solution to the above issue. Oddly enough the solution to this issue is the same as the solution to the next. As I will demonstrate, if external properties are made internal, the problem disappears.

The next solution I propose to the problem of the identity of liberated *jīvas* is that *jīvas* are differentiated due to their personal histories as well as their relations to other substances. That is, each *jīva* has the unique property of that particular *jīva*'s past incarnations, locations, associations, etc. There seem to be two objections to this claim. First, one might object that one's personal history is irrelevant after liberation for it is upon liberation that they lose their external attributes and thereby become identical. Such an argument is correct from the perspective of time, however we have to consider the relation of time to identity as it is conceived by the Jains. Second, as per the previous solution to *jīva* identity, one might object that differentiation remains insufficient for identity because what matters for identity is intrinsic properties and one's history is accidental. As we will see, the internalizing of extrinsic properties will solve this problem.

Now, as per the first objection raised above, according to the Jains, both time and *jīvas* are substances. But this is not the whole picture. There are in fact two kinds of time: ultimate and relative. Ultimate time is a substance and is merely the capacity for change. Relative time is qualitative, or noticeable/empirical time, that results from the relations between objects. Because substances are capable of independent existence, the identity of any particular *jīva* has to be

established independent of other substances such as ultimate time. But what about relative time? Again *jīvas* being substances entails that they are capable of independent existence i.e. existing independently of all other objects. Thus the identity of the *jīva* must be identifiable without relation to other objects and therefore without reference to relative time either. This entails that identity cannot change through time. A *jīva* cannot lose its identity at some point in time because it has an identity that is independent of time. The *Tattvārthasūtra* explains:

The emancipated souls can be differentiated with reference to the region, time, realm of birth, gender or dress, food, conduct, self-enlightenment, enlightened by others, knowledge, stature, interval, number and numerical strength of the liberated soul in these eleven gateways.³¹

This means that we differentiate liberated *jīvas* based on the details of their lives as well as their relation to other substances such as time and other *jīvas*. Now one might think this solution unsatisfactory because in experience we only know *jīvas* through their relations to other substances. That is, if the identity of a *jīva* lies outside of time and we are only capable of seeing in time then we never see a *jīva*. One might well ask “Where are these *jīvas* of which you speak? Are then nowhere?” It is true we only have empirical experience of a *jīva*’s momentary time slices and therefore do not ever encounter a *jīva* in its totality, but this is not problematic for my position. Firstly, not seeing a *jīva* in its entirety at any point in time is like never seeing the cosmos at any point in time. Just because we don’t see it in its totality does not entail that we do not interact with it and come to know it. Next time you are drinking a cup of tea ask yourself if there is a bottom to the cup that has an identity outside of your current experience. Furthermore, the above objection results from a categorical mistake. I remind such critics that the identity of the *jīva* is an ontological posit rather than an empirical derivation. Explaining how we come to know a *jīva* is a different task than making sense of the identity of a *jīva*. It is

perfectly coherent to differentiate *jīvas* based on their past histories.

So our second objection, that if identity depends solely on intrinsic properties then, despite our ability to differentiate *jīvas* based on their form or location, we cannot differentiate the identities of *jīvas* upon liberation, there is a solution. The solution to this problem is, rather ironically, a solution put forward in Leibniz's philosophy. If all external relations are understood as necessary internal relations, then the solutions presented above work. If the form and/or history of *jīvas* are different and also intrinsic properties, then liberated *jīvas* are not identical. This, however, yields for the Jaina philosopher the same philosophical issues that Leibnizian philosophy faces. Leibniz solves this problem with an appeal to a creator God that is necessarily independent of the world, a position that Jains would surely take issue with.³²

Jaina philosophers, so long as they adhere to Leibniz's law and also maintain that internal properties are what matter for identity, must solve this philosophical issue. The only other option for the Jaina philosopher is to disregard accidental properties and/or reject Leibniz's law.

Now, the project I have undertaken here is by no means complete. I have merely sketched a few problems with the identity of *jīvas* leaving much more to be done. For example the identity of the mundane *jīva* has been largely ignored, as well as a discussion on the acceptability of utilizing Leibnizian monads as a comparison with *jīvas*. Also some more discussion of *anekāntavāda* might help clarify how *jīvas* can be understood both as singular and as multiple. My humble contribution with this paper has been to demonstrate to the confused student of Jainism that the Jaina ontology of the self is coherent. As a second contribution, this project also acts as an impetus for Jaina philosophy to reconcile the issue I have raised above with the ultimate identity of the *jīva*.

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Jaina Voluntary Death as a Model for Secular End-of-life Care

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Purpose of study

Jaina voluntary death has been practiced in India for millennia. The three-fold process of *Sallekhanā-santhārā-samādhimaraṇa* has allowed countless Jaina practitioners to enter death consciously and most effectively, departing smoothly and on their own terms. As the interaction between cultures is possibly at a new height, given population diversity and information exchange, the existence of such a venerable and novel death methodology can lead to our asking: (1) Are there aspects of Jaina voluntary death that can be incorporated into secular end-of-life care? and (2) Can Jains receive the end-of-life care they need in a secular healthcare setting? Both questions could be pursued for the betterment of multi-cultural end-of-life care delivery by introducing potentially transferable and distinctly Jaina ideas/practice to secular healthcare practitioners and their clients.

This paper will show that despite some tension between Jaina ethics and contemporary bioethics, the answer to both questions is in the affirmative. Given that every human must not only die but also must stop eating, drinking and moving at some point before death, I am convinced that the Jaina systematic methodology for this time holds the potential for immense continued benefit to many more people in the future, both Jaina and non-Jaina and regardless of context. Among those who are non-Jaina, some will embrace transmigration or some other post-death continuity of existence as part of their world-view and some will not. Holding to such religious concepts is not required for the essential elements of Jaina voluntary death to be useful to non-Jains. Additionally, for Jains in Diaspora or in India who find themselves in a secular healthcare environment, modern bioethics are amenable to aspects of Jaina voluntary death based on respect for autonomy and the unique

values and beliefs of the client. A secular end-of-life setting is not reserved to a palliative or hospice environment but can include emergency, critical care, acute and chronic care settings where many people also die on a regular basis. In any environment, the Jaina emphasis on: (1) voluntary and autonomous decision-making to withdraw treatment, including (but not limited to) nutrition, hydration and ambulation; and (2) qualified assistance and separation from objects of attachment and aversion, have great potential to assist the dying.

Death in Jaina thought

Death is described in the *Paiṇayasuttāim* as the "...last moment of earthly life...when the atoms disintegrate." . Even more dramatic, sometimes "the Jains define death as the blowing up (samudghāta) of the atoms of life²." Since death is described as a time of destruction, explosive even, it provides a strong impetus for the development of means in Jaina practice to prepare physically and psychically to meet this difficult experience in the best way possible. The trauma of death is the main reason not only for the existence Jaina voluntary death practices, but also for the great importance placed on them by the Jaina community, to the point of reverence. It is a practice so highly considered, in fact, that the distinction between layperson and monastic dissolves in the asceticism of such a death. Jaina voluntary death has three aspects: (1) *Sallekhanā*; "emaciation of body and of passions through external and internal penances"³, (2) *Santhārā*; the death-bed or, by extension, the environment in which the practitioner dies, and (3) *Samādhimaraṇa*; end practices for achieving death in equanimity.

Jaina voluntary death practices are also of crucial importance because the quality of death is the cause of the quality of the experience after death, which can be another birth or even potentially liberation. Since death is the cause what comes afterwards, death is sub-divided into various qualitative levels based on commensurate levels of the state of mind of the dying person. The quality of the death is measured by the spiritual

realizations attained from the progressive mastering of restrained conduct. The list is sometimes compressed into two types, or three, and both the *Bhagavatī Ārāḍhanā* and *Uttarādhyayana-Niryukti* enumerate and describe seventeen types of death⁴. Mata Jnanamati gives a middling-length list which shows "death having five varieties:

- (1) Extreme Prudent's Death (Pañḍita-pañḍita Maraṇa)
- (2) Prudent's Death (Pañḍita Maraṇa)
- (3) Fool-Prudent's Death (Bāla-pañḍita Maraṇa)
- (4) Fool's Death (Bāla Maraṇa)
- (5) Extreme Fool's Death (Bāla-bāla Maraṇa)⁵

Often the highest type of death is a reserved designation for the death of a liberated being, or a death which results in liberation from *saṁsāra*, the cycle of existence. The worst type of death is described by Mata Jnanamati as "the death of a wrong-faithed living beings and death by suicide and accident etc⁶." It would be problematic in modern bioethics, where even the word 'accident' has been replaced by terminology such as 'collision', to associate events causing sudden death with foolishness. This would be unfair to a pedestrian struck by no fault of their own. Additionally, 'wrong-faith' needs to be qualified because such logic would not survive outside of a Jaina context if it meant 'Non-Jaina.' Betraying the above description of the worst type of death are other indications in Jaina thought which show that, in fact, the last moments of life continue to hold the redemptive opportunity to improve one's death by way of supplementary purification practices, such as confession. A sudden, traumatic death would, indeed, make dying more problematic. However, even if there is little time to prepare and only mere moments of consciousness remaining, Jaina death practice allows for the continued potential to transform the mind.

Fasting (anasana) and bodily turmoil (kāyagleśa) austerities (tapa) in Jaina Voluntary Death

Austerities, particularly fasting and immobilization, are a crucial part of understanding Jaina voluntary death practice. Generally, we can categorize fasts into three types: (1) instrumental; (2) protest; and (3) purificatory/liberative. The first would be those aimed at achieving a specific worldly end, the second would be those associated with social activism, and the last would be concerned with *karma*.

Instrumental fasting and that used for protest are rejected in Jaina thought and practice. "Forms of instrumental fasting (*vrata*) are invariably criticized by the Jains⁷," and it is also felt that "fasting unto death for specific purposes has an element of coercion which is against the spirit of non-violence⁸." They are distinguished as inappropriate types of fasting because they keep one "caught in the wheel of *Samśāra*"⁹, rather than being a cause of liberation from the cycle of existence.

Immobility austerity types also are generally sub-divided into three: (1) taking certain postures to the exclusion of others; (2) restriction motion to a certain limited area; and (2) refraining from all bodily motion altogether.

All Jaina austerities are aimed only towards purification and liberation and are mainly concerned with *karma*. On a lower level, austerities make for the accumulation of merit (*puṇya*) which brings about good results. Some good results, such as material gain, can be counterproductive on the path to liberation by being a distraction to the goal. They can, however, be useful. Consider the good result of having resources and using them to support religious organizations. A commentary to Ācārya Amitagati's *Yogasāra-prābhṛta* states that such actions "may bring some good (*śubha*) but not spiritual purity (*śuddhi*)."¹⁰ Merit is helpful, but ultimately still obstructs liberation. On a higher level, austerities are for the purpose of stopping the influx of all *karma* (*saṁvara*),

positive and negative, and for destroying *karma* already bonded (*nirjarā*).

Most literature concerning Jaina voluntary death practices focus mainly on fasting, but it is important to keep in mind that the austerity of limiting mobility also features prominently. Since both fasting and mobility-restricting austerities could fall under the category of *kāyagleśa*, which "literally means to give turmoil to the body¹¹," and *kāyagleśa* is one of "the twelve types of elimination of *karma* (*nirjarā*)¹²", both austerity-types destroy *karma*. Not only this, but they also both prevent the influx of new *karma*. This is so because both are of the fifth "of the five types of *saṁvara* [that of] *Ayoga* - stopping all the mental vocal, mental and bodily activities.¹³"

This overlap in the functions of fasting and immobility austerities carries over to their practice as well. The distinctions between the main fast types in Jaina death practice are not based on the fasting itself, but rather with regard to mobility and assistance to oneself (by oneself or others). The three fast-types are: (1) *bhata-paccakkhāṇa*, in which one renounces food and drink, and can receive help from oneself or others; (2) *itvara* or *iṅginī-maraṇa*, in which one renounces food and drink and limits physical movement, and can receive help from oneself; (3) *pāvagamana*, in which one renounces food and drink and all motion, and receives no help from anyone (self or others).

Stoppage of oral intake & ambulation in secular end-of-life care

There are three main causes which lead people to stop oral intake and ambulation in a health care setting: (1) The requirement to stop such activities temporarily to prevent further deterioration of health and to allow for diagnostics and treatments; (2) debilitation; and (3) choice. For our purposes, it is this last cause that is most significant.

The Health Ethics Guide of the Catholic Health Association of Canada governs the principles of care in many hospitals which serve

diverse patient populations. I have consciously chosen to use this document when looking at health ethics in hospital because it comes from a religious organisation that is often seen as having extreme views about euthanasia and assisted-suicide, among other controversial issues. Since much of the controversy around Jaina voluntary death stems from opponents accusing Jains of engaging in suicide, and much of the literature is in defense of Jaina voluntary death as not suicide, it seems that if the Jaina voluntary death model can survive Catholic ethics then it can survive anywhere. The context that Catholic and Jaina ethics share is the necessary interaction with secular healthcare within diverse populations. First we will look at how Catholic health ethics deal with decision-making and the individual, and then we will look at how Catholic and Jaina ethics interact in end-of-life practices.

Regarding 'The Primary Role of the Person Receiving Care' in Section II 'Dignity of the Human Person', the Catholic Health Ethics Guide states that:

Article 25. The competent person receiving care is the primary decision-maker with respect to proposed treatment and care options.

Article 27. The competent person has the right to refuse, or withdraw consent to, any care or treatment, including life-sustaining treatment¹⁴.

Further, regarding 'Criteria for Decision-making' in Section V on the 'Care of the Dying Person':

Article 92. Decisions about end-of-life care should take into account the person's past and present expressed wishes; as well as the person's culture, religion, personal goals, relationships, values and beliefs¹⁵

Lastly, in the same section on 'Care of the Dying Person' regarding 'Refusing or Stopping Treatment', the guide states:

Article 96. Morally, a person can refuse life-sustaining

treatment when it is determined that the procedure would impose strain or suffering out of proportion with the benefits to be gained from the procedure.

Article 97. Even when life-sustaining treatment has been undertaken, this treatment may be interrupted when the burdens outweigh the benefits. The competent person receiving care makes this decision. When such a decision is being made for a non-competent person, his or her known needs, values and wishes are to be followed ¹⁶.

Here it is demonstrated that, according to the principles of Catholic health ethics, decisions are guided both by the autonomy and uniqueness of each individual. Although arising from the ideology of a Christian religious group, there is nothing here that is faith-based or particularly Catholic and not transferable to a secular context.

Next, to properly set the stage for attempting an interaction between Jaina and secular death practices, we will determine how the choice to engage in Jaina voluntary death practice and the choice to withdraw treatment in secular end-of-life practice are arrived at.

The Choice to stop oral intake and motion in Jaina and secular death practices

Jaina voluntary death practice: A personal choice from the inability to perform religious duties

It is a crucial point that in Jaina voluntary death practice the taking of death vows is not suggested or encouraged by others but chosen by oneself. This non-coercive decision is followed by a request to a qualified teacher to engage in the practice, and a subsequent permission or denial. It is a process initiated by the individual, but chosen interdependently with a preceptor.

What leads a person to want to engage in Jaina voluntary death practice? Most sources repeat the same main justifiable reasons for starting a fast unto death as we find in "Ācārya Samantabhadra's

overtaken by a calamity, by famine, by old age, or by an incurable disease, to get rid of the body for '*dharma*' is called '*Sallekhanā*.' One should by degrees quit the body¹⁷". We could include any number of situations under 'calamity,' such as environmental disasters, mortal injury and so on. The crux of the matter is that these instances have in common the potential to leave a person unable to perform their religious duties, also often mentioned in Jaina texts as the cause for choosing Jaina voluntary death. The *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* says this:

"If this thought occurs to a monk:

'I am sick and not able, at this time, to regularly mortify the flesh,'

that monk should regularly reduce his food;

regularly reducing his food, and diminishing his sins,

he should take proper care of his body,

being immovable like a beam; exerting himself he dissolves his body.¹⁸"

Entrance into Jaina voluntary death practices is considered, therefore, when religious duties are no longer able to be performed and when death approaches. This is to prevent the influx of negative *karma* from breaking commitments, which occurs naturally even if unintentional: "If...a person allows his vows to fall into disuse due to the onset of infirmity or senility, he will pass his final hours in *asaṃyama*, non-restraint; such an unfortunate circumstance, it is believed, will adversely affect his next birth.¹⁹" The importance of preparing for death is shown in the *Samaṇa Suttaṃ*, which recommends that "when death is inevitable in any case, it is better to die possessed of a calm disposition.²⁰"

Secular healthcare and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment: Iminency of death and quality of life

In medicine, educated-guessing of how much time a person has to live is a frequent occurrence. It is part science and part prognostication and thus, only as good as the accuracy of the

prognostication and thus, only as good as the accuracy of the diagnostic means and experience of the physician. Such predicting can be misused, of course, if a physician makes a statement based on insufficient diagnostic evidence or with a confidence exceeding their ability. It can be devastating to a patient and their family if someone is told that they have less or more time than they actually do. A patient is at risk of giving up hope, or having too much hope for longevity and delaying preparations for the end of life. On the other hand, it can also be a useful tool if done well and used sensitively and appropriately, with the humility that comes with the use of an imperfect tool. Even with a reasonable margin of error, it is very helpful to decision-making to have some indication of length of life remaining. For instance, some palliative care units disallow certain life-sustaining treatments, such as intravenous hydration and blood-transfusion, because the focus in such a place is comfort and not curing. As such, they have parameters on whom to admit, given both their focus and scarcity of beds. One of the prerequisites for admission has to do with remaining length of life, which can be three weeks to a month in some places but varies with demand. So, having some idea of how long a person will live can contribute to their entrance into palliative care and all that comes with that shift, including stoppage of certain treatments such as artificial hydration and nutrition.

The usefulness of medical treatment is often based on assessing if it will at all improve a person's quality of life. If it does not, or if it is burdensome, it is considered futile. Quality of life is not determined by a person having all of their physical faculties intact or being able to take care of themselves. To be sure, many disabled people lead very rich and meaningful lives. Quality of life, which is of crucial importance in healthcare in deciding on treatments or their withdrawal, is measured by conscious awareness and, based on that, the level of one's meaningful participation. It is determined primarily by mental status and not by physical ability.

Does the Jaina voluntary death decision-making model fit secular end-of-life?

According to a secular health ethics model, determining quality of life by measuring a person's ability to perform duties would be unacceptable. Let us for a moment put aside Jaina religious duties, such as the required performance of austerities (which require physical ability) and merely look at secular duties such as the duty a father has to support his family. It is a commitment taken for life, which continues even after a divorce. If this father falls ill, reasonable people would not begrudge his inability to work. Actually, the tides might turn and the children might then have to care for their father. Also, social systems can build in accommodations that protect both the children and father, such as disability, unemployment and health insurances. This does not mean that the sick or disabled person themselves has an easy task finding fulfillment after losing certain functionalities and means of participation. Many of the disabled clients I have cared for over the years struggle with depression and suicidal feelings, especially during the time when their injury is new. The saving grace in the Jaina voluntary death practice is the inclusion of means to ensure that the choice to die voluntarily is not based on despondency. The Jaina system even eschews less negative motivations, such as wanting gain in the future, since such feelings are tipping the scale away from equanimity and renunciation.

The disconnect between the Jaina and secular approaches here, it seems, from the view that after a certain threshold the negative consequences from the inability to fulfill commitments made does not outweigh positive consequences from any good activities. Even if a person can still participate, such as an ascetic being confined to a chair but still being able to give discourses and which surely causes the influx of positive *karma*, the inability to perform other ascetic duties is still causing the influx of negative *karma*. Jaina karmic theory, here, does not leave much room for intention. Even for the Jaina who sincerely wishes they could continue fulfilling their religious commitments and feels remorse for not

being able to negative *karma* relentlessly bonds. In all the traditions that embrace *karma* and rebirth, it is usually said in one way or another that a short life of high quality is better than a long life of low quality.' Quality here could be measured by non-harm and the fulfillment of religious duties, both religious ideals. From the secular perspective of health care ethics, quality of life can ever be defined this way. I would even go as far as to say that it would be dangerous to determine life being worthwhile in health care based on non-harm and the fulfilment of religious duties that rely on physical ability rather than mental capacity and meaningful participation in society. In this way, in principle, health ethics aim towards equal treatment in considering people equally worthwhile and deserving of all means of help for cure or comfort even if clients are harmful or lack physical ability.

