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Editorial

This is the special PV-ISSJS 2013 issue of Śramaṇa, a bi-lingual quarterly Research Journal of Jainology, brought out by Parshwanath Vidyapeeth since 1949. It contains seven papers, written by six week (6-W) participants. These papers were presented by them on the concluding day of their programme in India.

The first paper by Julie A Hanlon **'Early History of Jainism and Migrations to South India'** is an attempt to present the earliest migration route of the Jain monks from North to South India during early centuries, based on the archaeological and epigraphic evidence. It also incorporates the observations of modern scholars on the topic.The second paper **'Whitehead's Constructive Metaphysics for an Emerging Jain Diaspora Community'** by Rafael Reyes III, underlies the distinction between orthodox Jains and Diaspora Jains and especially second generation Diaspora Jains. For orthodox Jainism the vows are a reflection of the metaphysical system exposed in Jains scriptural texts, while Diaspora Jains require a constructive metaphysics advocated by Alfred North Whitehead. This paper throws light on the approach of Diaspora Jains towards the orthodox doctrines of Jains.The third paper **'The Rise of Pinjrapoles and the Fall of Zoos: An Appeal to Jainism'** by Mr. John Di Leonardo, critically examines the argument for the existence of zoos and plea for the establishment of Pinjrapoles which suits the Jain doctrine of Ahiṁsā, Anekānta and Aparigraha.The fourth paper **'Doctrinal and Social Context of Non-Violent Attitudes of the Jains and the Quakers'** by Zdenek Vojtisek deals with similarties between two non-violent communities of the world-Jains and Quakers. The fifth paper **'The Vibrancy of Pudgala: Thinking about the activity of Matter in Jain Philosophy'** by Michael Anderson, discusses the productive capacity of matter (*pudgal*) as advocated by political theorist Jane Bennet. Bennet proposes that matter has a vital, vibrant, existence.The sixth paper is **'The Dimensions of a Word: Bhartṛhari's and Amṛtachandra-sūri's Approach'** by Malgorzata Glinicka. Bhartṛhari and Amṛtacandra-sūri have different opinion concerning the nature of a word but there is one joint between them the conviction that one single word can never elucidate the whole nature of an object and the entire truth of it. It brings one meaningful part of knowledge of an object to a human being's mind. The seventh paper is **'Rethinking Anekāntavāda and Animality in Jainism and Poststructuralism** by Rebekah Sinclair. The object of this paper has been to show that Jainism can offer more than just prohibitions of violence, who can and cannot be eaten, owned and addressed; the doctrines anekāntavāda actually provides an extremely rich tradition perhaps the richest tradition from which to draw our strength for the coming age.

This issue is the outcome of the initiative of our President Dr. Shugan C. Jain. Our thanks are due to Dr. Ruchi Rai, she computerized and incorporated corrections sincerely. Dr. Navin Srivastav and Mr. Om Prakash Singh, co-operated in seeing it through the press. Because of lack of space we could not include all the articles in this issue. We plan to publish remaining articles in forthcoming regular issues of Śramaṇa. This special issue intends to reach a wider Jain and non-Jain readership, especially scholars and researchers.

Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh

Early History of Jainism and Migrations to South India

JULIE A. HANLON

[*The early history of Jainism is shrouded in legend, with only scant bits of evidence from archaeology, epigraphy and literature. However daunting the task of historical reconstruction, it is a necessary endeavor for understanding the important role and contributions of Jain communities to the cultural history of India. This paper represents humble attempt to collate information regarding the early history of Jainism in an effort to discern the earliest migration route of the Jains from North to South India.*

The first section of this paper begins with the notion of eternity, for Jainism has no real 'beginning'. From there, it attempts to trace the rise of Jainism during the 9th to 4th centuries BCE by presenting literary evidence related to the last tīrthaṅkaras, Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra. The next section discusses the composition, loss and recovery of the Jaina canon in the post-Mahāvīra period. The first 1,000 years after the nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra was an extremely important period in the formation of the Jaina community. This section attempts to highlight the way in which the motif of loss is endemic to the history of Jainism. This notion of loss appears not only in regard to the scriptural tradition, but to the archaeological record as well. This latter point becomes more apparent in the latter parts of the paper.

Having laid a very modest foundation for the history of Jainism up to 4th century BCE, the paper attempts to address the Jain migration to South India. Narratives regarding this migration center on the figure of Bhadrabāhu and suggest a southern migration route through Karnataka. Therefore, the third section examines the various literary references to Bhadrabāhu and the epigraphic evidence from Śravaṇa Belgola.

The final sections deal specifically with archaeological and epigraphic evidence of Jainism in South India. The ultimate aim of this paper is to present a working hypothesis concerning the migration of Jain monastics to South India during the early centuries CE. While there is still much work to be done, I hope that this small contribution will help to clarify the possibilities for further research.]

I. The Eternal and Ancient History of Jainism

In Jainism, the world has neither beginning nor end; it is eternal, as is the existence of Jainism itself.[1] The Jain concept of the cosmic cycle of time is envisioned as a rotation of a wheel.[2] Each half of the wheel is divided into descending and ascending cycle. Each cycle is divided into six phases, differentiated by levels of happiness (*suṣamā*) or unhappiness (*duṣamā*).[3] In the descending cycle, the phases are: 1. *suṣamā-suṣamā* (extremely happy), 2. *suṣamā* (happy), 3. *suṣamā-duṣamā* (more happy than unhappy) and 4. *duṣamā-suṣamā* (more unhappy than happy),

5. *duṣamā* (unhappy), 6. *duṣamā-duṣamā* (extremely unhappy).[4] Currently, we are living in the fifth phase of the descending cycle, which is said to be 21,000 years long.[5]

In each cycle, guides called *tīrthaṅkaras* (lit. ford-makers) emerge during the fourth phase to impart the eternal Jain teachings of right faith, right knowledge and right practice (*samyag darśana, jñāna* and *cāritra*). For example, in this half-cycle Ṛṣabha appeared at the end of the third phase, signaling the beginning of the fourth and Mahāvīra appeared at the end of the fourth phase, signaling the beginning of the fifth. It is only during the fourth phase (*duṣamā-suṣamā*) that liberation is possible.[6]

Not only do *tīrthaṅkaras* repeatedly appear each half-cycle, but also a series of 12 *cakravartīs* (emperors), 9 *baladevas* (gentle heroes), 9 *vāsudevas* (violent heroes) and 9 *prativāsudevas* (anti-heroes). These individuals are referred to as *śalākāpuruṣas* (illustrious or worthy persons) and together with the 24 *tīrthaṅkaras* comprise a group called the *triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣa* (63 illustrious persons).[7] The stories of the illustrious persons from this half-cycle are recounted in the Jaina canonical and narrative literature, such as the *Samavāya, Kalpasūtra, Āvaśyaka Niryukti* and Hemacandra's *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita.*[8]

Attempts have been made to coordinate the chronology of these 63 illustrious persons with archaeological and historical evidence. For example, based on such estimations the first *tīrthaṅkara* Ṛṣabha (aka Ṛṣabhanātha, Ṛṣabhadeva and Ādinātha) was born in Ayodhya around 8,000 BCE.[9] However, most historians concur that the earliest *tīrthaṅkara* who can be dated with any historical reliability is Pārśvanātha.[10]

Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra

There is a considerable amount of literary evidence regarding Pārśvanātha. The *Kalpasūtra* (c. 2nd to 1st centuries BCE)[11] contains an account of his life. The *Ācārāṅga-sūtra* suggests that Mahāvīra's parents were followers of the faith propounded by Pārśvanātha and the *Āvaśyaka Cūrṇi* provides the names of ascetics belonging to the sect of Pārśvanātha who were contemporaries of Mahāvīra. The *Bhagavatī* describes a discussion between Mahāvīra and a follower of Pārśvanātha named Gāṅgeya.[12] In the *Isibhāsiyāiṃ* ('The Sayings of the Seers') the teachings of Mahāvīra and Pārśvanātha are juxtaposed with figures from rival religions. Dundas has highlighted the importance and antiquity of this work, claiming that it is "one of the most ancient Jain texts available" and probably dates between the second or first centuries BCE.[13] Such descriptions in the Jaina canon of Pārśvanātha and the interrelation of his teachings with the Jaina *dharma* propounded by Mahāvīra, strongly suggest that Pārśvanātha was a definite historical figure.

Pārśvanātha is said to have lived about 250 years before the birth of Mahāvīra. According to tradition, Pārśvanātha was born in Varanasi in 877 BCE and died at the age of 100 (777 BCE).[14] The followers of Pārśvanātha were known as *Nirgranthas* (Sanskrit) or *Niganṭhas* (Prakrit), which means 'one who is without bonds'.[15] The religion preached by Pārśvanātha

consisted of four vows, or the four-fold path (*cāturyāma dharma*): nonviolence (*ahiṃsā*), truthfulness (*satya*), non-stealing (*asteya*) and non-accumulation of possessions (*aparigraha*).[16]

Mahāvīra, which means 'great hero', was born under the name Vardhamāna in 599 BCE[17] in a place called Kuṇḍagrāma, which may be near Vaisali in the Ganga basin. Accounts of Mahāvīra's life are provided in the *Kalpasūtra*, as well as the *Ācārāṅga, Sūtrakṛtāṅga* and *Bhagavatī-sūtras*. According to the Śvetāmbaras, Mahāvīra left this world in 527 BCE, while the Digambaras hold that it was 510 BCE.[18]

Although Mahāvīra is often discussed as the founder of Jainism, his role in the religion cannot be understood outside of the context of the 23 *tīrthaṅkaras* who preceded him. In this way, rather than a founder, one may consider him a reformer. He continued to preach the Jain *dharma* of the earlier 23 *tīrthaṅkaras* with only slight modifications. The *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* contains a discussion between Kesi, a follower of Pārśvanātha and Indrabhēti Gautama, the chief -disciple of Mahāvīra, regarding the differences between the four-fold path of Pārśvanātha and the five-fold path of Mahāvīra. This five-fold path, or the five *mahāvratas,* includes: *ahiṁsā* (non-violence), *satya* (truth), *asteya* or *acaurya* (non-stealing), *aparigraha* (non-possession), and *brahmacarya* (celibacy).

The biography of Mahāvīra is some what distinct from that of the previous 23 *tīrthaṅkaras*. The general pattern for the other 23 *tīrthaṅkaras*[19] consists of being born into a family of the warrior class (*kṣatriya*), a realization of their destiny as a great spiritual teacher, renouncing the world of the household to become a wandering ascetic and after a series of physical and mental austerities, the fulfillment of omniscience. Lastly, after a period of preaching and converting others to the Jaina dharma, they die in meditation and their souls become liberated (*mokṣa*). Like the previous *tīrthaṅkaras*, Mahāvīra was born into a *kṣatriya* family. Specifically, he belonged to the Nāya clan (*Nāta* in Pali and *Jñātṛ* in Sanskrit). Thus, he is often referred to as Nāyaputta ('son of the Nāyas'). His father was a wealthy *kṣatriya* nobleman and his mother was the sister of an eminent Licchavi prince.[20] However, according to the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacarita*, Mahāvīra was actually conceived in the womb of a *brāhmaṇa* lady and his embryo was later transferred to his *kṣatriya* mother.[21] In addition, unlike the previous *tīrthaṅkaras* who publicly renounced their fortunes to join ascetic groups, Mahāvīra renounced the world alone, with only the gods in attendance and did not join any pre-existing ascetic group.[22] According to Dundas, these distinctions suggest, "early Jainism coalesced out of an interaction between the cosmological ideas of Pārśva and a more rigorous form of orthopraxy advocated by Mahāvīra, with the relationship between the two teachers eventually being formalised within the gradually evolving fordmaker lineage."[23]

Mahāvīra renounced the life of a householder at the age of 30. Soon after, he began a wandering mode of existence that lasted for twelve years. At age 42 he obtained omniscience, meaning a state of perfect knowledge. He continued to wander and preach the doctrines of Jaina *dharma*. He would wander for eight months of the year and then remain stationary in some town for four

months during the rainy season. Some of the places Mahāvīra is said to have visited during his travels include cities in Bihar, West Bengal and eastern Uttar Pradesh. During that time he converted many kings, queens, princes, princesses, high officials and merchants to the Jaina dharma.[24]

II. Post-Mahāvīra Period and the Composition, Loss and Recovery of the Jaina Canon

After Mahāvīra's death at age 72, the Jaina community continued in the hands of his eleven *gaṇadharas* or principal disciples. Significantly, all of the *gaṇadharas* were *brāhmiṇs*. Only two of the eleven survived beyond the death of Mahāvīra. The first, Indrabhūti Gautama, is said to have obtained omniscience at the night of Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa* and died twelve years later. Depending on the sources, the second disciple, Sudharmā, became the head of the Jaina community upon the death of Mahāvīra or upon the death of Indrabhūti Gautama.[25] Sudharmā was succeeded by his pupil Jambū.

The history of the first thousand years after Mahāvīra's death, or attainment of *nirvāṇa* (marked as V.N. 1-1,000, where V.N. stands for '*Vīra Nirvāṇa*'), is divided into four ages: 1. Era of the omniscient (*Kevalī* era), 2. Era of the all-canon-knowing (*Śrutakevalī* era), 3 Era of having knowledge of the ten prior canons (Daśa Pūrvadhara era) and 4. Era of having some knowledge of the prior canons (*Sāmānya Pūrvadhara* era).[26] The Kevalī era is approximately 62 to 64 years and includes the attainment of omniscience by Indrabhūti Gautama, Sudharmā and Jambū. After this omniscience and *mokṣa* were no longer attainable by mortals.[27] During the Śrutakevalī era (V.N. 64-170) includes the six leaders[28] of the Jaina community after Jambū. These men lacked omniscience, but had complete knowledge of the Jaina canon. Just as the history of Jainism is eternal, similarly, the Jaina canon (*Dvādaśāṁgī*) is considered "eternal and without a beginning."[29] It is believed that the *Dvādaśāṁgī*, or the twelve *aṅgas*, which elaborate the teachings of Mahāvīra, were the combined effort of all of the *gaṇadharas*.[30] The twelth *aṅga*, the *Dṛṣṭivāda* is made up of five sections and one of those sections, the *pūrvagata*, contains 14 sub-sections. The *śrutakevalīs* were also known as the *caturdaśa pūrvadhara* ācāryas because they knew all 14 (*caturdaśa*) of the *pūrvas*. The last and most famous, of the *śrutakevalīs* was Bhadrabāhu.

Bhadrabāhu was said to be the last person to know all fourteen *pūrvas* by heart. After Bhadrabāhu, knowledge of the *14 pūrvas* was lost and during the *Daśa Pūrvadhara* era, the leaders only knew 10 (*daśa*) of the *14 pūrvas*. There is some debate between the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara Jains regarding how much of the canon was lost or preserved after Bhadrabāhu. Jaini notes that knowledge of the *pūrvas* was lost after the time of Bhadrabāhu because many of the monks who had memorized portions of these texts had died during the great Magadha famine.[31] In any case, the history of the Jaina canon after this time becomes one of loss and reconstruction and the *Sāmānya Pūrvadhara* era, of only knowing some of the canon, begins.

A series of three councils were held in order to organize the remains of the Jaina canon. According to Dundas, "The word *vācanā*, usually rendered as council, in fact, signifies 'recitation' and the function of these conclaves was ostensibly to establish recensions of the scriptural canon through consulting the memory of authoritative monks."[32] Significantly, all three councils are described

as taking place after twelve-year famines. The first council, which is not acknowledged by the Digambaras, was held in Pāṭaliputra (modern Patna, Bihar) 160 years after the death of Mahāvīra, sometime in the 4th century BCE. According to the Śvetāmbara Jains, at this time the number of *aṅgas* was reduced to 11, with the complete loss of the *Dṛṣṭivāda*. The next council[33] took place simultaneously in Mathurā and Valabhī, 827 years after the death of Mahāvīra. The final council took place at Valabhī between 453 or 466 CE.[34] At this time the Jaina canon was written down in manuscript form. Dundas refers to this council as the "catalyst for the final hardening of boundaries between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras,"[35] as it marks the stabilization of the Jaina canon by one sect (Śvetāmbaras) in contradistinction to the other.

The significance of these councils cannot be over-stated. They provide immense insight into the ways in which Jains view their history and received knowledge of Jaina dharma. It is worth quoting Dundas at length:

The accounts of these recitations are interesting for the insight they give about the Jain view of a gradually disintegrating scriptural corpus, although they hardly have eyewitness status. For example, the earliest accounts of any of the recitations date from the second half of the seventh century, while the references to twelve-year famines represent virtually a figure of speech in Jain literature, not to be taken literally, signifying some degree of discord in the community or political instability. ...[A] working hypothesis would be to see the issue at stake in the second and third recitations as not the literal disappearance of the scriptures or the lack of authoritative sources as a result of the death of learned monks through famine, but rather the stabilisation and control of an originally oral tradition whose integrity was being undermined by the increasing proliferation of manuscript versions.[36]

Dundas highlights some important points. First, endemic to the history of Jainism is this reoccurring motif of loss and recuperation. There is always a sense of uncertainty. As we are living in the *Sāmānya Pūrvadhara* era, we only know a part of the actual canon. Moreover, we are living in a period where liberation (*mokṣa*) and omniscience (*kevalī*), ultimate knowledge of both the scriptures (*śruti*) as well as of reality in general, are no longer possible. Thus, we perpetually find ourselves battling against some obscurity of knowledge. Second, from a non-Jain perspective, one can approach this anxiety as a socio-historical process, as Dundas has done, in the sense that the survival and perpetuation of the Jain community necessitated a stabilization of the canon in a time of instability. This period of the ancient councils (c. 4th century BCE to 5th century CE) and increase in manuscript production is also the period that witnessed the spread of Jainism across the Indian subcontinent and the formation and differentiation of the Śvetāmbara and Digambara sects. It is from this period of instability and transition that the illustrious figure of Bhadrabāhu emerges.

III. The Bhadrabāhu-Chandragupta Tradition and the Migration to South India

Although there were certainly multiple migrations of Jains from north to south India[37] and vice versa, the earliest migration is estimated to have taken place during the 3rd to 4th centuries

CE. The conceptualizations of this ancient migration are intimately tied to the legendary figure of Bhadrabāhu and in particular to stories connecting Bhadrabāhu to one Chandragupta.[38] The basic narrative is that Bhadrabāhu, the last *śrutakevalī*, due to a twelve year famine, sent or led a group of Jains to south India.[39] Chandragupta, often identified as King Chandragupta Maurya (340-298 BCE), became a disciple of Bhadrabāhu, abdicated his throne and accompanied the group on their journey south. The destination of the group is regularly identified as Mysore district of Karnataka or specifically the site of Śravaṇa Belgoḷa. From there, Jainism is said to have spread to the rest of South India, i.e. Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. In order to understand the significance of these narratives within Jaina history, it is necessary to clarify the historical and literary character of Bhadrabāhu, his role in the migration to South India and the significance of Śravaṇa Belgoḷa as the central locus of this migration.

Bhadrabāhu: One or Many?

Bhadrabāhu is a significant figure in Jaina religious, literary and political history. As an historical figure, he is estimated to have died c. 365 BC.[40] He was a pontiff within the early Jaina community; a leader whose authority may be definitively traced back in the line of ācāryas to Mahāvīra. As noted above, he was the last *Śrutakevalī*, the last person to know the entirety of the Jaina canon. After Bhadrabāhu the canon began to disintegrate, causing rifts between different communities of Jains. Consequently, the origins of the two major sects of Jainism, the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, are often traced back to him.

The name Bhadrabāhu is associated with a number of important Jaina texts. The *Kalpasūtra*, which contains the biographies of the *tīrthaṅkaras* and three of the *Chedasūtras* (*Bṛhatkalpa*, *Vyavahāra* and the *Niśītha*), which deal with the codification of monastic law, are attributed to Bhadrabāhu and dated c. 300 BCE. A person named Bhadrabāhu is also identified in the works of Kundakunda as his *(gamaka guru)* ('valid teacher').[41] There is also much later another Bhadrabāhu, often referred to as Bhadrabāhu II or *Niryuktikāra* Bhadrabāhu, who lived between 4th to 6th century CE.[42] He is identified as a Śvetāmbara ācārya and author of ten *niryuktis,* or commentaries.[43]

Jain and Surana refer to this later Bhadrabāhu as the 'occult-powered ācārya' and place him c. Vikram 124 (67 CE).[44] According to the *Bhāvasamgraha*, a Digambara text, this later Bhadrabāhu also foresaw a twelve year famine. However, in this case, an ācārya called Śānti brought the group of Jain ascetics from Ujjain to Valabhī Nagara in Saurastra (Gujarat). Unfortunately, in Gujarat there was also a famine. Therefore, ācārya Śānti allowed his congregation to take up the walking stick, rug and bowl and to wear white clothing. After the famine was over, Śānti advised the group to go back to the old ways, but one of the disciples, Jinacandra, refused. He hit Śānti with his stick and killed him. This is the Digambara version of how the Śvetāmbara sect came into being.

There is also another story from the *Titthogāliya painnā*, dated early 5th century Vikram era (4th to 5th century CE), which tells the story of the earlier Bhadrabāhu.[45] In this version, Bhadrabāhu was born into a noble family and converted to Jainism. He practiced yoga for twelve years and

composed the *Chedasūtras*. During this time, there was a severe drought and famine. Many monks took the vow of *sallekhanā* and died in *samādhi*. "The rest of the monks migrated to other places especially coastal areas or places near to the rivers & [*sic*] sea and wandered with detachment."[46] Bhadrabāhu went to Nepal and began tapas. After the famine was over, many of the monks returned to central India, but Bhadrabāhu remained in Nepal. As he was the only one with knowledge of the fourteen *pūrvas*, Sthūlabhadra approached him in order that the knowledge of the Jaina canon would be preserved. A group of 500 Jain monks traveled to Nepal to learn the *pūrvas*. After some time, all of the monks except Sthūlabhadra got tired and found the task too difficult, so they returned home.

During Bhadrabāhu's twelve years of *mahāprāṇa* meditation, Sthūlabhadra remained and learned ten of the *pūrvas*. At this time he was visited by his sisters. In order to impress them with the knowledge he had learned, he turned himself into a lion. Thinking that their brother had been eaten by a lion, the women ran to Bhadrabāhu. Bhadrabāhu instantly understood what had happened. Because Sthūlabhadra could not control the temptation of displaying his power, Bhadrabāhu refused to teach him the remaining four *pūrvas*. After some debate, Bhadrabāhu conceded to teach Sthūlabhadra the original text of the last four *pūrvas*, but not to reveal their "meaning and special interpretation".[47]

Jaina and Surana conclude that according to the literary evidence of the Digambaras there were five different ācāryas named Bhadrabāhu, while the texts of the Śvetāmbaras suggest the existence of only two.[48] In addition to these initial Digambara texts, there is also a large corpus of medieval texts that position Bhadrabāhu as the leader of a migration to South India and provide an important founding narrative for the Digambara center of Śravaṇa Belgoḷa.

The *Bṛihatkathākōśa* by Hariṣena (c. 931) contains a biography of Bhadrabāhu and recounts the tale of his migration to south. In this story,[49] after hearing an infant crying out to him to go away, Bhadrabāhu has a premonition that there will be a twelve year famine in Ujjain. Because he senses that the end of his life is drawing near, he resolves to remain in the city alone, but sends King Chandragupta and the *saṅgha* of Jain ascetics to the Punnāma kingdom in the south. After fasting for many days, Bhadrabāhu dies. Twelve years later, Chandragupta, having assumed the name of Viśākhācārya, returns to Madhya-deśa with the rest of the saṅgha.

In another version of the story told in the *Bhadrabāhucarita* by Ratnanandi (c. 15th century),[50] after predicting the twelve year famine, Bhadrabāhu advises the saṅgha to go to "Karṇāṭa" with him. However, during the journey they reached a forest and perceiving that the end of his life was near, Bhadrabāhu appoints leadership of the saṅgha to Viśākhācārya. King Chandragupta remains with Bhadrabāhu, while the rest of the saṅgha continued on to "Chōḷa country". Soon after, Bhadrabāhu takes the vow of *sallekhanā* and dies. Chandragupta builds a tomb for Bhadrabāhu and an image of his feet to worship.

In a later Kannada version, the *Munivamśābhyudaya* by Chidanandakavi (c. 1680),[51] the *śrutakevalī* Bhadrabāhu came to Belgoḷa and was killed by a tiger. Dakṣiṇācārya founded a temple to Bhadrabāhu containing his footprints. At some time later, Chandragupta came to Belgoḷa on pilgrimage to worship at this place and received *dīkṣā*, ascetic initiation, from

Dakṣiṇācārya. Chandragupta later took over the position of Dakṣiṇācārya.

A much later Kannada version found in the *Rājāvalī-kathe* by Devachandra (1838) adds more details to the story. It begins like the *Bṛihatkathākōśa* and *Bhadrabāhucarita*. Then, to avert the famine, the king's ministers offer many sacrifices. To atone for this great sin, Chandragupta, the king of Pāṭalīputra, abdicates his throne and gives it to his son Simhasena. After taking *dīkṣā*, Chandragupta joins Bhadrabāhu. Together with 12,000 disciples they travel south. Upon reaching a certain hill, Bhadrabāhu perceives that his life is coming to an end. He therefore puts Viśākhācārya in charge of the rest of the disciples. This group continues south to "the Cōḷa and Pāṇḍya countries". Chandragupta remains behind and performs the funeral rites for Bhadrabāhu. He spends the rest of his life on that hill in a cave, worshipping Bhadrabāhu's footprints.

It is important to note the differences between these stories. The first two stories are written in Sanskrit and the second two in Kannada. In first and earliest story, only Chandragupta goes to the south, while Bhadrabāhu remains in Ujjain. Chandragupta becomes the sage Viśākhāchārya. Neither Bhadrabāhu nor Chandragupta die in South India. In the *Bhadrabāhucharita*, both Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta travel southward along with a third sage named Viśākhācārya. Bhadrabāhu performs *saṅllekhanā* somewhere south of Ujjain, perhaps Karantaka and the rest of the sangha continue southward to "Chōḷa country," i.e. Tamil Nadu. This story is reproduced in the Kannada *Rājāvalī-kathe*, with the additional details regarding the transfer of the throne of Pāṭalīpura to Simhasēna and the final resting place of Bhadrabāhu as a hill rather than a forest. Also, the migration of the rest of the *saṅgha* to south is expanded to include both eastern (Cōḷa) and central (Pāṇḍya) regions of Tamil Nadu. In the *Munivaṁśābhyudaya*, there is no mention of a migration or famine. Bhadrabāhu's death is due to a tragic accident rather than the vow of *sallekhanā*. There is no close association between Chandragupta and Bhadrabāhu, as the latter is deceased before the former arrives in Beḷgoḷa.

Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa

Many scholars postulate that Bhadrabāhu and/or his *saṅgha* migrated to South India via Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa. This notion is based on a combination of the literary evidence discussed above, as well as a number of inscriptions found in the surrounding area. The name Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa means the white (*beḷ*) pond (*koḷa*) of the Jaina ascetics (*śravaṇas*). It was apparently named thus due to a beautiful clear pond in the middle of the village. The name 'Veḷgoḷa' appears in inscriptions as early as 650 CE and as 'Beḷgoḷa' in 800 CE. Other forms of the name, which occur in later inscriptions, include Beḷguḷa, Beḷuguḷa and Beḷaguḷa. [52] The village of Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa is located between two rocky hills. The larger hill, known as Doa-bemma or Vindhyagiri, is located to the south and is home to the colossal image of Bāhubali. The smaller hill, known as Chikka-bemma or Chandragiri, is located to the north and contains the oldest inscriptions and a large number of Jaina *bastis*.[53]

The earliest inscriptions from Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa that refer to the migration to South India date from the 7th century CE and it is also mentioned in numerous later inscriptions at the site.[54] Both Dundas and Champakalakshmi note that the earliest epigraphic reference to the migration is 600

CE.[55] Although they do not mention the specific inscription number, it is clear from the context that they are alluding to the famous 'Bhadrabāhu inscription' discovered by L. Rice in. 1874.[56] According to Rice, the translation of the inscription is as follows:

Bhadrabāhu-svāmin, of the illustrious line of this regular order of great men, who by virtue of his severe penance had acquired the essence of knowledge, having, by his power of discovering the past, present and future, foretold in Ujjayini a period of twelve years of dire calamity (or famine), the whole of the *saṅgha*, leaving the northern regions, took their way to the south. And the rishi company arrived at a country counting many hundreds of villages... Whereupon, at a mountain with lofty peaks, whose name was Katavapra, an ornament to the earth; the ground around which was variegated with brilliant hues of the clusters of gay flowers fallen from the beautiful trees...the achari, with Prabhāchandra also perceiving that but little time remained for him to live and fearing on account of the road (or journey), announced his desire to do the penance before death and having dismissed the entire *saṅgha*, he with one single disciple, worshipping on cold stones covered with grass, quitted his body and in this manner attained to the state (or, gained the adoration) of the seven hundred rishis...[57]

Whether or not this inscription supports the story of the Jain migration as depicted in the Kannada *Rājāvalī-kathe* (19th century CE) has been a subject of some debate. Rice felt strongly that this inscription supported the veracity of the legend that Bhadrabāhu, the last of the *śrutakevalīs*, came to Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa and died there, along with his disciple king Chandragupta Maurya. Rice reasoned that the Prabhāchandra in the inscription was Chandragupta under a new name, presumably taken after he received *dīkṣā* and became a monk. However, after examining the *Rājāvalī-kathe* more carefully, Dr. J.F. Fleet highlighted some important differences between the text and the inscription: "And, when we examine it [*Rājāvalī-kathe*], we find that it really indicates, not Chandragupta, the grandfather of Asoka, but an otherwise unknown Chandragupta, son of Asoka's alleged son Kunala; that he abdicated in favour of an otherwise unknown son named Simhasena and that the Bhadrabahu who figures in it is not the Sruta-Kevalin of that name, but quite a different person, probably the Pontiff Bhadrabahu II."[58]

Moreover, Fleet argued that Rice had incorrectly translated the inscription to suit his own theories. According to Fleet, the description of Prabhāchandra in the inscription clearly reads "The ācārya *by the name* Prabhāchandra" not "the ācārya along with Prabhāchandra."[59] Fleet also disagrees with Rice's estimate for the age of the inscription and claims that it dates to the medieval period c. 8th century CE. Therefore, Fleet argues that Rice is quite mistaken in attempting to correlate the Chandragupta Maurya with the southern migration.

The rest of the inscriptions on Chandagiri hill[60] do not include any references to a migration.[61] Chandagiri hill derived its name from the local history that claims that Chandragupta lived there. The hill has seven inscriptions that refer to Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta, but not of any migration from the north. For example, the earliest inscription noted by Narasimhachar, No. 31, c. 650 CE, "refers to the pair of the great sages Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta and states that the Jaina religion which had greatly prospered when they shed lustre on it, having become a

little weak, the sage Śāntisēna renovated it."[62] Rather than a discussion of the migration south, this inscription seems reminiscent of the Digambara *Bhāvasamgraha*, discussed above, which described the migration of Jains to Gujarat under the ācārya Śānti.

The next inscriptions that mention the two sages date to c. 900 CE, roughly contemporary with Hariṣeṇa's *Bṛhatkathākōśa*. However, these inscriptions[63] are located near Srirangapattna, approximately 65 km south of Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa, on the northern bank of the Kaveri River. The pair of inscriptions describes the summit of Chandragiri as marked by the footprints of Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta. While no migration is mentioned, these inscriptions correspond with the description in the *Bhadrabāhucarita*, which describes the creation of a shrine to Bhadrabāhu's footprints by Chandragupta. The other inscriptions located at Chandragiri are dated to the 12th century and later.

What we may conclude from the epigraphic record is that Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa did not become associated with the figure of Bhadrabāhu until 7th century CE. In addition, according to Tabard, the local traditions associated with Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta do not date much earlier than the 9th century CE.[64] The numerous Jain *bastis* on Chikka-bemma hill were constructed between the 9th and 12th centuries CE and the famous colossal statue of Bāhubali on Doa-bemma hill was constructed during the late 10th century CE. In the medieval period, Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa "became a hub of all religious activity of the Jainas not only in Karnataka, but also the whole of South India, venerated by both Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras."[65] The epigraphic and archaeological/ architectural evidence from Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa, therefore, attest to the increasing religious and political importance during this time.

The elaborate legends regarding Bhadrabāhu, dating from the 10th century onwards, may have had as their primary aim to situate Śravaṇa Beḷgoḷa within Jaina historical geography and to highlight its importance as a center of pilgrimage. Tabard seems to come to a similar conclusion, when he notes, "Mysore is rich enough in historical associations and needs no legend unsupported by facts to make it one of the most interesting provinces of India."[66] Jain and Surana also note, "after thorough research, many other scholars of Digambara sect have also made it apparent that it was the second Bhadrabāhu and not the first one, who went down South."[67] Therefore, "the tell-tale stories like making Candragupta the contemporary disciple (monk or layman) of Śrutakevalī Bhadrabāhu, has [*sic*] no significance and are considered as baseless."[68]

IV. Reconstructing the Migration Routes to South India

Despite the fact that numerous scholars have already highlighted the late date of the Bhadrabāhu-Chandragupta tradition, this story is still cited by historians as evidence of the migration to South India in the early centuries CE. Even if not cited directly, its influence is apparent in the notion that the migration to South India (Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala) was through Karnataka. For example, Champakalakshmi claims, "The Jaina migration seems to have avoided the areas of intensive Buddhist concentration [the coasts]ēand opted to make a beeline for south Karnataka and then for Tamilakam, particularly Madurai."[69] She estimates that this migration took place sometime between the end of the 4th and the beginning of the 3rd century BCE.[70]

However, archaeological evidence does not support this route. While the archaeological evidence of Jainism in Tamil Nadu, in the form of inscriptions in Tamil-Brāhmī, goes back to around 3rd century BCE, the earliest evidence of Jainism in Karnataka, in the form of Kadamba inscriptions in early Kannada, goes back only to the 5th century CE.[71] Therefore, if a group of Jains did indeed travel from North India via Karnataka, specifically Śravaṇa Belgoḷa, during the 3rd century BCE on their way to the far south, one would expect some kind of material evidence (archaeological or epigraphic) confirming their presence in Karnataka. So far, we have not discovered any such evidence.

According to Sharma, in the Śvetāmbara tradition, the Jaina migration to South India began from Ujjaiyini in Malwa.[72] The route of their migration is suggested to be along the western coast, from Gujarat, through Maharastra to Karnataka and from there to Tamil Nadu. While this route is certainly possible, the problem of archaeological evidence to corroborate it is again missing. While the towns of Vidisha and Ujjain are frequently mentioned in the Jaina literary tradition, the earliest archaeological evidence for Jainism in Madhya Pradesh only goes back as far as the 4th century CE.[73] The earliest evidence from Gujarat is a 2nd century CE inscription at Girnar in Junagadh district that mentions "Jaina monks claiming the attainment of perfect knowledge."[74] There are also some Jain caves at Dhank in Kathiawad district, that contain sculptures dated to c. 2nd century CE. However, the high period of Jainism in Gujarat is between the 11th and 12th centuries CE, under the patronage of the Chalukya kings.[75] The earliest evidence of Jains in the Maharashtra Deccan dates to 500 CE. Between 500 and 950 CE the Jains enjoyed the patronage of many Rāṣṭrakūṭa rulers and some of their feudatories.[76] The famous Jain caves at Ellora date to the 9th and 10th centuries CE. Therefore, if this was indeed a route of Jain migration, it likely dates to a later period, sometime between the 2nd and 5th centuries CE.

Dundas suggests, "The two main directions of movement were along the important trade route to the west and down the eastern littoral to the Dravidian south and it must be assumed that this process involved both ascetics and lay supporters, the former following the logic of the ideal of wandering mendicancy and the latter in search of greater mercantile opportunity."[77] The idea of a migration route down the east coast to South India is particularly compelling. Returning to the *Titthogāliya painnā,* one of the earliest accounts of the migration (c. 5th century CE), it is worth noting that the monks escaped the famine by migrating "to other places especially coastal areas or places near to the rivers & [*sic*] sea."[78] Although Champakalakshmi suggested that the migration avoided such areas of Buddhist concentration and followed trade routes along the interior, it is also possible that it is precisely because they traveled through areas that later became associated with Buddhism that we lack archaeological and epigraphic evidence.

As a working hypothesis, let us suggest that during the 4th to 3rd centuries BCE, the coastal areas and particularly the hillsides of the Eastern Ghats were home to some Jain communities. With the rise of Buddhism as a political and economic power under the patronage of Aśoka and the Śātavāhanas in the 3rd century BCE, these settlements became Buddhist centers. In fact, archaeological evidence from Andhra Pradesh suggests a close association and appropriation of early Jaina centers by Buddhists during this intervening period.[79]

The early prescriptive scriptures on the movement of Jain monks also support the notion of a migration route along the coast. In the *Ācārāṅga-Sūtra* (II.3.1,2) it stresses that a monk should remain stationary during the four months of the monsoon or rainy season and engage in a life of constant wandering for the remaining eight months.[80] While moving, a monk must be extremely cautious not to inflict injury on any living thing. As a result, monks are discouraged from walking on grass and traversing through dense forests. Monks are also advised not to engage in worldly affairs during their mendicancy. For example, they should avoid traveling through politically unstable regions and also avoid revealing particular information to strangers about the towns through which they have traveled. There are also a number of prescriptions regarding travel by boat.[81] Dixit notes that if a monk is travelling by boat and the boatmen and his fellow travelers ask him to help maneuver the craft, "even at the risk of being thrown out into the water,"[82] he should refuse. What is gleaned from these sections of the *Ācārāṅga-Sūtra* is that during the early period of Jainism monks were quite mobile. However, this movement was limited by the concern for the life of other beings. Movement by watercraft eliminates the concerns of trampling small creatures under foot. Therefore, it is quite possible that the earliest Jain migrants traveled to South India along the coasts and river-ways.

As noted above, during his time as a wandering ascetic, Mahāvīra is said to have visited many cities in the modern states of eastern Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal. This area roughly corresponds to the Ganga River Valley. Moving south from Patna (ancient *Pāṭalīpura*) in Bihar, the group would have traveled through the modern states of Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. In order to assess the credibility of this hypothesized migration route along the eastern littoral, it is necessary to examine the archaeological evidence in closer detail.

V. Archaeological Evidence for an Eastern Migration Route South Orissa

If one were to travel directly south from the ancient Jaina city of Pāṭalīpura (modern Patna, Bihar) one would reach the coast at Puri, Orissa. Therefore, it is quite significant on Udaigiri hill, just south of the Mahanandi River and about 60 km north of Puri, is the famous inscription of Mahāmeghavāhana Khāravela at the Baā Hāthīgumphā ('Big Elephant Cave'). Detailed analysis of this inscription by Sashi Kant suggests a date of c. 172 BCE.[83] Within the inscription there are numerous references to Jainism.[84] Most predominant is the invocation at the beginning of the inscription: "*Namo Arihaṁtānaṁ Namo sava-Sidhānaṁ.*" This is reminiscent of the first two lines of the *Namokar mantra* or *Pañca-namaskāra* hymn of the Jains. Kant contends that this inscription is "the earliest preserved record for this hymn in its traditional form."[85] This fact, along with the notation of dates in V.N. (Vikram Nirvāṇa, i.e. Mahāvīra Era) and the record of donations and associations with Jains and Jain forms of worship confirm beyond doubt that Khāravela was a Jain as well as a great patron of Jainism.

Aside from the famous Hāthīgumphā inscription, there are also a number of other Jain inscriptions at Udaigiri hill dating between the 2nd century BCE and 10th century CE.[86] According to Dundas, although the architectural remains in Orissa suggest the continued presence of Jains until c. 16th century, the "region's contribution to the historical development of Jainism remained comparatively minor."[87]

Andhra Pradesh

According to Jawaharlal, Andhra was home to a community of Jains as early as 4th century BCE.[88] Moreover, "The early Jain monks were mostly highlanders and preferred natural caves, for their stay on the tops of the hills, which were inaccessible."[89] The rock-shelters and caves located along the Eastern Ghats of Andhra Pradesh may have served as temporary refuges for the Jain mendicants. What distinguish the Jain caves in Andhra from those of the Buddhists are the rock-cut beds and inscriptions. Jawaharlal suggests that these rock-cut beds were used in observing the vow of *sallekhanā*, fasting until death.[90]

At present, there are only three sets of Jain caves in Andhra that date prior to the 5th century CE. The first is a natural cave at Malkoṇḍa in Prakasam district, which contains an unspecified number of rock-cut beds inside. The cave is located on a hill and has a prepared drip ledge and a smoothed interior floor. A drip ledge is necessary during the rainy season to direct water downward, across the front of the cave. Without a drip ledge the water will follow the curve of the rock and flow into the cave. On the drip ledge there is an inscription in Brahmi characters dating to c. 3rd century BCE.[91] According to Jawaharlal, the record is a donation by Sri Vīri-Sēthi, son of Nanda Sēthi of the Aruvāhila-kula. Jawaharlal associates the Aruvāhila-kula with the Aruva caste and from this to the Aravās, a Telegu name for Tamils.[92] Extending this reasoning further, this inscription therefore attests to the support of a Jain monastic community in central Andhra Pradesh by a patron of Tamil origin.

Another cave, locally referred to as Munulagutta ('the hill of ascetics') in Kapparaopet, Karimnagar district contains the remains of four rock-cut beds with low pillows. There are no inscriptions. However, some Śātavāhana coins dating between the 2nd and 1st centuries BCE were discovered nearby.[93] This hill may therefore date back to roughly this period. On the other hand, Karimnagar is located in the heartland of the Śātavāhana Empire. Therefore, the presence of Śātavāhana coins is not surprising and their location near the cave may be purely coincidental.

A series of caves on a hill at Jilakaragudem in West Godavari district, called the Guṇṭupaḷḷi caves, were originally attributed to the Buddhists. However, there is an inscription engraved on one of the faces of a limestone shaft which records the grant of the maṇḍapa by Chula-goma, the recorder of Mahāmekhavāhana Kalinga chief Sada. The title of a Mahāmekhavāhana from Kalinga reminds one of the famous Hāthīgumphā inscription of Mahāmeghavāhana Khāravela from Orissa, mentioned above. Because Khāravela was a great patron of Jainism, Jawaharlal reasons that the Mahāmekhavāhana chief in this inscription may have also been a Jain. If so, this would suggest that the cave bearing this inscription may have initially been inhabited by Jains.[94] Moreover, if this chief Sada was a descendant in the line of Khāravela, then this inscription could be dated to some point after the 2nd century BCE. However, the Mahāmeghavāhana dynasty ruled Kalinga up until the early 5th century CE. Therefore, it is possible that this inscription dates from a later period when Jainism was not patronized by Mahāmeghavāhanas and thus the cave may have only been inhabited by Buddhists and not Jains.[95]

The majority of archaeological and epigraphic evidence[96] from Andhra Pradesh related to Jainism seems to date from the 9th to 12th centuries CE.[97] Desai explains this 'gap' in evidence as due to

the unfavorable conditions to Jainism in the interceding periods.[98] Between 3rd century BCE and 3rd century CE, Andhra Pradesh was under the influence of the Śātavāhana, who were primarily supporters of Buddhism. The Ikṣvākus who succeeded the Śātavāhana were also great patrons of Buddhism, as demonstrated by inscriptions at their capital of Vijayapuri (Nāgārjunakoṇḍa). The Śātavāhana, Viṣṇukuṇḍins and the Pallavas, who ruled between the 3rd and 7th centuries CE were followers of the Brahmīnical traditions. Ājīvikas had also settled in substantial numbers in the Nellore District in the 5th century CE. Thus, due to competition with Buddhists, Brahminical sects and Ājīvikas, Jainism remained without significant patronage until the rise of the Chalukyas.

Tamil Nadu

The earliest evidences of Jainism in Tamil Nadu are also some of the oldest historical records in South India.[99] These consist of a series of approximately 100 cave inscriptions written in Tamil-Brahmi that record donations of various kinds to Jaina monastic communities. These Jaina inscriptions date from c. 3rd century BCE. The contents and contexts of these inscriptions have been described in detail by P.B. Desai,[100] K.V. Ramesh,[101] I. Mahadevan[102] and A. Ekambaranathan.[103] Here it will suffice to highlight some of the major sites.

Mahadevan has classified the inscriptions at Mangulam, Madurai district, as the earliest rock-cut Tamil-Brahmi cave inscriptions. Based on linguistic and paleographic features, he suggests a date c. 2nd century BCE.[104] The hill at Mangulam, locally known as Kalugumalai, has a total of five caves, four of which have inscriptions and rock-cut beds. One of the caves contains 31 beds.[105] The inscriptions are written in a bold, clear, script on a boulder over the main cavern and on a boulder of the lowermost cavern. The content of the inscriptions suggests that the caves were part of a monastic community whose leader was named Kaninanta. One of the caves contains a centrally located rock-cut bed, which Ekambaranathan surmises may have been meant for a person of honor.[106]

The inscriptions at Mangulam are significant because they show how the early monastic communities in Tamil Nadu were patronized by local merchants and people associated with the ruling elite. Two inscriptions (nos. 3 & 6)[107] identify their donors as members of the merchant guild (*nikama*) of Vellari. Two inscriptions (nos. 1 & 2) record that the *paḷḷi* (Jaina monastic residence), dedicated to Kaninanta, was caused to be carved by associates, specifically an officer and the father of a brother-in-law, of a man named Nēṭuñcāḻiyaṇbṉ/ Nēṭuñcāḻiyaṇbṉ. Scholars have identified this man as the Pāṇḍyan king Nēṭuñcāḻiyaṇbṉ, who ruled in. 2nd century BCE.

