STUDIES IN JAINISM

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE
GOLPARK, CALCUTTA

STUDIES IN JAINISM

Studies In Jainism

THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION
INSTITUTE OF CULTURE
CALCUTTA

Published by
SWAMI LOKESWARANANDA, SECRETARY
THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE
GOL PARK, CALCUTTA

First Edition 1997

© THE RAMAKRISHNA MISSION INSTITUTE OF CULTURE
CALCUTTA

All rights are reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, no portion may be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher.

Price : Rs. 75.00

ISBN
81-85843-85-6

Printed in India at
ARUNIMA PRINTING WORKS
81 SIMLA STREET, CALCUTTA 700 006

Publisher's Note

Jainism is the earliest post-Vedic non-Brāhminical religious faith which appeared in northern India in the first millennium B.C. It's earliest exponent was Ṛṣabha—the first Tīrthaṅkara. It was, however, finally codified by Vardhamāna or Mahāvīra, the 24th Tīrthaṅkara, an elder contemporary of Gautama Buddha. Born in 599 B.C., Mahāvīra is admittedly the founder of modern Jainism.

A Creator-God behind the vast universe around us has no place in Jaina theology. Nor does it accept that a religious faith can be impersonal '*apauruṣeya*' as accepted by the prevailing Vedic religion. The difference of Jainism with the Vedic religion is apparently sharp on many issues. A closer study of the two systems, however, reveals that they have much in common as well, and it would be a better appreciation of both to say that Jainism was a contemporary reformist religious movement. Such reform movements are a testimony to India's spiritual vitality—eclecticism and assimilation. The few articles printed in this small volume present the different aspects of Jainism.

We thank all those who have helped us in producing this book. We also thank Govind Charity Trust for helping us finance the publication.

August 1997

CONTENTS

---

* Reprinted from *The Cultural Heritage of India.*

** Reprinted from the *Bulletin* of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture (August 1992)

SRAMAṆA OR NON-BRĀHMAṆICAL SECTS

THE philosophical schools of India, speaking broadly, may be grouped as Brāhmaṇic and non-Brāhmaṇic, the former being referred to as *āstika* and the latter *nāstika*. *Astika* denotes the systems which recognize the Vedas and their branches as supreme authority. It does not, as in the West, denote 'theism'. Sāṁkhya, for instance, is an atheistic philosophy, yet it is regarded as a Brāhmaṇic system, since it has accepted the authority of the Vedas. Buddhism and Jainism are considered to be non-Brāhmaṇic, because they do not recognize the authority of the Vedas. According to another interpretation, *āstika* is one who believes in the existence of the future world etc. According to this interpretation, the Buddhists and the Jains cannot be called *nāstikas*. Nāgārjuna implies it when he says, 'A *nāstika* is doomed to hell'.[1] Manu, on the other hand, defines *nāstika* as a person who challenges the authority of the Vedas (*nāstiko Vedanindakaḥ*).[2]

As already stated, it will be a misnomer to dub the Buddhists and the Jains as *nāstikas*. It will be much more fitting and appropriate, if we call them *avaidikas* (non-Vedic sects). Buddhist literature appears to speak of all the non-Brāhmaṇic systems as Śramaṇas in the frequent expression *'samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā'*. Here 'Brāhmaṇa' appears to refer to orthodox schools. According to the tradition preserved in the Tamil literature, Śramaṇa represents three sects, viz. Aṇuvādins (Pakudha Kaccāyana's sect), Ājīvikas (Ājīvakas), and Jains. The Buddhists are spoken of separately as Śākyas.

Of these Śramaṇa sects, Buddhism and Jainism occupy the foremost rank. There are materials in abundance, both literary and otherwise, to understand the real attitude taken up by them in the matter of religion and philosophy.

---

1. A verse from his *Ratnāvalī* cited in the *Madhyamaka-vṛtti* (Bib. Bud. IV), p.135.
2. *Manu Smṛti*, II. 11.

But, side by side with Buddhism and Jainism, there were other sects having no independent literary documents as their scriptures. They are frequently referred to for criticism by the Buddha and Mahāvīra in their discourses. The common features of all these religious bodies were :

(1) They challenged the authority of the Vedas.

(2) They admitted into their Church all members of the community, irrespective of their social rank and religious career (*varṇa* and *āśrama*).

(3) They observed a set of ethical principles.

(4) They practised a dètached life with a view to liberating themselves from the worldly life etc.

(5) They could take to a life of renunciation (*pravrajya*) any time after passing over the minor age.

Brahmacarya (the period of Vedic learning) had a quite different connotation for Buddhists and such others, though they preserved the practice of 'begging the food' (*bhikṣācarya*). Such religious bodies are known to us only through references to their teachers and tenets scattered in the vast literature of the Buddhists and Jains. The religious teachers whom the Buddha described as heretic (*titthiya* = *tīrthakara*) are : Pūraṇa Kassapa, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Keśakambalin, Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta, and Niganṭha Nātaputta.[3]

We shall deal here only with those teachers of sects, other than Buddhism and Jainism, who are less known. The following brief account of their views can be gathered from the Jaina and Buddhist literature, which, however, may not always represent their best side.

I. PŪRANA KASSAPA (THE SECT OF AKRIYĀVĀDINS)

We learn from the Buddhist records that Pūraṇa Kassapa (Pūrṇa Kāśyapa) was an old and respectable

3. We have another list in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* which mentions ten heretic sects by their collective names : Ājīvika, Niganṭha, Muṇḍasāvaka, Jaṭilaka, Paribbājaka, Magaṇḍika, Tedaṇḍika, Aviruddhaka, Gotamaka, and Devadhammika—Rhys Davids *Dialogues of the Buddha* (Sacred Books of the Buddhists, 1923), I. p.220.

teacher (*tīrthakara*) leading a religious body. He was, most probably, born in a Brāhmaṇa family, as his name indicates. The name Pūraṇa (= Pūrṇa) shows that he was fully enlightened and perfect in wisdom. It is reported that King Ajātaśatru once visited him, on which occasion the latter expounded his views thus : 'To him who acts or causes another to act, mutilates or causes another to mutilate, punishes or causes another to punish, causes grief or torment, trembles or causes another to tremble, kills other creatures, takes what is not given, breaks into houses, commits dacoity or robbery or tells lies, to him thus acting, there is no guilt ... no increase of guilt would ensue. ... In giving alms, in offering sacrifices, in self-mastery, in control of senses, and in speaking truth, there is neither merit nor increase of merit.'[4] This is called an exposition of 'non-action' theory (Akriyāvāda).

Jaina Sūtras also attribute similar views to him. This, probably, may not represent the correct view of Kassapa, for no system of thought in India, except the materialistic Cārvāka, is known to deny any merit or demerit to actions. Most probably, he was, as Barua states, an advocate of the theory that the soul was passive (*niṣkriya*), no action could affect it, and it was beyond good and bad—a view which many previous Vedic thinkers have enunciated. There must be some truth when Śīlāṅka, a Jaina commentator, identifies Kassapa's doctrine with the Sāṁkhya view.[5]

It is further reported, in the words of the Buddha, that no *hetu* (cause) and no *paccaya* (condition) are accepted by Pūraṇa Kassapa for one's becoming either defiled or purified.[6] Abhaya, again, says that Kassapa accepts no cause for *ñāṇa* (knowledge) and *dassana* (insight).[7] These passages tend to point out that Kassapa was an upholder of Ahetuvāda (no-cause theory). Hence Barua tries to bring

4. Rhys Davids, *op.cit.*, I. pp. 69-70 (as abridged by H. Ui in his *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p.21).
5. B.M. Barua, *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta University, 1921), p.279.
6. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III. p.69.
7. *Ibid.*, V. p.69.

his view under *adhicca-samuppāda* (fortuitous origin),[8] referred to in the *Brahmajāla-Sutta*, i.e. Ahetuvāda. The Buddha's teaching alone is said to be Hetuvāda, whereas that of others is Ahetuvāda.

In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya*,[9] we find two Lokāyatika Brāhmaṇas stating to the Buddha that Pūraṇa Kassapa asserts himself to be always in possession of *ñāṇadassana* (introspective knowledge), while walking or staying etc., and that he perceives the finite world through infinite knowledge (*anantena ñāṇena antavantaṁ lokaṁ jānaṁ*), while they attribute to Niganṭha the theory of perceiving the finite world through finite knowledge. In another passage,[10] the Buddha is said to have represented Kassapa, along with the other heretic teachers, as possessing the power of telling that a particular dead person was reborn in a certain place. Ānanda ascribes to him Makkhali Gosāla's doctrine of six classes of human beings (*chalābhijātiyo*), such as *kaṇhābhijāti* (black class of being), *nīlābhijāti* (blue class of being), etc.,[11] which evidently shows that Ānanda made a mess of the doctrines of Gosāla and Kassapa.[12]

II. PAKUDHA KACCĀYANA (THE SECT OF AṆUVĀDINS)

According to the Buddhist records, Pakudha Kaccāyana (Prakruddha Kātyāyana) was one of the six heretic teachers (*titthiyas*). He was a leader of some religious body and was held in great esteem by the people of the time. Buddhaghoṣa says that Pakudha is his personal name and Kaccāyana his family (*gotra*) name. The term '*pakudha*' has been traditionally interpreted as '*prakruddha*' (furious). This interpretation is supported by another reading '*prakruddha*' in the *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*.[13] Its alternative form is

8. H. Ui says that Gosāla's opinion is referred to in the *Brahmajāla-Sutta* under *adhicca-samuppannika* (*op.cit.*, p.22, f.n. 1).
9. IV. pp. 428-29.
10. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV. p.398.
11. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III. p.383-84.
12. *The Nīlakeci* (*Nīlakeśī*), a jaina treatise in Tamil, tells us that Gosāla also had the title 'Pūraṇa'. See N.A. Sastri, 'Ājīvakas', *Journal of Sri Venkateshwara Oriental Institute* (Tirupati, 1941), p.418.
13. Published by Pali Text Society, p.144.

'kakudha' or *'kakuddha'* which means the same thing. It is also used as a personal name for Koliyaputta,[14] who was attending on Mahāmoggallāna. Barua, assuming *'kakuda'* to be the original and correct form meaning 'a man having a hump on his back', connects this Kātyāyana with Kabandhī Kātyāyana, one of the pupils of the sage Pippalāda of the *Praśna Upaniṣad*.[15] The suggestion, though ingenious, lacks a convincing proof. Kabandhī Kātyāyana, on the other hand, is said to be one of the *Brahmaniṣṭhas* in the Upaniṣad. Buddhaghoṣa records that Kaccāyana never used to touch cold water. He never even crossed the river or a marshy pathway, lest his vow should be transgressed.[16]

As to his philosophy, we have mainly two sources, namely, *Sāmaññaphala-Sutta* and *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, of which the former represents Kaccāyana as saying : 'The following seven things are neither made nor commanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be created ; they are barren (so that nothing is produced out of them), steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed. They move not, neither do they vary; they trench not one upon another, nor avail aught as to ease (pleasure) or pain or both. And what are the seven ? The four elements—earth, water, fire and air—, and ease (pleasure) and pain, and the soul as a seventh. So there is neither slayer nor causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or explainer. When one with sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby deprives any one of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances.'[17] It appears from this passage that Kaccāyana accepted seven elementary substances as permanent and eternal, neither created nor caused to be created. This fundamental principle of seven elements is also corroborated by the Tamil sources.[18] The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, on the other hand, presents the system of six categories omitting pleasure and pain, adding ether or space in their place. H. Ui has rightly

14. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III. p. 122.
15. *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p.227.
16. *Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī* (P.T.S.), p.144.
17. N.A. Sastri, *op.cit.*, p.407.
18. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. p.74.

pointed out that if this Sassatavāda (Eternalism) is developed, 'the resultant must be the atomic theory'.[19] It is likely that this Sassatavāda is the same as Aṇuvāda, atom-theory, of the Tamil texts. According to the Tamil tradition, Aṇuvāda of the Kātyāyana sect is more intimately associated with the Ājīvikas, and appeared some time after them.

The eternal elements, earth, water, etc., unite or separate automatically without any volitional activity. The two elements, pleasure and pain, stand for some factors calling forth a union of those elements, just like *adṛṣṭa* in the Vaiśeṣika system. Barua has well remarked that Kātyāyana cannot be denied his rightful claim to be singled out as the Empedocles of India, for, according to both, the four elements are root-things and the formative principle is two-fold : 'love' and 'hatred' for Empedocles, and 'pleasure' and pain' for Kātyāyana.[20]

III. MAKKHALI GOSĀLA (THE ĀJĪVIKA SECT)

Makkhali Gosāla (Maskari Gośāla) was the leader of the Ājīvika sect. Before Gosāla, there were two leaders of the sect, viz. Nanda Vaccha and Kisa Saṅkicca. Gosāla is said to have been born somewhere near Śrāvasti, and left home for some unknown reason and became a homeless wanderer. His career as a wanderer covers about 24 years, of which the first six[21] he spent at Paṇiyabhūmi together with Mahāvīra. He parted company with the latter on account of doctrinal differences, and went to Śrāvasti, where he attained Jinahood and became the leader of the Ājīvika sect. He died sixteen years before Mahāvīra, who predeceased the Buddha at least by a few years. In the *Bhagavatī-Sūtra*, Gosāla is stated to have been a disciple of Mahāvīra at Nālandā, but it is not admissible.

The name of this teacher is variously spelt : Makkhali Gosāla in Pali, Maṅkhaliputta Gosāla in Ardha-Māgadhī,

---

19. *Op.cit.*, p.23.
20. *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, pp.283-84.
21. Only one year according to the *Kalpa-Sūtra*. See Amulya Chandra Sen, *Schools and Sects in Jaina Literature* (Visva Bharati Studies No. 3, Calcutta, 1931), p.8. According to the *Bhagavatī-Sūtra*, six years. See Barua, *Ājīvikas*, p.7.

and Markali in Tamil. Buddhaghoṣa, giving a fanciful etymology[22] for Makkhali, viz. *'Tāta, mā khaliḥ'* (My dear man, take care lest you stumble), assumes that he was a servant in the household of a wealthy man, who warns him thus. The Jaina tradition derives Maṅkhaliputta as 'son of a *maṅkhali'*, a mendicant who carries about the picture (of a deity) for collecting alms. His father, Maṅkhali, once came to Śaravaṇa and, failing to obtain any other shelter, he took refuge for the rainy season in the cowshed (*gośālā*) of a wealthy Brāhmaṇa, Gobahula, where Maṅkhali's wife Bhaddā brought forth a son, who became known as Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta.[23] Makkhali in Pali or Markali in Tamil is Maskarin in Sanskrit. Chinese tradition records his name as Maskari Gosāliputra and explains that Maskari is his *gotra* name and Gosāli is his mother's name. So he was Gosāliputra, son of Gosāli.[24] According to Pāṇini (VI. 1.154), *maskarin* was a wanderer who carried a *maskara* (bamboo staff) about him.[25]

Hoernle remarks that the name 'Ājīvikas' was not taken by themselves, but was given to them by their opponents. Gosāla by his conduct laid himself open to the charge of insincerity, in that he practised religious mendicancy not as a means of gaining salvation (*mokṣa*), but as a means of gaining livelihood. Rhys Davids thinks that Ājīvikas are 'those who claimed to be especially strict in earning their means of livelihood'.[26] It may not be improbable that they earned their livelihood by some profession such as fortune-telling, astrology, divination, etc.[27] That astrology was almost a profession with the Ājīvikas is confirmed by an old

---

22. Barua, *Ājīvikas* (Calcutta University, 1920), p.11.
23. *Ibid.*, p.9.
24. See *Chinese Encyclopaedia,* VI. pp.820-21.
25. The historical significance of the word had already been lost sight of by the time of the *Mahābhāṣya* which interprets the term in a quite fanciful manner : *Mā kṛta karmāṇi, mā kṛta karmāṇi, śāntir vaḥ śreyasītyāha; ato maskarī parivrājakaḥ.*
26. *Op.cit.*, I. p.221.
27. Vide *Udāna,* VIII. 13.

tradition preserved in a Jātaka and the *Divyāvadāna*.[28] This tradition fits in with their philosophical standpoint, viz. fatalism.

From the account narrated in the *Bhagavatī-Sūtra*, it is presumed that the scriptures of the Ājīvikas consisted of ten Puvvas, i.e. eight Mahānimittas and two Maggas, like the fourteen Pūrvas of the Jains.[29] The dialect adopted as a literary medium for their scripture was closely allied to Ardha-Māgadhī, a few stereotyped fragments of which have survived in the Jaina and Buddhist literatures. The South Indian tradition mentions as their scripture some treatise known as *Navakadir* (Nine Rays), which, most probably, comprised nine groups of works embodying the teaching of Maskarin. This work might be a Tamil redaction of the original Prakrit, previously mentioned.[30] It is most unfortunate that this important work on the sect is no more traceable.

HIS ETHICAL TEACHINGS

We often find statements to the effect that the Ājīvikas adhered to a severe form of asceticism. The *Nīlakeci*, a Tamil treatise of the Jains, states that Gosāla exhorted his disciples to abide by strict moral observances, and that they observed *śīlas*, though they denied their efficacy.[31] The author of the *Śivajñāna-śittiyār*, while describing some common features of the Śramaṇas other than the Buddhists, states that the Ājīvikas worship the *aśoka* tree as god, deny the authority of the Vedas, practise severe asceticism, keep their body dirty (for want of daily bathing), give up household life, cover their nakedness with mat-clothing, and carry in their hand a bunch of peacock feathers.[32] The

28. Barua, *Ājīvikas* (Calcutta University, 1920), p.68. This seems to be supported by the epithet '*lagnājīvaka*' used for the Ājīvika sect in the *Vajrasūci*.
29. Barua, *Ājīvikas*, pp.43, 47-51. See also B.C. Law, *India as Described in the Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism* (Luzac & Co., London, 1941), pp.265-66 for detailed information of their literature.
30. N.A. Sastri, *op.cit.*, p.405.
31. *Ibid.*, pp.405-6.
32. *Ibid.*, p.413.

Bhagavatī-Sūtra says that they abstained from eating five kinds of fruits, viz. *umbara* (*ficus glomerata*), *vaṭa* (*ficus Indica*), *bora* (jujube), *satara*(?), and *pilaṅkhu* (*ficus infectoria*), and also abstained from eating roots etc.

The *Sthānāṅga-Sūtra* says that the Ājīvikas practise four kinds of austerities, viz. severe austerities, fierce austerities, abstention from ghee and other delicacies, and indifference to pleasant and unpleasant food.[33] They are said to observe the fourfold *brahmacarya* consisting of : (1) *tapassitā*, asceticism; (2) *lūkhacariyā*, austerity; (3) *jegucitā*, comfort-loathing; and (4) *pavivittatā*, solitude. The *Aupapādika-Sūtra* describes the system of collecting alms of the Ājīvika ascetics. Some of them beg in every second or third or fourth or fifth or sixth, or even in every seventh house; there are some who accept lotus-stalks only as alms under certain conditions; some beg in every house, but do not accept alms if there is a flash of lightning. There are some ascetics who practise penances by entering into big earthen vessels. It is stated also that they were men of right living, and in this mode of right living, they were followed by both the Jains and the Buddhists.