There are occasions in the Jaina tradition, however, where exceptions are made for a monastic unable to fulfill certain religious obligations due to ill-health. "If an ascetic can no longer walk, he (or she) is temporarily or indefinitely exempted from the practice of wandering."²¹ In Jaipur, I saw a sort of bike used for monastics when they are unable to walk. A same-gendered monastic pushes the three-wheeled bike from the back, using handle-bars with brakes, and the monastic being pushed sits inside. This allows the monastic to fulfill the commitment to wander and not stay in one place beyond a certain length of time. This sort of creative flexibility shows an active concern for debilitated monastics, which can only be beneficial for those who require help, those who help and for the order itself in keeping the spirit of the vows in changing times.

It seems, therefore, that the Jaina push towards choosing to engage in death practices when one can no longer fulfil religious commitments, such as self-study for the layperson or wandering for the ascetic, does not lend itself well to a secular end-of-life context. However, the Jaina emphasis on choosing to engage in death practices to most effectively prepare for death when it is imminent can easily be accommodated in a secular end-of-life setting.

Can Jaina voluntary death be practiced in secular healthcare?

We have already determined the importance placed on the autonomy and uniqueness of the individual in health ethics. Both would allow for the individual to choose to withdraw oral intake and ambulation. Next, let us go even further and look at an explicit reference to withdrawal of treatment that leads to death in the *Catholic Health Ethics Guide*. Under the 'Suicide and Euthanasia' section of the 'Care of the Dying Person' chapter we find this:

*Article 105. Refusal to begin or to continue to use a medical procedure where the burdens, harm or risks of harm are out of proportion to any anticipated benefit is not the equivalent of suicide or euthanasia*²².

All together, autonomy, the unique background and perspective of the individual, and the Health Ethics Guide not equating withdrawal of treatment with suicide, make a secular end-of-life setting very amenable for Jaina voluntary death.

In end-of-life care, people are offered food and drink by mouth, but are not pressured to eat or drink. They are also not required to move. A palliative client can walk, sit in a chair or go for a stroll in a wheelchair if they wish, but they may also stay in bed. Here, based on the acceptance and understanding of the imminent approach of death in a palliative care environment, choosing to engage in Jaina voluntary death practices such as taking any of the three types of fast-vows, such as to not take anything by mouth (*bhatta-paccakkhāṇa*) and also to not move beyond a certain area (*iṅginī-maraṇa*), or to not move at all (*paovagamana*), would fit easily. The third aspect of the vows regarding receiving help from others might require negotiation. With *bhatta-paccakkhāṇa* one can receive the full assistance of others, thus requiring no alteration of the delivery of personal care on the part of palliative caregivers. With *paovagamana*, however, one can receive no help from others. Standard nursing care for a patient who cannot move themselves requires them to have their position changed in bed at least every two hours. Also, incontinent urine and feces must be cleaned

immediately upon detection. I have often been witness to cases where, after crossing a certain threshold in the dying process (which is often a dramatic change in respiration called 'cheyne-stoking' which resembles a fish gasping when out of water), the family and staff decide to not turn the person anymore. In fact, turning the patient may be enough of a disturbance to the body-systems to hasten death. Colloquially we refer to this as 'the last turn.' Because death is so near at this point, the development of bed-sores from an unchanging position is no longer relevant. It could happen that the decision is made to stop turning someone and they linger. Perhaps for days on end. This might be tricky because of the caregiver's habit and injunction to turn patients. Here, the Jaina tradition can offer a very good approach. It is recommended to not take final vows until it is sure there will be no improvement in one's illness or deterioration, because in the Jaina tradition vows once taken cannot be rescinded. This is not the case during the stage of preparation for *sallekhanā*, before taking formal voluntary death vows. One finds this in the *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*:

"Subduing the passions and living on little food he should endure (hardships). If a mendicant falls sick, let him again take food.²³"

But with vows there is no turning back.

"Occasionally it may happen that a supposedly "fatal" illness undergoes remission or complete cure during the course of progressive fasting. In such cases the vows which have been taken cannot be rescinded; the aspirant must continue to take no more food per day than his current allotment far as long as he lives. This possibility explains the usual practice of refraining from a vow of total fasting until such time as death is clearly at hand.²⁴"

So, great care must be taken with the timeliness of vow-taking. The vow to not receive help can come at the time when definitely there will be no more mobility or improvement. Another problem arises here because at this point, generally, people become unconscious

and an unconscious person cannot take a vow. This issue becomes very subtle and requires more investigation. It requires delving into advance directives and proxy decision-making and how they might relate to vows, which brevity prevents. Would a Jaina death vow be valid if in advance, with clear mind, competency and consultation with a preceptor, a practitioner wanted a vow to be installed at a certain point even if they are not conscious or competent? It is a fascinating question. There is also the problem of bowel and bladder elimination. This is less of a problem close to death because with the stoppage of oral intake, there is a reduction in elimination. Another way around this problem is to insert a urinary catheter and rectal tube which collect elimination. This way, elimination can continue without requiring bodily movement and the vow to not receive help anymore can be maintained.

As with the initial choice to engage in death practices, when death is imminent the fulfillment of the various Jaina voluntary death vows can also be accommodated in a secular end-of-life setting.

Qualifications of those caring for the dying in Jaina voluntary death

The unique relations of a householder are quite complex. Attachment to loved ones and wealth can interfere with death in equanimity. To be qualified, "before voluntary death can be resorted to, all worldly ties are to be severed: the individual will already be out of this world ²⁵." This, of course, is very difficult. Even when someone considers themselves prepared for voluntary death practice and confirms it with the assessment of a highly qualified preceptor, one cannot predict what will happen as death approaches. The process of dying, when the elemental particles are coming to destruction or blowing up, "may give rise to emotional excitement and morbid thoughts, which are harmful to the undisturbed spiritual end."²⁶ In service of equanimity, there are practical ways to improve the chances of the practitioner being "free from the memories of the friendly attachment"²⁷. In terms of attachment to wealth, one part of the process of voluntary death is

in the "...intermediate phase of renunciation... when he gives all his belongings away.²⁸" In terms of attachment to loved-ones, the practitioner is not surrounded by family, but rather, monastic assistants.

"...the saints who ordain or cause the saints to undertake this vow in a prescribed way, are called 'Expiation/holy death preceptors' (niryāpakas).

The Head-Saints have advocated the presence of 48 saints when a saint undertakes the vow of holy death. They let him undertake the vow of holy death in a proper place and, then, perform various duties as described below:

- (1) *Four saints serve the mortifier saint to raise him, to get him seated and so on so that there may be no difficulty in observance of restraint.*
- (2) *Four saints cause him to listen to religious scriptures.*
- (3) *Four saints cause him to take foods as prescribed by Ācārāṅga (Book on Monastic Conduct).*
- (4) *Four saints arrange for the potable drinks for him.*
- (5) *Four saints try to protect him.*
- (6) *Four saints remove the filthy excretions of the body of the saint.*
- (7) *Four saints remain at the door of the place where the saint is undertaking his holy death vow.*
- (8) *Four saints arrange and address the visitors to the saint.*
- (9) *Four saints take care of the saint in the night while awake.*
- (10) *Four saints judge the situation of the country and public.*
- (11) *Four saints tell the religious stories to the outside visitors.*
- (12) *Four saints refute the alien doctrines through debates. Thus, these forty eight holy death preceptor saints try to get the saint cross the ocean of weary world through their care in maintaining the meditation and equanimity*

of the mortifier saint. If one does not get the required number of holy death preceptor saints, one can arrange the above activities with the number of saints available at the time. However, it is necessary that at least two saints be there.²⁹ "

We know that such death assistants must be monastics, and thus necessarily follows the " twenty eight basic and primary properties (*mūla-guṇa*) of a Jaina ascetic which is comprised of the five great vows (*mahāvratā*), the five 'cares' (*saṃiti*) which aim to not harm beings, the six essential duties (*āvaśyaka*) which consist of inner and outer practices, the five-fold abjuration (of indulgence in the pursuits of the five senses)³⁰" and seven more bodily austerities. The "*mahāvratas* (five great vows) are - *ahiṃsā* (*non-violence*), *satya* (truthfulness), *asteya* (taking nothing belonging to others, for own use, without permission of the owner), *brahmacarya* (chastity), and *aparigraha* (possessionlessness)³¹." This would ensure great discipline. A monastic, also, "must be totally obedient to his *upādhyāya* (preceptor) and to his *Ācārya* (the head of his order)³²," and thus has a two-fold accountability. Generally, then, Jaina voluntary death assistants are both highly disciplined and highly accountable.

It is significant that those who assist a practitioner who is engaging in Jaina voluntary death practice is expected to be so highly qualified. Not only is this time the most crucial for the practitioner, one they have been preparing for their entire life and which will determine the quality of their rebirth, but there are also very subtle negotiations that need to occur between the practitioner and the community. Jaina voluntary death practice is done by monastics and householders, and in both cases it must be supervised by a qualified teacher. In both cases, also, apologies are made. For the monk, the *Bṛhat-Kathākośa* mentions "*kṣamāpanā*: apology to the congregation"³³, and for the householder, many sources suggest that "having called relatives and friends, one should seek their forgiveness for any transgressions in conduct"³⁴." This can be seen as the occasion for saying farewell. In both monastic and lay

communities, there will be potential grief at the departure of a close one, but considering "*Samlekhanā* as the highest end...there is no cause for tears.³⁵" Grieving around the practitioner can cause mental agitation, and thus hinder the dying process, and so separation from all but the death assistants after the farewell is recommended. Likewise, in what is a great parallel between Jaina voluntary death and initiation (*dīkṣā*, or entrance into the monastic order), the practitioner "gives all his belongings away³⁶." and they are "practically a monk.³⁷" As such, separation from both loved-ones and wealth is undertaken in preparation for death in Jaina practice.

Qualifications of those caring for the dying in secular end-of-life care

In a healthcare institution, the qualifications and accountability of the various members of the multidisciplinary end-of-life care team are well-known. We can draw many parallels between such a team and the Jaina death assistants. But what are the qualifications of the others who remain at the bedside in end-of-life care, those whom we do not see in the Jaina voluntary death model? Is the Jaina voluntary death practice of separation from loved-ones and wealth applicable to secular end-of-life care? What can people do to appropriately resolve issues around their wealth and estate in end-of-life care? To answer these questions we can look to both the Health Care Consent Act, and to actual practice in hospital.

In determining the qualifications of those who are permitted to be at the bedside of the dying person, the Health Care Consent Act favours spouses, partners and relatives in relation to decision-making. 'Spouses' are defined by marriage, or co-habitation, or having a child together³⁸ whereas 'partners' are defined as a "close personal relationship that is of primary importance in both persons' lives³⁹" which, happily, is accommodating to same-sex couples. These relationships are given prominence. Next, 'relatives' are defined by "blood, marriage or adoption⁴⁰." In hospital, such people are favoured as well. There is no mention of personal qualifications. Where in the Jaina voluntary death practice those at

the bedside are at least monastics holding to a code of discipline and accountability, in a secular hospital setting the qualifications of those at the bedside at death-time are dependent solely on interpersonal relations. These are useful indicators but because there is no behavioural or motivational expectations, they leave much room for difficulties around visitation of, and wealth distribution by (or inheritance from), the dying person. The Jaina emphasis on relinquishing wealth in advance and separation from loved-ones during voluntary death, after proper farewell exercises such as confession and forgiveness are performed, helps the dying person achieve maximal calmness and equanimity. In secular health care, such as in Canada, the majority of families wait for estate distribution until after death.

Additionally, family typically wants to be around the dying person until their last breath. Both can cause disturbances to the dying person, as visitation and concerns over wealth distribution can be from the best or worst of intentions. Visitation and inheritance can be linked, as in the case of a child who has not been in contact with a parent and breaks the estrangement in order to show support at the end of life in order specifically to win favour and influence wealth distribution. This happens more frequently than most would like to admit. I would even be bold enough to say that fighting over inheritances is one of the leading causes of the destruction of family harmony. It is difficult in practice to distribute wealth in advance and to screen visitors in hospital, especially around death because often everyone shows up. There are, however, precedents for both. It is possible to make wealth distribution known in advance, and for it to be dependent on conditions determined by the dying person. This would bring the person themselves much relief knowing that this has been adequately dealt with and will not cause fighting between family members nor inspire wrong actions in relation to the dying person to try and shift the weight of their distributive share. With visitation, in some environments, such as intensive, emergency and palliative care, ensuring that certain people who the patient does not want in their presence being prevented entry and access is common. If a person does not want family around the bed

grieving after a certain point in the death process, so as to die undisturbed, they can make this request known and it will be followed. I would suggest that the separation from wealth and family in Jain voluntary death is one that can be very helpful in the pursuit of a peaceful death in secular health care, and entirely possible to achieve given the respect for patient autonomous wishes. Further, I would suggest that despite the compulsion and habit for people to consider presence with and grieving around the dying person as a necessary and beneficial part of the process of death, it may not be in the best interest of the dying person. Grieving is not only important, it is necessary. Death and loss are a trauma and the experience of grief is a part of healing this trauma. Despite this, grief does not have to be displayed around the dying person. The Jaina voluntary death model strongly recommends against it, and I feel that the option to not have grief displayed at the bedside needs to be made available to individuals who may want to control their death environment in such a way, even though there may be great resistance to this novel approach. Grief can be experienced in an anticipatory way, also during the death either in the same location as the death or not, and after the death has occurred. Who is around the dying person and when is entirely up to the individual. They may want family and grieving in their presence until the moment they are dead. However, they may not. In such a case, if a person does truly have the best interest of the dying loved-one at heart, it must be considered that their desire to grieve around the dying person against their wishes might be a self-centered act that actually will disturb the death-process by triggering feelings of attachment or aversion in the mind of the dying person and make it more difficult for them to leave smoothly.

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Faith of an Abhavya: Kundakunda's Heretical Dialectic Insight for Contemporary Jaina Science

Brianne Donaldson

The Self is realized by discriminative wisdom. Just as he is separated by discriminative wisdom so also by the very same discriminative wisdom he is realized.¹

Practitioners often refer to Jainism as a “scientific religion.” It has been called the “religion for scientists” because of its emphasis on rationalism and experimentation²; it has been said that “Jainism is the only religious system that recognizes clearly the truth that religion is a science”³; and another account suggests that the realism of Jainism’s duality of matter and soul “has opened new doors for the mutual coordination of Jaina Study [sic] and Modern Science [sic].”⁴

Whether the scientific aspect is specifically one of method, epistemology or collaborative content, it is enough to concede broadly that Jainism considers itself scientific because it not only concerns itself with spiritual or abstracts concepts, but also with “phenomena of the material world and the living beings in the universe.”⁵ Jaina scriptures, “detail many aspects concerning the physical world, including physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics and astronomy, architecture, geology, medical sciences, food science and the like.”⁶

This dialectic between spiritual and empirical is a central aspect of Jaina doctrine, resulting in numerous comparisons between ancient teachings and contemporary science.⁷ For example, the doctrine suggesting that nothing in the universe can be destroyed is seen as compatible with contemporary scientific perspectives that matter is indestructible. The notion that all plants, vegetables and elements have souls and sensory organs is understood to have anticipated certain aspects of biological life sciences. The Jaina doctrine of

Karma supports the visible variations we see among living creatures and does away with the need for any outside agency. The Jaina theory of *anekāntavāda* has even been compared to Einstein's *Theory of Relativity*.⁸

In his book *Jaina Studies and Science*, Dr. Mahaveer Raj Gelra offers a comprehensive example of an attempt to fuse Jaina theory with modern science, with chapters devoted to the atomic composition of matter, ecology, the laws of motion, mathematics, psychology and bodily health.⁹ Finally, a series of conferences sponsored by the International School for Jaina Studies was organised last year around the theme "Integrating Modern Science and Spirituality for Social Wellness."¹⁰

Despite this perceived compatibility and the progressive anticipation in its scriptures of many of the so-called modern discoveries, there remain a number of significant discrepancies between modern science and Jaina theory. These discrepancies derive from those aspects of Jaina metaphysics that must be believed, even in the absence of empirical data or personal experience. Though Jains do not posit an exterior agency, such as God, that exists outside empirical reality, they do maintain a number of ontological presuppositions that function in a similar way such as *karma*, *mokṣa*, soul/self and *parmāṇu* (atom).¹¹

The doctrine of *Karma*, for example, and knowledge-obscuring karmic particles, is crucial for Jaina understanding, not only of one's birth form and social status in this life (whether you're born as a bacteria, apple tree, dog, pig, female or male human, wealthy or poor) but also the nature of your ethical decisions and intelligence. However, evolutionary biology suggests that my being born a female human and not an apple tree has more to do with recessive genes and phylogeny (Alexandrov, et. al, 1987).¹² Social psychology might suggest that my pursuit of a Ph.D., my ethical choices or my preferences for a sexual mate may have more to do with my I.Q. than with any karmic influence (Kanazawa, 2010).¹³ Neuroscience suggests that my ability to make a free choice is not

the result of *karma*, but of a decision circuit activating between the frontal and parietal cortex (Pesaran, et al., 2008).¹⁴

Likewise, cognitive science challenges any preconceived notion of the self or of a soul as separate from matter. To date, the notion of self or of an “I,” is often posited as an emergent phenomenon created from 2nd-3rd level interactions of sub-systems. These substances coordinate to form a unified identity (Maturana and Varela, 1987).

Concepts of *parimāṇu* as a non-reducible aspect of matter is challenged by wave-particle theory expressed in the Schrödinger equation xiv, accepted by nearly all practitioners of quantum mechanics.

Mokṣa, or final liberation as telos, is not verifiable. Though alternative modes of consciousness and life-after-death experiences have been documented, proof of an alternative realm of liberated beings remains outside the scope of empirical study. So how will Jains, and especially those interested in maintaining Jainism as a “scientific religion,” begin to deal with these discrepancies?

The question remains as to whether Jains, given these ontological presuppositions, are truly free to compare the relevant alternatives and insights offered through empirical research. According to Nietzschean scholar Walter Kaufmann, exploring such alternatives is, “the heart of rationality, the essence of scientific method, and the meaning of intellectual integrity.”¹⁵ Kaufmann calls this exploration of alternatives the “canon” which is shaped by standards of honesty and a series of imperatives.

Confronted with a proposition, view, belief, hypothesis, conviction - one’s own or another person’s - those with high standards of honesty apply the canon, which commands us to ask seven questions: (1) What does this mean? (2) What speaks for it and (3) against it? (4) What alternatives are available? (5) What speaks for (6) against each? And (7) what alternatives are most plausible in light of these considerations?¹⁶

Kaufmann advocated this canon of integrity, not only for scientists, but for individuals who participate in any system, be it political, religious, interpersonal, philosophical or ethical. Though not a scholar of Jainism, Kaufmann's unique location as a lifetime scholar of religion and philosophy, both east and west along with his emphasis on personal authority and empiricism, makes him an especially useful conversation partner for the present endeavor. His concise and elegant texts, though widely unknown, are germane to contemporary issues of identity and autonomy across disciplines. As such I frequently turn to them to enrich my own thinking and feel compelled to familiarize others with his insights, so relevant for our time.

Though the kinship between Kaufmann's sentiments on autonomy and the scientific method of discovery is evident, his canon offers all individuals an epistemological method that values rigorous empiricism, intuition, and the need to articulate "the defects of significant alternatives."¹⁷ Only in weighing such alternatives and considering the various aspects of one's experience can one "choose responsibly," or act in autonomy.¹⁸

Svarāja: A Precedent for Autonomy in Jainism

Jains value autonomy as well, and the concept of *svarāja* or "self-rule" was an essential component for Gandhi's nonviolent movement. Gandhian scholar Pratibha Jain suggests that Gandhi's primary legacies were his autonomous interpretation of Jaina doctrines and the subsequent variations he developed. Gandhi transformed personal practices of nonviolence into collective action and he extended his reinterpretation of vows beyond the purpose of self-purification so that they became tools for political peace that hastened Indian independence. Gandhi even authorized the euthanasia of a calf who was suffering, an act of intervention typically unheard of for Jains.¹⁹ Autonomy is seen in contemporary Jainism as well. Jains develop hybrid worship practices that blend Jaina and Hindu ritual that suit their communities. Jaina art and sculpture integrates Jaina narratives with cultural and social

developments. Dr. Mehta at Jaipur Foots exercises autonomy by focusing more on the physical and economic needs of amputees in the current moment, rather than the abstract future of *mokṣa*.