The second major Jain site in Tamil Nadu is located at Alagarmalai, Madurai district. It is considered to be one of the eight sacred Jaina hills. Atop the hill is a large cavern with approximately eight rock-cut beds inside and eight rock-cut beds outside. A total of 15 inscriptions from between 2nd and 1st centuries BCE have been carved on the rock face of the exterior of the cave. A group of 13 inscriptions (nos. 36 to 48) record endowments of various merchant groups. The donors of these inscriptions include a variety of people from Madurai, such as a goldsmith (no. 36), a salt merchant (no. 39), an accountant (no. 40), a Jain nun (no. 41), a trader in molasses (no. 42) and trader in ploughshares (no. 43). One inscription was donated by a cloth

merchant from Venpalli (no. 46). Like the earlier inscriptions at Mangulam, these records also demonstrate the support of Jain monasteries by local merchant communities.[108]

In addition to the inscriptions at Mankulam and Alagarmalai, there are 29 more inscriptions associated with Jain caves that date from this early period of c. 2nd to 1st centuries BCE. The majority of these early inscriptions cluster around the ancient Pālya capital of Madurai in Madurai district. There are also five inscriptions from Madurai district dated to c. 1st to 2nd centuries CE. Between 2nd and 3rd centuries CE there are 19 inscriptions. Of these, the most significant are the inscriptions at Pukalur in Tiruchirappalli district.

In Pukalur, a hill known as Arunattarmalai has a group of about eight caves containing a number of rock-cut beds. The inscriptions at Pukalur are located on the rock-face outside the caves as well as engraved along the ends of the rock-cut beds. This site has become particularly renowned due to two of the inscriptions (nos. 61 & 62) that refer to Chēra kings mentioned in the *Patiṟṟupattu*, a poetic anthology of panegyrics in Classical Tamil dated (c. 2nd to 5th centuries CE). Other inscriptions at the caves (nos. 69 & 70) record donations to the *paḷḷi* from a gold merchant from Karur and an oil merchant. Therefore, like the inscriptions of Madurai district, it seems that the merchants and ruling elite of the Chēra capital of Karur (located 15 km southwest of Pukalur) were also devoted patrons of Jaina monasteries.

Based on the epigraphic evidence, I would argue that these early Jain caves and the beds within them were used primarily as spaces for contemplation and study rather than *sallekhanā*, as suggested by Jawaharlal for the Andhra caves. None of the early inscriptions (c. 3rd century BCE to 4th century CE) mention *sallekhanā*. The first inscription in Tamil Nadu that mentions death by fasting (*nisītikai*) is from Tirunatarkunram, South Arcot district and dates to c. 5th or 6th century CE. As noted above, the caves are concentrated around the capital cities of the early polities, particularly the Pāṇḍyan capital of Madurai and the Chēra capital of Karur. The spatial distribution of these early caves also appears to correspond to ancient trade routes.[109] All of this data strongly suggests substantial connections between the early Jain monastics and the growing Jain lay community who helped to support them.

Evidence for the presence of Jains in Tamil Nadu, despite historical narratives that suggest a large exodus of the Jains in the 10th century CE, is continuous from the 3rd century BCE to the present day. Kundakunda is said to have traveled through the Pāṇḍya, Chōḷa and Chēra regions of Tamil Nadu and Kerala in the latter half of the 1st century CE.[110] A key moment in the history of Jainism in Tamil Nadu was the formation of the Drāviḍa sangha in Madurai c. 470 CE.[111] Following this, there is a considerable rise in Jaina inscriptions and in texts attributed to Jaina authors. The Pallavas of Kāñcī and the Pāṇḍya rulers of Madurai were great patrons of Jainism in the 6th to 7th centuries CE.[112] It is also around this time that the Jains began to adopt the temple "as their main institutional base for survival as a socio-religious force."[113]

Despite the rise of *bhakti* and Brahminical Hinduism in South India in the 7th to 8th centuries, Jain temples continued to receive land grants and generous donations from patrons.[114] In fact,

between the 8th and 9th centuries there is a considerable rise in the creation of new Jain monastic centers with rock-cut temples, images of the *tīrthaṅkaras* and other deities.[115] According to Champakalakshmi, their pattern of distribution is along routes connecting northern and southern Tamil Nadu, from North Arcot district in the north-east to Kanyakumari district in the south-west.[116] Such routes no doubt were part of a larger sacred landscape of Jain *tīrthas* and pilgrimage sites.

VI. Preliminary Conclusions

The archaeological and epigraphic evidence suggest that there indeed could have been a migration route that traveled south from Orissa, through Andhra Pradesh and into Tamil Nadu along the Eastern Ghats. The earliest evidence from Orissa dates to c. 2nd century BCE, that from Andhra to c. 3rd century BCE and from Tamil Nadu to c. 2nd to 3rd centuries BCE. While the initial migration to South India is often dated to c. 4th century BCE, the epigraphic evidence presented here suggests a date of c. 3rd to 2nd centuries BCE.

While the evidence is quite uneven, it seems that there is stronger evidence for the presence of Jains in Andhra Pradesh in the early centuries BCE than for Jains in Karnataka. Desai's explanation for the gap in evidence for Jainism in Andhra Pradesh seems quite plausible. If Jain centers were overshadowed and/or appropriated by the Buddhists in the later centuries, it may be helpful to examine in more detail remains from Buddhist sites to see if there are any iconographic or figural representations that would suggest the presence of Jains.

Overall, the task of historical reconstruction is arduous and daunting. However, thanks to the tremendous efforts of previous scholars, we have a strong foundation on which to build.

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2. Natubhai Shah, *Jainism: The World of Conquerors*, Volume 1 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), p.13.
3. Lawrence A. Babb, *Absent Lord: Ascetics and Kings in a Jain Ritual Culture*, Comparative Studies in Religion and Society. 8 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press,1996), p.42.
4. Shugan Chand Jain and P.S. Surana, eds., *Jain Legend: Jain Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa of ācāryaśrī Hastī Mala Jī*, 4 vols., vol. 1: Era of ford-maker, Relating to Tirthaṅkaras (Jaipur: Samyak Jnana Pracharak Mandal, 2011), p.31.
5. Shah, *Jainism*, p.13.
6. Babb, *Absent Lord*, p.42.
7. Jain and Surana, eds., *Jain Legend: Jain Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa of Ācārya śrī Hastī Mala Jī*, p.23.
8. V. K. Sharma, *History of Jainism: With Special Reference to Mathura*, Reconstructing Indian History & Culture; No. 23 (New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, 2002), p.25.
9. Shugan Chand Jain, "Historical Background of Jainism," in *Study Notes V.5.0: Selected Papers on Jainism* (Delhi: International School for Jain Studies, 2012). However, the Jain literature describes Zcabha as having lived "more than one hundred billion oceans of yearsago"(Buhler 1903, *On the Indian sect of the Jainas*, 7, cited in Sharma, *History of Jainism*, 47-8).

10. Sharma, *History of Jainism*, 55.
11. This date is taken from Paul Dundas, *The Jains* (London: Routledge, 1992), 23. However, the chronology of the Jaina canon is a subject of some debate.
12. Sharma, *History of Jainism*, 56.
13. Dundas, *The Jains*, 18.
14. Shah, *Jainism: The World of Conquerors*, 26.
15. Jeffery D. Long, *Jainism: An Introduction*, First ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 30. Sharma, *History of Jainism: With Special Reference to Mathura*, 56.16 Long, *Jainism: An Introduction*, 30.17 There is some debate about the dates of Mahāvīra's life. According to the Śvetāmbaras, Mahāvīra lived 599-527 BCE. According to the Digambaras, he died in 510 BCE. However, recent Indological scholarship on Buddhism, suggests that the date of Mahāvīra's death should be shifted to as late as 425 BCE (see Dundas, *The Jains*, 24).
18 Dundas, *The Jains*, 24.
19 Ibid., 20.
20 Sharma, *History of Jainism: With Special Reference to Mathura*, 66.
21 This tale is only acknowledged by the Śvetāmbara Jainas.
22 Dundas, *The Jains*, 35.
23 Ibid.
24 Sharma, *History of Jainism: With Special Reference to Mathura*, 68-73.
25. C.f. Ibid., 77-78. And Shugan Chand Jain and P.S. Surana, eds., *Jain Legend: Jain Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa of ācāryaśrī Hastī Mala Jī*, 4 vols., vol. 2: Relating to Omniscient lords and knowers of the prior canons (Jaipur: Samyak Jnana Pracharak Mandal,2011), p.29-30.
26. Jain and Surana, eds., *Jain Legend*, Vol. 2, p.28.
27. Sharma, *History of Jainism: With Special Reference to Mathura*, p.78.
28. Jaini notāhu (Padmanabh S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 46-47. Between Yaśobhadra and Bhadrabāhu, Jain and Surana list Sambhutavijaya (Jain and Surana, eds., *Jain Legend*, Vol. 2, 104). This is the Śvetāmbara list. According to the Digambaras, the five Śrutakevalīs are Viṣṇunandi (aka Nandi), Nandimitra, Aparājita, Govardhana and Bhadrabāhu- I (*ibid.*).
29. Jain and Surana, eds., *Jain Legend: Jain Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa of ācāryaśrī Hastī Mala Jī*, Vol. 1, 14.
30. -----, eds., *Jain Legend: Jain Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa of ācāryaśrī Hastī Mala Jī*, Vol. 2, p.30-
31. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification*, p.50.
32. Dundas, *The Jains*, p.71.
33. Jyoti prasad mentions another council held at the Kumārī Parvata in Kali Ega (Orissa) at the invitation of the emperor Khāravela in the "middle of the second century BC"(2010:23). It is unclear whether he is referring to the council mentioned in the Hathigumpha inscription. This council was said to occur in year 165 (Kant 2000:32), which Kant (2000:36) correlates to 165 VN or 362 BCE. According to Kant, this would be concordant with the Mathura council.
34. Dundas, *The Jains*, p.49.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p.71-72.
37. Desai mentions identifies four different waves traditions regarding the migration from north to south India. Pandurang Bhimarao Desai, *Jainism in South India and Some Jaina*

Epigraphs, Jīvarāja Jaina Granthamālā No. 6 (Sholapur: Gulabchand Hirachand Doshn[for] Jaina Saṁskṛti Saṁrakshaka Sangha, 1957), 1-3.

38. C.f. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification*, 5-6, 277.
39. The specific number of monks is often given as 7,000 (Jain, "Historical Background of Jainism," 43.) or 12,000 (S. Padmanabhan, "Ancient Jain Centres in Kanyakumari," in *Jainism: Art, Architecture, Literature & Philosophy*, ed. Haripriya Rangarajan, G. Kamalakar and A.K.V.S. Reddy (Delhi: Sharada Publishing House, 2001), 202.).
40. Jain, "Historical Background of Jainism," 42.
41. [Study Notes Vol. 1 p. 125].
42. 6thcentury [Study Notes Vol. 1 p. 110] 4th to 5th century [Study Notes Vol. 2 p.261 and 6th vikrama samvat [Study Notes Vol. 2 p.344].
43. [Study Notes Vol. 1 p. 302].
44. Jain and Surana, eds., *Jain Legend: Jain Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa of ācāryaśrī Hastī Mala Jī*, Vol. 2, 33.
45. Ibid., Vol. 2, 142-43.
46. Ibid., Vol. 2, 143.
47. Ibid., Vol. 2, 140-43; 171-76.
48. Ibid., Vol. 2, 144-45; 150-51.
49. Synopsis from Rao Bahadur R. Narasimhachar, "Sravana Belgola," *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society* 13 (1922/23): 441-42.
50. Synopsis from Ibid.: 442.
51. Synopsis from Ibid.
52. Ibid.: 430.
53. Ibid.: 431.
54. R. Champakalakshmi, "Jainism in Tamil Nadu: A Historical Overview," in *Religion, Tradition and Ideology: Pre-Colonial South India*, ed. R. Champakalakshmi (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011). For inscriptions, see *Epigraphia Carnatica* Vol. 2, pp. 36-7, Inscriptions Nos 1, 31, 64, 67, 166, 258; *Epigraphia Carnatica* Vol. 3, Nos 147, 148.
55. Dundas, *The Jains*, 224-25. Champakalakshmi, "Jainism in Tamil Nadu: A Historical Overview," 357.
56. L. Rice, *Indian Antiquary*3 (1874): 153; L. Rice *Epigraphia Carnatica* 2 (1889): 1; J.F. Fleet *Epigraphia Indica* 4 (1896-7): 22.
57. As reproduced and quoted in A.M. Tabard, "Sravana-Belgola," in *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society* (Madras: S.P.C.K. Press, 1912), 16-17.
58. As reproduced and quoted in Ibid., 18.
59. J.F. Fleet, "Remarks on Mr. Rice's Note," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* Jul. (1911): 817. (emphasis added)
60. As described by Narasimhachar, "Sravana Belgola."
61. Ibid.: 441.
62. Ibid.
63. *Epigraphia Carnatica* Vol. 3, Nos. 147, 148.
64. Tabard, "Sravana-Belgola."
65. R. Champakalakshmi, "Jainism in Andhra and Karnataka," in *Religion, Tradition and Ideology: Pre-Colonial South India*, ed. R. Champakalakshmi (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 412.

66. Tabard, "Sravaṇa-Beṭgola," 19. It is perhaps also worth quoting his preceding two sentences here: "The interval is too long after Chandragupta's disappearance from history to admit of an historical link between Sravana-Belgola and the grandfather of Asoka The sooner then [sic] the legend, which has already found its way into some manuals the history of India is eliminated, the better." I heartily agree.
67. Jain and Surana, eds., *Jain Legend: Jain Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa of ācaryaśrī Hastī Mala Jī*, Vol. 2, p.34.
68. Ibid., Vol. 2, p.36.
69. Champakalakshmi, "Jainism in Tamil Nadu: A Historical Overview," p.357.
70. Ibid.
71. A.K. Chatterjee, "Historical Significance of Early Jaina Kadamba Inscriptions," in *Parshvanath Vidyapith Swarna Jayanti Granth*, ed. Sagarmal Jain and Ashok Kumar Singh (Varanasi: Parshwanath Shodhpith, 1994).
72. Sharma, *History of Jainism: With Special Reference to Mathura*, p.89.
73. J. Manuel and O.P. Mishra, "A Temporo Spatial Analysis of Jaina Archaeological Remains in Central India," in *Jainism: Art, Architecture, Literature & Philosophy*, ed. Haripriya Rangarajan, G. Kamalakar, and A.K.V.S. Reddy (Delhi: Sharada Publishing House, 2001), p.172.
74. Sharma, *History of Jainism: With Special Reference to Mathura*, p.86.
75. Ibid., p.88.
76. Ibid.
77. Dundas, *The Jains*, p.113.
78. Jain and Surana, eds., *Jain Legend: Jain Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa of ācāryaśrī Hastī Mala Jī*, p.143.
79. For example, the caves at Guntupalli. See G. Jawaharlal, *Jainism in Andhra: As Depicted in Inscriptions* (Jaipur: Prakrita Bharati Academy, 1994), p.37.
80. K. K. Dixit, *Early Jainism*, 1st ed., L.D. Series (Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology, 1978), p.58.
81. *Jaina Sutras*, trans. Hermann Jacobi, 2 vols., vol. 1, Unesco Collection of Representative Works: Indian Series (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1968; reprint, Motilal Banarsidass 1968), Book 2, Lecture 3, Lesson 1: 13-21, Lesson 2:1-3. Specifically, boats are mentioned with regard to crossing rivers, rather than traveling down them.
82. Dixit, *Early Jainism ācārāṅga* II.3.1.p.726-35.
83. Shashi Kant, *The Hathigumpha Inscription of Kharavela and the Bhabru Edict of Asoka:A Critical Study*, 2nd revised ed. (New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, 2000), p.46.
84. Ibid., p.65-72.
85. Ibid., p.65.
86. Desai, *Jainism in South India and Some Jaina Epigraphs*, p.18.
87. Dundas, *The Jains*, 113.
88. G. Jawaharlal, "Jain Caves of Andhra," in *Jainism: Art, Architecture, Literature & Philosophy*, ed. Haripriya Rangarajan, G. Kamalakar, and A.K.V.S. Reddy (Delhi: Sharada Publishing House, 2001), p.133.
89. Ibid.
90. ----, *Jaina Monuments of Andhra* (Delhi: Sharada Pub. House, 2002), p.48.
91. *Annual Report of South Indian Epigraphy* 1937-38, No. 531; *Epigraphia Andhrica*, Vol.IV.
92. Jawaharlal, "Jain Caves of Andhra," p.134.

93. *Journal of the Epigraphical Society of India*, Vol. IV, pp. 136 ff.
94. Jawaharlal, *Jainism in Andhra: As Depicted in Inscriptions*, p.188.
95. Jawaharlal also discusses another cave in a hill in Konaku Gla in Anantapur district. He claimsthat this "wide natural cave" was originally "the domicile of the famous saint Kundakundācharya" (2001:135). However, this cave is also "devoid of any carvings "and the earliest antiquities found in its vicinity date from the 12thcentury CE (ibid.). The attribution of this cave to Kundakunda (see Jawaharlal 1994:88-89), is only possible if we agree with Jawaharlal's reasoning that Kundakunda's original name was Padmanandin. The first scholar to identify Konakulla as the birthplace of Kundakunda was Upadhye (see A.N. Upadhye(ed.), *Pravacanasāra*, Introduction.)
96. For discussion of archaeological finds see Desai, *Jainism in South India*, 15-17. For discussion of the epigraphic evidence see Desai, *Jainism in South India*, 17-14 and Jawaharlal, *Jainism in Andhra: As Depicted in Inscriptions.*
97. H. Sarkar extends the high period of Jainism in Andhra Pradesh from the 7th to 14th centuries CE (H. Sarkar, "Glimpses of Jaina Vestiges in Andhradesa," *Nirgrantha* 2 (1996): 70.).
98. Desai, *Jainism in South India and Some Jaina Epigraphs*, 18-19.
99. Most inscriptions have been dated on the basis of "archaic linguistic and paleographic features "(I. Mahadevan, *Early Tamil Epigraphy: From the Earliest Times to the Sixth Century A.D.* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 7.). However, inscriptions on burial ceramics at the site of Porunthal, excavated by K Rajan have pushed the date of the earliest Tamil-Brahmi scripts back to 5th century BC, see Kavita Kishore, "Porunthal Excavations Prove Existence of Indian Scripts in 5th Century Bc," *The Hindu*, October 15, 2011 2011. One of the inscribed pots contained grains of paddy. This paddy was dated using AMS (accelerated mass spectrometry) at the Beta Analytic Laboratory to 450 BCE (Rajan personal communication).
100. Desai, *Jainism in South India and Some Jaina Epigraphs.*
101. K.V. Ramesh, "Appendix: Jaina Epigraphs in Tamil," in *Jaina Literature in Tamil*, ed. A. Chakravarti (Mysore: Bharatiya Jnanapitha Publication, 1974).
102. Iravatham Mahadevan, "Corpus of the Tamil-Brahmi Inscriptions," in *Kalvemmuk Karuttaranku*, ed. R. Nagaswamy (Madras: Madras Books, 1968). Mahadevan, *Early Tamil Epigraphy.*
103. A. Ekambaranathan and C. K. Sivaprakasam, *Jaina Inscriptions in Tamilnadu: A Topographical List* (Madras: Research Foundation for Jainology, 1987). A. Ekambaranathan, *Jainism in Tamilnadu: Art and Archaeology* (Mississauga: Jain Humanities Press, 1996). --, *Jaina Archaeological Heritage of Tamilnadu* (Lucknow: Published on behalf of the Dept. of Ancient History and Archaeology, [University of Madras] by Shri Bharatvarshiya Digamber Jain (Teerth Sanrakshini) Mahasabha, 2005).
104. Mahadevan, *Early Tamil Epigraphy*, 7.
105. Ekambaranathan, *Jainism in Tamilnadu: Art and Archaeology*, 5.
106. Ibid.
107. Unless otherwise specified, the nos. provided relate to Mahadevan's catalogue in *Early Tamil Epigraphy.*
108. Mahadevan, *Early Tamil Epigraphy*, 15.
109. This has been confirmed on the basis of my own spatial analysis as well as the work of Rajan and Yatheeskumar K. Rajan and V.P. Yathees Kumar, "Cultural Transformation

from Iron Age to Early Historic Times: A Case Study of the Vaigai River Valley, Tamil Nadu," in *New Dimensions in Tamil Epigraphy*, ed. Appasamy Murugaiyan (Chennai: Cre- A:, 2012), 174.

110. Champakalakshmi, "Jainism in Tamil Nadu: A Historical Overview," 363.
111. Ibid., 364.
112. Ibid., 365.
113. Ibid., 367.
114. For a detailed analysis of such donational inscriptions in comparison to those of Buddhists and Hindus, see Leslie Orr, "Women's Wealth and Worhship: Female Patronage of Hinduism, Jainismand Buddhism in Medieval Tamilnadu," in *Faces of the Feminine in Ancient, Medieval and Modern India*, ed. Mandakranta Bose (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
115. Champakalakshmi, "Jainism in Tamil Nadu: A Historical Overview," 375.
116. Ibid.

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Whitehead's Constructive Metaphysics for an Emerging Jain Diapsora Community

Rafael Reyes III

[*The past century has witnessed the growth of about three million Diaspora Jains, spreading through out the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, East Africa as well as West-South and South-East Asia. This has led to the emergence of thought, prehending of multifarious ideas and experiences. As a result, there are visible differences between traditions of Orthodox Jains and Diaspora Jains. This deference may be expressed Anne Valley's chapter, title From liberation to ecology; Ethical discourses among Orthodox and Daispora Jain. Here he deals with diferences between the two.*

For its treatment, the present paper takes the basis of philosophy of organism, constructive metaphysics of Alfred North Whiteheed, treated in his work 'Religion in the making'. This paper has underlined the marked differences through the respective version of famous story of 22nd Tīrthaṅkara Neminātha. Through the analysis of both the versions it is derived that the emphasis of Orthodox Jainism is on ahiṁsā, aprigraha and anekāntavāda with central focus on liberation. While Daispora Jains are socio-centric. The response of Neminath to the cry of animal is also different. The problems discussed here in, to mark differences between traditional and Orthodox Jains are creativity, tradition and novelity, ontology and relationality.

The author concludes that Whitehead's constructive metaphysics provides a dynamic process to experience, define and refine the Diaspora Jain philosophy as well as religion, developing a way of life that espouses the three views of ahiṁsā, aprigraha and anekāntavāda.]

Jainism as a religious and philosophical system is at an emergent period. In *Jains in India and Abroad: A Sociological Introduction*, Prakash C. Jain states that within the past century the growth of Diaspora Jains has been estimated at about 3 million, spreading throughout the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, East Africa, as well as West, South and South-East Asia.[1] With this emergent growth comes another emergence; an emergence of thought, a prehending of multifarious ideas and experiences which have shaped diaspora Jains to express differences and push against certain traditions of classical Jains.

In *Religion in the Making*, Alfred North Whitehead writes that religion as expressed in human history goes through four sides or factors of itself. It ia ritual of sorts: ritual, emotion, belief and rationalization. These stages are gradual and increase in emphasis as Whitehead writes, "But certainly, when we go far enough back, belief and rationalization are completely negligible and emotion is merely a secondary result of ritual. Then emotion takes the lead and the ritual is for the emotion which it generates. Belief then makes its appearance as explanatory of the complex of ritual and emotion and in this appearance of belief we may discern the germ of rationalization."[2] Whitehead and I myself, use this way of understanding the emergence of

religion. It moves through stages from ritual to rationalization, forming an intricate system of understanding the world around them. However, it is the last stage, the stage of rationalization, which is the most important and most dynamic, for it is the rational reorganization of beliefs and rituals to make sense of life, making it coherent so that ones thoughts and conduct are narrowed, intensified and clear.[3]

Traditional Jainism as a religion is a mature, rational religion, with its canonical texts, commentaries, codes of conduct and apologetic tomes. It has certainly shaped generations of persons in India. However, to those in the diaspora movement, it is once again going through this 4th stage of emergence: How does one who has experienced the other which exists outside of ones own context and religion and merge it with ones own tribal religion, in order that what emerges is a rationalized religion?[4] It is an arduous and adventurous process, one which takes ones own religion and begins to promote "the habit of thinking dispassionately beyond the tribe."[5] The Diaspora Jain, because of its acceptance in the society in which they exist, begin to take in that society as part of who they are and move beyond the regular confines of the Jain tradition. The question that emerges from this and the one in which I would like to think through is this: how can Jain tradition be rethought in order for their to be an expansion or revision of its own system? Can its own system be open to changing times? Can the essence of its own religion engage the current form of Jainism, Diaspora Jainism?

In order to do this, I will first focus on Anne Vallely's chapter titled "From Liberation to Ecology: Ethical Discourses among Orthodox and Diaspora Jains." Vallely provides a succinct summary of both orthodox and diaspora Jains citing differences between the two. Although her intended goal is how each group derives at the importance of nature, I will rather use her work to ground my discussion for its philosophical and religious value. erence where I believe diaspora Jainism cannot accept the individual focus of *mokṣa*, liberation of the world, when the importance of *ahiṁsā, aparigraha and anekāntvāda* are reimagined in a new context. I will then introduce, as I have already in a sense done, Alfred North Whitehead, whose working definition of metaphysics and philosophical system is both congruent with, yet provides a certain distinction in the focus of a philosophy of organism. It grounds rationality in experience, seeks complexity over simplicity, novelty over tradition and relationality in the complex tension with singularity. It is a philosophy that is process oriented, but does not deny the permanence of actuality. What is emphasized are the "Evanescence, becoming, incessant novelty and 'perpetual perishing'...[are the] experiences [which] are themselves our fundamental points of reference."[6] In the liberation centric model notions such as the end of becoming (rebirth), novelty (the new, the never before seen, the addition of what was not known prior) and perishing (death), are problems to be remedied. In Whitehead's system they are the points of reference for what is to become.

Traditional and Diaspora Jainism

What is most important that I would like to bring out of Vallely's chapter is the rendering of the wedding story of Nemi Kumar, who became the twenty-second *Tīrthaṅkara Arhat* Neminath. I will cite the orthodox telling of the story, followed by the diaspora version.[7] "Nemi Kumar saw that on the side of the road there were large fenced-cages full of wailing animals and birds.

Filled with sympathy and compassion, he asked the elephant driver why the animals and birds were being kept? He inormed him that the creatures were collected to be butchered for meat to be served to the gests attending his marriage. Nemi Kumar was filled with despair and a feeling of detachment. He said to the elephant driver, 'If I agree to be the cause of the butchering of so many living beings, my life and the one to come will be filled with pain and misery. Therefore, I will not marry. Immediately arrange for the release of all these creatures. Return home to Dwarka.' The driver opened the gates of the cages. The animals ran away into the jungle. The driver came back and turned the elephant towards Dwarka. On the way Nemi Kumar took off all the valuables and ornaments on his body and handed them over to the elephant driver. The news spread panic in the marriage procession. All the seniors of the Yadav clan tried to change the mind of Nemi Kumar, but in vain. Nemi Kumar said to them, "As these animals were prisoners in iron cages, we all are prisoners in the cages of *karma* which is much stronger. See the feeling of joy evident in the animals released from the cages. Know that happiness is in freedom, not in bondage. I want to tread the path of breaking this bondage of *karma* and embrace eternal bliss.' One day, not long afterwards, he stood under an Ashoka tree before many onlookers. There he removed his clothes and pulled out five fistfuls of hair, initiating himself as an ascetic. He spent the next 54 days in deep spiritual practices, meditating and fasting without any attachment to his body. On the fifteenth day of the dark half of the month of Ashvin, while observing a two day fast and meditating, he became an omniscient. He became the twenty-second Tīrthaṅkara, known as '*Arhat Neminath.*'"

Here is the diaspora version:

"The Prince was sitting calmly in his chariot, which his charioteer was driving. Suddenly Prince Nemi Kumar heard animal noises which got louder as they got nearer. They soon saw where the noises were coming from. Prince Nemi Kumar asked the procession to stop and listen. Hundreds of animals and birds were packed tightly in cages. There were fish in large tanks. The animals seemed frightened and restless. Their eyes were pleading. The Prince asked his friends why these animals and birds were captured. He was told they were for his wedding feast.This saddened the Prince, who was very kind and sensitive. The frightened sheep seemed to say, 'We will be slaughtered for this prince's feast.' A beautiful deer had his eyes full of tears, as if he was pleading, 'I don't want to be killed, I want to go back to the forest and roam free.' Beautiful green parrots were flying here and there in their cages trying to find a way out. A wise bull seemed to be saying, 'These men are cruel. They cry when their children die, but how can they kill our children? Why can't they eat only plants and fruits, as we do? How can they claim to be superior to us when they kill us all the time?' The kind Prince could bear it no longer. His heart was crying at the pain and fear the poor animals were suffering. He climbed down from his chariot and walked towards the cages. The animals quietened down, seeing such a stately but kind and loving figure walking towards them. They knew that they need no longer be frightened. The Prince opened the cages and let the animals and birds out. He told his men to return the fish to the sea without harming them. The birds flew out happy and free. The animals ran into the forest. They all seemed to be thanking the Prince for saving them. Just then

King Ugrasen, the Princess's father, came to meet the Prince. He saw the Prince releasing the animals and asked, 'Why have you released these animals, O Prince?" The Prince replied, 'How can we humans rejoice when so many animals are suffering? How can we humans feast on these innocent animals and birds we are meant to protect? What use is happiness if it is built on the suffering of so many?' With this the Prince turned his chariot and went back. The wedding was called off. After some time, the Prince became a monk. Princess Rajimati followed in his footsteps and became a nun. The Prince Nemi Kumar was none other than the 22nd Tīrthaṅkara Bhagvan Neminath."

Orthodox Jainism

Although both stories are similar, there is a marked difference in the outcome which, if we go back far enough, tells us about the central tenets they are trying to portray. The purpose of Jain narrative literature is to use it as a didactic tool, using case based logic, to make doctrine understandable.[8] For Orthodox Jainism, the focus is on liberation of the soul. The story used is that of the wedding of Nemi Kumar. The logic is found in the if/then statement, highlighting the doctrine of *ahiṁsā, aparigraha* and *anekāntavāda* (if in an indirect way). The practice that needs to be done is found in Nemi Kumar's giving away of his possessions to the elephant driver and becoming an ascetic monk, stating that "happiness is in freedom, not in bondage. I want to tread the path of breaking this bondage of *karma* and embrace eternal bliss." However, what grounds the doctrine of ahimsa, aparigraha and anekantvad is the outcome for Nemi; it is his soul which is at stake.

In Orthodox Jainism, the most fundamental factor of all things is that the universe is made up of two classes, *jīva* and *ajīva* (matter). The *jīva* is an invisible eternal substance, which can neither be created nor be destroyed. It cannot be perceived by the senses, but has all the qualities of *cetanā* (sentiency) and *upayoga* (manifestation of con- sciousness), as well as *darśana* (intuition or indeterminate perception) and *jñāna* (cognition or definite knowledge).[9]

However, its form or mode changes. It begins in a very simple mode, for example, of a single sensed being and can become as detailed as a five-sensed being, a man. The process by which the *jīva* is able to change modes through *ajīva* matter. The soul is connected to matter through time in its path to liberation, called mokṣa. The reason that mokṣa is necessary is because the soul is connected to matter and matter has obscured the soul from knowing its true potential as liberated. Liberation of matter, in the forms of *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of rest), *ākāśa* (space) and *kāla* (time), can only be achieved through human form and through the process of religious practices that remove *karma* from the soul, which are practiced by followers of the Jain religion, householder and to a more strict degree Śvetāmbara or Digambara monks.

For the orthodox Jains, the goal of reaching liberation can only be found within the self and it is through a process of awareness, awareness that outside of the self exists other *jīvas* seeking liberation and that in every act one does, one performs a violence in some way to one another, another *jīva*. Because of this, the body attracts *karma*, whether good or bad, which deters one from reaching mokṣa. The only way to attain this liberation, to understand full knowledge and

full happiness, is to remove oneself from harming other, to lessen their influence in the world and in each reincarnation, to perform good deeds and ultimately, to get to the place where one can become a monk to go through the final stages of liberation. For only as a monk can one break away from the world, performing the final religious practices which highlight non-attachment, non-violence and *anekāntavāda.*

Jain philosophy grounds knowledge in the soul. The soul is both the knower and the known, in that the knower takes in knowledge and knows. It is not the component of matter per say. Matter is but the medium for the soul to take in knowledge through the mundane senses. The soul is tantamount to any understanding of knowledge.

The way in which one attains liberation is through the removal of several forms of *karma, (Jñānaavaraṇīya)* Knowledge Obscuring *karma, (Darśanāavaraṇīya)* perception obscuring *karma, (Vednīya)* Feeling *karma, (Mohanīya)* Deluding *karma, (āyu)* Lifespan in four kinds of realms determining *karma, (Nāma)* Physique determining *karma, (gotra)* Status determining *karma* and *(Antarāya)* Hindrance causing *karma.*[10] Each of these *karmas* fall into two groups, obscuring *karma,* which is further defined as *karma* which obscures the soul and non-obscuring *karma, karma* that solely affects the physical body. If the *karma* is obscuring the soul, it affects one in the current and next lives in their pursuit of liberation. Only by performing certain *karma* reducing activities, *saṁvara,* the stoppage of *karma* building. They are achieved by performing these actions which are done by the soul: Stillness, carefulness, *dharma,* contemplation, conquest of suffering, conduct.

The goal of liberation for the soul is to reach full omniscience, to be free from that which hinders, matter and *karma.* Because of this, the soul must go through the process of the removal of *karma* realized in the religious practices, in being a householder, in becoming an ascetic, for in each stage, through the practices, one removes their *karma* and can be liberated. Paul Dundas in his work, *The Jains,* "Omniscience is the end result of a process of self cultivation, in which the individual progresses through the aid of religious ritual, from the state of an inadequate perception of the world to an omniscient knowledge of the world. This is done by removing the negative factors, *karma,* from ones self."[11] What is Omniscience? For Digambara Kundakunda, the experience omniscience is directed towards the individual's inner nature, Dundas sees that the tradition of the fordmakers, from Mahavira and prior, considered omniscience to be in literal sense, "to know and see everything in the universe at all times and in all possible modifications simultaneously...a complete unfettering of the mind."[12]

The analysis of Orthodox Jainism is that their focus is on *ahiṁsā* primarily because of the awareness that the soul is in bondage because of violence that the individual performs. The performance of these actions accrue *karma* and thus the resolve is to perform ahiṁsā through *aparigraha, anekāntavāda* by removing the self away from partaking of the earth. The interaction becomes interesting; because of the awareness of the self as a soul on the path to liberation, one understands that everything else is on the path to liberation and thus by removing oneself from performing any action that may cause violence, one is lessening their karmic bondage and in

addition helping the other *jīvas* move along the path. In one sense, this promotes a self-ethic which has ramifications outside of oneself; yet the path of liberation is the void of any social ethic, precisely because the goal of liberation is to remove oneself from social structures, "[orthodox] Jain ideology is... nonethical, in that the practices it requires of the adept are meant to remove him from structures that render social ethics of any sort possible"[13] Nevertheless, the central focus is to attain liberation, which in achieving it finds omniscience and thus full compassion, full bliss and in the end, removal of matter and reincarnation, the removal from the universe itself. This is the liberation-centric model of Orthodox Jainism.

Socio-centric Diaspora Jainism

The story as depicted by diaspora Jains has a different focus. First, prince Nemi, upon hearing the animals crying, not only felt compassion, which as defined is a concern for the sufferings of the other, but the prince actually felt their pain. He hears, as if through a form of telepathy, the animals thoughts of fearing death, calling out humanity's hypocrisy through food and children. Although it could be translated as the prince through his imagination the voices and words of the animals, a more deeper response maybe one of the relationship between all living beings or in another tone, of actual occasions, what Whitehead would call the things that make up the universe. In "Surrogate Suffering: Paradigms of Sin, Salvation and Sacrifice Within the Vivisection Movement", Antonia Gorman writes, "Yet if relationality (or, in Whiteheadian terms, 'interrelationality') is fundamental....[then] the suffering of the 'one' necessarily becomes the suffering of the many, just as the suffering of the many inevitably effects the well-being of the one."[14] The animal's suffering connotes not the individual awareness that the animal is a *jīva*, although I would include this: rather, it is the fact that prince Nemir is feeling the feelings of the animal as his own suffering that is unique. It is not equating the animals pain that he feels, albeit that is a part, but more so it is the feeling of the animals pain, that its life as part of the web of the universe is in jeopardy and its pain is reverberating across all who are able to hear it.

The second significant difference in the diaspora story is that action performed was by prince Nemi himself. In the orthodox version it is said that prince Nemi ordered the elephant driver to arrange the freeing of the animals. In the diaspora story it is Prince Nemi who, in response to what he had heard, imagined and witnessed, reacts; he first goes to the animals in their cages, which in effect causes a passivizing response in the animals. Finally he opens the cages and the animals are set free. This speaks in two ways: first, Nemi is performing the action of freeing the caged animals. The call to respond cannot be answered by another; each person is involved in the act of responding to the cares of the needy, to non-violence. Second, the fact that he does not call on the charioteer to perform the act, as well as coming close to the animals, suggests that their is no hierarchy in two forms: in the form of action in the world, as stated prior and among animals. We cannot rely on the other to perform the action, we must all be involved in the process. We must all share in active participation of non-violence. In the question of non-violence, violence is done when one forces another to act on behalf of them, as well as violence is performed when we have a hierarchical ethics when we compare humans to non-humans.

The third significant difference is found in Nemi's response when asked why he performed the act of freeing the animals. His response was commensurate to his action, saying, "How can we humans rejoice when so many animals are suffering? How can we humans feast on these innocent animals and birds we are meant to protect? What use is happiness if it is built on the suffering of so many?" The difference here between the first and second story is this: in the first story, in witnessing the freeing of the animals, prince Nemi equated freedom with happiness and thus went through his own process of freedom as performed by Jain monks, which is cessation of the self in the world. In the second story, happiness is not equated to freedom in the same way; freedom can never be individually recognized if their are others in the world who are suffering. Also, if happiness is built on the suffering of others, then happiness is not true happiness. Thus, the connections are not connections of hierarchy and therefore happiness is not found at the uppermost echelon, but rather at its removal.

Vallely, however, critiques the diaspora version for its loss of ascetic values. Because it estranges ascetism, the notion of ahiṁsā in its orthodox version is lost and the focus is on the avoidance of suffering. A preoccupation with the avoidance of suffering is a very modern take, one which holds that suffering is meaningless, opposite of what orthodox Jains would state. For Jains, it may be abominable, but never meaningless, for the universe has a moral order. The idea of suffering presupposes that nature has no moral law and it is the responsibility of humanity to bring moral order to the world of nature.[15] Vallely's final reflection gets at the core of the Jains of North America, that they have shifted its roots from the traditional orthodox Jain ontology and redefined in ways that reflect the concerns of the modern diaspora community.[16]

Although Vallely is correct in her assessment, I would not agree with her entirely. It is because of the interrelationality of western with eastern motifs which suggest a struggle, rather than clear and fully thought out metaphysics and religious system. In the next portion of this paper I suggest several parts of Whitehead's philosophy of organism that work well in this emerging diaspora Jain religion. In the intermingling of two thoughts and ideas, it leads to an experience, an experience that forms a habit. In this case it is the development of a social ethic which takes seriously the ideas of *ahiṁsā, aparigraha* and *anekāntavāda.* But the grounding on which this is built, the religious system, has changed to one of active involvement in the world. The western understanding of suffering, the idea of being this-worldly instead of other-worldly and the inter-relationality of all things seem tantamount to diaspora Jains.

The question from here is this: Can the philosophical and religious system of orthodox Jainism be able to cradle the emergent diaspora Jain community? What are some areas that can be redefined, rethought, in order that the notion of anekāntavāda can be expanded to invite the diaspora Jain community to grow? What will allow the diaspora Jain community to be grounded in their traditions, yet able to have wings to engage other worldly systems in light of anekāntavāda? A return to the past is not the response for diaspora Jains, but amove towards the future requires both roots and wings.[17]

Anekāntavāda and Whitehead Philosophy of Organism in Conversation

The purpose of this paper is not to question the continued existence of Orthodox Jainism. It would be a false statement to say that Orthodox Jainism is in a stagnant state, precisely since in one perspective there is a permanence, in another there is a flux. It is constantly engaging, in acceptance or rejection, the world around it. However, in the case of Diaspora Jains, can the Jain system be open to a notion of faith, knowledge and conduct, which is not predominantly controlled by the Orthodox ascetic tradition, in the form of Karma theory and reincarnation? Can the notion of the soul be decentralized for a notion of the web of souls, that liberation is only found in its all being free from violence?

The orthodox tradition of *anekāntavāda* seems to supply an answer. *Anekāntavāda* asserts that not only are there a plurality of determinate truths, but also that each truth is an indetermination of alternative truths. The notion of multiple viewpoints, that knowledge is always perspectival and ultimate knowledge can only be found upon liberation, will bring forth the notion of multiple viewpoints. The notion of *anekāntavāda* is best explained through the story of the five men and the elephant:

A king once brought five blind men into his courtyard where he had fastened a large elephant and asked them to tell him what it was. Each man touched the elephant and on the basis of their perspective, told the king that he knew this thing to be. The first felt the trunk and declared that it was a huge snake. The second touched the tail and said it was a rope. The third felt the leg and called it a tree trunk. The fourth took hold of the ear and called it a winnowing fan, while the fifth felt the side of elephant and declared it to be a wall. Because each insisted that his claim was correct and truly described the object in question, the five men were soon in the middle of heated argument, unable to resolve the dispute because they failed to recognize that each of their claims was true only from limited perspective.

The blind men are considered as perspectives, each limited by their context, sense, rea- soning, etc. Based on their perspective, they see some form of truth. But these are only partial truths, or tentatively true. For the Jain, the goal is to seek full truth, absolute truth by seeking liberation of the *Jīva* (soul) from *ajīva* (matter). Only then can the soul reach omniscience and thus fully know.

The brilliance of *anekāntavāda* is in its seven-fold argumentation, *syādvāda* and is expressed in these formulas:

1)A pot simply exists in some respect.
2)A pot does not exist in some respect.
3)A pot does exist in one respect and does not exist in another respect.
4)A pot is inexpressible in some respect.
5) A pot exists and is inexpressible in some respect.
6)A pot does not exist and is inexpressible.
7)A pot exists and does not exist and is inexpressible.[18]

Any observation based on the limitation of parts of a picture leads one to a limited conclusion, which often appears wrong from a different perspective. A single conclusion, is a mere part of

the whole truth because it comes from a study of only part. The goal of *anekāntavāda* is to be non-one-sided, to remove preconceptions, biases and theories and place the self in the position of the other. It is a shift of sight to many different perspectives, each unique from the other, to arrive at a new conclusion. As Shugan C. Jain writes, "*Anekāntavāda* is intellectual humility that empowers the user. It is an essential part of being non-violent in our thoughts and words. It shows us why we shouldn't wed ourselves to rigid opinions that disconnect us from reality and stifle the pursuit of fuller understanding."[19]

The problem, however, for diaspora Jains, is that *anekāntavāda* is undergirded by a Jain ontology which is religiously guided by right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. This is what the diaspora Jains have forgone in response to a more modern reflection of *ahiṁsā*, *aparigraha*, *anekāntavāda*. For orthodox Jains, this is not an adequate response, for they are removing the essence of why these vows function in the first place. Is there space in *anekāntavāda* to cradle the emergent diaspora Jains? Or is there a system that can ground them?

However, because of the notion of *anekāntavāda*, is it possible for orthodox Jainism to understand that this movement and the philosophy and ethic they are emergently espousing a part of the multiple viewpoint, that it is another view that expands the understanding and in which they can learn from? Here I would introduce Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, which has the potential to provide a response for diaspora Jains : a constructive metaphysics, creativity, a rethinking of tradition through novelty, a flat ontology and relationality. This can help "solidify" the emergent diaspora Jain community.

Metaphysics

The first area of difference in Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism is in his working definition of metaphysics. Metaphysics deals with the most basic generalities of the universe, the first principles of things, which include abstract concepts such as being, knowing, substance, cause, identity, time and space. The locus of Jain metaphysics is found in Mahāvīra's assertions as to these abstract concepts. They are not falsifiable, as Dundas suggests, specifically because there are texts which attest to Mahāvīra's statements.[20] However, for the diaspora Jain who has disconnected with orthodox Jain ontology and metaphysics, their is a need for a hybrid notion of these same concepts, grounded not in supermen assertions but in one of experience.

Whitehead would agree that any discussion of metaphysics must begin from direct obser- vation, immediate experience. For it is from the immediate experience that thought begins its process and vice versa. Whitehead uses the metaphor of the flight of an airplane to elucidate his metaphysics. It starts from the ground, makes its flight and it again lands. The notion of starting from the ground is the place of particular observation; we start from a point of reference. The second, flight, is Whitehead's creative aspect, imaginative general- ization. The imaginitive is beyond the usual repetitive notion of logical conclusion, it asks the question of applicability beyond from the locus of which it originated. Thus from one area in which it is true/successful, it enlightens observation in other fields for the elucida- tion or the discerning of general principles.[21] The final stage, landing, is once again to enter into observation, checking the conclusions of

said flight, to check for errors, to expand and stimulate thought.