The *Sāmaññaphala-Sutta*, however, says that in the opinion of Gosāla, no spiritual development can take place by moral observances. It is rather difficult to make out why the Ājīvikas should enjoin the moral observances and in the same breath deny their efficacy. It is likely that Gosāla approved, in pursuance of time-honoured fashion, the moral and religious observances, even though they were ineffective in doing any good. This may be evident from his strong plea that one gained the final deliverance solely by virtue of transmigrations (*saṁsāra-śuddhi*).

HIS PHILOSOPHY

The *Bhagavatī-Sūtra* gives the following account of his philosophy. An experiment was made by Gosāla together with Mahāvīra taking as specimen a large sesamum plant (*Tila-thambha*) which being uprooted and destroyed reappeared in due time. Gosāla drew therefrom the conclu-

33. A.C. Sen, *Schools and Sects in Jaina Literature*, p.11.

sion that all living beings are subject to reanimation (*pautta parihāraṁ parihanti*).[34]

All those who reach final beatitude will have to pass through 84,00,000 great *kalpas*, and then seven births as a deity, seven as a bulky (insensible) being, seven as a sensible being, and seven with changes of body through reanimation; and having thus gradually expiated the 5,00,000 deeds and the 60,603 minor deeds, they will reach final beatitude.[35]

Another account of his doctrine can be gathered from the *Sāmaññaphala-Sutta*. All beings and souls are without force, power, and energy of their own. They get transformed by their fate (*niyati*), by the necessary conditions of the class to which they belong (*saṅgati*), and by their individual nature (*bhāva-pariṇatā*). They experience pleasure and pain according to their position in one or other of the six classes of existences.

There are 84,00,000 periods during which both fools and wise alike, wandering in transmigration, shall at last make an end of pain. Though the wise should hope 'by this virtue or this performance of duty, or this penance or this righteousness, will I make the *karma* (I have inherited) that is not yet mature, mature', and though the fool should hope, by some means, to get gradually rid of *karma* that has matured—neither of them can do it. Pleasure and pain cannot be altered in the course of transmigration ; there can be neither increase nor decrease thereof, neither excess nor deficiency. Just as when a ball of string is cast forth, it will spread out just as far as, and no farther than, it can unwind, just so, both the fools and the wise, transmigrating exactly for the allotted term, shall then, and only then, make an end of pain.[36]

From the Tamil texts, we learn that the Ājīvikas admitted five kinds of atoms: earth, water, fire, air, and life. Of

---

34. Rockhill, *The Life of the Buddha* (Trübner & Co., London, 1884), pp.250-51; and Barua, *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p.301, f.n. 1.
35. Rockhill, *op.cit.*, p.253.
36. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. pp.71-73.

these, only life is endowed with knowledge and others are not. They are beginningless, eternal, and indivisible. They can severally assemble together and assume varied forms, such as mountain, bamboo, diamond, etc. Only a man of divine vision can perceive single atoms. Pleasure and pain are atomic. The life-atom, which is imperceptible, becomes embodied through its own *karma*. Only an *arhat* can perceive it. It can, by its nature, enter into all things constituted of four kinds of atoms. When it enters into a body, it takes all the qualities of the body as its own.[37] The Jīva knows by means of contact, pressing on, and mingling with, the corporeal things.[38]

There are six classes of beings—black, blue-black, green, red, yellow, and white.[39] The final stage is Release *(vīḍu)*, which is extremely white. There are two kinds of released persons, *sambodhaka* and *maṇḍala*. The *Śittiyār* describes the functions of these two types of persons thus: the former remains always in the highest stage of life, while the latter comes down on earth to impart the sacred scriptures to the world. The *Nīlakeci* remarks here that in case all Jīvas attain *mokṣa*, the spring of *saṁsāra* will dry up. So they invented the doctrine of *maṇḍala-mokṣa*, according to which Jīvas that have attained *mokṣa* may come to *saṁsāra* in order to keep the latter going.[40]

There are eight kinds of results determinable at the stage of embryo : acquisition, loss, obstruction by impediments, migration to other place, suffering misery, enjoying pleasure, losing what is obtained, and birth and death. It is to be noted that the *Bhagavatī-Sūtra* mentions only six, omitting the third and the fourth.

This sect originated in North India, perhaps at Śrāvasti, and flourished for several centuries, probably beginning with the early part of the sixth century B.C.[41] It enjoyed

37. Cf. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. No. 35, pp.230-33.
38. N.A. Sastri, *op.cit.*, pp.407-9.
39. According to *Maṇimekalai*. The *Śitiyār* reads : white, yellow, red, blue, extremely white, and green.
40. N.A. Sastri, *op.cit.*, p.419.
41. According to Barua seventh or eighth century B.C. Bühler is also of the opinion that the founder of the sect may be placed about 750 B.C.

royal gifts from the great emperor Aśoka, who dedicated two cave-dwellings to the sect. It continued to exist in the Middle Country till the fifth century A.D. Barua traced references to the sect in Varāhamihira's *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* and Bāṇa's *Harṣacarita*. In the former, it is mentioned under the name of Ekadaṇḍin (one-staff man), while in the latter, under the name of Maskarin. It appears that the sect was patronized by King Daśaratha, the grandson of Aśoka, for three cave dedications in the Nāgārjuni Hills were made by him.[42] It may be noted that the sect has been referred to in the *Mahāvaṁsa* (X.102) as one of the flourishing religions in Ceylon during the reign of King Pāṇḍukābhaya (377-307 B.C.).

The sect must have continued in existence in South India till as late as the thirteenth or fourteenth century A.D., the time of the *Śivajñānaśittiyār*, which furnishes a vivid picture of the sect and its creed. This conclusion has been happily corroborated by references collected by Professor Pathak from the Digambara Jaina works in the Karṇāṭaka country.[43] Though the Jaina works confound the Ajīvikas with the Buddhists, yet they prove beyond doubt that they were well known to the Jaina authors of the late Cālukya and Yādava periods as a sect of the Buddhists who lived on *kaṅji* (rice-gruel).[44]

IV. AJITA KEŚAKAMBALIN (THE MATERIALISTS)

Ajita Keśakambalin is another of the six non-Brāhmaṇic teachers mentioned in the Buddhist and Jaina records. He was held in great esteem by the people. He was the earliest representative of Indian Materialism. He was called Keśakambalin, because he put on a blanket of human hair. His metaphysics may be summed up as follows:

A human being is built of the four elements (*cātum-mahābhūtiko ayaṁ puriso*). When he dies, the earthy in him relapses to earth, the fluid to water, the heat to fire, the windy to air, and his faculties (*indriyāṇi*, five senses and the mind as the sixth) pass into space (*ākāśa*). Four men

42. Barua, *Ājīvikas*, p.70. These Nāgārjuni Hills are near Buddha-Gayā.
43. *Indian Antiquary* (1912), pp.88 f.
44. Cf. Barua, *Ājīvikas*, pp. 77,79.

carry the bier, eulogizing the dead man till they reach the burning ground. His body having been cremated, the bones turn into the colour of a dove's wing, and his sacrifices end in ashes. Alms-giving is the preaching of such fools who speak of the existence (of the soul etc.) and speak vain things and untruth. When the body dies, both the foolish and the wise alike perish. They do not survive after death.[45]

As a corollary to this radical materialism, the ethical and religious teaching of this school was : There is no merit in sacrifice or offering; no resultant fruit from good and evil deeds. No one passes from this world to the next. No benefit results from the service rendered to mother and father. There is no afterlife. There are no ascetics or Brāhmaṇas who have reached perfection by following the right path, and who, as a result of knowledge, have experienced this world as well as the next and can proclaim the same.[46]

It is evident from the above that Ajita was a nihilist in metaphysics and antinomian in ethics. It is to be further noted that he postulated no solution for the phenomenon of knowledge. The materialists of the later days, however, have attempted to solve it in this way. When the four elements constituted the body, the spirit (*caitanya*) came into existence automatically. The Materialism of classical literature is attributed to the sage Bṛhaspati. The school is called Cārvāka in the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* of Mādhava, and Lokāyata in the *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* of Haribhadra. The Lokāyata or Lokāyatika was not unknown to the Buddhist authors. But what is meant by the term '*lokāyata*' in Pali Nikāyas is interesting to note. The following conversation between a *lokāyatika* Brāhmaṇa and the Buddha has been recorded in the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* (II.77) :

The Brāhmaṇa : Does everything exist (*sabbaṁ atthi*) ?
The Buddha : To say that everything exists is the first view of the worlding (*lokāyataṁ*).
The Brāhmaṇa : Does not everything exist (*sabbaṁ na'tthi*) ?
The Buddha : To say so is the second view of the worlding.

45. *Sāmaññaphala-Sutta* (*Dīgha Nikāya*, I. No.2), 23.
46. *Ibid.*

The Brāhmaṇa : Is everything one and identical *(sabbaṁ ekattaṁ)* ?
The Buddha : To say so is the third view of the worlding.
The Brāhmaṇa : Is everything separate *(sabbaṁ puthuttaṁ)* ?
The Buddha : To say so is the fourth view of the worlding.

Therefore the Buddha preaches *dhamma* (i.e. the law of causation) of the middle path, avoiding the above two extremes.

V. SAÑJAYA BELAṬṬHIPUTTA (THE SCEPTICS)

Sañjaya, son of Belaṭṭhi or Vairāṭi, was also one of the religious leaders of the sixth century B.C., and probably an elder contemporary of the Buddha. He is believed to be identical with Parivrājaka Sañjaya, teacher of Sāriputta and Moggallāna. Parivrājaka Suppiya was another follower of Sañjaya. He was reputed for an opinion which was a scepticism on the one hand and a primitive stage of criticism of knowledge on the other, like that of the Sophists in the Greek philosophy.[47] His scepticism on metaphysical questions may be summed up as follows :

'If you ask me whether there is future existence (*atthi paraloko*), well, if I believed that there was, I should say so. But I do not say so. And I do not say it is thus or this. And I do not say it is otherwise, and I do not say that it is not so, nor do I say it is not not so. If you ask me whether there is no future existence (*na'tthi paraloko*), well, if I believed ... If you ask me whether there is and is not another world (*atthi ca na'tthi ca paraloko*), well, if I believed ... If you ask me whether there neither is nor is not another world (*n'ev'atthi no na'tthi paraloko*), well, if I believed...'[48]

A follower of this sect has been described in the *Brahmajāla-Sutta* (37) as Amarāvikkhepika, who, when asked a question, would equivocate and wriggle out like an eel. Barua thinks that the Aviruddhakas mentioned in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* were also followers of Sañjaya—that they were called Amarāvikkhepikas for their philosophical doctrines and Aviruddhakas for their moral conduct.

---

47. H. Ui, *op.cit.*, p.23.
48. *Sāmaññaphala-Sutta, 31.*

JAINISM : ITS HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRECEPTS

HISTORICAL SURVEY

THE Jains claim a great antiquity for their religion. Their earliest prophet was Ṛṣabhadeva, who is mentioned even in the *Viṣṇu* and *Bhāgavata Purāṇas* as belonging to a very remote past. In the earliest Brāhmaṇic literature are found traces of the existence of a religious Order which ranged itself strongly against the authority of the Vedas and the institution of animal sacrifice. According to the Jaina tradition, at the time of the *Mahābhārata* war, this Order was led by Neminātha, who is said to have belonged to the same Yādava family as Kṛṣṇa and who is recognized as the twenty-second Tīrthankara. The Order gathered particular strength during the eighth century B.C. under Pārśvanātha, the twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara, who was born at Vārāṇasī. This Order we may call the *śramaṇa saṅgha* (as distinct from the Vedic Order), which later became divided into the Jaina and the Buddhist Orders under Mahāvīra and the Buddha, respectively.

Mahāvīra, also known as Vardhamāna, the twenty-fourth and last of the Tīrthaṅkaras, was born 250 years after Pārśvanātha, and this, according to a Jaina traditional era still current, corresponds to 599 B.C. His father was the chief of Kauṇḍinyapura near Vaiśālī which is now the village Basarh some twenty-seven miles to the north of Patna. His mother was Triśalā Devī, the daughter of the Licchivi King of Vaiśālī. From his early childhood, Mahāvīra had a reflective mind. After undergoing all the education and training usual for princes of the time, he realized the transitory nature of the world and became an ascetic at the age of thirty. He practised hard penance and meditation for twelve years, in the course of which he had to bear many persecutions at the hands of the ignorant, till, at last, he attained enlightenment. He then began to preach his doctrines to the people. The basic creed propounded by

Mahāvīra consisted of five vows and twenty-two endurances as shown subsequently. His chief contribution was the popularization of the principle of *ahiṁsā* (non-injury), on the basis of which he elaborated an ethical code for householders as well as for monks, and, as its background, he put forward the philosophy of the seven *tattvas* (realities). He organized the Jaina community, to which he admitted all aspirants irrespective of caste or sex, and inaugurated a system of peaceful proselytization. This he did for thirty years and won a large number of followers, both monks and householders. He abandoned his mortal body at the age of seventy-two, in 527 B.C.

Mahāvīra left behind him a strongly organized religious Order, through whose efforts the animal sacrifices fell into disuse and non-violence became firmly established as a rule of life even amongst those classes of people who did not join the Order. His followers gradually spread over the whole country. Jaina monks were to be found on the banks of the Sindhu already at the time of Alexander's invasion. A band of Jaina monks under Bhadrabāhu migrated to the South and spread the religion throughout the Deccan, with Shravanabelgola in Mysore as their central seat. Royal patronage was also bestowed upon the faith, and it is claimed that the great Maurya emperor Candragupta himself joined Bhadrabāhu's march to the South as his disciple. A very old rock inscription at Shravanabelgola commemorates his visit to the South; a cave is dedicated to him, and the hill on which it exists is known as Candragiri.

During the second century B.C., King Khāravela of Kaliṅga professed Jainism and promoted its cause by setting up Jaina images himself. During the early centuries of the Christian era, Mathura in the North and Shravanabelgola in the South formed important centres of Jaina activities, as is proved by a large number of inscriptions, images, and other monuments discovered at both places. From the fifth to the twelfth century the various royal dynasties of the South, such as the Gaṅgas, Kadambas, Cālukyas, and Rāṣṭrakūṭas, accorded their patronage to the faith. Some of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa kings of Mānyakheṭa, from the eighth to

the tenth century, showed a special leaning towards Jainism and gave a great impetus to the development of Jaina art and literature. Many Jaina poets of great repute flourished under them. Vīrasena wrote his monumental works, the *Dhavalā* and the *Jayadhavalā*, in exposition of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, under Jagattuṅga and his successor. Jinasena and Guṇabhadra composed the *Mahāpurāṇa* at the time of King Amoghavarṣa, when Mahāvīrācārya also wrote his work on mathematics. Amoghavarṣa himself was an author, and his *Ratnamālikā*, though a Jaina work, became very popular with people of all sects, and it has frequently been imitated. He is said to have become a Jaina monk in the latter part of his life. There is epigraphical evidence of the fact that one of his successors, Indra IV, died by the Jaina form of renunciation. The famous Apabhraṁśa poet Puṣpadanta was patronized by the ministers of Kṛṣṇa III and his successor. About A.D. 1100, Jainism gained ascendancy in Gujarat, where the Caulukya kings Siddharāja and his son Kumārapāla openly professed Jainism and encouraged the literary and temple building activities of the Jains. Hemancandra, the author of several works on different topics, religious as well as secular, lived at the court of the latter.

Jainism is one and undivided so far as its philosophy is concerned. But about the beginning of the Christian era, it became split up into two sects called Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, chiefly on the point of certain rules and regulations for the monks, the most important difference being that while the former held that monks could not wear any clothes, the latter asserted that they could. During the centuries that followed, further minor splits took place amongst both these sects, the most important of them being one that renounced idol-worship altogether and devoted itself to the worship of the scriptures. These are called Terāpanthīs amongst the Śvetāmbaras and Samaiyās amongst the Digambaras. This sect came into existence not earlier than the sixteenth century.

CULTURAL CONTRIBUTION

The Jains have played a very important role in the linguistic development of the country. Sanskrit has all along been the medium of sacred writings and preachings of the Brāhmaṇas and Pali that of the Buddhists. But the Jains utilized the prevailing languages of the different times at different places for their religious propaganda as well as for the preservation of knowledge. In this way, they exercised a predominant influence on the development of the Prakrit languages. They even gave a literary shape to some of the regional languages for the first time.

Mahāvīra preached in the mixed dialect called Ardha-Māgadhī, in order that he might be understood by people speaking both Māgadhī and Śaurasenī, and his teachings were classified into twelve books called Śrutāṅgas. These were preserved by oral tradition for some time, but were subsequently lost. An effort was made in about A.D. 454, during the tenth century after Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa*, to reconstruct the lost texts, and the result was the present canonical books of the Śvetāmbara Jains which still preserve for us the form of the Ardha-Māgadhī language. Of late, a very rich literature produced by the Jains has come to light, which preserves the form of the language as it was current prior to the evolution of the present-day regional languages, especially Hindi, Gujarati, and Marathi. This language is called Apabhraṁśa. It forms the link between the classical languages, Sanskrit and Prakrit, on the one hand, and the modern regional languages, on the other. The earliest literature in Kannada is of Jaina authorship, and the early Tamil literature also owes much to Jaina writers. The Jains have also produced a rich literature in Sanskrit, both narrative and philosophical, and works on grammar, prosody, lexicography, and mathematics.

The Jains have always taken their due share in the development of arts in the country. They erected *stūpas*, as did the Buddhists, in honour of their saints, with their accessories of stone railings, decorated gateways, stone umbrellas, elaborate carved pillars, and abundant statues. Early examples of these have been discovered at Mathura. Bundelkhand is full of Jaina images of the eleventh and

twelfth centuries. The huge statues of Bāhubalin, known as Gomaṭeśvara, at Shravanabelgola and Karkala in Mysore State are among the wonders of the world. The former was erected by Cāmuṇḍarāya, the minister of the Gaṅga king Rācamalla, during the tenth century. The colossal reliefs carved on the rock-face near Gwalior belong to the fifteenth century. The Jains also built cave-temples cut in rocks, the earliest examples of which, belonging to the second century B.C. and later, exist in Orissa, known as Hāthīgumphā caves. Other examples of varying periods exist at Junagadh, Junnar, Osmanabad, and other places. The numerous Jaina places of pilgrimage, such as the Parashnath (Pārśvanātha) Hills, Pavapuri, and Rajgir in Bihar, and Girnar and Palitana in Kathiawar, posses temples and other architectural monuments of different ages. The Jaina marble temples at Mount Abu in Rajasthan, belonging to the eleventh century and later, 'carry to its highest perfection the Indian genius for the invention of graceful patterns and their application to the decoration of masonry'.

PHILOSOPHY

The Jaina philosophy might be summed up in one sentence. The living and the non-living, by coming into contact with each other, forge certain energies which bring about birth, death, and various experiences of life; this process could be stopped, and the energies already forged destroyed, by a course of discipline leading to salvation. A close analysis of this brief statement shows that it involves seven propositions: first, that there is something called the living; secondly, that there is something called the non-living; thirdly, that the two come into contact with each other; fourthly, that the contact leads to the production of some energies; fifthly, that the process of contact could be stopped; sixthly, that the existing energies could also be exhausted; and lastly, that salvation could be achieved. These seven propositions are called the seven *tattvas* or realities by the Jains. The first two great truths are that there is a *jīva* or soul and that there is an *ajīva* or non-soul. These two exhaust between them all that exists in the universe.