In fact, built into Jainism are doctrines of relativity, *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda*, and *syādvāda*, which validate infinite viewpoints and those who hold them. For this reason, it might seem intuitive to the average Jaina that autonomy has prominent precedence in Jaina practice and Jaina texts. Yet, it is important to remember that, per Kaufmann, autonomy does not exist for its own sake. It is the result of continuously applying the canon to weigh alternatives so that one can make fateful decisions by discerning what speaks for and against certain alternatives. Though the Jaina theories of relativity often rely on the story of “The Blind Men and the Elephant” to synthesize various viewpoints, the task of a rigorous empiricism as well as autonomy and integrity is to evaluate the alternatives at hand, knowing that some may be better than others; that not all differences may be reconciled into a single elephant.

It is important to note here that Kaufmann does not reject religious beliefs or ontological presuppositions out of hand. In fact, he is quite clear that one might choose to participate in a religious community after evaluating alternatives.²⁰ He does insist, however, that for such a decision to be autonomous, the belief system and its components must be subjected to the canon.

In this way, he echoes the practical epistemological plurality of many philosophers of science such as John Stuart Mill or Paul Feyerabend who sought to safeguard the community of existing ideas so that the totality of thought even inherited, outdated or incomprehensible conjecture were seen as contributions toward ongoing discovery. Mill, speaking of his father’s insight into matters of logic wrote that, “His explanations did not make the matter at all clear to me at the time; but they were not therefore useless; they remained as a nucleus for my observations and reflections to crystallize upon.”²¹ Likewise, Feyerabend has insisted that scientific discovery depends on the freedom of all ideas,

including religion and metaphysics. Without this freedom, a scientist would be severely disadvantaged, "His imagination is restrained, and even his language ceases to be his own."²² Within Jaina literature, Kundakunda offers a similar canon regarding the dialectic of empirical and transcendental, suggesting that both means of knowledge are essential for a thorough understanding of reality. It is to this dialectic that we now turn.

Kundakunda, the second-century Digambara philosopher and mystic was a celebrated author and innovative thinker. Among his prolific writing, many texts are given canonical authority, and his three major works are *Pravacanasāra* and *Pañcāstikāyasāra* and *Samayasāra*. The last of these, *Samayasāra*, which means "Essence of the Soul," is the focus of this paper. In it, Kundakunda employs a unique dialectical method that emphasizes two crucial standpoints by which reality can be viewed: the *vyavahāra-naya*, which is the empirical standpoint; and *nīścaya-naya*, which is the transcendental standpoint. This two-fold dialectic corresponds to the complex Jaina understanding of *jīva*, meaning the essence of a living being. Jaina scholar Jeffery Long describe these distinctions succinctly:

The *jīva* has a substantial, unchanging aspect (*dravya*), characterized by intrinsic qualities (*guṇas*), and a constantly changing, karmically determined aspect...²³ Kundakunda takes the two aspects of *jīva*, permanent and unchanging, as his starting point for his methodological dialectic. *Vyavahāra* is the perspective by which one engages the changing, material world and *nīścaya* is the ultimate perspective by which one perceives the soul in its pure, unmixed state. From these two perspectives, Kundakunda erects a "super-structure" by which he "views the empirical Self from an empirical standpoint and the transcendental Self from the transcendental standpoint."²⁴ The empirical and transcendental standpoints are essential to Kundakunda's entire philosophy and add a crucial dimension to the broader theory of relativity *anekāntavāda* within Jainism, upon which Kundakunda's dialectic depends. *Anekāntavāda* is a unique Jaina alternative to the

Brahmanism and Buddhism of the time. On the one hand, Brahmanism suggested that all reality was unchanging Brahman and the visible world of transformation is *māyā*, or illusion. On the other hand, Buddhism was emphasizing the momentariness of Reality, so that only change explains the Real. Jainism presents a metaphysical system that values change as well as permanence, as noted in Long's description of the *jīva*. These metaphysics are expressed in the theories of *anekāntavāda* and its two wings *syādvāda* and *nayavāda*. *Anekāntavāda* is a metaphysical claim that reality is multifaceted with infinite qualities. As such, there are infinite perspectives from which reality can be viewed. *Nayavāda* is an "analytical method of investigating a particular standpoint which does not rule out other different viewpoints and is thereby expressive of a partial truth about an object."²⁵ *Syādvāda* is a method of synthesis "designed to harmonize the different viewpoints arrived at by *nayavāda*."²⁶ As mentioned earlier, Jains often use the story of "The Blind Men and the Elephant" to illustrate these three aspects of Jaina metaphysics. The elephant functions as a many-sided Reality. The men, blinded by their karmic obstructions, can only experience the part of the elephant that they are touching. So one, feeling only the tail, says the elephant is like a snake. One, feeling only a leg, says the elephant is like a tree, etc. *Nayavāda* is the method of exploring how the elephant may be like a tree and a snake; how multiple perspectives may be partially true. *Syādvāda* is the explanatory method by which these multiple perspectives are held in tension, such that the elephant is both like a snake and like a tree; the elephant is both not like a snake and not like a tree. Kundakunda's dialectic of *vyavahāra-naya* and *nīścaya naya* presupposes the theories of *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. According to S. M. Shaha's research on Indian epistemology, Kundakunda's dialectic represents a unique path of ethical and spiritual empiricism that few others adopted.²⁷ Nevertheless, when it comes to issues of Jainism and contemporary science, Kundakunda's dialectic of *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya* are a sensible starting point because they provide a

methodological framework by which we can evaluate empirical and religious claims. Specifically, *vyavahāra*, as the empirical perspective, is a logical foundation that Jaina scientists could potentially base their ongoing exploration upon.

Kundakunda's Dialectic: Its Potential and Limitations

Kundakunda's use of *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya* is unique in that he makes the two perspectives inseparable from one another. Both represent modes of epistemology that provide insights into the apprehension of reality, whether through intellect, will, feeling, emotion, cognition or pure consciousness. Although Kundakunda clearly privileges the *nīścaya* viewpoint as the ultimate, he maintains a relationality between the two that seems promising.

He opens his text by putting the pure *jīva* in relation to empirical actions and attitudes of Right Conduct, Right Faith and Right Knowledge.²⁸ He initially places the transcendental Self as the "beautiful ideal in the whole universe,"²⁹ and he recognizes "the proposition that all living beings are characterized by desire for worldly things and enjoyment of the same."³⁰ He validates the Knower as both "unique and self-identical" to reality, clarifying his place between Brahmanic Vedānta and Buddhistic perspectives that preserves empirical uniqueness as well as ultimate Real.³¹ He unequivocally states that "From the *vyavahāra* point of view, conduct, belief and knowledge are attributes (as different characteristics) of the Knower, the Self"³² and should be understood in relation to a Self that is undifferentiated. In this way there appears to be a space where the *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya* perspective require one another. Kundakunda gestures toward the invaluable role played by the *vyavahāra* perspective when he writes:

Just as a non-Aryan (foreigner) cannot be made to understand anything except through the medium of his non-Aryan language, so the knowledge of the Absolute cannot be communicated to the ordinary people except through the *vyavāhara* point of view.³³

The empirical world seems to play a necessary role in perceiving the *nīścaya-naya*. Knowing the scriptures, and utilizing the belief,

knowledge and experience of conduct available to us in the practical world are all essential tools to apprehending the Ultimate. Although he clearly qualifies the *vyavahāra-naya* as a less complete perspective, while *nīścaya-naya* is a total perspective, he allows the two to exist as valid complimentary perspectives:

The pure standpoint which reveals the pure substance should be adopted by (those whose object is to be) the seers of the supreme state of the soul; but the practical one by those who are satisfied with a lower status.³⁴ This dialectic initially looks like it will provide space between the conceptual ideal of the Self and the practical experience of the Self, much like the way an abstract inductive hypothesis is tested by concrete, empirical means. The *nīścaya* Self acts as a possibility space, what Kundakunda calls “the unitary substratum”³⁵ or ideal that interfaces with the empirical world of *vyavahāra*, so that knowledge of both leads to collaborative growth.

But this dialectic does not last long as Kundakunda quickly places *vyavahāra*, not only on a more inferior level than *nīścaya*, with some interplay between the two ways of knowing, but ultimately discards *vyavahāra* as a valid way of knowing altogether. As Shaha points out, “By *vyavahāra-naya*, Kundakunda means: the differential, the particular, the impure, the modal, the accidental, the unreal, the non-existing, the formal, the pervert, the gross, and the discardable aspect of reality. It simply diagnoses the unhealthy, unnatural, despicable, diseased condition of the empirical self. It is the lowest rung of the ladder of the *nayas*.³⁶ Not only does the *vyavahāra* standpoint have no insight to lend to the fullness of the *nīścaya* standpoint, but it becomes a perspective to be discarded or exterminated in order that it may be replaced with pure knowledge that cannot be empirically tested, but must be trusted and believed.

He who, subjugating the senses, realizes that the self is of the nature of real knowledge is verily called a conqueror of the senses by the saints who know reality.³⁷ Sense perceptions are to be eradicated as

“alien dispositions,”³⁸ and the organs and objects of sense perception as misleading illusions. Not only is the transcendental Self absolutely separate from the senses, “without colour [sic], without smell, imperceptible to touch, without sound, not an object of anuman or inferential knowledge, without any definite bodily shape,”³⁹ but the empirical self actually falsely “builds within himself the various types of sense-organs” by which he perceives the world of illusory objects.⁴⁰ The mistrust of the senses is not unknown to contemporary science. In the twentieth-century, many scientists made an effort to revise the scientific method so that its underlying assumptions would be subject to greater scrutiny, patience and peer review. German philosopher of science Carl Hempel criticized inductive reasoning as being based on false assumptions and Polish biologist Ludwik Fleck warned scientists to be on the lookout for bias in the premises of experiments. In theory this resulted in a more rigorous scientific method that involved defining the initial question more precisely, and added more cycles of hypothesis and testing, followed by publication and retesting. In practice however, many academics have suggested that this new methodology has little to do with the process of scientific discovery. Belgian chemist and philosopher Isabelle Stengers maintains that science cannot escape being a “‘dangerous exercise,’ implying ‘groping experimentation’ resorting to measures that are not very respectable, as they belong to the order of dreams, of esoteric experiences, intoxication, or excess.”⁴¹ Feyerabend claims that the only way to maintain a creative and humane science is by allowing “charlatans and cowards” into the university so that theories and imagination clash.⁴² However Kundakunda forecloses the relationship between *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya*. The transcendental ideal cannot be influenced by the empirical world and those who wish to study it. Rather the transcendental Self becomes a trump card over the empirical Self, caught perpetually in the delusion of its karmic bonds. There is no avenue of interaction by which the empirical self, defined by its karmic bondage, can add to, subtract from or transform the

metaphysical presupposition of the ultimate Self. Inevitably the empirical self is defined by “wrong faith, wrong knowledge and wrong conduct.”⁴³ Those who investigate perceptive experience are condemned as having “dull intellect,” being victim to “sheer ignorance.”⁴⁴ Far from a true *naya* or valid perspective, the empirical becomes an enemy of the transcendent and its fruits of imagination, creativity, and skepticism are rendered meaningless.⁴⁵ Further, only by the removal of all *bhāva*, or emotional attachment such as desire, aversion or dissatisfaction, can one be free of the unwieldy burden of the empirical Self.⁴⁶ But where does this leave a scientist, when it is precisely the excitement of conjecture, or dissatisfaction with the status quo that drives curiosity, yearning, and ultimately the empirical process. A science null and void of all feeling or investment, “indifferently experienced”⁴⁷ as Kundakunda encourages, would never have resulted in the Copernican Revolution.⁴⁸ A Self utterly neutral to the material world, exhibiting “neither a desire for the present changes nor a longing for the future ones,” would never have developed carbon dating or genetics that are so essential to our increasing understanding of a complex and enchanting world.

The *Samayasāra*, or “Essence of the Soul,” ends up, not merely as a pure transcendent state to “contemplate upon,”⁴⁹ but a tyrannical abstraction that renders the empirical reality moot.

The Promise of the Abhavya

Though the dialectic of *vyavahāra* and *nīścaya* ends up being more a totalitarian relation of the transcendent over the empirical, Kundakunda does not leave us totally empty-handed. The autonomous empiricist, exercising his *svarāja* (self-rule), intent on employing the scientific method as well as Kaufmann’s canon to explore relevant alternatives to transcendental and empirical claims, can still find inspiration from an unlikely series of passages in the *Samayasāra*. In the eighth chapter, Kundakunda describes the *abhavya* as a “person incapable of spiritual liberation.”⁵⁰ This concept predates the *Samayasāra* though the reason for developing

such a category is unclear. Padmanabh Jaini's research on Jaina purification posits that the theory of *abhavya* "may simply reflect the commonplace observation that some individuals show no interest whatsoever in their salvation."⁵¹ Jaini speculates that the *abhavya*, because she has no interest in salvation, may parallel the phenomenon of "rotten seeds" that are "forever incapable of spiritual growth" found in some Buddhist texts.⁵² But the *abhavya* in Jainism is not forever incapable of such growth, nor does she necessarily abandon the spiritual quest. On the contrary, an *abhavya* may still be a devout and committed Jaina, who, according to Kundakunda, "observes vows, carefulness, restraints, rules of conduct, and penance as described by the Jinas."⁵³ Further, the *abhavya* is not anti-tradition or anti-religious. "No doubt he has faith in (a kind of) *dharma*," writes Kundakunda, "he acquires it, he delights in it and practices it all with the object of future enjoyment."⁵⁴ Though this *dharma* may not lead to the total destruction of *karma* and will not result in *mokṣa*, he may still be "well versed in all the scriptures," though he lacks the "faith" that can grant him liberation.⁵⁵ The *abhavya* does relinquish the possibility of attaining *mokṣa* but not necessarily its conceptual influence. In fact, no text denies that an *abhavya* may have quite a dynamic spiritual life that includes study of scriptures, manipulation of *karmas*, and even births in higher heavens. Yet this type of person can also employ a true dialectic. This dialectic permits the transcendent perspective of *niścaya* to inform and guide, but not ultimately trump, the empirical life. Neither does it require unquestioned obedience or allegiance to presupposed ontological categories like soul, *mokṣa* or *karma*. One is able to exercise the inventive imagination necessary to develop an idea and then exercise the "canon" as described by Kaufmann to evaluate its meaning, what speaks for and against it, exploring what speaks for and against relevant alternatives and by deciding what alternatives are most plausible in light of these considerations.

This type of empiricism does not oblige us to check our transcendental ideals at the door any more than it requires a

complete suspension of the data provided by our senses. Rather, it invites a constitutive interplay between the conceptual abstractions and practical manifestation, where each inform and transform the possibilities and power of the other. As English mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead suggests, “You cannot think without abstractions; accordingly it is of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your modes of abstraction.”⁵⁶

The *abhavya* is one who holds the transcendent and empirical in tension, without stacking the cards on the side of regulative principles or beliefs that trump empirical discovery. It allows a process of inquiry to unfold rather than dictate its telos at the outset as karmically or ontologically determined. According to Stengers, “It is rather a deliberate experimental exercise in partiality,” resisting the ultimacy of pre-given truths that exist outside the material world as well as “resisting what is given as obvious through perception and by language.”⁵⁷

Embracing the faith of an *abhavya* is not without costs. The *abhavya* represents for Kundakunda the lowest form of knowledge and, at least in Jaina texts, it is often treated with disinterest at best and outright disdain at worst. Yet the *abhavya* represents a compelling dialectic position between transcendence and empiricism that represents not only an embrace of multiple *nayas*, but also of the fundamental doctrines of *anekāntavāda*, *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* upon which the core of Jaina doctrine rests.

Additionally, it exemplifies an integrated and fearless exploration of alternatives that is, as Kaufmann tells us “the heart of rationality, the essence of scientific method, and the meaning of intellectual integrity.”⁵⁸ It forecloses neither the possibility of the transcendent nor the insights provided through empirical discovery and the continuous retesting and growth of ideas, experience and spiritual precepts.

Conclusion

The “scientific” nature of Jainism, has to be redefined and clarified by every generation. The truths discovered by Kundakunda and his

dialectic of empirical and transcendental perspectives is a valuable insight that contributed a unique thread among diverse religions as well as within Jainism itself. However, like all beliefs and propositions, for it to remain vibrant and lively in the present time, it must be subject to the canon of evaluation, comparison and empirical critique. For Jainism to maintain contemporary status as "scientific," it must participate with, though not be captured by, the general understanding of science as a rigorous process of imagination, verification, review and revision.

This canon is not meant only to evaluate religious claims alone but exists as a tool for those *abhavyas* who neither give full authority to the observable world nor to the unobservable truth claims inherited through family, society, religion and tradition. Both scientific and transcendent possibilities play together in a true dialectic in which both provide necessary value to the other. This play can lead to unexpected points of collision, where differences must be explored with a discriminating eye; where not all difference can be subsumed in the same proverbial elephant. This discernment has ample precedence in Jaina thought, including the sentiments of Kundakunda. "The Self," he writes, "is realized by discriminative wisdom. Just as he is separated by discriminative wisdom so also by the very same discriminative wisdom he is realized."⁵⁹ Such wisdom may well rest in relinquishing the ontological premises that devalue empirical discovery, experiential authority and the exploration of alternatives. But such is the burden of the *abhavya*, one who holds *mokṣa* as an autonomous and responsive way of life and not a preemptive premise. The *abhavya* understands that the concept of liberation places demands on the present moment even as the present moment informs and transforms the concept of liberation.

For the autonomous empiricist, Jainism as a "scientific religion" requires the faith of an *abhavya*, an unbeliever whose integrity permits him the embodied potential of the rich Jaina scriptures as well as the delight and dissatisfaction that drives his open, creative path.

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Personal Biography in Jaina Literature

Ulrich Timme Kragh*

In Western literary history, it is often said that biography and especially autobiography form the beginning of the emphasis on subjectivity and the individual that is so prevalent in modern humanistic thought. However, in the Western encounter with pre-modern Indian literature, it immediately becomes clear how very little focus there has been on individuals and their historicity, even to the extent that it sometimes has been said that Indians have no sense of history, and, in fact, have no history at all.¹ Fact-based sources for pre-modern Indian history must often be sought in texts written by foreign visitors, whether Greek, Chinese, or Middle-Eastern chroniclers and historiographers.

In the beginning, Indian genres of biography (*carita*, *caritra*, *prabhāvaka*, etc.) were purely devoted to describing the careers of the religious founders, such as Mahāvīra, the Buddha, and various other such figures from the distant past. Or else, they were devoted to describing the glorious deeds of semi-mythological figures, i.e., persons not ascertainable in 'historical' time, such as the epics (*mahākāvya*) and legends (*purāṇa*) about Rāma, the Pāṇḍava brothers, the various incarnations (*avatāra*) of Viṣṇu, etc.

Then in the 11th century, Indian literature suddenly took a new turn when Indian authors began to produce biographies (*prabandha*, *pravṛtti*) of more recent historical individuals. In particular, they began to write hagiographies of religiously significant individuals, and thereby brought a new focus on the individual into the Indian perception of the universe and man's place therein. It is here of note

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that the appearance of these new biographical genres occurred more or less simultaneously in Jainism and Buddhism.²

Admittedly, Indian medieval biography has little pretense of the facticity usually sought by the modern historian, which he bases in a notion of an objective past reality that stands outside the parameters of the text itself. However, as text as such, namely the fact that a given biography was written at a certain time and locality, the sources nevertheless possess historicity: as specific instances of writing, they provide insight into how a given personal narrative was formed at an age- and place-specific juncture in history. Just like the art-historian may distinguish the pictorial representations of a given motif chronologically to determine how the motif developed over time, the text-historian perceives how various narrative constructs formed and evolved, and these formations can be described as historical fact. Accepting this as the text's historical reality operates with a different understanding of historicity than proposing that the contents of a given biography depict a knowable, objective historical reality about the person being portrayed. It is this view of history that forms the basis for my study, and which makes the historical study of literature one of the most accessible inroads into mankind's knowable past.