This generalization, however cannot dismiss any form of experience in the interest of the system, but must consider the whole of evidence, so that nothing can be omitted.[22] He rejects supernatural explanations, holding to what he calls the ontological principle: the claim that "actual entities are the only reasons," that "the search for a reason is always the search for an actual fact which is the vehicle of that reason," for "there is nothing which floats into the world from nowhere. Everything in the actual world is referable to some actual entity."[23] This means that empiricism is ultimately correct: all our knowledge comes from experience and there is nothing outside experience, or beyond it. This also suggests that Whitehead seeks to produce a metaphysics that is nonanthropomorphic and nonanthropocentric.

This grounds diaspora Jain ethics in a metaphysics of discovery, grounded in the principles of non-violence, multi-view and non-possession. What will be spoken subsequently will be a further elucidation of how Whiteheadian metaphysics serves the needs of diaspora Jains and possibly providing the cradle for orthodox Jains.

Creativity

In Jain metaphysics, the ultimate in its metaphysical system is the soul. Soul is the animator of matter, the reason for our practices, the end goal for its liberation. It is the essence, the unseen, always showing an aspect of itself, yet when one tries to engage it, it disappears. It is the unseen reality which moves the universe. In Whiteheads Philosophy of Organism, the category of the ultimate is creativity. Creativity is the unseen, the clinamen, what allows the novel to arrive. Because we do not see it, it both induces the process of actualization, as well as the expression of the process.[24]

For Whitehead, Creativity is the universal of universals, the ultimate principle by which "the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity."[25] This notion of creativity embodies, or rather encompasses, the production of novel togetherness. This is distinct, I believe, from the orthodox perspective, since the process of being as both permanence and flux is one way of thinking of process. But for Whitehead, the creation of actuality, the production of novelty requires each individual component par- ticipating in its becoming. It is not the letting go of an atom and the taking of an atom; it is in each event creatively taking in the universe as complex chaos and bringing into a social order, distinct from its prior occasion.

This creativity as the principle of novelty undergirds what we see in the process of diaspora Jains finding their space in Jain religion, philosophy and society. They are taking in their context disjunctively, their upbringing, their western context, the experiences of their daily lives, the issues they are facing, the acts of others and its effects and are ordering it so that they can respond to it in some way. Creativity allows the re-imagination of *ahiṁsā* from a personal, inward response to a social, outward response.

Tradition and Novelty

One of the problems orthodox and diaspora Jains face is how to handle tradition. How can we hold on to the traditions of the past, yet engage the present context in which we live. Orthodox Jainism would probably respond to this that holding on to the traditions of Mahāvīra is tantamount to Jain survival and the notion of the soul. But for Whitehead, to explain why things are the way they are through assertion as well as why we follow them is an explanation by effcient cause and is not by final cause, which is that of the final real reason for why something does what it does. There must be a factor that has never before been given from its past, for the novel introduced "disturbs" the inherited response of the subject. Reflecting Brett Everton's statement, "It is a mistake to view any religious tradition as static or uniform," Jainism is not functioning in a static way, but is very much in flux.[26] However, as its guideposts, *ahiṁsā*, *aparigraha* and *anekāntavāda*, are established in their metaphysical system, it would be difficult to come at the same conclusions of what is of importance, if their is a change to a metaphysical concept, or a change of religious practices. Speaking on tradition and the introduction of an alternative, Whitehead writes, "The depositions of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Hegel, merely mean that ideas which these men introduced into the philosophic tradition must be construed with limitations, adaptations, and inversions, either unknown to them, or even explicitly repudiated by them. A new idea introduces a new alternative and we are not less indebted to a thinker when we adopt the alternative which he discarded. Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher."[27]

To accept tradition without question and to follow in its practices, is just the effcient cause; their is no liveliness to the act. It is in the process of taking tradition and introducing an aspect of the immediate event that makes the actual occassion, the event, alive. It is the how which makes it a final cause, the reason for its becoming, for effecting change its in environment.

For diaspora Jains, the complexity of their situation; western ideals, the essence of the vows of Jainism and their immediate context which constitutes their day to day living require them to hold to the essence of Jainism, which for them are the vows and taking on the new ideals and forming something Jain like.

Flat Ontology

The Ontology of Jainism Jainism, it'relies on several notions, the universe as uncreated, that of *Jīva* and ajīva and several others. It is a universe eternal and everlasting with a universal moral order which exists without a giver and we follow that process through reincarnation to liberation. The most important of these, is the separation of being as *jīva* and *ajīva*. This is a bifurcation of nature, a split which is used to explain world of nature and the world beyond it. Thus centering the being in the soul as the end goal, the purest the ideal to reach towards.

Whitehead finds that the soul is not an adequate reason for freedom, nor in this case happiness. He writes, "Life is a bid for freedom: an enduring entity binds any one of its occassions to the line of its ancestry. The doctrine of the enduring soul with its permanent characteristics is exactly the irrelevant answer to the problem which life presents. That problem is, how can these

be originality? And the answer explains how the soul need be no more original than a stone."[28] In Whitehead's case, why, if the soul seeks freedom, is it bound to its past? The enduring soul is not, in essence the most important.

What Whitehead gives instead a one substance ontology, that of the actual occasion, or the event as it is now called. Actual Occasions are creatures; in the actual becoming of an entity, the "potential unity of many entities in disjunctive diversity-actual and non- actual-acquires the real unity of the one actual entity; so that the actual entity is the real concrescence of many potentials."[29] They are the process of fact and potential, the real and the possible. You cannot bifurcate the two, for the actual is the realized of both the fact and its meaning.

All the stuff of the universe are made up of actual occasions and are all self-caused, *causasui*. And the more complex beings, those such as ourselves have higher grades of intensity; nevertheless, it does not mean higher in importance. For a flat ontology as actual occasions also abandons "the subject-predicate forms of thought, so far as concerns the presupposition that this form is a direct embodiment of the most ultimate characterization of fact. The result is that the substance-quality concept is avoided."[30] A further explanation is necessary. The subject-predicate form means that the subject remains the subject no matter which secondary qualities are attributed to it. It is quite the contrary in Whitehead: there is no stable and essential distinction between subject and object, human or non-human, or between living and non-living. But everything is based on the situation at hand, the event itself at every moment. So their is no human being per say, but rather a socially ordered nexus with high conscious that is an enduring object feeling greater intensity that we call the human being with its qualities, unable to separate one from the other.[31] Because each actual occasion derives it own value from it prehension of the universe, or its context, it has its own ideal, separate from any other actual occasion. There are no two alike. However, the in which it becomes, in which it concresence, is found in the last piece, relationality.

Relationality

Relationality has to do with the coherence of things, how events, prior termed actuaoccasions, or things, are entirely interdependent, yet mutually independent. As stated prior in creativity, the universe is a disjunctive multiplicity of discrete entities and yet are a continuous web of interconnections.[32] In the subject of relationality, neither can be ignored, for the individuality of an entity (event) is just as important at their community.[33] Each and every entity is related, either positively, or negatively, to all other entities in the universe and yet within the network of relationality, the "ultimate metaphysical truth" is atomism.[34]In the process of novelty, the many become one and are increased by one, that is, the universe disjunctively passes into a conjunctive unity.[35]

Both flat ontology and relationality provide the seedbed for diaspora Jains in the interconnectedness of their world around them. The connection of animals to humans need not, as Vallely suggests, lead to the realization that it is humanity alone that can affect change in the world around them. On the contrary, it is the interconnectedness of the world luring actual

occasions, to a process of renewal and change. In the event of the human, who does have a higher intensity of feeling, they feel the feelings of the world around them and are aware that their own actions are the cause of much of the infractions and violence that is present in the world.[36] The lure to action is primarily found in the realization that humans do have greater agency than others, although the ability to act based on emotion, feeling, sympathy, etc., is realized only in humanity, but has been evidenced in other beings as well. Relationality maintains the connection of the individual within the web of the world around them, in one sense making them the center and in another, decentralizing them, specifically because of the feelings being felt of the other as found in perception.

Conclusion:

Diaspora Jains and more so second generation diaspora Jains, are in a state of flux, a liminal space from which to emerge a more solidified yet, constructing definition of who they are. They hold to the three vows of Jainism, that of *ahiṁsā, aparigraha,* and *anekāntavāda*; however, they have moved away from the ascetic lifestyle and with it a religious and philo- sophical system that holds the vows together. For orthodox Jainism, the vows are a reflection of the metaphysical system espoused in their scriptural texts and their religious system is the practices to achieve the highest goal, that of *mokṣa.* What is the diaspora Jain to do?

What diaspora Jains require is a constructive metaphysics, open to revision, in order to better equip their world view that they are experiencing at every moment. The constructive metaphysics does not seek generalities through supernatural or other-worldly means, but rather through the direct observation of experience and then move to its application in other fields. In other words, metaphysics is derived, not revealed and yet it is always around us, never ending.

The constructive metaphysics, precisely because it is constructive, requires creativity, the process in which novelty is introduced, a flat ontology, which although leads one to higher grades of intensity does not lead to anything more real than the actual occasion as ultimate fact and relationality, the realization that to each occasion, event, is entirely interdependent and mutually independent with one another. This creates a web of connections that creates a value system that is both individually as well as socially engaging, creating new ways of handling issues when brought into different concepts, not by relying on tradition but rather by using tradition as a point of reference for a new way of looking at the world around them, in which to handle that event. Whitehead's constructive metaphysics thus provides a dynamic process to experience, define and refine the diaspora Jain philosophy as well as religion, developing a way of life that espouses the three views of *ahiṁsā, aparigraha,* and *anekāntavāda* and yet does not directly need the traditional forms to come to a right knowledge, faith and conduct.

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2. Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making,* with an introduction by Judith A. Jones,

New York: Fordham Press, 1996, pp. 18-19.

3. Ibid., p. 31.
4. In Whitehead's writings, anything which is considered social in the sense that one follows the system in order to appease a God or some final end, is considered tribal. Although I do not like the term, it is consistent with Whitehead's terminology.
5. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 40.
6. Steven Shaviro, *Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), p. 151.
7. The two stories are taken from Vinod Kapashi and et al., *Text Book of Jainism, Level I* (Middlesex: The Institute of Jainology, 1994), pp.16-17. However, it is also found in Anne Vallely, "From Liberation to Ecology: Ethical Discourses among Orthodox and Diaspora Jains," in *Jainism and Ecology: Nonviolence in the Web of Life*, ed. Christopher Key Chapple (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 209-211.
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14. Antonia Gorman, "Surrogate Suffering: Paradigms of Sin, Salvation, and Sacrifice Within the Vivisec- tion Movement," in *Ecospirit: Religions and Philosophies for the Earth*, ed. Laurel Kearns and Catherine Keller, New York: Fordham University Press, 2007, p. 389.
15. Vallely, "From Liberation to Ecology: Ethical Discourses among Orthodox and Diaspora Jains," pp.211-212.
16. Ibid., pp. 213. See also Brett Evans, "Jainism's Intersection with Contemporary Ethical Movements: An Ethnographic Examination of a Diaspora Jain Community," *The Journal for Undergraduate Ethnography* Volume 2 (Issue 2 2012)
17. Roots and wings is used by Jay McDaniel to describe the necessity of being grounded, of maintaining our traditions, yet at the same time having wings to seek out the new. In the same way, diaspora jains in their new space are forced to do the same. It is in the vein of *ahiṁsā*, *aparigraha* and *anekāntavāda* that they are rooted, key words and vows that get at the essence of Jainism, but the wings describe the move away from the notion of moving away from the planet we are on, a move away from leaving the world and also a move away from recognizing the suffering is a normal part of the moral order of the universe.
18. Nagin J. Shah, ed., *Jaina Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth (Anekantavada)* (Delhi: Motilal\ Banarsidass Publisher Private Limited And Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology, 2000), pp.47-48.
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20. Dundas, *The Jains*, p. 89.
21. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, Corrected, ed. David Ray Gri n and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 5.
22. See Alfred North Whitehead, *Modes of Thought* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 3. as well as Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Pelican

Mentor Books, 1948), p.vii. and Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventure of Ideas* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 226.

23. Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, pp. 24, 40, 244 respectively.
24. Shaviro, *Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics*, p. 37.
25. Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, p. 21.
26. Evans,"Jainism's Intersection with Contemporary Ethical Movements: An Ethnographic Examination of a Diaspora Jain Community," p. 5.
27. Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, pp. 10-11.
28. Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, p. 104.
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30. Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, p. 7.
31. Shaviro, *Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics*, pp.21-23.
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33. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 88.
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The Rise of Pinjrapoles and the Fall of Zoos: An Appeal to Jainism

John Di Leonardo, M.S.

[*The Jain principles of ahiṁsā and aparigraha have cultivated an immense love and reverence for nonhuman life in the followers of Jainism as well as an immense call to philanthropy. As a result, 12,000 of the 16,000 animal shelters, hospitals and sanctuaries in India are Jain pinjrapoles and Jains are committed to animal rights as well as conservation. Though pinjrapoles have been founded out of benevolence, other more sinister institutions, known as zoos, have appeared over the centuries under the guise of promoting conservation and care as well, despite proving to do little of either. This paper will not only examine common arguments for the existence of zoos, showing how zoos should not be permitted as they currently are based on the principles of ahiṁsā and aparigraha, but will also lay out a plan for pinjrapoles to work to replace zoos, freeing their animals from bondage and providing a foundation for animal advocacy through anekāntavāda. The author has based his observation on his personal interactions to important zoos of the world, in addition to the researches carried out by different organizations of the world.*]

Ahiṁsā and *Aparigraha* according to Jain Karmology

Ahiṁsā, the Jain concept of non-violence and *aparigraha*, the Jain concept of non-possession, are integral to Jainism and mandatory in the practice of Jain dharma, being vows included in both the *mahāvrata* (vows of Jain monks and nuns) and the *aṇuvrata* (vows of Jain laity). For one to liberate one self from the cycle of birth and rebirth *(saṁsāra)* achieving *(mokṣa)* liberation and becoming a *(Siddha)* Pure Soul, one must both commit no *(hiṁsā)* harm to any living being *(jīva)* and rid oneself of all feelings of possessiveness *(parigraha)* which are considered soul-soiling passions *(kaṣāya)*. Soul soiling-passions such as *parigraha* cause *hiṁsā* in the world and failure to rid oneself of *parigraha* results in the accumulation of *(aśubha bhāva)* inauspicious karmic particles which then bound to the *(ātmā)* soul through the process of *(bandh)* bondage. This bondage obscures both right knowledge and the soul, causing one to act ignorantly and violently. This karmic bondage in turn weighs down one's soul, keeping it from rising and becoming a *Siddhās* is its true nature. According to the *Bhagavati Sutra* 7.1.6 and the *Jñātādharmakathā* (VI. 2 and 3) "the *jīva* is like a gourd. When it is coated with mud (*karman*), it sinks to the bottom of water (hell); when the mud is removed (*karma-nirjara*), the gourd floats up (attains liberation)."[1] As becoming a *Siddha* is the ultimate goal of Jain practice, *aparigraha* and *ahiṁsā* go hand in hand as essential duties of a Jaina.

Ahiṁsā and *Aparigraha* as they apply to Non-humans

Directly translated as "the absence of the desire to kill or harm," *ahiṁsā* is perhaps the most extreme manifestation of non-violence in the world.[2] Similarly, *aparigraha* is the ultimate

manifestation of non-possession. In their application to non-humans, nowhere are these concepts as kind and as demanding. While many people fail to notice even the largest of people as they bump into them on the street, *ahiṁsā* challenges Jains each day to notice the smallest of beings so as not to do them any harm at all. As attention to their vow of *ahiṁsā* permeates throughout Jain life, Jainas are required to be careful in their movement, speech, eating, placing and removing of objects and elimination of waste. All of these cares are to be kept in mind at all times so that Jains do not intentionally or unintentionally harm any sentient being.

Care in movement manifests itself in a number of ways. Members of the Jain laity are encouraged to watch their steps as they walk so not to step on even the smallest of life-forms. They are also not supposed to travel after sunset as this is when many insects are out and it is hardest to see them, thus being hardest to avoid crushing them. Jain monks try to move the least possible to accomplish tasks and gently brushing their paths with a small broom or shed peacock feather whenever they do have to travel so they do not accidentally crush any small *jīvas* under their feet. The vow of *aparigraha* is also relevant here as a Jain is prohibited from feeling ownership of any living being and exploiting one for a method of locomotion. Surely both implies ownership and does great *hiṁsā*.

Jain care in speech manifests itself as Jainas avoiding derogatory words and even phrases that can be taken as insulting. Words of kindness are encouraged while other words are limited. Of more importance to our nonhuman brethren, to avoid the accidental swallowing of small arthropods when they breathe or speak, many Jain monks and some members of the laity also wear veils covering their noses and mouths when outside.

Jain's care in eating results in one of the strictest diets on the planet. Jains eat an entirely lacto-vegetarian diet devoid of honey and rooted vegetables. Honey is forbidden since its collection amounts to violence toward bees and rooted vegetables are forbidden as well since uprooting them both kills the plant being uprooted and may cause violence to nonhuman animals that may be living underneath the ground. While Jains traditionally consume milk, there is dispute about this in today's age due to supplements now making a vegan diet possible and cruelties in the dairy industry. As a result,an increasing number of Jains today choose to avoid milk as well, especially in the West where standardized cruelty in the industry has gotten the most exposure.[3]

In addition to simply having restrictions on what they eat, Jains restrict how they eat. Much like Jains avoid traveling at night, they avoid cooking and eating at night to minimize the chance of insects getting into their cooking and accidentally getting killed. Some even take this practice of not eating after sunset on as an additional vow called *anastamita*. For the same reason, Jains also refrain from leaving liquids uncovered and strain their liquids for small organisms before use.

In addition to the cares mentioned above, Jains show care for the myriad of nonhuman life in their choice of clothing, historically rejecting the use of fur, plumes and silk and traditionally using only leather made from naturally dead animals.

Ahiṁsā also extends into the workplace of Jains. Jains are prohibited from any occupation that intentionally causes harm, such as hunting, butchering, joining the military and trade in animals. Jobs in agriculture are not prohibited for Jains but are discouraged as many agricultural practices cause harm to living beings even when the most care is taken to avoid doing so. Additionally, many methods of farming include the ownership and subordination of nonhuman animals, which is prohibited both by the vows of *ahiṁsā* and *aparigraha.*

What About Zoos?

According to Jain dharma, there are five ways one can violate the vrata or vow, of *ahiṁsā.*

1. Keeping in captivity (*bandha*)
2. Beating (*vadha*)
3. Mutilating (*chavi-ccheda*)
4. Overloading (*ati-bhārā aropaṇa*)
5. Depriving of food and drink (*bhakta-pāna-vyavaccheda*)[4]

As we will now see, by their very nature, zoo while guilty most obviously of this first *aticāra,* or infraction, in the process violates almost, if not all, of the rest. By their very nature, zoos commit *bandha* by treating their animals as possessions, confining them, depriving them of their liberty and "cutting deeply" into their animals' autonomy or ability to do what they want. The unnatural environment of almost all zoos thwarts even the most innate, natural behaviors of many, if not all, of these animals, such as roaming or foraging. Some very social animals, such as elephants, whales, dolphins and primates, may be unable to develop appropriate social orders within captivity as well.[5]

As a result of their inability to act out these natural individual and social behaviors, many inhabitants of zoos develop stereotypies or repetitive, ritualistic movements, such as head-swaying and pacing, much like people confined in psychiatric institutions, trying to cope with their predicament in any way they can. If you have ever observed a lion or a tiger pacing back and forth in his or her exhibit at a zoo or seen an elephant dancing, you have witnessed an animal displaying a stereotypy and if you have ever noticed a bump on the lip of a *piranha* at an aquarium, you have seen the calloused result of countless hours rubbing against the glass.

In addition to the psychological problems induced upon animals by captivity, many anthropogenic or human-caused, physical problems, such as deadly foot infections in elephants, occur quite frequently in captivity whilebeing exceedingly rare or never occurring at all the wild. Furthermore, elephants in all zoos in India and many still in the United States and abroad, are bound by short chains the majority of the time and beaten and threatened with bamboo sticks or bullhooks, which are long metal instruments resembling fireplace pokers on a regular basis. Very obviously, these zoos are guilty of both *vadha* and *chavi-ccheda* in addition to *bandha.*

Similarly, zoos with a heavy entertainment focus, such as Sea-World and Marineland, which spend much of their resources on dolphin and whale shows, (which have just recently become illegal in India) and the Indian Bondola Zoo, which still gives elephant rides, are often guilty of both *atibhārāropaṇa* and *bhakta-pāna-vyavaccheda,* forcing their animals to let staff and patrons ride on their backs and often withholding food from them in order to entice them to perform.

As a result of these poor conditions, many animals, elephants and dolphins included, live much shorter lives in captivity than they typically do in the wild as well, making all of them guilty of not just harming other *jīvas* but also killing them.

Due to these assertions, many philosophers and activists such as[6] have called for the abolition of zoos, however, zoo directors across the world still hold fast to the claims that they are helping animals and that whatever *hiṁsā* is done to animals by their bondage is justified by the greater good. In the interest of *anekāntavāda* and in the pursuit of truth, let us examine such claims of the industry one by one.

For the Good of the Animals

In direct contrast to the assertions that keeping nonhumans in captivity both deprives them of their liberty and causes them much undue suffering, it has been posited that keeping nonhuman animals in captivity actually protects them from the dangers of the wild, such as natural predators, diseases and poachers that "might be said to limit their freedom" and cause them further suffering in the wild.[7] While it is surely true that keeping animals in captivity helps protect them from certain native diseases, natural predators and poachers that they may encounter in the wild, this argument is incredibly disingenuous and does not at all justify keeping *healthy, able-bodied and able-minded wild* animals captive.

Firstly, nature is far from the world "red in tooth and claw" that is traditionally depicted to audiences by the media, with some ethologists writing entire books and dedicating their entire lives to the wide assortment of pleasures found in the animal kingdom.[8] As Mahāvīra has said, "All beings are fond of themselves, they like pleasure, they hate pain, they shun destruction, they like life and want to live long."[9] While zoos in the past and unfortunately some zoos in the present, have portrayed many predators as sadistic and ruthless in order to up their attendance, life in the wild is typically one full of pleasure for predator and prey animals alike. Portraying nature as being unrealistically harsh does not only do a disservice to zoo-goers who get duped, but also to the animals that are being wrongly stereotyped. As Dr. Balcombe wrote in Pleasurable Kingdom by "reinforcing [this] myth, we perpetuate an one-dimensional perception of the animal kingdom. Cougars are seen only to snarl, snakes to hiss and bats to slaver. Animals experience a range of feelings and motivations, including those associated with reward and pleasure."[10] For honest reflections on the dishonest ways nonhumans are portrayed in the media, one can read famed wildlife filmmaker[11] confessional book entitled *Shooting in the Wild: An Insider's Account of Making Movies in the Animal Kingdom,* where he admits to hiding jelly beans in the entrails a deer's stomach in order to film a tame bear feeding upon her and[12] *Nurse or Nemesis? Public Perception of the Australian Grey Nurse Shark,* which examines this unfair portrayal regarding sharks.

Though captivity does protect some nonhumans from some native diseases, arguing along these lines is also very misleading as captivity itself thrusts a multitude of harms upon many nonhumans in zoos. Animals in zoos suffer from diseases exotic to them, parasites readily spread from animal to animal, zoonotic diseases spread between humans and nonhumans and problems

unique to breeding. This latter point should be particularly noted by those Jains in India. Contrary to popular belief, white tigers, which are a favorite of Indian zoos, are not members of a rare species in need of protection as zoos often tell their visitors. Rather, they are the descendants of recessive mutants who were inbred over and over with devastating consequences. Strabismus, club feet, crooked backbones, kidney problems, early arthritis and other very serious health problems abound among these animals. Additional anthropogenic mental and physical healthproblems abound as well, including the aforementioned stereotypic behaviors, self-injurious behaviors and deadly foot problems in elephants that are common in captivity but have never been documented in the wild.

Far from a minor problem, the full spectrum of diseases thrust upon nonhumans in captivity is also so vast as to have entire textbooks devoted to it, such as *Diseases of Zoo Animals (Diseases and their Therapy of Wild Animals in Zoos, Game Farms, Circuses and Private Collections).* Due to this, from the 1930's to 1960's, many zoos in the United States and abroad attempted to attack the problem of diseases in zoos by "adopting a pose of scientific purity" that resulted in "clinically sterile cages with walls lined in glazed tiles, usually white or pale green, smooth concrete floors and cage furnishings reduced to a stainless steel pole and cantilevered slab."[13] Plate glass in these exhibits denied even audio contact between visitors and inhabitants and caused the sounds from the slamming of the steel doors used to access their exhibits to reverberate painfully within them. Built with only sterility and easy-cleaning in mind, every part of the animals' environments was controlled and immobile during this period, with even cleaning regimens being unchanging and introduction of novelty foods being forbidden. Perhaps most appalling, in Philadelphia "animal diets were reduced to the convenience of prefabricated vitamized biscuits, nutritionally sound but sensually defunct."[14] With such horrid monotony pervasive in zoo exhibits during this time, animal stereotypiesabounded.

While things have improved since the mid-1900s, much of this has been simply aesthetic, in the interest of pleasing zoo-goers rather than in the interest of nonhuman animals. According to zoo architect and zoo director emeritus David Hancocks:

Though zoo animals no longer live in barred cages, they often exist in conditions little better than the old menageries. Too many modern zoo spaces are much too small and while the spaces may look green, the animals have no contact with living vegetation and shuffle along dusty corridors confined by electric wires.

The main difference from a century ago is a new look, which is essentially superficial and is typically a peculiar distortion of the natural world, since zoos have developed a design vernacular that Ithink is best described as Tarzanesque. Modern zoos often resemble a Hollywood version of Africa on a B-movie set.[15]

This is evidenced by zoos as far around the world as the National Zoo of India and the Bronx Zoo in the United States. At the National Zoo, the elephant exhibit includes trees, water-holes and mounds, however, being bound on foot-long heavy chains 95% of the time, the three elephants

inhabiting it spend more time swaying back and forth stereotypically than anything else. Similarly, two elephants at the Bronx Zoo sway back and forth in similar fashion, though their chains have long been removed. A third elephant at the Zoo lives out her days in solitary confinement inside as the two on the outside have been made so psychotic that they killed her mate.

Though we talked about the pleasures and pains of nonhumans in the wild in the previous section, notice how much suffering is here in comparison. When one weighs all of the health benefits of keeping animals in zoos against all of the harms that arise from keeping animals in zoos, the "keep animals in zoos to protect them from diseases" argument is rendered misguided at its most innocent.

The assertion that keeping animals in zoos protects them from poachers and others with ill will *is* also not as true as it seems.

In the context of India, just this past year a six year old tigress was killed by poachers inside the Itanagar Zoo and in 2006, three tigers and a leopard were poisoned in the same zoo. Even more recently, just this January, a poacher was nabbed next to the rhino enclosure inside the Guwahati zoo in possession of a .303 rifle, cartridges and an axe.In 2000, a young tigress was killed in Hyderabad zoo and its jugular vein slashed to collect blood for a Durgāṣṭamī ritual and in neighbouring Bangladesh, four tigers were poisoned over three days by their keepers at the Dhaka zoo in 1996. Additionally, eight rare Brazilian marmosets were stolen from the Calcutta zoo in 2009 and the thief later confessed to stealing military macaws from Ahmedabad's Kankaria zoo and other wildlife from different zoos in Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh.[16]

This is also not a problem unique to India. In 2009, poachers killed and skinned an endangered Sumatran tiger named Sheila at the Jambi Zoo in Indonesia while in 2010 four endangered cotton-top tamarins named Mitu, Bella, Rico and Toro, and four pygmy marmosets named Milagro, Thiago, Alonso and Che were stolen from the Symbio Wildlife Park in Australia.[17] As recently as 2011, a marmoset was stolen from the St. Maarten Zoo in the Caribbean and in 2000 two koalas were stolen from the AZA-accredited San Francisco Zoo. (Stolen San Francisco Koalas Found, 2000) As a zoo-goer myself, I can also attest to the fact that stealing an animal from many AZA zoos would not be an incredible feat for even a novice thief, with staff at some zoos, such as the Queens Zoo, Prospect Park Zoo and Trevor Zoo, almost nonexistent. At the Queens Zoo and Prospect Park Zoo, even the vendors have become machines and when I visited the Trevor Zoo, I could not even find someone to take my money, instead putting it in a box posted for donations. Considering the fact that I could reach in and grab turtles and iguanas at the Trevor Zoo if I so chose, even those zoos accredited as the best zoos in the most advanced country zoologically, cannot claim their animals are truly safe from wanting hands.

What is even worse is that[18] *Animal Underworld: America's Black Market for Rare and Exotic Species* reveals that rather than keeping their animals out of the hands of shady characters, many AZA-accredited zoos actually support an underground market of animal dealers through unloading their unwanted and overly bred surplus animals in sales resources like *The Animal*

Finders Guide. Here, their unwanted animals are sold to animal dealers with histories of abuse and citations who in turn sell them as pets and objects for canned hunting, among other nefarious uses. Perhaps here more than anywhere else, *parigraha* is present, with *jīvas* being bought, sold and used for sport asif they were materials to be owned and done with as one pleases. Though the only expose' on the subject has been written in relation to America, this problem again is not limited to one country but is rampant among zoos around the world. Its root problem, unrestricted breeding, is particularly evident in Indian zoos, despite the Central Government's ruling that, "To safeguard against uncontrolled growth in the population of prolifically breeding animals, every zoo shall implement appropriate population control measures like separation of sexes, sterilization, vasectomy, tubectomyand implanting of pallets etc." In fact, as a part of Zoo Check Canada's "Indian Zoo Inquiry," inspectors Shubhobroto Ghosh and Sanjib Sasmal found 26 of the 27 Indian zoos they inspected to have surplus animal problems, recommending for 14 of them to halt all breeding and stop acquiring new animals immediately while recommending the remainder either halt all breeding and acquisition of particular species or severely decelerate any such initiatives.[19]

Even if we ignore zoos' support of the exotic animal trade and put the poaching of nonhuman animals from captivity all around the world aide, taking animals from the wild in order to protect them is still not a viable solution to protecting animals from poachers. As Snyder et al. (1996) has written, all this does is give us a "false impression that a species is safe so that destruction of habitat and wild populations can proceed."The only way to stop poaching is to stop poachers through in situ conservation efforts, such as education and law enforcement. If zoos truly were looking to protect nonhumans from poachers, they would focus their attentions on these efforts rather than taking the animals for themselves, making them in many ways no better than the poachers they are claiming to be defending these animals from.

Using Animals for Entertainment

Another common justification proposed for keeping nonhuman animals in zoos is that zoos are great sources of entertainment for humans. After all, this is certainly the reason behind hundreds of millions of people flocking to zoos annually with their friends and families and it definitely explains the spike in zoos' attendance following the births of baby animals and the capture of an endangered species. What it doesn't explain, however, is why we should put our non-vital interest in entertainment above the vital interests of captive animals, treating them as possessions rather than as *jīvas* themselves. Those that argue for humans to do this argue from a speciesist standpoint rather than the Jaina perspective, suffering a prejudice described by Richard Ryder in 1970 and condemned even earlier by Mahāvīra himself.

Obviously, people can be entertained in ways that do not involve depriving animals of their most innate and natural interests, (e.g., playing basketball, reading books, watching television) so even if entertainment was a vital interest of humans, this could not possibly be a proper justification for keeping animals in zoos.That being said, a love and appreciation of nonhuman *jīvas* is to be applauded, but there are other ways to act on this much more responsibly, such as

visiting parks and preserves and feeding feral cats in the United States or street dogs in India.Even in the most concrete of jungles in the West, pigeons are plentiful and dogs and cats are being culled in shelters due to overpopulation. Giving life to one of these animals is perhaps one of the most active forms of *ahiṁsā* one can perform.

Research

A somewhat rarer but highly academic explanation that attempts to justify keeping animals confined in zoos is an appeal to scientific research. What type of scientific research you may ask? One type is strictly field research, which involves studying animals outside the confines of zoos. While not done in zoos, this type of research is worth mentioning because some zoos do in fact donate money to studying animals in their natural environments. Apart from field research is the research done inside zoo walls, where most curators spend their time and money. This latter kind of research is further divided into behavioral research and anatomical and physiological studies, with some blending in between.

While studying nonhuman animals outside of captivity can certainly be done without harming any animal and very well should be, it in no way necessitates keeping nonhuman animals in captivity. Despite this fact, most zoos regrettably spend more of their time and money on research conducted on animals in their zoos than spending it on field research where it is most valuable and least cruel. The idea of performing behavioral research within the confines of a zoo that deprives animals from acting out their natural behaviors is also, to put it one way, just rather foolish. This is especially true of larger, more social animals whose natural environments are hardest to replicate in zoos. While it is true that some studies might benefit the health of some animals in zoos, as we mentioned previously, most of the health problems of captive animals are in fact anthropogenic and do not occur in the wild. Research about elephant foot-problems that occur overwhelmingly in captivity but do not occur in the wild and research regarding stereotypies caused by captivity are two examples of this. While such studies may be useful for animals in zoos, these studies do not offer reasons for keeping those animals captive to begin with, so they cannot be used to justify their confinement. As for performing invasive, non-observational studies on nonhumans in captivity to benefit humans, this puts the non-vital interests of humans ahead of the vital interests of nonhumans and cannot be justified either due to its highly speciesist premise. As Mahāvīra said, "To all, life is dear; hence their life should be protected."[20]

Zoos Educate Us but What About?

Another explanation you might hear from zoo curators for the existence of zoos may be that the primary function of zoos is educational. After all, many zoos welcome field trips and offer guided tours, while almost all modern zoos have informational signs at every exhibit and perhaps supply some informational pamphlets. With right knowledge being so invaluable to Jainas, education efforts surely should be lauded, but what type of education exactly goes on in a zoo and can that type of education justify keeping nonhumans in bondage?

Scientific Facts

One type of education taught in many zoological establishments is scientific education about

nonhuman animals. Scientific education encompasses a great wealth of information regarding nonhumans, including but not limited to their scientific names, how to classify them according to their taxa, what each species of animal typically eats in the wild, where each particular species lives in the wild and what their particular niches, or individual functions in the larger ecosystem, are in the wild. While this information is surely interesting to science-minded people, most zoos fail in their goal of educating people about their animals. As Rowlands wrote in *Animals Like Us*,"one study indicates that zoo-goers express the usual prejudices about animals" and "zoo-goers are only slightly more knowledgeable than those who claim to know nothing at all about animals."[21] Obviously, there are much more effective ways to learn about animals than attending zoos.

How to Save the Planet

Another form of education done by zoos is conservation education and as is evident by the New York Zoological Society's name change to the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), many zoos are now making conservation efforts a much stated goal. With threats to the world's biodiversity such as habitat destruction, habitat fragmentation, environmental degradation and pollution, global climate change, invasive species and disease looming over world, conservation education should surely be valued by all Jainas, but do efforts at conservation education justify keeping nonhumans in captivity in zoos?

While many zoos and aquariums are now touting themselves as centers for conservation education, as[22] noted in "Zoo Tourism: The Need for More Research," there is very little information available on the effects zoo and aquariums have on visitors. Following Mason's claim[23] reviewed studies attempting to measure the impact of zoos and aquariums on educational and conservation-oriented objectives, however, nothing conclusive was found,[24] a study largely undertaken by the AZA, claimed to have been the first, claiming "zoos and aquariums are enhancing public understanding of wildlife and the conservation of the places animals live" and "zoos and aquariums make a difference."[25] In its publication, Jim Maddy, the president of the AZA, celebrated the study, claiming:

For the first time, we have reliable data validating the positive impact zoos and aquariums have inchanging visitors' feelings and attitudes about conservation. This study clearly shows that visitors believe that accredited zoos and aquariums are deeply committed to animal care and education and that we play an important role in species conservation.[26]

Despite these claims, however,[27] in "Do Zoos and Aquariums Promote Attitude Change in Visitors? A Critical Evaluation of the American Zoo and Aquarium Study," identified a major conceptual problem and seven threats to methodological validity within Falk et al., undercutting the authors' conclusions. These threats to validity included nonspecific effects, novelty, construct confounding, demand characteristics, experimenter expectancy effects, nonrandom sampling and response bias.[28] In the end, Marino et al. joined the ranks of previous studies, concluding "to date there is no compelling or even particularly suggestive evidence for the claim that zoos and aquariums promote attitude change, education and interest in conservation in visitors."[29]

Even if zoo conservation education programs were superb however, leading to attitude change and then to behavior change as is claimed, this would still not justify their keeping animals' in captivity in their zoos since conservation education efforts exist apart from zoos to begin with. Television programs, school curriculums and books dedicated to conservation education all exist without confining any animals at all.

The Kindest Justification Yet

Another very important type of education that can be said to occur in some zoos is humane education, which has its explicit purpose teaching humans compassion and reverence for both the human and nonhuman world. If this type of education is done correctly, it can both enlighten humans about how their actions impact nonhuman species and cause them to examine their relationships with nonhumans in other regards, causing them to become kinder towards animals in their daily actions.

The most impressive humane education program I have ever come across is the Detroit Zoo's Berman Academy for Humane Education, a program I myself was once a part of. This program, run by humane education specialist Lisa Forzley, works to instill reverence for nonhuman animals in every facet of the Detroit Zoo, both formally and informally. Far from only being concerned with tame and non controversial subjects, the Berman Academy at the Detroit Zoo covers humane education topics ranging from pet care to circuses in their education efforts. One of my favorite programs run by the Academy is the City Critters program, in which humane educators visit urban schools, libraries and children's hospitals in order to help children "develop an awareness of the animals that share their neighborhoods," enabling these children to "better understand and appreciate them." This program also teaches children "to study and enjoy wildlife from a distance" and "teaches strategies to peacefully co-exist or simply avoid disturbing certain types of wildlife."[30] Since starting out by concerned citizens giving sanctuary to animals abandoned by a travelling circus, the Detroit Zoo has also kept with its tradition of rescuing nonhuman animals in need and has 316 of its animals as rescues from circuses, backyards, race-tracks and even a suspected "crack house." Certainly messages of humane education permeate throughout the Detroit Zoo but do humane messages justify keeping nonhuman animals in captivity?

The justification of keeping animals in captivity in order to further humane education is perhaps the kindest justification proposed yet but it also fails perhaps most obviously. Keeping nonhuman animals in captivity so that they cannot act out their most vital interests and innate behaviors is the exact opposite of what humane education is supposed to teach. There is no need to fret however, as Lisa Forzley's successful City Critters program proves that humane education can thrive without involving live animals whatsoever.

When It Comes to Education, Zoos Imprison Us

Paul Waldau has suggested that there is an underlying "meta-message" in modern zoos that has a much more insidious undertone than the positive educational messages zoos claim to be conveying. This "meta-message" conveyed by modern zoos is "namely, that it is acceptable for

[the individuals or species held captive] to be held captive by us."[31] This imprisons "us and our children into a mentality of domination that, in the end, is detrimental, creating terrible harms for the animals that we use for entertainment, profit and education."[32] This meta-message in zoos was first revealed in 1906 when the New York Zoological Society, now the Wildlife Conservation Society, displayed the pygmy Ota Benga in a cage alongside chimpanzees and orangutans, with an overhanging sign claiming him as Darwin's "Missing Link."[33] points out:

The mere fact of Ota Benga's captivity ē conveyed, unsurprisingly, the message that Ota Benga's freedom wasn't as important as that of the visiting humans who were 'educated' by putting this human on exhibition. And there surely was the risk that a similar message was, and still is, conveyed by the fact that bonobos, chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas are still held captive and displayed in a way that overrides these individuals' interests.

In his forward to *Ethics on the Ark: Zoos, Animal Welfare and Wildlife Conservation*, David Ehrenfeld noted similar problems, writing "In many ways, the zoo has come to typify the themes of the Age of Control: exploration, domination, machismo, exhibitionism, assertion of superiority, manipulation."[34]

According to the Ācārāṅga Sūtra, "He who harms animals has not understood or renounced deeds of sin...Those whose minds are at peace and who are free from passions do not desire to live at the expense of others." Rather than teaching this, it seems zoos teach quite the opposite.

In Situ Conservation

Perhaps more than any other zoological organization, the Wildlife Conservation Society prides themselves upon their contributions to conservation and surely this bravado is not all talk. Under the leadership of William Conway, the Wildlife Conservation Society became a powerhouse for in situ conservation efforts or conservation efforts in the wild. In recent years, the WCS has worked in Afghanistan helping the country establish its first National Park, "conducting wildlife surveys, delineating the park's boundaries, helping the government develop Band-e-Amir's management plan, hire and train its rangers, and design new laws for the national park's creation." They have also been instrumental in encouraging ecotourism in Cambodia and in forming in situ community-based conservation efforts in Zambia, Bolivia, Eastern Mongolia and Tanzania and the list does not stop here.[35] The Wildlife Conservation Society's in situ conservation work is surely impressive, but that is not what is at question here. Excellence in in situ conservation exists apart from zoos, with organizations like Conservation International and the World Wide Fund for Nature accomplishing as much, if not more, without imprisoning a single animal.

The Ark: Breeding for Conservation

One of the most powerful justifications for the establishment of zoos comes from another form of conservation effort: the breeding of endangered species. Remarkably, even zoo abolitionist Mark Rowlands has admitted "Zoo breeding programmes have had important successes; without them the Pere David Deer, the European Bison and the Mongolian Wild Horse would all now be extinct."[36] David Hancocks also adds the Arabian oryx, the Hawaiian goose and the golden lion

tamarin to this list.[37] With current extinction rates estimated to be between 100 and 1,000 times greater than natural background extinction rates, it seems that breeding efforts may have the potential to be a good justification for keeping some animals in zoos. After all, this justification at least seems to be for the concern of the vital interests of animals other than us. Does this justification hold up to scrutiny however?

Unfortunately, when it comes to most zoos, talk of breeding for conservation has been talk rather than walk, with most zoos doing very little breeding and even fewer breeding animals who are members of an endangered species. Mostly, the breeding of nonhumans in zoos are for the sake of zoos, enabling them to keep up their "collections" and trade them for other animals from other zoos. Far from being a claim made by only radicals, this was even stated by Director Keith Winsten at Canisius College's Future of Zoos Symposium (FOZS) in his statement that Species Survival Plans (SSPs) designed by AZA-accredited zoos are "not designed to maintain wild populations, but to maintain captive ones." Assistant curator of the Maryland zoo, Kevin Murphy, also stated' "we can't say anymore that we'll put them back in the wild" and a zoo "can never be an ark in reality." In his speech on "The Diminished State of Wildlife" at the FOZS, even William Conway displayed much doubt in the viability of zoo-based SSPs for larger species, saying that their network is just too small for them to be successful. When asked by zoo and "unzoo" architect Jon Coe about how SSPs would be able to help animals in an emergency situation, William Conway simply said, "We can't save them." Further supporting the fact that breeding is mostly for the good of zoo business, not conservation, most species represented in zoos are not even those threatened with extinction, but rather "charismatic megafauna" who are the best for getting people to attend zoos.[38] Additionally, upon a massive review of captive-breeding programs,[39] found that only 13% of the few captive-born populations even slated for reintroduction were viable. This echoed the earlier results of[40] which found only 11% to marginally succeed.

As said earlier, claims of species conservation in zoos are fig leaves used to justify their proliferation rather than actual justifications or even realities of breeding viability. The leaders of the zoological industry admit the fallacious nature of these claims, but still allow false messages of conservation to permeate throughout their establishments. This must stop as dishonest claims of conservation only serve to further the more sinister "meta-messages" of domination written about by Waldau.

Mark Rowlands has also pointed out that most zoos that do have breeding programs have their major breeding programs located in "facilities specifically created for this purpose and far from the attention of zoo-goers," such as the New York-based Wildlife Conservation Society's Wildlife Conservation Center on St. Catherine's Island in Georgia.[41] Much like I mentioned earlier that conducting field research is not dependent upon keeping animals in captivity, conducting breeding operations elsewhere is not dependent upon keeping animals in zoos so this cannot be a valid justification for doing so. As long as morally permissible zoos can be established however, I will applaud zoos that donate money to both permissible field research and permissible breeding facilities but can such programs even be established according to Jain ethics?

Of particular importance to this question is philosopher[42] "Nooz: Ending Zoo Exploitation." In this piece, she has written:

Ultimately, captive breeding schemes have little to do with the individuals who are captured and imprisoned as pawns to our purposes. Captive breeding exploits reproductive abilities. Individuals are stripped of all that is meaningful in exchange for being manipulated sexually-in exchange for being bred by humans. Captive breeding stems from a human interest in genetic diversity-a biological state that we deem beneficial to us. Furthe rmore, we enjoy having these species in "our" world.

If Lisa Kemmerer is correct in this assertion, captive breeding does not truly stem from the principles of *ahiṁsā* but rather from *parigraha* and should be discontinued, both for the sake of the animals and the sake of our souls.