JĪVA TATTVA

The soul, by itself, is imperceptible, but its presence can be found out by the presence of its characteristic qualities in a material body. Its chief characteristic is consciousness, which is accompanied by sense activity, respiration, and a certain period of existence in a particular body. There is an infinite number of such souls in the universe, and they retain their individuality throughout, neither destroying it altogether nor merging it in the individuality of any other superior being. In their embodied state, they are divisible into two classes, the immobile *(sthāvara)* and the mobile *(trasa)*. The former are of five kinds, according as their body is made up of earth, water, fire, air, or vegetable substance. The first four are very subtle forms of life, while the fifth is gross. All these five classes of beings have only one sense developed in them, that is, the sense of touch, responding thereby only to a stimulus of physical contact.

There is a class of beings still lower than these, called the *nigoda* or group-souls, in which an infinite number of beings have a body and respiration in common. They infest the whole world, not excluding the bodies of men and other animals. They are slowly evolving and serve as a regular supply for replacing beings that pass out of the cycle of birth and death by the attainment of *nirvāṇa*.

The mobile *(trasa)* class of beings is also divided into four kinds, according as they possess two, three, four, or five senses, i.e. the senses of taste, smell, sight, and sound, in addition to that of touch. Oysters are examples of the two-sensed beings; bugs and lice of the three-sensed; mosquitoes, flies, and bees of the four-sensed; and birds, animals, and men of the five-sensed beings. Amongst the last kind, again, there are beings, like men and most of the animals and birds, that possess *saṁjñā* or a faculty to discriminate between the beneficial and the injurious, between the favourable and the unfavourable, while there are some, like a particular kind of reptile in the ocean, that possess no such faculty.

Consciousness being the characteristic of a soul, knowledge is inherent in every living being, but its stage of development differs. Knowledge derived from the observa-

tion of nature through the senses *(mati jñāna)* is the first to be acquired and is the most universal. Next come, in gradual order, knowledge of the scriptures or of others' experiences *(śruta jñāna)*, of objects remote from one in time and place *(avadhi jñāna)*, of another's mind *(manaḥ-paryāya jñāna)*, and, lastly, perfect and supreme knowledge of everything *(kevala jñāna)*. The first two kinds are possible to any man, the next two to sages, and the last, only to a perfect sage, who has qualified himself for *nirvāṇa* (illumination).

AJĪVA TATTVAS

The second reality or *tattva* is a *jīva*, the lifeless substance, whose essential characteristic is that it lacks consciousness. It is of five kinds: The first kind is matter *(pudgala)*, which includes everything that is perceptible by the senses. It could be touched and found to be soft or hard, smooth or rough, heavy or light, cold or hot; it could be tasted and found to be bitter, sour, pungent, saline, or sweet; it may smell good or bad; and it may appear black, blue, yellow, red, or white. Matter constitutes the physical basis of the universe, even as the *jīva tattva* constitutes the psychical. The elements of nature—earth, water, fire, and air—are all gross manifestations of matter, the finest and most subtle form of which is the atom *(paramāṇu)*. Even heat, light, shade, and darkness are forms of fine matter, whose particles are constantly in motion *(parispanda)*, leading to a perpetual succession of integration and disintegration, with a variety of forms and appearances as the result. In this respect, the Jaina view of matter differs from the atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which assumes as many kinds of atoms as there are elements. This matter is as real and eternal as the soul, and its total quantity always remains the same in the universe.

The second kind of *ajīva* is named *dharma*. It is quite imperceptible, though it fills the entire universe of life and matter *(lokākāśa)*. It has none of the characteristic qualities of life or matter, but forms the medium of motion, which is possible only through its existence. 'Just as water helps the

fish to move about, even so *dharma* makes the movement of soul and matter possible.'

The necessary counterpart of this subtle substance forms the third kind of *ajīva* called *adharma*, which also pervades the whole universe and serves as a medium of rest, 'like the shade of a tree helping the wayfarer to stop for rest'. It will thus be seen that *dharma* and *adharma* are two non-physical, inactive-conditions of movement and rest, respectively, conceived as real substances. They should not be confused with righteousness and unrighteousness, for which the terms used in Jainism are *puṇya* and *pāpa*.

The fourth *ajīva* substance is space *(ākāśa)*, which, like the preceding two, is non-material. Its nature is to provide space for the existence of all other entities. Unlike the other substances, it is infinite. Only a part of it is occupied by the other substances, and this part is called the *lokākāśa*. The other part which is void is called *alokākāśa*. *Dharma*, *adharma*, and *ākāśa* are, thus, mediums or conditions of motion, rest, and subsistence, respectively, all the three of which are interpenetrating.

The fifth and last *ajīva* substance is time *(kāla)*, which also pervades the whole *lokākāśa* in the form of single, independent, minute points that never mix together to form a composite body. It brings about changes or modifications in all the other substances, and it affords them extension in time, which, by itself, is beginningless and endless. For practical purposes *(vyavahāra)*, however, *kāla* is divided into limited periods such as minutes, hours, days, months, years, and ages. These five varieties of *ajīva*, together with the *jīva*, form the six substances *(dravyas)* that exist in the universe.

As to the nature of existence attributed to the six substances, the Jaina system holds that existence consists of three factors operating simultaneously, namely, production, decay, and permanence. From the point of view of the essential nature of a thing, it is permanent and unchanging; but from the point of view of its accidental qualities, it originates and perishes. The soul is permanent in itself, but its relationship with the body begins and ends. The atoms

of which gold is made are unchanging, but its form as a chain or a ring originates and perishes. A particular point of space is the same, but its occupants are different at different times. Time is ever the same, but the appearances and events associated with it are frequently changing. This is the case with everything that exists.

SYĀDVĀDA OR ANEKĀNTAVĀDA

The Jains have not been satisfied with merely emphasizing these three aspects of existence, but they have formulated on this basis a system of thought called Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda, which comes to this that we may make seven assertions, seemingly contradictory but perfectly true, about a thing: It is *(syādasti);* it is not *(syānnāsti);* it is and is not *(syādasti-nāsti);* it is indescribable *(syādavaktavyam);* it is and is indescribable *(syādasti ca avaktavyaṁ ca);* it is not and is indescribable *(syādasti nāsti ca avaktavyaṁ ca).* A man is the father, and is not the father, and is both—are perfectly intelligible statements, if one understands the point of view from which they are made. In relation to a particular boy he is the father; in relation to another boy he is not the father; in relation to both the boys taken together he is the father and is not the father. Since both the ideas cannot be conveyed in words at the same time, he may be called indescribable; still he is the father and is indescribable; and so on. Thus, the philosophy of Anekānta is neither self-contradictory nor vague or indefinite; on the contrary, it represents a very sensible view of things in a systematized form.

There is yet another approach to the proper understanding of objects and events. When we take a co-ordinated view of things, we are said to be resorting to *naigama naya.* When we are inclined towards generalization, it is *saṅgraha naya;* and when inclined towards particularization, it is *vyavahāra naya.* When a specific point or period of time is of the essence, it is *ṛjusūtra naya.* When differentiation is made according to the usage of language and grammar, it is *śabda naya.* When derivative significance of words is ignored and conventional meaning is accepted, it

is *samabhirūḍha naya*. And lastly, when words are used exactly in their original derivative sense and significance, it is *evambhūta naya*. This is the doctrine of seven approaches *(sapta naya)* to the clarification of knowledge. The first three are grouped under *dravya naya*, and the last four under *paryāya naya*.

KĀRMIC BODY AND ITS END

We now come to the third *tattva*, the contact of the soul with matter *(āsrava)*. There is no God or supreme Being creating, destroying, and recreating the world. Souls exist in the world from time eternal in association with matter. The enjoyment of this association leads to further contact, and so the cycle goes on till the association is brought to an end in such a way as to avoid any fresh contact; salvation is then achieved. The contact takes place in the following way: The soul is always surrounded by a large volume of fine matter called *karma*. This invades the soul and settles down on it whenever the soul is found to be in a state of iniquity, i.e. affected by the activities of the body, mind, or speech, owing to the propelling force of wrong belief or moral failings or passions, namely, anger, pride, deceit, or greed. This contact leads to the formation of what is called the *kārmaṇa śarīra* (body of subtle *karma* matter), corresponding to the *liṅga* or *sūkṣma śarīra* (subtle body) of the Sāṁkhyas, which accompanies the soul throughout life as well as in its migrations from one body to another. That this *kārmaṇa śarīra* is formed of actual matter particles is evident from the fact that it has both weight and colour. Soul, by itself, is very light, the lightest of all substances, and hence, in a pure state, it would fly at once to the highest point of the *lokākāśa*, as far as the existence of *dharma* matter would make movement possible. But it is actually kept down by the weight of its *kārmaṇa śarīra*. The latter also imparts to it a complexion *(leśyā)* that may be dark, blue, grey, yellow, red or white. The first three of these are regarded as inauspicious and the last three auspicious.

Closely associated with *āsrava* is *bandha* (bondage), the fourth reality. The *kārmaṇa śarīra*, spoken of above, binds

the soul in eight different ways, according to the nature of the forces developed in it when the inflow of *karma* takes place. These are called the eight *karmas*. The first two kinds obstruct knowledge and insight *(jñānāvaraṇīya* and *darśanāvaraṇīya)*, the third causes delusion in the form of affections and passions *(mohanīya)*, the fourth brings about pleasure and pain *(vedanīya)*, the fifth determines the length of life *(āyuṣka)*, the sixth assigns everything that is associated with personality, i.e. the kind of body, senses, health, complexion, and the like *(nāma)*, the seventh determines the social status at birth *(gotra)*, and the eighth produces hindrances in the way of realizing virtues and powers *(antarāya)*. The time when a particular *karma* will bear fruit and the intensity of its fruition are determined at the very time the kārmic matter flows into the soul. The eight kinds of *karma* have been further subdivided into 144 classes, calculated to account for almost every experience that a man has in life.

As will be seen from what has been said above, the four kinds of *karma*, from the fourth to the seventh, may lead to good and enjoyable results or the reverse. Pious and holy activities of the mind and body give rise to good results and vice versa. This appears like fatalism, but it is not so, because one may, by special efforts, shorten or prolong, transform or suspend, the activity of the *karmas*. It is also open for the individual not only to stop any further bondage, but also to destroy or render ineffectual the existing bondages. This is the subject of the next two realities *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*. By a systematic control of the mental and physical activities, any fresh inflow of the *karmas* may be prevented, while certain austerities would destroy the existing *karmas*. When this is achieved in its fullness, the soul is set free, once for all, and the cycle of birth and death comes to an end. The soul realizes its inherent qualities of supreme knowledge and unlimited happiness. It attains salvation *(mokṣa)*, and becomes a perfect being—*siddha*. This is the seventh reality or *tattva*. The measures recommended for bringing about these results form the ethical codes of the householders and the monks.

ETHICAL CODE FOR A HOUSEHOLDER

The most important vows of a householder are five, namely, he shall not do violence to other living beings; he shall speak the truth; he shall not commit theft; he shall not commit adultery; and he shall set a limit to his greed for worldly possessions. These are respectively called the vows of *ahiṁsā, satya, asteya, brahmacarya,* and *aparigraha.*

The observance of even the first vow presents many difficulties. Firstly, What is violence? and secondly, How could one avoid it, even in the ordinary pursuit of his occupation? The answer to the first question is that any action calculated to do injury to other living beings is violence. Killing any being or inflicting a wound upon it or beating it is physical violence; speaking harsh words so as to injure the feelings of others is violence of speech; while thinking ill of others or contemplation of injury is mental violence, as it disturbs the equanimity of one's own soul, even though no harm to others may actually follow. For a householder, it is not possible to avoid all these kinds of violence in their entirety, and therefore he is recommended to discharge his worldly responsibilities with the minimum injury to others. For giving more practical guidance in this matter, injury to others has been analysed, according to the mental attitude of the individual, into four kinds: (1) accidental, (2) occupational, (3) protective, and (4) intentional. The injury to small living beings, unavoidable in building a house, cooking meals, grinding flour, walking, bathing, and similar other activities of daily life, is violence of the first kind. When a soldier has to fight and strike his enemy, or when an agriculturist has to till the land and carry on other operations involving injury to living beings, the injury belongs to the second kind. If a tiger attacks you and you have to shoot it down, or if you are confronted with a dacoit and have to protect your life and property by striking him in self-defence, the injury is of the third kind. And when you kill men, animals, or other lower creatures simply for the sake of killing, the injury belongs to the fourth kind. The householder is required to abstain fully from the fourth kind of injury, and he should take as much care and

caution against loss of life in the other forms as it is possible for him. This means the observance of the vow of *ahiṁsā* in a less rigorous form suitable for a householder, and hence it is called *aṇuvrata* (minor vow). Not that this will cause no kārmic bondage, but it will be of a minor type, its intensity being proportionate to the intensity of the passion of the man committing it and to the grade of life injured. Piercing, binding, overloading, and starving animals are all forms of *hiṁsā*, and should be avoided.

The same kind of concession, as is allowed to a householder in the observance of the vow of *ahiṁsā*, is enjoyed by him in the observance of the other four vows also, and for this reason, they are all called *aṇuvratas*. He should neither speak falsehood himself, nor induce others to do so, nor approve of any such attempt on the part of the others. Spreading false ideas, divulging the secrets of others, back-biting, forging documents, and breach of trust are all forms of untruth, and one must guard oneself against them. It would be theft if one takes away secretly or by force what does not belong to oneself. Appropriating to oneself what another man has forgotten or has dropped, or accepting what he knows to be stolen property, instructing another person in the methods of stealing, adulteration, and use of false weights and measures are all forms of theft and should be abstained from. A householder must keep himself satisfied with his own wife, and should look upon all other women as his mothers, sisters, or daughters. He would be violating the vow of *brahmacarya* even if he talks obscenity. The fifth vow recommends that a householder should fix, beforehand, the limit of his maximum belongings, and should, in no case, exceed it. If he ever happens to earn more than that, he must spend it away in charities, the best and recognized forms of which are distribution of medicines, spread of knowledge by the distribution of religious books and support of teachers, provision for saving the lives of people in danger, and feeding the hungry and the poor.

From the aspirant's spiritual point of view, the *aṇuvratas* are meant to give him practice in self-denial, self-control, and renunciation. This purpose becomes more

pronounced in the next three vows called the *guṇavratas*. He should lay down limits of distance in all the four directions beyond which he shall not travel in his life *(dig-vrata)*; he should prescribe further limits of his movements for a specified period of time, according to the requirements in view *(deśa-vrata)*; and, lastly, he should set limits on his belongings and occupations for a particular period of time, and should eschew all evil meditations, carelessness about the storing and using of weapons, and misusing his influence by doing evil or persuading others to do so *(anartha-daṇḍa-vrata)*.

The next four vows take him a step further. They are called *śikṣāvratas* or instructive vows, because they initiate him directly in the ascetic practices. The first of the instructive vows is contemplation *(sāmāyika)*. Retiring with as few encumbrances, such as clothes, as possible to a quiet place, be it a temple or a private dwelling or forest, where he is not likely to be disturbed, he should stand erect, or squat on the ground, or even recline if that be more convenient to him. He should then mentally renounce, for the time being, every worldly possession, attachment, and aversion, and begin to meditate upon the nature of the Self, the cycle of existence which is full of misery, and the way to salvation. This may be done once, twice, or thrice a day, morning, noon, and evening, according to convenience, the duration being gradually increased. This gives him mental strength and peace. Physical discipline is then secured by the next two vows, *poṣadhopavāsa* and *bhogopabhoga-parimāṇa*. On four days in a month, that is, once a week, he should observe complete fast, abstaining from all kinds of food and drink, and should pass his day in a temple reading scriptures or contemplating upon the Self. This is called *poṣadhopavāsa*. For each day, he should fix his programme of food and comforts in a restrictive manner, both as regards quantity and quality, and should strictly adhere to the same. This is known as *bhogopabhoga-parimāṇa*. The last of the instructive vows is *atithi-saṁvibhāga*, according to which he should, each day, freed, out of what is cooked for himself, such righteous and holy persons as may turn up at his house at the proper time.

These five *aṇuvratas*, three *guṇavratas*, and four *śikṣāvratas*, in all twelve, constitute the chief vows of a householder, and a proper observance of them means right conduct *(samyak-cāritra)*. But right conduct has to be preceded by right faith *(samyak-darśana)* and right knowledge *(samyak-jñāna)*. A deep devotion to those who have attained perfection, or are on the way to it, as well as to their teachings, constitutes right faith. In order to keep this faith ever enkindled in his heart, a householder should perform the daily worship of the gods, scriptures, and teachers. The sages who become perfect in knowledge and are on the verge of their salvation, teaching humanity its duties, are the real gods deserving worship. Twenty-four such *arhats* or *tīrthaṅkaras*, as they are called, are recognized, with Ṛṣabhadeva as the first and Pārśvanātha and Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna as the last two. Books embodying their teachings and ascetics following the rules of conduct laid down therein are the true worshipful scriptures and teachers. Right knowledge is the knowledge of the seven *tattvas* as propounded by the Tīrthaṅkaras and explained above. Right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct together constitute the way to salvation.

For the convenience of practice, the whole course of right conduct of a householder is divided into eleven stages *(pratimā)*. Right faith, without falling into pride or superstitious beliefs and unholy worship, is the first state *(darśana)*. Next comes the observance of the aforesaid twelve vows in a general way *(vrata)*. At the third stage, he devotes himself specially to self-contemplation thrice a day *(sāmāyika)*. Carrying out the programme of the weekly fasts constitutes the fourth stage *(poṣadhopavāsa)*. At the fifth stage, special attention is paid to avoid loss of life by renouncing green vegetables *(sacitta-tyāga)*. Meals at night are completely given up at the sixth *(rātribhojana-tyāga)*; strict celibacy is observed at the seventh *(brahmacarya)*; household affairs and occupations are given up at the eighth *(ārambha-tyāga)*; claims to properties in his own name are renounced at the ninth *(parigraha-tyāga)*; giving consent or advice in worldly affairs is abandoned at the tenth *(anumati-tyāga)*; and at the eleventh stage, he does

not even take food specially cooked for himself *(uddiṣṭa-tyāga)*. At this stage, he is ripe for launching upon the much more arduous career of a monk.

ETHICAL CODE FOR A MONK

A monk completely abandons all worldly possessions and ceases to dwell under a roof. As aids in the observance of his vows, he can keep with him a jug for holding pure water, a bunch of peacock feathers for driving away insects from wherever he may have an occasion to sit, and some religious books for study. In addition to these, the Śvetāmbara section of the Jains also allows some clothes to be worn by the monk, but the Digambara section prohibits this absolutely and regards the abandonment of all clothing as the *sine qua non* of the monastic Order. He disciplines his body and mind by practising twenty-two endurances *(parīṣaha)*, namely, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquito-bite, nudity, disgust, sex-feeling, movement, sitting, lying, anger, beating, begging, non-acquisition, disease, straw-prick, dirt, honour, wisdom, ignorance, and lack of insight.