The study of the appearance and development of personal narrative in Jainism is particularly significant for the general study of medieval religious biography in India. When personal biography began to appear in 10th-century India³, the other literary Indian religions all had extensive foreign contacts. Buddhism was active throughout Central, East, and South-East Asia, and Buddhist pilgrims from these nations constantly visited India bringing with them many outside influences. Hinduism had by then been carried widely into South-East Asia with a strong presence as far as present-day Indonesia. Islam, whose spread in India was just at its beginning, was with its ties to the Middle East still an outsider's religion, rooted in immigrant trader-communities. Jainism, on the other hand, had little presence - if any at all - outside of India.

Even though many Jains were merchants with international trading-ties, the religion itself remained local. Jainism seems to have maintained an introversion not found with the other much more extrovert Indian religions. Therefore, to study the rise of this new biographical turn in Indian literature with a focus on the tradition of Jainism may allow a particular understanding of this literary phenomenon in relative isolation from outside influences, thus enabling a better understanding of its nature and character.

In the following pages, I shall first briefly survey the overall development of biography in earlier Jaina literature, providing a picture thereof which may also be so familiar to the reader from Buddhist literature. Thereupon, I will turn to present and discuss the appearance of personal biography in Jaina literature in some detail. Although the underlying question of my study is broadly to understand the circumstances that led to the appearance of personal biography in Indian literature, this paper remains quite limited in this attempt, seeking merely to gain a basic overview of the genre and its appearance in Jainism, while suggesting a few possible venues for further inquiry.

1. Proto-Biographies in the Early Canon

The Jaina canonical literature of both the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara sects contain proto-biographies, mainly depicting the lives of Mahāvīra and other Tīrthaṅkaras. These may be called “proto”-biographies, since they are not written in the form of separate biographical texts bearing any genre-specific titles, such as *caritra* or *prabhāvaka*, as seen with later biographies.

In the Śvetāmbara canon, the oldest written layer of the canonical literature dates, according to JACOBI (1884 : xliii), to the 3rd-2nd century BCE. The *Āyārāṅgasutta* (Skt. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*) in its first book, viz. the first *Sūyakkhaṇḍha* (Skt. *Śrutaskandha*), ends with a versified account of Mahāvīra’s behavior and austerities,⁴ which JACOBI (1884 : xlvi) dates slightly later than the preceding segments of the same text. This account, however, is not an actual biography aiming to provide a chronological outline of a person’s

life, but rather serves to state major facets of Mahāvīra's religious code of conduct. The second *Suyakkhaṇḍha* of the same text, moreover, contains in its third part a partial biography of Mahāvīra,⁵ which in turn formed the basis for later Mahāvīra-biographies. Inscriptions and reliefs from the 1st century CE accord with the canonical descriptions of Mahāvīra's life found in this text, and these epigraphic and art-historical sources thus attest to the antiquity of the written accounts (WINTERNITZ, 1920:264). Other Śvetāmbara canonical works contain other proto-biographies, in particular the fifth *aṅga*, viz. the *Bhagavati* (*Viyāhaṇṇatti*, which contains brief stories of earlier *tīrthaṅkaras* (*ibid* :300-301)

In the scriptures of the Digambara sect, which must be considered a relatively later textual layer than the Śvetāmbara canon, the *Prathamānuyoga* section contains the life-stories of Mahāvīra as well as of other Tīrthaṅkaras. These stories are said to have been derived from the fourth part of the lost 12th *aṅga* called *Dṛṣṭivāda* (BHUTORIA, 2005:46)

2. Early Biographies in the Canonical and Post-Canonical Literature

In terms of actual biographical literature, WINTERNITZ (1920:327) presents a distinction between two forms of biography: *caritra* and *prabandha*.⁶ The Sanskrit word *caritra* (also written *carita* ; Prakrit *cariya*) literally means “going” and has the derived figurative meaning of “deeds, gestes, behavior, exploits, biography, life-story.” The word also points to its derivative form *caritra* (CORT, 1995:476), meaning “right conduct,” “observance of vows,” thereby indicating the implicit purpose of the *caritra* genre, namely to exemplify the ideal religious life as exhibited by a saint. The word *prabandha* literally means “connection, band” and carries the derivative meaning “continuance, succession, story, fiction, collection.” According to the medieval Jaina author Rājasekhara (CORT, 1995:498, fn. 26), the word *caritra* occurs in titles of works presenting life-stories of Tīrthaṅkaras, mythical

rulers (*cakravartin*), and holy men (*Rṣi*) from the ancient past, whereas the word *prabandha* signifies stories of monks and laymen from the historical age. However, as the genre-survey below will show, such a rigid distinction between the usages of the two terms is not feasible, since the word *caritra* also is used of biographies of historical persons.

The earliest biography having the word *caritra* as part of its title is found in the *Kalpasūtra*.⁷ The *Kalpasūtra* is a Śvetāmbara canonical text forming the eighth chapter of the *Āyāradasāo*, viz. the fourth *Chedasūtra*. The *Kalpasūtra* is ascribed to Bhadrabāhu, the sixth patriarch of the Jaina community after Mahāvīra's death, who is said to have died 170 years after Mahāvīra's death. The first part of the *Kalpasūtra* is entitled *Jinacaritra*, "The deeds of the Jinas." It commences with the vita of Mahāvīra,⁸ parts of which are adopted verbatim from, or have close correspondence to, the earlier, partial Mahāvīra-biography of the *Āyārāṅgasutta*. The same chapter of the *Kalpasūtra* continues with other biographies of the earlier tīrthaṅkaras, including Pārśva (Tīrthaṅkara no. 23) (JACOBI, 1884:271-275), Ariṣṭa-Neminātha (no. 22) (*ibid.*:276-279), and Rṣabha (no. 1).⁹ For the other twenty Tīrthaṅkaras, only their names are listed.

In the fourth century, the Digambara-author Yati Vṛṣabha composed the Prakrit text *Tiloyapaṇṇatti*, which is the first text giving an outline of the lives of a group of figures referred to as the sixty-three great men (*mahāpuruṣa*) or the sixty-three torch-bearers (*Śalākāpuruṣa*).¹⁰ The sixty-three great men are the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras, twelve universal monarchs (*cakravartin*), nine Vāsudevas, nine Baladevas, and the nine foes of the Vāsudevas (Prativāsudeva). The Vāsudevas, Baladevas, and Prativāsudevas are all semi-divine kingly and princely Jaina figures related to the epics of Rāma and Kṛṣṇa, which thus ties Jaina mythology in with the *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, and other Vaiṣṇavaite Hindu epics of the Bhāgavatism that became popular in India from the fourth century CE onwards.¹¹

The lives of the Tīrthaṅkaras and other religiously significant non-historical figures were told and retold, often under the name *purāṇa*, “legend,” thereby making these stories parallel to the *purāṇa* genre of Hindu mythology. The term *purāṇa* was used by both Śvetāmbara and Digambara authors, but the word became particularly popular with texts belonging to the latter sect (CORT, 1995:478). The *Mahāpurāṇa*, “The Great Legend,” is one such example. It consists of two parts. The first part entitled *Ādipurāṇa*, “The First Legend,” was written by Ācārya Jinasena at the Raṣṭrakūṭa court in Karnataka before his death in 887 CE. To this was added a second part entitled *Uttarapurāṇa*, “The Subsequent Legend,” completed by Jinasena’s disciple Ācārya Guṇabhadra in 897 CE. The *Ādipurāṇa* gives the story of the first Tīrthaṅkara, Ādinātha or Rṣabha, while the *Uttarapurāṇa* narrates the stories of the remaining twenty-three Tīrthaṅkaras. According to WINTERNITZ (1920:333 fn. 2), the *Uttarapurāṇa* was further enlarged in 898 CE by Guṇabhadra’s student Lokasena. Other Digambara *purāṇas* include texts parallel to several well-known Hindu *purāṇas*, such as Jinadāsa’s *Harivaṃśa* written in 783 (parallel to the *Harivaṃśa Purāṇa* in the Hindu tradition) and Śubhacandra’s *Pāṇḍavapurāṇa* (partially parallel to the Hindu epic *Mahābhārata*).

In or about 868 CE, Ācārya Śīlāṅka authored the treatise *Cauppanamahāpurisacariya* in Prakrit giving detailed biographies of the sixty-three great men.¹² It seems to have been partly based on the fourth Śvetāmbara canonical *aṅga*-text entitled *Samavāyāṅga*.

Yet, the most comprehensive set of stories of the sixty-three great men was written in 1160-1172 CE at the Caulukya court in Gujarat by the Śvetāmbara author Ācārya Hemacandra Sūri (1088/9-1172)¹³ in his magnum opus entitled *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra*, “Lives of the Sixty-Three Illustrious men”.¹⁴ Hemacandra’s Sanskrit text was partly based on Śīlāṅka’s earlier Prakrit work. Its tenth chapter on Mahāvīra also appears in manuscripts as an independent work bearing the title *Mahāvīracaritra*

(WINTERNITZ, 1920 :329). The story of each Tīrthaṅkara centers around five auspicious events (*kalyāṇaka*), viz. conception, birth, mendicant initiation, enlightenment, and bodily liberation at the moment of death (CORT, 1995:474), which are identical for each Tīrthaṅkara, and all the stories thus follow more or less the same narrative pattern. In an addendum entitled *Parīṣiṣṭaparvan*, “The Appendix Chapter,” or *Sthavirāvalīcarita*, “Lives of the Line of Elders,” Hemacandra gives in brief the vitae of the *Daśapūrvins*, i.e., the earliest teachers of Mahāvīra’s doctrine who still knew the now lost ten *pūrvas*, i.e., the ‘oldest’ or ‘former’ (viz. pre-canonical) Jaina texts.¹⁵

Long narratives of the lives of individual Tīrthaṅkaras were later worked out by a number of authors. Jinasena (9th century) wrote the *Pārśvābhyudaya*, “The Rise of Pārśva,” giving a poetic description of the 23rd Tīrthaṅkara Pārśvanātha’s life.¹⁶ The Digambara-author Haricandra (10th century) wrote the epic poem *Dharmaśarmābhyudaya*, “The Rise of Dharmaśarman,” which in twenty-one songs describes the life of the fifteenth Tīrthaṅkara Dharmaśarmanātha.¹⁷ Vāgbhaṭa (12th century) depicted the life of the 22nd Tīrthaṅkara Neminātha in his poem *Neminirvāṇa*, “Nemi’s Nirvāṇa.” Vardhamānasūri (13th century) wrote the *Vāsupūjya-caritra* giving the story of the 12th Tīrthaṅkara Vāsupūjya. Kṛṣṇadeva wrote the lifestory of the 13th Tīrthaṅkara Vimala. Devasūri narrated the biography of the sixteenth Tīrthaṅkara Śāntinātha was narrated by Devasūri.¹⁸

The stories told in these *caritra* texts are thus mainly stories of the Tīrthaṅkaras, especially Mahāvīra, Neminātha, and Pārśvanātha, or of various persons associated with Mahāvīra or earlier Jinas, particularly with Neminātha, such as Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva, etc. The foci of the stories is thus predominantly a distant (‘universal’) past, and no stories are found of any persons living in the historical (‘localized’) age closer to the centuries CE in which these texts were put into writing from their former oral transmission or composed anew.

3. Personal Biographies of Jaina Scholars and Teachers

In his study of Jaina historical literature and its various genres, John E. CORT (1995) describes the above-mentioned *caritra* and *purāṇa* literature as pertaining to what he calls the “Jaina Universal History.” The term “universal history” is derived from a 19th-century German historiographical concept, signifying the writing of a universal history of all of mankind transcending national histories. This term was, in turn, adopted by a number of early 20th-century German Indologists when referring to certain aspects of Hindu and Jaina narratives. According to CORT (1995:480), Jains thus consider the stories of Tīrthaṅkaras and so forth as reflecting universal events in the recurrent structure of cyclical time, where each downward and upward cycle of time will see the similar appearance of twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras, who - though consisting of different individuals in each time cycle - follow the same universal biographical pattern in their paths to liberation and omniscience. In contrast to such stories of universal time, CORT (*ibid.*) speaks of what he calls ‘localized histories’, signifying “the histories of the Jaina tradition in the centuries since the death and liberation of Mahāvīra a little over 2,500 years ago.”

In its earliest and simplest form, such localized histories did not consist of actual biographies, but were simply canonical and post-canonical lists of monks who had headed the Jaina community. These monks were bearers of the Jaina transmission of mendicant initiation (*dīkṣā*), which is the ritual that allows every monk or nun entry into the order of the ordained community. Since it was of great significance to be able to claim the authority of an unbroken line of transmission reaching all the way back to Mahāvīra himself, such transmission-lines were recorded and preserved in so-called *avali*, i.e., “lineage”-texts, bearing such titles as *Paṭṭāvālī* (“The line of Seat-Holders”), *Sthavirāvālī* (“The Line of Elders”), or *Gurvāvālī* (“The Line of Gurus”).¹⁹ The oldest example of such a text is a segment in the *Kalpasūtra* following the life-stories of the Tīrthaṅkaras entitled *Therāvālī* (Skt. *Sthavirāvālī*), which simply gives the names of the line of head-monks of the early Jaina

community.²⁰ However, in the later literature, such texts often came to include some biographical detail of the major individuals listed, as, e.g., seen in Hemacandra's above-mentioned appendix to the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra* entitled *Sthavirāvalīcarita*, "Lives of the Line of Elders." CORT (1995:482) mentions that the Śvetāmbaras in the 11th-12th century began to write more extensive versions of such texts, describing the transmission lines right up to the time of the (gradually ongoing) composition of the text, in accordance with the particular sectarian affiliation of the author (s). While not biography per se, such texts were certainly intimately linked with the genre of Jaina religious biography, partly sharing the purpose of establishing the authority and glory of a given religious lineage.

More specific biographical genres of ('localized') historical individuals began to appear around the same time, i.e., from the 11th century onwards, embodied in the genres of *prabandha* ("collections"), *caritra* ("deeds, lives"), and *kāvya* ("poem"). GRANOFF (1989b:331) states that these biographies are much less school-specific or sectarian than the above-mentioned *āvalī*-texts with their focus on specific sectarian transmission-lineages, noting that the biographies are "concentrating on the lives of those monks who would have been most widely acceptable to Śvetāmbara Jains regardless of any particular loyalty to a local group or *gaccha*" (*ibid.*).

The following is a survey of primary sources containing Jaina personal biography, while surely not exhaustive at least lists some of the major and most well-known texts:

- 1077 CE, the Digambara-author Prabhācandra's *Kathākośa*,²¹ "*The Treasury of Stories.*" This is a collection of miscellaneous stories in two distinct parts (UPADHYE, 1974:16). The first part contains 90 stories, while the second part, probably being a slightly later supplement possibly written by a different hand who in the colophon is called Bhaṭṭāraka Śrī Prabhācandra, contains 32 stories. The text incorporates brief life-stories of three historical authors, namely:

1. Story no. 1: (Vidyānanda) Pātrakeśarin (ca. 8th century, author and opponent of the Vedāntin Śaṅkarācārya).
 2. Story no. 2: The Digambara Ācārya and author Akalaṅka (second half of 8th century).²²
 3. Story no. 4: The Digambara author Samantabhadrā (ca. 2nd century CE).²³ The story of Samantabhadrā also includes the story of his student Śivakoṭi, whom the author considers identical to Śivārya (date unknown), the author of *Bhagavatī Ārādhana*.²⁴
- First half of 12th century, Sarvarājamuni's commentary to Jinadattasūri's *Gaṇadhārārdhaśataka*, "Hundred and Fifty Heads of the Assembly," containing, among others, the biography of the Śvetāmbara teacher and author Haribhadra suri (second half of the 9th century).²⁵
 - 1134 CE, Āmradevasūri's Prakrit verse-commentary *Ākhyānakamaṇikośavṛtti*,²⁶ "Commentary on the Jewel-Treasury of Narratives," containing the life-story of the Śvetāmbara author Siddhasena Divākara (5th century CE).²⁷
 - Mid-12th century, Bhadreśvara's *Kahāvalī*,²⁸ "The Line of Stories," containing several biographies, including that of Haribhadra.²⁹
 - 1160-1172 CE, Hemacandra's (1088/9-1172) *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra*, "Lives of the Sixty-Three Torch-Bearers", which includes details of his own life in the tenth chapter of the text (WINTERNITZ. 1920:329), i.e., the *Paṛiśiṣṭaparvan* or *Sthavirāvalīcarita*.
 - Late 12th century, Sumatisūri's *Jinadattacarita*, "The Deeds of Jinadatta," concerning the Śvetāmbara Kharatara Gaccha³⁰ monk Jinadattasūri.³¹

- 1277 CE, Prabhācandra's and Pradyumnasūri's *Prabhāvaka-caritra*, "Lives of Illustrious Monks."³² The Sanskrit text consists twenty-two biographies (*prabandha*) and is written in Śloka (verse), providing the vitae of the following twenty-two famous Śvetāmbara monks: (1) Vajrasvāmī (199 verses); (2) Āryarakṣita (279 verses); (3) Āryanandīla (84 verses); (4) Kālakasūri (156 verses); (5) Pādaliptasūri (also including the story of Āryakhapaṭa)(357 verses); (6) Vijayasīmhasūri (141 verses); (7) Jivadevasūri (203 verses); (8) Vṛddhavādisūri, viz., Siddhasena Divākara (180 verses); (9) Haribhadra (224 verses); (10) Mallavādisūri (75 verses); (11) Bappabhaṭṭisūri (772 verses); (12) Mānatuṅgasūri (168 verses); (13) Mānadevasūri (84 verses); (14) Mahākavi Siddharṣi³³ (157 verses); (15) Vīraṅṇi (169 verses); (16) Vādivetāla Śāntisūri (132 verses); (17) Mahendrasūri (328 verses); (18) Sūrācārya (261 verses); (19) Abhayadevasūri (including the story of his teacher Jineśvara) (177 verses); (20) Vīrācārya (94 verses); (21) Vādidevasūri (290 verses); (22) Hemacandra (853 verses).
- Early 14th century, *Purātanaprabandhasaṅgraha*,³⁴ "Collection of Ancient Narratives," containing various biographies, including that of Haribhadra, Siddhasena, and Āryakhapaṭācārya.
- 1304 CE, Merutuṅga's (14th century) *Prabandhacintāmaṇi*,³⁵ "Wish-fulfilling Jewel of Narratives." This is a semi-historical anthology of biographies containing stories of significant historical monarchs, including the story of Hemacandra and king Kumārapāla, as well as the story of Siddhasena.
- 1333 CE, Jinaprabhasūri's pilgrimage-guide *Vividhatīrthakalpa*,³⁶ "The Cycle of Various Holy Places," containing in passing several life-stories, including that of Siddhasena Divākara.

- 1349 CE, Rajaśekhara's Sanskrit text *Prabandhakośa*, "Treasury of Narratives."³⁷ It contains the life-stories of ten Jaina ācāryas (including Hemacandra, Mallavādī, Kālakācārya, Bhadrabāhu, Āryanandila, Āryakhapaṭācārya, Bappabhaṭṭisūri, Pādalipta, Siddhasena, and Haribhadra), four poets (Śriharṣa, Harihara, Amaracandra, and the Digambara Madanakīrti), seven kings (including Sātavāhana), and three other figures.³⁸
- 1366 CE, Saṅghatilakasūri's *Samyaktvasaptatikāvṛtti*, "Commentary on the Seventy Verses on Perfection," giving the life-story of Siddhasena Divākara.³⁹
- 1370 CE, Śrī Guṇākarasūri's commentary on Mānatuṅga's devotional poem entitled *Bhaktāmarastotra*, "Praise to the Worshipped Deathlessness," containing a number of miracle-stories related to this praise, including the life-stories of Mānatuṅga and Āryakhapaṭācārya.⁴⁰
- 1419 CE, Devamūrti's *Vikramacarita*, "The Deeds of [King] Vikrama," being a cycle of tales including the story of Siddhasena Divākara.
- 1434 CE, Jayasāgaropādhyaya's *Gurupāraṅgīya*, "Reliance on the Guru," including the life-story of Jinadatta.
- 1436, Jinamaṇḍana's *Kumārapālacaritra*, "The Deeds of [King] Kumārapāla," including the life-story of Hemacandra.
- 1443 CE, Śubhaśīlagāṇi's *Vikramacarita*,⁴¹ "The Deeds of [King] Vikrama," being a cycle of tales including the story of Siddhasena Divākara.⁴²
- 1468 CE, Pratiṣṭhāsoma's *Somasaubhāgyakāvya*, "Poem on the Auspiciousness of Soma," concerning the Tapā Gaccha monk Somasundarasūri (1374-1443).