(Sincerely) For the Good of the Animals

The category of animals that I can see justly keeping in captivity is exactly the reason I specified earlier that keeping *"healthy, able-bodied and able-minded, wild"* animals captive to protect them from disease, natural predators and poachers cannot be justified rather than saying keeping any animal captive cannot be justified for protective purposes. While nature certainly is not always or essentially, "red in tooth and claw," there are certain animals that cannot survive in nature on their own for one reason or another and these animals can justly be offered protection, or sanctuary, in captivity if their quality of life in captivity can rightly be argued to be better than their life elsewhere. Under these lines, captivity no longer resembles a form of bondage but rather an avenue of liberation. Animals are seen as guests or companions, not prisoners or sources of wealth and power. No semblance of intent to harm and no semblance of ownership exist; therefore, *ahiṁsā* and *aparigraha* abound.

Examples of animals that may qualify to be justly sanctuaried are domestic dogs, many domesticated animals originally bred to be farmed and severely disabled animalswho can still be predicted to have a substantial quality of life in captivity. Animals who have lived all their lives in captivity and thus do not have the know-how to survive in the wild or have become too habituated to humans to be releasedto the wild may also fall under this category, however, only after all attempts at rehabilitation have been reasonably exhausted. Similarly, animals who have been injured temporarily, especially at the hands of humans, may be and should be, rehabilitated in captivity pending their healthy release. This exemplifies an active component of *ahiṁsā* that is crucial to Jain dharma.

Beyond Zoos; To Pinjarapoles

Far from places I have just imagined, animal sanctuaries and rehabilitation centers exist all over the world. It can even reasonably be claimed that Jains were the first to start such institutions. Though Indians did not start documenting their own history until much later, the English merchant Ralph Fitch described pinjrapoles as early as 1583, writing of Jainas, "They have hospitals for sheepe, goates, dogs, cats, birds and for all other living creatures. When they be olde and lame, they keep them until they die."[43]

I have volunteered my time and resource with several sanctuaries in the United States and visited quite a few more while I was here, including the Delhi Charity Birds Hospital, the Ahiṁsā Teerth in Jalgaon, the cow sheltar at Jain Irrigation and the help in suffering animal rescue in Jaipur. Of these four pinjrapoles and goshalas (cow sanctuaries) I visited in India, three were run by Jains, confirming to me the activity of Jain philanthrophy I have heard so much about in this sector.

As of now, pinjrapoles and sanctuaries all over the world operate apart from zoos, but they do not currently challenge zoos to either reform or shut down. Despite this fact, I see an immense opportunity for pinjrapoles to accomplish this feat, becoming both self-sustaining and true centers of humane education, presenting themselves as a kinder alternative to zoo visitors and truly educating their visitors in a humane manner. To get there, however, some major changes do have to occur within the pinjrapoles themselves.

While the intent of pinjrapoles is always the most beneficent, many unfortunately suffer from some of the same problems as zoos. This is especially true when it comes to surplus animals. While zoos hide or sell away their surplus animals, pinjrapoles keep them long-term and as a result often get focused on keeping their inhabitants alive rather than making sure they thrive. As a result, many pinjrapoles often neglect to provide their animals with any more stimulation or naturalistic enclosures than even the worst zoos. Accordingly, not only do the animals in them suffer more than they should but the pinjrapoles themselves are often very depressing for their visitors and volunteers. This in turn does not create the happy atmosphere that is needed for pinjrapoles to truly challenge zoos and attract visitors, volunteers and donations but instead it creates an atmosphere of sadness that many visitors tend to avoid. While zoos solution to this problem is totally impermissible and should not be replicated, this problem nonetheless must be addressed for pinjrapoles to best care for their animals and to overtake the zoo industry.Birth-control, a method already being used by both zoos and sanctuaries in the United States, should certainly be implemented in pinjrapoles in India and elsewhere. Additionally,pinjrapoles and goshalas like the *Ahiṁsā* Tirth in Jalgaon need to stop breeding cows for their milk while they and India generally, are already so overpopulated with cattle. No matter if their intent is pure, this action causes *dravya-hiṁsā* and it should cease. True euthanasia, used on a case-by-case basis, may also be considered in the case of perpetually suffering animals. Though Jains historically have been quite hard in their stance against this practice, if both the intent and action of euthanasia provide only relief and not suffering, there is a strong argument for Jains to reconsider this stance in the light of *anekāntavāda.* Several of our Professors already supported this in relation to humans, however, such conversation should also be extended to nonhumans.

Though the *Ahiṁsā* Tirth does present a perfect example of an overpopulation problem within a pinjrapole, it also presents an equally important piece of the puzzle in the operation of its You Turn museum. A picture of humane education, the *Ahiṁsā* Tirth's You Turn museum operates with the goal of helping people make a "U-Turn" in their life toward animals. On the first floor, You Turn exhibits pictures and information about animal issues ranging from meat-eating to

vivisection to animal circuses to silk and more. On the second floor, Hindi movies exposing the cruelty of eating meat and inspiring visitors to live more compassionately are played periodically. I see this as the most awe-inspiring manifestation of *anekāntavāda*, exposing, and asking visitors to consider, a reality that is so often hidden from their daily life.

In my vision, pinjrapoles and sanctuaries around the world should strive to replicate the exhibits found in the You Turn museum in their establishments and even turn their animals' enclosures into such exhibits. On signboards, words such as "collection" and "specimen" will never be used and personal histories of the individual animals in the pinjrapoles will be put forward before species histories. In addition to recognizing and celebrating the unique individualities of each animal, these personal histories will serve to show why the permanent residents in the pinjrapoles unfortunately cannot join their brethren in the wild, despite that typically being the best place for animals and the pinjrapoles utmost desire to make that happen for all their animals. This will illuminate issues such as animal experimentation, meat-eating and even the errors of former zoos. Under these contexts, humane education like that of the Berman Academy will be most effective and pinjrapoles will lighten their load of animals in need due to the public becoming more aware of how they can prevent animals from needing rescue. To better meet their animals' needs as well as make their exhibits more attractive to visitors, pinjrapoles should also strive to increase the size of their housings considerably, make them more like their animals' natural habitats and utilize enrichment programs like some zoos utilize in the United States. With fewer animals, pinjrapoles could better accomplish this task.

In order to portray the most humane messages, pinjrapole dining menus, which must exist for them to truly combat zoos, should also be vegan, as building an emotional connection and humane attitude toward animals in one area and then serving their products in another area certainly portrays a mixed message. While Jains historically have been vegetarian, not vegan, several Jain leaders, most notably JAINA founder Gurudev Shri Chitrabhanu, have made the switch and asked their followers to do the same. The modern dairy industry endlessly impregnates their animals for their milk and habitually rips calves away from their mothers to sell them for slaughter. In the United States, calves are often raised in veal crates, where they are deprived of not just their mother but her milk and their own movement as well and then slaughtered at just a few weeks to a few months of age. In India, calves often become either leather or beef for export, resulting in India becoming the biggest exporter of beef in the world in 2012 and the largest exporter of leather years earlier. These deaths, as well as the high number of abandoned cows seen on the streets and in goshalas, are a direct result of the dairy industry, so serving only vegan food in these pinjrapoles could also serve the purpose of taking a stand against this industry by showing their visitors how easy and delicious, it is to be vegan.

Additionally, while dining menus should be vegan, the meals that the animal inhabitants eat certainly do not have to be. Many, if not all, pinjrapoles do not accept meat-eating animals into their walls. Despite this fact, animal meat is unfortunately in no short supply. Rather than going to waste, the bodies of animals who die in the pinjrapoles and die naturally or as a result of

accidents in the streets should go to feed those carnivores in need. Some sanctuaries, such as the Folsom City Zoo Sanctuary in the United States, already do this and in a place such as India acquiring such meat should be even easier. In fact, while the famous Charity Birds Hospital in Delhi does not take in any birds of prey, they do have an intricate network of volunteers who take in and deliver birds in need. If such a network could also be devised to acquire freshly dead animals, they certainly would be able to take in birds of prey without causing any *hiṁsā* to any animal.

Lastly, to truly challenge zoos, pinjrapoles need to be able to challenge them financially. Zoos are big business in the United States, in India and internationally. No longer are they run by "animal people," but instead they are run by cut-throat businessmen and often subsidized by the State.Jains have shown themselves to be quite business savvy and should apply these skills to running pinjrapoles as well as giving donations to help raise them to the level they need to be in order to start generating money. While soliciting donations in temple-boxes is well and good, pinjrapoles can never expect to realistically challenge the multi-billion dollar zoo industry without solid business plans themselves. Thankfully, the Jain vows of *ahiṁsā* and *aparigraha* both support developing pinjrapoles in such a manner.

Conclusion

Zoos throughout the world are currently causing great *hiṁsā* to an incalculable amount of animals. Similarly, other industries such as animal farming, vivisection, animal circuses, etc. are doing the same. Pinjrapoles currently rescue many individual animals who wind up as victims of these industries, however, in today's modern world their impact is often limited to placing Band-Aids on an ever-growing wound. As I have laid out in this paper, with a few changes, pinjrapoles could very well become catalysts to a peaceful revolution in so many fields of animal exploitation, starting with zoos. Rather than even a verbally violent revolution, this revolution would simply use the Jain principle of *anekāntavāda* to present a peaceful alternative to zoos that currently does not exist. Fostering *ahiṁsā* and *aparigraha* toward all animals, sanctuaries need to be the future and pinjrapoles are the foundation to that future, if they choose to be.

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Doctrinal and Social Context of Non-Violent Attitudes of the Jains and the Quakers

Zdenek Vojtisek

[*The goal of this paper is to provide closer view of the Jain and Quaker concepts of non-violence and on the doctrinal and social context of this ethical maximum which indicates similar and different elements of these concepts and contexts. By doing this, I have always kept in my mind that I try to compare what is not comparable in its deepest meaning. To meet the goal of a closer watch, I have made use of Quaker and Jain literature (Jain literature in English translations) as well as scholarly literature dealing with one of these traditions. As a student of the International School of Jain Studies, contemporarily based in India and therefore having access to Jain libraries, I have made more use of Jain literature than of that of the Quakers. That is why the statements about the Quakers are sometimes based on my previous studies and on my experience and are not in all cases documented by bibliographical references to that extent I would wish.*]

At first sight, there are striking similarities between religious traditions of Jainism and Quakerism.[1] Adherents to these traditions are best known for their non-violent attitudes and indeed, non-violence stands out from their ethical standards and to a large extent determines their personal conduct. (1) Moreover, in both these religious traditions the doctrine of non-violence is related to the conviction of equality of all human beings (in the case of Jainism even of equality of all living beings in some sense), (2) Non-violent attitudes of both the Jains and the Quakers have probably encouraged them to develop special negotiating and reconciling abilities and in the case of Jainism, these abilities even founded an original theory of knowledge, (3) It is not only some doctrinal aspects and behavioral patterns based on them, however, that may be seen as being similar in these two traditions. Similarities can be found in the way of life of both communities, in their social standing, in extraordinary levels of philanthropic activities and in many other aspects, (4) On first sight, however, there are also obvious differences. Jainism represents one of the oldest religious traditions in the world and is remarkably unanimous in its basic doctrines, whereas the Quakers make only one denomination of a highly differentiated Christianity with a distinctive doctrine and praxis.[2] The period of coming into existence or the number of adherents[3] is extremely different, too. But the most essential difference lies, of course, in their basic world view; the Quakers proudly bear the heritage of a Semitic monotheistic tradition, namely Christianity, while the Jains are deeply rooted in one of the varieties of Indian *dharmas*.

Similarities, mentioned above are discussed in a more detailed way below. The closest attention is paid to to the comparison of concepts of non-violence in Jainism and Quakerism. (a) the doctrinal ground and (b) the scope of the concepts of non-violence in each tradition. Before the beginning of this comparison, however, the early history of Jainism and Quakerism are described together with basic characteristic doctrines.

I do not take into consideration much of the development of both traditions nor of their specific faces in so-called sects and splinter groups. The image in my mind is something like 'classical' Jainism and 'classical' Quakerism, something in the middle of time and opinion varies.

The basics of Jainism

The foundations of today's Jainism were laid down by an Indian ascetic Vardhamāna (599-527 BCE.) who is better known as Mahāvīra (the Great Hero) or Jina (the Conqueror). He is said to have rejected the advantages of his noble family and similarly to some other people of his revolutionary era to have sought a new way as to how to attain *mokṣa*, i. e. salvation from the endless cycle of births and deaths (*saṁsāra*) caused by the effects of past activities (i. e. by *karma*). He found this way after some twenty years of meditation and severe asceticism and in this way, he became a victor (*Jina*) over *karma*, the principle of cause and effect to which all living beings have to succumb.

For his followers, Mahāvīra is a *tīrthaṅkara* (ford-maker) who revealed the path of salvation to humankind. As Mahāvīra apparently followed and renewed older religious traditions, he is regarded 24th in the tradition of *tīrthaṅkaras* which has begun at the very dawn of our civilization some 15 000 BCE. These *tīrthaṅkaras* are not worshipped as transcendent beings but honored as outstanding human examples able to inspire the Jains in their own fight for better future births and finally attaining *mokṣa*.

Although the Jains suppose the existence of gods and other transcendent beings, they are primarily concerned with *jīvas*, eternal souls, trapped in non-living matter and therefore condemned to the cycle of reincarnation. Of all living beings (including gods) only humans are able to liberate *jīvas* from their *karmic* bondage. Liberation is achieved by penance and renunciation that eliminate the effects of previous *karma*. The other condition of liberating the *jīva* is the detachment from all matter, which is necessary to stop the influx of new *karma*.

As liberation of *jīva* requires observing strict rules that do not allow obtaining one's own sustenance and leading a family life, the community of Jains (*saṅgha*) consists of two types of aspirants: monks and householders. The former are striving for final liberation and are fully dependent on support of the latters who are bound by a much easier set of rules and -in turn - spiritually nourished by monks when preparing themselves the best conditions for their future birth. One of these rules -and probably the most important one -is *ahiṁsā*, the attitude of avoiding any kind of hurting of any living being.

The Early Quakerism

The Quakers, often called Friends, have come out of social and religious turmoil of 17th century England. During the bitter fight against the state-supported Anglican Church, Puritans (the church reformers of that time) experienced deep disappointment having found a gap between professed Christian faith of many publicly engaged persons and their morals and religious practice. Some of them were attracted by the idea that there is an Inner Light dwelling in each human being. According to this idea, it is this Christ Within who should be considered the authority for human faith and conduct more than the Church or the Bible.

This idea was introduced in 1647 by George Fox (1624-1691), a powerful preacher, whose sharp words were aimed at moral and liturgical praxis of the churches. He accompanied his reproaches with actions that were even more disturbing than his words. Fox and his followers disrupted church services and attracted attention of believers in the manner of old Bible prophets when walking naked and performing symbolic acts. Because of these public outrages, Fox and his early followers experienced imprisonment and other forms of persecution. They regarded this suffering as proof of rightness of their faith.

Probably by 1667, the liturgy and organization had been at least loosely fixed in Fox's new movement. Since these beginnings, meetings of Quakers have been concentrated neither on sacraments (not even Holy Communion is celebrated) nor on sermons but on the cultivation of the Inner Light and on listening to It. Silence prevails at these meetings. Only from time to time, somebody feels moved by the Spirit to interpret a passage of the Bible or share with others what may sustain their faith. At the beginning of the movement, this stirring of the Spirit was accompanied by the shaking of that person who was about to speak. This might be the reason why adherents of this new movement were nicknamed Quakers.

A new period in the development of the Quaker community arrived with the conversion of William Penn (1644-1718), a son of an influential British admiral and relative to the King. Penn obtained a large amount of land in North America in 1681. He planted a new colony called Pennsylvania there and as the owner of the land, he was responsible for establishing its constitution and laws. He succeeded in founding a prosperous and uniquely tolerant society. At the end of the 17th century, religious freedom was enjoyed in Pennsylvania not only by the Quakers and other Christian dissenters but even by Jews and Muslims.

(1) Non-violent attitudes of the Jains and the Quakers

As one could probably expect, the reasons for non-violent attitudes of the Jains and the Quakers and doctrines behind them are entirely different. For a better understanding, they are discussed in two areas that have been already stated above-

(a) The doctrinal ground of non-violent attitudes

Non-violent attitudes in Jainism are prescribed by the first of five basic vows that bind both Jain monks and householders (yet each of these groups in different measure). This vow of *ahiṁsā* is seen as the most fundamental of these vows and other vows may be even interpreted as its restatements (Williams 1983:64). The necessity of non-violence is clearly stated in the most honored part of Jain sacred scriptures, in *Ācārāṅgasūtra*[6] and passages dealing with this vow can be found in many influential commentaries, religious tracts and treatises.

It can be briefly summoned that the vow of *ahiṁsā* requires avoiding all intentional violence and minimizing unintentional violence by careful conduct and restraint. *Ahiṁsā* means "knowingly or unknowingly not causing pain or the killing of any living being by activities of mind, body or speech; or not asking others to do so or not to admire or support those who do so..." (Jain, Shugan 2012 d: 196) The basic argument for this attitude says that violence causes pain, sorrow

and fear while as it is put in *Ācārāṅgasūtra* - "all beings love life. They wish to relish pleasures. They loathe pain. They abhor being killed - they are attached to this mortal coil. They want to hang on to life."[7] (Āyāro 1981: 105)

It would be false, however, to suppose that *ahiṁsā* is practiced because other living beings deserve not to be disturbed. This reason comes second: for Jainas, *himsā* (violence)[8] "refers primarily to injuring oneself, to behavior which inhibits the soul's ability to attain *mokṣa*. Thus the killing of animals, for example, is reprehensible not only for the suffering produced in the victims, but even more so, because it involves intense passions on the part of the killer, passions which bind him more firmly in the grip of *saṁsāra*." (Jaini 1998: 167)[9] Attachments are the roots of these passions: "The attachment and detestation gradually grow into passions and cause the conscious violence." (Bothara 2009: 28) Causing violence is, according to Mahāvīra himself, "the knot of bondage, it, in fact, is the delusion, it, in fact, is the death, it, in fact, is the hell." (Āyāro 1981: 66-67)[10] Non-violence is therefore not the goal but the means in the purification process that should finally lead to liberation of *jīva* (Bothara 2009: 29). Or, saying the same from the opposite point of view, *ahiṁsā* "is the reflex of an already-achieved state of internal purity which is, by definition, non-binding." (Johnson 1995: 179)

Although the primary motive of a non-violent person is "eliminating or avoiding attachment and aversion" (Jain, Shugan 2012 d: 200), the motive of compassion is very strong as well. We can thus agree that "ahimsÖ is a combination of empathy and abstention." (Mehta 2012: 35) But yet, "*ahiṁsā* achieved as the result of a feeling of compassion is, by definition, not fully *ahiṁsā* and cannot be fully liberating, although, in saṁsāric terms, it is relatively virtous." (Johnson 1995: 177)[11] This kind of *ahiṁsā* is practiced by householders, whose prospect is in not final liberation of *jiva* from *saṁsāra* but better future birth.[12] Compassion is then "essentially lay virtue". (Ibid.: 178)

In comparison to the Jains, the motives of Quaker's commitment to non-violent attitudes appear quite simple. Similarly to a few other Christian denominations,[13] the Quakers believe that Jesus was a pacifist. In this belief, they refer to the New Testament, especially to the passage of Jesus' Sermon on the Mount and his alleged commandment "Love your enemies".[14] This conviction of the Quakers is backed up by the perception of God as a loving Father of all humans and a caring Creator of everybody and everything, which is common to all Christians. As other Christians, the Quakers take Jesus as the example of moral conduct and follow what Jesus would praise. And non-violence, in their opinion, belongs to the ethics of Jesus.

The relative simplicity of doctrinal grounds of the non-violent attitude of the Quakers in comparison with those of the Jains is probably caused mainly by limiting the objects of non-violent behavior to human beings. Therefore, in the following explanations we must concentrate on the scope of non-violence in each tradition.

(b) The scope of non-violence

On the contrary to the Quakers, the nature of Jain *ahiṁsā* can be called all-inclusive (Sogani

2012 b: 200). It includes not only humans, but all living beings and even more than that: according to the Jain metaphysics, there are *jīvas* also in *sthāvaras,* one-sense beings (air, water, fire, earth and vegetation), who are living but not appearing to move.

The Jain concept of *ahiṁsā,* however, is markedly wider than that of Quakers also in another respect. Not only physical acting on it but evil thoughts are also *hiṁsā.* No *hiṁsā* should be committed by mind, speech, or body.[15] Moreover, the basis of violence is the intention to hurt (*bhāva-himsā*), not actual causing of hurt (*dravya-hiṁsā*). The discussion of the state of mind is by no means unfamiliar to Quakers,[16] but attaching more importance to thoughts and feelings than to actual deeds would be very unusual for them and maybe even unacceptable.

Nevertheless, exactly this sequence of importance is substantial in Jainism: "The coverage of non-violence is so vast that it does not only refer to our external activities (like hurting or killing by physical means only) but it refers more strongly to the internal activities of mind, both physical and psychic." (Jain, Shugan 2012c: 191) Or - as Johnson put it - "it is the mental component, the underlying attitude, which is karmically significant, not the harming act itself." (Johnson 1995: 176)[17] - "In other words, the basic strategy for (correct) conduct, as prescribed in early Jaina doctrine, has been retained but internalised: physical inactivity, the antidote to external *himsā,* has been internalised to mental inactivity, i. e. to the attainment and maintenance of an inactive and therefore pure, consciousness. Not even compassion must disturb this uncompromising stasis." (Ibid.: 177) In this way, we come back to the topic of compassion, discussed above and may understand it better.

The admirably wide scope of beings protected by the concept of *ahiṁsā* in Jainism obviously demands exceptions. As the householders cannot abstain completely from violence, they concentrate primarily on their non-violent state of mind. In fact, the strength of the monk's vow concerning *ahiṁsā* is what distinguishes him most clearly from the lay person in classical Jainism. (Johnson 1995: 84) While "monks are required to observe non-violence completely throughout their life for all types of living beings, (...) the householders are required to observe complete non-violence for mobile living beings (...) and minimize (...) violence for stationery/ immobile (*sthāvara*) living beings." (Jain, Shugan 2012c: 193; comp. Williams 1983: 65-66)

As the non-violent state of mind is of highest importance for householders, the basic division of violence (*hiṁsā*) is related to intentional (*saṁkalpi*) and occupational (*ārambhi*) *hiṁsā.* While the former *hiṁsā* is strictly condemned, the latter is excusable although - naturally - *karmically* binding, too. There are three basic kinds of occupational *hiṁsā*: vocational *hiṁsā, hiṁsā* committed in carrying out the domestic duties and defensive (*virodhī*) *hiṁsā.* (Tukol 1980: 205; Jain, Prakash 2011: 43-44; comp. Williams 1983: 66ff.)

In respect to the importance of *ahiāsā* for the Jains, it might be surprising to find a soldier (or officer) among those six occupations that a householder can follow (Tukol 1980: 205). But during their long history, the Jains used to be not only under royal patronage of a great number of kings and royal dynasties but they were playing a decisive role in establishing kings and

supporting governments in a number of cases. (Jaini 1998: 274-313; Jain, Jyoti Prasad 2010: 26-37) This meant that Jain kings engaged in violence (Long 2010: 109, 152). The Jains were probably even such experienced soldiers that they distinguished between 338 different cuts and thrusts used in a battle. (Glasenapp 1999: 397) In addition to that, "Jaina literature (...) is by no means pacifist (in the sense that Quakers are, for example): only aggressive war is proscribed, while the subject of fighting in defense of one's country is passed over almost without comment."[18] (Jaini 1998: 313)

But, on the other hand, it must be put in mind that "Jainism does not preach cowardice". (Tukol 1980: 205) It is justifiable, when *virodhī hiṁsā* is committed in self-defense, in defense of person or property of members of the family or relatives and friends, or in defense of country. "No unnecessary *hiṁsā* must be indulged in as a matter of hostility or revenge." (Ibid.) Or, in other words, "although a king is allowed to make use of violent means and although they are against the Jaina-principle of Ahiṁsā with respect to all beings, it may be pointed out here that force is to be used only in emergency when all other means of warding off the enemy have proved to be unsuccessful. If war cannot be avoided, it has to be seen that there is, as far as possible, little loss to human life and that unnecessary cruelty is avoided." (Glasenapp 1999: 362)

As the scope of objects of non-violent behavior of the Quakers is much narrower and includes only humans, their attitudes are much more clear-cut and at least in their classical era, unanimous. The Quakers strictly refuse any violence committed on another person and reject any kind of war including a war waged in defense. Their pacifism reaches so far that in the name of their religious principles, they, at least in theory, as it is an extremely hard task, do not even defend themselves when attacked or abused. (Stein 2000: 43)

Pacifist attitude was developed by George Fox and his followers in the cruel wars during the period of Oliver Cromwell in the 1640s and 1650s. In 1661, after the restoration of the English monarchy, Fox and his companions wrote a declaration addressed to the king Charles II. containing the following famous words: "... and we do certainly know, and so testify to the world, that the spirit of Christ, which leads us into all Truth, will never move us to fight and war against any man with outward weapons, neither for the kingdom of Christ, nor for the kingdoms of this world." (Fox 1990) The Quakers were probably the first conscientious objectors (Yoder 2007) and contributed in a substantial way to develop a legal status of conscientious objection in some states.

It is necessary to say that, in contrast to the Jains, the Quakers have never accepted full political responsibility for the society they live in. This difference between them and the Jains becomes apparent most clearly when remembering the events in Pennsylvania in the 1750s. Soon after establishing this colony by William Penn, the Quakers became the leading political faction in the Pennsylvania Assembly in Philadelphia. In this position, they were confronted with the task to defend the borders against French troops supported by Native Americans. Their moral dilemma

was even hardened by the fact that it was William Penn and other Quakers who had always been struggling for good relations with Indians. In this moral dilemma, the majority of Quaker representatives decided not to compromise by taking part in the process of preparing military legislation. By resigning, they showed the preference of their religious conviction to their civic responsibility. In 1756, they left the rule over the colony to others. (Stein 2000: 46-47)

When comparing the practical effects of Jain and Quaker non-violent attitudes, one could easily come to the conclusion that the Jains are concentrated more on small and even non-perceptible living beings while the attitudes of the Quakers have direct impact on humans and societies. This, let us say rather superficial, impression may be corrected by the following explanation:

It has sometimes been suggested that Jaina holy men are overly preoccupied with beings of a lower order, to the detriment of their concern for higher animals or with human kind. But this criticism fails to take into account the fact that a mendicant has already, as part of his lay vows, established a pattern of absolutely nonharmful behavior towards the more highly evolved creatures; his attention to the well-being of the *ekendriya* (single-sensed beings, note of Zdenek Vojtisek) and element bodies by no means excludes this prior commitment but rather carries it to the widest possible extent. Indeed, Jainas consider their practice of ahiṁsā unique in the universality of its application. (Jaini 1998: 242) Putting it in another way, the fact that the Jains consider all living beings in some respect equal does not mean that humans are somehow less important for them. The topic of equality is discussed in detail in the next part.

(2) Doctrines of Equality in Jainism and Quakerism

Doctrines of equality accompany and support the doctrine of non-violence in both traditions. But again, there is a large difference in scope of equal beings that the Jains and the Quakers are concerned with. On the one hand, the Jain feeling of universal fraternity "does not limit itself to fellow human beings" but "really means the feeling of sameness or equality toward every living organism." (Bothara 2009: 86) On the other hand, Quakers together with other Christians believe that God created man in his image and appointed him the ruler[19] of the rest of creation. In their task of bearing the image of God are all people equal but in their governing and protecting mission, humans can be by no means taken equal to non-humans.

The Jain doctrine of equality is based on conviction of equality of souls (*jīvas*) which is a part of Jain right faith: "All souls are equal and alike in their inherent nature, essential qualities, intrinsic characteristics and potentialities; they are all capable of attaining liberation." (Jain, Jyoti Prasad 2010: 41) These *jīvas* exist eternally as separate, individual entities. (Sagar 2012: 128) The souls present in living beings are also equal in having the same capacity to be liberated of nonliving matter and thus to achieve *mokṣa*. In the same way, they are all submitted to the same law of *karma* that inevitably makes them enjoy the fruits of their actions. Humans are therefore not supposed to be superior over other living beings, which makes a metaphysical ground for the ethic of non-violence (*ahiṁsā*).

Speaking from the point of view of soteriology, however, living beings are not equal as the

mokṣa can be achieved in the human body only. In Digambara Jainism (in one of two Jain sects), this privilege is restricted even further. As without being monk or nun, there is no possibility to keep full versions of vows that are necessary for final liberation of soul and as these Jains do not have nuns, *mokṣa* is reachable for men only.

Putting aside soteriology, however, Jain women in India seem to enjoy more equality to men than women in most other Indian religious communities. Indian Jains take the lead in female literacy with the figure at 90.6%. (Jain, Prakash 2011: 62) On the other hand, the gender gap among the Jains is extremely sharp in regard to work participation rate. "Apparently lots of talent among the Jain women is not being properly utilized. It is likely that most Jain women spend their time either in performing religious activities or in doing household chores. It is also very likely that they do not feel the need for economic employment given the fact that the Jains are economically a better off community." (Ibid.: 67) Anyway, Jainism in India is "at least in principle (...) open to all irrespective of caste, colour, creed, gender or wealth, though in practice Jains observe all forms of discrimination and exclusion." (Ibid: 21)[20]

One more area of inequality in Jainism has to be mentioned. Harming all living beings is not equally bad and, in fact, destroying life of plants could be seen as even acceptable. (Bothara 2009: 74) As Mehta reminds, "according to Mahāvīra the killing of a man is far more sinful than the killing of lower forms of lives..." (Mehta 2012: 42) The reason for that lies in the fact that the gravity of *karma* attached due to killing "is related not to the number of beings but to the level of their development." (Mehta 2013: 14-15)

In contrast to the Jain wide concept of equality, Quaker notion of equality is applied, as it has already been mentioned, to human beings only. Its root could be found in Fox's basic conviction of everyone's equal access to spiritual insight through the Light Within. In the immediate consequence of this idea, Fox refused traditional division of the Christians to clergy and laity. His refusal was supported by those verses of the Bible that put stress on equality and fraternity of all believers.[21] At Quakers' meetings, then, men, women and even children have been equally encouraged to rise and to address others. As early as in the days of George Fox, women side by side with men promoted faith and principles of Quakers and were thus accepted into the Quaker ministry earlier than in most other churches (Melton 2009: 441). It is not surprising, then, that among those struggling for women's rights in the 19th and 20th centuries was an extraordinary number of Quakers.

Quakers extended the principle of equality of all people outside their community from the very beginning. A good example of this "was their use of the familiar *thou* and *thee* to all, even those toward whom convention dictated that the more formal and respectful *you* be employed. (...) This refusal to make distinctions resulted in frequent problems with the authorities." (Williams 2002: 132) Another source of troubles soon appeared, when Quakers refused to remove their hats even in court. But more importantly, the idea of equality of all people encouraged William Penn to deal with the Native Americans with respect and with the intention to not only avoid conflict but to avoid the exploitation and misunderstanding from which conflict arises." (Ibid.:

132-133) Quakers' above mentioned departure from the Pennsylvania Assembly provides more evidence of how closely the principle of equality is related to the principle of non-violence.

The most famous Quakers' public engagement derived from the principle of equality started also at this time. It took more than a century to bring its fruit in full. As early as in 1754, an American Quaker John Woolman (1720-1772) published his first tract directed against slavery[22] and in following decades, he persuaded many Quakers to grant freedom to slaves. Quakers gradually started to refuse participation in everything related to the slave trade (Brinton 1952:10). In this process, they were significantly ahead of other Christian churches. In a similar way, the idea of equality of all humans, lead some Quakers to promote humane treatment with prisoners[23] and with the mentally ill decades before other humanitarian activists.

In partial conclusion it can be stated that in Jainism, the doctrine of equality relates to such a large scope of living beings that in practice, it has to serve as an ethical maximum to which the Jains are expecting to get ever closer: "All souls deserve similar treatment. By harming another soul, in a way, we are harming our own similar souls." (Mehta 2012: 41-42) Quakers, on the other hand, do not go so far to feel united with souls in all living beings and therefore seem to succeed in influencing the surrounding society more than Jains. The impact of their doctrine of equality seems to be very significant even outside their own community. In the case of Jainism, the main importance of the idea of equality can be found in supporting the principle of *ahiṁsā.*

(3) Jain doctrines of relativity and the decision-making principles of the Quakers

It is probably not mere coincidence that adherents of both religious traditions, that are well-known for their doctrines of non-violence, have developed remarkable techniques of coping with different opinions. These techniques may serve as a prevention of conflict and therefore they may diminish the danger of violence. At the same time they are probably related to the doctrine of equality, as this doctrine requires respect for every opinion and as it excludes the possibility of a forcibly imposed solution. Once again it can be found, however, that these techniques of the Jains and of the Quakers differ radically in their source as well as in their usage. While Jainism worked out a detailed and precise philosophical system, the Quakers apparently concentrated more on practical impact of the technique both within their community and in larger society.

As the "doctrines of relativity" (Long 2010: 117) may be called the complex of three Jain mutually interrelated doctrines: ontological doctrine of *anekāntavāda*, epistemological doctrine of *nayavāda* and the method of leading a philosophical discourse (dialectic), called *syādvāda.* The doctrine of *anekāntavāda* is based on the presupposition that all entities possess attributes that are relative and even in mutual opposition. At all times, their existence is constituted simultaneously by emergence, perishing, and duration.[24] The character of reality is therefore multi-faceted (*anekānta*).[25] This character of reality determines its knowability: the reality can be comprehended from a number of standpoints, perspectives or means of cognition (a number of *nayas*).[26] This epistemological theory, then, represents "Jain attempts to conceptualize the

fact of a diversity of philosophical perspectives in the society around them" (Long 2010: 145) and provides the Jains a useful tool to enter philosophical discussions without fear of conflict and violence. *Nayavāda,* "the doctrine of perspectives" (Ibid.: 143), sets rules for the art of discussing called *syādvāda* in Jainism. Each contribution to philosophical discourse can be true "in some specific sense" (*syād*). On this basic level, the truth is relative to the perspective from which the truth-claim has been made. In concord with other Indian religious traditions, however, the Jains believe in the upper level of truth. This level, accessible to omniscient beings only, is believed to affirm the presuppositions of Jainism.

The above mentioned relation of the doctrines of relativity (esp. *anekāntavāda*) to the principle of *ahiṁsā* is stressed by many (if not all) Jain authors discussing this topic. According to one of them, the Jain sense of tolerance and peaceful co-existence with other communities "can be related to their epistemological doctrine of relative pluralism (*nayavāda*) and which states the manifoldness (*anekānta*) of reality and knowledge." (Jain, Prakash 2012: 140) Doctrines of relativity are regarded as "non-violence of the Mind" (Rankin 2007), "intellectual derivative of *ahiṁsā*", "an extension of *ahiṁsā* attitude" (Bothara 2009: 109; resp. 158) etc. The legitimacy of taking *anekāntavāda* as "intellectual *ahiṁsā*" is even discussed thoroughly by Long (2010: 154-165). One way or another, it seems quite reasonable that Jain authors promote doctrines of relativity as being considerably relevant for today's world. (Jain, N. P. 2012: 20 and many others)

Less for tackling different philosophical standpoints and more for solving practical problems, the Quakers' principles for decision-making have been developed. Especially at the beginning of the Quaker community, there was no visible bound to hold Quakers together (no confession, no clergy, no liturgy etc.) but fellowship. The necessity of such an organizational tool emerged that could help with daily matters as well as with radicals inside and persecutors outside. That is why "meetings for business" or "business meetings" came into existence. To secure a balance between freedom and order at these meetings, principles of decision-making have gradually evolved.

These principles are based on conviction that, as the famous Quaker preacher Thomas Story (around 1670-1742) put it, "since there is but one Light and one Truth, if the Light of Truth be faithfully followed, unity will result." (Brinton 1952: 12) To remind some of these principles in short, it might be stated that the goal of the discussion should always be kept in mind and refined. As there is Light in everybody, all opinions should be listened to and taken seriously. In fact, the appointed clerk should record them and push the discussion further and deeper. The opinion once expressed does not belong to the speaker alone but the decision-making fellowship follows and develops it. Actually, the group is not searching for a compromise but for the best solution acceptable by all: "The objective of the Quaker method is to discover Truth which will satisfy everyone more fully than did any position previously held." (Ibid.: 16) For the same reason, voting is not used, as it "creates nothing new". (Ibid.) Different attitudes are welcome, may be resolved in a discussion and overcome in the widest possible consensus. This consensus

does not mean uniformity but unity in spite of partial differences. (Ibid.: 12) The method obviously requires time, patience and discipline but these sacrifices are said to pay in the end.

However useful and successful Quakers' method of decision-making has proved, it did not save the growing community of schisms. On the other hand, Quakers have shown extraordinary ability to unite whenever it was useful for promoting their common attitudes. Outside the Quaker community, the decision-making method was first validated in the Pennsylvania Assembly, "which endeavored to reach decisions by general consent." (Williams 2002: 133) For Quakers, it was encouraging to find a similar way of reaching consensus and similar way of inviting women into discussion among Native Americans (Brinton 1952: 25) Individual Quaker authors have published a large number of books on mediation, decision-making and conflict management and deeply influenced secular theories and methods in this field that are used by both business and activist groups.

It could be summed up that both Jains and Quakers succeeded in developing unique and inspiring models of handling situations that threaten with a clash of opinions. While small religious, business, or activist groups will probably remain the objects where the Quakers' model can be primarily put into effect, the Jain philosophical triad owns potential for becoming a really powerful tool in "big" inter-religious and multi-cultural issues of today's world.

(4) Other similarities briefly considered

When dealing with adherents to religious traditions of Jains and Quakers, one cannot help noticing similarities in their way of life, their social standing, their relations to wider society, and undoubtedly in other connected spheres of their life. The following paragraphs are dedicated to short notes on some of them.

While the Quakers may represent puritan morality most of all, contemporary churches that have come out of Puritanism, the Jains' way of life is said to possess a "puritanical element" (Rankin 2007: 216) as well. The contemporary Indian sociologist Prakash Jain agreed with German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920)[27] when writing, "Many aspects of rational conduct promoting savings such as thriftiness, self-discipline, frugality and abstention as part of this worldly asceticism (...) are directly present in Jainism." (Jain, Prakash 2012: 141) Another description of a Jain householder is similar. He allegedly "works hard, conforms to conventions, obeys constituted authority, leads a frugal and unostentatious life and carefully calculates the consequences of every step he takes". (Williams 1983: xxii) Jains may have gained the fame of the "Puritans of India" thanks to their consciousness of absolute individual responsibility for life: According to the belief of Jains, no one, not even God, can intervene in favor of a human. To put it another way and even more frankly, "...whatever is not in our hand is of little significance." (Bhargava 2012: 204)

Puritan morality of Quakers is mostly derived from the example of Jesus: Quakers "sought to live in a manner consistent with their understanding of the voice of Christ Within. They looked to the example provided by Jesus, who did not dwell with the rich and powerful but rather the

common folk. The Quakers called for Christians to adopt a plain and modest style in both clothing and conversation." (Stein 2000: 43)

When portraying the way of living of the Jains and the Quakers, we nevertheless should remember that the life style has generally been changing quickly these days: "Cheating, bribing, smuggling, tax evasion, amassing wealth, by fair or foul means are as common with Jains as with others." (Bothara 2009: 7) Something similar can be probably said about Quakers: "With a few exceptions, contemporary Friends live much like their evangelical or mainstream neighbors, depending on the branch of the tradition with which they identify. The most distinctive feature of liberal Quakers is their commitment to peace-making, which manifests itself not in language or dress but rather in social involvements." (Williams 2002: 136)

Puritanical rational thought, a simple way of life, the feeling of personal responsibility and highly moral conduct contributed undoubtedly to the fact that both communities reached outstanding social status based on relative wealth[28] and a high level of literacy and education.[29] They have also contributed widely to the culture.[30] The status of Jains in the Indian society was historically good as they often enjoyed royal patronage and were able to somehow influence the public events (Jain, Jyoti Prasad 2010: 26-37). They succeeded in retaining this (to some extent privileged) status even in turmoil of industrial revolution and beyond: "A very high degree of individualism, dual value system, Protestant ethic-like elements present in the Jain religion, a high level of urbanization and literacy and progressive occupational specialization over the centuries as traders, money-lenders, bankers etc. δ all tended to add to the prosperity and relative modernization of the Jain community." (Jain, Prakash 2012: 143) Max Weber was then probably right when he maintained that there is "a positive relationship between Jainism and economic motivation which is otherwise quite foreign in Hinduism." (Jain, Prakash 2011: 122)[31]

Puritanical ethic was decisive for good social status of (at least early) Quakers, too.[32] They achieved it mainly by means of business, "the main avenue of worldly endeavor" (Williams 2002: 132) for them. In business, "their reputation for complete reliability, together with a strenuous work ethic and a disciplined, frugal lifestyle, resulted in considerable financial success." (Ibid.) It is not so surprising, then, that three out of four of the banks coming into existence in England in the late 17th and the 18th century were of Quaker origin, including Barclay's and Lloyds banks.

Good social standing has enabled both Jains and Quakers to carry out rather "subtle influence" (Rankin 2007: 208) in societies that surround them than exercise direct political power. Saying this I do not deny the fact that the Jain community has produced a large number of monarchs, ministers and generals in its long history. But "during the last four decades" the role of Jains in public life "has significantly dwindled." (Jain, Prakash 2011: 20) The strongest influence of Jains to the Indian society in the last century was indirect. It was performed by the political deployment of *ahiṁsā* by Mahatma Gandhi, who was especially in his young age in close contact with Jains. Anyway, the "subtle influence" of Jains remains and is visible thanks to a large variety of social activities.

Generosity and social activism of Jains may have three main motives. One of the five vows binds Jains to *aparigraha,* non-possession, or in the case of householders, non-attachment to possessions. This vow prevents Jains from obsession with material goods and helps them to deal with wealth in a less selfish and more altruistic manner. The second motive comes out of one's need of good karma. Charity and involvement in social work are means of accumulating *puṇya* (merits) for the sake of future better birth. The third motive is opposite to the former in one sense: it is *karunā* (compassion) that moves lay Jains to acts of generosity and personal engagement. Jain organizations may therefore be found in the large scope of social work: in education, medical treatment, food supply etc. (Jain, Shugan 2012b: 152-165; (Mehta 2013: 25-26) Jain engagement in social activities is sometimes called "social *ahiṁsā*" or "social non-violence". (Sogani 2012a: 74.76; resp. Jain, Shugan 2012c: 192)

On the contrary to Jains, Quakers have always shown a detached relation to worldly power. From the very beginning of their existence, they distanced themselves "from what they regarded as the ungodly ways of secular society". (Williams 2002: 131) The departure from the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1756 confirmed their relation to the direct political power. As several Quaker families became very rich, indirect but considerable influence on politics remained for some time. Nevertheless, the main domain of Quakers' impact has been the social scene. Besides above mentioned activities, Quakers have become notorious for their long-term struggle for educational and prison reformations and for their participation in a wide variety of humanitarian endeavors. Humanitarian engagement is in the case of Quakers often connected to pacifist and peace-making efforts. Quakers, represented by two organizations of this kind, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947.

The listing of similarities of Jainism and Quakerism may go on and include even such details as refusing sacraments, religious ceremonies and devotional articles by all Quakers and by a substantial part of the Jains. But even the majority of the Jain community that do use material entities in their religious life (*mūrtipēūjakas*) shows a kind of aloofness in respect to the worship of idols, material offerings and to performing ceremonies (*dravya-pūjā*) (Jaini 1998: 193-194; Jain, Yogendra 2007:149). They consider psychic or mental worship (*bhāvā-pūjā*) more important. Both communities seem to feel well, that "true worship involved the cultivation of the inner being." (Stein 2000: 42) Moreover, neither Quakers nor Jains have priests (yet Jains have monks) and make no difference between participants during common worship.[33]

Conclusion

Non-violence is what is associated first with both the Jains and the Quakers. It used to be only one of the characteristics of their religious life but it has stepped out of the fabric of doctrines and ethics and has become the most distinctive feature of both traditions in the last decades. (Williams 2002, 136; Rankin 2007: 193, Sogani 2012c: 228 etc.) This development may be surprising especially in the case of Jainism, as "in line with the Indian tendency to view ethics as being contextualized according to caste and situation, Jains are usually content to observe *ahimsā* as an ethic suitable for themselves, but not expected from everyone else." (Cort 2001: 149) Contemporary Jain authors, however, often put emphasis on the alleged universalism of

ahiṁsā and tend to regard the practice of *ahiṁsā* as the solution for almost all problems of our civilization: "The *ahiṁsā* way of life is the sure panacea for all moral, social, economic and political illnessess, *ahiṁsā is the highest religion, and where there is ahiṁsā* there is victory." (Jain, Jyoti Prasad 2010: 120; Bothara 2009: 107ff) Of course, it is not necessary to share this victorious prospect when appreciating the doctrines of non-violence and their influence within and outside both communities.

In spite of a long list of similarities touched on previous pages, differences between traditions of Jainism and Quakerism are so vast that the sense of any comparison can be easily called into question. As we have seen, the doctrines of non-violence differ in the starting presuppositions as well as in the scope of those who are taken into consideration. Something similar is true about other doctrines I was dealing with in this study. Moreover, items of Jain tradition seemed more theoretically worked out than the corresponding part of Quaker theology but less able to change the surrounding society directly. The decisive difference between Jain and Quakers may therefore lie in the realm of the sociology of religion.