The five vows of non-injury to living beings, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy, and poverty are observed by him in their strictest form as *mahāvratas*, and not as *aṇuvratas* like the householders. He must under no circumstances whatsoever injure any living being, in thought, word, or deed, not even to save his life. The other four vows are observed with similar strictness without the least concession. For this purpose, he observes certain forms of carefulness *(samiti)*. He must, for example, walk only by day taking care that he kills no being *(iryā-samiti)*, and in his speech strictly avoid censure of others, self-praise, and talk about women, kings, thieves, or eatables. He should speak only beneficial words *(bhāṣā-samiti)*. He should be satisfied with whatever food is offered to him, but he should see that what he eats is free from all impurity *(eṣaṇā-samiti)*. He must also be very careful in placing and taking up his things *(ādāna-nikṣepaṇa-samiti)* as well as in answering calls of nature and disposing of refuse *(pratisthāpanika* or *utsarga-samiti)*, so as to exclude the possibility of loss of life by these operations.

He must so train himself as not to be affected or moved by the objects of the senses. A beautiful or an ugly sight, a charming note or a jarring sound, a fragrant or foul smell, a flavoury or a tasteless dish, and a tender or a rough touch should arouse in him no feelings of joy or hatred, attraction or repulsion. He should devote himself to deep meditation, eulogistic recitations of the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras and homage to them, confession of sins unwittingly committed and fresh determination to be more cautious and careful, and detachment of thought from the body. All these come under the twenty-eight fundamental qualities *(mūlaguṇa)* of an ascetic, by cultivating which no fresh inflow of *karmas* takes place in his soul. The existing *karmas* may then be exhausted by allowing them no opportunity to bear fruit. This is done by means of various practices, the chief of which is meditation. Withdrawing his senses from all objects, concentrating his mind on the Self, he should reflect upon the nature of reality as propounded under the seven *tattvas*, the qualities of the *arhats* and the *siddhas*, and the way to perfection. He should so absorb himself in these thoughts that hunger or thirst, cold or heat, praise or censure, and worship or blows may have no effect on him. Forgiveness to all creatures, complete absence of self-conceit, deceitfulness, or greed, perfect honesty, complete self-control, and chastity should characterize all his actions, utterances, and thoughts. He should be friendly towards all, pleased with the learned, compassionate and helpful to the suffering, and indifferent towards those who might be uncharitably inclined towards him. The one aim before an ascetic should be to perfect himself in self-control and knowledge and be a light to himself and others.

There are fourteen stages of spiritual advancement *(guṇa-sthānas)*. At the first stage, an aspirant is steeped in falsehood *(mithyātva)*. If he is lacking in the right belief, he is at the second stage *(sāsādana)*. There may be a mixture of rightness and falsehood in his mental attitude *(miśra)*. Right belief *(samyag-darśana)* constitutes the fourth stage. Partial moulding of conduct according to the right faith is the fifth stage *(deśa-virata)*. The ascetic begins activities at the sixth stage with some slackness in conduct and thought

(pramatta-virata). This slackness is got rid of at the seventh stage *(apramatta)*. The passions are controlled and extraordinary spiritual powers are developed at the eighth *(apūrva-karaṇa)*. A special purity of the mind which allows no swerving is achieved at the ninth *(anivṛtti-karaṇa)*. Very little of self-interest remains at the tenth *(sūkṣma-sāmparāya)*. All delusion subsides at the eleventh *(upaśānta-moha)*, and it ceases altogether at the twelfth *(kṣīṇa-moha)*. At the thirteenth, he shines forth perfect in knowledge with all the disabling kārmic influences destroyed: he is a *sayogi-kevalin*, an *arhat*, or a *tīrthaṅkara*. At the fourteenth and last of the *guṇa-sthānas*, the mortal coils lose their hold; he is an *ayogi-kevalin:* and, lo, in a moment, he becomes a *siddha*, free from *saṁsāra* for all times !

JAINISM : ITS PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

THROUGHOUT Vedic literature we find two parallel currents of thought, opposed to each other, one enjoining animal sacrifice in the *yajñas* (sacrifices), and the other condemning it, the former being represented by the Brāhmaṇas of the Kuru-Pañcāla country in the west, and the latter by the Kṣatriyas of the eastern countries consisting of Kāśī, Kosala, Videha, and Magadha. It is also noteworthy that in these areas the Kṣatriyas were at the head of society, whereas in the Kuru-Pañcāla country, the Brāhmaṇas were the leaders. And again, in the eastern countries, instead of pure Sanskrit, Prakrits were prevalent, which were the canonical language of Jainism and Buddhism. Further, the *Ātma-vidyā* of the Upaniṣads is found to be cultivated by the Kṣatriyas of these eastern countries, as against the sacrificial religion and the adoration of the gods in the Kuru-Pañcāla country. As we find these features in Jainism, and in Buddhism which later arose in this very area, we may conclude that Jainism was prevalent in the eastern countries, and is as old as the Vedas. It is also held by the Jains that the Vedas, at least the portions that are now lost, advocated *ahiṁsā*, and the cleavage arose between the two schools when there was difference of opinion in the interpretation of the Vedas, as illustrated in the story of King Vasu found in Jaina literature as well as in the *Mahābhārata*.

THE PLACE OF JAINA DARŚANAS AMONG THE INDIAN DARŚANAS

It is the usual practice of Hindu philosophers to classify *darśanas* (philosophies) into two groups—Vedic and non-Vedic, otherwise known as *āstika darśanas* and *nāstika darśanas*. Under the former heading, it is usual to include Sāṁkhya and Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. Under the latter come the Jaina, Bauddha, and Cārvāka. It is but a truism to say that the Jaina *darśana*

is outside the Vedic fold. But, on this score, it is misleading to call it a *nāstika darśana* (for the term *'nāstika'* is also interpreted to mean those who do not believe in any higher reality than this sense-perceived world), which becomes still more misleading when translated into English as 'an atheistic school'.

The term 'atheism' has a definite and well-recognized significance. It is associated with the Semitic conception of a Creator. One who does not accept such a Creator and His created activity is generally signified by the term 'atheist'. But in the case of Indian *darśanas*, there is no such implication anywhere. In this respect they are at one with the Jains. The Sāṁkhya school openly rejects the creation theory and the doctrine of the Creator of the universe. The Yoga school, which has gained the name 'Seśvara Sāṁkhya', i.e. Sāṁkhya with an Īśvara as contrasted with the 'Nirīśvra Sāṁkhya', of Kapila, is equally opposed to sṛṣṭivāda or the creation theory, and holds up Īśvara merely as an ideal to be realized by man. Besides this function , Īśvara in the Yoga system has no resemblance to Jahveh, the Creator in the Hebrew religion. In the case of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, writers very often speak of an Īśvara, with the attributes of *sṛṣṭi* (creation) and *saṁhāra* (dissolution), but the word *'sṛṣṭi'* here refers only to the building up of the cosmos out of ultimate and eternal elements, the atoms of the physical world and the Jīvas of the living world. In the case of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, we do not find any Creator at all. The ultimate factor in evolution is recognized to be *karma*. Finally, in the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā, otherwise known as the Vedānta, there is no recognition of a creation theory at all. The concrete world is interpreted to be a manifestation of the ultimate Brahman.

When we compare these *darśanas* with Jaina *darśana*, we cannot detect any fundamental difference among them. The Jaina *darśana* is opposed to Sṛṣṭivāda, but it speaks of a Paramātman or Sarvajña, the omniscient Being, who serves as an ideal to be aimed at by man. It resembles the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in emphasizing the potency of *karma* as the basic principle of *saṁsāra* (relative world), but differs from it in maintaining the doctrine of Sarvajña. It resembles

Vedānta in holding that every individual Jīva is potentially a Paramātman. As the commentator Guṇaratna of Haribhadra Sūri's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* maintains, the only significance we can attach to the word *'āstika'* is a belief in the reality of Ātman, of *saṁsāra* (cycle of births and deaths), and of *mokṣa* (salvation) and the path to realize it *(mokṣa-mārga)*. According to this interpretation, the *darśana* that could be truly called *nāstika* is the Cārvāka, and partially that school of Buddhism which emphasizes Anātmavāda (the doctrine that there is no Ātman or Self).

PAÑCA-PARAMEṢṬHINS

Thus, according to Jainism, there is no creation of the world, nor is there any Creator necessary to explain the nature of the world. After completely conquering all the *karmas* and destroying all the shackles of sāṁsāric (worldly) consequences, the Self exists in its supreme purity as *siddha-parameṣṭhin*, endowed with the qualities of infinite perception, infinite Knowledge, infinite bliss, and infinite power. This *parameṣṭhin* with infinite qualities is the conqueror of *saṁsāra*, is the *jina*, and he serves is the ideal to be aimed at by all persons who desire to escape from the cycle of births and deaths characteristic of *saṁsāra*.

Besides the *siddha-parameṣṭhin*, Jainism recognizes the *arhatparameṣṭhin*, who represents a lower stage in liberation than the *siddha-parameṣṭhin*. Nevertheless, in some respects, the stage of *arhat* should be considered important from the human point of view, because it is in this stage of Arhathood that the *arhat* or *tīrthaṁkara* reveals, for the benefit of the world, the path to salvation and all the various Āgamas or scriptures describing such a path.

According to Jaina tradition, the scriptures embodying the knowledge of the ultimate Reality are periodically revealed for the benefit of mankind by the *tīrthaṁkaras* or the *arhats*, whose status corresponds to that of the founders of various other religions, or to the conception of the *avatāras*. Born with the privilege of becoming the lord of religion, through the adoption of *yoga* practice or *tapas*, after destroying the most powerful of kārmic bondages, the *tīrthaṁkara* attains omniscience in this world. He becomes

entirely free from the wants and desires characteristic of the flesh. Establishing his own Self in its purity, uncontaminated by the defects of the body which still clings to him, filled with universal love and mercy for all living beings, worshipped by the lords of the three worlds, the *tīrthaṅkara* spends some time in the world with the object of propounding the *dharma* for the benefit of the Jīvas that are still entangled in *saṁsāra*. After achieving his own object in life by the realization of his true Selfhood, and thus becoming endowed with knowledge, power, and bliss of infinite magnitude, the *arhat* or *tīrthaṅkara-parameṣṭhin* wanders over the country propounding the *dharma* and defining the path of salvation, so that others may also have the benefit of liberation from *saṁsāra*.

There is the traditional belief that, for his convenience, Indra constructs an elaborate moving audience hall which serves both as a vehicle carrying the *tīrthaṅkara* from place to place and for accommodating the devout *bhaktas* (followers) eager to listen to the truth propounded by him. This is known as the *samavasaraṇa maṇḍapa*. Whenever this *maṇḍapa* appears in any particular locality carrying the *tīrthaṅkara*, there is a reign of universal peace and harmony. Even animals naturally antagonistic to one another exhibit a tendency towards peace and goodwill to one another. The *tīrthaṅkara*, who is omniscient *(sarvajña)* and is immersed in infinite bliss, is worshipped with one thousand and eight names, such as Sarveśvara, Sarvahita, Mahādeva, Mahā-Viṣṇu, Arhadeva, etc.

Such *tīrthaṅkaras* appear in the world in different cosmic periods which, according to Jaina philosophy, consist of an age of evolution and growth, followed by an age of dissolution and decay. The former is called *utsarpiṇī* and the latter *avasarpiṇī*, the two constituting the complete cosmic cycle of time. Each of these periods is subdivided into six parts, and the present world-period represents the period of decay or *avasarpiṇī*, of which the current division is the fifth time-period called *pañcama-kāla*. In the period immediately prior to this, the fourth period of *avasarpiṇī*. appeared all the twenty-four *tīrthaṅkaras* of the modern world-period. These are Ṛṣabha or Vṛṣabha or Ādi, Ajita,

Sambhava, Abhinandana, Sumati, Padmaprabha, Supārśva, Candraprabha, Suvidhi or Puṣpadanta, Śītala, Śreyāṁsa or Śreyān, Vāsupūjya, Vimala, Ananta (jit), Dharma, Śānti, Kunthu, Ara, Malli, Suvrata or Munisuvrata, Nami, Nemi or Ariṣṭanemi, Pārśva, and Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. With Mahāvīra ends the line of the *tīrthaṅkaras* as also the fourth period of *avasarpiṇī*.

A *tīrthaṅkara* is associated with five kinds of festivals known as the *pañca-kalyāṇas*, in which the *devas* take part. The *pañca-kalyāṇas* are: (1) *svargāvataraṇa*, the descent of a *deva* to become a *tīrthaṅkara;* (2) *mandarābhiṣeka* (or *janmābhiṣeka)*, rejoicing at the birth of the *tīrthaṅkara* by performing an *abhiṣeka* (ablution) at the summit of Mandaragiri; (3) *dīkṣā*, when the *tīrthaṅkara* renounces the kingdom and worldly pleasures in order to become a *yogin;* (4) *kevalotpatti*, which represents the appearance of omniscient knowledge as the result of *tapas* and the destruction of *karmas;* and (5) *parinirvāṇa*, representing the complete destruction of all *karmas* and the attainment of salvation or the realization of *paramātmasvarūpa*.

Besides these two types of *parameṣṭhins*, *siddha* and *tīrthaṅkara*, Jainism recognizes three other kinds who also deserve reverence and worship from the devotees. These are the *ācārya-parameṣṭin*, *upādhya-parameṣṭhin* and *sādhuparameṣṭhin*. They do not represent the stage of complete liberation from *saṁsāra*, but nevertheless represent important stages towards that goal. The *ācārya-parameṣṭhins* must be free from attachment to external things; must show general sympathy and love to all living beings; must be actuated by 'the three jewels' *(ratnatraya)*, i.e. right belief, right knowledge, and right conduct; must be entirely free from the baser emotions, such as anger and ambition; must illustrate by their conduct the significance of the five great *vratas* (vows); must be able to exercise the authority of initiating into the *jina-dharma* all those that seek to be admitted; must possess undoubted knowledge as to the nature of Reality; must not be actuated by the desire for

self-aggrandizement or self-praise; and must whole-heartedly devote themselves to the propagation of *dharma*.

Next in rank to the *ācārya-parameṣṭhin* comes the *upādhyāya-parameṣṭhin*, who has no authority to initiate people into the *jina-dharma* or to organize the Jaina *saṅgha* (organization). His whole function is to popularize the *jina-dharma*, in order to help the souls entangled in *saṁsāra* to reach perfection. He educates and instructs the people.

Next in order are *sādhu-parameṣṭhins*, the great souls who do not have any definite function, either of authority or of instruction, but still illustrate through their conduct the path to salvation, so that others, following their example, may accept the *dharma* and adopt the path of self-discipline and self-realization.

These five constitute the *pañca-parameṣṭhins*—the five kinds of persons worshipped by the Jains as representing the ideal in life at the different stages of realization.

THE ĀGAMAS OR SCRIPTURES

The Āgamas or the scriptures of the Jains are revealed by the Sarvajña, or the omniscient Being. The Jaina scriptures should not be in conflict with the well-known *pramāṇas*, the criteria of correct knowledge. They must be capable of leading men towards higher goals, to *svarga* and *mokṣa*, must give correct information as to the nature of reality, and must describe the four *puruṣārthas* (ends of human life): *dharma* (religious merit), *artha* (wealth), *kāma* (enjoyment), and *mokṣa*. The Āgamas with such characteristics, revealed by the Sarvajña, have been handed down from generation to generation by a succession of teachers called *gaṇadharas*, beginning with Sudharman, the chief disciple of the Tīrthaṅkara Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. They are known by the following appellations: the Siddhānta, Paramāgama, Kṛtānta, Veda, Śruti, Śāstra, etc.

The Āgamas[1] are grouped under three classes: Aṅga, Pūrva, and Prakīrṇa. The first group, i.e. Aṅga, consists of twelve subclasses: *Ācāra, Sūtrakṛta, Sthāna, Samavāya, Vyākhyā-prajñapti* or *Bhagavatī, Jñātṛdharmakathā, Upāsaka-daśāka, Antakṛd-daśāka, Anuttaraupapātika-daśāka, Praśna-vyākaraṇa, Vipāka-Sūtra,* and *Dṛṣṭivāda.*[2]

The second group, i.e. Pūrva, consists of fourteen subclasses: *Utpāda, Agrāyaṇīya, Vīrya-pravāda, Asti-nāsti-pravāda, Jñāna-pravāda, Satya-pravāda, Ātma-pravāda, Karma-pravāda, Pratyākhyāna, Vidyānuvāda, Kalyāṇa, Prāṇavāya, Kriyā-viśāla,* and *Loka-bindu-sāra.*

The third group, i.e. Prakīrṇa, consists of sixteen sub-

---

1. In the matter of the religious scriptures, there is some difference of opinion between the two sects of the Jains—the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras. About the time of the Maurya emperor Candragupta, on account of a terrible famine in North India, a large body of Jaina ascetics under the leadership of Bhadrabāhu, with his royal disciple Candragupta, who renounced his kingdom and joined the party, migrated to the South for the purpose of obtaining support and sustenance during the period of the famine. But a large section of the Jaina ascetics stayed behind in North India. When the body of ascetics who migrated to the South returned home to the North, after the famine conditions had been over, they found that their brethren who stayed at home had changed their habits very much. On account of this change of habits, there arose a cleavage between the two, which is supposed to be the origin of a schism within the community resulting in the two sections—the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras—, the former school associated with those that stayed at home and the latter championed by those who migrated towards the South. The books preserved by the northern group were not accepted as authoritative by the Digambaras, who maintained that the original texts revealed by the *tīrthaṅkara-parameṣṭhin* and preserved by the succession of teachers were lost completely, and what the Śvetāmbaras claimed as the authoritative texts were spurious substitutes for the lost originals. This controversy still persists between these two groups. Of course, this contention of the Digambaras is not accepted by the Śvetāmbaras, who claim that their texts are quite valid, inasmuch as they represent the originals.
2. About the time of the Conference at Pāṭaliputra, after the twelve years' famine, *Dṛṣṭivāda* was lost, and the Śvetāmbaras therefore recognized only eleven. But the Digambara tradition which is followed in South India recognizes all the twelve.

divisions: *Sāmāyika, Caturvimśati-stava, Vandanā, Prati kramaṇa, Vainayika, Kṛtikarma, Daśa-vaikālika, Anuttarādhyayana, Kalpya-vyavahāra, Kalpyākalpya, Mahākalpya, Puṇḍarīka, Mahāpuṇḍarīka, Padma, Mahāpadma,* and *Cinyaśītikā.**

Besides the foregoing classification of Āgamas, there is another classification. According to this, the Āgamas are of four kinds: *Prathamānuyoga, Caraṇānuyoga, Kāraṇānuyoga,* and *Dravyānuyoga. Prathamānuyoga* contains the biographies of the *tīrthaṅkaras,* the emperors, and other great historical personages relating to India. Such a life-history of the great personages is represented by the *Mahāpurāṇa. Caraṇānuyoga* deals with the course of conduct prescribed for the householder as well as the homeless ascetic. *Kāraṇānuyoga* treats of the cosmos and the constituent elements which build up the cosmos. The fourth, *Dravyānuyoga,* is a metaphysical treatise describing the nature of life, matter, and other primary categories of reality.

I. JAINA METAPHYSICS

Metaphysics forms an important portion of Jaina sacred literature. The reality, according to Jaina philosophy, is uncreated and eternal. According to the *Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra, 'Utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-lakṣaṇaṁ sat'*—reality is that which is characterized by origination, decay, and permanence, i.e. appearance and disappearance in the midst of permanence. The only parallel to this in western thought is the Hegelian doctrine of the dialectical nature of reality—the thesis and antithesis reconciled and held together by synthesis.