- Late 15th century, Sumatisādhu's *Somasaubhāgyakāvya*, "Poem on the Auspiciousness of Soma," concerning the same monk.
- Late 15th or 16th century, Ratnanandin's *Bhadrabāhucarita*, "The Life of Bhadrabāhu," i.e., the story of the fourth century BCE Jaina monk and leader of the Digambara monastic community Bhadrabāhu.
- 1590 CE, Padmasāgaragaṇi's *Jagadgurukāvya*, "Poem on the Guru for the World," concerning the Tapā Gaccha monk Hīravijayasūri (1527-1596).
- Late 16th century, Siddhicandropādhyaya's *Bhānucandra-gaṇicaritra*, "The Deeds of the Assembly-Head Bhānucandra," concerning the Tapā Gaccha monk Bhānucandraṇi.
- Early 17th century, Devavimalagaṇi's *Hirasaubhāgyakāvya*, "Poem on the Auspiciousness of Hīra," concerning Hīravijayasūri.
- 1625 CE, Hemavijaya's *Vijayaprasastikāvya*, "Poem of praise for Vijaya," concerning Hīravijayasūri.
- Mid-17th century, Vallabhopādhyaya's *Vijayadeva-māhātmya*, "The Grandness of Lord Vijaya," on the Tapā Gaccha monk Vijayadevasūri (1578-1653).
- 1699 CE, Meghavijayopādhyāya's *Devanandamahākāvya*, "The Great Poem [that brings] Pleasure to the Gods," on Vijayadevasūri.
- Ca. 1710 CE, Meghavijayopādhyāya's *Digvijaya-mahākāvya*, "The Great Poem of World Conquest," on the Tapā Gaccha monk Vijayaprabhasūri (1621-1693).
- 1787 CE, Vijayalakṣmīsūri's *Upadeśaprāsāda*, "Clarity of the Instructions," containing the life-story of Siddhasena Divākara.⁴³

4. Prolegomenon on the Emergence of Personal Biography in Jaina Literature

The above survey of personal biography in Jaina literature illustrates that biographies of historical individuals of a recent ('localized') past began to appear in the second half of the 11th century. There may, to be sure, have been several reasons and influences leading to this turn in Jaina writing, and I shall here but attempt some cursory and quite preliminary remarks for explaining this development.

The first circumstance to consider is the nature of the earliest text containing personal biographies that I have hitherto been able to identify, namely the first work listed in the above survey: Prabhācandra's *Kathākośa*, "The Treasury of Stories." This text was composed in the late 11th century (UPADHYE, 1943:62), possibly in the year 1077 CE (date according to GRANOFF, 1989a:110). The text begins with a verse of homage, wherein the author characterizes his text as a "collection (*prabandha*) of genuinely good stories (*sat-su-kathā*) on the *Ārādhana*" (*Ārādhanaśatsukathāprabandha*).⁴⁴ This statement is, in fact, parallel to the title by which the author himself later refers to his text, namely, *Ārādhana-kathā-prabandha* (UPADHYE, 1943:60), meaning "A Collection of Stories on the *Ārādhana*." The word *Ārādhana* refers to a text entitled *Bhagavatī Ārādhana*, and it is thus clear that the *Kathākośa* is intimately linked with this work.

The *Bhagavatī Ārādhana* is an important Digambara work composed by Śivārya (date unknown), possibly written in the early centuries CE. It deals with a long series of ascetic practices culminating with death through fasting. It is, in fact, just one of several *Ārādhana* texts dealing with this topic.⁴⁵ In the words of UPADHYE (1943:47), "*Ārādhana* consists in firm and successful accomplishment of ascetic ideals, namely, Faith, Knowledge, Conduct and Penance, that are laid down in Jainism; in maintaining a high standard of detachment, forbearance, self-restraint and mental equipoise at the critical hour of death; and in attaining

spiritual purification and liberation.” In his study, UPADHYE (1943:72-80) shows that Prabhācandra’s *Kathākośa* is closely linked with several earlier texts bearing the title *Kathākośa*,⁴⁶ especially with the 9th-century work *Bṛhatkathākośa*, “The Large Treasury of Stories,”⁴⁷ written by Hariṣeṇa.⁴⁸ UPADHYE concluded that the majority of these *Kathākośa*-texts, including Prabhācandra’s *Kathākośa*, were intended as narrative commentaries on the *Bhagavatī Ārāḍhanā*. Unlike the formal commentaries on the *Ārāḍhanā*,⁴⁹ which had the purpose of explaining the words and overall meaning of the Prakrit verses of the *Bhagavatī Ārāḍhanā* root-text, the *Kathākośa*-texts were intended as collections of stories providing edifying illustrations (*naya*) of selected verses from the *Ārāḍhanā* text.

In this vein, Prabhācandra’s *Kathākośa* begins, right after the above-mentioned verse of homage, by citing the first two verses of the *Bhagavatī Ārāḍhanā*. The text then provides its first thirteen stories to exemplify the meaning of these verses. Thereafter, the author goes on to illustrate other verses from the *Ārāḍhanā*, usually citing the pertinent verse or part thereof at the beginning of a story. In first part of Prabhācandra’s *Kathākośa* (stories 1-90), the selected verses from the *Ārāḍhanā* occur in sequential order, but in the second supplementary part (stories 90*1 to 90*32) the verses are random in order.⁵⁰ Prabhācandra’s *Kathākośa* shares almost all of its stories with Hariṣeṇa’s earlier and larger work, the *Bṛhatkathākośa*. Only eight of the 122 stories found in Prabhācandra’s *Kathākośa* are not found in *Bṛhatkathākośa*.

Prabhācandra’s *Kathākośa* includes three personal biographies, namely the life-stories of the Digambara authors Pātrakesarin (8th century), Akalaṅka (8th century), and Samantabhadra (ca. 2nd century CE). These biographies constitute stories no. 1, 2, and 4, and thus belong to the sequence of the text’s first thirteen stories meant to illustrate the meaning of *Bhagavatī Ārāḍhanā*’s verses 1-2. The story of Pātrakesarin (story no. 1) is meant to illustrate the manifestation of rightness (*samyaktvodyotana*). The story of

Akalaṅka (story no. 2) exemplifies the manifestation of knowledge (*jñānodyotana*). The third story, showing the manifestation of good conduct (*cāritroddyotana*), is the legendary tale of the sage Sanatkumāra, and is thus not a personal biography. The biography of Samantabhadra (story no. 4) illustrates both the qualities of knowledge and conduct combined (*ubhayoruddyotana*).

What is here noteworthy is that none of these three personal biographies occur in the *Bṛhatkathākośa* or any other extant, earlier *Kathākośa*-text, and it therefore seems that Prabhācandra was the first to include stories of recent historical persons into this genre. If this is so, the beginning of personal biography in Jaina literature is in the *Kathākośa* genre and is aimed at providing edifying illustrations of ascetic practices.

While the above analysis may explain one of the circumstances in which personal biography first appeared, it did not reveal any particular reason as to why Prabhācandra chose to include stories of historical individuals, where he could simply have chosen stories of non-historical figures as seen in all the other tales of his work. It may just be noted that he felt sufficiently assured that the vitae of these well-known Digambara masters were suitable illustrations for the spiritual qualities he wished to exemplify, and that he chose to place these biographies at the very beginning of his work. The two earlier *Kathākośa*-texts on which Prabhācandra's work is partly based, namely Hariṣeṇa's *Bṛhatkathākośa* and Śricandra's *Apabhraṃśa Kathākośa* (10th century),⁵¹ did not provide any prototype for stories to illustrate verses 1-2 of *Bhagavatī Ārādhana*, since both these texts begin their first stories as illustrations of *Āradhanā*'s verses 19, 22, and 23.⁵²

It may be that Prabhācandra included the biographies to state his veneration for earlier, outstanding masters of the Digambara tradition. It is at least of note that the last biography, that of Samantabhadra, includes the story of Samantabhadra's student Śivakoṭi, whom Prabhācandra considers identical to Śivārya, the author of the *Bhagavatī Ārādhana*. To be sure, the three biographies

are not given in chronological order, since Pātrakeśarin and Akalaṅka, who both belong to the 8th century, postdate Samantabhadra (ca. 2nd century CE) with six centuries. Yet, as authors whose thought may have been significant to Prabhācandra, the three biographies could be seen as a sequence expressing a certain intellectual heritage in a line ending with Samantabhadra and his student Śivārya, whose work Prabhācandra is setting out to illustrate at this point in the text. This remains, however, merely a hypothesis, the validity of which can only be determined by a much more in-depth study of Prabhācandra's relationship to these three authors.

If meant to provide a sense of heritage, the beginning of personal biography in Jaina literature might be seen as related to the importance of lineage and to the authority of holding an unbroken transmission. In Buddhist literature, where personal biography began within the context of the Tāntric tradition, the earliest biographies were either accounts of Tāntric lineages or life-stories of major figures considered to be founders of various Tāntric transmissions.⁵³ It is possible that a similar emphasis on heritage and lineage was significant for the appearance of personal biography in Jaina literature.⁵⁴

In this case, personal biography ought to be, at least partly, traceable to the Jaina genres of lineage-records, the so-called *Āvalī*-texts mentioned above, which were accounts of the transmission-lines of mendicant initiation (*dīkṣā*). While in their earliest form such records, e.g., the *Therāvalī* found in the *Kalpasūtra*, did not include biographies, CORT (1995:482) notes that biography began to be included already in Hemacandra's *Sthavirāvalīcarita*, "Lives of the Line of Elders," written in 1160-1172 CE. Likewise, later *āvalī*-texts often came to include personal biographies (CORT, 1995:482). This development in the *avalī*-literature thus paralleled the rise of the personal biographies listed in the survey above, and this fact may further highlight a desire for heritage and in extension thereof a need for pedigree as significant factors. Yet, what was it in the 11th-12th centuries that gave rise to such needs?

To consider some possible answers to this complex question, one explanation may have been the way in which the Śvetāmbara sect from the 11th century onwards began to splinter into several subsects. GRANOFF (1999:297) has noted that she has “sought to understand the compiling of certain collections of stories, didactic and biographical, the line is not always so finely drawn, as a response to a deeply-felt need to create a community self-image that would transcend the many dividing borders that were rapidly coming to criss-cross the religious map of Śvetāmbara Jainism.” In other words, by writing biographies of beloved teachers that any Śvetāmbara group would consider their own, a sense of common heritage and unity could be produced in the otherwise divided Śvetāmbara community. Whether such an explanation would also be true for the production of Digambara biographies, such as Prabhācandra’s *Kathākośa* discussed above, remains to be seen. Yet, it is a fact that Śvetāmbara biographical texts far outnumber the Digambara writings of this genre.

Another circumstance that could have created a need for a clearer sense of heritage and for the authority of an authentic transmission could have been the many political alliances with royal courts that Jaina monks were beginning to maintain. After the end of the Gupta Empire in the 7th century, the political landscape of India fragmented into many smaller kingdoms. The Pāla Dynasty (770-850) brought a brief state of partial unity, which was quickly replaced by another breakup into petty kingdoms. This environment must have put more stress on leaders of the Jaina community to establish donor-relations and religious-political alliances with many more rulers than with just a single monarch of a large empire. In view of this, access to narrative about eminent Jaina monks who had performed miracles for their kingly patrons would certainly have been useful for the Jaina monks residing at the royal courts. Stories of this kind figure prominently in many Jaina biographies. The theme is, for example, reflected in the many accounts of Siddhasena Divākara’s miracle of manifesting a Pārśvanātha image out of a Hindu statue or a *liṅga* before the eyes

of a king (GRANOFF, 1989b, 1990), and it also occur in the famous story of Hemacandra's role as advisor to the Gujarati King Kumārapāla (1143-1173). GRANOFF (1989a:122-123) has also underlined the fact that "Jainism was making significant Hindu conversions, particularly among royalty" in the 12th century and has noted that "the *prabandhas* were primarily written for royal audiences or for ministers close to the kings" (*ibid.*). She (*ibid.*) has consequently argued that this political development may have been the cause for the strong anti-Buddhist tone seen in some biographies of this time, intended as a way to distance the Jains from the by-then somewhat unpopular Buddhists with whom they had formerly been closely associated in the eyes of others.

Besides the arrival of the Turkic and Pashtun invaders in the 12th-13th centuries, and the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate in 1206 might also have created a further need for Jaina monastic leaders to foster stronger bonds with local Hindu rulers. At the same time, it is also not inconceivable that the Indian notion of writing personal biography to begin with was inspired by the gradual influx of Islamic culture with its much stronger tradition of historical writing. This influx began already in the centuries leading up to the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire. Muslim scholars, such as Al-Bīrūnī (973-1048), visited India in the 1030s and studied there, and it is conceivable that the presence of their scholarly traditions left an early impact on Indian thought and writing. This remains, however, another aspect that requires further study to be considered properly.

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1. See CORT (1995:469ff.) for a discussion of this statement.
3. I have not yet had the opportunity to examine the history of personal biography in Hindu literature, and it therefore remains merely a hypothesis when I mention the possibility of such biographies appearing also in Hindu literature at this time.
4. While the eleventh century mentioned above is valid for Jainism, the tenth century applies to Buddhism (see below).
5. For an English translation, see JACOBI (1884:79-87).
6. For an English translation, see JACOBI (1884:189-202).

7. I shall here not treat the closely related genre of *stotra*, i.e., eulogies, paeans, and praises, wherein devotional descriptions of various sages' lives also may occur.
8. Edition and translation by SAGAR (1984).
9. For a translation, see JACOBI (1884:217-270).
10. For a translation, see JACOBI (1884: respectively 271-275, 276-279, and 281-285).
11. For a description of this group of men, see CORT (1993). Brief mention of the 'illustrious men' (*śalākāpuruṣa*) occurs in various canonical scriptures (see GEEN, 2009:88-89), but those passage fall short of actual biography.
12. This is though not to say that the Prakrit Jaina versions of these stories necessarily were adopted from their Sanskrit Hindu equivalents. As partly argued by CHATTERJI (1936:458ff.), the written texts in either language and religious tradition reflect to some extent older layers of oral narratives rooted in local lore associated with semi-animistic village gods (*grāma-devatās*), thereby transcending their later pan-Indian religious affiliation and eventual Sanskritization. For a comparative study of Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva and his foes in Jaina and Hindu literature, see GEEN (2009), who considers the Jaina figures of Kṛṣṇa and his foes to have been adopted from their Hindu counterparts. See also JAINI (1977 and 1984) for further links between Jaina and Hindu literature.
13. For the Sanskrit text, see BHOJAK (1961) as well as BRUHN (1954).
14. For information on Hemacandra, see WINTERNITZ (1920:327-332).
15. For an English translation, see JOHNSON (1931-1962).
16. For a German translation of some excerpts, see HERTEL (1909).
17. For the life of Pārśvanātha, see BLOOMFIELD (1919).
18. The words *Śarman* and *nātha* are synonyms, both meaning "guardian, protector"
19. My present mention of such biographies of the Tirthaṅkaras is far from exhaustive. For a list of more of such biographies of individual Tirthaṅkaras, see Hiralal JAIN (1997:83-84). CORT (1995:478) states that over two hundred such texts have been composed in Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhraṁśa, and various regional languages between the early centuries CE and the present.

20. For some editions and articles on these genres, see GRANOFF (1989b:373 fn. 6).
21. For a translation, see JACOBI (1884:286-295).
22. For a Sanskrit edition based on a single available manuscript, see UPADHYAYE (1974).
23. See GRANOFF (1989a:110).
24. See GRANOFF (1989b:352-358).
25. See UPADHYE (1943:53).
26. For information on Haribhadra, see WINTERNITZ (1920:317-318) and GRANOFF (1989a). For Sarvarājamuni's text, see GRANOFF (1989a:111).
27. For an edition, see PUNYAVIJAYJĪ (1962).
28. For information on Siddhasena, see GRANOFF (1989b and 1990).
29. On the dating of this text, see GRANOFF (1989a:124 fn.4).
30. For a study, see MALVANIA (1983).
31. The Kharatara Gaccha and the Tapā Gaccha (mentioned below) are two major sub-sects of the Śvetāmbara. For a thorough list of such sub-schools, see Kamal Jain (1975:50-52).
32. This and some of the following information is based on CORT (1995:499, fn. 30).
33. For a critical edition, see MUNI (1940).
34. Siddharṣi was the author of the grand epic *Upamitibhavaprapaṅcakathā* written in 906 CE. The story goes that he started out as a Jaina monk, then became a Buddhist for some time, and finally returned to Jainism.
35. For a Sanskrit edition, see MUNI (1936).
36. English translation by TAWNEY (1901); for a Sanskrit edition, see MUNI (1933).
37. Edited by MUNI (1934).
38. For an edition, see MUNI (1935).
39. For a comparative discussion of *Prabhāvākacaritra* and *Prabandhakośa*, see DELEU (1981).
40. Published as vol. 35 in the Devchandra Lalbhai Pustakoddhara Series.
41. Edition by KAPADIA (1932). For a discussion, see GRANOFF (1989b:363).
42. For an edition and translation, see EDGERTON (1926). NB. I am not sure whether Edgerton's edition and translation is of Devamūrti's or Śubhaśīlagani's *Vikramacarita*.

43. Edited by Pandita Bhagavandas, *samvat* 1996.
44. Published in Rajanagara, 1938. 45. Edited by UPADHYE (1974:1).
46. For a list of such texts, see UPADHYE (1943:47-55).
47. For an overview of *Kathākośa* texts, see UPADHYE (1943:39-47 and 57-72).
48. As argued by UPADHYE (1943:81), the word *Bṛhat* “large” may have been added to the title at a later stage to distinguish it from other *Kathākośa* texts.
49. See also GRANOFF (1986:396ff.) for more information on this text.
50. For a survey of *Ārādhana* commentaries, see UPADHYE (1943:55-57)
51. For a table showing which stories of *Kathakośa* are related to which verses of *Ārādhana*, see UPADHYE (1974:12-15).
52. See UPADHYE (1943:59-60).
53. See the table correlating verses and stories in UPADHYE (1943:73).
54. One of the very early Buddhist collections of biographies is a lineage-history of Sahaja-teachings found in Lakṣmī’s *Sahasiddhipaddhati* possibly written in the 10th century (see KRAGH, forthcoming). Other early Buddhist biographies include the Sham Sher Manuscript, perhaps written in the late 11th-12th century, containing the life-story of Maitrīpada (TATZ, 1987), as well as Abhayadattaśrī’s **Caturaśīti-siddha-pravṛtti* (*Tib. grub thob brgyad cu rtsa bzhi’i lo rgyus*, Tibetan Peking Tanjur no. 5091) written in the twelfth century giving the hagiographies of the eighty-four *Mahāsiddhas*.
55. I have not had the opportunity to consider whether the Jaina monks whose vitae appear in the earliest texts containing personal biographies held any particular importance for the Jaina Tāntric tradition. I have also not had opportunity to examine whether Jaina *Mantra* and *Yantra* texts contain their own lineage-histories with biographies. In general, it seems that Jaina Tantric works appeared roughly side-by-side with the Buddhist and Hindu Tāntric literature, and these sources may need to be considered for a further study of Jaina biography.

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Summary of the Paper

Jains in Development Challenging Some 'Religion and Development' Arguments

Nathan R.B. Loewen, Ph.D.

Grass keeps low and does not get cut, but trees grow high, and do". (K.C. Sogani, Jaipur, June 26 2006). This Jaina proverb expresses a norm of abstention from social involvements. It is a strategy that contributed to the Jains passage through centuries of socio-political vicissitudes. Involvement in education is a very public thing and Jains' involvements in education would seem to betray this proverb. Are there grounds for a Jaina theology of development?