In the case of Jainism, we find a large social body; a respected religion, the existence of which is rarely, if ever, threatened.[34] Such a large body, in terms of the sociology of religion called "an established church", with a long tradition of scholars, may afford wide philosophical concepts and broad perspectives of salvation. This context may be the reason why Jainism sometimes seems to go to extremes. A Jain sociologist, for example, has written that "in Jainism the notion of *ahimsā* (non-violence) has been pushed to the extreme." (Jain, Prakash 2011: 129) The extremely wide concepts that reveal liking in the smallest details may become a challenge for contemporary Jains. These concepts may have to be translated into the language of pragmatic thought of the post-modern world.[35]

Quakers, on the other hand, form a social body of a very different kind. Sociology of religion would call them "a sect". The main task of such a body is to represent a religious alternative to established churches or other worldviews. To survive, the sect has to assume the position of protest against the religious or spiritual life of the mainstream society by means of a loud and visible critique. At the same time, it has to usher attractive (and rather simple and practical) alternatives that might gain attention of some part of society. In both of these tasks Quakers succeeded in an excellent way. Their critique of slavery, for example, was very effective and alternative principles appeared as practical and useful for daily life. Quakers were successful to such an extent, however, that now, it is not easy to maintain religious origin and character of these principles and explain *raison d'Ştre* of Quakers community in a postmodern world where social activism is by no means confined to protesting bodies of Christians.

Therefore, both Jains and Quakers and these are the last similarities, have great tasks ahead and at the same time, possess a great potential to fulfill them.

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1. Quakers are probably the best-known pacifist church. Mennonites and other Anabaptists come second.
2. Some communities of Quakers have gradually loosened their relation to Christianity and they would prefer to say that they form a movement with Christian roots.
3. The total Jain population is estimated to 5 million in India and 250,000 in diaspora. (Jain, Prakash 2011: 69) The number of the Quakers represented by Friends World Committee for Consultation (FWCC), the main umbrella organization, is estimated at 400,000.
4. If I am well informed, the only comparative study of the Jains and the Quakers deals primarily with the socio-economic standing of these two communities: Nevaskar, Balwant (1971): *Capitalists without Capitalism: The Jains of India and the Quakers of the West (Contributions in Sociology)*, Greenwood Pub., Westport. ISBN 978-0837132975.
5. In transcription Sanskrit words, I try to follow the pattern of Jeffrey D. Long, stated in Long 2010: x.
6. "All sorts of living beings should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor driven away." (*Ācārānga sūtra*,1.4.2), "With due consideration preaching the law of mendicants, one should not do injury to one's self, not to anybody else, nor to any of the four kinds of living beings. But a great sage, neither injuring nor injured, becomes a shelter of all sorts of afflicted creatures, even as an island, which is never covered with water." (*Ācārānga sūtra*,1.6.5). Both passages are quoted according to *Ācārānga sūtra* 1968: 38, resp. 61.
7. *Ācārānga sūtra,* 2.3.63
8. According to Umāsvāmī, *himsā* is "the severance of vitalities out of passion." (Tattvārthasūtra VII.13, see Jain Shugan 2010: 246)
9. Italics has been removed and put on other places in this passage by Zdenek Vojtisek.
10. *Ācārānga sūtra,* 1.6.134.
11. Striving for detachment, however, should not be seen as opposite to compassion. Mainstream Jain authors condemn such an extreme view as not genuinely Jain: "One of the sub-sects of Jain has ever gone to the extent of describing the act of saving the life of a man or animal in distress, as violence." (Mehta 2012: 37) The same author complained that some spiritual teachers (*Ācāryas*) "brazenly describe the positive aspects of *ahimsā*, like saving the lives of man and other creatures, feeding the hungry, providing water to thirsty, helping the sick with medicines etc., as undesirable, because in their view, these activities result in generating of *karmas,* which inhibit one's liberation. They treat such activities as an expression of attachment, which according to themis the cause of bondage and not salvation." (Mehta 2012: 36) Other refuses these extreme views as well: "It is fact that there are sects in Jainism where deeds of philanthropy and feelings of compassion are considered undesirable and detrim sectarian only and not as original and central part of Jainism." (Bothara 2009: 90)
12. It is true for monks that one "does not refrain from *himsā* because it is compassionate to do so, one refrains because the practice of *himsā* indicates internal impurity, i. e. impure *upayoga* which binds." (Johnson 1995: 177) In this way, the principle of *ahimsā* can be summarized as follows: "Aspire for yourself. Do not aspire for others. This is the fundamental principle of Jainism." (Jain, Bhagchandra 2012: 326)
13. Mennonites and subsequent groups seem to be the most important of those denominations.
14. The Gospel According to Matthew 5:44, New International Version.

15. Umāsvāmī prescibed five rules for observance of *ahiṁsā*: control of speech, control of thought, regulation of movement, care in lifting and placing things or object and examination of food and drink before taking in. (Tattvārthasūtra VII/4, see Jain Shugan 2010: 235-237).

16 As other Christians, Quakers are familiar with following passage of the Jesus' Sermon on the Mount: "You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, 'You shall not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment.' But I tell you that anyone who is angry with a brother or sister will be subject to judgment." (The Gospel According to Matthew 5:21-22, New International Version)

17. The internalization can be seen in words of Jinabhadra, a 6th and 7th century Jain monk: "It is the intention that ultimately matters. (...) From the real point of view, it is the evil intention which is violence whether it materializes into an evil act of injuring or not."- Jinabhadra is quoted by Dundas 2002: 162.

18 This author goes so far as to accuse Jainism of reluctance to cope with examples of what he calls "doctrine coming to terms with social and political reality": (Jaini 1998: 281) "(...) it is a serious indictment of a tradition so closely associated with the ideal of nonviolence that it could have remained ambivalent or at best noncommittal, on the subject of warfare."(Ibid.:313)

19. Genesis1:26, resp. 28, New International Version.

20. An introduction to gender debate in Jainism is provided by Parekh 2012.

21. "[Jesus said:] ... you have one Teacher, and you are all brothers." (The Gospel According to Matthew 23:8, New International Version).

22. In his treatise "Some Considerations on the Keeping of Negroes" dated 1754, Woolman refers explicitly to equality of people and to the idea of their brotherhood: "When we remember that all nations are of one blood (Gen. 3:20); that in this world we are but sojourners; that we are subject to the like afflictions and infirmities of the body, the like disorders and frailties in mind, the like temptations, the same death and the same judgment; and that the All-wise Being is judge and Lord over us all, it seems to raise an idea of a general brotherhood and a disposition easy to be touched with feeling of each other's afflictions. (Woolman 1971: 200)

23. British Quaker Eric Baker (1920-1976) was one of the founding members of Amnesty International.

24. "Existence is characterized by origination, disappearance (destruction) and permanence. "(Tattvārthasūtra V.30, see Jain Shugan 2010: 189)

25. Concise introduction to the doctrines of relativity is provided by Jain, Kamla 2012.

26. Very briefly about *nayas:* Ibid.: 92.

27. Weber, Max (1921/1978): *Gesammelte AufsṚtze zur Religionssoziologie.* Bd. II. Tābingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

28. Even though they are less than 0.5% of total population of India, it is estimated that they contribute more than 5% of the GDP (gross national product). (Jain, Shugan 2012a: 1)

29. More than 98% Jains are literate with more than 50% at least graduates. (Ibid.) - "Literacy-wise, in 2001 Jains with a figure of 94.1% were the most literate community,..." (Jain, Prakash 2011: 62)

30. "Throughout their long history Jains have made tremendous contribution to the Indian culture and society which is quite disproportionate to the size of the community." (Ibid.: 17).

31. "Weber seems to suggest that although Jainism is spiritualized in the direction of World renunciation, some features of inner worldly asceticism are also present in it. These are reflected in such virtues as thriftiness, self-discipline, frugality, abstention, economy of time etc., which eventually promotes savings and accumulation of wealth."(Jain, Prakash 2011: 122)
32. A comparative study of the Jains and the Quakers using Protestant Ethic thesis of Max Weber was written by Balwant Nevaskar in 1971. See note 4.
33. This inward orientation may be attributed to the Jains' belief in eternal and individual soul (*jīva*) present in all beings and to the Quakers' belief in inner light of Christ dwelling in every human. Because of this belief, the Quakers are sometimes seen as Christian mystics.
34. This can be said in spite of the fact that it comprises relatively a tiny part of Indian society.
35. We may see this effort in the book by Jain, Yogendra 2007 and some others.

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The Vibrancy of *Pudgala* : Thinking about the activity of Matter in Jain Philosophy

Michael Anderson

[*This paper explores the concept of pudgala (matter) in Jain philosophy. Although traditionally posited as an inanimate substance due to the fact that it lacks the enlivening jīva (soul), I want to look in the ways in which matter has some productive capacity. To do so, I wish to enter into dialogue with Jainism and the work of political theorist Jane Bennett. Bennett's work proposes that matter has a vital, indeed vibrant, existence by arguing that matter possesses 'thing-power,' "the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle" (Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 6). This "thing-power" of matter, I argue, is already apparent within Jain philosophy. For example, matter has an affect on the soul in its unique interpretation as karma.*

The enjoining of matter and soul that describes the Jain doctrine of karma is extensively described; it is quite unlike that of other dharma traditions. For Jains, karma is much more than a situation of cause-and-effect, because it is also a material force. It is called 'subtle matter,' visually imperceptible particles that attach upon a jīva. This interaction between matter and soul is similar to Bennett's (following Deleuze and Guattari) idea of an 'assemblage,' an engagement that produces creative effects, for instance, the decision of embodiment a jīva possesses in the next life.

Making the intuitive leap in which if karma, a type of matter, has an affect upon the soul, I argue, then, it is very likely that other types of matter (gross and extended matter, for instance) could potentially have similar affects. With Bennett's perceptive notion of vital materialism in mind, I want to dialogue further with the doctrines of ahiṁsā and aparigraha, non-violence and non-possessiveness, respectively. I argue that this subtle perspectival shift in the thing-power of matter can make Jainism's already expansive ethic of carefulness even more robust.]

As a Western student of Jainism, there is a difficulty for me in grappling with the ideas and concepts of Jain philosophy. Jeffery Long explains this difficulty eloquently in these words, "Jainism, more than any other Indic religious tradition, explicitly and dramatically embodies not only a rejection, but a *reversal* of the values that are dominant in contemporary Western society."[1] This is perhaps even more so for me as a Western materialist. Indeed, from my socio-theoretical position, matter and not some external (or internal) substance such as the soul, is of critical importance. Jainism proposes a sharp dualism between the substances of *(jīva)* soul or living beings and *(ajīva)* non-living beings, the latter of which matter is a part. In my readings of Jain philosophy, (*pudgala*) matter is constantly put down, demonized in some sense or simply overlooked in favor of the *jīva*. Granted, this is understandable from the fact that Jainism has origins as and is still, a renunciant tradition. However, for me at least, a healthy concept of matter is incredibly valuable, especially in this contemporary moment of environmental degradation.[2]

Traditionally, both in the West and in Jain philosophy, matter is often viewed as passive and inanimate. Indeed, in Jainism especially, it is precisely because matter or *pudgala*, lacks the

enlivening *jīva* that matter is not animate in any way. Despite this downplaying of matter's potential vibrancy, I wish to enter into conversation with Jain philosophy and the work of political theorist Jane Bennett. Bennett's work proposes that matter has a vital existence; she argues that matter possesses thing-power, "the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle."[3] Bennett's vital materialism has markedly influenced my perspectives on matter, in viewing it as something more than brute, passive stuff. My aim in this dialogue is to suggest that perhaps matter is far more significant than Jain philosophy gives credit. In fact, I argue that Jainism stresses this point very clearly; however, the reason in which this is de-emphasized is due to the fact that Jainism glorifies the *jīva*. In doing this, in recovering a potentiality of matter, I wish to suggest that the already complex and valuable ethic of carefulness that Jain philosophy espouses (a la *ahiṁsā* and *aparigraha*, non-violence and non-possessiveness, respectively) can be further strengthened to meet the needs of a changing world.

My attempt here is to articulate a materiality that can be congruent with the worldview espoused by Jain philosophy and religion that gives matter something "more." I will do this in roughly four moves. First, I will explicate the matter as a substance and concept within Jain philosophy. Second, I will describe the core concepts of Bennett's theory of vital materialism, how it contrasts to vitalism and critical vitalism and the implications of her project. Third, I will explain how it would be possible to synthesize these two perspectives; in doing so, I will address the central problem of Jainism being a vitalistic dualism and Bennett working in a materialistic monism. In this synthesis, I will also suggest that Jain philosophy offers a counter to the typical passivity of matter through the example of the doctrine of *karma*. Finally, I will discuss the implications of the vitality of matter and how this strengthens the doctrines of *ahiṁsā* and *aparigraha* to build up Jainism's ethic of carefulness.

A brief prelude on speculation

Before I even get to the actual project at hand, I think it is important to consider exactly how am I able to attempt such integration in the first place. In many ways, in which I cannot stress enough, all I am arguing is a slight perspectival shift. John Cort notes that Jain philosophy, specifically because of its soteriological angle, radically devalues materiality in order to pursue pure spirituality; however, he also argues, "the Jains also have a rich history of daily practices and attitudes that foster a much more positive engagement with the material world."[4] The trajectory of my shift latches onto these practices and attitudes. My attempt to bridge Bennett's vital materialism with the Jain concept of matter would resonate with them.

In fact, I believe that a lot of Jains would agree with my sentiment of matter having a function, a purpose; the difference is in the language in which I describe it would not be similar to that of Jains. Still, I must explain how I am to justify why this shift can happen and why it should at least be considered. I argue that this is where the Jain doctrines of relativity come into play. However, I wish to note that my use of these doctrines is quite basic; a systematic overview of the Jain doctrines of relativity is not within the scope of this paper on matter. Nonetheless, I view it prudent to discuss them in order to justify my exploratory work.

The first of these doctrines is *anekāntavāda* (the doctrine of non-one-sidedness). As an ontological doctrine, *anekāntavāda* argues that all aspects of reality, all existent entities, possess innumerable aspects to them; indeed, any particular thing is multifaceted. Long writes, "This claim stems from the ontological realism that characterizes the Jain position. That is, according to Jain thought, reality is essentially as we perceive it. The apparent contradictions that our perceptions of reality involve- continuity and change, emergence and perishing, permanence and flux, identity and difference- reflect the interdependent, relationally constituted nature of things. Reality is a synthesis of opposites."[5]

Out of *anekāntavāda*, Jain scholars developed natural correlates in the form of the epistemological *(nayavāda)* the doctrine of perspectives and the meta-philosophical *(syādvāda)* the doctrine of conditional assertion. *Nayavāda* attempts to address the perceived contradictions of the multi-faceted nature of reality by articulating that there are multiple perspectives in which an entity is viewed.[6] *Syādvāda* articulates a formalized logic of seven propositions that tests the truthfulness of an entity, which are: true, not true, both true and not true, inexpressible, inexpressible and true, inexpressible and not true and inexpressible and both true and not true.[7] These two doctrines attempt to reflect the possibilities and the wide-range of perspectives in which reality can be viewed. The cardinal sin, so to speak, of these doctrines the classification of a specific position about what an entity is.

Recently, *anekāntavāda* has been taken up as the Jain contribution to discussions on religious pluralism. Long intimates that not only do these doctrines "recommend themselves... to those who are committed to religious pluralism due, not only to their own internal consistency, but also to the fact that they allow for a minimal distortion of the claims of the world's religions."[8] I believe it is possible to take look at this in another way, as a space of speculation. What I mean in here is that *anekāntavāda*, along with *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*, give us some room to work with in thinking about how entities interact or are described. While there are definite guide posts of true knowledge, there is a sense of ambiguity. Further more, I think *anekāntavāda* is the very starting place for any sort of dialogue between Jain and Western philosophy; it acts as the gate in which creative expressions and connections can be made. My challenge, then, is if I ascribe some vitality to matter, would I breach into the realm of "false knowledge?" While it could be entirely possible, I think the beneficial thing about Jain relativity is that enables some sort of flexibility. Materiality in the vital materialism conception of it, in many ways still fits, I think, to ways in which Jains speak of materiality. This entire endeavor is built on a perspective shift. In a perspective, I may be true, but in another I may be false.

Understanding matter in Jainism

A discussion on matter in Jain philosophy stretches into multiple realms, beginning first and foremost with metaphysics. In *Religion and Culture of the Jains*, Jyoti Prasad Jain notes, "Jaina metaphysics starts with the scientific axiom 'nothing is destructible', that is, nothing can be created out of nothing, or out of something which does not at all exist in one form or the other."[9] Within Jain cosmology, something has always existed; for instance, there was never a

creatio ex nihilo akin to Christian cosmology. Furthermore, due to the fact that something always existed, it is posited that the universe is "eternal, everlasting, without a beginning and without an end."[10]

Veer Sagar Jain and Shugan C. Jain note that in order "to know [the] cosmos, it is essential that [one] understand[s] properly the concept and nature of substance (*dravya*). Without knowing the nature of substance, [one] cannot understand the characteristics of any entity properly/ correctly."[11] What Veer Sagar Jain and Shugan Jain mean here is that for Jains, the universe is broadly classified into two broad categories, of which six constituent elements or *dravyas*, are derived. The first major division is between *jīva* and *ajīva*, soul or living beings and non-living beings, respectively.[12] From these broad categories, Jains further classified the elements of *ajīva*, specifically: matter *(pudgala)*, principle of motion *(dharma)*, principle of rest *(adharma)*, space *(ākāśa)* and time *(kāla)*. These five classifications, including the sixth of *jīva*, are the six substances that compose the entirety of the universe.

While this paper is uniquely oriented toward *pudgala* or matter, it is perhaps useful to explain each of these substances in brief. In contrast to each other *dharma* and *adharma* enable the capacity of entities to move or rest. They are, as Jyoti Jain explains, "neutral and conditional causes... non-corporeal but homogenous-whole in their constitution. They are simply passive, inactive agents or media for the other substances to move or step, as the case may be."[13] *Ākāśa* is the substance of space in the literal sense, it is physical space in which entities and the other substances participate. Veer Jain and Shugan Jain explain that it is omnipresent and singular; however, it is divided into the *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*, inhabitable and non-habitable space, respectively.[14] *Kāla* is the substance that assists other substances undergo change and it is atomistically composed.[15] Notably, Jyoti Jain explains that the practical units of time "are mere deductions of the real substance that *kāla* is."[16]

Jīva and *pudgala* are the two substances that are of critical importance to this paper. As mentioned, *jīva* is understood as soul, but also as living being. Jyoti Jain explains, "The *jīva* (*atman*, soul, spirit or the psychic principle) is the very antithesis of matter and cannot be perceived by the senses. It is essentially constituted of sentiency (*cetanā*) and its differentia is the manifestation of consciousness (*upayoga*) which takes the form of *darśana* (intuition or indeterminate perception) and *jñāna* (cognition or definitive knowledge) and flows at a time in any one of the three channels: inauspicious, auspicious and pure, indicating impiety, piety and purity, respectively."[17]

The *jīva* is significant, insomuch as the *jīva* is the vitalism of Jainism. It is that substance which provides animation, sentience and awareness. There are two types of *jīva*. The first type is the transcendent *jīva* or liberated *jīva* (*mukta*), which is the soul that is pure spirit/pure consciousness. It is the achievement of this state that Jain philosophy and religion aim toward. In contrast to the liberated *jīva*, there is also the embodied *jīva* or *samsārin*, which is connected to the material and matter. This embodied *jīva* is further classified based on sensory organs and mobility. Those that are immobile include elemental-bodies (fire, water, air, earth)[18] and

vegetation, which are one-sensed beings possessing only the sense of touch; meanwhile mobile being include two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed and five-sensed beings, which "are accordingly... endowed with the faculty of touch and taste; touch, taste and smell; touch, taste, smell and sight and touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing, respectively."[19] The five-sensed beings are further divided into four types of embodiments that possess mental faculties or intelligence: human, animal, hellish and celestial beings. It is precisely because the embodied *jīva* possess bodies that they are consistently reborn, having to work out their relationship with matter until the point of liberation.

So what is matter in Jain philosophy? In *Concept of Matter in Jaina Philosophy*, Jogendra Chandra Sikdar provides an elaborate and detailed comparative study between the Jain understanding of matter and other Indian schools (including modern scientific notions of matter).[20] Sikdar explains, "According to Jaina metaphysics, the most visible form of *ajīvadravya* (non-living substance) or *acetanatattva* is *(pudgalāstikāya)* matter which exists in the Universe in various forms, such as, earth, water, fire, air, shadow, objects of four senses -hearing, smell, taste and touch, physical mind, speech, bodies, etc. up to karmic matter and *(paramāṇu)* ultimate atom. *Pudgala* is a tangible reality within the sensuous and supersensuous experiences in perceptible and imperceptible conditions. Its finest form is *(paramāṇu)* ultimate atom."[21]

Thus, out of the non-living substances, matter is the most populous, frequent, or present. This is understandable when we take into consideration Sikdar's further explication of matter's eternality: "it will never be destroyed nor will it be converted into other substances...whatever material substance there was in the past, (that much) is at present and will be in the infinite future."[22] As such, it is eternal and therefore permanently fixed in quantity. Interestingly, when Sikdar further explains the characteristics of matter, he is sure to note how it is devoid of soul, of *jīva* and therefore devoid of sentiency and consciousness.[23] In fact, he stresses the fact that *pudgala* is the opposite to *jīva*, similar, of course, to Jyoti Jain's description of the *jīva* being matter's antithesis. Notably, this raises the question about how matter is perceived. M. R. Gelra highlights that this question asks "whether *ajīva* is only a negative form of *jīva* or it is a positive entity."[24] It seems that it is precisely due to the fact that *pudgala* has eternal and immutable natures that matter is given a positive spin.

While there are numerous other qualities and modes that Jains give to matter, such as certain sensory qualities, colors, smells and tastes, one thing that Sikdar highlights in his text, which is most salient for this paper, is a short line: "Matter is active."[25] He notes that it is due to the trinitarian principle of origination-decay-permanence that is engendered in the fact that substances have modes and qualities. He writes, "The permanence of quality in a substance can be called inactivity, while the origination and decay of mode in it are to be called activity, *kriyā*, modes of a substance are infinite, so there are stated to be infinite divisions or conditions of activity."[26] In fact, Sikdar describes activity even further, as a vibration. Indeed, "vibration is the nature of matter; activity takes place in it due to this vibrating nature and it is capable of being active. Only by its capacity of vibration (*parispandana śaktiguṇa*) [*sic*]. Therefore it is active by its own capacity."[27]

The activity of matter is noted as being integrative and disintegrative. Indeed, the very name of *pudgala* suggests such. Etymologically, the meaning of *pudgala* comes from two words: *pud* and *gala*, meaning to combine and to dissociate respectively.[28] *Pudgala* is given its name because of its nature. However, Sikdar intimates a reason why matter does this dance between association and disassociation. He highlights "the first cause of it is (*paramāṇu*) ultimate atom."[29] The *paramāṇu* "On account of their mutual touch or contact" integrates and disintegrates from one another, entering into new combinations, interactions and relationships. The *paramāṇu's* nature accounts for Jain philosophy's sophisticated atomic theory, akin to atomic theory as purported by the West. When the *paramāṇu* swerves into a new formation, it becomes a *skandha* or molecule, which can equally collide into new formations with other *skandha* or even *paramāṇu* to form more aggregations and collectivities or dissolve back into a *paramāṇu*. Sikdar notes that "The ultimate capacity and multifariousness of Matter are generated by its integrating and disintegrating nature."[30]

The canonical literature discussed the nature of matter as being *jīvagrāhya* or as receivable by the *jīva*, which means, "[m]atter is endowed with the attribute of reception or attraction from the stand-point of quality."[31] Here we begin to see the concept and doctrine of *karma* within Jain philosophy and how such a doctrine is associated with matter. Sikdar explains, following the ācārya Umāsvāti, "the individual self attracts particles of Matter which are fit to turn into *(karmapudgala)* karmic matter as the self is actuated by passions."[32] But these very passions are product of matter-ly associations. Indeed, it is "[t]he function of matter... to form the basis of body and organs of speech and mind and respiration [*sic*]," which means that the soul that attracts matter, i.e. the embodied soul, attracts and bonds with matter because that matter transforms into body, mind, speech, actions, passions which in turn attracts more matter.[33] Matter enters into a cycle of mattering, which is ultimately called *saṁsāra*.

This brief exposition on the Jain concept of matter is a gloss. In a very apparent way, I am not going far enough, which I wish to make very transparent; indeed, my latest restatement of Sikdar's work is only the tip of the iceberg that is the doctrine of *karma*, which is but a piece of an overall theory of *pudgala*. I will return to *karma* theory later in order to make connections between matter and vital materialism. However, first, I must explore what is vital materialism.

Jane Bennett's vibrant matter

In *Vibrant Matter*, Jane Bennett describes her project as being two-fold. At once, it is a philosophical endeavor, in which to orchestrate a reconsideration of the stereotypical view of matter as "passive stuff, as raw, brute or inert."[34] This philosophical conversation, however, also moves into a political undertaking, in which Bennett hopes "To encourage more intelligent and sustainable engagements with vibrant matter and lively things."[35] The theory of vital materialism, then, is ultimately an ecological investment. In the text, she recounts a day in which she finds an assortment of things, objects, or more in her words "stuff," located within a storm drain. She writes, "Glove, pollen, rat, cap, stick. As I encountered these items, they shimmied back and forth between debris and thing -between, on the one hand, stuff to ignore,

except insofar as it betokened human activity (the workman's efforts, the litterer's toss, the rat-poisoner's success) and on the other hand, stuff that commanded attention in its own right, as existents in excess of their association with human meanings, habits or projects. In the second moment, stuff exhibits its thing-power: it issued a call, even if I did not quite understand what it was saying."[36]

Following a tradition that is informed by a wide variety of Western philosophers and thinkers, from Deleuze and Guattari to Spinoza to Thoreau to Adorno, Bennett traces the contours of vital materialism through her notion of "thing-power." Thing-power, she writes, is "the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle."[37] It is this capacity or quality, a hard-to-describe trait, of random debris that commands to be known. In describing thing-power, Bennett explores the idea of trash as having some productive ability; she cites Robert Sullivan who explains how the piling of garbage in New Jersey creates polluting ooze and sludge, so that we realize that "a vital materiality can never really be thrown 'away,' for it continues its activities even as a discarded or unwanted commodity."[38] In this way, thing-power challenges the typical idea of what are certain substances by asking the question: what can a substance do? Indeed, it becomes "a good starting point for thinking beyond the life-matter binary, the dominant organizational principle of adult experience."[39]

Bennett's project has her think about the power of electricity, fat, metal, stem cells and garbage. This engagement with these substances, her arguing that they have vitality to them, lends itself to a new understanding of "acting." Bennett in this instance takes cue from theorist Bruno Latour and his term actant. Bennett writes, "*Actant*, recall, is Bruno Latour's term for a source of action; an actant can be human or not or most likely, a combination of both. Latour defines it as "something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It implies no special motivation of human individual actors, nor of humans in general." An actant is neither an object nor a subject but an 'intervener," akin to the Deleuzean "quasi-casual operator." An operator is that which, by virtue of its particular location in an assemblage and the fortuity of being in the right place at the right time, makes the difference, makes things happen, becomes the decisive force catalyzing an event."[40]

Bennett's drawing of Latour to describe the nature of actants creates an axiom, "an actant never really acts alone."[41] Her understanding of actants in vital materialism emphasizes a constantly shifting web of relationality between different types of things: human bodies, plant bodies, plastic, fat and lightning, for example. Following Deleuze and Guattari, Bennett describes this constantly (re)shaping relationships an assemblage. Bennett describes assemblages as "ad hoc groupings of diverse elementsē living, throbbing confederations that are able to function despite the persistent presence of energies that confound them from within."[42] The beauty of an assemblage is that a single force does not guide its activity, but rather, it is an emergent culmination of forces, each one activity together (or against one another) to cause something to happen. The vitality of the constituent members of an assemblage still remains, enabling them to break off from the assemblage upon whom to enter into new assemblages and relationships. This description

of material assemblages seems quite coherent with the very definition of matter in Jain philosophy. Indeed, as the *Tattvārthasūtra* reminds us,"[*p*]*ud* means combine and *gala* means to separate. The main attribute of matter is its ability to combine and separate (fusion and fission) to form clusters."[43]

Bennett's vital materialism is a new imagining. Ultimately, it is a break away from traditional vitalism and critical vitalism. Bennett declares, "Mine is not a vitalism in the traditional sense; I equate affect with materiality, rather than posit a separate force that can enter and animate a physical body."[44] The traditional vitalism that Bennett is operating away from conceives of a separate, external substance that animates and/or gives life to matter. This is often associated to religious belief in the substance of souls. The development of critical vitalism was made in response to vitalism, as well as mechanistic materialism. Bennett notes that key figures such as Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch, "distinguished themselves from those 'naīve' vitalists who posited a spiritual force or soul that was immune to any scientific or experimental inquiryē [they] also opposed the mechanistic model of nature assumed by the 'materialists' of their day."[45] These critical vitalists expressed an idea that there was something within matter that was ineffable, that always escaped their grasp, however, they were not willing to suggest that it is a substance that they could not theorize. The distinction between their work and Bennett's is that critical vitalists always posited something 'not-quite-material' rather than equate materialism "to the vitality they discerned in natural processes."[46]

But what are the implications of such a vital materialism? As mentioned, Bennett's project in *Vibrant Matter* is both philosophical as well as political and for her, the political is intimately entangled with the ethical. In many ways, her ethio-political project is built on attentiveness. Bennett writes that "[w]hat is also needed is a cultivated, patient, sensory attentiveness to nonhuman forces operating outside and inside the human body."[47] In doing so, we are able "to raise the status of the materiality of which we are composed."[48] Raising the status of the material of matter, forces us to be more cognizant of our interactions and our relationships. B[illegible] intimates, " The ethical aim becomes to distribute value more generously, to bodies as such. Such a newfound attentiveness to matter and its powers will not solve the problem of human exploitation or oppression but it inspire a greater sense of the extent to which all bodies are kin in the sense of inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations. And in a knotted world of vibrant matter, to harm one section of the web may very well be to harm oneself. Such an enlightened or expanded notion of self-interest is good for humans."[49]

A renewed perceptivity enables humans and nonhumans alike to enter into new formations, new assemblages that recognize our interdependence with one another. Again, I highlight that Bennett's work is greatly ecological and despite the fact that she does not view that this new attentiveness, this carefulness, would fix all our problems, such carefulness does produce new ways of interacting and being in this world that deal less damage.

Synthesizing two views

With Bennett's theory of vital materialism in view, I believe it is time to return to Jain matter, to *pudgala* and as I hope to explain, to *karma* theory. I greatly believe that there is a possible

intersection or even synthesis between these two perspectives. While I have been noting throughout this paper some similarities, such as the fact of the *paramāṇu* functioning like actants in forming *skandha*-assemblages, there is an immediate problem that must be addressed. How is it possible that a connection between Bennett and Jainism be made? As previously quoted, Bennett's vital materialism is ultimately material; she does not "posit a separate force," which is something that Jainism does, in fact, do.[50] In engaging with vital materialism and Jainism, I come into a situation in which I am attempting to integrate or at least synthesize a vitalistic dualism and a vital-materialistic monism. How do we jump over this hurdle?

Bennett, interestingly enough, provides a potential solution. Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari, who in turn are drawing upon philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon, Bennett suggests,"such a material vitalism... doubtless exist everywhere but is ordinarily hidden or covered, rendered unrecognizable by the hylomorphic model."[51] The hylomorphic model explains vitalism very accurately. It posits "some nonmaterial supplement with the power to transform mere matter into embodied life."[52] The *jīva*-as-soul is always connected to matter and that matter in which it is associated becomes empowered, alive. But, what is interesting is that the hylomorphic model fails to see any interior elements of matter. Bennett intimates that "[t]he hylomorphic model is ignorant.... [to the fact] there exist 'variable intensive affects' and 'incipient qualities' of matter that 'external forms [can only] bring out and facilitate."[53] Thus, even in the hylomorphic model, matter still has a vitality about it.

But what, exactly is this vitality that *pudgala* has that Jainism ignores? I want to argue that Jainism, in its pursuit of liberation *(mokṣa)*, becomes oblivious to matter's functional potentiality. In fact, the vibrancy of matter has been right under Jainism's nose all along: the curious ability of inanimate matter is to effect the ways in which the soul progresses. Indeed, *karma* theory becomes Jainism's best correspondence to vital materialism.

The doctrine of *karma* within Jain philosophy helps address the fact, as Jyoti Jain explains, "the soul has been associated with matter from times immemorial."[54] However, in comparison to other Indian philosophical traditions that discussed *karma*, Jains add a particularly material twist. As Padmanabh Jaini explains, "Most Indian systems employ the term karma to designate certain traces (*vāsanā*) or seeds (*bīja*) left behind, as it were, by one's deeds. These residual factors will someday bear fruit in the sense of generating or conditioning experience, thus it is said, "Every action must eventuate in an appropriate reward or retribution to the perform of that action: this is karma. Jains adhere to the general outlines of this view but they stand alone in asserting unequivocally that karma is itself actual matter, rather than the sort of quasi-physical or psychological elements envisioned by other schools."[55]

My quoting of Jaini at length drives the point that Jains do something unusual. They give matter an unusually significant weight in its interaction with the soul. The Jain conception of *karma* "is actually a form of subtle matter and the mechanism by which the bondage of the soul occurs, as well as the path to its eventual liberation."[56] To stress further, "karma is understood in Jainism to be a material substance which produces the universal law of cause and effect, which produces

experiences in our souls according to certain regular patterns."[57] Karmic matter acts as the conditions in which a *jṣva* interacts and struggles within the world.

Jyoti Jain highlights that the doctrine of *karma* directly comes out of the Jain view on matter.[58] Just how does *karma* attach to the *jīva*, however? Additionally, what exactly does *karma* do? As I explained earlier, matter, through its original relationship to the soul, forms the embodiment of the *jīva*. However, it is the passions and actions of the embodied *jīva* that creates the inflow of *karmic* matter. The nature of the bondage of *karma* is self-perpetuating because in order for matter to be accumulated, matter needs to be there in the first place. What is interesting is that Jain philosophers have articulated the precise types of *karma* there are. Indeed, there are "eight primary classes and one hundred and forty-eight subclasses" of *karma*, in which "[t]he primary or principal classes of *karman* obstruct, cover, obscure, distort, pervert, or prevent the full expression of the...soul."[59]

I wish to dwell on these very words; these words are verbs, indeed actions, which *karmic* matter does to the soul. It is no longer the instance in which matter simply *exists* but rather, matter is always described as performing some sort of action. Indeed, matter does something, but not just a singular something; different types of matters do different types of actions. Four of the classifications affect the soul in ways to reduce its knowledge; the other four classifications affect the soul in the sense that it physically en-fleshes it. Here we can see the obvious connection between vital materialism and Jain *karma* theory; matter becomes a literal site of productivity in its relationship with the *jīva*. When Sikdar writes about matter and karma, he very curiously writes that matter ends up being "in the service of Soul."[60] This service is not only in the formation and embodiment of bodies but also in the obscuration of knowledge of said bodies.

Jyoti Jain notes that "[m]atter is the basis of all worldly existence," and it is such an existence that keeps the soul from achieving its liberative goal. This experience of worldly existence culminates in pleasure, pain, life and death. Interestingly, in a lecture entitled "Definition of Religion in Jainism," Shugan Jain explored the notion of purity and impurity in Jain religious practice. In this lecture, he argued that matter is considered impure, because it is bonded with these experiences of pain and pleasure.[61] I do not wish to challenge the religious imperative on purity, however, what I wish to emphasize is that even in the religious context, this implies a certain level of activity or capacity for matter. Matter has thing-power, albeit, detrimental thing-power. Sikdar calls these experiences "material functions toward [the soul]."[62] Matter does something for the soul to reconcile with, to work out. Jyoti Jain, quoting an unnamed Western scholar, highlights this relationship in a beautiful way, "The Jaina idea of karman; is an animating element of dialectical edification...."[63] Matter edifies the soul; matter serves a function.

In many ways, I see a comparison between the assemblage of vital materialism and the interaction of matter and the *jṣva*. In every new moment in which matter and soul come together, something new occurs δ whether it is a new embodiment or shift in status -but ultimately, this is a productive work. In part, *karma* does indeed create the wrong faith, knowledge and action, but it also conditions the possibility for the correction of such. All I wish to do when I attempt this

connection between a vital materialism and Jain material philosophy is to raise the question of relationality. *Karma* does this on a micro-scale. I fully believe similar situations occur when Jainism interacts with gross and extended types of matter.

Implications: Jain vital matter and an ethic of carefulness

Bennett's construction of a theory of vital materialism creates a greater awareness of matter and its relationships. In many ways, I think this awareness as a cultivation of an ethic of carefulness. We become more careful about our actions and the impact of our actions when we view the world as "enmeshed in a dense network of relations."[64] Although in this paper I look at the Jain doctrine of *karma* as a dialogue partner to show the very actant nature of (subtle) matter, I do not believe it is impossible to conjecture outward: other types of matter, gross and extended types, are equally vital. Such an intuitive move breaks free of the closed system of Jain philosophy and crosses over into Bennett's work.

There are creative collisions and re-imaginings that happen when Jain matter is seen vitally. Primarily, it rejuvenates and extends the ethic of carefulness that Jainism espouses. In her essay, "Thou Shall Not Harm All Living Beings: Feminism, Jainism and Animals," Irina Aristarkhova offers a transitional development from Western feminist ethics-of-care through an infusive reading of Jain *ahiṁsā* and *samāhi* (carefulness).[65] Her conception of carefulness travels along the traditional reading of Jain philosophy. What is interesting, however, is that *ahiṁsā* becomes largely an instance in which non-violence is promoted toward those who are considered living beings. We do not harm another being, not only because it is a *jīva* but also because it is home to an infinite amount of microbial *jīvas*. A vibrant material follows with *ahiṁsā*, connecting the material of our bodies with those other *jīvas*, recognizing that we share a common materiality, a connection of matter to matter that is being worked out. However, even more deeply, a vibrant materialism extends the concept of carefulness beyond simply living beings; indeed, non-living beings are considered equally important.

I want to think about *aparigraha*, the doctrine of non-possessiveness. Long defines *aparigraha* as a "cultivation of a detached attitude toward material objects and physical relationships."[66] It is often described as a letting-go, exemplified by the monastics of Jainism as total rejection of possessions.[67] But letting go, of giving up possessions does not deny their reality. These things still exist, somewhere; the difference, however, is they are no longer in a direct assemblage with a renunciant. Bennett argues "frugality is too simple a maxim. Sometimes ecohealth will require individuals and collectives to back off or ramp down their activeness and sometimes it will call for grander, more dramatic and violent expenditures of human energy."[68] Obviously, a Jain vital materialism would remain tied down to the principle of *ahiṁsā*; yet, I think Bennett's remarks do offer something. It calls us to be more attentive to our relations of material possessions. Simply refusing them or getting rid of them means that they are moved into a new grouping and orientation. A vital materialism calls for Jainism to be more attentive to matter, not only for the sake of *jīvas* but also for the sake of matter itself. This is something that I believe Jain philosophy would find greatly appreciative.

This paper is an attempt at connectivity. I, a young, Western vital-materialist, am seeking to connect to Jain philosophy. Jainism is profoundly sensitive to the smallest aspects of life; this is something that I can appreciate immensely. Jainism has taught me to be more aware to the life around me. Yet, I find it surprising that matter is constantly overlooked. This attempt is perhaps too idealistic, too speculative, too impossible. I do not believe there will ever be a true integration or synthesis between my worldview and Jainism. Matter and the material are far too important to me and matter and the material is not as important for Jain *dharma*. However, I believe my endeavor to find a possible vantage point has nonetheless been fruitful. In attempting to bridge the gap between Jainism and vital materialism, I highlighted the curious power of *pudgala*, of *karma*. Matter is no longer passive or inanimate but rather it serves, it edifies the *jīva*. I have argued that Jainism has always said this; indeed, this fact is only hidden by the overwhelming significance of the soul. This project is a slight shift away from the soul. A perspectival slip, a verbal twist, a glance down to the messy, eternal, changing, karmic stuff called matter. When we begin to think in tandem with Jain philosophy and vital materialism, our attentiveness, our carefulness becomes even more attentive and careful. We begin to see matter differently. Vibrantly.

References:

1. Long, Jeffery D., *Jainism: An introduction* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p.19.
2. I do not mean "healthy" in the sense that I wish matter to be a permanently "positive" concept. I do not think that Jainism would ever have a truly "positive" notion of what matter is, due to the fact that matter is bondage and prevents the soul from achieving its true trajectory: *mokca*. What I wish to mean when I use "healthy" is perhaps something akin to "robust."
3. Bennett, Jane, *Vibrant matter: A political ecology of things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), p.3.
4. Cort, John, "Green Jainism? Notes and queries toward a possible Jain environmental ethic," in *Jainism and ecology: Nonviolence in the web of life*, edited by Christopher Key Chapple (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 84.
5. Long, *Jainism*, p. 141.
6. Ibid, p.143
7. Ibid, p.146-148.
8. Ibid, p.171.
9. Jyoti Prasad Jain, *Religion and culture of the Jains* (New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith, 1975), p.39.
10. Ibid.
11. Jain, Veer Sagar, and Shugan C. Jain, "Reality (sat) and concept of dravya (substance)," in *Select papers on Jainism - Volume II: Jain philosophy including karma doctrine*, edited by Shugan Chand Jain (New Delhi: International School for Jain Studies, 2013), p.2.
12. Ibid.
13. Jain, Jyoti, *Religion and culture*, p. 40.
14. Jain, Veer Sagar, and Shugan C. Jain, "Reality," p.10.
15. Jain, Jyoti, *Religion and culture*, p. 40.

16. Jain, Jyoti, *Religion and culture*, p. 40.
17. Ibid, p. 41.
18. It should be emphasized that these elemental-bodies are embodied *jīvas* and not a type of matter. However, it may be difficult to understand why, for example, an earth-body is not the same as a brick in a building. The Jains understand that the "life" of an elemental-body is easily killable and as such, even the slightest touch can end the life of an elemental-body. Thus, it is so that a brick was previously an earth-body but it is currently no longer one. As I understand it, elemental-bodies are alive only in undisturbed states; thus, untouched (pure) ground would be where earth-bodies exist.
19. Jain, Jyoti, *Religion and culture*, p. 44.
20. Sikdar, Jogendra Chandra, *Concept of matter in Jaina philosophy* (Varanasi: Parshwanath Vidyapeeth, 1987), ix. He notes that "[th]e Jaina concept of Matter is flexible to some extentēit has passed through a series of developments into a meaningful [*sic*] stage of dynamic reality of the present day." This comment is quite interesting for this endeavor in integrating a Jain understanding of matter with a vital materialism, because it suggests that even the "idea" of matter can shift to something similar to vibrant matter.
21. Sikdar, Jogendra Chandra, *Concept of Matter*, 28. Notably, Sikdar mentions the elements as types of matter; presumably, he is referring to the instance in which elemental-bodies are no longer "living beings."
22. Sikdar, *Concept of Matter*, p. 34.
23. Ibid.
24. Gelra, M. R., "Matter and its types,"in *Select papers in Jainism - Volume II: Jain philosophy including karma doctrine*, edited by Shugan Chand Jain (New Delhi: International School for Jain Studies, 2013), p. 16.
25. Sikdar, *Concept of Matter*, p. 37.
26. Ibid, p. 38.
27. Ibid, p. 39.
28. Gelra, M. R., "Matter," p.16.
29. Sikdar, *Concept of Matter*, p. 39.
30. Ibid, p. 40.
31. Ibid, p. 42.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, vii.
35 Ibid, p.8.
36. Ibid, p. 4.
37. Ibid, p. 6.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid, p. 20.
40. Ibid, p. 9.

41. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, vii., p. 21.
42. Ibid, p. 23-24.
43. Ācārya Umāswāmi, *Key to Reality in Jainism*, p.170.
44. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, p.13.
45. Ibid, p. 63.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid, p.14.
48. Ibid, p.12.
49. Ibid, p.13.
50. Ibid, p.13.
51. Ibid, p.56.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Jain, Jyoti, *Religion and culture*, p.45.
55. Padmanabh S. Jaini, *The Jaina path of purification* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1998), 111-112. Emphasis mine.
56. Long, *Jainism*, p.93.
57. Ibid, p.92.
58. Jain, Jyoti, *Religion and culture*, p.45.
59. Ibid, p. 47.
60. Sikdar, *Concept of matter*, p. 43.
61. Shugan C. Jain, lecture, "Definition of religion in Jainism," International School for Jain Studies, New Delhi, India, 10 June 2013.
62. Sikdar, *Concept of matter*, p.43
63. Jain, Jyoti, *Religion and culture*, p. 51.
64. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, p.13.
65. Irina Aristarkhova, "Thou shall not harm all living beings: Feminism, Jainism and animals," *Hypatia* 27, no. 3 (2012): p.641.
66. Long, *Jainism*,1 p.94.
67. Depending, of course, one's sectarian allegiances. For the Digambara, monks truly refuse all material items, clothing included; however, for the Śvetāmbara, monks and nuns are allowed to keep a white cloth for clothing, a begging bowl and a peacock broom to sweep away small creatures.
68. Bennett, *Vibrant Matter*, p.122.