Every real object embodies in itself an affirmative and a negative aspect synthesized and held together by its own complex nature, quite analogous to the biological principle of metabolism comprehending and reconciling in itself the two opposite processes of katabolism and anabolism. It maintains its identity and permanence only through the continued process of change consisting of origin and de-

* For a different account and classification of the canonical works, see *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,* VII. p. 467 (Jainism)—Ed.

cay—identity and permanence in the midst of variety and change.

Such ultimate reals are five in number: *jīva, pudgala, dharma, adharma*, and *ākāśa*. These are primary constituent elements of the cosmos, and are technically called *pañcāstikāya*, the five *astikāyas*. *Asti* implies existence, and *kāya*, volume. *Astikāya* therefore means a category which is capable of having spatial relations. Here spatial relation should be differentiated from volume associated with matter. Materiality or corporeality is a property which is peculiar to *pudgala* or matter. *Pudgala* alone is *mūrta* (corporeal), the others are *amūrta* (non-corporeal), though they are *astikāyas* having spatial relations. Of these, the first, *jīva astikāya*, relates to Jīvas or Ātmans or souls. It is the only *cetana* (conscious) category, the other four being *acetanas*. This *cetana* entity, Jīva, is entirely different from *pudgala* or matter, which represents the inorganic world. If *kāla* (time) is added to these five *astikāyas*, then we have the six *dravyas* (substances) of Jaina metaphysics. The time category is different in nature from the five *astikāyas*. Whereas the *astikāyas* are capable of being simultaneously associated with multiple spatial points or *pradeśas*, time can have only unilateral relation of moments, and hence cannot have simultaneous relations to a group of multiple points.

DRAVYA AND GUṆAS

Dravya is that which manifests itself through its own *guṇas* and *paryāyas*—qualities and modifications. The usual illustration given is gold with its qualities of yellowness, brilliance, malleability, etc. Its *paryāyas* or modifications are the various ornaments that can be made of it. One ornament may be destroyed and out of the gold another ornament may be made. The disappearance of one *paryāya* or mode and the appearance of another, while the substance remains permanent and constant, are the characteristics of every *dravya*. *Utpāda* and *vyaya*, appearance and disappearance, always refer to the changing modifications, while permanence always refers to the underlying

substance. From the aspect of *paryāya*, a thing is subject to birth and decay. From the aspect of *dravya*, it is permanent. Therefore permanence and change refer to two different aspects—change from the aspect of modifications, and permanence from the aspect of the underlying substance.

Jaina metaphysics does not recognize *guṇas* without *dravyas* nor *dravyas* without *guṇas*. Qualities without a substratum and a substratum without qualities are both empty abstractions and hence unreal. The qualities constitute the expression of the substance, and the qualities of one cannot be transformed into the qualities of another. Thus substance and qualities are identical, inasmuch as the latter exhibit the nature of the former. In spite of this identity between *dravya* and *guṇa*, they are distinct from each other. If there is no fundamental difference between substance and quality, *dravya* and *guṇa*, there will be no means of apprehending the nature of *dravya*, except through its manifestation. Hence the two must be kept separate in thought, though they cannot be separated in reality. *Dravya* and *guṇa*, substance and quality, may be said to be different from each other from one point of view and yet identical from another point of view. It is both *bheda* and *abheda*, different and yet identical. This *bheda-abheda* point of view is again peculiar to Jaina metaphysics.

In this respect, it is fundamentally distinct from the Vaiśeṣika point of view, which holds that *dravya* is a distinct *padārtha* from *guṇa*, and the two are brought together by a third principle called *samavāya*. Jīva is a distinct *dravya*, and knowledge, feeling, and conation, as properties of Jīva, exist independently of it, but the two are brought together by the intervention of *samavāya*. Jaina metaphysics completely rejects this view. *Jñāna* and other properties of the Jīva or soul are inseparable from its nature, and hence the presence of properties in the Jīva is not the result of a combination effected by a third principle. If knowledge, feeling, and conation, the properties of the soul, were considered to be existing independently of it, then the soul without these properties would cease to be a conscious principle, a *cetana dravya* (conscious entity), and

hence would be indistinguishable from the *acetana dravya* (matter). The distinction between *cetana* and *acetana* among the reals will cease to have any meaning; similarly, properties such as *jñāna* and *sukha* or *duḥkha* (pleasure or pain), since they do not have any relation to a *cetana dravya*, will cease to be the properties of the *cetana* entity, and their association with the *dravya*, effected by a third principle, may be with matter, an *acetana dravya*, and not necessarily with a Jīva. Thus the absolute independence of *guṇa* and *guṇin*, quality and substratum, is rejected by Jaina metaphysics as an impossible doctrine. The Jīva, which is by nature a conscious or *cetana* principle, is fundamentally different from material substance; and yet in concrete life it is intimately in association with a body.

JIVA OR CETANA DRAVYA

The description of *jīva dravya* as a *cetana* entity is similar to the description of Ātman in the Upaniṣadic literature. Since its nature is *cetana*, or *citsvarūpa*, it has the essential characteristics of perception and knowledge. In itself, it is incapable of being measured by material units or space units. In the concrete world, it is always found associated with a body as an organized being, and has all the characteristics of a living being associated with a body and other sense-organs.

The Jīva as an active agent figures as the operative cause of its own *karmas* and in turn enjoys the fruits of such *karmas*. Hence it is a knower *(jñātṛ)*, an actor *(kartṛ)*, and an enjoyer *(bhoktṛ)*. It has knowledge of objects; it acts either to possess them or to avoid them; and, as a result of its action, is able to enjoy the fruits thereof. Thus it is endowed with the triple nature of consciousness—conation, cognition, and affection or emotion. In this respect, the Jaina conception of Jīvātman is wholly different from the other views. For example, the Sāṁkhya conception of Puruṣa makes it the knower and the enjoyer, but not the actor. Jaina metaphysics makes the Ātman active in itself, and what it enjoys as *bhoktṛ* is merely the fruit of its own action which it performs as *kartṛ*.

CLASSES OF JĪVAS

Throughout the living kingdom, in the botanical and zoological world, life is found in association with matter. The association of Jīva with body, its *śarīra*, is an important characteristic of the concrete living world. Jīva in association with its body is quite different from Jīva in its pure state. The latter is called the pure Ātman and the former *saṁsārī jīva*. This *saṁsārī jīva*, in association with its appropriate body, is said to be of different grades of existence. Jīvas, in the biological kingdom, are classified according to their development. Jaina philosophy divides the Jīvas in the world according to the principle of the development of the sense-organs. The lowest class of Jīvas consists of *ekendriya jīvas*, or Jīvas having only one sense-organ. Next higher to this are *dvīndriya Jīvas*, or Jivas having two sense-organs. Then higher above, we have Jīvas with three *indriyas*. Then there are Jīvas with four *indriyas*, then *pañcendriya jīvas* or Jīvas with five sense-organs, and lastly, *samanaska*, i.e., *pañcendriya jīvas* with *manas* (mind). The first class refers to the vegetable kingdom which is considered to be a part of the living world. Trees and plants have all the properties of living organisms, such as assimilation, growth and decay, and reproduction. They are endowed with only one sense-organ—the awareness of touch. In addition to the recognition of the botanical world as a part of the biological world, the Jaina philosophy speaks of *sūkṣma ekendriya jīvas*, minute and microscopic organisms endowed with only one sense—the sense of touch. These generally exist in other bodies, and also in earth, water, air, and light, on account of which such Jīvas are called *pṛthvī-kāyika, ap-kāyika, vāyu-kāyika*, and *tejas-kāyika*. This doctrine of *sūkṣma ekendriya jīvas*, with their respective places of existence, is entirely misunderstood by some scholars, who go to the extent of attributing to Jaina philosophy a primitive doctrine of animism that earth, water, air, etc. have their own souls.

Worms represent the second class of organisms with two senses—touch and taste. Ants represent the third class

with touch, taste, and smeli. Bees represent the fourth class with sight in addition to the three. Higher animals represent the fifth class having in addition the sense of hearing. Of course, man represents the highest of these classes, having mind in addition to the five senses.

SAṀSĀRA AND MOKṢA

Again, Jīvas are of four main groups according to the four *gatis* (states of existence): *devas* or divine beings, *naras* or human beings, *nārakas* or denizens of hell, and *tiryaks* or the lower animals and the plant world. These four beings constitute *saṁsāra*, which is the result of kārmic bondage, according to which a particular Jīva will be born in any one of the *gatis*. *Mokṣa* or salvation consists in escaping from the sāṁsāric cycle of births and deaths in any one of these four *gatis* and reaching that safe haven where there is no birth and death. The Jīva that reaches this stage beyond *saṁsāra* attains the goal and realizes the Truth. It is pure Jīva or Ātman, otherwise known as *siddha jīva*. As long as a Jīva is in *saṁsāra*, it is bound by kārmic shaċkles which lead to the building up of a body for it, and the purity of its nature and strength of knowledge have no chance of complete manifestation. Its knowledge is limited, and nature deformed, according as it is bound by various *karmas*. Since there is no scope for its pure nature to manifest itself, it mainly depends upon the sense-organs as to instruction and acquiring knowledge, and its life is mainly determined by its environment consisting of objects presented to the senses. Naturally, it is attracted by the pleasures derived from the sense objects and repulsed by contrary feelings. Till the proper time comes, when it is able to realize its heritage of nobility and purity, it remains immersed in these sense pleasures which only make it move from one birth to another, from one *gati* to another, in an unending series of births and deaths.

AJĪVA OR ACETANA DRAVYAS

The *dravyas* which belong to the non-living class, the *ajīva dravyas*, are: *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa*, and *kāla*—matter, the principle of motion, the principle of rest,

space, and time. All these are *acetana* (insentient) *dravyas*. *Pudgala* or matter is *mūrta dravya*, the corporeal category which can be perceived by the senses. It is associated with sense properties such as colour, taste, and smell. These consist of ultimate entities called atoms of *paramāṇus*. By the combination of these atoms, aggregates are formed which are called *skandha*. Thus the term '*skandha*' in Jaina metaphysics means quite a different thing from the Buddhistic *skandha*. These aggregates may range from the smallest molecule of two atoms to the most important and biggest aggregate or *mahā-skandha*, represented by the whole physical universe. Thus the constitution of the physical universe is entirely dependent upon the ultimate constituent elements, the *paramāṇus*. The *pañca-bhūtas* (five elements) of the other systems are but examples of these aggregates of atoms. The *paramāṇu* or the ultimate atom cannot be perceived by the ordinary senses, so also the minute aggregates or the *skandhas*.

The peculiar doctrine of the Jaina metaphysics is the doctrine of kārmic matter, *karma-prayoga pudgala*—subtle material aggregates which form the basis for the building up of the subtle body *(kārmaṇa śarīra)* which is associated with every Jīva till the time of its liberation or *mokṣa*. The gross organic body, which is born of the parents, nourished by food, and subject to disease, decay, and death, is known as *audarika śarīra*—the body which is given birth to and is cast away by the Jīva associated with it at the time of death. But the Jīva cannot so cast away the *kārmaṇa śarīra* during its existence in *saṁsāra*. It is inevitably associated with every *saṁsārī jīva* throughout its career in the cycle of births and deaths. In fact, it is this kārmic body that is responsible for the sāṁsāric changes of Ātman which is in itself a pure *cetana dravya*. Its intrinsic purity is thus lost or diminished, because of its association with this kārmic body built up by the psychic activities of the soul itself. Conscious activities such as desires and emotions, according as they are healthy or unhealthy, act as causal conditions for the building up of the kārmic body which then becomes the vehicle for good or evil, and in its turn

affects the nature of the psychic experience. Thus the interdepen-dence between Jīva and the kārmic body, acting as cause and effect, each in its turn, continues to keep up the show of the sāṁsāric drama. But this should not be interpreted as fatalism, because the Jīva has in its unfathomable being a mighty potency transcending the limitations imposed upon it by its association with its kārmic body. Each person has the power and possibility of becoming an architect of his own destiny.

Jīva and *pudgala*, soul and matter, thus constitute the main *dravyas*. All activities in the world are ultimately traceable to these two entities. Hence they are called active principles, *sakriya-dravyas—dravyas* which are capable of acting. The other *dravyas—dharma, adharma, ākāśa*, and *kāla* are called *niṣkriya-dravyas—dravyas* without intrinsic activities. Of these, *ākāśa* refers to space. Its only function is to accommodate the other *dravyas*. Space, according to Jaina metaphysics, is infinite in extent. That portion of *ākāśa* which accommodates the concrete world with its *saṁsārī jīvas* and *pudgala* is called *loka-ākāśa*—space accommodating the world. The space beyond, where there is neither matter nor soul, is called *aloka-ākāśa*—the space beyond the world. Thus the physical universe is supposed to have a definite structure, within which are accommodated all the Jīvas and all the *pudgala skandhas* and *paramāṇus*. *Dharma* and *adharma*, the principle of motion and the principle of rest, are two categories peculiar to Jaina metaphysics, and not found in any other Indian system. The two pervade the whole of *loka-ākāśa*. They do not extend beyond it. Subtle and imperceptible in themselves, they are endowed with important properties of serving as conditions for motion or rest. Movement in the world is associated with either a Jīva or *pudgala*, these being *sakriya dravyas*. But while life and matter are both capable of moving of their own accord determined by appropriate operative causal conditions, their movement is dependent upon the presence of the non-operative principle called *dharma*. Remaining in itself non-operative, this *dharma dravya* serves as a condition for making movement possible; and the illustration generally given is the presence of

water for the movement of fish. When a fish swims, the movement is due to an operative cause present in itself. Nevertheless, swimming would be impossible without the presence of water.

Similarly, when a moving object, living or non-living, comes to rest, it is necessary to have the presence of an opposite principle. Such a principle, determining rest, is *adharma dravya*. This also is a non-operative condition of rest. A moving object coming to rest is the result of an operative condition present in itself. A bird must cease to beat its wings so that its flight may come to a stop. But the stopping of activity requires a further condition. A bird ceasing to fly must perch on the branch of a tree or on the ground. Just as the branch of a tree or the ground serves as a non-operative condition of rest, the presence of the *adharma* principle serves as a condition for the moving objects to come to rest.

Without these two principles of *dharma* and *adharma*, there would be no definite structure of the world. The cosmos would disintegrate into primordial atoms, which might spread throughout the whole of infinite space. There would be no distinction between *loka* and *aloka;* the world and the beyond. There would be no permanent constitution of the world. Without constancy in the structure of the world, there would be nothing left but chaos. Hence what sustains the world as world, and what prevents the disintegration of the world into a chaos, is the presence of these two principles.

The last *dravya* is *kāla* or time. In Jaina metaphysics, time is a necessary category of existence. The whole world consisting of matter and soul is in a process of change, either evolution or involution. Changes involving growth and decay constitute the very nature of the concrete world. The process of change without time would be unintelligible and must be dismissed as illusory. Since the concrete world cannot be dismissed as illusory, the category of time must be postulated as a necessary condition of change. *Kāla dravya* consists of moments or *kāla-paramāṇus* which constitute a time series having only the relation of before

and after. There can be no simultaneous moments in the time series. The *vyāvahārika* or conventional time is the time which we use in our social life, the durations being measured by the movements of the sun and moon. This is of different durations, according to different measures, and ranges from the shortest *nimiṣa* to the longest *yuga*.

KĀRMIC BODY

We have noticed already that throughout its sāṁsāric life the Jīva is associated with a kārmic body, which forms the nucleus around which the grosser bodies are built up. According to this conception, the building up of the kārmic body forms the foundation for life in *saṁsāra* and the disintegration of the kārmic body constitutes the final liberation of the Jīva. The process of building up of the kārmic body and the plan of breaking it up are important aspects of metaphysical truth. *Jīva* and *ajīva*, the primary entities, are brought together to build up the body appropriate to each Jīva in the following process: *Āsrava*, which means 'flowing in', of kārmic molecules that are attracted by a Jīva, according to its characteristic psychic experience, is the main basis of the building up of the kārmic body, which, like the cocoon of a silkworm, surrounds the Jīva and acts as an impediment against the free manifestation of its intrinsic qualities. *Āsrava* leads to the next stage *bandha*, when the kārmic matter gets settled, or fixed up, in the kārmic body. This *karma*-bondage is of various intensity and duration. So long as the Jīva is not alive to its own intrinsic properties, and so long as it identifies itself with objects alien to itself, the building up of the kārmic cocoon goes on interminably. But when the Jīva realizes its nature as distinct from the material world, it endeavours to extricate itself from the trammels of *saṁsāra*, the root cause of which is the kārmic body.

The first step in extricating oneself from the shackles is called *saṁvara*, putting a stop to the inflow of kārmic matter. This is done by developing an appropriate mental attitude characterized by freedom from the attractions of sense objects and concentration upon one's own nature. In other words, yogic meditation or *tapas* is the necessary

condition for preventing the flowing in of fresh kārmic matter. When this is achieved, the *yogin* turns his attention to the kārmic deposits already present in his kārmic body. By concentrated attention and endeavour to realize one's own true nature through *tapas*, the bondage of already deposited kārmic matter is loosened and finally shaken off. This process by which the kārmic body gradually gets disintegrated by the attack on its intensity and duration is technically called *nirjarā*. When the *āsrava* of new kārmic matter is shut out by *saṁvara*, and the old kārmic matter, already present, crumbles and disintegrates through *nirjarā*, the kārmic body gradually gets attenuated and finally disappears. Side by side, the intrinsic qualities of the Ātman get expressed more and more, till it shines in full luminosity, in infinite greatness and infinite glory, which state represents final liberation or *mokṣa*. Then the sāṁsāric Jīva, by the process of destroying all the *karmas*, becomes Paramātman, the pure soul with infinite knowledge, power, and bliss. These stages represent critical periods in the life-history of the soul.

DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATIONS OF CATEGORIES

Technically, *āsrava*, *bandha*, *saṁvara*, *nirjarā*, and *mokṣa*, together with the primary entities, *jīva* and *ajīva*, constitute the seven *tattvas* (principles). If we add the two mental attainments, *puṇya* and *pāpa* (virtue and vice), to these, we get the nine *padārthas* (categories). Thus we have in Jaina metaphysics the five *astikāyas*, the six *dravyas*, the seven *tattvas*, and the nine *padārthas*, classified from different standpoints.