Many Jains are involved in establishing and supporting schools, hospitals and other work for social benefit. These actions contrast with the Jaina dharma, which is mostly concerned with world-denying religious roles and goals. This paper seeks to understand what is going on by exploring Jains' involvements amid India's socio-economic development. The paper shows how the uniqueness of Jains social involvements belies several Western academic claims about the religious dimensions of socio-economic development. This study concludes with a reflection upon emerging doctrinal sources for Jains actions for India's development.

Jains take the human condition seriously. This point is made with reference to scriptures, secondary sources, field research and in-person interviews with leaders of Jaina communities. For example, the humanity of the Tirthankaras is regularly emphasized. However, each Tirthankara ultimately transcended the human condition. And the Tirthankaras' teachings are validated due to the latter and not the former. This brief example is one among others deeply analyzed to shows how an 'is/is not' dynamic guides historical and contemporary positions on social involvement. The paper proposes that the *dharma* of this is/is-not situation may be understood *vis-a-vis anekāntavāda*. '*Anekānta*' may best illustrate

the apparent ambivalence of the Jaina dharma towards development. On the one hand, a doctrinally-informed perspective, social involvement does not exist; and, there are not sufficient grounds for a Jaina theology of development. On the other hand, compassion is said to figure among the characteristics of right belief. The attitude fitting for this understanding of compassion is encapsulated by the popular *bhajana* "*Merī Bhāvanā*." Since J.K. Mukhtara composed it in 1916, this poem has become a prayer oft-recited daily at many Jaina-run schools.

May distress and suffering no longer exist and may it rain on time;
May the king be righteously inclined and do justice to all his
subjects; May the diseases, epidemics and famine cease to spread
and exist; May *Ahimsā* pervade the entire universe and bring
benevolence to all. (Stanza 10)

Merī Bhāvanā expresses a rightly-held desire for the welfare of others that includes a theology of good governance and social justice as a precondition for the cessation of diseases, epidemics and famine. These *bhāvanās* are inconsistent with ancient Jaina dharma, which did not teach responsibility towards famines, diseases and epidemics. Thus "*Merī Bhāvanā*" may well express the dynamic origins of Jains' social consciousness. Hostels, hospitals, clinics and schools were established in large numbers to serve the Jaina community; many of these are now public-service institutions. Though Paul Dundas claims that the "Jaina laity does not generally regard its attitudes towards matters of government policy" (2002, 191), it clearly seems that many Jains today do.

Jaina theologies are produced by the ongoing *anekānta* dynamics explored in this study. Jains perspectives on social engagement are not that of extremes, but a series of partial perspectives ranging across a broad spectrum. This paper's topic requires further investigation. Jains play a key role for the future of India. This study concludes that Jains are indeed 'in' development.

Summary of the Paper

The Parables of the Three Merchants

Josef Bartosek

(Comparison: *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* 7,14-30¹ with Matthew 25,14-27
and Luke 19,11-27)

Commentary

The three merchants represent three different approaches to life. Everybody goes with his capital. Each merchant represents a different approach to life. The capital is life (16). The life in Jainism is the result of previous deeds, not a gift, unlike in the Gospel, and so everybody has his own capital.

One returned with significantly more capital, the other with just his capital and the third returned empty handed.

The third merchant loses his capital and gets plenty of negative *karma* matter (*ghātikarma*) and is born again in a very low position (16), but he is not lost, he only starts again from much worse situation.

The second merchant brings his capital back-he is born again as a human being, but there is no progress. To keep his position he has to "exercise in various virtues" (20), as we know that there is an influx of *karma* and of course, some *karma* falls off as the time passes.

The third merchant increases his capital, by higher virtues he removes *karma* up to the limit possible in this era: *duḥkha-sukha*, (21)

Every sensible man can see that gaining "divine pleasures" is the highest goal. Why lose them? Isn't such behaving silly? (22)

Especially when the difference between them is so huge-like a drop compared with the ocean. (23, 24)

And again: everybody is taught the right way so why doesn't he care? (25)

He who cares will reach the goal (26).

Verse 27 is very peculiar. The reward is bliss of the world, in fact, exactly that which should be refused by a virtuous person. It is either the influence of ancient Indian tradition or the influence of the world. From the point of *dharma* or *mokṣamārga* it will not stand the test.

Verse 28 compares the folly of the sinner (28) and wisdom of a wise man (29,30). The whole story ends with an exclamation 'Thus I say' which resembles European ear for Jesus 'Amen.'

The parable of talents in *The New Testament* (25.15-25.28) about Mathew entrusted his property to three slaves (5 talents to first, 2 to second and one to third) while going on a long journey. On return he demands his property back. The first one returned ten talents, the second one four and the third one just one. Mathews then calls the third one as lazy and evil and takes his talent away and give it to who has ten. Another example 'The parable of the ten Minas (19.11-27) is also similar as told by Jesus where the king gave ten minas each to ten slaves to go and to do business till his return.

According to the note of Herman Jacobi this parallel was researched by H. Hutman, follower of professor Leumann from Strasbourgh. The question whether The New Testament texts are inspired by the *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* or vice versa, or whether the texts are independent from one another and are similar only due to the fact that both are based on everyday-life-examples (Utt 17,15) is difficult to decide.

Jacobi thinks that the parable was created in India and not Palestina. He reasons that the Jaina story has only basic elements which are more precisely developed in The Gospels.

.....(Table on next page)

I will only present the following chart.

| scripture | property | gain-loose | consequence |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|--|
| Uttarādh.7,14-30 | | | |
| 1. merchant | Their own equal Capital | Everything lost | Goes into the worse state |
| 2. merchant | | Preserved the same | Continues on the same level |
| 3. merchant | | gained | gains the highest reward |
| NT - MT 25,14-30 | Given according to his abilities | | |
| 1. servant | 5 talents | gained 5 | Praised by the Lord |
| 2. servant | 2 talents | gained 2 | |
| 3. servant | 1 talent | Preserved the same | take the talent from him and give it the one who has 10 |
| NT - Lk 19, 11-27 | | | |
| 1. servant | 1 mina | gained 10 | Rule over 10 cities |
| 2. servant | 1 mina | gained 5 | Rule over 5 cities |
| 3. servant | 1 mina | Preserved the same | take the mina from him and give it to the one who has 10 |
| 4.-10. servant | 1 hrvnu | Is not known | Is not known |

*

Summary of the Paper

The Emergence of Ahimsā in Indian Thought

Kayla Keehu

The practice of *ahimsā* within the Indian traditions has a long and obscure past, one that is as complicated and difficult as the history of India itself. In tracing the origins of this concept, the question that is soon addressed is: From what tradition did this practice originate? In attempting to answer one must venture far back in history, looking at an assortment of texts and trying to construct a timeline based off of ancient writings from oral traditions. From this timeline it becomes clear that *ahimsā* as both a practice and a teaching came out of the Śramaṇic tradition, as opposed to the tradition of the *Vedas*.

The religion of Ancient India is often characterized by the beliefs and practices of the Vedic Period, along with the Brahmin who took charge. Fire rituals and blood sacrifices to various deities for the gain of material wealth, sons, and long life were performed, with seemingly little interest in otherworldly matters. Because practices such as these were widely accepted, it becomes clear that the practice of *ahimsā* had other roots, ones that were possibly more indigenous to India than the practices descending from the Aryans. The Śramaṇic tradition arose in contrast to the mainstream Brahmanical religion, emphasizing meditation and ascetic practices, as opposed to external rituals. Jainism and Buddhism both emerge from this tradition, with their so-called founders Pārśvanātha, Mahāvīra, and Siddhārtha Gautama becoming wandering mendicants in their paths toward spiritual awakening. These leaders taught *ahimsā* as one of the foremost important aspects to spiritual liberation as one of the ways of reducing the accumulation of *karma*.

By tracing the timeline of the usage of this term it becomes clear that the Jaina tradition was the forerunner in using *ahimsā* as a religious concept. The *Vedas* briefly mention the term, however their usage is mostly in reference to the god Agni, requesting he does not bring harm upon the people. The first time it appears in the Hindu tradition as a moral teaching can be found in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, which dates to around 600 BCE, and becomes part of the doctrine from then on. However, Pārśvanātha, who is believed to have lived three centuries before the *Upaniṣads* were recorded, attained enlightenment and instructed his followers and fellow monks, who would later be known as Jains, to take up this practice. Centuries later Mahāvīra spreads this message to a wider audience, who would then hold it as their highest *dharma*. It is therefore likely that the *ahimsā* so widely taught throughout most, if not all, Indian religions has its origins in the Jaina tradition. The promulgation of this practice shows a change in religious consciousness, as well as the goal for many within the Indian religious traditions of the time.

Ahimsā remains at the forefront of Jaina doctrine and philosophy, and is perpetuated by its practitioners in a variety of ways. Most known are the ordained monks and nuns who go about carrying brooms to remove critters from their path, and wearing masks to prevent from harming any *jīva* that may potentially be in the air. However, the laity, too, implements non-violence in their everyday lives, from what they eat to the professions they decide to take. The laity and the ordained hold a reciprocal relationship in which they help one another with their practices, including that of *ahimsā*, with the laity providing food and shelter to the wandering monks and nuns, while the ordained perform rituals, chant *mantras*, pray and meditate for the well-being of all. *Ahimsā* as a religious concept began within the tradition that would later be known as Jainism, and remains paramount today, as is evident by both lay and ordained practitioners.

Summary of the Paper

Wilderness in the Jaina Śramaṇa Ascetic Tradition : Its Contemporary Context

Kate Kragh

The 5th century BCE witnessed the appearance of a new religious movement, whose members' only objective was to obtain liberation through giving up household existence and embracing independent life of wandering mendicants who would exclusively engage in strict celibate discipline free from the shackles of the society and in austere conduct in the wilderness. This type of ascetics became known as *Śramaṇas*. Buddhist and Jains belonged to this tradition and they flourished for over two centuries in modern day Bihar, then known as Magadha before flourishing in other part of India. The unprecedented commitment and intensity of Jaina mendicants to this conduct is evident in Long's comparative definition of ascetics from different parts of the world as:

'One who practices austerities, usually in the form of renunciation, in the form of renunciation, in order to advance spiritually; a relatively mild form of asceticism would be the Christian practice of giving up certain luxuries during the period of Lent; a relatively difficult form of the asceticism would be the practice of constant nudity by a Digambara Jaina monk'.

The *Śramaṇa* movement allowed the person to separate from the Indian householders' values and enter the wilderness within which any claim to worldly possessions, inheritance, social position, family, or male successors was completely uprooted and annihilated. The process of abandoning a householder's existence was extricably connected with wandering away from Human settlements. This practice is expressed as *Araṇaya Vanavāsa*, *Vivikta-sayyāsana*, *Jinakalpī* in different Indian philosophical systems.

The paper analyses this practice from Mahāvīra's time to-date, through various Jaina texts but primarily story literature, the places most popular (Śravaṇabelgola, caves and how they were made worthy of performing austerities) for such practice and the current state of this practice amongst Jaina ascetics. The strong presence of the wilderness-narrative literature, if only in the background, suggest the continued importance of the role of wilderness as a support and reminder of the Jaina ideal of complete and unequivocal renunciation with its inevitable consequences of the life devoid of all worldly residue and filled with utter *tapas* in the wilderness. What is more, the *vanavāsa* state of mind is not only thriving in a latent and unrealized form but is actively being brought back to life by capable individuals.



जिज्ञासा और समाधान

जिज्ञासा- क्या जैन धर्म केवल निवृत्ति प्रधान है? इसका मूल स्रोत क्या है? क्या इसमें समाजोपयोगी साहित्य एवं समन्वय की प्रवृत्ति नहीं है?

- श्री ओमप्रकाश सिंह

समाधान- भारतीय अनुसन्धान इतिहास परिषद्, नई दिल्ली के आर्थिक अनुदान से पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ में एक पन्द्रह दिवसीय (१२-२७ मार्च) कार्यशाला आयोजित की गई थी। जिसका विषय था 'जैन विद्या के स्रोत एवम् उसके मौलिक सिद्धान्त'। विषय बहुत व्यापक था परन्तु इसका लक्ष्य था जैन विद्या के सम्बन्ध में प्रचलित भ्रान्तियों का निवारण। इस कार्यशाला में इन प्रश्नों का समाधान किया गया, जो इस प्रकार है-

समन्वयात्मक दृष्टि-

जैसा कि आप सभी जानते हैं कि जैन धर्म एक श्रमण परम्परा है और यह सामान्यतः निवृत्ति प्रधान मानी जाती है। यहाँ एक प्रश्न है कि क्या जैन धर्म केवल निवृत्ति प्रधान है? नहीं, निवृत्ति के अतिरिक्त यहाँ प्रवृत्ति विषयक कर्मकाण्ड तथा साहित्य भी उपलब्ध हैं। विभिन्न धार्मिक मान्यताओं की जैन धर्म में उपेक्षा नहीं की गई है अपितु उनका सम्मान करते हुए विधिवत् अपनी परम्परा में अपनाया गया है। जैसे- अवतारी राम, लक्ष्मण, कृष्ण, बलराम आदि को तीर्थकर आदि महापुरुषों (शलाका पुरुषों) के साथ जोड़कर आदर दिया गया है और जैनेतर धर्मों भाइयों की भावनाओं को सम्मान दिया गया है। इतना ही नहीं वैदिक पुराणों में घृणित भाव से चित्रित रावण, जरासंध जैसे राजाओं को भी जैन पुराणों में सम्मान देकर अनार्यों की भावनाओं को ठेस नहीं पहुँचने दी है। रावण को दशमुखी राक्षस न मानकर विद्याधरवंशी बतलाया है। पंडित प्रवर रावण को सीता के साथ बलात्कार करने की सलाह दी जाती है परन्तु वह अपने व्रत के कारण वैसा प्रयत्न नहीं करता है। हनुमान, सुग्रीव आदि को बानर न मानकर विद्याधरवंशी बतलाया है। उनका ध्वजचिह्न अवश्य बानर था। इस तरह जैन पुराणों में पक्षपात की संकुचित भावना से ऊपर उठकर समन्वय करने का प्रयत्न किया गया है। इसी तरह नागवंशी राजाओं की हिंसात्मक पूजा-विधियों का निषेध करके उनके प्रमुख यक्ष नागादि देवताओं को अपने तीर्थकर के रक्षक के रूप में स्थान दिया है। पशुओं को भी आदर देते हुए उन्हें भी तीर्थकर चिह्न के रूप में समाहित किया गया है। इसी तरह वनस्पति, वायु, जल आदि के संरक्षण को आवश्यक बतलाते हुए पर्यावरण संरक्षण को महत्त्व दिया गया है। यह समन्वयात्मक नीति जैनियों की अवसरवादिता नहीं है अपितु जैनधर्म के आधारभूत सिद्धान्तों की स्वाभाविक पृष्ठभूमि है।

स्याद्वाद सिद्धान्त सभी की अनिवार्यता

जैनधर्म की उदात्त विचारधारा-स्याद्वाद, अहिंसा, अपरिग्रह आदि सिद्धान्तों के परिणाम स्वरूप आज विश्व ने इसकी महत्ता को स्वीकार कर लिया है। भौतिक विज्ञान तथा तर्क के द्वारा भी इसके सिद्धान्तों की पुष्टि होती है। विश्वबन्धुत्व की भावना को स्याद्वाद-सिद्धान्त के माध्यम से पल्लवित किया गया है। स्याद्वाद-सिद्धान्त अनिश्चयात्मक या संशयात्मक नहीं है। अपितु एक निश्चयात्मक विचारदृष्टि को दर्शाता है। ऐसा कोई भी दर्शन नहीं है जो इस सिद्धान्त को बिना स्वीकार किए अपने पक्ष को रख सकता हो। एक ओर वेदान्त दर्शन एकमात्र नित्य चिदात्मक ब्रह्म की सत्ता को मानता है और दृश्यमान् जगत् को मायाजाल कहता है, दूसरी ओर चार्वाक दर्शन मात्र भौतिक तत्त्वों की सत्ता को स्वीकार करके चैतन्य की उत्पत्ति उन्हीं का परिणामन मानता है। जैन धर्म जीव और अजीव (चित् और अचित्) दोनों की सत्ता स्वीकार करता है परन्तु वह उन्हें सांख्य दर्शन की तरह दो मौलिक तत्त्व अथवा चित्-अचित् रूप विशिष्टाद्वैत न मानकर छह द्रव्यों की स्वतंत्र सत्ता को स्वीकार करता है। साथ ही प्रत्येक द्रव्य को त्रिगुणात्मक (उत्पाद, व्यय और ध्रौव्य रूप) स्वीकार करता है। इसका परिणाम यह हुआ कि जैन धर्म वेदान्त की तरह न तो सत्ता को सर्वथा नित्य मानता है और न बौद्धों की तरह क्षणिक। अपितु जैन धर्म दोनों सिद्धान्तों का विधिवत् सयुक्तिक समन्वय स्थापित करता है। आपको यह स्पष्ट कर दूँ कि बौद्ध, वेदान्त आदि दर्शनों में भी जब उनके सिद्धान्तों में विरोध उत्पन्न होता है तो वे दो (परमार्थिक और संवृति सत्य) या तीन प्रकार की (पारमार्थिक, व्यावहारिक और प्रातिभासिक) सत्ता को स्वीकार करके अपने पक्ष में समागत विरोधों का समन्वय करते हैं। जैनदर्शन का स्याद्वाद सिद्धान्त भी नित्य-अनित्य आदि विरोधों का समन्वय निश्चयनय-व्यवहारनय या द्रव्यार्थिकनय-पर्यायार्थिकनय द्वारा करता है। इसका यह तात्पर्य नहीं है कि जैन धर्म मात्र एकान्तरूप मिथ्यादृष्टियों का समन्वय करता है। अपितु विभिन्न दृष्टियों से देखने पर तत्त्व हमें विभिन्न रूपों में दृष्टिगोचर होता है। इस विविध दृष्टिगोचरता को उजागर करते हुए जैनधर्म में अनेकान्तवाद, स्याद्वाद, सप्तभंगीवाद तथा निक्षेपवाद आदि का प्रतिपादन किया गया है।

जैनधर्म की कसौटी अपरिग्रह और अहिंसा

संसार में सुख-शान्ति स्थापित हो इसके लिए जैन तीर्थकरों ने स्याद्वाद के अतिरिक्त अहिंसा और अपरिग्रह के सिद्धान्तों को बतलाया है। अपरिग्रह का वास्तविक अर्थ है 'वीतरागता' और उसका परिणाम है 'अहिंसा'। जैनधर्म के समस्त आचार और विचारों की कसौटी अहिंसा और अपरिग्रह ही है। यदि किसी धार्मिक आचरण में मन, वचन, काय से अहिंसा और अपरिग्रह की परिपुष्टि नहीं होती है तो वह सदाचार नहीं

है, मिथ्यात्व या असदाचार है। अहिंसा और अपरिग्रह से व्यवहार में सुख-शान्ति संभव है और परमार्थ से मुक्ति भी है। ये दोनों विषम-परिस्थितियों और विरोधों में दीपक का काम करते हैं। जगत् में व्याप्त कलह, तनाव आदि से निवृत्ति का उपाय एकमात्र अहिंसा और अपरिग्रह है। अन्य जितने भी नियम और उपनियम हैं वे सब इसी धुरी के आरे हैं।

कर्मवाद और ईश्वर

जैनधर्म का दूसरा सिद्धान्त 'कर्मवाद' का है जो पूर्णतः मनोवैज्ञानिक है। इसके प्रभाव से शरीर-संरचना, ज्ञान, चरित्र, आयु, संपन्नता, सुख, दुःख, शक्ति आदि का निर्धारण होता है। मूलतः कर्म के आठ प्रकार हैं। ये अवान्तर भेदों से १४८ हैं। ये कर्मण-पुद्गल आत्मा के राग-द्वेषादि परिणामों का निमित्त पाकर मूर्तिक होकर भी अमूर्त आत्मा से सम्बन्ध स्थापित कर लेते हैं। इस सम्बन्ध को कराने में लेश्यायें गोंद की तरह कार्य करती हैं। जैनधर्म में किसी अनादि, नित्य, सृष्टिकर्ता, संहारकर्ता और पालनकर्ता ईश्वर की आवश्यकता नहीं मानी गई है। तीर्थंकरों को ही ईश्वर मानकर उनकी पूजा की जाती है। यद्यपि तीर्थंकर कुछ नहीं करते परन्तु उनके गुणों के चिन्तन से हमारे विचारों में परिवर्तन एवं शुद्धता आती है और हमें अच्छा फल मिलता है। यहाँ प्रत्येक आत्मा में परमात्मा बनने की शक्ति को स्वीकार किया गया है। कर्म का आवरण उस शक्ति को प्रकट होने में आवरण का कार्य करता है। रत्नत्रय के प्रभाव से इस कर्म-आवरण के हटते ही आत्मा पूर्ण चैतन्यता, आनन्दावस्था, सर्वज्ञता, सर्वशक्तिमत्ता को प्राप्त कर लेता है।