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The Dimensions of a Word: Bhartṛhari's and Amṛtachandra-sūri's Approach

Malgorzata Glinicka

[*The Jaina philosophy of language has been developing through centuries according to its own insight into crucial phenomena of reality and advanced exploration of mind. The followers of Mahāvīra were formulating their ideas and concepts in constant struggle and vivid and dynamic interaction with the representatives of other schools of philosophical thought, such as Buddhists, nyāya, mīmāṁsā, vaiśeṣika etc.*

It is worth considering what was their attitude towords one of the most profile, celebrated and outstanding intellectuals in this field-Bhartṛhari. The proponent of śabda and sphoṭa theories, is quoted analyzed and criticized by each school.

Bhartṛhari and Amṛtacandra-sūri have different opinion concerning the nature of a word but there is one joint between them - the conviction that one single word can never elucidate the whole nature of an object and the entire truth of it but it brings one meaningful part of knowledge of an object to a human being's mind.]

Aspects undertaken by them have been related to main issues of philosophical and linguistic investigations, such as origin, nature and structure of language, way of conveying meanings, relation between word and its denotation, expressed meaning of word (universal v. particular), limitation of meaning, problem of describability of reality, relation between language and truth, criterion of judging truthfulness of a sentence (a statement/a proposition) and truthfulness or falsehood of a statement, the types of statements, which are beyond the categories of truthfulness or falsehood.

It is worth considering what was their attitude towords one of the most profile, celebrated and outstanding intetectuals in this field-- Bhartṛhari, The proponent of śabda and sphoṭa theories, quot, analyzed and criticized by each school an how their concept of world has been evaluating within their own perspective and anekānta approach. There is also a very important presupposition--underlined by Wittgenstein and admonished by Indian thinkers-- that language cannot by cut off other human activities[1].

The Jaina thinkers have incorporated their intuitions concerning the nature of language and processes lying under a dynamic of generating a speech and crystalizing a meaning into their precisely constructed system propped up the great pillars of their philosophy-- *ahiṁsā-vāda* (postulate of non-violence), *aparigraha-vāda* (doctrine of non-possession) and *anekānta*[2]*-vāda* (multiplexity of reality), supported by the concepts of *syād-vāda* (method of seven-fold modal description) or *pramāṇa-sapta-bhaṅgī*, *naya-vāda* (doctrine of view-points[3]) or *naya-sapta-bhaṅgī* and *nikṣepa-/ nyāsa-vāda* (the method of seven stand-points)[4].

Main texts on these issues are Umāsvāti's *A Treatise On Reality* (*Tattvārtha-sūtra/ Tattvārthādhigama-bhāṣya*), Siddhasena Divākara's *A Treatise on One View Reasoning* (*Sanmati-tarka-prakaraṇa*), Akalaṅka's *A Chief Annotation* (*Rāja-vārttika*) and *The Three-fold Light* (*Laghīyas-traya*), Siddharṣigaṇi's *An Explanation of The Introduction to Logic* (*Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti*), Mallişeṇa's *A Cluster of Blossoms of the Method of the Seven-fold Modal Description* (*Syād-vāda-mañjarī*) and Mallavādin's *A Wheel of View-Points Having 12-Spokes* (*Dvādaśāra-naya-cakra*)[5]. The theory of the multiplexity of reality has been described especially in: Haribhadrasūri's *A Flag of Victory of Multiple View-Points [Doctrine]* (*Anekānta-jaya-patākā*) and *An Introduction of the Theory of Multiple View-Points* (*Anekānta--vāda-praveśa*), Devasūrivādin's *An Ornament of the Light of Categories [Describable with] Means to Valid Knowledge and View-Points* (*Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokālaṁkāra*).

The Bhartṛhari's Background

Bhartṛhari, born in 4th/5th c. C.E. under Gupta empire[6], the disciple of Vasurata[7], was the author of grammatical and philosophical texts, relating to the tradition of Pāṇini grammar: *Vākyapadīya* (*On sentence and word*), an ancient commentary (*vṛtti*)[8] to the first or second book (*kāṇḍa*) of *Vākyapadīya*, *Mahābhāṣya-ṭīkā/-dīpikā*, the earliest available commentary to Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* and probably *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*[9]. In *Mahābhāṣya-ṭīkā* and *Vākyapadīya* he accentuates his knowledge and understanding in the field of the Buddhist and Jaina thought without criticizing the results of their work[10].

Bhartṛhari considers grammar as the most important *vedāṅga* and as the fundamental of all methodical studies, the only way leading to the cognition, which -- according to *Vākyapadīya* -- is verbal. He explains his vision in a following passage: "It [is] an archway to liberation, a healing of the speech defects/ A purification of all sciences; [it] brightens over [all] of them (sciences)./ As all categories of things depend upon [their] verbal form,/ The same situation actually happens in this world [where] this discipline [is] the ultimate objective of/ [all] systems of knowledge"[11] Quote after Wielinska (1994: 141). VP I.14-15:tad dvāram apavargasya vāṅ-malānāṁ cikitsitam / pavitraṁ sarva-vidyānām adhividyaṁ prakāśate //.

The structure of *Vākyapadīya (Trikāṇḍī)* consists of three parts: *Āgama-samuccaya* (*Brahma-kāṇḍa*), *Vākyapadīya* (*Vākyakāṇḍa*) and *Prakīrṇa(ka)* (*Pada-kāṇḍa*), divided into chapters and descriptions (*samuddeśa*)[12]. This treatise, in the form of mnemonic verses, relates to three intrinsically interpenetrating systems: epistemology, ontology and philosophy of language[13]. There are following accessible classic commentaries: *Vṛtti* in longer and original version [Hari-vṛṣabha -> (Bhartṛ-)hari], *Vṛtti* in shorter and later version [an unknown editor], *ṭīkā*[14] entitled *Paddhati* lub *Sphuṭākṣarā*, explanation *kārikā*[15]+ longer *Vṛtti* [Vṛṣabha/ Vṛṣabha-deva] (to the first book), *Vṛtti* [Hari-vṛṣabha -> (Bhartṛ-)hari], *ṭīkā* entitled *Vākya-pradīpa*, only explanation *kārikā* [Puṇya-rāja (=Phulla-rāja) or Rājānaka-śūra-varman], recapitulation in verses *ṭīkā* [Puṇya-rāja (=Phulla-rāja) or Rājānaka-Śūra-varman], *Vākyapadīya-prameya-saṁgraha*, podsumowanie *ṭīkā* [an unknown editor] (to the second book), *ṭīkā* entitled *Prakīrṇa(ka)-prakāśa*, vājasaneyi *kārikā* [Helā-rāja (two gaps filled by Phulla-rāja)] (to the third book)[16].

There are also the following, prominent commentaries, which have had a great impact upon many Indian philosophers of language: *Paddhati* by Vṛṣabhadeva (8th c.) to *Vākyapadīya* and *vṛtti* to the first of *kaṇḍas*, the full commentary to the second *kāṇḍas* by Puṇyarāja, Śaśaṅkaśiṣya's disciple[17], *Śabdaprabha* to the first and the second *kāṇḍa*, *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* to the third one by Helaraja (9th), quoted by Madhvācharya, Bhattoji Dikṣita and Nageśabhatta and also gaps in third *kāṇḍa* filled by Phullarāja[18]. *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*, understood as the root cause of *śabda*, the lost work, has been attributed to Bhartṛhari based on Somananda's critique comprised in *Śivadṛṣṭi* and on Utpalacharya's approach[19].

Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, so important for Bhartṛhari's development, has become the ultimate authority in describing language. Corrected versions (with interpolations, modifications and changes) of this unique work and numerous commentaries support scholars to have on deep insight into it: *Saṁgraha* of Vyāḍi[20], *Vārttika* by Kātyāyana and *Mahābhāṣya* by Patañjali, reducing grammatical and philosophical notions and using the term *śabdānuśasāna* for grammar. Some scholars (Baiji, Saubhava, Haryakca) started distorting *Mahābhāṣya*[21].

For Bhartṛhari, grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) relates to a spoken language focused on communication and consisting of: sentences and words, meanings corresponding to sentences and words, compatibility between sound and meaning and spiritual benefit achievable through proper usage of language[22].

This stable structure has been described by Indian grammarian analyzing the basis of logical abstraction, singling out different components such as root and suffix. Analytical language explains the structure of communicative language, the causal effect relations and relations between abstract forms and meanings[23].

A Word, a Sentence and a Relation Between Language and the Reality

Bhartṛhari identifies a language with the absolute entity -- *brahman*[24]. The basic unit of language is sentence which as a judgment belongs to the mind and the words cannot exist separately out of it[25]. The author of *Vākyapadīya* enumerated perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and word (*śabda*) as means leading to the valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*[26]) which has the highest authority. There is a strict correlation between language and the reality[27]. The world is an aggregate of different forces and meaning is all-powerful (*sarvaśaktivat*). Each object has three powers: manifestation (*āvir-bhāva*), hideness (*tiro-bhāva*) and the state of continuance (*sthiti*), which reflect upon masculine, feminine and neutral state. The infinitive reality is under control of a particular, limited word (*vyavahāra*) based on a conventional usage (*saṁketa*) and exposing its own power through the intention of the speaker (*vivakṣā*). In consequence we can get only a limited image of the universe[28]. The essential reality (*bhāva*) is behind all differentation (*vikalpātīta*).

The subject in its totality will never be understood on the basis of word denoting it. In *Vākyapadīya* there is a following passage: *na hi sarveśām satāṁ śabdobhidhāyakaḥ*"[29] ("a word does not express all of the existent qualities [of an object]"). The same kind of limitation is related to a perception[30].

There are also words which do not denote existent objects but abide in non-reality, for example "a horn of hare" (*śaśa-śṛṅga*) or "a flower of heaven" (*kha-puṣpa*)[31] and that is why the lan

guage can lead to falsification of an image of the world. A word could be expressed through qualities selected by an intuition (*vivakṣā*)[32]. Sometimes there are non-existent qualities as "singularity" and "plurality" in an expression *paṭasya śuklaḥ* ("white color of cloths") and "masculinity" in a term *dārāḥ* ("a wife")[33]. The reality transcends a language and only seers (*ṛṣis*) have possibility to make a deep insight but also without a possibility of a full verbalization[34].

Bhaṭṛhari makes differentiation between "the actual reality" (*sampratisattā*) and "the symbolic reality" (*aupacārikī sattā*) existing in mind in perfect coexistence with the language and including also non-existence (*abhāva*). It helps to avoid logical errors, for example in an expression *aṅkuro jāyate* ("a sprout is born") the word *aṅkura* implies the existence of entity denoted by this word and the usage of the form *jāyate* is redundant. The problem is solved when we consider the designation of *aṅkura* as an entity existing in the mental world with an important role of an intellect (*buddhi*)[35]. Because the reality is not to be fully cognized, words based on such an incomplete cognition expose the objects in different form. The author of *Vākyapadīya* uses a notion of "abstraction" (*apoddhāra*) to a language, which means that for him it is illusory and unreal as a grammar[36]. According to a selected view-point we perceive the object differently[37]. The phenomenal reality-- as a consequence of a division of the undivided Absolute-- is a result of language, which does not join the ultimate real elements (the Buddhist point of view) with one another but divides the real totality of the existent[38]. The word -- having a real and an unreal aspect[39] -- deprived of parts and sequences unveils itself to give birth to something which will have both, like the lively essence (*rasa*) of pea-cock's egg[40]. He emphasizes a great role of multifold connections between Vedic sentences and the phenomenal world[41]. An intuition (*pratibhā*), called "the meaning of a sentence", can be a result of verbal instruction, a consequence of impulses (*bhāvanā*) or can be innate[42]. The great grammarian is conscious that there is an inherent, strict relation between the sequence of sounds and denoted object[43].

The *Sphoṭa* Theory

Bhartṛhari is famous of his *sphoṭa* theory (od *sphuṭ*, to burst, to spring, to puncture, to fissure, to fracture, become suddenly rent asunder, split open with a sound, expand, blossom, disperse, run away, crack etc.) and a notion of *dhvani* (od *dhvan*, to sound, to roar, to make a noise, to echo, to reverberate, to mean, to imply" etc.)[44] developed by Bharata (ok. 2nd) and later by Vāmana, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa (8th/9th)[45].

A process of communicating through language is as follows: During the first step the speaker formulates a sentence in not precise manner, immediately after a moment a thought appears in their mind (*buddhi*). During the second stage they create in their mind the sentence according to the specific, sequential pattern. Then they translate-- through an articulation--the constructed sentence into the sounds of speech[46]. A listener has to undergo the same stages in the opposite direction.

It is this first level to be undergone by a speaker which is called *sphoṭa*, the next ones--*dhvani* or *nāda*. *Dhvani* at the second stage receives a differentiation of lasting, such as: short (*hrasva*), long (*dīrgha*) and very long (*pluta*) and is called *prakṛta-dhvani*[47]. The same *dhvani* at the third

phase obtains a characteristic: "impetuosity" (*druta*), "moderately" (*madhyamā*) and slowness (*vilambita*) and is called *vaikṛta-dhvani*[48].

Śabda is the tiniest particle of speech connected with a meaning. *Sphoṭa* treats a sentence or a sequence as a whole. As a letter and a phoneme don't have constituents, a word or a sentence hase to be treated as indivisible entities[49]. *Sphoṭa*, a word located in mind (*śabdo buddhi-sthaḥ*)[50], is revealed by sounds situated in a constant and regular order.

Bhartṛhari analyses three aspects of linguistic situation:
(1) an integral linguistic symbol, called *sphoṭa*, that can be conventionally and typographically discriminated as for instance *agni*. It is not tantamount to a pronouncing *sphoṭa* but its name[51];
(2) *prakṛta-dhvani*, *agni*, a phonological structure, a model of the norm's standard; or a name of the class which different moments are elements[52];
(3) *vaikṛta-dhvani*, *agni*, an individual moment, grasped in pure phonetic terms[53].

Vijñāna Bhikṣu formulates following questions: What is the nature of *sphoṭa-śabda*? What is the cause of *sphoṭa*? What is the proof for *sphoṭa*[54]? *Sphoṭa* is the unitary whole expressed "word". A particular sound produced by an effort is the cause of it. The letters fail to convey the meaning individually and this also accomplishes the "*sphoṭa*"[55].

Sphoṭa vāda became a very significant and important issue of philosophy of language.

"According to grammarians, *sphoṭa* means '*Sphuṭati artho yasmāt sa sphoṭaḥ*' i.e. the eternal and imperceptible element of sounds and words and the real vehicle of the idea which bursts out or flashes on the mind when a sound or word is uttered is *sphoṭa*. In other words on hearing the words or sentence, when the entire picture-unit of its meaning is presented before us, it is called *sphoṭa*. Thus, *sphoṭa* is a meaning bearing unit of language. It is an element to clean the meaning or denotation of a sentence or word. According to grammarians, the denotations of word or sentence is not determined by letter-sound or phoneme but on completion of those phonemes, it automatically appears. [...] *Sphoṭa* is the internal aspect of denotation"[56].

Brough underlines, that in normal situation we do not consider it in the process of linguistic communication, because we receive it as series of sense-data, which are in detail elaborated by brain and interpreted by it as having a limited form.

Four Levels of Speech Origination

For Bhartṛhari the process of producing speech is the fundamental and the essence of a consciousness and the means to different cognitive processes. In his philosophy particular levels of consciousness correspond with particular stages of language57. A mind or a wakeful consciousness relates to temporal sequences of language in two aspects: superficial speech (*vaikharī*) and inner speech or thought (*madhyamā*). Pure consciousness concerns two higher stages of language beyond common experience: *paśyantī* i *parā*. They constitute sound and semantic units deprived of temporal order and phenomenal differentiation. They are available respectively to temporal and stable experiences of the pure consciousness, the first one as "the differentiated unity" (*savikalpa samādhi*), the second one as "the unity free from differentiation" (*nirvikalpa samādhi*)[58].

The lower level *vaikharī vāc*, the most external and differential, fulfilling communication functions in the relation speaker-listener, is constituted of articulated words and sentences composed of them. That what makes functioning of articulation and hearing organ according to a destination possible -producing and a perception of sound -[is breath (*prāṇa*). Here, at this level, individual characteristics of speech appears (such as: volume, tone and accent) and all linguistic categories[59].

The essence and a content of sentence is not in uttered words, but it exists at higher and deeper level *paśyantī vāc* ("a perceiving and seeing speech") constituting a potential source of speech[60]. At this very stage a process of differentiating a word and its meaning is stopped. There is no temporal consequence, because the process of the realization of the act of speech has not yet begun. The speech is identified with the process of thinking. The term *paśyantī* concerns a realization of the mystic insight, pure consciousness and a content of speech itself[61]. Here a word, a speech and the phenomenal reality (designation) construct one totality and a fulfillment of a creative speech becomes possible - a creative mental act (*dhī*) is identified with the object.

Between those two levels there is the third "middle" (*madhyamā vāc*) phase of conscious mental construction, strictly connected with functions of the intellect (*buddhi*)[62]. The speech transforms itself into dynamic mental process, preceding the act of speech and following the hearing. Bounded with a thing or an idea it achieves the state of mental objectification - the inner speech. This intermediate point is situated between the source of thought and its external realization. All linguistic categories related to the language and a mechanism of speaking receive hidden and latent form. The proceeding of differentiating at the central position depends on language in which it becomes realized. A word is formed and also the meaning related to it and a syntax of utterance as well.

Bhartṛhari considers those three levels as three main phases leading to the realization of each speech. There are other minor stages between them[63]. The fourth and the higher peak of speech (*parā vāc*) is an container and source of uttering, "the ocean of primary waters", homogeneous and uniform chaos and creative potentiality - the Speech, which exists in a speaker as their inmost essence (*ātman*) called a mighty bul one desires to connect with[64].

The language is a core of consciousness and means to all knowledge. When we talk about a speech (*vāk*) or a word (*śabda*) we should understand by that a transmission or revelation of a meaning and a commonly understood reference to a notional and conceptual formation, formulated of conclusions, which can exist only at two lower levels of language (*vaikharī* i *madhyamā*). For a meaning is described as internally connected with a consciousness it enables an activity of direct intuition (*pratibhā*) or common cognition and hence become logically possible at all levels of thought and other sounds, as those of animals[65]. The mystic experience of language reveals when individual identifies themselves with a movement towards the origin[66].

Bhartṛhari and the Jainas

The contribution of Bhartṛhari's thought was significant, especially his concept of word as an

entity which is not able to reveal the whole reality but unfolds only a part of it. It also underlines the importance of an intention of a speaker and a context of a statement.

These framings have been incorporated by Jain philosophers[67] who have formulated the theory of understanding a meaning - with the special role of an intention (*naya*[68]) and a context (*nikṣepa*) -- which became a basis of *syād-vāda* and *sapta-bhaṅgī* (seven-angled)[69]. According to it here should be as many *nayas* as there are styles of making statements or ways of speech[70]. In

Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra naya* (the mood of statements) is described as the method by which things are comprehended from particular standpoints: *naigama* (the non-distinguished or non-analytical), *saṁgraha* (the collective), *vyavahāra* (the practical), *ṛju-sūtra* (the straight or immediate), *śabda* (the verbal or nominal), the method of proper nomenclature consisting of three kinds: *sāmprata* ("the suitable"), *samabhirūḍha* ("subtle") and *evaṁbhuta* ("the such like").

The relationship between a word and its meaning (*saṁjñāsaṁjñi-sambandha*) is designated by Jaina as *vācya-vācaka-niyama* (reduction to [a relation] expression-expressed) or *ekārthatva-niyama* (reduction to an act expressing only one thing or notion)[71]. Every distinctive meaning needs a distinctive word (*pratiniyata-vācya-vācaka-bhāva*) for its medium[72].

"Bhartṛhari, in his *Vākyapadīya*, has indicated about the theory of molecular structure of word but his commentators have not thrown any light on the subject as to who was the propounder of this theory? It is clear that the propounder of this theory were Jainas, because only Jainas regard words as physical construct or the modes of matter. It has been taken as granted by the Jainas that the language or word sound is generated through a special type of matter (*pudgala*). They regard word as one of the different modes of matter"[73]. Further: "It is to remember here that Jainas have established the material concept of the word but that is established in respect of word-sound and not its meaning. If we relate word with the intention of speaker and listener, then definitely that is not-material. Actually the cause of this controversy is the linguistic ambiguity"[74].

A Controversy

The beginning of grammatical interests in the field of philosophy has its own legendary interpretation. One of the oldest significant linguistic controversy was between Mahāvira and his son-in-law Jamālī concerning the meaning of the term *kriyamāṇa* (*present. cont.*, *kṛ*, to do, to make, to prepare, to undertake). First of them, emphasizing the past aspect, regarded it as *kṛta* (past done), the other, concentrated on the future aspect, as *akṛta* (not done).

"- O Lord! Is it proper to call moving as moved, fructifying as fructified, feeling as felt, separating as separated, cutting as cut, piercing as pierced, feeling as felt, separating as separated, cutting as cut, piercing as pierced, burning as burnt, dying as dead and exhausting as exhausted?--Yes, Gautama it is so! Moving is moved, fructifying is fructified, feeling is felt, separating is separated, cutting is cut, piercing is pierced, burning is burnt, dying is dead and exhausting is exhausted".

Another controversy arose when a nun haṇka put a burning coal on the border of Mahāvira's daughter Priyadarśanā's *sāri*. "- Oh! My *sāri* is burnt. -- According to your own view, Madam,

till an activity is not completed it remains 'not-done'. 'Burning' is 'not burnt', it is rather 'non-burnt'. In that case till your whole *sāri* is not burnt, you cannot say it is burnt. It would be false and contradictory to your theory".

The third story relates to the fact that each sentence uttered in some purpose should be situated in the dimension determined by one specific point of view. According to this story Jayantī asked Mahāvīra whether sleeping is good or waking. The master of spiritual awakening replied that for some living-beings one of this options is good and for some others the second is better. Everything depends upon the context, so the process of defining and establishing the relative meaning of questions, answers and concepts is very important.

The next step in clarifying crucial intuitions has become *vibhajya-vāda* (analytical method), an analytic method based on strict divisions (Sanskrit. *vibhaj*, to devide, to distribute, to assign, to separate, to part, *vibhajya*, to be devided, to be distinguished) - developed by the Jaina and the Buddhists- consisting in scrutinizing questions for its solutions. Mahāvīra uses two main methods - *avyākṛta-vāda* (sanskr. *avyākṛta*, undeveloped, not expounded, method of inexplicability) and *vibhajya-vāda*. Then other conceptions as *syād-vāda*, *sapta-bhaṅgī* and *naya-vāda* have been developed.

Jain Conception of Origin of Language and a Scriptural Knowledge

In *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* (*A Work On Statement*) Mahāvīra asked by Gautama about the beginning of the language said: "The language begins with the living beings" and this thesis is strictly connected with the whole Jaina view dividing the set of entities between the living beings (*jīva*) and the non-living beings (*ajīva*). The multiplicity of languages is based on the multiplicity of living beings. Jaina tradition emphasizes a meaning rather than a word and the advocacy of this first aspect should be laid in tīrthaṅkara auspices[75].

Jain scholars have distinguished two types of word cognition: linguistic *(bhāṣātmaka)* and non-linguistic *(abhāṣātmaka)* and two aspects of language: *akṣarātmaka-bhāṣā* ("language which nature is syllables", "language consisting of syllables"), typical for human beings and *anakṣarātmaka-bhāṣā* ("language which nature is a lack of syllables", "language consisting of no syllables") of other living creatures, infants and dump people.

There are two types of scriptures[76]: *sādi-śruta* (temporal scriptures) and *anādi-śruta* (eternal scriptures). Because they are based on language, it is also relatively temporal or relatively eternal. The scriptural knowledge *śrut-jñāna* (cognition based on listening, language based cognition) is not possible without sensory one - *mati-jñāna* (cognition based on perception) including *avagraha* (perception with the senses, a form of knowledge), *īhā* (speculation), *apāya* (perceptual judgement) and *dhāraṇā* (retention keeping back, also in remembrance, a good memory the act of holding, bearing, wearing, supporting, maintaining)[77].

"Scriptural knowledge proceeded by sensory knowledge is of two or of twelve, or of many kinds"[78]. The verbal proficiency is acquired after one based on mind - testimony. There are two types of scriptural awareness - inner corpus (*aṁga praviṣṭa*) consisting of twelve limbs[79] and external one (*aṁga bāhya*), for example *Daśa Vaikālika* and *Uttarādhyayana*. The owner of it

knows the six substance types through their attributes[80]. In that case learning and grasping the reality is not free from error[81] and therefore it is called *kuśruta*. There is the significant passage in *Tattvārtha-sūtra*: "Scriptural knowledge is the province of mind"[82]. As all the activities can be obscured by karma the same situation happens due to this particular genre of knowledge[83], where a word (*vyañjana*) in texts is passing from one term into another[84].

The Notion of *Śabda*

According to Mahāvīra's *Prajñāpanā-sūtra* language is the result of bodily efforts of living-beings known as rational[85] and is made of words caused by efforts (*prāyogika*, applicable, used), not naturally (*vaisrasika*). The above-mentioned process is possible on certain fundamentals - on the work of intellect and the precise capacity of expressing thoughts in speaker and in listener. Producing and expressing words is eventual due to the function of matter having impact upon the body, the organs of speech, the mind and the respiration[86]. The speech - physical and psychic[87] - is whatever is spoken in the form of speech particles (*bhāṣāvargaṇa*, multiplication, class, division of speech or language)[88].

Tattvārtha-sūtra announces: "Sound, union, fitness, grossness, shape, division, darkness, image, worm light and cool light also (are forms of matter)"[89]. *Śabda* (word, name, technical term, sound, voice, term) is the transformation of matter particles capable of converting into sound (*bhāṣāvargaṇās*) as a result of colliding with matter. It is two fold-- one which takes part in the nature of languages (*bhāṣātmaka*) -- expressed (*akṣara*[90]) and not expressed (*anakṣara*) -- and the other type which does not[91]. The word as a mode of matter (*pudgala-paryāya*) is an effort of embodied and corporeal human being, although the language apparatus (*jaḍa*) are non-living beings[92].

"The language used to write the scriptures or the medium of communication between both civilized and novice persons to understand each other and interact are called expressed sound, e.g. Prakrita, Sanskrita etc. The sound created by living beings with two or more senses without alphabets/language to understand each other is called unexpressed sound"[93].

Unexpressed sound is divided between contrived (*prāyogika*) of four kinds -- the sound produced from musical instruments covered with a diaphram (*tata*), the sound produced by stringed musical instruments (*vitata*), the sound produced by metallic musical instruments (*ghana*) and the sound produced by wind musical instruments (*sucira*)-- and natural (*vaisrasika*)[94]. It is worth considering that *Tattvārtha-sūtra* includes passages of precise, concrete, biological and mechanical descriptions, such as those which analyze following activities (*yoga*) of speech[95], understood as a vibrations of the space-points of the soul: right activities of speech (*satya-vacana-yoga*), wrong activities of speech (*asatya-vacana-yoga*), activities of the bilateral speech (*ubhaya-vacana-yoga*) -- simultaneously correct and incorrect, and activities of the neutral speech (*anubhaya-vacana-yoga*)- - neither correct nor false[96].

Human language is a significant kind of means for comprehending the meaning through sound symbols (*akṣarātmaka*, "that whose nature is a syllable") or word-formed signs (*śabdātmaka*, "that whose nature is a word")[97]. We can find a lot of different, advanced classifications sup

porting the complex outlook of Jain philosophers. From the point of view of the origin of words they can be classified into -- caused by efforts (*prāyogika*) and word sounds exerted by the friction or collision of two inanimate things (*sangharṣa*)[98].

A word is the alphabetical meaningful sound-symbol. According to *A Lexicon of the Dogmas of Buddhists Philosophy [which is] The Lord of Kind* (*Abhidhāna-Rājendra-kośa*) we have been provided by several Jain definitions. A sound should be alphabetical, arranged in a definite order and it should be meaningful by interpretation or manifestation. The Ācāryas of tṣrthaEkaras' tradition mention inseparable relation between a word and a meaning but they do not treat them as equal and identical but bounded with *vācya-vācaka* relation leading to the revelation of the reality consisting of expressible units of matter-objects. Listening and pronouncing are the fundamentals of articulate knowledge gained through written or uttered word engaging three senses.

"According to Jaina masters when a speaker wants to express his thoughts and feelings to others, it is mind, which first of all becomes active. After the mind, the speech becomes active. After speech the body and then after the speaker's sound system receives the atoms of speech variform (*bhāṣā-vargaṇā*). Then it transforms into language or in special word-sound and finally excretes the form of sound and gets them out. These linguistic matters emerged in sound form, spread over the sky as sound waves. [...] The transmission process of word-sound waves takes place in the following way. First of all, the departed matter (*pudgala*) in the form of sound, vibrates their near by aggregates and makes it articulated. In this way, gradually emerging sound-waves through the matters of speech variform reaches up to the end of the universe like undulation method [...]. As a stone thrown into the water of a pond creates waves in the water and those waves, again by vibrating their nearby waves reach to the cool of the pond, in the same way the sound waves travel to the end of the universe"[99].

The audible sound can be of three kinds: uttered (*uccarita*), infused (*vāsita*) and uttered-infused (*uccarita-vāsita*). From the point of view of the speaker the physical language (*dravya-bhāṣā*) is regarded of being of three kinds: receiving (*grahaṇa*), coming out (*niḥśaraṇa*) and shocked (*parāghāta*)[100].

"Jainas maintain that the sense of hearing is *prāpyakārī* (contractile). When the sound touches the sense of hearing, then only the cognition of word is occurred, it does not matter whether the sound is generated in near by or at distant place. The sound due to its spreadable nature reaches to the sense of hearing and strikes to the listener for word meaning"[101].

This peculiar and distinct philosophy of language differs from philosophy formulated by the Buddhists, nyāya, mīmāṁsā, vaiśeṣika and other schools of Indian systematic thought. The followers of Mahāvīra accentuate a word symbol, situating in the main position and then the recollection of previous situations implies an identification of these objects for which word symbols are used and for which accordingly there is a cognition of meaning.

In this view the important role is played by mind (*manas*), considered as direct (*avyavahita*), in the opposition to indirect (*vyavahita*)- cause of cognition. According to Āchārya Pujyapāda's *A Complete Attainment of All Objects* (*Sarvārthasiddhi*) mind is one of ten vitalities of life

principle (five senses, energy, respiration, life duration and the organ of speech and the mind)[102]. It is worth underlining that in this perspective it is falsehood that replaces the serenity of mind with worry and anxiety, thus directly robs the highest bliss[103].

Human linguistic communication depends upon physical and spiritual development of each human being as a result of destruction cum subsidence (*kṣayopaśama*) and body makings karmas (*nāma-karma*)[104].

The Jain thinkers have formulated several arguments against those presented by the representatives of nyāya school[105] elucidating several original features of their broad and vivid perspective. First of all, the words possess the quality of touch similar to the air and other material objects, so they can remain inexperienced by the sense of touch. Secondly, the material words must not be interrupted by any obstruction. Thirdly, the molecules of sound have capacity to pass through smoothly and subtly without colliding with other ones.

The word is generated from body and perishes in the very end of the universe. Ability of generating and constituting a meaning expressed in it is not due to its eternity but due to its resemblance (*sādṛśya*)[106]. The concept of this kind of significance is based on manifold view - etymological (*dhātu*) and conventional. Determination of it relies on three principles- natural ability (*sahaja-yogatā*), symbols (*saṁketa*) and usage of tradition (*abhisamaya*)[107]. Primary denotation of a vowel is established by convention.

Methods of Naming

The Jain philosophers formulated an advanced method of naming -name disquisition (*nāma-dvāra*) and disquisition doors (*anuyoga-dvāra*). Classification is as follows: single-fold name (*eka-vidha-nāma*), double-fold name (*dvi-vidhā-nāma*) - on the basis of the numbers of alphabets, on the basis of consciousness, on the basis of generality and individuality, three-fold name (*tri-vidhā-nāma*) -- on the basis of substance, attributes, modes and gender, four-fold name (*catur-vidhā-nāma*) -- induction, deduction, root, delusion, five-fold name (*pañcavidhānāma*) - pertaining to names, indeclinable words, pertaining to verbs, pertaining to a prefix and a complex word, six-fold name (ṣaḍ-*vidhā-nāma*) -- the volitional conditions produced as a consequence of the joint of karma particles with soul (realisational, subsidential, destrucional, destructional cum subsidential, modificational and conjunctive), seven-fold name (*sapta-vidhā-nāma*) - referring to the seven notes of music (*sapta-svaras*), eight-fold name (*aṣṭa-nāma*) - based on eight cases (*vibhakti*) of placement of the word in sentence, nine-fold name (*navavidhānāma*) - based on nine types of sentiments (*rasa*), ten-fold name (*daśavidhā nāma*)-- to the method of naming[108].

Polysemantic Words and The Dispute On Universals

Bhartrhari in *Vākyapadīya* accepts the theory according to which the words are of both types -- polysemantic and synonymous, because we can find two important factors in speaker. One of them brings forward the denotation of word or words (*upacāra*) and the second eliminates the unwanted meaning (*praticāra*)[109]. For followers of Mahāvīra determination of meaning of polysemantic words falls into the doctrine of *naya* (viewpoint) restricted by an intention and a context.

As in the case of Western philosophical schools also in the Indian field there was a controversy if this particular word is the individual (*vyakti*) or the universal (*jāti*). Bhartṛhari analyzes this problem focusing on *sphoṭa* notion and phenomenon. Bhaṭṭoji-dīkṣita ascribes him a view according to which *sphoṭa* is the universal[110] and quotes the following passage of *Vākyapadīya*: "The division into cows and other objects through differentiation of those things, to which the relation is ascribed, it is an Entity called the Class and all the words exist in it"[111]. Brough does not agree with this presupposition. Both sides of the controversy accept the "class" notion. One school underlines that *sphoṭa* is the class consisting of *sphoṭas* and non-*sphoṭas*. Second one wants to see *sphoṭa* within the individual. There is severe probability that Bhartṛhari chooses this last option, because -- regarding the definition of a sentence-- he treats a sentence as unique, one-fold and integral linguistic symbol (*eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*), more *vyakti-sphoṭa* than the class situated in the position of terms (*jātiḥ samghātavartinī*)[112]. This theory has had a great impact upon Kaplan or Copilowish who define a sign as "a class of sign-vehicles all having one and the same law of interpretation"[113].

The Jain philosophers underline that the word is neither absolute universal nor absolute individual but it denotes universalized particular. These two factors cannot be empirically separated. According to Sagaramal Jain's example *maṇuṣyatva* (humanity, mankind) cannot be separated from *manucya* (single man)[114]. The subject of experience is individual possessed of universal (*jātyānvitovyakti*) and therefore it is the denotation of the concrete term. Some words are of the nature of *jāti* (kind, genus, species, class, the generic properties), some of *vyakti* (specific appearance, distinctness, individuality, the individual)[115].

A Refutation of the *Sphoṭa* Theory

Jaina thinkers rejected the *sphoma-vāda* on the condition that its existence cannot be proved, especially Prabhācandra, who underlines that the last letter manifests the meaning of the word supported by dispositional tendencies (*saṁskāra*) of the previous letters, therefore the theory formulated by Bhartṛhari is not necessary. The resemblance of latent disposition of the previous letter and the utterance of last letter are capable of denotation of the term and the sentence, and in consequence there is no need to apprehend and conjecture an indirect cause for the same doctrine[116].

The second argument concerns the aspect of a lack of possibility to manifest the meaning by letters-- individually or collectively. If it is really so, how they can manifest the *sphoṭa*? It is also not sure whether the dispositional tendency of the letters produced from letters itself is named as *sphoṭa* or it is a quality of *sphoṭa*? If the dispositional tendency of the letters is *sphoṭa*, then it is product of letters and therefore eternal. "If the *saṁskāra* is not *sphoṭa* in itself but a quality of *sphoṭa*, then the question arises where the latent dispositions is identical with the *sphoṭa* or it is different from the *sphoṭa*. If we accept the dispositional tendency as a quality of *sphoṭa* and thus identical with *sphoṭa*, then we must accept the emergence of the quality through letters and in that case *sphoṭa* will be non-eternal (*anitya*). If the quality (*dharma*) produced from latent disposition is different from the *sphoṭa* then their mutual relation will not be possible and in that case manifestation of *sphoṭa* from phoneme (letters-sound) will be impossible.

Again, in the condition when both are identical, if phoneme is unable to produce meaning then the *sphoṭa* too cannot produce the meaning"[117].

The conclusion is that only the conscious entity can have ability of manifestation of meaning. In contrast to Bhart[hari Jainism regards the sentence as an absolute collection of the terms with mutual expectancy, but it avows equal importance to both--the sentence and the terms. That is why neither a sentence is possible without the terms not the terms are capable to express their meaning without a sentence. Particular units of language get their meaning only in sentence, not independent of it, but without them there is no existence of a sentence. "Terms and sentence both enjoy a relative existence and have relative importance. [...] The Jaina philosophers have accepted the relative truth of all the theories but has not given undue emphasis on any one aspect. [...] Therefore, it is more reasonable to regard a sentence as an absolute collection of relative terms"[118].

The Concept of a Word in Amṛtachandrasūri's *Laghutattva-sphoṭa*

A very interesting concept of word, deeply rooted in the Jaina perspective, has been presented by Amṛtachandrasēri (10th c. C.E.), a famous commentator of Kunakunda's works, in his highly philosophical poem *A Light Bursting of the Reality* (*Laghutattva-sphoṭa*), a collection of twenty five independent chapters each having twenty five verses in different matters, belonging to the group of *stotras*, a Sanskrit literary form.

As it was mentioned before the ability to speak is a distinctive feature of conscious living beings and this consciousness - according to the Jaina point of view- operates by way of contraction and expansion[119], where the first one relates to *darśana*, focused on the self, and the second one - to *jñāna*, turned towards the infinity of external objects. The person, who proceeds in the way of purification and perfection, tends to reach the *nirvikalpa* state of his consciousness or apprehension[120], the peak of the undifferentiated knowledge[121].

The whole seventeenth chapter is focused on the relationship between words together with the elements of *syād-vāda* and the impact of this way of verbalizing thoughts upon the image of the reality. The core idea of this very set of passages is to stress the intuition that each word is one-dimensional, expressing one primary aspect (*mukhya*) desired by the speaker (*mukhyatvam bhavati vivakcitasya*)[122] and the state of things can be two-dimensional. One dimension refers to positive (*vidhi*) aspect and the second one -- to the negative (*niṣedha*), simultaneously present in an object. First proclaims the thing as established in specific characteristics and the second as exclusion of these. Probably it is also a cause of the lack of possibility of discerning between the real and the unreal aspects of reality. *Tattvārtha-sūtra* expresses it in the following way: "Owing to the lack of discrimination between the real and the unreal, wrong knowledge is whimsical as that of a lunatic"[123]. The only way of avoiding this controversy is to add the *syāt*-qualificator (*syāt, con. praes. act., as*, to be), supporting the sentence with a broader perspective of different opposite possibilities, especially with the other compatible aspect or aspects subordinate (*gauṇa*). It is significant that this duality is inside in each word but the manifestation (*vyakti*) is possible only by using the very qualificator. It implies the split within an inherent meaning of the word transposed into the divided, dual image of the reality (*dvyātmaka*)[124].

"O Giver of the Most Excellent (*varada*)! Because of the dual nature (*ubhayasvabhāvād*), consisting of positive and negative aspects (*vidhi-niyama*), inherent to all existents (*vastūnām*), (even) words which possess the power of (literal) expression (*pariṇata-śaktayaḥ*) (invariably) fail (*skhalantaḥ*) with regard to one (*ekāṁśe*) of these two (aspects). But those (very) words (*śabdāḥ*) can, by you grace (*anugrahāt te*), express (*vedanty*) the full meaning of reality (*tattvārthaṁ*) when they are strongly supported by (*prasabha-samarthanena*) the qualification 'maybe' [*syād-vāda*]" (1) [401].

A single word is not able to touch and penetrate the very core of the absolute meaning. It can cast light on singular aspect or elucidate a surface of the sense relating to concrete object but without blearing ontic chasm between denoted object and denoting expression.

"Although a word (*śabdopi*) (functions to) render (*nayan*) the three worlds (*trailokyam*) an embodiment of positive aspects (*vidhim-ayatām*), it does not (*na*) itself (*svayam*) attain (*gāhate*) to the nature of the object (*cāsau 'rtharūpam*). If this were to happen (*satyevam*), then the obvious (*dṛṣṭam etat*) distinction (*bhinnatvam*) (which exists) between words (*vācakānām*) and their innumerable objects (*niravadhi-vācya*) would disappear (*vilayam*)" (5) [405].

Amṛtachandra repeats his intuition in the next passage, underlying this crucial difference resembling somehow the Derridian concept of differance. The boundary between words and objects is real. One can only imagine a state of destroying, leading to identifying a thing and its name but such a phantasy belongs to an illusionary perspective.

"If one imagines that words (*śabdānām*) themselves (*svayam api*) are (*kalpite*) (identical with) the objects (*'rthabhāve*) (to which they refer), then the (distinction between) word and referent (*vācya-vācakatvam*) would be (*bhāvyeta*) an illusion (*bhrama*[125]). And in (such an) illusion, the obvious (*dṛṣṭo*) distinction (*yam vibhedaḥ*) (which exists) between the word 'pot' and a pot itself (*ghaṭa-paṭa-śabdayor*) could never (*na jātu*) be established, since there would be no fixed basis (*niyaman ṛte*) upon which to distinguish them (*asmin siddhyat*[126])" (6) [406].

The author of *Laghutattva-sphoṭa* analyses the main Jain conception of different points of view. He makes an effort to explain that even if we consider the whole universe as really existent and we ascribe all positive qualities of the supreme entity to it, there is always possibility that someone situated in different position will attribute opposite characteristics.

"Although (*api*) the expression 'sat' (*etat sad iti vaco*) comprehensively refers (*cumbi*) to the entire universe (*viśva*), in truth (*sat*) it does not render (*na hi vidhatte*) everything (*sarvam*) completely positive (*sakalātmanā*). For although (this 'sat') is supreme (*tat varo*[127]), it still anticipates negative aspects (*asad 'py apekcÖm*), from the point of view of other (*parasvarūpāt*), fixed in (*kuryān niyatam*) (all) existents (*arthānām*)" (7) [407].

The world of objects in consciousness of human beings is divided into two main parts - one consisting of objects belonging to them and the other consisting of objects belonging to the other, not me. Such division can also be regarded as having positive aspect of belonging and negative one of non-possessing. All the differences and divisions are possible because of this

structure of considering the outer space and this concrete mechanism of describing the reality. The possibility of choosing one type of characteristic would imply disappearance of the own-other point of view - the unity of everything in the case of unite positive perspective and disappearance in the case of entre negative approach.

"Since the world (*sa śabdaḥ*) (is) endowed with distinctions of 'own' and 'other' (*sva-para-vibheda-bhāji*), what (*kim*) can any word (*sati asmin viśve*) (really) say (*brūyād*) if it chooses only one of these two aspects (*ādvayāt*), namely the positive or negative (*vidhi-niyama*)? If (the word) speaks (*yādi prābrūyad*) only of the positive aspect (*vidhim eva*), then there will be no distinction (*nāsti bhedaḥ*) and if (the word) speaks (*prabrūte yādi*) only of the negative aspect (*niyamam*), then this universe (*jagat*) would disappear (*pramṛṣṭam*)" (10) [410].

Amṛtacandra stresses that to tell anything about an object we have to accept in our minds the potentiality of the opposite characteristic. One side never should be free from the consciousness of both-sided image of each entity existent.

"If the positive aspect (*sÖpekco*) is stated without being qualified by the negative aspect (*na vidhṣyate vidhis tat*), then surely (*nanu*) that positive aspect (*vidhir*), (standing alone), will not express (*nÖbhidhatte*) even (*eva*) its own object (*svasyārtham*). For (*yat*) the positive aspect (*vidhyarthaḥ*) by itself (*svayam*) proclaims (*bravīti*) the object (*artham*) as established in its own (*svasmin niyatam asau*) (substance, space, time and modes but this assertion is meaningless unless) it simultaneously (*sa khalu*) implies (*parān*) exclusion (*niṣiddha*) of that" (16) [416].

This potential power of possibility to look through the surface and realize the other side is incorporated in a word as its most innate core and inherent root independent of external state of things and a will of speaker, reader or listener. The factor which helps this power to burst out is the term *syāt*.

"The dual power (*ubhayā śaktiḥ*) of words (*śabdānām*) is innate (to them) (*svayam ātmikā 'sti*); no external (*paro*) thing can produce (a power) (*śaktas tāṁ svayam na kartum*) in something else which does not (already) exist there (*asatīm*). But the manifestation (*vyaktir tasyāḥ*) of that (dual) power (of words) never (*na kadācanāpi kintu*) takes place (*bhavati*) without the accompaniment (*sahacara antareṇa*) of the expression 'maybe' (*syād-vāda*)" (18) [418].

There are two main points of view - positive and negative, of ownership and other's ship. But beside that distinction we can imagine ourselves more points of view dependent upon various perspectives.