II. JAINA LOGIC AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

We have already seen that, in Jaina metaphysics, *jñāna* is an intrinsic property of the Jīva, and that it gets clouded in the state of *saṁsāra* by the kārmic body. As such the process of knowing must be interpreted to be the process of the manifestation of the intrinsic nature of the Jīva. Jñāna or knowledge is of five different kinds according to the stages of the spiritual development of the soul, viz. *mati*, *śruta*, *avadhi*, *manaḥ-paryāya*, and *kevala*. *Mati jñāna* re-

fers to the ordinary process of sense experience, which is generally conditioned by perception through the sense-organs and the inferential knowledge based thereon. *Śruta jñāna* is the knowledge revealed by the scripture, the scripture itself being revealed to the world by the Sarvajña. *Avadhi jñāna* corresponds to what is known as clairvoyance. It is a kind of extra-sensory perception, not ordinarily available to all persons, though it is latent in everyone. Through the instrument of extra-sensory perception, one may actually see events taking place in a distant land or at a distant time. *Manaḥ-paryāya jñāna* refers to the knowledge of thoughts in other minds. It has direct access to the mind of other persons, and this capacity arises only as a result of *yoga* or *tapas*. *Kevala jñāna* refers to the infinite knowledge which the soul attains as the result of complete liberation or *mokṣa*. These are the five kinds of *jñāna* which constitute the *pramāṇas* (instruments of knowledge). Of these, the first two are described as *parokṣa jñāna*—knowledge derived through an intervening medium. The other three are called *pratykṣa jñāna*—knowledge derived through direct perception by the soul without any intervening medium.

It is the function of these *pramāṇas* to reveal the nature of objects in reality. The external world revealed through these *pramāṇas* consists of real objects, and hence should not be dismissed as illusory. In this respect, the Jaina theory of knowledge rejects the theory of Māyā of Advaitism, as well as the Buddhistic doctrine of illusoriness of the objective world. The function of *jñāna* is merely to reveal, on the one hand, the objective reality which is already existing, and also to reveal itself, on the other hand. Knowledge therefore is like a lamp, which, on account of its luminosity, reveals other objects as well as itself. The external objects so known are independent, inasmuch as they exist by themselves, and yet are related to knowledge as they are revealed by it. Similarly, the soul is both the subject and the object of knowledge in one. Inner experience reveals this nature of the soul, which is a *cetana* (conscious) entity.

The logical doctrine of Jaina philosophy forms the most

important aspect of that school. The fundamental principle of this logical doctrine implies the possibility of a positive and negative predication about the same thing. This doctrine is generally referred to as *asti-nāsti*, is and is not. According to Jaina logic, affirmative predication about a thing depends upon four conditions—*svadravya, svakṣetra, svakāla*, and *svabhāva*, i.e. its own substance, its own locality, its own time or duration, and its own nature or modification. Correspondingly, the negative predication about the same thing is conditioned by the four things of an opposite nature—*paradravya, parakṣetra, parakāla*, and *parabhāva*, i.e. other substance, other locality, other time, and other nature. This ornament is made of gold, and it is not made of any other metal—are two obvious predications about the same gold ornament, the affirmation *(asti)* from the point of view of itself *(svadravya)* and the negation *(nāsti)* from the point of view of other substances *(paradravya)*. Similarly, it may be said, Socrates was born in Athens, and he was not born in Rome—affirmative predication from *svakṣetra* and negative predication from *parakṣetra* point of view, both referring to the same individual. Likewise, we may affirm the historical period of an individual when we refer to his proper time in history *(svakāla)*, and deny his relationship to any other period of time *(parakāla)*. Tennyson lived in the Victorian age, and he did not live in Elizabethan period. In the same way, the last condition, *bhāva* or mode may be explained. Charles I died on the scaffold, and he did not die in his bed.

From these examples, it is quite obvious that both affirmative and negative predications are possible about the same thing from different points of view. From the same point of view, certainly it would be absurd to talk of affirmation and negation. The affirmative predication is conditioned by one aspect and the negative predication is conditioned by another. It is this difference of aspect that makes the *asti-nāsti* doctrine quite reasonable and enables us to have an affirmative and negative predication about the same object of reality. It may be urged that both *asti* and *nāsti*, affirmation and negation, being applicable to the same thing, the doctrine has to apply even to non-existent

things such as the sky-flower and rabbit's horns, and that they too exist in some way, since what can accommodate the negative predication that it is not must also accommodate the positive predication that it is. The reply is that the *asti-nāsti* doctrine is applicable only to existing reals. It is only in the case of an existing reality that one can talk of *svadravya* and *paradravya*, *svakṣetra* and *parakṣetra*, etc. But in the case of a non-existing thing, one cannot apply these different points of view, and hence the doctrine is not applicable to absolute nonentities, but only to the reals.

Based upon this principle is the doctrine of saptabhaṅgī, the seven modes of predication. In order to speak of something in relation to its own substance or locality, time or mode, affirmation or *asti* is needed, while in relation to another substance or locality, time or mode, negation or *nāsti* is to be used. If both the aspects are to be spoken of, then both *asti* and *nāsti* are to be used, but one after another. Again, if both the aspects, affirmative and negative, in the same predication, are to be expressed, it becomes inexpressible by language—it is *avaktavya*. These are the four initial modes of predication in the group of *saptabhaṅgī*. By attaching the fourth term '*avaktavya*' to each of the first three, we arrive at the seven modes of predication: *asti*, *nāsti*, *asti-nāsti*, *avaktavya*, *asti-avaktavya*, *nāsti-avaktavya*, and *asti-nāsti-avaktavya*. These are the only seven possible modes of predication that we can have.

Is it possible to make the predication in each case in an absolute sense? Jaina logic does not recognize any such absolute predication. The nature of reality does not admit of it. Any real substance, since it embodies in itself the qualities as well as its modifications, must be described as something permanent in the midst of change, an identity in the midst of difference. One cannot describe a thing as absolutely unchanging permanence, or absolute change without permanence. Similarly, one cannot assert that the qualities are absolutely distinct from the thing, nor that they are absolutely identical, since reality is by nature an identity in the midst of diversity, unity in the midst of multiplicity, permanence in the midst of change. Since

reality, while maintaining its identical nature, expresses itself through multiple forms, it is *anaikāntātmaka*. A true apprehension of its nature must recognize this aspect of reality and hence should reject any type of absolute predication. It is because of this that Jaina *darśana* is called Anekāntavāda, as opposed to other *darśanas* which are Ekāntavāda. Since absolute predication is impossible, Jaina logic recognized only relative predication. Thus the term *'syāt'*, which literally means 'perhaps', is prefixed to the predication, and it implies 'from one point of view'. It is added on to the seven modes of predication referred to in the doctrine of *saptabhaṅgī*, viz. *syādasti, syānnāsti*, and so on. This doctrine is therefore called by the names Saptabhaṅgī and Syādvāda.

III. JAINA ETHICS

The most important teaching of Jainism is Mokṣa-mārga (path to salvation). *Samyak darśana* (right faith), *samyak jñāna* (right knowledge), and *samyak cāritra* (right conduct), known as *ratnatraya* (the three jewels), together constitute the path to salvation.[3] They are wholly different from the Bhakti-mārga of the Bhāgavatas, Jñāna-mārga of the Vedāntins, and Karma-mārga of the Mīmāṁsakas. Unlike these religious schools, which lay all the emphasis either on *bhakti*, or *jñāna*, or *karma*, as means of salvation, Jainism holds that all the three must co-exist in a person, if he is to walk along the path of salvation. The Jaina commentators make the meaning quite clear by bringing in the analogy of medicine as a curative of some malady. Faith in its efficacy, knowledge of its use, and actual taking of the medicine—all these three must be present if a cure is to be effected. In the same way, the universal malady of sāṁsāric misery, which every soul is suffering from, can be cured by this triple panacea, the *ratnatraya*, when accepted as a mixture of the three principles of right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct. If any one element is miss-

3. *Samyag-darśana-jñāna-cāritrāṇi mokṣa-mārgāḥ (Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra* of Umāsvāmin. The Central Jaina Publishing House, Arrah).

ing, the other two, though each is valuable in itself, would be useless.

There are two courses of moral discipline or conduct according to Jaina ethics, one prescribed for the householder and the other for the homeless *sannyāsin*. In both cases, the code of morals is based upon the doctrine of *ahiṁsā*. The path of righteousness or *dharma* consists of the *ratnatraya*. *Dharma* would be incomplete if any one of these is wanting.

Of these three, the first, *samyak darśana* or right faith, is the basis of conduct and the important starting point in the religious life of a Jain. In order to possess an unwavering faith, the Jaina householder is expected to get rid of the three types of superstitious ignorance and the eight kinds of haughtiness or arrogance. The three types of superstitious ignorance are the three *mūḍhas—loka-mūḍha, deva-mūḍha*, and *pāṣaṇḍi-mūḍha*. The first refers to the general superstition among people that by bathing in the so-called sacred rivers, or climbing up the hills, or walking through fire one acquires sanctity. The second refers to the belief of the people in the powers of gods and goddesses who are endowed with human qualities and human emotions, and to the propitiation of such gods and goddesses with the object of securing certain selfish ends. The third refers to devotion to certain false ascetics and acceptance of their teaching as gospel truth. Freedom from these three types of superstition is the primary condition of right faith. One who has the right faith must be free from the eight types of arrogance, for humility is a necessary condition for entering the kingdom of God. These eight are: arrogance of (1) the possession of intelligence; (2) the ability to conduct a grand type of temple worship; (3) noble family; (4) caste; (5) physical or mental strength; (6) magical powers; (7) *tapas* or *yoga;* and (8) the beauty of one's person.

The householder, thus equipped with right faith and right knowledge, must observe the five *vratas* or abstinences: *ahiṁsā, satya, asteya, brahmacarya*, and *aparigraha*, i.e. he must be free from cruelty, untruth, theft, unchastity, and avarice and unnecessary luxury. They are called *aṇuvratas*, the minor code of morals, when they are

of limited application, and when they are applied without limitation, they become *mahāvratas*, the major code of morals, which are prescribed for the yatis or homeless ascetics. Every householder is expected to practise these five *vratas* according to his capacity. He has to pass through eleven stages or grades of a householder's life before he can enter the life of an ascetic.

The first *vrata*, *ahiṁsā*, means not injuring or hurting in any way any living being, an animal or even an insect, either by thought, word, or deed. It includes forbearing from binding them cruelly with ropes, thus preventing free movement, compelling them to carry burdens beyond their capacity, and not feeding them properly. It is not enough if he does not himself directly injure; he should neither cause injury through an agent, nor indirectly approve of the conduct of others when they indulge in such an act of cruelty. The second *vrata*, not to utter falsehood, is quite obvious. But it is interesting to note that even speaking truth which results in injury to others should be avoided. Thus it is clear that this principle is sub-ordinated to the principle of *ahiṁsā*, which is the primary principle. This second *vrata* of *satya* includes refraining from teaching false doctrines with the object of misleading people; openly proclaiming from sheer wantonness certain secrets such as those pertaining to the private life of people; scandalmongering out of envy; sending anonymous letters containing mischievous insinuations; and suppressing the truth for the purpose of deceiving others. The third vow, *asteya* or non-stealing, has to be interpreted in the same comprehensive manner. A thing may be left by one due to forgetfulness; it may accidentally fall on the road. Such things belonging to others should not be taken possession of, for it may amount to stealing others' property. This principle also forbids indirect stealing in five different ways: instigating a person to go and steal in somebody's house, receiving stolen property, accompanying a victorious army in a military campaign with the object of looting the enemy's town, using fraudulent weights and measures, and adulterating things in selling them. The fourth principle, *brahmacarya*, refers to chastity or sex-purity in thought, word, and deed. The

last vow, *aparigraha*, refers to limiting one's attachment to wealth and other worldly possessions—*parimita parigraha*. Inordinate longing for worldly goods will never result in contentment and happiness. It prevents spiritual harmony and peace in life. Hence even a householder has to reduce his wants and limit his desires, if he is to pursue his spiritual career and not be altogether lost in the world.

THE STATE OF THE HOMELESS

The *pañca aṇuvratas* are but the probation for the *pañca mahāvratas*. The discipline for the householder is specially intended to liberate him from the domestic ties which bind him to his wife and children, to his land and wealth. After completing this period of probation, the householder evidently is expected to enter into a wider realm of activity as an ascetic *yogin*. His love and sympathy, liberated from the sphere of domestic environment, will thereafter become available for the whole living creation. He quits the house to make the whole realm of nature his abode. He has no roof to live under except the star-bespangled canopy of the heavens. The *yogin* has to observe certain principles and adopt certain courses of conduct appropriate to his new surroundings. Since he has no need to associate himself with the ordinary social occupations, he limits his words and thoughts and refrains from indulging in useless and unnecessary activities. An ordinary person is generally a slave of his emotions; and his behaviour becomes characterized by harshness of speech, hastiness of movement, and general excitement. But in the case of the *yogin*, who has conquered such emotions through *dhyāna* (meditation), gentleness of behaviour comes naturally. His words are soft and soothing; the movements of his limbs are gentle and peaceful. In his presence, timid birds and animals will muster courage, and even wild animals will lose their ferocity.

Thus equipped with an internal peace and harmony, the *yogin* carries about him a spirit full of melody. His whole discipline aims at the conquest of the environment. His pride consists in being unshaken by its changes. His thoughts are fixed on higher and nobler things. The body

which may be a source of inconvenience and trouble to the ordinary man ceases to be such in the case of a *yogin*. For, in his case, the body derives its strength and vitality from the inner strength and vitality of the Spirit. To one who carries in himself the universal panacea, there can be neither disease nor decay. This conquest of the environment, including his own body, carries him through the threshold of a newer world, where he enjoys a happiness far surpassing the pleasures of the senses, and he secures the peace that passeth understanding. The ordinary conventions which are made so much of by the man of the world are completely discarded by the superman, the *yogin*. Hence his words and actions become unintelligible to the people at large. He has secured the citizenship of the world of reality, whereas they are still living in the realm of shadows.

MESSAGE OF JAINISM

The pleasures of a *deva*, however great they be, must end some day. Even Devendra, the king of the gods, with all his greatness, can never enter the kingdom of God, if by the latter is meant that spiritual liberation implied by the term *mokṣa*. He must become a man before he can think of Heaven. For man forms the 'way in' for that paradise wherein is situated the temple of spiritual freedom. This embodies an important truth, viz. that man's heritage as man is far superior to any other riches in the world. It is this wonderful spiritual heritage of man that Naciketas would have from the lord of Death, in preference to the overlordship of the three worlds offered to him. It is this heritage again that Maitreyī preferred to all the accumulated wealth which was offered by her husband, Yājñavalkya. Again, it is to inherit this Kingdom that prince Siddhārtha cast away his father's kingdom as worthless and put on the mendicant's robe, in preference to the royal crown. This is the message of Jainism to mankind. 'Be a man first and last, for the Kingdom of God belongs to the son of Man'. It is this same truth that is proclaimed in unmistakable terms by the Upaniṣadic text *'Tat tvam asi'* (Thou art That).

SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JAINISM

MANY religious and philosophical movements contributed their different hues to the multi-coloured canvas of the ancient culture of India. Of these, the religious and philosophical system, at present known as Jainism, was, in the time of Pārśvanātha or, more accurately, of Mahāvīra, designated Nirgranthism (Niggaṇṭha Dhamma), though it was known by the general name Śramaṇism as well, a term which was applied to all non-Brāhmaṇical sects. It was known as Nirgranthism, because it laid supreme stress on non-possession and on renunciation of the house *(agāra* or *gṛha)*, which was considered a knot *(grantha)*. It also held that the conquest of the evil tendencies of attachment and hatred was the real end, and that the act of non-violence or austerity or renunciation which fails to achieve this end was spiritually futile. The promulgators of this ideal came to be regarded as *jinas* (victors), and their religion came to be known as Jainism. Over and above the general characteristics of Śramaṇism, Nirgranthism or Jainism has some specific characteristics, ethical and philosophical, based on equality and non-violence.

EMPHASIS ON SĀMĀIYA OR EQUALITY

Jainism lays great stress upon the attitude of equality. It has identified this attitude with the famous Brāhmaṇic conception of Brahman, and has designated the whole religious conduct and philosophical thought that helps the development of the attitude of equality as *bambhacera (brahmacarya)*, even as Buddhism has designated the principles of goodwill *(maitrī)* and the like as *brahmavihāra*. Further, just like the *Dhammapada*[1] and the

1. *Brāhmaṇa-vagga*, 26.

Mahābhārata,[2] the Jaina texts[3] identify a Sramaṇa, who embodies equality, with a Brāhmaṇa.

Among the twelve Aṅgas of the Jaina scripture, Sāmāiya(Sāmāyika) occupies the first place, and is known as the *Ācārāṅga-Sūtra*. We can find the religious and philosophical views of Mahāvīra most prominently in this work, which lays stress on the principle of equality. The Prakrit or the Māgadhī term *'sāmāiya'* has reference to the idea of equality *(sāmya, samatā,* or *sama)*. There are in Jainism six necessary rites prescribed for the ascetics as well as the laity, and of these *sāmāiya* is the most important. Whenever a layman or an ascetic takes the vow of religious conduct in accordance with his position and right, he utters the oath *'karemi bhante sāmāiyam'*,[4] which means 'I undertake to observe, O Lord, the attitude of equality'. This has been clearly explained in the very next passage which runs: *'sāvajjaṁ jogaṁ paccakkhāmi'* (I dissociate myself from harmful activities according to my capacity). It is because of this supreme importance of *sāmāiya* that the famous scholiast Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa of the seventh century A.D. composed an elaborate commentary entitled the *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* on it, and shown that these three factors of religion, viz. faith, knowledge, and conduct, constitute what is called *sāmāiya*.[5]

The author of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* composed his work on the basis of the attitude of equality that was already prevalent in such schools as the Sāṁkhya, Yoga, and Bhāgavata. This is the reason why we find in it, on numerous occasions, the inculcation of the spirit of equality, by such terms as *samadarśī (one possessed of the attitude of equality)*, *'sāmya'* (equality), and the like. This attitude of equality, as found in the *Gītā*, was originally identical with that found in the *Ācārāṅga-Sūtra*. But it has assumed different forms which were in accordance with the spirit of the systems with which it was integrated. The *Gītā* dis-

2. *Śāntiparvan*, 263.34; 269.30-33. See also U.J. Sandesara, *Mahābhārata ane Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra* (Gujarati).
3. *Uttarādhyayana-Sūtra*, 25.
4. *Āvaśyaka-Sūtra*, 3.
5. 2673.

suades Arjuna from the acceptance of the life of a mendicant, and urges him to fight. The *Ācārāṅga-Sūtra*, on the other hand, would instead say: If you are a true warrior *(kṣatriya-vīra)*, you should not enter into warfare when you are inspired by the attitude of equality. You can, on the contrary, fulfill the function of a true warrior only by fighting with your spiritual enemy by the acceptance of the life of a homeless mendicant. The Bharata-Bāhubalin episode, as recorded in the Jaina literature, clearly points to this spirit of Jainism. It is said there that when Bāhubalin raised his hand to take vengeance on his own brother Bharata, who had already struck him violently, the spiritual attitude of equality took possession of him, and, under its influence, Bāhubalin accepted the life of a mendicant and did neither take revenge on Bharata nor claim from him his own due share of the kingdom.

COMPREHENSIVE APPLICATION OF NON-VIOLENCE

The attitude of equality has found expression in non-violence both in the domain of religious conduct and in that of philosophical thought.

Jainism does not endorse any religious act which does not promote the cause of non-violence. All the Jaina religious rites, external or internal, gross or subtle, were formulated round non-violence. Although every religious school has laid stress, to a more or less degree, on the principle of non-violence, the supreme importance and wide application that it receives in Jainism is not found in any other school.