मूल स्रोत

परम्परा से जैनधर्म अनादि माना जाता है। वर्तमान काल में आज से असंख्यात वर्ष पूर्व प्रथम तीर्थंकर आदिनाथ (ऋषभदेव) हुए थे जिन्होंने सर्वप्रथम असि, मसि, कृषि, वाणिज्य, शिल्प और विद्या (गायनादि) इन छह विद्याओं की शिक्षा दी थी तथा समाज को कार्यों के आधार पर तीन वर्गों में विभक्त किया था- क्षत्रिय, वैश्य और शूद्र। बाद में ऋषभदेव के पुत्र इस युग के प्रथम चक्रवर्ती भरत ने ब्राह्मण वर्ण की स्थापना की। ऋषभदेव के भरत और बाहुबली आदि १०१ पुत्र तथा ब्राह्मी, सुन्दरी ये दो पुत्रियाँ थीं। ब्राह्मी को लिपि विद्या और सुन्दरी को अंक-विद्या सिखाई। ऋषभदेव का उल्लेख हमें वेदों में भी मिलता है। इनके बाद जैनधर्म में २३ तीर्थंकर और हुए जिनमें २०वें तीर्थंकर मुनिसुव्रतनाथ के समय मर्यादापुरुषोत्तम राम हुए। नेमिनाथ के ८४६५० वर्ष बाद २३वें तीर्थंकर पार्श्वनाथ का जन्म वाराणसी में हुआ और उसके २४८ वर्ष बाद ईसा पूर्व ५९९ में भगवान् महावीर का जन्म हुआ। यह अंतिम २४वें तीर्थंकर का शासनकाल चल रहा है। भगवान् महावीर के निर्वाण के बाद २५३७ वर्ष बीत चुके हैं। आदिनाथ, नेमिनाथ, पार्श्वनाथ और महावीर इन चारों तीर्थंकरों की

ऐतिहासिकता सिद्ध हो चुकी है। तीर्थंकर महावीर के शिष्य गौतम, सुधर्मा आदि गणधरों ने १२ आगमों की रचना की पश्चात् उपांग आदि आगम परवर्ती ऋषियों ने लिखे जो आज इस धर्म के मूल स्रोत हैं। वेदों में हमें वातरशना मुनि और केशी आदि के जो वर्णन मिलते हैं वे स्पष्टतः जैनमुनियों की ओर संकेत करते हैं, जैसे-

“ककर्दवे वभाभो युक्त आसीद्, अवावचीत् सारथिरस्य केशी।

दुर्धयुक्तस्य द्रवतः सहानस, ऋच्छन्ति मा नि पदो मुद्गलानीम्।।”

तात्पर्य यह है कि मुद्गल ऋषि की जो इन्द्रियाँ पराङ्मुखी थीं, वे उनके योगी ज्ञानी नेता केशी वृषभ के धर्मोपदेश को सुनकर अन्तर्मुखी हो गईं।

ऋग्वेद में जिन यतियों का उल्लेख आया है वे सम्भवतः जैनयति थे।

प्राकृत-संस्कृत भाषाओं में विविध-विषयक विपुल साहित्य

भाषा की दृष्टि से जैनागमों की भाषा जनभाषा प्राकृत थी। वैदिकों ने संस्कृत को ‘दैवी वाक्’ मानकर उसी भाषा में रचना की। इसका एक अच्छा परिणाम यह रहा कि प्राचीनतम वेदों की रक्षा भली प्रकार हुई परन्तु तत्कालीन विविध लोक-भाषाओं का प्रतिनिधित्व नहीं बन सका। भगवान् महावीर और बुद्ध ने इस कमी को पूरा करते हुए लोक भाषा को अपने उपदेशों का माध्यम बनाया। भगवान् बुद्ध की भाषा को बाद में ‘पालि’ के नाम से व्यवस्थित किया गया।

महावीर के उपदेशों को उनके गणधरों ने अर्धमागधी में उपनिबद्ध किया जो १८ भाषाओं का सम्मिश्रण था। कालान्तर में शौरसेनी भाषा में दिगम्बरों के परवर्ती आगमों की रचना हुई। पश्चात् संस्कृत तथा अन्य लोक भाषाओं में विपुल साहित्य लिखा गया। यह साहित्य हमें काव्य, दर्शन, वाद्य, संगीत, आयुर्वेद, मंत्र-तंत्र, विधि-विधान, ज्योतिष, पूजा-पाठ, योग, खगोल, गणित, आदि विविध विषयों में उपलब्ध हैं। इस साहित्य के अतिरिक्त हमें लोक-कलाओं से सम्बन्धित स्थापत्यकला, स्तूप, गुफा, मंदिर, शिलालेख आदि से सम्बन्धित विपुल सामग्री प्राप्त होती है जिसके द्वारा जैनधर्म दर्शन के सिद्धान्तों को रूपायित किया गया है। अतः हम कह सकते हैं कि जैन धर्म केवल निवृत्ति-प्रधान नहीं है अपितु लौकिक जीवन से बहुत अधिक सम्बन्ध रखता है। इसी तरह इसमें समाजोपयोगी विपुल साहित्य तथा समन्वय की प्रवृत्ति उपलब्ध है। अतः जहाँ साधुचर्या को प्रमुखता से रूपायित किया गया है वहीं गृहस्थाचार को भी प्रमुखता दी है। गृहस्थाचार को तो उत्तराध्ययनसूत्र में घोराश्रम की संज्ञा दी गयी है क्योंकि इस पर चारों आश्रमों का उत्तरदायित्व होता है। मूलस्रोत के रूप में आगम ग्रंथ, परवर्ती आगमाश्रित साहित्य तथा पुरातात्विक साक्ष्य हैं।

-प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन

पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ के प्राङ्गण में

द्विदिवसीय संगोष्ठी एवं लोकाख्यान गायन कार्यक्रम का आयोजन

इन्दिरा गाँधी राष्ट्रीय कला केन्द्र, पूर्व क्षेत्रीय केन्द्र, वाराणसी की तरफ से विद्यापीठ के प्राङ्गण में ४-५ जनवरी २०११ को विलुप्त हो रहे चन्दालोरिक/मञ्जरीलोरिक एवं बिरहा आख्यान को जीवित रखने के लिए द्विदिवसीय सङ्गोष्ठी एवं गायन कार्यक्रम का आयोजन किया गया। कार्यक्रम के परामर्शदाता थे प्रो० कमलेश दत्त त्रिपाठी तथा अध्यक्ष थे प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन, निदेशक, पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ, वाराणसी।

श्री धनपतराज सुशीला भंसाली विद्याभवन का लोकार्पण एवं पार्श्वचन्द्रगच्छीया प०पू० भव्यानन्द श्री जी म०सा० के ४१वें दीक्षा-दिवस पर गुणानुवाद

पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ में दिनांक १६ जनवरी २०११ को श्री धनपतराज सुशीला भंसाली विद्याभवन का भव्य लोकार्पण सम्पन्न हुआ। इस भवन का निर्माण श्री धनपतराज भंसाली ने साधु-साध्वियों की आवास व्यवस्था को दृष्टि में रखकर कराया है। इस भवन में सर्वसुविधायुक्त कुल आठ कमरे एवं एक हाल है। पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ में पहले भी साधु-साध्वियों के ठहरने हेतु व्यवस्था थी किन्तु यह नया भवन उनकी अपेक्षा बड़ा तथा सुविधा सम्पन्न है।

कार्यक्रम का प्रारम्भ श्री भंसालीजी की इच्छानुसार पार्श्व-पद्मावती पूजन से हुआ। पूजा के पश्चात् विद्याभवन का उद्घाटन समारोह प्रारम्भ हुआ। पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ प्रबन्ध समिति के अध्यक्ष डॉ० शुगन चन्द जैन ने पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ का परिचय देते हुए अन्तर्राष्ट्रीय स्तर पर इसकी पहचान को स्थापित करने का संकल्प दुहराया। समारोह के मुख्य अतिथि थे महात्मा गाँधी काशी विद्यापीठ के कुलपति प्रो० अवधराम तथा अध्यक्ष थे संस्कृत साहित्य के उद्भट विद्वान् प्रो० कमलेश दत्त त्रिपाठी। श्री धनपतराज भंसाली ने इसके निर्माणकार्य में सहायक श्री सतीश चन्द जैन एवं श्री ओमप्रकाश सिंह का स्वागत करते हुए इस प्रोजेक्ट के विषय में अपने विचार प्रकट किए। इस अवसर पर समिति के मन्त्री श्री इन्द्रभूति बरड, उपाध्यक्ष श्री कुँवर विजयानन्द सिंह, पूर्व निदेशक प्रो०सागरमल जैन एवं पूर्व निदेशक प्रो० महेश्वरी प्रसाद, श्री दीनानाथ झुनझुनवाला, श्री शान्तिलाल जी जैन, श्री गौतम बुरड आदि उपस्थित थे। इनके अतिरिक्त जैन समाज के पदाधिकारीगण तथा अनेक सभ्रान्त व्यक्ति भी उपस्थित थे।

इस अवसर पर पार्श्वचन्द्रगच्छीया ज्ञानभारती प०पू० भव्यानन्द म०सा० के ४१वें दीक्षादिवस पर उनका गुणानुवाद भी किया गया। इस अवसर पर पार्श्वचन्द्रगच्छ की

६ साध्वियों के साथ गोंडल स्थानकवासी समाज की विदुषी साध्वी वीरमति महासतीजी भी ससंघ उपस्थित थीं। संस्था के सहनिदेशक डॉ० श्रीप्रकाश पाण्डेय ने साध्वीश्री का जीवन परिचय दिया तथा अनेक वक्ताओं ने साध्वीश्री के विषय में अपने उद्गार व्यक्त किए। अतिथियों ने साध्वी भव्यानन्दजी का गुणानुवाद करते हुए उनके ४१वें दीक्षा दिवस पर उन्हें बधाइयाँ दीं। स्थानकवासी महासती वीरमतीजी ने साध्वी भव्यानन्दजी को आशीष देते हुए उनके दीर्घायु होने की कामना की। कार्यक्रम का संचालन पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ के निदेशक प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन ने किया तथा धन्यवाद ज्ञापन विद्यापीठ के प्रबन्ध समिति के मन्त्री श्री इन्द्रभूति बरड़ ने किया। भंसालीजी की दो नतनियों ने गणेश वन्दना की मोहक प्रस्तुति की। कार्यक्रम की समाप्ति पर विद्यापीठ की तरफ से स्वामी वात्सल्य का आयोजन किया गया।

जैन विश्वकोश का लोकार्पण खण्ड-१

(ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF JAINA STUDIES, VOL. 1)

जनवरी १६, २०११, सायं ५.०० बजे पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ द्वारा प्रथमतः प्रकाशित जैन विश्वकोश (ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF JAINA STUDIES) के प्रथम खण्ड जैन स्थापत्य और कला (JAINA ART & ARCHITECTURE) के लोकार्पण/विमोचन का कार्यक्रम आयोजित किया गया। इस खण्ड का लेखन एवं सम्पादन जैन कला इतिहास के तीन मूर्धन्य विद्वानों- प्रो० मारुति नन्दन प्रसाद तिवारी, कला इतिहास विभाग, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय, प्रो० कमल गिरि, पूर्व प्रोफेसर, कला इतिहास विभाग, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय तथा प्रो० हरिहर सिंह, प्राचीन इतिहास संस्कृति एवं पुरातत्व विभाग, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय ने किया है। लोकार्पण समारोह के मुख्य अतिथि थे काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय के कुलपति प्रो० धीरेन्द्र पाल सिंह तथा अध्यक्षता की प्रो० चन्द्रेव सिंह, कुलपति, इन्दिरा गांधी राष्ट्रीय जनजाति विश्वविद्यालय, अमरकंटक ने। कार्यक्रम का प्रारम्भ ५०० साध्वी भव्यानन्दजी के मंगलाचरण से हुआ। समारोह में समागत अतिथियों का स्वागत पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ के प्रबन्ध समिति के अध्यक्ष डॉ० शुगन चन्द जैन ने किया। डॉ० जैन ने पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ द्वारा प्रारम्भ की जाने वाली नई योजनाओं से सभा को परिचित कराया। डॉ० शुगन चन्द जैन ने बताया कि श्रमण संघ के आचार्य परम पूज्य शिवमुनिजी का आशीर्वाद अब हमारे साथ है। उन्होंने आचार्यश्री की संगठन शक्ति एवं शिक्षा के प्रति उनकी दूरदृष्टि की प्रशंसा करते हुए विद्यापीठ को आचार्यश्री द्वारा प्रकल्पित ध्यान का सम्यक् अनुशीलन केन्द्र बनाने पर जोर दिया और बताया कि बहुत शीघ्र हम आचार्यश्री द्वारा प्रकल्पित ध्यान का उच्चकृत कोर्स विद्यापीठ में प्रारम्भ करेंगे। इस अवसर पर ५०० आचार्यश्री शिवमुनिजी का एक विशाल चित्र

भी कार्यालय में अनावृत किया गया। कार्यक्रम में उपस्थित कुलपति द्वय ने जैन विश्वकोश के प्रथम बार प्रकाशन पर पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ को बधाई दी। इस अवसर पर विश्वकोश परियोजना के प्रमुख सम्पादक प्रो० सागरमल जैन भी उपस्थित थे उन्होंने सप्तखण्डीय विश्वकोश की समूची योजना पर प्रकाश डाला तथा बताया कि शीघ्र ही जैन भाषा और साहित्य का दूसरा खण्ड (VOL. II- LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE) प्रकाशित होगा। लेखकों की तरफ से प्रो० मारुति नन्दन प्रसाद तिवारी ने अपना वक्तव्य प्रस्तुत करते हुए कहा कि पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ ने इस विश्वकोश के लेखन में हमें पूरी स्वतंत्रता तथा हर सम्भव सहायता दी, इसके लिए हम विद्यापीठ के आभारी हैं। मुख्य अतिथि प्रो० धीरेन्द्र पाल सिंह ने प्रथम बार इस तरह के विश्वकोश के प्रकाशन पर विद्यापीठ को तथा सम्बन्धित विद्वान् लेखकों को बधाई दी। प्रो० चन्द्रदेव सिंह ने अपने अध्यक्षीय उद्घोषण में पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ द्वारा काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय के माध्यम से पी-एच०डी० करने के इच्छुक छात्रों के पंजीकरण में आने वाली बाधाओं की तरफ कुलपति, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय का ध्यान आकर्षित किया और इस सम्बन्ध में हर सम्भव सहायता देने का अनुरोध किया। इस अवसर पर अन्य विश्वविद्यालयों से भी अनेक विद्वान् उपस्थित थे। कार्यक्रम का संचालन विद्यापीठ के निदेशक प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन ने किया तथा धन्यवाद ज्ञापन विद्यापीठ की प्रबन्ध-समिति के मंत्री श्री इन्द्रभूति बरड़ ने किया।

नवकार मन्त्र की विकासयात्रा पर व्याख्यान

दिनांक २० जनवरी २०११ को पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ के पूर्व निदेशक डॉ० सागरमल जैन ने नवकार मंत्र की कई दृष्टियों से व्याख्या करते हुए इसके विकास तथा महत्त्व पर महत्त्वपूर्ण व्याख्यान दिया। कार्यक्रम का संचालन संस्था के निदेशक प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन ने किया। डॉ० एस०पी० पाण्डेय, डॉ० अशोक कुमार सिंह, डॉ० (श्रीमति) मनोरमा जैन आदि श्रोताओं ने व्याख्यान पर जो प्रश्न किए उनके समुचित उत्तर डॉ० सागरमल जी ने दिए। मंगलाचरण प०पू० साध्वी श्री भव्यानन्द जी म०सा० ने किया।

Lecture on 'From a moment of eternity : Jaina Philosophy of Time as a meeting point of Science and Religion'

On 18th February 2011 a lecture was delivered by Ana Bajzelj Bevelacqua, Deptt. of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana on 'From a moment of eternity : Jaina philosophy of Time as a meeting point of Science and Religion'. Renowned scholar of

Sanskrit, Prof. Kamalesh Datta Tripathi presided over the lecture. A number of scholars and students attended this lecture.

बौद्ध दर्शन में शून्यता सिद्धान्त विषय पर संगोष्ठी

बौद्ध धर्म के शून्यता के सिद्धान्त पर बौद्ध धर्म-दर्शन के प्रसिद्ध विचारक प्रो० ए०के० चटर्जी, पूर्व अध्यक्ष, दर्शन एवं धर्म विभाग, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी का शोधपूर्ण व्याख्यान २१ फरवरी २०११ को पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ में सम्पन्न हुआ। यह व्याख्यान भारतीय दार्शनिक अनुसंधान परिषद्, नई दिल्ली द्वारा प्रायोजित था। कार्यक्रम की अध्यक्षता प्रख्यात मुद्राशास्त्रविद् एवं बौद्ध दर्शन के विद्वान् प्रो० ए०के० नारायण ने की। कार्यक्रम का प्रारम्भ डॉ० अशोक कुमार जैन के मंगलाचरण से हुआ। प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन, निदेशक, पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ, ने अतिथियों का स्वागत करते हुए शून्यता के विषय में प्रचलित भ्रान्त अवधारणाओं पर प्रकाश डाला तथा पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ का सविस्तार परिचय दिया। व्याख्यान के अन्त में प्रो० चटर्जी ने विद्वानों द्वारा शून्यता की अवधारणा पर पूछे गए विभिन्न प्रश्नों का तर्कपुरस्सर उत्तर दिया।

‘जैन विद्या के स्रोत एवम् उसके मौलिक सिद्धान्त’ विषयक पन्द्रह दिवसीय कार्यशाला सम्पन्न

पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ परिसर में दिनांक १२-२७ मार्च २०११ तक भारतीय इतिहास अनुसंधान परिषद्, नई दिल्ली द्वारा प्रायोजित ‘जैन विद्या के स्रोत एवम् उसके मौलिक सिद्धान्त’ विषयक पन्द्रह दिवसीय कार्यशाला का आयोजन किया गया। कार्यशाला का उद्घाटन १२ मार्च २०११ को हुआ जिसमें मुख्य अतिथि थे- प्रो० अवधराम, कुलपति, महात्मा गाँधी काशी विद्यापीठ, वाराणसी तथा अध्यक्ष थे प्रो० रामहर्ष सिंह, पूर्व कुलपति, राजस्थान आयुर्वेद विश्वविद्यालय, जोधपुर। उद्घाटन सत्र में संस्कृत के मूर्धन्य विद्वान् प्रो० रेवा प्रसाद द्विवेदी, संस्कृत विद्या धर्म विज्ञान संकाय, का.हि.वि.वि. मुख्य अतिथि तथा प्रो० आर० सी० पण्डा, डीन, संस्कृत विद्या धर्म विज्ञान संकाय, का.हि.वि.वि. सारस्वत अतिथि थे। इस कार्यशाला में स्थानीय तथा बाहर के कई विश्वविद्यालयों के ८१ छात्रों/अध्यापकों ने भाग लिया। इस कार्यशाला में २१ प्राध्यापकों (रिसोर्स पर्सन्स) ने जैनधर्म दर्शन से सम्बन्धित अनेक विषयों पर उत्कृष्ट व्याख्यान दिये। जिनके विवरण इस प्रकार हैं- डॉ० शुगन चन्द जैन (अध्यक्ष, मैनेजिंग बोर्ड, पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ एवं निदेशक, ISSJS, नई दिल्ली)- ‘Bhagavāna Mahāvīra and his divine Sermon’, ‘Ethical Doctrine in Jainism, Religious harmony’ प्रो० श्री जवाहर लाल (चेन्नई)- ‘Epigraphs of Andhra’, डॉ० उषा अग्रवाल (दिल्ली)- ‘जैनदर्शन में पुनर्जन्म की अवधारणा’; प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन (वाराणसी)- ‘द्रव्य विज्ञान’, ‘जैन तत्त्वज्ञान’, कर्म सिद्धान्त,