"The manifold aspects (*bhāvānām parātmanor ajasram*) are (*pravṛtte*) forcefully and simultaneously (*anavadhi-nirbhara*) in contact (*samghaṭṭe mahati*) with each other. If, (in regards to their interaction, the words expressing) the positive and negative aspects (of objects) (*vidhiniyamūv*) are not supported by the expression '*syāt*' (*syātkārāśryaṇam*) they will not 'touch' (*asaṁspṛśantau*) (i.e. remain within) the boundaries (*sīmānam*) of 'own's own' and 'other', and so there will be discord among (*visaA vadÖte*) (the objects, because the distinctions between them would be lost)". (22) [422]

Summary

Bhartṛhari and Amṛtacandra-sēri have different opinion concerning the nature of a word but there is one joint between them, the conviction that one single word can never elucidate the whole nature of an object and the entire truth of it but it brings one meaningful part of knowledge of an object to a human being's mind.

References:

1. Cook (2002: 37).
2. Anekānta- sanskrit. anekānta, "not alone and excluding every other", "uncertain".
3. Cf. TS 1.33: "The figurative, the synthetic, the analytic, the straight, the literal, the conventional and the specific/ actuality are the standpoints/ viewpoints (*naigama-saṁgraha-vyavahāra- ṛjusūtra-śabda-samabhirūḍhaivaṁbhūtā nayāḥ*/)".
4. Cf. Balcerowicz (2003: 38): "An ontological assumption underlying the theory of the multiplexity of reality (*anekānta-vāda*) in general and the doctrine of view-points (*naya-vāda*) in particular, consists in the belief which is supposed to defy all simplistic concepts ranging from monism and eternalism (advaita) and ranging to pluralism and momentariness (*kṣanika-vāda*). In other words, the world forms a multifaceted structure, every part of which enters into specific relations and inter-dependencies with other parts of the whole. Its make-up is complex enough to allow for a vast range of statements that can be asserted from various statements".
5. Cf. Wezler (2003: 15-16). PK p. 18 f.: "'*Naya-cakra*', this is an appropriate name: Like in the wheel of e.g. a chariot here tóo there are twelve treatises (prakaraṇa) called 'Spokes'; in [these] 12 treatises 12 nayas [called] '*vidhi*' etc. are set forth here one after the other; under the pretext of expounding the nayas [called]vidhi etc. all philosophical doctrines without exception, which follow one or the other of [these] nayas and belong to his period are described minutely by Mallavādin and just as in the case of the wheel of e.g. the chariot, the spokes are separated from each other, so here too the 12 spokes are separated from each other by this part (aṁśa) which consists in the refutation of the opponents position (para-pakṣa) [...]. For all the twelve *nayas* stand in contradiction to each other and would hence be destroyed; but when they have the syād-vāda as their basis, then they refer to each other as one exposition and become hence firmly established as truth (satyārtha). In this way naya-cakra is an appropriate title. Since all nayas are here described in or of the shape of a wheel, the [philosophical] position of the twelfth spoke is in its turn again contradicted by the first naya, etc. And thus this wheel of nayas moves forward/revolves incessantly".
6. Singh (1999: 4047).
7. Murti (1997: 21).
8. *Vṛtti* (sanskrit.) -commentary, explanation or gloss.
9. Singh (1999: 4045).
10. Ibid (1999: 4045). *yathārtha-jātayaḥ sarvāḥ śabdākṛti-nibandhanāva lokevidyānām ecāvidyāqq parāyaṇam //prāpty-upāyo 'nukūraśca tasya vedo mahacibhiḥ/ eko'py aneka-vartmŚva samāmnātaḥ pṛthak pṛthak //* (My own translation).
11. Bhate, Bronkhorst (1994: 33).
12. Jatavallabhula (2004: 1).

13. *Ṭīkā* (sanskrit.) - commentary.
14. *Kārikā* (sanskrit.) --short sentence in a form of a verse explaining philosophical or gram mar doctrine.
15. Bhate, Bronkhorst (1994: 33).
16. Murti (1997: 13).
17. Ibid (1997: 14).
18. Ibid (1997: 14).
19. Ibid (1997: 21).
20. Ibid (1997: 21).
21. Ibid (1997: 22).
22. Ibid (1997: 22).
23. Pandey(1963: 19).
24 Ibid (1963: 19).
25. Pramāṇa - from sanskrit. "*mā* - "to measure", "to mete out", "to mark off", "to measure across", "to compare with", "to correspond in measure", "to apportion", "to fashion", "to build", "to make", "to form", "to exhibit", "to erect" etc. The usage of this term during epistemological considerations denotes an activity of measuring a knowledge ac cording to a strict and consequent process of examining its validity and correctness. A thorough investigation and just analysis are supposed to expose objectively verifiable dimensions of a particular object but also its very reality and truth. Sivaraman underlines that pramāṇa is a peculiar balance to measure the truth and reality of a concrete thing and untruth and the lack of reality of non-existent. He realizes also that a definition of the cognition criterion under stood as a path to a gain of a valid knowledge (pramiti-sādhanam)is taken from a suffix -ana in the word pramāṇa, which functions as a very important tool in measuring a right knowledge. Cf. Sivaraman (1973: 298). This word denotes the most important knowledge factor, its dominant cause and right measure which helps a human being with making a statement, that they possess a concrete set of informa tion, so that they are a cognizable person (pramat). It Buddhists and followers of Prabhakara have chosen this first meaning treating this term as expressing: "cognition which is free from illusion " (avisaṁvādi-jñāna) or "right cognistion" (samyagjñāna). Cf. Dreyfus (1997: 289). The members of the materialistic school cārvāka/lokāyata accept only one means to the right knowledge- a perception. The Buddhists and vaiśeṣika school -- a per ception and an inference. Sāṁkhya adds to them a verbal testimony (āgama or śabda). The continuators of Prabhakara enumerate five of them -- perception, inference, thinking through an analogy, a verbal testimony and a presupposition (*arthāpatti*). The successors of Bhaṭṭa and vedantins to those include the sixth- a non-existence (*abhāva*) and find out the seventh and eighth criterion - a probability (*sambhava*) and a gossip (*aitihya*). Cf. Narayanan (1992: 76): The Jain logicians accept the knowledge based on recollection (*smaraṇajñāna*), belonging to the type of knowledge devoid of perceptual background (*parokca*). The Buddhist reject all the knowledge engaging a thought (*vikalpajñā namātra*). Coseru trans lates the termpramāṇa as follows: "a source of knowledge", "an unfailing, reliable cognition "or" epistemic validation and guarantee". Cf. Coseru (2012: 5).
26. Bhate, Bronkhorst (1994: 67).

27. Ibid (1994: 68).
28. VP II. 38.
29. Bhate, Bronkhorst (1994: 68).
30. Ibid (1994: 70).
31. Ibid (1994: 70).
32. VP II. 11.10.
33. Bhate, Bronkhorst (1994: 71).
34. Ibid (1994: 71-72).
35. Ibid (1994: 73).
36. Ibid (2001: 480).
37. Ibid (2001: 480).
38. Ibid (2001: 481).
39. Ibid (2001: 481).
40. Ibid (2001: 482).
41. Ibid (2001: 483).
42. Ibid (1994: 73).
43. Cieśikowski (1976: 2).
44. Cieśikowski (1976: 3).
45. VP I.47.
46. VP I.76.
47. Murti (1997: 35).
48. Koc (2002: 31).
49. VP I.46.
50. Brough (1951: 40).
51. Ibid (1951: 40).
52. Ibid (1951: 40).
53. YV 3.16. *Sphoṭākhyaḥ śbdaḥ kīdṛśaḥ?/ Kiṁ kāraṇakaḥ?/Kiṁ pramāṇakaḥ?/*
54. Jain (2006: XV-XVI).
55. Ibid (2006: 61-62).
56. Haney (2002: 79).
57. Ibid (2002: 79-80).
58. Kot (2002: 48).
59. Ibid .
60. Ibid .
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Kot (2002: 47-48).
64. Coward, Penelhum (1977: 103).
65. Ibid (1977: 104).
66. Houben 2009.
67. Naya, sanskrit. a guide, a conductor, wisdom, prudence, behavior, plan, design, leading thought, maxim, principle, system, method, doctrine etc.
68. Jain (2006: 96-96).

69. ST 3.47: *Jāvaiyāvaṇapahā, tāvaiyā honti nayavāyā.*
70. SBT p. 61. After Padmarajiah (1963: 357).
71. Padmarajiah (1963: 357).
72. Jain (2006: 42).
73. Ibid (2006: 43).
74. Jain (2006: 13).
75. TS 1.9: "Knowledge is of five kinds namely; sensory/mind based scriptural/verbal testi mony, clairvoyance, mental-modes/telepathy and omniscience (Mati-śrutāvadhimanaḥ paryaya- kevalāni jñāqnam)". TS 1.11: "The first two (kinds of knowledge) are indirect (valid knowledge) (Ādye parokcam)".
76. Jain (2006: 20).
77. TS 1.20: *Śrutam mati-pūrvaṁ dvyānekad-vāda-śabhedam.*
78. These limbs are: *Ācāra, Śutra-kṛta, Sthāna, Samvāya, Vyākhyā-Prajñapti, Jñātadharma-katha, Upāsakāddhyana, Antakṛddaśā, Anuttaraupapātika, Praśnavyākaraṇa, Vipāka-sūtra, Dṛṣṭivāda.*
79. Cf. TS 1.26: "The range of sensory knowledge and scriptural knowledge extends to all the six substances but not in all their modes (*Mati-śrutayonirbandho dravyeṣvasarvaparyāyeṣu*)".
80. TS 1.31: "Sensory knowledge, scriptural knowledge and clairvoyance may also be erronous knowledge (*Matiśrutāvadhayo viparyayaśca*)".
81. TS 2.21: *Śrutamanindriyasya samanaskāḥ.*
82. A. III. 6. 3.
83. A. IX.4.5.
84. TS 2.24: *Saṁjñinaḥ samanaskāḥ.*
85. TS 5.19: *Śarīra-vāṁ-manaḥ prāṇāpānāḥ pudgalānām.*
86. A.V. 19.10-12. to TS 5.19. "It is of two types namely physical and psychic. The capacity to speak due to the rise of *āṁgopāṁga* (major and minor limbs making) karma and the subsidence cum destruction of energy obscuring karma and knowledge (mind based and scriptural knowledge) obscuring karmas is called psychic speech. The matter particles which are transformed as sounds due (the efficient cause) to the state of psychic speech of the soul are called physical speech".
87. A.V.19.5. to TS 5.19.
88. TS 5.24: *Śabda-bandha-saukṣmya-sthaulya-saṁsthāna-bheda-tamaśchāyā ātapodyotavantaśca.*
90. Akṣara,Sanskrit. a word, a syllable, a letter, a vowel, a sound, imperishable, unalterable, speech etc. *akc*, to pass through, penetrate, pervade, embrace, to accumulate" etc.
91. A.V.24.2-4.
91. Jain (2006: 41).
92. A.V.24.5-6.
93. A.V.24. 7-13.
94. TS 6.1.: *Kāya-vāṁ-manaḥ karma yogaḥ* / Cf. TS 9.5.
95. A.VI.12-16.
96. Jain (2006: 34).
97. Ibid (2006: 35).
98. Ibid (2006: 38-39). Cf. JSK Vol. IV, p. 3.
99. Ibid (2006: 39).
100. Ibid (2006: 39-40).

101. Ibid (1960: 62-63).
102. Ibid (1928: 23).
103. Ibid (2006: 41).
104. We know 55 representatives od nyāya school, e.g.: *Akṣapāda Gautama, Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana, Bhāvivikta, Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja, Avisśakarṇa, Śaṅkara-[svāmin], Viśvarūpa,* Dhairyarāśi, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Bhasarwadōnia, Trilocana, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana, Varadarāja Miśra, Keśava Miśra, Śaśadhara, Vādṣndra, Bhamma Rāghawa, Gaṅgeśa Kāśyapa itd. Por. BALCEROWICZ(2003: 222-236). Nyāya system has been described in: Balcerowicz 2003, Chakrabarti 1992, Chakrabarti 1999, Ganeri 2001, Ganeri 2004, Gangopadhyaya 1984, Gokhale 1992, Halbfass 1988, Matilal 1986, Matilal 2001, Oetke 1996, Solomon 1976, Taber 2004.
105. Jain (2006: 45).
106. Ibid (2006: 46).
107. Ibid (2006: 46-52).
108. Ibid (2006: 53).
109. Brough (1951: 44).
110. VP III.1.33: (My own translation) sambandhi-bhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu / jātir ity uchate taskam sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ.
111. Cf. Brough (1951: 45).
112. Ibid (1995: 45).
113. Jain (2006: 55).
114. Ibid (2006: 57).
115. Ibid (2006: 20).
116. Ibid (2006: 62-63).
117. Jain (2006: 84).
118. LTS 587: cit-*saṅkoca-vikāsa-vismayakaraḥ svabhāvaḥ* / LTS 367: *bahis-antarmukha-bhāsa* / LTS 607: cit-*sāmānya-viśeṣa-rūpam.*
119. LTS. Introduction, p. 20.
120. LTS 277: aneko'py *atimanye tvam jñānam ekam anākulam.*
121. LTS. Introduction, p. 23.
122. TS 1.32: sadasatoraviśeṣādyadṛcchopalabdherunmattavat.
123. Cf. LTS. Introduction, p. 23.
124. Bhrama, sanskrit. confusion, perplexity, error, mistake, giddiness, dizziness, etc.
125. Siddhi, sanskr. settlement, establishment, coming into force, validity, prosperity, solution of a problem, skill, understanding, efficacy, etc.
126. Varam, sanskrit. select, choicest, valuable, precious, act or object of choosing, election, wish, request, etc. From *vṛ*, to choose.

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Rethinking Anekāntavāda and Animality In Jainism and Poststructuralism

Rebekah Sinclair

[*The goal of this paper has been to show that Jainism can offer more than just prohibitions of violence--who can and cannot be eaten, owned and addressed. The doctrine anekāntavāda actually provides an extremely rich tradition--perhaps the richest tradition from which to draw our strength for the coming age. As the world changes quickly, as species disappear, as new communities form and others recede into the background, as the boundary between human and non human, nature and culture recedes from the horizon at an ever quickening pace, bodies Jainism has fought so long to defend will depend increasingly upon our ability to form new communities of co-becomings. Their well being and existence will depend upon our ability to release our attachments to clean lines old ethical habits and definitions and jointly form new ones by inhabiting the perspectives of those who have been denied them. It will only be by the principles of anekāntavāda, syādvāda, nayavāda--of attempting to see the perspective of each creature--that we'll be able to gamble, albeit imperfectly, in the direction of messy, beautiful and ever increasing relations of ahiṁsā.*]

A Jain Parable:

A king once asked his servant to summon five blind men into his courtyard where he had fastned a large elephant and asked them to tell him what it was. Each man touched the elephant and on the basis of their perspective, told the king that he knew what this thing to be. The first felt the trunk and declared that it was a huge snake. The second touched the tail and said it was a rope. The third felt the leg and called it a tree trunk. The fourth took hold of the ear and called it a winnowing fan, while the fifth felt the side of the elephant and declared it to be a wall. Because each insisted that his claim was correct and truly described the object in question, the five men were soon in the middle of a heated argument, unable to resolve the dispute because they failed to recognize that each of their claims was true only from a limited perspective.[1]

I. Introduction: Jainism, Pachyderms and Poststructuralism

The parable of the blind men and the elephant is often cited to explain the Jain concept of *anekāntavāda*-- the doctrine of multisided, non-one-sidedness, along with its corollaries *nayavāda* (the doctrine of multiple perspectives) and *syādvāda* (doctrine of conditional predication).[2] The elephant signifies reality and the blind men represent not only humans but also other creatures; gorillas, giraffes, donkeys, dogs, cows, chickens, even water and plants, all have perspectives on reality as well. But the King is the real hero: he is Mahāvīra, the omniscient one, whose all knowing perspective of reality is the eventual trump card, determining the correctness or incorrectness of the blind men. The moral of the story is most often stated like this: 1) approach situations with a view toward the plurality of partial-truths, for they help us get closer to the full truth, otherwise known only in the Omniscients[3] (*kevalins*); 2) act compassionately toward others whose perspective might be different: they too are looking at a side of the truth.

However, this story is more complex than it first appears, hiding within its folds some troubling violences. For despite its advocacy of pluralism--a concept which has made no small impact on the world via its influence on Gandhi, Martin Luther King, etc.--it also demonstrates Jainism's dramatic privileging of omniscience over *anekāntavāda, nayavāda* and *syādvāda,* of the real over the perspectives that compose it and of absolute knowledge over experience. In our story, the perspective of the omniscient, Mahāvīra--like king, freed from his karmic bondage, is able to know the elephant perfectly, even as each of his blind men can only know part and even as the elephant--simultaneously the most central and most spectral figure in the narrative--isn't given a voice at all.

According to poststructural thinkers like Levinas, Jacques Derrida and Gayatri Spivak--whose criticism of the philosophical priviledging of the *knower* over the perspectives of those *known* leads them to vigorously defend the irreducible Other against a reduction to my knowledge or aims--this story might be a perfect example of the power of abstract, heteronormative power over the perspectives of disenfranchised. If the irreducible Other--represented here by the elephant--signifies the unrepeatable, historically specific, contingent other whose existence is marked outside of knowledge and language--a social being that nevertheless is not intelligible to us--the responsibility to this other is the impossible challenge of encountering the other without reducing her through structures of similarity and difference to the same as myself or my aims.[4] Similar to the Jain commitment to non-absolutism over exclusivist positions, the poststructural tradition has long been critical of any trump card that submits the immanent, irreducibly valuable realities of creaturely life to spectral formations of omniscience and transcendence. Firmly rooted in that tradition, I too take up the project of critically dismantling any hierarchicalization of beings or truths according to a singular, universal narrative.

So while Jainism accords the elephant a perspective, as it does all other *jīvas* (living beings), their perspectives are ultimately subjugated to that of the Omniscients, who determine that the correctness and enlightenment of any given creature's perspective on truth is valued and evaluated only within a hierarchy of sensed beings that culminates in the (male) homo--sapien. While Jainism is unparalleld in its according of perspective to elephants and all other *jīvas*; while their system remains the first and most influential to offer radical equality to each living being;[5] while they unquestionably offer more sanctuary and care to other bodies than other religious or philosophical group in documented history and even as every aspect of their daily lives is infused with compassionate principles designed to prevent harm to non--human animals and other creaturely *jīvas* most others don't even realize exist. Jain scriptures maintain a humanocentrisim that subjugates the culturally specific, evolving, shifting perspectives of these same *jīvas* to those of the human.

Of course, this is just a parable and all parables have limits. So why obsess about the perspective--less elephant? Because, according to the aforementioned poststructural thinkers and even according to Jainism's own doctrines of *anekāntavāda*–the limits of this parable are precisely where we should begin our ethical inquiry: not with the perspective and speech of the enlightened

but with the perspectives of those about whom they speak. If we apply *anekāntavāda* to its own parable-considering this parable-- about *anekāntavāda* from another angle (*syād*)--it also asks to be read from the elephant's point of view. For even as *anekāntavāda* prompts us to ask Jeremy Bentham's question "does it suffer or die, how can I help,"[6] it also pushes us beyond that.[7] For a full implementation of *anekāntavāda* in this narrative, we must also ask the elephant, "what is it to be or feel the being of an 'elephant'? How does it see me? What does it want? What is its perspective on reality and to what metaphysics does it subsrcribe?"[8] As the doctrine of many perspectives, *nayavāda* itself would suggest we begin ethical inquiry with what Jean Francois Lyotard might call the *differend*: the perspective of the elephant, whose inability to signify itself makes possible both the musings of blind men and the intellectual acumen of omniscient kings.

In a way, I want to turn *anekāntavāda, nayavāda* and *syādvāda* into more than a justification for or path toward pluralism but into an ethical hermeneutic. This turning of *anekāntavāda* back on it's own narrative makes it a method, or a way of reading that looks always for the perspectives of the disenfranchised, the silent, the least beheld always *over* or before the doctrine of the Omniscients. If "*anekāntavāda* is conceived as the expression of *ahiṁsā* in the intellectual realm,"[9] we must consider what the consequences are of refusing the truth of certain perspectives in order to hold fast to doctrine. So, this paper is a retelling of the story of Jainism, of *anekāntavāda*, from the perspective of the elephant--from the perspective of what Gayatri Spivak would name the silenced subaltern figure, whoes point of view and radical singularity get covered over in the name of omniscient knowledge.

In order to create a deconstructive,[10] *anekāntavāda--ic* hermenutic from within Jainism, I will read-together the traditions of Jainism and the poststructrualism, particularly the lineage of Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida and Gayatri Spivak. I will begin with by comparing Jainism's doctrines of *jīva, nayavāda* and *ahiṁsā*, with Levinas's concept of the alterity of the face and his refusal to reduce it to our frameworks of knowledge. I believe this reading allows us to begin priviledging the perspective of a single *jīva* over our own, limited frameworks and positions of knowledge. My interest in this is twofold: first, I believe this will allow for a dismantling of the hierarchy of beings found in Jainism. A more detailed analysis of the anthropocentrism in Jainism is outside the scope of this paper but I will point to one element of its deconstruction here. Secondly, I want this deconstruction to contest current restrictions regarding human non-human interaction in Jain literature and culture. Because these restrictions prevent Jains from dealing adequately with an increasingly complex world. In other words, this section is intended to humble us, the groping blind men.

Following this, I will compare the concepts of *anekāntavāda*-particularly its metaphysical and epistemological dimensions--with Jacques Derrida's concept of *differand.* Here I will further draw out the similarities between the *jīva* and the irreducible Other, about whom poststrucuralism and *differand* are primarily concerned. Additionally, I suggest that *differand's* sister concept, the messianic to come or the not yet, could provide Jainism with the lens it needs to discern the ethical and unethical views within the multiplicity of perspectives while even avoiding Jainism's

structurally theological appeal to the Omniscients. This concept both resembles and challenges the Jaina concepts of omniscience and cyclical time, while remaining un-theological in structure and function. Here I hope to begin inserting *anekāntavāda* in between the singular perspective of the irreducible *jīva* and the omniscience, while also placing pragmatic but incomplete and non--limiting guides in the role the closed omniscient now serves.

Finally, after making possible the privileging the singular *jīva* over both blind men and Omniscients, I will close with the ethical analysis of Gayatri Spivak. Spivak takes all of our synthesis and completes the picture by instrumentalizing *anekāntavāda*–the multi-faceted nature of any *jīva* or singularity. Her work affirms the Jain definition of non-violence as compassion without attachment, ego and self. She also shares with Jainism a kind of radical assertion of Other's agency and assumes each *jīva* knows what is best for their life. However, if Spivak advocates letting go of the ego for the sake of the Other--priviledging what the Other or *jīva* might want and believe, never colonizing them by assuming we know the best--the Jaina's interest in their own karmic path leads them to gable in the direction of the scriptures, rather than in the direction of the Other. So I propose we read Spivak and Jainism as advocating a kind of *ahiṁsā* adventure, one that will have us gambling our beliefs and our own karmic burden, in each and every moment, on the compassion of inhabiting the suffering or perspective of an Other. It is only in this *ahiṁsā* adventure, this gamble of non-violence, that Jainism can begin to move into fuller appreciation for the complexity of inter-relations.

Before beginning, I want to affirm that my interest in Jainism is born of my respect not only for its contributions to philosophy but even more so, for the care and protection it has offered the billions of bodies who would have been sacrificed, eaten, stepped on, abused, neglected or otherwise subjugated without its influence. And yet, unlike Jainism, which is nevertheless unapologetic in its solipsism[11] and its privileging of the liberation of the 'human' self out of this world, I am primarily and with equal tenacity, attentive to the consequences of this solipsism on those who have been called 'animal'. It is only because Levinas, Derrida and Spivak represent for me the best and most ethical of poststrcucturalists (and the West as a whole) that I honor them with a place in dialogue with a tradition as richly compassionate as Jainism. And it is only because I believe hierarchy vis-a-vis omniscience will stymie our mutual goal of *anekāntavāda* and *ahiṁsā* that I offer the following criticisms of Jain thought from a place of camaraderie and a shared hope for a radically less violent future.[12]

II. Levinas, *Nayavāda* and the Blind Men

It is perhaps appropriate to begin this section by telling another story like that of the elephant and the blind men. Only this time, the creature being inspected is Emmanuel Levinas and the creature doing the seeing, the knowing, is a dog. Levinas tells this story in his short essay, 'Name of a dog':

There were 70 of us in a forestry commando unity for Jewish prisoners of war in Nazi Germany....The French uniform protected us from Hitlerian violence. But the other men, called free, who had dealings with us or gave us work or food, passed by and only sometimes raised their eyes, stripped us of our human skin. Our comings and goings, our sorrow and laughter,

illnesses and distractions, the work of our hands and the anguish of our eyes, the letters we received from France and those accepted for our families--all passed in parenthesis. We were beings trapped in their species: despite their vocabulary, beings without language.....How can we deliver a message about our humanity which, from behind the bars of quotation marks, will come across as monkey talk? [13]

And then, half way through their captivity, a dog comes to set them free. Levinas says, Then one day, a wandering dog entered our lives, greeting us as we returned (from work) under guard....We called him Bobby....He would appear at morning assembly and wait for us as we returned, jumping up and down and barking in delight. For him, there was no doubt we were men.[14]

If the Jain concepts of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* suggest the irreducibility of an object to only a single perspective of it, then story is a perfect politicalization[15] of those concepts. For in this moment of Nazi brutality,[16] where Levinas is understood as a life form unworthy of glance, touch, or care, Levinas only becomes more than this when he considers himself from the perspective of a dog.[17] Like Yudhiṣṭhira in *Mahābhārata* would not enter heaven without his companion stray dog, who, despite having traveled with him through thick and thin, was prohibited from entering paradise, Levinas cannot enter into 'humanity' without the power and primacy of Bobby's perspective.[18] Despite being denied equality by Levinas and despite being denied heaven by Indra, the king of gods, the perspective of stray dog that makes Levinas human and the companionship of the dog (*dharma*) makes Yudhiṣṭhira righteous.[19]

This passage excellently demonstrates both the reason for and method of the Levinasian shift from metaphysics or ontology as a first philosophy to ethics as a first philosophy. Similar to Jainism, Levinasian philosophy arose in response to the privileging of transcendence over immanence, of abstract knowledge over real, bodily relations and conditions in the here and now. For Levinas, it was precisely these rankings that led to the holocaust. So he created a philosophy that 1. considers ethics as first philosophy and 2. criticizes the metaphysics of presence, violence through cognition (or incorrect and violent knowledge) and other Enlightenment tendencies.

Instead of beginning philosophy by assuming we can know everything about a creature, Levinas begins with the phenomenologically driven principle of the multi-faceted, irreducible and un-capturable nature of the Other as expressed in the face-to-face relation. Levinas sums up this principle of irreducibility in the figure of the face, which he understands to signify vulnerability, the forbidding of violence and the hesitation to capture through frameworks of similarity and difference.[20] Even as we encounter another creature, we cannot know it fully-- because there will always be another perspective from which to see it, because they have such complex relations with the world, possesses infinite attributes. The face is an aporetic figure that marks the infinite alterity and irreducibility of the Other presented in the moment of encounter.

For Levinas, the irreducible relation exposed in the encounter with another is a privileged phenomenon in which the other person's proximity and distance are both equally felt; just as

the *jīva* is an Other we can karmically interact with, even as her radical alterity and singular karmic pathways exceed us. Additionally, since for the face is always--already a face-to-face relation--since individuals are never individuals as such but always--already in instantiating relation to one another-the face also always implies the relational bonds which constitute the vulnerability and prohibition Jainism wishes to highlight.

This bears great similarity to the Jaina concept of the *jīva* and the multiple perspectives it is possible to take on them, especially when they are found together with *ajīva*.[21] Even as we can encounter bodies, dynamically interacting with them in karmically crucial ways, we can never access the pure *jīva*-ness of any other living being, nor fully comprehend its path to liberation.[22]

Interestingly and to clarify further, if Levinas is responding in part to the philosophy of Emmanuel Kant when he locates the limits to knowledge of the other within the other itself--as though their alterity or unkowability prevents us, like a screen or wall, from seeing them in their entirety-and if Kant locates the limits in the knower--or in the Numena that humans lack access to-Jainism appears to support both. On the one hand, similar to Kant, the emphasis on the limits of knowledge in Jainism focuses "on the conditionality and limitedness of the human power and human vision."[23] But on the other hand, similar to Levinas, the *jīva* cannot be totally captured, as singular agency and creaturely creativity is located within "every existent entity in the form of immanent power and not in multiple devas or a single Ultimate Reality outside. The *jīva* describes a continuous, creative power within each entity, while maintaining a karmic connection to the rest of the living universe."[24] I know of no research to which I could appeal that discusses this triad relation and the implications such Jain logic might have on resolving long--held divisions based on these two figures. While outside the scope of the present paper, I hope something might yet come from a Jain synthesis of these two traditions.

Importantly, one of Jainism's most compelling concepts is that each *jīva* is numerically distinct but equal to every other.[25] In contrast to the Vedantic Brahmanic traditions, where all individual souls are part of a supreme universal soul. For Jainism, "the unity of all souls is a unity of *nature* or *essence*."[26] This seems to parallel both the Levinasian concept of the alterity of the face, and the concept of singularity I'll address in Derrida and Spivak in the following sections. What I wish to highlight here is that the quality of being a *jīva*, the quality of alterity, characterizes *all equally*. If every creature is irreducible, equally *jīva*, we see clearly that what defines the subsequent breakdown or speciation of *jīvas* is nothing more than our feeble, limited attempts to work out of a knowledge--a knowledge we know, per *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda*, is imperfect anyway.

Now, that we've discussed the limits of knowledge, we know we can never truly know the Other, never really have access to who they are, how they function, when we know that all of our knowledge is, at best, speculation. But what does this mean for the three Jain jewels of right knowledge, right faith, right action?[27] What does this mean *ahiṁsā* and the Jain project of non-violence?

It is here that I believe Levinas starts what I believe to be the most ethically compelling philosophical habit in all of western philosophy. He suggests that if violence can be performed both in the ways we exclude the Other--the ways we ignore, neglect and disenfranchise certain bodies--and in the ways that we misrepresent and understand the Other, our task is to refuse to cover over these other *jīvas* with our limited frameworks of knowledge, ethics, etc.[28]

One way we could conceive of Levinas's project is the instrumentalization of *nayavāda*. Levinas would agree with the Jains, who suggest that the doctrine of *nayavāda* is not only an epistemological principle but an inherently ethical one. Because the Other has infinite attributes (*anekāntavāda*) and because it can only be seen from our subjective standpoint (*nayavāda*), each of us must act not according to what we think is best, in our partial perspective (*syādvāda*) but according to what the Other desires, thinks is best, etc. If all *jīvas* are equal in their pure, unhindered state, then in order to assign them to a more closed group, we have to impose our

understanding of species, hierarchy, etc upon them. In order to capture an other in one reducible framekwork of knowledge (like species) rather than allowing them the irreducibility of their relations and existence, we have to impose knowledge on them. This, for Levinas, is what constitutes the limits of and violence of knowledge. If *anekāntavāda*, conceived as the expression of *ahiṁsā* in the intellectual realm," than refusing to domesticate the other to our limited frameworks of knowledge is precisely what is meant by right knowledge; assuming that something about a creature is true when it is not true, or rather, only limited.[29]

If the Jains suggest all *jīvas* are equal and also agree that we must be humble in our approach to each individual creature, given the impossibility of our knowing the whole truth, it seems troubling we would come then to the subjugation of certain perspectives over others. According to *Mahāvīra*, the movement of this soul from body to body is affected by karma it accrues according to its deeds and because karmic weight corresponds to a decrease in your social status,[30] gender[31] and species.[32] By focusing on the senses of the beings and on their hierarchically organized location rather than their perspectives, Jaina activity in the world today is limited. They are not able to adequately address questions of euthanasia, domestication, co-habitation because the metaphysical paradigms delivered by the Omniscients--the same paradigm that offers all creatures the equality of *jīva*--strips them of their right knowledge of reality.

Finally, for Levinas as for the Jains, abstract philosophical pursuit of knowledge is secondary to a basic ethical duty to the other. Once we are more concerned about the Other than obeying our own frameworks of knowledge, we become open to acting according to the Other's perspective, ethical responsibility precedes any "objective searching after truth." Preferring to think of philosophy as the "wisdom of love" rather than the love of wisdom, Levinas states,"...this is my entire philosophy-- there is something more important than my life and that is the life of the Other."[33] This seems to me very similar to the Jain mantra I have often heard, "*ahiṁsā* over truth."

III. Derrida, *Anekāntavāda* and a Critique of the Omniscients

If *nayavāda* is strongly advanced by Levinas as an ethical responsibility to refuse the domestication of the alterity of the face, it is in Jacques Derrida's concept of *differand* that we find both the

corollary for the infinite attributes of any subject and the ability to use the infinity of attributes to replace the Jaina scriptural privileging of the Omniscients.

Keeping with our theme of story telling, I'll begin here where Derrida begins in his famous work, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*: by recalling the time Derrida found himself standing naked before the gaze of a cat. Just after stepping out of the shower one afternoon, Derrida was surprised to find his cat looking at him.[34] He was not as surprised to find the cat looking at him as he was to realize the cat was looking at him *before* he realized it and looked at her. He recounts that while cats have been assigned various roles in mythologies, religions, poetry, fiction, etc. for thousands of years, it wasn't until he found himself taken in by the gaze of this particular cat that he realized he was also an object of her gaze, in her mythology. He was the object to her subject; the elephant to her blind man.

Derrida claims this encounter more clearly represented to him the relationship between the self and the Other than any previous: "If I say it is a real cat that sees me naked, this is in order to mark its unsubstitutable singularity. When it responds to its name, it doesn't do so as the exemplar of a species called cat, even less so of an animal genus or kingdom...it comes to me as this irreplaceable living being that one day enters my space, into this place....Nothing can ever rob me of the certainty that what we have here is an existence that refuses to be conceptualized" (*AIA* Intro).

In this important text, Derrida highlights the unsubstitutable singularity of each life by routing animality through the deconstructive logic of differance and replacing transcendental categories of human and animal with the infinite differences of bodies. The concept of *differand* plays a central role in Derrida's logic and is a metaphysical, epistemological and ethical claim for him. It produces his concept of singularity--similar to that of the *jīva* but also parallels the Jain concept of *anekāntavāda* and it is this latter aspect upon which I would like to dwell here.

Derrida situates his theorization of otherness, signification, identity in the double meaning--the play--in the verb 'to differ.'[35] This exchange is not merely between before and after, cause and effect, the primordial and derived. It signifies non-identity.[36] Differance is both a process of differentiation-a process of making distinct in space--and a means of temporalizing, that is to say 'putting off until later' the possible that is presently impossible.[37] To differ or to be different than implies that every body, act, event, thought is not only different from every other but also different from itself--changing from moment to moment but possessed of infinite, often contradictory traits. The second component--to defer--means we are always putting off our assumption that we have fully understood irreducible bodies or thoughts. I am always chasing after a meaning I can never capture. As soon as I think I've caught it, it evades me again.

The 'play' between these two and between the qualities of presence and absence is the logic of *differand.* Yet this *differand* is not a calculation, a summation of relations, epochs or causes, but a strategic positioning that functions to mark, from within, the openness of presence.[38] Differance goes beyond truth, where it avoids being rendered part of the zone of either non--knowing or knowing--it is, rather, the condition for knowing. It is as though *differand* is not a

thing in itself but, as the law gravity describes only attraction or relation between objects and not something that exists independently called gravity, *differand* is the name for the relation between objects, language, concepts.

Like the Jain principle of *anekāntavāda*, which takes a both--and position to Vedantic sameness and the Buddhist position of total change, *differand* can be situated neither in the ontic or the ontological,[39] nor can it be constellated with reference to 'truth', which holds within itself the dichotomy of disclosure or nondisclosure, concealed or unconcealed. Rather, it has close relationships to both presence and absence, but belongs to neither.[40]

In his discussion of *anekāntavāda, syādvāda* and *nayavāda*, Satkari Mookerjee describes *anekāntavāda* as the play between existence and non-existence: "if existence were their only characteristic and non-existence were denied as an ideal fiction, the result would be disastrous. There would be no distinction between one thing and another."[41] He elaborates four-kinds of non-existence: "(i) absolute non-existences, e.g. the non-existence of color in air (*atyantabhāva*); (*ii*) pre-non-existence, e.g., the non-existence of the effect in the cause (*prāgabhāva*); (*iii*) post-non-existence, e.g., the non-existence of an effect after destruction and (*iv*) mutual non-existence or numberical difference or non-existece of identity of things (*itaretarabhāva*).

Interestingly, the first and fourth principles correspond to the spatial dimension of differance, while the second and third correspond to the temporal elements of differance. Every subject and Other, ever *jīva* has the predicates of both existence and non-existence: even a single trait can be said to manifest both. From these concepts we can extrapolate our concepts of time (cause-effect-case, etc), identity, substance, change, etc. They are metaphysical principles that describe not only *Jaina* philosophy of language--the impossibility of language to directly correspond to reality--but also the physical relationships between matter.[42]

Because of this, each object can be at the same time similar to and at the same time radically, even infinitely different than everything else, not only in an abstract way, but in a very concrete, very material way. This is irreducibile nature that I will call the "embodied *jīva*." I allude to the embodied *jīva* as way of privileging the *jīva*'s relationship in this world, instead of the world of the Omniscients. I do so within the context of what I would argue could be described as a Jain vibrant materialism--one that does not need such strict separation between soul and matter to make its case about ethics and non-violence. Though it is outside the immediate confines of this paper, I believe looking at the concept of karma theory in conjunction with *anekāntavāda* would provide some fertile ground for further justifying Jainism's philosophical value, without needing to domesticate certain concepts to scriptural authority. In other words, given *anekāntavāda*-translated as 'doctrine of many-sidedness' and considering that *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* every entity can be looked at from infinite number of angles: coming to be, existing and passing away and many more, totally contradictory perspectives.[43] This makes the embodied *jīva* (the Other) irreducible, not just as you may perceive them, but actually, metaphysically and ontologically--utterly physically and spiritually irreducible, even to itself.

Now, aside from a study of pure logic and epistemology, why is this interesting for the elephants, dogs and cats about whom we've been speaking so far? It is interesting because, while on the one hand, Jainism continues to proclaim the equal value of non-humans as *jīvas*, on the other hand, the perspectives of particular *jīvas*--their ideas about reality and the possibility, their ideas about reality might conflict with Jain metaphysics--eventually get sublimated to hierarchicalization of bodies that places their perspectives always--already further from the truth than the humans. Despite the fact that all the angles we look at are all true and correct in some sense (*nayavāda*), Jains choose to focus on the static, speciesed, existent nature of a creature--the one it may share with others--over its transformation in the world, its radically irreducible nature. Jains affirm what appears essential and unchanging about a creature (their body-species), then construct and regulate ontological categories and identities based on the (culturally authorized) appearance of that abiding substance. They appeal to the senses of a being, on its supposed access to omniscient truth, instead of its pure soul.

So why do the Jains privilege certain aspects of the living *jīva* over others? Here I turn from a philosophical analysis of the possibility of taking up the subject perspective of each creature, to interrogating the particular doctrines of the Omniscients that domesticate these perspectives to what amounts to a humanocentric account of sensed beings. That is, leaving aside any problems the poststructural thinkers might have with the idea of omniscience as such--and there are problems aplenty-I confine my criticism here to that of the Omnicients themselves and to the pragmatic implications of confining our knowledge to humanocentric doctrines explicated those who have thus far reached it.

The singular differences between all infinitely different *jīvas* and the perspective these *jīvas* might take on the world and themselves, get domesticated to speciesed categories of sensed-beings. But because we have already seen that this need not follow, given the ability to view creatures not from senses but from their irreducibility, we know that this is a culturally imposed category. Prominent poststructural philosopher, Judith Butler, also an advocate of non-violence and a proponent equanimity among different identities, might claim that this is an example of confusing the cause for the affect: it is only by first assuming that non-humans have karmically imposed limits on their access to the truth of reality that they can then be silently classified as 'lower'. The political philosopher Georgio Agamben makes a similarly circular argument when he attempts to place both humans and animals on the same plane via their equal possession of what he calls, a-political bare life.[44] By assuming that 'bare-life' is without its own politics, ethics, metaphysics, etc,[45] he relies on the same human/non-human binary (mind vs. mute matter) he attempted to deconstruct.

Despite the limits of knowledge in the here and now, there exists "an absolute notion of truth which lies in the total integration of all particulars or conditionally arrived at truths." When the Jains priviledge substance or form over the internal irreducible *jīva*, Spivak would call this act of reduction "transcendentalization" (*MD* 125): the process through which particular attributes or aspects of the subject or Other become marked off as real' and then deployed to envelope other forms, constructing a category or collective. So while the Jaina doctrine of *anekāntavāda*

does not believe the living *jīva* is reducible to any one of its perceived predicates, even while *anekāntavāda, syādvāda* and *nayavāda* all prevent this transcendentalization of certain elements over others, Jains still find themselves subjugating the perspectives of certain creatures to those of the figure they believe is highest--the human. It is important to note, even after all of the work Jains have done to equalize *jīva*, the presumed absence of language and 'reason' is still what determines this hierarchy.

However, taking the sympathetic perspective for a moment, one could easily understand how the texts of the Omniscients are a sufficient if not necessary condition for providing some guiding principles in the midst of potentially infinite ethical perspectives. Yet it is the 'not necessary' part of this logical formulation upon which I wish to focus. Rather than letting this theory of how to act evolve out of their belief in *anekāntavāda, ahiṁsā* and *jīva*–as Levinas and Derrida do with singularity, *differand* and the face--Jainism brings in culturally, historically specific doctrines that actually limit not only the more radical quality of *anekāntavāda* I have outlined above but also those creatures who are at its doctrinal mercy.[46]

So what does this organic origination of an *ahiṁsā* guided perspective look like? It might look like Derrida's concept of the 'to come', the concept of Messianism. Per the element of *differand* that suggests the Other might be knowable, but this is always put off into the future--it is always deferred until later--the other *jīva* can never be known in the here and now. Derrida derives his concept of the 'to come' Derrida calls "messianism without a messiah." For Derrida, this is an appeal to the Jewish form of Messianism (and it is perhaps notable that we are taken back, at the end, to Levinas at the Hollocaust here).

This Messianism, originally elaborated in Jewish thinkers like Levinas, appeals to a paradox of the Jewish tradition--the positing that the Messiah will come, despite the disbelief in the literal reality of that coming. Rather infamously, Jewish religion centers around right conduct intended to prepare the way for the Messiah, while they simultaneously do not believe in a literal figure that will ever appear.[47] For Derrida, this parallels the relationship of between the self and the Other, between the quest for truth and the truth itself. Every time you try to stabilize the meaning of a thing, try to fix it in a position with limited and partial knowledge, the thing itself, if there is anything at all to it, slips away.[48] Is this not the very principle of *nayavāda*? You will always find more aspects to it than are possible to see. To put Derrida's point simplistically, it might be suggested that the meaning of a particular object, or a particular word, is never stable but always in the process of change (eg. the dissemination of meaning for which deconstruction has become notorious). The messianic therefore refers predominantly to a structure of our existence that involves waiting-waiting even in activity--and a ceaseless openness towards a future that can never be circumscribed by the horizons of significance that we inevitably bring to bear upon that possible future. This makes possible a messanism that has stripped away the necessity of faith and shed its theological underpinning and that this in fact presents a more thorough notion of a temporality capable of confronting the future. In other words, Derrida is not referring to a future that will one day become present (or a particular conception of the

savior or Other who will eventually arrive). He refers to an openness towards an unknown futurity that is necessarily involved in what we take to be the present but a future that never delivers itself, therefore making perfection action and knowledge impossible.

But we do not wait for no reason and we do not wait passively. In the present, we are to act according to dictates of *differand* and alterity, of *anekāntavāda* on the one hand and *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* on the other. We are to act according to the perspective of the Other, to refuse the temptation to reduce the Other to ourself or our aims and to allow the Other to remain open, free. Because the Other lives and feels, do not harm it. Because the Other desires and wants, to not subjugate it. Because the Other has beliefs and perspectives, do not insist it act according to your own. This is how you act in the here and now--combining the irreducibility of the Other (*anekāntavāda*) with an openness toward the privileging of its own viewpoint (*syādvāda* and *nayavāda*). It is, to put it another way, an ethical imperative to open oneself up to the arrival of the Other that is always 'to come'.[49]

Though this concept might seem at first foreign to a philosophical tradition based on the text of old, this is a concept that Jainism is actually quite familiar with. In the single rotation of the Jaina wheel of time, we are currently in the fifth phase of the descending cycle and no souls are able to be liberated.[50]

However, we will not always be in this stage. After enduring a few deaths and doing the best we can, even while we can't attain (liberation) *mokṣa*, we will be reborn in a time cycle that allows liberation.[51] For now, Jains are acting according to the principle of the 'to come'. Their lives as individual, embodied *jīvas* require openness to an unknown future that is, at the same time, intimately involved in what we understand to the present. Therefore, acting perfectly or with perfect knowledge in the present is, therefore, always already impossible, in this sense.