In the domain of philosophical thought, it has given rise to the attitude of non-absolutism (Anekāntavāda) or the doctrine of 'explanation by division' (Vibhajyavāda). Obstinate insistence on one's own attitude and way of thought, considering them as the complete and ultimate truth, is an enemy of the attitude of equality. It is accor-dingly maintained that one should have as much respect for another's attitude as one has for one's own. The doctrine of Syādvāda, with its main reference to the linguistic aspect, and the doctrine of Nayas, with its reference to the thought aspect, are also the gradual outcome of this attitude. There is no

subject of religious discipline or philosophical enquiry that has not been judged by the non-absolutistic standard or has been left out of its purview. Hence, whereas the authors of the other systems tacitly accepted non-absolu-tism and did not compose original literature on it, the Jaina authors composed a vast creative literature expounding and elaborating the non-absolutistic attitude and its two corollaries, viz. the doctrines of Syādvāda and Nayas.

To explain fully the implication of non-violence, Jainism has formulated: 1) the science *(vidyā)* of the selves *(ātman)*; 2) the science of *karma;* 3) the science of conduct *(cāritra);* and 4) the science of the universe *(loka).* Similarly, to explain the principle of non-absolutism, it has developed: 1) the science of scriptural record *(śruta);* and 2) the science of logic and epistemology *(pramāṇa).* All these sciences constitute the soul of the legacy of Jainism. We shall here record some brief observations on these topics.

ĀTMAN

There is intrinsic equality among all selves, be they earth-bodied, water-bodied, vegetable oganisms, insects, birds, animals, or human beings. Non-violence consists in sincere and earnest exertion of oneself for the application of the principle of equality as far as possible in every field of life. To bring about such application in practical life, the *Ācārāṅga-Sūtra* asks us to feel the miseries of others as much as we do our own.

In regard to non-violence, the difference between the dualist systems, such as Jainism and the like, and the non-dualist Aupaniṣada (Upaniṣadic) system lies only in the fact that the former admit real plurality of selves and establish non-violence on the basis of the doctrine of intrinsic equality of selves, while the latter denies plurality of selves and establishes non-violence on the basis of their intrinsic identity. It seems that the doctrine of identity based upon non-dualism has gradually evolved from the doctrine of equality based upon dualism. However, what is of the utmost importance from the point of view of non-violence is the fact that the actual feeling of equality or

identity of the self with others is the primal source of the principle of non-violence.

KARMA

From the metaphysical doctrine of 'equality of selves', Jainism deduced also the spiritual law of Karma, which holds that all physical, mental, and other distinctions between one self and another are only adventitious, that is, are due to *karma* and not intrinsic. It follows from this that the least developed being, such as the vegetable organism, can develop into a human being, and can, by spiritual evolution, attain absolute freedom from bondage, and, conversely, a human being may return to the stage of a vegetable organism. The only determinant of the nature of the self, of its higher or lower stage of existence, as well as of its absolute freedom, is *karma*, also called *saṁskāra* (trace), or *vāsanā* (predisposition). The intrinsic equality of all selves is fully manifested when there is complete absence of *karma*.

If all the selves are intrinsically equal, why then is there this mutual inequality between them? Why again does the same self pass through different states at different moments? Jainism answers that, while the state of a self, no doubt, is in accordance with the nature of its *karma*, the self is, at the same time, free to do or not to do a good or a bad act; it can serve a good or a bad purpose according to its will, and it creates its own future as well as the present. The law of Karma maintains that the present is created in accordance with the past and that the future is created on the basis of the present. The mutual relation of the past, present, and future is determined by it. This is the foundation of the doctrine of rebirth.

Karma, in reality, consists of ignorance and the passions of attachment and hatred. The absence of the true cognition of the intrinsic different between the self and the not-self is ignorance, known as *darśanamoha* (perverted attitude) in Jainism. This ignorance has been called *avidyā* in such systems as the Sāṁkhya and the Buddhist. The predispositions and defilements which originate on account of the perverted assessment, due to the influence

of ignorance, of the values of things have been briefly classified into two categories, viz. attachment and hatred. Although attachment and hatred are the origin of violence, yet the root cause of all evils is ignorance or *darśanamoha* or *avidyā*. Ignorance therefore is the root cause of violence. All those systems of thought which believe in the self agree on this issue.

The *karma*, whose nature has been described above, is technically known as *bhāva-karma* in Jainism. It is a kind of *saṁskāra* existing in the self. This *bhāva-karma* attracts the subtle material atoms that always surround the self and gives them a definite form. The group of material atoms thus determined is called *dravya-karma* or the kārmic body *(kārmaṇa śarīra)*, which follows the self in the next birth and forms the ground for the constitution of a new body. Although a cursory study shows that the conception of *dravya-karma* is a peculiarity only of the Jaina doctrine of Karma, and is absent in the doctrines of the other systems, yet a deep study will clearly show that this is not the fact. In such systems as the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, and the Vedānta, there is the description of the subtle or the *liṅga* body which transmigrates to different births. This body has been regarded as constituted by such evolutes of Prakṛti (primordial principle of matter) of Māyā (the basic principle of illusion) as the internal organ *(antaḥ-karaṇa)*, the ego-sense *(abhimāna)*, the mind *(manas)*, etc., and is obviously the substitute for the kārmic body of the Jains. Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, which does not clearly admit such a subtle body, has accepted the atomic mind which transmigrates from one birth to another. The fundamental basis of the conceptions of the subtle body and the kārmic body is the same. If there is any difference, it is only with reference to its mode of description and elaboration and classification.

Like the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the Vedānta, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Buddhist systems, Jainism believes that the association of *karma* with the soul is beginningless, because the beginning of that association is absolutely beyond the limit of knowledge. All the systems have unanimously admitted that, from the point of view of the chain

of unbroken succession, the association of *karma* or *avidyā* or *māyā* with the soul is beginningless, but the association, as a case of particular occurrence, has a beginning, because we clearly feel that the *karma* or the predisposition *(vāsanā)* repeatedly originates in our life from ignorance and the passions of attachment and hatred. The reason why *karma* or predisposition can no more originate in the absolutely pure self, which emerges on the complete dissociation of *karma*, is that the soul has a natural tendency for purity, and such defects as ignorance and the passions of attachment and hatred are totally uprooted on the fullest expression of its intrinsic attributes, such as consciousness and the like, on account of absolute purification.

CĀRITRA

The function of religious conduct *(cāritra)* is to remove the conditions of the state of inequality existing in our life, and such conduct is known as *saṁvara* (self-control) in Jainism. Ignorance, the root cause of the state of inequality, is destroyed by the real comprehension of the nature of the self, and such passions as attachment and hatred are removed by the fulfilment of the attitude of indifference *(mādhyasthya)*. The spiritual conduct therefore consists in these two factors: (1) knowledge of the self, or comprehension of the distinction between the self and the not-self *(samyag-darśana* or *viveka-khyāti)*; and (2) absolute indifference to, or conquest of, the passions of attachment and hatred. Only such activities as self-concentration, vows, principles of self-control and austerity, which help the growth of the internal spiritual conduct, are regarded as forming the code of external conduct for the spiritual aspirant.

The evolution of spiritual life depends upon the gradual development of the internal spiritual conduct. Jainism gives a very vivid and elaborate description of this development in its doctrine of 'the stages of spiritual development' *(guṇasthānas)*. Anyone interested in the stages of spiritual evolution will find it useful and interesting to compare such stages as the *madhumatī* and the like of the Yoga system,

the stages of *srotāpanna* and the like of Buddhism, the various stages of ignorance and enlightenment of the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, the stages of *mandabhūmi* and the like of the Ājīvika school, and the *guṇasthānas* and the *yogadṛṣṭis* of Jainism.[6]

We shall describe here not the fourteen *guṇasthānas*, but the three stages into which the *guṇasthāṇas* can be classified. The first stage is known as the state of the exterior self *(bahirātman)*, wherein there is the total absence of the knowledge of the self or the comprehension of the distinction between the self and the not-self. The second stage is known as the state of the interior self *(antarātman)*, wherein there is the knowledge of the self, but the passions of attachment and hatred, even though they are mild, have not yet lost their hold upon the soul. The third stage is the state of the transcendental self *(paramātman)*. There is absolute destruction of attachment and hatred at this stage, and the soul has attained freedom from the influence of passions *(vītarāgatva)*.

LOKA

This science describes the nature of the universe. The universe consists of nothing but the mutual association of the two fundamental principles of *jīva* (the principle of consciousness) and *ajīva* (unconscious matter). These two, *jīva* and *ajīva*, are eternal entities, which were neither born nor will ever perish. The substance that has its supreme influence on the principle of consciousness in its worldly career is only the *pudgala* (material atoms), which comes into association with the soul in a number of ways and also delimits its various capacities. But the principle of consciousness has intrinsic and fundamental potencies, which, when properly directed, will eventually emancipate the consciousness from the influence of the material atoms. The universe is nothing but the field of the mutual influence of consciousness and matter, and freedom from this influence is the end of the universe. The Jaina conception

6. For a fuller discussion of this topic, see author's article in Gujarati on *'Bhāratīya Darśanomān Ādhyātmika Vikāsakrama'*, in *Purātattva*, I. p. 199.

of the universe and its space tallies in many respects with the conceptions of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the Purāṇas, and the Buddhist schools.

The Jains, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, are atomists and are not, like the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the upholders of the principle of one Prakṛti as the basis of the world. But the nature of an atom of the Jains has more similarity with the nature of the Prakṛti of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga than with the nature of the atom of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The atom of the Jains undergoes transformations like the Prakṛti of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, and is not absolutely unchanging like the atom of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is therefore held that, even as the one uniform Prakṛti of the Sāṁkhya becomes the ground of the manifold physical creation of earth, water, fire, air, ether, etc., exactly so the atom of the Jains can transform itself into various forms such as earth, water, fire, etc. The Jaina school does not agree with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in admitting that the material atoms of earth, water, etc. belong to fundamentally different types. Another basic difference is that the atom of the Jains is so subtle, as compared with the atom of the Vaiśeṣika, that, ultimately, it becomes as unmanifest *(avyakta)* as the Prakṛti of the Sāṁkhya. The Jaina doctrine of the infinity of atoms is not very dissimilar to the doctrine of plurality of *prakṛtis* of the old Sāṁkhyas, corresponding to the doctrine of the plurality of *puruṣas*.[7]

The Jaina system also, like the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, the Mīmāṁsaka, and the like, regards the universe as beginningless and endless from the standpoint of the chain of unbroken succession. It does not believe, like the Paurāṇika or the Vaiśeṣika systems, in the periodic dissolution and recreation of the universe. Therefore, there is no place in Jainism for an independent person like God as Creator or Destroyer. Jainism believes that every individual self is responsible for its own creation, that is to say, the creation of its own *karma* and its results, such as the body

7. Cf. *Maulika-Sāṁkhyā hi ātmānaṁ ātmānaṁ prati pṛthak pradhānaṁ vadanti; uttare tu Sāṁkhyāḥ sarvātmasvapi ekaṁ nityaṁ pradhānaṁ iti prapannāḥ (Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya, Guṇaratna-ṭīkā,* p. 99).

and the like. According to it, there is, intrinsically, Godhood in every individual, and this becomes manifest in the state of emancipation. The soul which has manifested its Godhood becomes the object of worship of the common people. The God of the Yoga school is also only an object of worship and not the Creator or Destroyer. But there is basic difference between the conceptions of the Jaina and the Yoga schools. The God of the Yoga school is eternally free and was never in bondage, and thus belongs to a separate category from that of the ordinary souls, whereas the God of Jainism is not such. Jainism believes that every competent spiritual aspirant can attain to Godhood, inasmuch as it is capable of being achieved by proper spiritual exertion, and that all the emancipated souls are equally the objects of worship as Gods.

ŚRUTA

The science of scriptural record consists in the faithful compilation of the old as well as the up-to-date thoughts of other thinkers as also the thoughts founded on one's own experience. The object of this science is that no thought, or way of thought, which aims at Truth, should be despised or ignored, and therefore the science has gradually developed along with the growth of new lines of thought. It is because of this that in the same context where formerly only the *sad-advaita* (non-dualism of the existent) of the Sāṁkhya was mentioned as an instance of the *saṅgrahanaya* (standpoint of the universal) in the texts, in later times, after the development of the thought of *Brahmādvaita* (non-dualism of Brahman), this latter thought also found place as an instance of the same *naya* (standpoint). Similarly, where formerly the old Buddhist doctrine of momentariness was given as an instance of the *ṛjusūtranaya* (standpoint of the immediate present), in later times, after the development of Mahāyānism, all the four famous Buddhist schools, viz. the two Hīnayāna schools of Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika, as well as the two Mahāyā schools of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, the latter two upholding momentary consciousness *(vijñāna)* alone,

or the unsubstantiality of things *(śūnyatā)*, respectively, as the truth, found place as instances of the same *naya*.

The field of activity of the attitude of non-absolutism is so vast and extensive that all the empirical and transcendental sciences that are conducive to the well-being of human life find their proper place in it. It is for this reason that, in addition to the transcendental sciences, the empirical sciences have also found place in the Jaina scriptures.

PRAMĀṆA

In the science of logic and epistemology, all the organs of knowledge, such as perception, inference, etc., and the means thereof as well as their relative strength have been elaborately described. In this field also the non-absolutist attitude has been so comprehensively applied that no sincere thought of any philosopher has been despised or ignored. But, on the contrary, all the available thoughts regarding knowledge and its instruments have been properly blended into a harmonious system.

LITERATURE OF JAINISM

JAINA literature begins with the last of the Tīrthaṅkaras,[1] Mahāvīra (*c.* 599-527 B.C.), who reorganized the old Nirgrantha sect and revitalized its moral and religious zeal and activities. He preached his faith of *ahiṁsā* (non-violence or harmlessness) and self-purification to the people in their own language which was not Sanskrit, but Prakrit. The form of Prakrit which he is said to have used was Ardha-Māgadhī, by which was meant a language that was not pure Māgadhī but partook of its nature.

TWELVE ANGAS

Mahāvīra's teachings were arranged in twelve Aṅgas (parts) by his disciples. These Aṅgas formed the earliest literature on Jainism, ana were as follows:

1. *Ācārāṅga* laid down rules of discipline for the monks.
2. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* contained further injunctions for the monks regarding what was suitable or unsuitable for them and how they should safeguard their vows. It also gave an exposition of the tenets and dogmas of other faiths.
3. *Sthānāṅga* listed in numerical order, categories of knowledge pertaining to the realities of nature.
4. *Samavāyāṅga* classified objects in accordance with similarities of time, place, number, and so on.
5. *Vyākhyā-prajñapti* or *Bhagavat* explained the realities of life and nature in the form of a catechism.

---

1. Jainism admits twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras who were responsible from period to period for the promulgation of religion or *dharma.* The twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara was Pārśvanātha whose historicity is now accepted. Mahāvīra whom Buddhist texts mention as Niganṭha Nātaputta, was a senior contemporary of Buddha (*c.* 535-486 B.C.). He came from a ruling clan and was related to the royal families of Magadha.

6. *Jñātṛdharmakathā* contained hints regarding religious preaching as well as stories and anecdotes calculated to carry moral conviction.
7. *Upāsakādhyayana* or *Upāsaka-daśāka* was meant to serve as a religious code for householders.
8. *Antakṛddaśāka* gave accounts of ten saints who attained salvation after immense suffering.
9. *Anuttaraupapātika* contained accounts of ten saints who had gone to the highest heaven after enduring intense persecution.
10. *Praśna-vyākaraṇa* contained accounts and episodes for the refutation of opposite views, establishment of one's own faith, promotion of holy deeds, and prevention of evil.
11. *Vipāka-Sūtra* explained how virtue was rewarded and evil punished.
12. *Dṛṣṭivāda* included the following five sections:
    (a) *Parikarmāṇi* contained tracts describing the moon, the sun, Jambudvīpa, other islands and seas, as well as living beings and non-living matter.
    (b) *Sūtra* gave an account of various tenets and philosophies numbering no less than 363.
    (c) *Prathamānuyoga* recounted ancient history and narrated the lives of great kings and saints.
    (d) *Pūrvagata* dealt with the problems of birth, death, and continuity, and consisted of the following fourteen sub-sections:
        (i) Utpāda described how substances such as living beings are produced and maintained and decayed.
        (ii) Āgrāyaṇī gave philosophical exposition of nature.
        (iii) Vīryānupravāda explained the powers and potentialities of the soul and other substances.
        (iv) Asti-nāsti-pravāda studied the substances of nature from various points of view pertaining to their infinite qualities and forms.

(v) *Jñāna-pravāda* was a study in epistemology, giving an exposition of how knowledge was acquired in its five forms, namely: *mati* (desire), *sruti* (hearing), *avadhi* (attention), *manaḥ-paryāya* (the state of mental perception which precedes the attainment of perfect knowledge), and *kevala* (the highest possible knowledge).

(vi) *Satya-pravāda* studied the nature of truth and reality and forms of untruth.

(vii) *Ātma-pravāda* was the study of the self or the principle of life.

(viii) *Karma-pravāda* gave an exposition of the eight forms of *karma*, bondage, namely: *jñānāvaraṇa* (knowledge-cover or error), *darśanāvaraṇa* (obstruction of one's philosophical views), *Vedanīya* (expression of feelings), *mohanīya* (producing delusion), *āyu* (duration of life as governed by *karma*), *nāma* (attachment to name), *gotra* (attachment to race), and *antarāya* (any obstacle to realization) as well as their subdivisions.

(ix) *Pratyākhyānavāda* contained expiatory rites, and rules for the observance of fasts and vows.

(x) *Vidyānuvāda* was an exposition of various sciences and arts, including prognostication.

(xi) *Kalyāṇavāda* was devoted to astrology and a description of the five auspicious events, that is, conception, birth, renunciation, enlightenment, and salvation, in the lives of the sixty-three great men, namely, the Tīrthaṅkaras, the Cakravartins, the Baladevas, the Nārāyaṇas, and the Prati-Nārāyaṇas.

(xii) *Prāṇavāda* was the science of physical culture and longevity, and expounded the eight forms of medical treatment.

(xiii) *Kriyāviśāla* gave an exposition of the seventy-two fine arts, including writing and poetry.

(xiv) *Loka-bindu-sāra* treated of worldly professions as well as ways and means to secure salvation.

(e) *Cūlikā* was the fifth section, of *Dṛṣṭivāda*, dealing with charms and magic, including methods of walking on water, flying in air, and assuming different physical forms.