‘स्याद्वाद और अनेकान्तवाद’, ‘अहिंसा-सिद्धान्त’, ‘प्राकृत भाषा’; प्रो० सीताराम दुबे (वाराणसी)– ‘Literary Sources of Jainism’, ‘Epigraphical Sources of Jainism’; डॉ० अशोक कुमार जैन (वाराणसी)– ‘जैन प्रमाण एवं न्याय’, ‘सम्यग्दर्शन’; डॉ० सुभाष जैन (अमेरिका)– ‘Jaina Karma Theory’; डॉ० अशोक कुमार सिंह (वाराणसी)– ‘जैन कोश परम्परा’, ‘जैनों द्वारा की गई अजैन कृतियों पर व्याख्यायें’; प्रो० कमलेश दत्त त्रिपाठी (वाराणसी)– संस्कृत नाटकों में प्राकृत भाषा प्रयोग; प्रो० हरिहर सिंह (वाराणसी)– ‘जैन स्थापत्य’; प्रो० फूलचन्द जैन ‘प्रेमी’ (वाराणसी)– ‘जैन आचार’; राकेश ब्रह्मचारी (सागर)– ‘गुणस्थान, लेश्या और पाण्डुलिपि’; प्रो० कमलगिरि (वाराणसी)– ‘जैन चित्रकला’; डॉ० श्रीप्रकाश पाण्डेय (वाराणसी)– ‘जैन योग’; प्रो० रामचन्द्र पाण्डेय (वाराणसी)– ‘जैन ज्योतिष’; प्रो० कमलेश जैन (वाराणसी)– ‘जैन आगम’ तथा प्रो० डी०पी० शर्मा (वाराणसी)– ‘Jaina Sculptures from Pabhosa’, और ‘Lower Yamuna Ganga Doab’।

इस कार्यशाला में पत्र प्रस्तुति, परिचर्चा और परीक्षा भी हुई। कार्यशाला का समापन सत्र दिनांक २७ मार्च २०११ को सम्पन्न हुआ। समापन सत्र के मुख्य अतिथि थे श्री नरेन्द्र कुमार जैन, जिला एवं सत्र न्यायाधीश, वाराणसी तथा अध्यक्ष थे प्रो० डी०एन० तिवारी, अध्यक्ष, दर्शन एवं धर्म विभाग, काशी हिन्दू विश्वविद्यालय, वाराणसी। विशिष्ट अतिथि थे अतिरिक्त न्यायाधीश श्री रामकृष्ण गौतम। संस्था के निदेशक प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन ने विवेचित विषयों पर प्रकाश डाला। संस्था के संयुक्त निदेशक (स्थापन) डॉ० श्रीप्रकाश पाण्डेय ने संस्था का परिचय प्रस्तुत किया। कार्यक्रम का संचालन डॉ० अशोक कुमार सिंह, मंगलाचरण पंकज जैन तथा धन्यवाद ज्ञापन श्री ओम प्रकाश सिंह ने किया। कार्यक्रम की सफलता को सभी ने सराहा और इस प्रकार के कार्यक्रम को भविष्य में पुनः करने की इच्छा प्रकट की।

प्राकृत एवं अपभ्रंश भाषा में पाठ्यक्रम का शुभारम्भ

राजस्थान विश्वविद्यालय द्वारा मान्यता प्राप्त तथा अपभ्रंश साहित्य अकादमी, जयपुर द्वारा संचालित प्राकृत तथा अपभ्रंश भाषाओं के पाठ्यक्रम के लिये पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ में पन्द्रह-पन्द्रह छात्र-छात्राओं का पंजीकरण हुआ है। पंजीकृत छात्र/छात्राओं के अध्यापन की व्यवस्था पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ में की गयी है। अग्रिम वर्ष से जैन विद्या और योग के पाठ्यक्रम भी संचालित होंगे।

नियुक्तियाँ

पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ, करौंदी, वाराणसी में डॉ० अशोक कुमार सिंह की एसोसिएट प्रोफेसर के रूप में, डॉ० नवीन कुमार श्रीवास्तव एवं डॉ० राहुल कुमार सिंह की शोध-अध्येता के रूप में तथा श्री सूरज कुमार मिश्रा की कार्यालय सहायक के रूप में नई नियुक्तियाँ की गयी।

जैन जगत्

डॉ. टी.सी. कोठारी को डी.लिट् की उपाधि

डॉ. टी.सी. कोठारी, अध्यक्ष : ओम् कोठारी ग्रुप ऑफ कम्पनीज, को आगरा विश्वविद्यालय से इतिहास में डी.लिट् की उपाधि प्रदान की गयी। आपके डी.लिट् का विषय था 'नौवीं-दसवीं शताब्दी के जैन पुराणों के परिप्रेक्ष्य में भारत का सांस्कृतिक इतिहास'। ८१ वर्ष की उम्र में आपने यह कार्य करके एक कीर्तिमान स्थापित किया है। इसके लिए पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ की ओर से आपको बधाई।

श्री दीपेश मुनि को पी-एच.डी. की उपाधि

युवा मनीषि श्री दीपेश मुनि को जैन विद्या और प्राकृत में 'वास्तु एवं ज्योतिष विज्ञान : जैन आगमों के आलोक में' विषयक शीर्षक पर सुखाड़िया विश्वविद्यालय, उदयपुर से पी-एच.डी. की उपाधि प्रदान की गयी। पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ की ओर से मंगलकामना।

प. पू. मुनि सुबुद्धसागर जी की समाधि

मुनि श्री सुबुद्धसागर जी ने दिनांक १४ नवम्बर २०१० को नातेपुते, जिला-सोलापुर (महा०) में यम संलेखनापूर्वक नश्वर शरीर का त्याग किया। हमारी प्रणामांजलि उन्हें समर्पित है।

आचार्य श्री सन्मतिसागर जी का समाधिमरण

तपस्वी सम्राट् आचार्य श्री प०पू० सन्मतिसागर जी ने २४ दिसम्बर २०१० को मुम्बई में इंगिनिमरण नामक समाधि को स्वीकार करके इस नश्वर शरीर का परित्याग किया। आपकी समाधि होने से जैन जगत् की अपूरणीय क्षति हुयी है। पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ उन्हें हार्दिक प्रणामांजलि समर्पित करता है।

वैशाली में कुन्दकुन्द व्याख्यानमाला सम्पन्न

दिनांक २० जनवरी २०११ को प्राकृत जैन शास्त्र और अहिंसा शोध संस्थान, वैशाली में आचार्य कुन्दकुन्द व्याख्यानमाला का आयोजन किया गया। मुख्य वक्ता के रूप में डॉ० शीतल चन्द जैन (उदयपुर), प्रो० राजीव रंजन सिंह (वाराणसी), प्रो० वीर सागर जैन (नई दिल्ली), प्रो० रमेश कुमार रवि (मुजफ्फरपुर) तथा संस्थान के निदेशक डॉ० ऋषभ चन्द जैन ने आचार्य कुन्दकुन्द के योगदान पर गम्भीर चिन्तन प्रस्तुत किया।

साहित्य-सत्कार

पुस्तक-समीक्षा

जैन श्राविकाओं का वृहद् इतिहास (आदिकाल से वर्तमान युग तक)
लेखिका एवं सम्पादिका- साध्वी डॉ. प्रतिभा श्री 'प्राची', प्रकाशक- सिविल लाईन,
स्थानकवासी जैनसंघ लुधियाना (पंजाब) एवं प्राच्य विद्यापीठ, दुपाड़ा रोड,
शाजापुर (म.प्र.), प्र०सं० ई. २०१०, मूल्य. रू.५५०/-, पृ०सं०- ७२४

यह विशालकाय ग्रन्थ डॉ. सागरमल जैन जी के मार्गदर्शन में पी-एच०डी० हेतु प्रस्तुत शोध-प्रबन्ध 'चतुर्विध जैन संघ में श्राविकाओं का योगदान' का पुस्तक के रूप में प्रकाशन है। इस ग्रन्थ में प्रागैतिहासिक काल से लेकर आधुनिक काल तक की प्रमुख श्राविकाओं का विवेचन है। इसमें आगम-साहित्य, आगमिक व्याख्या-साहित्य, चरित काव्य, कथा काव्य, पुराण, प्रबन्ध-साहित्य के साथ ऐतिहासिक ग्रन्थों, शिलालेखों, गन्थ प्रशस्तियों एवं पुरातात्विक साक्ष्यों को आधार बनाया गया है। आचार्य श्री रत्नाकर सूरीश्वर जी म०सा० का इस ग्रन्थ को विशेष आशीर्वाद प्राप्त है। इस ग्रन्थ पर पू० डॉ० विशाल मुनि जी म०सा०, श्रमणी डॉ० विजय श्री आर्या, डॉ० धर्मचन्द्र जैन एवं प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन जी का विशेष अभिमत उल्लेखनीय है।

विद्वज्जनों ने इस ग्रन्थ को एक अत्यन्त ही महत्त्वपूर्ण कृति करार दिया है। संकलनात्मक होते हुए भी यह ग्रन्थ ऐतिहासिक अभिलेख जैसा है, जो सात अध्यायों में विभक्त है।

श्राविकाओं के इतिहास से सम्बन्धित प्रामाणिक स्रोतों का अभाव तथा अपर्याप्त सामग्री के कारण उनके सम्पूर्ण योगदानों को संग्रहीत करना एक दुःसाध्य कार्य है। तथापि इस ग्रंथ में यत्र-तत्र बिखरी हुई श्राविकाओं के जीवन एवं कृतित्व सम्बन्धी सूचनाओं एवम् उनके सांस्कृतिक, धार्मिक एवं सामाजिक अवदानों को लिपिबद्ध करने का एक अनूठा प्रयत्न किया गया है।

प्रथम अध्याय में श्राविका सम्बन्धी आचार-व्यवहार का वर्णन है तथा साहित्यिक एवं अभिलेखीय स्रोतों के आधार पर प्रागैतिहासिक काल से लेकर वर्तमान युग तक की श्राविकाओं द्वारा जैन संघ को दिये गए योगदानों की चर्चा की गयी है। लगभग ७८ चित्रों के माध्यम से श्राविकाओं के अवदानों का भी चित्रांकन है। द्वितीय अध्याय में प्रागैतिहासिक प्रथम तीर्थङ्कर से बाईसवें तीर्थङ्कर कालीन विविध

श्राविकाओं का, तृतीय अध्याय में अन्तिम दो तीर्थङ्करों की कालवर्ती श्राविकाओं का, चतुर्थ अध्याय में तीर्थङ्कर महावीर के पश्चात् तीसरी शताब्दी से सातवीं शताब्दी तक की ४१ श्राविकाओं की खारवेल एवं मथुरा के पुरातात्विक साक्ष्यों के आधार पर धर्मप्रभावना का, पंचम अध्याय में आठवीं से पन्द्रहवीं शताब्दी तक की उत्तर एवं दक्षिण भारतीय श्राविकाओं द्वारा कलापूर्ण मन्दिरों एवं साहित्य-संरक्षण के क्षेत्र में कृत योगदान का उल्लेख है। छठा अध्याय गदर (१८५७) के पूर्व एवं सातवाँ अध्याय गदर (१८५७) के पश्चात् की श्राविकाओं द्वारा राजनीति, स्वतंत्रता संग्राम, साहित्य, शिक्षा, सल्लेखना इत्यादि के क्षेत्र में कृत योगदान का उल्लेख करता है। उपसंहार में पूर्व विवेचित तथ्यों का सार प्रस्तुत किया गया है।

ग्रन्थ के अन्त में सन्दर्भ ग्रन्थ सूची है। लेखन में सर्वत्र समीक्षात्मकता दृष्टिगोचर होती है। यह ग्रन्थ पाठकों के लिए पठनीय एवं संग्रहणीय है।

डॉ. राहुल कुमार सिंह

पूजन का वैज्ञानिक अनुशीलन, लेखक- दिगम्बर जैन मुनि उपाध्याय निर्भयसागर, सम्पादक- प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन, प्रकाशक- निर्भय निर्ग्रन्थ वाणी प्रकाशन, नांगलोई, दिल्ली-४१, सन्-२००९, पृष्ठ-२५८, मूल्य- रू० ५०/अजिल्द, १००/सजिल्द।

मुनि उपाध्याय निर्भयसागर स्वयं एक वैज्ञानिक हैं और उन्होंने इस ग्रन्थ में वैज्ञानिक पद्धति को अपनाते हुए पूज्य, पूजक, पूजा का फल, देवदर्शन, यन्त्र, मन्त्र, तन्त्र एवं वास्तु-विज्ञान से सम्बन्धित सामग्री विस्तार से प्रस्तुत की है। 'पूज्य देव' को परिभाषित करते हुए कहा है कि जिसने अपने सभी कर्म-शत्रुओं पर विजय प्राप्त करके ईश्वरत्व को प्राप्त कर लिया हो वही पूज्य है, अनादि देव विशेष नहीं। इस परिभाषा के अनुसार अर्हन्त और सिद्ध परमेशी ही पूज्य देव की कोटि में आते हैं। इनके साथ ही वे भी पूज्य देव की कोटि में बतलाये गये हैं जो इस मार्ग पर आरूढ़ हैं अथवा इस लक्ष्य (मोक्ष) की प्राप्ति में निमित्त हैं। इस तरह यहाँ जैन दृष्टि से नव देव पूज्य माने गये हैं- अर्हन्त, सिद्ध, आचार्य, उपाध्याय और साधु- ये पंचपरमेशी तथा आगमशास्त्र, धर्म, चैत्य, (मूर्ति) और चैत्यालय (मन्दिर) ये नव ही पूज्य हैं इनके अतिरिक्त कोई पूज्य नहीं है।

प्रथम पाँच अध्यायों में इन नव देवताओं का वर्णन है और षष्ठ अध्याय में भक्त और भक्ति का विवेचन है। सप्तम अध्याय में पूजन और अभिषेक की विधि और पूजा का फल बतलाया गया है। अष्टम अध्याय में जिन देव दर्शन की विधि तथा उससे

सम्बन्धित क्रियाओं का चिन्तन है। नवम अध्याय में मन्त्र-तन्त्र एवं स्वस्तिक का विवेचन है। वास्तु विज्ञान का विवेचन चैत्य-चैत्यालय के प्रसंग (पंचम अध्याय) में किया गया है। ग्रन्थ के प्रारम्भ में प्रो० सुदर्शन लाल जैन द्वारा १७ पृष्ठ की सम्पादकीय है जिसमें इन समस्त विषयों का सरल पद्धति से प्रतिपादन किया गया है। पूज्य, पूजक, पूजा आदि से सम्बन्धित प्रामाणिक एवं वैज्ञानिक जानकारी प्राप्त करने के लिए यह पुस्तक बहुत ही उपयोगी है। भाषा सरल एवं तर्कसंगत है। यथा प्रसंग आगम ग्रन्थों के प्रमाण दिये गए हैं। अतः यह पुस्तक हर दृष्टि से पठनीय एवं संग्रहणीय है।

डॉ० नवीन कुमार श्रीवास्तव

A History of the Canonical Literature of Jainas Author- Prof. Hiralal Rasikdas Kapadia, Editor- Nagin J. Shah, Publication- Prakrit text Society Ahmedabad, Year 2010, Price- Rs. 320/-, Pages- 301.

‘A History of the Canonical Literature of the Jainas’ by Prof. H.R. Kapadia, is a revised edition of the same book on the request of Seth Amritlal Kalidas Doshi. In revision here is rare space for amendments. There is mostly edition in the body of the text as also in foot notes. The first edition of this book was published in 1942.

The present title contains seven chapters in total excluding appendix and indexes. First chapter deals with the genesis of the Jaina scriptures where writer speaks of *tripadī*, Āgamas and the two different opinion with regard to their order of composition. Second chapter describes classification of the Āgamas in Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects, and third tells about ‘*Pūṣṭakārohaṇa*’ (redaction) of the Jaina Āgamas. Chapter four beautifully depicts loss of more than infinite *dvādaśāṅgīs* and reasons assigned for the loss of *Pūrvas* by various scholars, where the fifth chapter speaks of the Āgamas available at present, their section and their subject matter. The sixth chapter elaborately speaks of all those works which explains the pure texts forming the Jaina canon. In the seventh chapter the author has given an evaluation by Occidental scholars from 1876-1903, about Jaina Literature.

It is hoped that this compendious work will be of immense value to the scholars as well as general readers and students who really want to know about Jainology in historical perspective.

- Dr. Rahul Kumar Singh

Jains Today in the World, Author- Pierre Paul Amiel, Editor- Prof. Sagarmal Jain and Dr. S. P. Pandey, Publisher- Parshwanath Vidyapeeth, Varanasi, First Edition- 2008, Price- Rs. 500/ \$30, Page- 307.

'Jains Today in the World' is a book of introductory nature dealing not only with the Fundamental of Jainism but also with the spread of Jains in world today. This work beautifully presents the contemporary status of Jain religion as well as Jains on the globe. This book presents Jains with their long history, their sacred literature, their ways of living, their customs, rites and the influence we had and we have, as well as their settlements in numerous countries in the world, in an easy way to read and well documented.

This work contains ten chapters in total. First chapter deals with the history of Jains from undated origin to the present day and Second chapter gives a brief outline of various branches of Jains. The Third chapter describes about the great heavenly beings that Jains worship and Fourth chapter deals with the sacred book (Āgama) and other writings of Jains. Fifth chapter tries to draw an inventory of the Jaina temples and the sacred places. The Sixth and Seventh chapter express the main rituals, worship, culture, festivals, life, duties and vows of Jains; and Eighth chapter shows the religious symbols, drawing and expressions. Ninth Chapter elaborately summarizes the Jaina monastic order, code of conduct and the 'Path' followed by monks and nuns of the various Jaina Sects. The Tenth and final chapter speaks of the influence of Jainism in India as well as outside India and author has given his own observation about Jaina religion in conclusion. The very last part of the book consist with seven annexes. An 'Introduction' and a 'Prologue' by Dr. Sagarmal Jain, is given in the very first in the book. It is hoped

that this compendious work will be useful for the scholars as well as general readers who really want to know about Jainism.

- **Dr. Rahul Kumar Singh**

Antiquity of Jainism (Jainism: An Ancient, Scientific and Independent Religion of the Universe), Editor: Sunjay K. Jain (President Vishwa Jaina Sangathan, Delhi), Published by- Vishwa Jaina Sangathan, Delhi, First Edition 2010, Price- Rs. 100 /-, Pages 128.

The present title is a concise book of an introductory nature dealing not only with the fundamental philosophy and ethics of Jaina Religion but also with the antiquity, spread and significance of Jaina Religion. The book containing 56 topics in total, is quite comprehensive in its content. Starting with the introduction of Jainism, the twenty four Jaina Tirthankaras, Jainism after Mahāvīra, Jaina Teachings, Namokāra Mañtra, Santhārā, No concept of ghost in Jainism, Jaina as a religious minority etc., this covers Jaina's struggle in Indian Freedom, Gandhiji and Jainism and author of KURAL no other than Jain.

It is hoped that this comprehensive work will be of immense use value both to the academicians and the general readers desirous to have an objective, correct and proper understanding of various facts of Jaina Religion in a short time.

Dr. Rahul Kumar Singh



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


Figure 1 Scholars enrolment in ISSJS

Originally the Indian program was designed for a two month summer stay in India at different places of interest for Jainism (and way of life) to provide a comprehensive and experiential exposure to the visiting scholars. A typical ISSJS program included over 100 class room lectures by eminent Jain scholars, visits to temples, monks and nuns, laity, rituals, pilgrim places and social welfare organizations run by Jains.

With the growing class sizes and diverse interests of the participants, the classes for 2010 onwards of ISSJS were split into two /three tiers for the starters, middle advanced graduates studies. ISJS since 2009 has started at Mahidol University Bangkok, Thailand. It was a combined program for all the participants (starters to middle and faculty).

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