Despite metaphysics, ethics and epistemology the three concepts of *anekāntavāda, nayavāda* and *syādvāda* possible, despite the possibility of appealing to the Other, to the ethical dimensions of the Other for your ethics, Jainism relies on doctrines of the Omniscients. In so doing, they make a theological appeal to doctrine that are unnecessary for deciding how to act in accordance with *ahiṁsā*. They have removed the productive and important uncertainty that comes when two perspectives, inaccessible to one another and different in their desires, come into conflict. For Kundakunda, in these moments, you are always supposed to respond to these difficult moments by focusing on and limiting your own karmas.[52]

But this is only a half truth: what if there were a way to focus on yourself that also involved waiting for the irreducible Other and privileging her perspective? I think this is what we find in Spivak.

IV. Concluision: Spivak, Ahiṁsā and Non-attachment

By putting Levinas in conversation with the concepts of *jīva, ahiṁsā* and *nayavāda*, I have tried to demonstrate that even from within Jainism, the elephant's perspective ought not be subjugated to that of the blind men. By putting Derrida in conversation with the concept of the living, embodied *jīva* and also with *ahiṁsā* and *anekāntavāda*, I have tried to demonstrate that Jainism

does not need a theological responsibility to the Omniscients in order to choose the correct, least violent perspective of an embodied *jīva*.

But even if we concede these points, none of these perspectives *on* an embodied *jīva* can gain us access to their perspective--that thing which we have just worked so hard to protect from colonization by our own, limited frameworks of similarity and difference. It is only that *jīva's*, own, historically specific, utterly unique perspective that can provide us with answers. If we are to rethink the ways we live not just alongside but entangled with actual fleshy, furry, hairy and hairless bodies--bodies whose perspectives on what is right, just or true in any moment might differ radically from our own--we must figure out ways to suspend our own beliefs and allow the Other absolute, unhindered, agency. We must try, knowing we will never succeed, never fully reach our goal, to act according to the Other's perspective.

To begin (or end?) here, allow me to tell one final story. In *Death of a Discipline*, Spivak looks to yet another version of the blind men and the elephant. In this version, pulled from the work of South African scholar, J.M. Coetzee, a single Magistrate of a small village keeps the peace between the townspeople and the local indigenous population (called barbarians), by defending the legally enforceable, highly racist status-quo.[53] At a pivotal moment in the book, the Magistrate attempts to decipher a young barbarian girl whom he is both sleeping with, and providing with food and shelter.[54] Spivak notes that his deciphering efforts make evident his repeated generalization that his own meaning and identity are unclear when he tries to imagine himself from the Other's perspective.[55] The Magistrate's attempts at deciphering are expressed by him in the following: "So I continue to swoop and circle about the irreducible figure of the girl, casting one net of the meaning after another over her....What does she see? The protecting wings of a guardian albatross or the black shape of a coward crow afraid to strike while its prey still breathes?"[56] He cannot determine what she sees because her perspective is withheld from him. For Spivak, it is because she withholds her perspective that the would-be omniscient sovereign questions the rightness of his actions and his perspective on her and her fellow "barbarians." Subsequently, the next time he witnesses the townspeople abusing one of "the barbarians," he steps in, takes upon himself the torture from the townsfolk.[57]

Through this story, we can trace three, interrelated concepts that are found in both the Jain tradition and the dialogic tradition of Jainism and poststructuralism that I have been trying to cultivate herein: both traditions affirm that ethical decision making requires one to 1. let go of one's own ego, in order to 2. affirm the Other's radical agency in their own life over one's own, limited view, so that 3. we act out of compassion without attachment, to either our ego or the Other.

To begin with the ego, this passage illuminates the power of the logic of the 'to come' to shake us free from the ego that is confined by our attachment to both our own identity and our certainty about the Other. By focusing on the parts of the Other that are always reducible, always on their way to us, we pull focus on the self, we limit our negative karmas precisely by refusing to colonize the Other through our perspective. One might say that this is the supreme act of non-violence. This agrees with the Jain focus on the self and with their assumption that

you can never really know another fully, as highlighted in the concepts of *anekāntavāda, nayavāda* and *syādvāda.*

But Spivak adds to this the attempt to deconstruct your own ego--to focus on yourself--precisely by trying *and failing* to see yourself through the Other's perspective. In trying to see himself through the eyes of the barbarian--in trying to realize what she might want or need from him--the Magistrate realizes that he cannot decipher how *she might see him* precisely because *he cannot decipher or know her.* The meaning of both the embodied *jīva* and the ego (or sovereign subject position) of the magistrate are destabilized in this process of imagining oneself through the eyes of the Other. [58] Spivak states, "this is the structure that can open into responsibility with the subaltern Other whose definition rests in an irreducible figure."[59]

According to this narrative, one's own ego-identity is destabilized precisely by the privileging of the Other's agency and not through self-imposed or restricted limits. This combines the letting go of ego with a intense respect for the Other *jīva.* For Spivak, the ethical relation to the Other is provoked by the Other's radical alterity and status as an irreducible, embodied *jīva* and therefore it must be routed through her alterity first, not through our own knowledges. Rather than learning or commenting *about* populations, *about* particular embodied *jīvas* and what particular scriptures say about how to act toward them, Spivak suggests that the ethical relation is routed through the undecidability of our own identity *in the eyes of the Other.*[60] In this way, our ego is undone precisely by the agency of the Other we are supposed to uphold, and we participate in this undoing through the practice of remaining open to the ways that we are imagined by the Other's indecipherable perspective. To phrase this in the logic of Jainism, this is an example of the moment our better selves, our pure self, lets go of the attachments of the ego for the sake of the Other. The with-holding of her perspective, the irreducibility and unkowability of her perspective, make it impossible for the magistrate's ego to completely attach itself: it tries, again and again, but slips off, like water on a leaf.

Moving on to the concept of the other's agency, we can see that this ego detachment is actually the result of a truly radical appreciation and respect for the life course and subject position of each singularity, each embodied *jīva.* Jainism shares this extremely strong sense of the agency and path of the Other and values all lives inherently, without having to sentimentalize them.[61] They do not perform the troublesome gesture of which Deleuze and Guattari's accuse many western philosophers and householders, infantalizing non-humans as cute, little, family pet creatures-oedipal animals.[62] According to Kundakunda, each embodied *jīva* is responsible for its own life and therefore, it does not need you to pity it, change it, remove it from its circumstances or otherwise interfere with the course of its path to *mokṣa.*[63] This is the reason *ahiṁsā* is often (mis)conceived as a principle of non-interference.

Finally, however, these traditions differ in one key way. For Jainism, the agency is of the Other, non-human *jīva's* is set out before hand, by the Omniscients and is *confined to certain forms of interaction freedom*; their identity as an animal, as a five--sensed being without reason, does not allow the possibility of their perspectives to act as a disruptive ethical force on its own. But for

Spivak, it is precisely because the Other is so utterly responsible for it's own life, so radically free to live and think how they wish, that their relations, desires and understanding of the world do not need to be approved by humans in order to be justified. Indeed, for Spivak, the strongest ethical imperative is that we refuse to subjugate the Other's agency and desires--neither to we blind men, nor to the Omniscients. Imagining oneself through the eyes of the Other is a way of letting go of the ego without letting go of the relations between singularities, between embodied *jīvas.*

In other words, the poststructural tradition has an even more radical faith in the perspective and life-course of the other *jīva*; it assumes the *jīva* not only has its own path but has its own ideas about what that path should be and how it should be followed. It is the assumption of this Other's radically different, irreducible perspective that allows for the deconstruction of my ego and in moving on to the third concept, for me to act ethically from compassion without attachment. In fact, domesticating irreducible perspective of the Other to my attachment to the delineations of the Omniscient is a way of both re-affirming the ego I have just released and a form of attachment that prevents me from acting out of pure compassion. In Jainism, the conduct of the Jain monks and laity is carefully scripted to prevent the individual from violating any of the wisdom of the Omniscients, creating any violence and thereby accruing karma.[64] The avoiding of violence against others is done for the sake of avoiding one's own karmic increase.[65]

The difference here may seem small, but it has very large consequences. In the tradition of Levinas--one in which both Spivak and Derrida follow--the embodied *jīva*, the irreducible Other, will always take precedence. In Jainism, the goal is non-harm and non-interference (especially when you do not know what the right thing to do) to avoid the creation of karmic influx, "your conviction that you give misery or happiness to another beings is a delicious which engenders bondages of karma."[66] After all, what if, for example, at the Jain Bird Hospital and Sanctuary in Jaipur, you ended the life of a suffering, dying creature in an act of compassion and by doing so only increased the karma they had to work through in their next life? According to Kundakunda, the misery, happiness and physical suffering of living beings is a result of "the fruition of karmas" and [67]the view that their death or physical suffering could be abated by you is erroneous. Yet this system subjugates the possibility that the Other does not want to suffer, is not Jain and would just as soon be taken on to the next life. In other words, we come to moments when we have to gamble-we can either gamble in the direction of possibly accruing karma ourselves (according to the Omniscients) or acting according to the desires of another creature.

In Jaipur, India, the Help and Suffering Sanctuary doctors and good Samaritans rehabilitate injuries, vaccinate, neuter and provide treatment to all animals of every form and walk of life. To the heart-breaking dismay of all involved, some bodies are so badly mistreated and disfigured, so horribly malnourished, in so much pain that they can languish for weeks on their way to the next life. Because of this, the facility regularly euthanizes animals. The staff there view euthanizing a creature as a more intense form of subjugating of their ego to the desires of the Other; for they must willfully let go of their desire for and efforts toward its survival, they humbly assist in quietly, painless passing.[68] In extreme cases, the doctors attest that these be the only moments

of peace the creature has felt in months.[69] By this, you know that this is not a Jain sanctuary. Indeed, it has no religious affiliation at all. However, to their credit, many of its board members are Jain, including the brilliant, prestigious and compassionate founder of Jaipur Foot, Dr. Mehta. He and his fellow board members, along with the doctors, janitors, cooks and researchers at the facility, are perfect examples of gambling in the direction of creaturely relation and *ahiṁsā* from the perspective of the other *jīva*.

Let us take a less complex example, that of cohabitation with other *jīvas*. According to both Umāsvāti in the *Tattvārtha Sūtra*[70] and Kundakunda in the *Samayasāra*,[71] one is not allowed to cohabitate with dogs, birds, cats or other creatures. While their appreciation for the power structures definitely at work in the domestication and confinement of other animals, most Jain animal rescues also do not account for the desires of those dogs who would actually wish to join you in your home, eat by your side, walk and play with you, maybe even sleep in your bed. In Jain doctrine, the desires of the Other are subjugated to the belief that such interactions, such

blatent co-habitation, accrues karma. The result is that *Jaina* sanctuaries catch, neuter, vaccinate and then release dogs and other animals often into circumstances the dog might not choose.

In contrast, upon driving up to the entrance of Help and Suffering Sanctuary, you will almost certainly be greeted by a multitude of four-legged bodies that have chosen to stay after their treatment was finished. Tails wagging, they follow you all around the compound, enjoying your company and communicating with you in all kinds of interspecies ways. In fact, you can hardly escape their care and desire for affection, even if you try. In addition to the possey on the compound, this sanctuary adopts dogs out, as well. While we cannot ever know perfectly whether any given dog prefers the freedom of the street or the companionship and safety of a particular home, we must act according to what we have perceived their perspective to be and according to how they might see us: if they have not left the compound and enjoy human company and sleeping in the safety of a warm place, why choose to place them on the streets, instead of into a home? One may be the perception of the Omniscients and the other the perception of the dog; so why not gamble in the direction of the dog's perceived desires, even as you know there is still some kind of miscalculation involved? Would you give food to a blind woman, heal a sick child and then drop them off back in the leper colony?

The way the magistrate acts in our story is directly in keeping with privileging the perspective of the Other over your own certainty. This is precisely what needs to be done in order for Jains to respond adequately to the increasingly complex situations of institutionalized violence. Jainism needs to be able to say something more adequate to the tiger or hawk that requires other flesh and for those very reasons, cannot be kept in a Jain Sanctuary; to the birds in the Delhi Bird Hospital that languish for weeks on their way to certain death; to the subaltern mother, whose womb bears fruit her hands cannot feed; to the cows that wish not to be milked; to the dogs, whose lives are enriched by interspecies pack contact and might prefer a domestic life with humans than a life on the streets.

The goal of this paper has been to show that Jainism can offer more than just prohibitions of violence--who can and cannot be eaten, owned and addressed; the doctrines *anekāntavāda* actually provide an extremely rich tradition--perhaps *the* richest tradition from which to draw our strength for the coming age. As the world changes quickly, as species disappear, as new communities form and others recede into the background, as the boundary between human and non human, nature and culture recedes from the horizon at an ever quickening pace, bodies Jainism has fought so long to defend will depend increasingly upon our ability to form new communities of co-becomings. Their well being and existence will depend upon our ability to release our attachments to clean lines old ethical habits and definitions and jointly form new ones by inhabiting the perspectives of those who have been denied them. It will only be by the principles of *anekāntavāda*, syādvāda, *nayavāda*--of attempting to see the perspective of each creature--that we'll be able to gamble, albeit imperfectly, in the direction of messy, beautiful and ever increasing relations of *ahiṁsā*.

References:

1. While I was unable to find the original text for this parable, I did find it quoted in a number of other texts, including Shugan Jain's lecture notes and several online references in the Jain E. Library. Including, "Stories From Jainism."
2. Select Papers on Jainism, Study Notes V.5.0. Volume II, pages 128, 111 and 133
3. I capitalize Omniscients in this paper for two reasons: 1. even careful readers can lose track of the difference between omniscience and omniscients--often appearing close together in this work: better to place the distinguishing mark at the beginning than the end of the word and 2. to indicate both a proper title and a theological status (e.g. God), for I argue the Omniscients function theologically.
4. I will attempt to make way for the elephant in this story, even as I also recognize the other elements that must be addressed. That is, given the servants, and the all-male, mostly disabled caste of the class--stratified characters in this story, there is no doubt this story of knowing-ness mut also be re-told and criticized from perspectives of post-colonial, Marxist, feminist, disabaility, race and other critical traditions. Indeed, as impressive scholarship on Jainism continues to arise, these perspectives must be taken up if Jainism is to speak to the disenfranchised, least privileged "knowers" in contemporary society.
5. Christopher Chapple, "Equality Without Sentamentality," in *A Communion of Subjects.*
6. Full quote: "What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse?...the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being?... The time will come when humanity will extend its mantle over everything which breathes... " Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
7. The corresponding notion to "does it suffer" is also, "does it not suffer?" Work needs to be done on the permission giving device this question becomes should the answer to "does it suffer," be "no." Is it then okay to hurt or kill it?
8. Here again I appeal to Agamban's fallacy of assuming that other creatures do not have their own metaphysics just because we cannot perceive them or believe them to be incapable of such reasoning and abstraction. *Of Mites and Men: Animality and Bare Life In Agamben's "The Open,"*

9. Jeffery Long, "*Anekānta* and *Ahiṁsā*: A Jain Philosophy of Universal Acceptance." Presented at the VR Gandhi Lecture; Claremont, California. 2013.
10. In short, deconstruction is the process by which you recognize two seemingly different and hierarchically organized concepts are actually internally related to one another. This is the realization that both the identity/ideas and their hierarchical organization are a product of mis-perception. For an easy synopsys of Derrida' concept of Deconstruction, see *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, by John D. Caputo.
11. Said by Professor J. Soni, July 6, 2013. Lecture in Delhi.
12. It is also important to note that Jain scholars differ as widely in their beliefs about Jainism as the poststructuralists differ within their tradition. My intent is not to treat Jainism as a unified tradition, which I recognize would be fallacious and most disrespectful. However, I do hope that my crude generalizations can elicit responses from those who may disagree with me, even as their silence on these issues that has allowed the perception of the generalization they may contest. This is but an effort to start a dialogue on issues that, thus far, have remained largely if not wholly unaddressed in Jain Scholarship.
13. 'Name of a Dog'.
14. Ibid.
15. I define "politicalization" as: the making political of an act that is either not inherently political, or is not traditionally viewed as political.
16. I believe that there is a great deal more work to be done on the connections between Levinas, Judaism, the German National Socialists, and Jainism. Everything from the misuse of the swastika, to Schopenhauer's fascination with Jainism and it's subsequent misuse by Hitler. I think a great deal of fruitful work could be done comparing to opposite traditions and the misappropriation of one by the other.
17. Insert your criticism of Levinas.
18. Bhagavad-Gita.
19. The 'Name of the Dog'.
20. Wright, "The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas."172.
21. Jain, Shugan. "*Anekāntavāda*: non-one-sidedness." From, *Select Papers On Jainism*, VII. Nov, 2012. Delhi, India.
22. Jain, Shugan Lecture Notes on Advanced Topics of the Soul, Delhi, 2013.
23. Shah, Nagin J. Jaina. *Theory of Multiple Facets of Reality and Truth.* 2000, BL. Institute of Indology, India. Preface, xiii
24. Donaldson, Brianne. "Immortality and Omniscience," presented at the 2013 conference in Claremont, California, Beyond the Bifurcation of Nature.
25. Long, Jeffery. Jainism: An Introduction, 90.
26. Ibid, 91.
27. Paul Dundas, p. 3. & Tattavārthasutra (SKS 1.6.17).
28. Ibid.147. She states, "the first effacement is through occlusion; the second is an effacement through representation itself."
29. Paul Dundas, pg 3. And Tattravartasutra (SKS 1.6.17).
30. Shugan Lecture on Advanced Topics of the Soul. Kusum Jain, Practical Application of Anekantavada. Delhi and Jaipur, Respectively. 2013.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.

33. Tamara Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison Ainley, "The Paradox of Morality: an Interview with Levinas" trans. by Andrew Benjamin and Tamara Wright in 'The Provocation of Levinas' (New York: Routledge, 1988), 172.
34. I include the shower scene, and include the fact that he is naked, because Derrida spends a significant amount of time theorizing the idea of nakedness, nudity, shame as they play roles in the distinction between the human and animal in history.
35. Ibid. 255.
36. Ibid. 255.
37. Ibid. 256
38. Derrida, "*Differance.*"258
39. Ibid. 258. Here Derrida is working closely the Heideggarian categories of 'facticity' that does not give rise to ontological questions (ontic) and the openness and investigation of the structure of meaning and existence (ontological).
40. Derrida, "*Differance.*" 258.
41. Mookerji, pj 29.
42. For more on the relation of *Jaina* philosophy of language, please see ....Cite Margarettihere.
43. Long, Jefferey Introduction, 142.
44. Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002).
45. Ibid.
46. Shah, Nagin J. p 9.
47. Spivak, *Death of a Discipline.* 12.
48. Caputo, J., *Deconstruction in a Nutshell*, New York: Fordham University Press, 1997.
49. Spivak, Death of a Discipline. 45.
50. Shah, Natubhai. Jainism: The World of Conquerors. Shri Jainendra Press: India, 1998. 13.
51. Ibid.
52. Kundakunda. *Samayasāra.* "Bondage of Karmas." Translated by Vija K. Jain. 2012. Vikalp Printers; Anekānt Place, Uttarakhand. 115-137.
53. J. M. Waiting for Barbarians.
54. Ibid. 22.
55. Ibid. 34.
56. Henry Abelove, Michŗle Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin, eds., *The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader* (New York: Routledge,1993). 34.
57. J.M. Coetzee. Disgrace.
58. Spivak, Death of a Discipline. 12.
59. Ibid. 4.
60. Spivak, *Death of a Discipline.* 52.
61. Deleuze G., & Guattari, F. (2005), A Thousand Plateaus, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. 240-241.
62. Ibid.
63. Kundakunda. *Samayasāra.* "Bondage of Karmas." Translated by Vija K. Jain. 2012. Vikalp Printers; *Anekānt* Place, Uttarakhand. 115-137.
64. Kundakunda. *Samayasāra.* Translated by Vija K. Jain. 2012. Vikalp Printers; Anekā nt Place, Uttarakhand, India Special. 125.
65. *Samayasāra,* 125.

66. Ibid., 124.
67. Ibid., 122
68. Interview with Help and Suffering Sanctuary founders and staff, July 2013.
69. Ibid.
70. *Tattvārtha Sūtra,* of Umāsvāti
71. *Samayasāra* Kundakunda the

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पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ समाचार

'जैन विद्याः सिद्धान्त एवं व्यवहार' विषयक १५ दिवसीय राष्ट्रीय कार्यशाला का आयोजन (२५ सितम्बर - ९ अक्टूबर २०१३):-

दिनांक २५ सितम्बर २०१३ को १५ दिवसीय 'जैन विद्या: सिद्धान्त एवं व्यवहार' विषयक राष्ट्रीय कार्यशाला का उद्घाटन सम्पन्न हुआ। उद्घाटन सत्र के मुख्य अतिथि जैन दर्शन के शीर्षस्थ विद्वान एवं का.हि.वि.वि वाराणसी के जैन-बौद्ध दर्शन विभाग के अध्यक्ष डॉ. अशोक कुमार जैन थे। इस समारोह की अध्यक्षता पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ के प्रबन्ध समिति के सभापति डॉ. शुगन चन्द जैन ने की। मुख्य अतिथि के रूप में प्रो. अशोक जैन ने कहा कि दूसरे दर्शनों में जो ब्रह्म की अवधारणा है वही जैन दर्शन में आत्मा की अवस्था है। आत्मा वैयक्तिक विकास की सम्भावनाओं से परिपूर्ण है और इस क्रम में वह परमात्मा बन जाता है। इसके लिए दर्शन, ज्ञान और चारित्र का सहारा लिया जाता है। यह सहारा आत्मा को मिथ्यात्व से सम्यक्त्व में ले जाता है। व्यावहारिक उपयोगिता की प्रासंगिकता को दर्शाते हुए कहा कि सामायिक पाठ द्वारा मैत्री, करुणा, माध्यस्थ इत्यादि भावनाओं का विकास होता है। फलस्वरूप हित-प्रिय वचन से सामाजिक समरसता का मार्ग प्रशस्त होता है एवं सह-अस्तित्व की भावना द्वारा पर्यावरण संतुलन में सहयोग प्राप्त होता है इसीलिए वर्तमान में अणुबम नहीं बल्कि अणुव्रत की आवश्यकता है।



दर्शन एवं धर्म विभाग, का.हि.वि.वि वाराणसी के पूर्व विभागाध्यक्ष प्रो. अरविन्द कुमार राय ने कार्यशालाओं के महत्त्व एवं प्रासंगिकता पर प्रकाश डाला। अध्यक्ष डॉ. शुगन चन्द जैन ने कहा कि सामायिक पाठ वर्तमान के लिए नितान्त आवश्यक है। यह स्वयं की स्वयं द्वारा खोज है और यह खोज तभी संभव है जब खोजकर्ता की सक्रिय सहभागिता हो न कि वह तटस्थ द्रष्टारूप हो। उन्होंने कार्यशाला के माध्यम से जैन दर्शन के सिद्धान्तों को समाज एवं पर्यावरण के संतुलित विकास हेतु व्यवहार में लाने का सुझाव दिया। कार्यशाला संयोजक डॉ. नवीन कुमार श्रीवास्तव ने कार्यशाला के उद्देश्य, प्रतिभागियों की संख्या, व्याख्यानों आदि के बारे में प्रकाश डाला। कार्यक्रम का प्रारम्भ पू. मुनिश्री प्रशमरति विजय जी म.सा. के मंगलपाठ से हुआ। डॉ. श्रीनेत्र पाण्डेय ने कार्यक्रम का संचालन किया। डॉ. अशोक कुमार सिंह ने स्वागत वक्तव्य एवं डॉ. राहुल कुमार सिंह ने धन्यवाद प्रस्ताव प्रस्तुत किया ।

इस कार्यशाला में विद्वानों द्वारा जैन धर्म-दर्शन के अधोलिखित विषयों पर व्याख्यान हुए-
प.पू. प्रशमरति विजयजी महराज जी (वाराणसी)-- जैनागम साहित्य, संल्लेखना की अवधारणा एवं जैन पर्व एवं त्योहार, डॉ. शुगन चन्द जैन (नई दिल्ली)-- जैन साहित्य, महावीर कालीन इतिहास, महावीरोत्तरकालीन इतिहास एवं जैन श्रावकाचार, प्रो. अरविन्द कुमार राय (वाराणसी)-- भारतीय संस्कृति एवं दर्शन की विशेषताएँ, प्रो. मारुति नन्दन तिवारी (वाराणसी)--जैन कला एवं जैन प्रतिमा विज्ञान, प्रो. माहेश्वरी प्रसाद (वाराणसी)-- जैन अभिलेख, प्रो. रामचन्द्र पाण्डेय (वाराणसी)-- जैन ज्योतिष, डॉ. अशोक कुमार जैन (वाराणसी)-- जैन दर्शन में अनेकान्तवाद, जैन धर्म में गुणस्थान सिद्धान्त की अवधारणा एवं श्रमणाचार, प्रो. हरिहर सिंह (वाराणसी)--पश्चिम भारत के जैन मन्दिर, प्रो. सुमन जैन (वाराणसी)-- पाण्डुलिपियों का सामान्य परिचय, डॉ. अशोक कुमार सिंह (वाराणसी)--जैनाचार्यों का दार्शनिक साहित्य को अवदान, जैन आगमों की (प्राकृत एवं शौरसेनी) व्याख्यायें, जैनधर्म एवं धार्मिक सहिष्णुता तथा जैन आध्यात्मिकता, डॉ. श्री प्रकाश पाण्डेय (वाराणसी)-- द्रव्य, गुण,पर्याय, जैन योग, कर्म सिद्धान्त, लेश्या सिद्धान्त, स्याद्वाद एवं सप्तभंगी, नय निक्षेप, डॉ. झिनकू यादव (वाराणसी)-- जैन सम्प्रदाय, डॉ. जयन्त उपाध्याय (वाराणसी) -- भारतीय दर्शन में ज्ञान की अवधारणा, डॉ. नवीन कुमार श्रीवास्तव (वाराणसी)--जैन ज्ञान मीमांसा, जैन दर्शन में आत्मा की अवधारणा एवं जैव नैतिकता, डॉ. राहुल कुमार सिंह (वाराणसी)-- जैन सप्त तत्त्व एवं जैन नवतत्त्व की अवधारणा, जैन प्रमाण मीमांसा, षड्द्रव्य की अवधारणा, जैन दर्शन एवं गांधी -विचार तथा शाकाहार और श्री ओम प्रकाश सिंह (वाराणसी)-- जैन कोश साहित्य।

कार्यशाला के अन्तिम दिन में १८ छात्र-छात्राओं ने जैन धर्म-दर्शन के विभिन्न विषयों पर पत्रों का वाचन किया। पत्र-वाचन में डॉ. अर्चना कुमारी को प्रथम, डॉ. तपेश्वर राम को द्वितीय एवं सुश्री प्रतिमा सिंह तथा श्री राज कुमार सिंह को संयुक्त रूप से तृतीय स्थान मिला।

दिनांक ९ अक्टूबर, २०१३ को इस पन्द्रह दिवसीय कार्यशाला का समापन समारोह सम्पन्न हुआ। सारस्वत अतिथि के पद से बोलते हुए श्री लेख राज मेहता एडवोकेट, जोधपुर, ने कहा कि हमें वर्तमान में दर्शन के सिद्धान्त को अपनाने की आवश्यकता है। समापन सत्र के मुख्य अतिथि दर्शन एवं धर्म विभाग, का.हि.वि.वि. के अध्यक्ष प्रो. एस. पी. पाण्डेय थे। इस समारोह की अध्यक्षता कला संकाय, का.हि.वि.वि के संकायाध्यक्ष प्रो. एम. एन. राय ने की। मुख्य अतिथि के रूप में प्रो. एस. पी. पाण्डेय ने कहा कि कार्यशालाओं का आयोजन कुछ विशेष संदर्भों एवं समस्याओं पर आधारित होता है। इस कार्यशाला में विषयों का चयन संदर्भों के अनुरूप हुआ है। पाठशालाएँ विद्या का पाठ कराती हैं तो कार्यशालाएँ उनका व्यावहारिक प्रयोग।



प्रो. महेन्द्र नाथ राय ने कहा कि टी. आर. वी. मूर्ति एवं मैत्रैय जी के शिष्य श्री लेख राज मेहता जी का सानिध्य ही कार्यशाला की सफलता का सूचक है। उन्होंने आगे कहा कि हम देहवादी युग में जी रहे हैं, आत्मा की ओर हमारी दृष्टि नहीं है। प्रासाद है पर घर नही है। आज आवश्यकता है आत्म-निरीक्षण की। हम सिर्फ सहिष्णुता को ही अपना ले तो वर्तमान समय में एक बड़े लक्ष्य की उपलब्धि हो जाएगी। कार्यशाला संयोजक डॉ. नवीन कुमार श्रीवास्तव ने कार्यशाला के व्याख्यानों की विषय-वस्तु के बारे में विस्तृत प्रकाश डाला। डॉ. श्रीनेत्र पाण्डेय ने कार्यक्रम का संचालन किया। डॉ. एस. पी. पाण्डेय ने स्वागत वक्तव्य एवं डॉ. राहुल कुमार सिंह ने धन्यवाद प्रस्तुत किया।

ISSJS NEWS-2013

International School for Jain Studies organised the following programs (June 1st to August 8th 2013):

Program	Subject	Duration	Participant profile	Number
ISSJS-2013.4W	Jain Studies	June 1st-30th	U. Graduate students	15
ISSJS-2013.6W	Jain Studies	June 1st-July 15th	Graduate students, PhD and faculty members	15
ISSJS-2013.3W	Teachers for Peace	July 15th-Aug 8th	High school and Primary school teachers	14

The participants for the first two programs (in their ninth year of offering now) came from seven universities and five countries of USA, Canada, Czech, Poland, UK, Japan and Spain while those from the third program came from USA and Russia.

The first two programs were conducted at Delhi, Jaipur, Varanasi, Aligarh and Jalgaon. Each program consisted of six course modules like History-culture and literature of Jainism, Philosophy, Karma Doctrine, Ethics, Applications to modern day issues and reading of one Jain Holy text. The participants of ISSJS-2013.6W were also required to undertake one week of independent research and present a well-documented research paper on relevant subject of study. They were also taken for day's pilgrimage to Hastinapur, visits to temples and monks in Delhi and participate in some religious rituals. A typical day consisted of two to three 1.5 hours of academic interactive lectures in the morning followed by group discussions in the afternoon. A typical work day started at 08:00 A.M and lasted till 09:00 P.M in the evening.

The AAA (Ahimsa, Anekant and Aparigraha) and karma doctrines were discussed at length during the program along with ways and means to enhance self-improvement for enlightened thinking and happiness. In all 15 qualified and experienced faculty members from India and Germany delivered the lectured as well as guided the participants in their afternoon discussions. ISJS provided excellent and comfortable living space, Jain wholesome vegetarian food, unlimited and uninterrupted internet access and library facilities to the participants. The participants earned three (4W program) and six (6W program) credit units from Mangalayatan university for transfer

to their graduate programs of studies in their home countries. During the passage of time the participant's involvement in studies in the classroom and outside increased till the last day as was seen from the comments they made and the regular feedback received from them on a daily basis. All the participants wrote excellent research papers after extensive research at Parshwanath Vidyapeeth, Varanasi.

These papers will be published by Parshwanath Vidyapeeth (an associate and part of **ISJS**), in its quarterly journal ŚRAMAṆA to be brought out in September 2013.

The third program, popularly called as Teachers ready for peace is the second time offering by ISJS. It aims at training the High School and Primary School Teachers in the doctrine and practice of Ahimsa (non violence) in their personal life as well as in their class room to reduce violence and violent behaviours, enhance wellness and learning by the students to attain sound social and emotional values and skills to contribute towards lasting peace and happiness and self improvement.

The program was designed in three modules, namely Fundamentals of Ahimsa, Observations of its practice in different types of schools (urban, inner city, rural and high end private schools, followed by class room lectures on applying the doctrines learned in first module. The entire program was designed on the concept of providing a family environment for learning by three eminent experts in philosophy and IT, Sociology and Science. Shugan and Uma provided not only the faculty and expert resource but as the family ensuring comfort and fearless ambience, own life experiences on each topic with easy access to food, water, tea-coffee and savouries all through. Extreme care was taken to avoid religion and replace it by universal spiritual values like Self improvement first, equanimity of all living beings, love, tolerance, forgiveness, fearlessness, reconciliation and non-acquisitiveness as the guiding spiritual values and constituents of ahimsa. The program used all techniques, like movies, mood breakers and quotations, daily Morning Prayer, three interactive academic lectures, afternoon discussions and paper presentations by participants (they were asked to write a paper on a topic identified by ISJS prior to their arrival for the program). Each school visited was discussed at length afterwards and if required the principal of the school visited was requested to come again for detailed discussions. Special emphasis was given on Mahatma Gandhi, his life and practice of ahimsa (Gandhi Research Foundation Jalgaon with an excellent state of the art Gandhi museum and library and two schools run on Ahimsa principles strictly) by Gandhians and Value education program developed by Bhartiya Jain Sangathana, Pune. A day long open house was also organized by inviting scholars of all popular religions (Christianity, Islam, Hindu and Buddhism) to talk on ahimsa in their religions as the one of the main sources of knowledge i.e. religion that is conspicuous by its absence in the present day education and dominated primarily by Science and technology and body comforts. It was indeed a great learning for ISJS also to see how young and experienced teachers alike in a totally alien environment, culture and subject, were deeply involved continuously from 08:00AM till 10:00 PM daily in learning through classroom and discussions amongst themselves organized by ISJS. The participants and the faculty touched the life of all the people visited in schools, museums and elsewhere. At the end, all participants expressed transformational experience, yearning to go back to their schools committed to share their experiences and come back to the ISJS India school next summer with more colleagues.

Other significant developments during the summer 2013

CLU (Claremont Lincoln University) support: The program would not have been so successful without the whole hearted support of Prof Philip Clayton (policy issues), Ms. Lidiya Potapenko for admission processing and Mrs. Stephanie Vernon Hughes for promotion of Teachers for Peace program and excellent coordination of all programs in India.

Others: Ms. Laura Hirshfield from AB School System Boston Mass and Prof. Julie Ashworth from South Dakota were instrumental in guiding the courseware preparation as well as motivating their colleagues to join the program.

Award to ISJS: JAINA of USA bestowed the award of Outstanding Jain education services globally to ISJS in their 17th Biennial convention in Novi Michigan USA. The award was received by Dr. Shugan Jain, Chairman ISJS

ISJS alumni going places:

1. **Dr. Ana Bajzelz,** outstanding ISSJS Alumni (2010) from University of Ljubljana Slovenia received her PhD on Concept of Change in Jainism as enunciated in the works of Kundkund and Umaswati. She is now coming to Centre of Advanced Studies, University of Rajasthan, (an affiliate of ISJS) for one year scholarship by Indian Council of Cultural Relations for Post doctoral research in Jain ontology through commentary literature. She has in the mean time acquired good knowledge of Prakrit, the language of Jain scriptures at ISJS affiliate in Jaipur.She will start her work in September 2013 and also spend significant time at Parshwanath Vidyapeeth, Varanasi.
2. **Prof. Tim Kragh and Mrs. Kragh** (PhD scholar at Leiden University Holland), ISSJS Alumni (2010) are coming to ISJS the third time for learning Prakrit, Apbhramsh and now Hindi to enable them study Jain scriptures. They both are now students for PhD in Jainism (Prof. Kragh earlier earned a PhD in Buddhism from Harvard University and Mrs. Kragh MA from the same university). After attending their lives to Jain studies teaching and research. They will spend significant time in internationalizing the academic work of Parshwanath Vidyapeeth.

ISJS partner institutions promise to give greater support to ISJS: Sh. Shantilal Muttha of Bharatiya Jain Sangathana Pune, Dr. Bhavarlal Jain of Gandhi Research Foundation, Jalgaon, Mr. Sugalchand of Chennai, Mr. N.K. Jain, Secretary General Atam Vallabh Smarak Shiksa Nidhi, Delhi and Hira Lal Jain SS School, Delhi (as a laboratory of peace program) have promised significantly greater organizational and financial support to ISJS to globalize its programs, particularly the Teachers for Peace program.

Dr. Shugan C. Jain

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जैन जगत्

प्रो. डॉ. दामोदर शास्त्री को संस्कृत शास्त्र पुरस्कारः-

राजस्थान संस्कृत अकादमी (कला, साहित्य व संस्कृत मंत्रालय, राजस्थान सरकार) द्वारा २०१२-२०१३ वर्ष का 'संस्कृत शास्त्र' पुरस्कार प्रो. डॉ. दामोदर शास्त्री को प्रदान किया गया है। यह पुरस्कार उनकी 'कातन्त्ररूपमाला' (संस्कृत व्याकरण) की विस्तृत संस्कृत टीका पर दिया गया है। गुजरात की राज्यपाल महामहिम श्रीमती कमला ने उन्हें यह पुरस्कार जयपुर कलाकेन्द्र के रंगायन सभागार में दिनांक ९ जुलाई २०१३ को प्रदान किया। प्रो. शास्त्री वर्तमान में जैन विश्वभारती (मान्य विश्वविद्यालय), लाडनूं में जैन विद्या एवं तुलनात्मक धर्म दर्शन विभाग के आचार्य व अध्यक्ष पद पर कार्यरत हैं। ज्ञातव्य है कि उक्त शास्त्रीय कृति पूज्य श्वेतापिच्छाचार्य मुनिश्री विद्यानन्द जी महाराज की प्रेरणा व निर्देशन में सम्पन्न हुई थी।

जम्बूस्वामी तपोस्थली पर सहस्राधिक वर्षों में प्रथम बार होगी दिगम्बर दीक्षाएं:-

जम्बूस्वामी तपोस्थली, बौलखेड़ा, कामां, जिला भरतपुर (राज.) में ०८ सितम्बर दिन रविवार को प्रातः ११ बजे से प. पू. राष्ट्र संत श्वेत पिच्छाचार्य श्री विद्यानन्द जी मुनिराज के सुयोग्य व प्रभावक शिष्य प. पू. अभीक्ष्ण ज्ञानोपयोगी एलाचार्य श्री वसुनन्दी जी मुनिराज के पावन कर कमलों द्वारा दीक्षा संस्कार प्रदत्त की जाएगा।

मुनि श्री १०८ प्रमुख सागर जी महाराज ससंघ का वर्षायोगः-

पुष्पगिरी प्रणेता परम पूज्य आचार्य श्री १०८ पुष्प दंत सागर जी महाराज के सुयोग्य शिष्य मुनि श्री १०८ प्रमुख सागर जी महाराज ससंघ का आगरा से पैदल विहार करके वर्षायोग हेतु १४ जुलाई २०१३ को मंगल प्रवेश अम्बाला छावनी में हुआ था और वर्षायोग स्थापना समारोह २१ जुलाई २०१३ को लार्ड महावीर जैन पब्लिक स्कूल, अम्बाला में सम्पन्न हो चुका है। मुनि श्री का वर्षायोग प्रवास१० नवम्बर २०१३ तक रहेगा। इस अवधि के दौरान मुनि श्री श्री दिगम्बर जैन मन्दिर, गुड बाजार, अम्बाला छावनी में विराजमान रहेंगे।

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Sāhitya Satkāra

Book Review

Samavāyaṅgasuttam A Jain Canonical Text (Text with English translation, variant reading, notes, appendices, Gāthā Index, Classified Index of Proper Names and Glossary of Technical Terms):- Translated and Edited by Dr. Ashok Kumar Singh, Published by Bhogilal Leharchand Institute of Indology, New Delhi, First Edition, 2012.

The 'Samavāyaṅga-sutta' is the fourth in the series of the twelve most authentic and the erliest canonical text (*aṅgas*) composed in the Ardhmāgadhī Prakrit. It is usually dated the 5th to 4th c. BCE. 'Samavāya' means 'a group' 'an aggregate' or 'a cluster'of items, subjets or concept usually associated with each other through certain common characteristics. The text is named as such because it follows the pattern of enlisting the subjects and themes related to Jain doctrine in a group from following numerical order in ascending manner. i.e. starting with one and going upto 100 in a regular way and then beyond in a faster pace, upto one crore. These subjects are then dealt with in a detailed and substantial manner unfolding thier characteristics, a process during which importent psychological and ontological aspects of Jain doctrine as well its cosmological beliefs come to fore. The text is thus an invaluable source of deriving information on various aspects of Jain Philosophy and belief system.

It is the first ever English translation of the text embllished with critical and supplementary notes which is bieng issued for the sake of reaching a wider Jain and non Jain readership, especially researchers and scholars.

- Dr. Ruchi Rai

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साभार प्राप्ति

पार्श्वनाथ विद्यापीठ को निम्न पुस्तकें साभार प्राप्त हुईं-

१. आत्म जागरण
लेखक- महामोहोपहतमति श्री ज्ञान मुनि, इण्टर-इण्डिया पब्लिकेशंस, राजा गार्डन, नई दिल्ली, प्रथम संस्करण २०१०।

२. सत्य प्रतिलेखना
लेखक- आ. श्री चन्द्रगुप्तसूरिजी, श्रीमती इन्द्राबेनरमेशकुमार गणेशमलजी,बाबा सोलंकी गुडाबालोतान।

३. सिन्दूर प्रकर
विवेचक- मुनिराज श्री जयानन्द विजयजी, श्री गुरु रामचन्द्र प्रकाशन समिति, राज.।

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Our Contributors

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Julie A. Hanlon (Email : jhanlon@uchicago.edu) is a Ph. D. student in the Department of Anthropology and the Department of South Asian Languages & Civilizations, University of Chicago, USA. Her doctoral research at the University of Chicago examines the socio-economic interactions between Jain monastic communities and early polities in South India, specifically Kerala and Tamil Nadu, between 5th century BCE and 8th century CE (with a focus on the early centuries CE).

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Rafael Reyes (Email :Rafael.reyes@cst.edu) is a Ph.D. Student at Claremont Lincoln University in the department of Religion: Process Studies. His interests lie in Philosophy and Religion, particularly in process, postmodern and continental philosophy, with the constructive theologies of process, ecological, feminist, post-colonial and liberation theologies. Prior to this, Rafael received his S.T.M. in Process Studies at Drew University.

Mr. John Di Leonardo, M.S.

John Di Leonardo (Email : jjdileonardo@gmail.com) is an Anthrozoologist and founder and President of Long Island Orchestrating for Nature (LION), Long Island, New York. For his undergraduate, John studied psychology and religious studies at Siena College. He continued on to study at both Humane Society University and Canisius College, graduating from Canisiussumma cum laude with his Masters of Science in Anthrozoology, currently the highest degree in the field, and most recently studied under a Fellowship with the International School for Jain Studies in India.

Zdenek Vojtisek

Zdenek Vojtisek (Email : vojtiskovi@volny.cz) is an Assistant Professor and the head of the department of Religious Studies at the Hussite Theological Faculty of the Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. He specializes in contemporary religion in the West, new religious movements, and millennialism. He authored *Encyclopaedia of religious movements in the Czech Republic, New Religious Movements and Collective Violence* (2009), *Millennial Expectations in the Grail Movement* (*Nova Religio* 2006/3) and other books and papers.

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OUR IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS

1.	Prakrit - Hindi Kośa Edited by Dr. K.R. Chandra	R 1200.00
2.	Encyclopaedia of Jaina Studies Vol. I (Art & Architecture)	R 4000.00, $ 100.00
3.	Jain Kumār Sambhavam Dr. Neelam Rani Shrivastava	R 300.00
4.	Jaina Sāhitya Kā Bṛhad Itihāsa, Vol. I - Vol. VII,	R 1430.00
5.	Hindi Jaina Sāhitya Kā Bṛhad Itihāsa, Vol. I-Vol. III Dr. Shitikanth Mishra	R 1270.00
6.	Jaina Pratimā Vijñāna Prof. M.N.P. Tiwari	R 300.00
7.	Jaina Dharma Darśana Dr. Mohanlal Mehta	R 200.00
8.	Sthānakavāsi Jaina Paramparā Kā Itihāsa Dr. S. M. Jain & Dr. Vijaya Kumar	R 500.00
9.	Studies in Jaina Philosophy Dr. Nathmal Tatia	R 200.00
10.	Theaory of Reality in Jaina Philosophy Dr. J. C. Sikdar	R 300.00
11.	Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy H.V. Glasenapp	R 150.00
12.	Jainism: The Oldest Living Religion Dr. Jyoti Prasad Jain	R 40.00
13.	Scientific Contents in Prakrit Canons Dr. N. L. Jain	R 400.00
14.	Pearls of Jaina Wisdom Editors: Dr. S. M. Jain & Dr. S. P Pandey	R 120.00
15.	Studies in Jaina Art Dr. U.P. Shah	R300.00
16.	Dr. C. Krause: Her Life and LiteratureVol. I Editor : Dr. S. P. Pandey	R 500. $ 40-00
17.	Jainism in a Global Perspective Editors: Dr. S.M. Jain & Dr. S.P. Pandey	R 400.00. $ 19.00
18.	Multi-dimensional Application of Anekāntavāda Editors: Dr. S.M. Jain & Dr. S.P. Pandey	R 500.00, $ 20.00
19.	Advanced Glossary of Jaina Terms Dr. N. L. Jain	R 300.00
20.	Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra: Eka Pariśīlana (Gujrati) Dr. S. L. Jain & Trans. A. Santilal Joshi	R 300.00
21.	Jains Today in the World Pierre Paul Amiel	R 500.00
22.	Kaṣāyapāhuḍa (Chapters on Passion) Dr. N. L. Jain	R 300.00
23.	Jaina Karmagrantha Part -I-V (Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi)	R 400.00

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