THE DIGAMBARA TRADITION

This comprehensive collection of practically the whole knowledge of the times, secular as well as religious, could not survive long in its original form. According to the Digambara Jains,[2] the whole canon was preserved for only 162 years after Mahāvīra that is up to the eighth successor, Bhadrabāhu. After that, portions gradually began to be lost.[3] So, after 683 years from the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra, what was known to the *ācāryas* (teachers) was only fragmentary. It was only the knowledge of a few portions of the *Pūrvagata* or *Pūrvas* that was imparted at Girinagara in Kathiawar by Dharasena to his pupils Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali who, on the basis of it, wrote the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* in the *sūtra* (aphorism) form during the first or second century A.D. The *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* is, therefore, the earliest available reli-

2. As early as in the first century A.D. the followers of the Jaina religion were divided into two main sects or schools known as the Digambara or 'sky-clad' (i.e. naked) and Svetāmbara or 'white-clad' (i.e. wearing white robes). There are some slight differences between them in finer matters of doctrine and cult practices, and each of these two sects claims precedence over the other. The Digambaras speak of a legend about the origin of the division, which differs from the legend prevalent among the Svetāmbaras. Cf. Glasenapp, *Der Jainismus*, pp. 347 ff. Some scholars, however, look upon the famine (fourth century B.C.), on the advent of which a body of Jaina monks migrated from Magadha to Karṇāṭaka under Bhadrabāhu, as the possible seed of the great schism. Because, after the famine when the followers of Bhadrabāhu returned to Magadha, they found a great gulf between the practices of their own and those of others who stayed in Magadha.
3. See the next article, *Prakrit Language and Literature, The Cultural Heritage of India*, Vol.V. Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta, 1978, p. 164.

gious literature amongst the Digambaras. It is for them the supreme authority for the teachings of Mahāvīra. Another most esteemed work, written about the same time as the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama*, was the *Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa* of Guṇadharācārya. *Dṛṣṭivāda*, the twelfth Aṅga, was also the basis of this text. The Digambaras, who thus have their procanon, refused to acknowledge the canon compiled at the Pāṭaliputra Council in the fourth century B.C.

THE ŚVETĀMBARA TRADITION

The literary tradition of the Śvetāmbara Jains is, however, different. They agree with the Digambara view so far as the continuity of the whole canon up to Bhadrabāhu is concerned. The Śvetāmbaras say that after Bhadrabāhu had migrated with a host of his adherents to the South on account of a famine, the monks who remained in Magadha met in a Council at Pāṭaliputra, already referred to, under the leadership of Sthūlabhadra. There a compilation was made of the eleven Aṅgas together with the remnants of the twelfth. This was the first attempt to systematize the Jaina Āgama.[4] But in the course of time, the canon became disorderly. Therefore, the monks met once again at Valabhī in Gujarat under the presidentship of Devarddhi Kṣamāśramaṇa in the middle of the fifth century A.D. All the sacred texts available today were collected, systematized, redacted and committed to writing by this Council. They are as follows:

1. The eleven Aṅgas named above, the twelfth being totally lost.
2. Twelve Upāṅgas (sub-parts): *Aupapātika, Rāyapasenaijja, Jīvābhigama, Prajñāpanā, Sūrya-prajñapti, Jambudvīpa-prajñapti, Candra-prajñapti, Nirayāvalī, Kalpāvataṁsikā, Puṣpikā, Puṣpacūlikā,* and *Vṛṣṇidaśā.*
3. Ten Prakīrṇas (scattered pieces): *Catuḥ-śaraṇa, Āturapratyākhyāna, Bhaktaparijñā, Saṁstāraka, Taṇḍula-*

4. The collective term given by the Jains to their canonical texts is Āgama or Siddhānta.

vaitālika, Carndāvijjhaya, Devendra-stava, Gaṇi-vidyā, Mahā-pratyākhyāna, and *Vīra-stava.*

4. Six Cheda-Sūtras: *Niśītha, Mahā-niśītha, Vyavahāra, Ācāradaśā, Kalpa,* and *Pañca-kalpa.*
5. Two Cūlikā-Sūtras: *Nandī-Sūtra* and *Aṇuyogadvāra.*
6. Four Mūla-Sūtras[5]: *Uttarādhyayana, Āvaśyaka, Daśa-vaikālika,* and *Piṇḍaniryukti.*

There are, however, variations in this classification. Sometimes *Nandī, Aṇuyogadvāra,* and *Pañca-kalpa* are put at the head of the Prakīrṇas. Instead of *Pañca-kalpa, Jita-kalpa* by Jinabhadra is sometimes mentioned amongst the Cheda-Sūtras. Traditionally, the number of texts fixed at Valabhī is forty-five; the names, however, vary up to fifty.

In a few cases the names of authors are also mentioned. For example, the fourth Upāṅga, *Prajñāpanā,* is ascribed to Śyāmācārya; the first of the ten Prakīrṇas, *Catuḥ-śaraṇa,* to Vīrabhadra; the fifth Cheda-Sūtra, *Kalpa,* to Bhadrabāhu; and the sixth, *Jita-kalpa,* to Jinabhadra; the first Cūlikā-Sūtra, *Nandī-Sūtra,* to Devarddhi; and the third Mūla-sūtra, *Daśa-vaikālika,* to Svayambhava.

It is therefore evident that books written up to the time of the Valabhī Conference were included in the canon. Perhaps some later works were also included in the Āgama is shown by the enlargement of the list up to fifty. But there is no doubt about a good deal of the material in the Āgama texts being genuinely old as is proved by the absence of any reference to Greek astronomy and the presence of statements which are not altogether favourable to the Śvetāmbara creed, such as Mahāvīra's emphasis on nakedness.

---

5. W. Schubring thinks that the Mūla-Sūtras are 'intended for those who are still at the beginning *(mūla)* of their spiritual career.' Cf. *Wrote Mahāvīras,* p. 1. But it is now generally believed that as they are very old and important texts of Jainism they are probably termed 'Mūla-texts'. Charpentier thinks that they contain 'Mahāvīra's own words' and therefore, they are called Mūla-Sūtras. *(Vide Uttarādhyana-Sūtra,* Introduction, p. 32). This explanation, however, is not accepted by Winternitz. (*Vide HIL,* Vol. II, p. 466 n. 1).

THE JAINA CANON: AN ESTIMATE

The language of these texts is called *ārṣa* by which is meant Ardha-Māgadhī. But it is not uniform in all the texts. The language of the Aṅgas and a few other texts, such as the *Uttarādhyayana*, is evidently older and amongst them the *Ācārāṅga* shows still more archaic forms. The language of the verses generally shows tendencies of an earlier age also. On the whole, the language of this Āgama does not conform fully to the characteristics of any of the Prakrits described by the grammarians; but it shares something with each of them. Therefore Dr Jacobi called this language Old Māhārāṣṭrī or Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī. But this designation has not been accepted and it is simpler and better to call it by its traditional name Ardha-Māgadhī.

Though the contents are quite varied and cover a wide range of human knowledge conceived in those days, the subject-matter of this canonical literature is mainly the ascetic practices of the followers of Mahāvīra. As such, it is essentially didactic dominated by the supreme ethical principle of *ahiṁsā*. But, subject to that, there is a good deal of poetry and philosophy as well as valuable information about contemporary thought and social history including biographical details of Pārśvanātha, Mahāvīra, and their contemporaries. Many narrative pieces, such as those found in the *Uttarādhyayana*, are interesting and instructive and remind one of the personalities and events in the Upaniṣads and the Pali texts. From the historical point of view, the life of Mahāvīra in the *Ācārāṅga*, information about his predecessors and contemporaries in the *Vyākhyā-prajñapti* or *Bhagavatī* and the *Upāsaka-daśāka*, about his successors in the *Kalpa-Sūtra*, and about monachism practised in the days of Mahāvīra in eastern India in *Daśa-vaikālika* are all very valuable.

THE COMMENTARIES ON THE JAINA CANON

A vast literature of commentaries has grown round the Āgamas themselves. The earliest of these works are the *niryuktis*, attributed to Bhadrabāhu. They explain the topics systematically in Prakrit verse, and elaborate them

by narrating legends and episodes. Ten of these works are available.

Then, there are the *bhāṣyas* similarly composed in Prakrit verse. These, in some cases, have been so intermingled with the *niryuktis* that it is now difficult to separate them. The *bhāṣyas* carry the systematization and elaboration further. These texts, of which there are eleven available, are mostly anonymous. The elaborate *bhāṣya* on the *Āvaśyaka-niryukti* is, however, attributed to Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa and that on the *Kalpa-Sūtra* to Saṅghadāsagaṇi.

The *cūrṇis*, of which twenty texts are available, are prose glosses with a curious admixture of Prakrit and Sanskrit. Some of them contain valuable historical information as well. The *Āvaśyaka-cūrṇi*, for example, makes mention of a flood in Śrāvasti, thirteen years after Mahāvīra's enlightenment. The *Niśītha-cūrṇi* contains a reference to Kalakācārya who invited a foreigner to invade Ujjain. All the *cūrṇis* are indiscriminately ascribed to Jinadāsagaṇi.

The last strata of the commentary literature consist of *ṭīkās* which carry the expository and illustrative process to its logical conclusion. They are written in Sanskrit retaining, in many cases, the Prakrit narratives in their original form. The well-known *ṭīkā* writers are Haribhadra, Śīlāṅka, Śānti Sūri, Devendra alias Nemicandra, Abhayadeva, Droṇācārya, Maladhārin Hemacandra, Malayagiri, Kṣemakīrti, Vijayavimala, Śānticandra, and Samayasundara. Their activities were spread over a period of 1,100 years between the sixth and seventeenth centuries. A number of other forms of commentaries called *dīpikās*, *vṛttis*, and *avacūrṇis* are also extant.

JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS ON THE KARMA DOCTRINE

The *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabali, as already mentioned, is the earliest and most authoritative work on Jaina philosophy. Its six sections are *Jīvasthāna*, *Kṣudrakabandha*, *Bandhasvāmitva*, *Vedanā*, *Vargaṇā* and *Mahābandha*. The last of these is almost an independent work and is popularly known as *Mahādhavalā*. It is com-

posed in *sūtras*, the language of which is Śaurasenī Prakrit strongly influenced on the one hand by Ardha-Māgadhī, particularly in its technical phraseology, and on the other by Māhārāṣṭri. It gives a very systematic and thorough exposition of the doctrine of Karma (results of action) which forms the most essential part of Jaina philosophy. The *Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa* of Guṇadharācārya is also devoted to particular aspects of the Karma doctrine. It is composed in 233 *gāthā-sūtras* which have been elaborated by the *cūṛṇi-sūtras* of Yativṛṣabha. Many commentaries are said to have been written on these works but the only one now available to us is the *Dhavalā* of Vīrasena on the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* and the *Jayadhavalā* of Vīrasena and Jinasena on the *Kaṣāya-pāhuḍa* written during the ninth century in Śaurasenī Prakrit. They are very voluminous and masterly. During the tenth century, their subject-matter was compressed by Nemicandra Siddhāntacakravartin in his *Gommaṭasāra (Jīva-kāṇḍa* and *Karmakāṇḍa)*, the *Labdhisāra*, and the *Kṣapaṇasāra* in about 2,400 *gāthā* verses. These works now form the basis of studies in Jaina philosophy, particularly amongst the Digambaras.

The Śvetāmbara literature on the Karma doctrine, besides the canonical works, consists of the six *karmagranthas*, separately called *Karmavipāka, Karmastava, Bandhasvāmitva, Ṣaḍaśīti, Śataka*, and *Saptaṭikā* of uncertain authorship and date, and also the *Kamma-payaḍi* of Śivaśarman and the *Pañcasaṅgraha* of Candrarṣi, all composed in *gāthā-sūtras* and covering the same ground in subject-matter as the works of Nemicandra.

OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

Next to the Karma doctrine in religious importance are the duties and practices of monks and householders. The earliest work on this subject amongst the Digambaras is the *Mūlārādhanā* of Śivārya which contains 2,166 Prakrit verses giving an exposition of the four devotions, namely, faith, knowledge, conduct, and austerities, but at the same time dealing with practically all aspects of Jainism. Narrative and descriptive elements are also not wanting in the work. At places the poet in the author gets the better of the

religious teacher, and he flashes forth in beautiful fancies and figures of speech. The *Mūlācāra* of Vaṭṭakera prescribes, in a thoroughly systematic manner, in about 1,250 Prakrit verses, the duties, practices, and observances of ascetics. The work has close affinities with the *Mūlārādhanā* of Śivārya as well as with the Āgama texts of the Śvetāmbaras dealing with similar topics. The *Kārttikeyānuprekṣā* of Kumāra contains, in 500 Prakrit verses, a beautiful exposition of the twelve reflections recommended for the promotion of the feeling of renunciation.

But the author who exercised the greatest and the most dominant influence on Jaina literature and gave form and shape to the Digambara creed as it exists today is Kundakundācārya. Tradition ascribes to him a large number of works of which more than a dozen texts called *pāhuḍas(prābhṛtas)* are now available. They are on the subjects of *Darśana* (36 verses), *Cāritra* (44), *Sūtra* (27), *Bodha* (62), *Bhāva* (163), *Mokṣa* (106), *Liṅga* (22), *Śīla* (40), *Ratna* (162), *Dvādaśānuprekṣā* (91), *Niyamasāra* (187), *Pañcāstikāya* (180), *Pravacanasāra*, and *Samayasāra* (415). The last three works are particularly popular and the *Samayasāra* is regarded as the author's best and most sacred production on spiritual topics. The works of Kundakundācārya may be regarded as the earliest models of that ascetic poetry and philosophy which became so popular through a long line of Jaina, Buddhist, and Hindu saints, cutting across all communal barriers.

The dates of these saintly compositions are uncertain, and all that may be said about them is that they belong to the early centuries. To the tenth century belongs Devasena whose works, the *Bhāvanāsaṅgraha*, the *Ārādhanāsāra*, the *Tattvasāra*, and the *Darśanasāra*, besides their religious and moral exposition, contain important and interesting information about the origin and development of various *saṅghas* in the Jaina community. The *Śrāvaka-prajñapti* among the Śvetāmbaras and the *Śrāvakācāra* among the Digambaras are the two Prakrit manuals of duties for lay adherents.

The religio-moral instructions found in these works form the subject-matter of a few very interesting antholo-

gies. *Vajjālaggā* of Jayavallabha contains about 700 verses grouped in topics such as poetry, friendship, fate, and poverty. It is a beautiful example of lyrical poetry in Prakrit and is almost non-sectarian. The *Upadeśamālā* of Dharmadāsa contains 540 verses devoted to moral preaching, particularly for monks. The author is claimed to be a contemporary of Mahāvīra. Tradition, at any rate, shows the great reverence and high esteem that the work commands. It is certainly earlier than the ninth century when its commentary was written. *Jivasamāsa* and *Bhavabhāvanā* of Maladhārin Hemacandra (twelfth century) contain more than 500 Prakrit stanzas of a didactic nature.

The essence of Jaina dialectics is found in its Nayavāda theory of view-points, and in Prakrit the *Sammatitarka* of Siddhasena and the *Nayacakra* of Devasena are the most important contributions on the subject. Jaina cosmology is very thoroughly described in the *Triloka-prajñapti* of Yativṛṣabha, the *Trilokasāra* of Nemicandra, and the *Jambudvīpa-prajñapti* of Padmanandin, all in Prakrit verse.

JAINA LITERATURE IN SANSKRIT

The language of Jaina literature was primarily the Prakrits which were prevalent amongst the people at one time or the other in different parts of the country. But Sanskrit was not altogether shunned. Amongst the Jains, the earliest work in Sanskrit devoted to religious writing is the *Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra* of Umāsvāmin which epitomizes the whole Jaina creed in about 375 *sūtras* arranged in ten chapters. The work occupies a unique position in Jaina literature as it is recognized as authoritative equally by the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras with a few variations in the readings, and is very widely studied by both. It has been commented upon by the most eminent authors of both the sects. There is an old *bhāṣya* on it which the Śvetāmbaras claim to be by the author of the *sūtras* himself. But this claim is not admitted by the Digambaras who regard the *Sarvārtha-siddhi-vṛtti* of Pūjyapāda (sixth century) as the earliest commentary. Pūjyapāda has made full use of the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama-Sūtra* in explaining some *sūtras* of this work.

The next commentary on it is *Tattvārtha-rāja-vārttika* of Akalaṅka (eighth century) which offers more detailed explanations of the *sūtras*, as well as of the important statements of Pūjyapāda. The *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* of Vidyānandin (ninth century) gives expositions in verse and makes valuable clarifications. For yogic practices, the *Jñānārṇava* of Śubhacandra and the *Yogaśāstra* of Hemacandra are valuable guides, while the *Ratna-karaṇḍa-śrāvakācāra* is more popular amongst the laity. Jaina Sanskrit literature is considerably enriched by a series of works on Nyāya (logic) begun by Samantabhadra and Siddhasena Divākara and followed up by Akalaṅka, Vidyānandin, Prabhācandra, Māṇikyanandin, Hemacandra, and many others.

JAINA NARRATIVE LITERATURE IN SANSKRIT AND PRAKRIT

The narrative literature of Jainism has mostly as its subject-matter the life of one or more of its sixty-three great men, called *triṣaṣṭi-śalākā-puruṣāḥ*. These are the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras, twelve Cakravartins, nine Baladevas, nine Nārāyaṇas, and nine Prati-Nārāyaṇas. In the lives of the Tīrthaṅkaras the five auspicious events *(kalyāṇaka)* namely, conception, birth, renunciation, enlightenment, and salvation, receive special attention from the poets. The conquest of the six sub-divisions of Bhārata-khaṇḍa is the main achievement of the Cakravartins. The Baladevas are charged with the special responsibility of getting rid of the tyrants of their times, the Prati-Nārāyaṇas, with the assistance of the Nārāyaṇas. They form triples. Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, and Rāvaṇa form one triple while Balarāma, Kṛṣṇa, and Jarāsandha form another, these two triples being the last of these nine triples; it is they who, next to the Tīrthaṅkaras, have inspired most of the narrative poetry. Descriptions of the universe and of the past lives of the persons under discussion, the introduction of numerous subsidiary stories to illustrate one point or another, and occasional discourses on religious topics are some of the other features of this Purāṇic literature. The narration as a rule begins in the saintly assembly of Lord Mahāvīra with a query from Śreṇika, the king of Magadha, and the reply

is given by the chief disciple of the Tīrthaṅkara, namely, Gautama. A rich literature of this kind is found, written in Prakrit and Sanskrit as well as in Apabhraṁśa.

The earliest epic available is the *Paümacariya* of Vimala Sūri, in 118 chapters, which gives the Jaina version of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. It has marked differences from the work of Vālmīki which was, no doubt, known to the author. The language is chaste Māhārāṣṭrī Prakrit and the style is fluent and occasionally ornate. Just as Vālmīki is the *ādikavi* of Sanskrit, Vimala Sūri may be called the pioneer of Prakrit *kāvya* (poetry). According to the author's own statement, the work was produced 530 years after Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa* (that is, at the beginning of the first century A.D.).

The *Padma-carita* of Ravisena (seventh century) in Sanskrit follows closely Vimala Sūri's work, and the same epic is beautifully rendered in Apabhraṁśa by Svayambhū (eighth century), and later on by Raidhu. The linguistic interest and poetic charm of the Apabhraṁśa works are remarkable as they set the model for the earliest epics of Jayasi and Tulasīdāsa in Hindi.

Jinasena's *Harivaṁśa Purāṇa* (eighth century) is the earliest Jaina epic on the subject of the *Mahābhārata*, the chief heroes being the twenty-second Tīrthaṅkara Neminātha and his cousin Kṛṣṇa Nārāyaṇa. The Apabhraṁśa version of it is beautified by the genius of Svayambhū and his later followers, Dhavalā and Yaśaḥkīrti.

The most comprehensive work, and again the earliest of its kind, is the *Mahāpurāṇa* of Jinasena and Guṇabhadra (ninth century). The first part of it, called the *Ādipurāṇa*, ends with the *nirvāṇa* of the first Tīrthaṅkara, Ādinātha or Ṛṣabhadeva, while the second part, called *Uttarapurāṇa*, narrates the lives of the rest of the Tīrthaṅkaras, and the remaining *śalākā-puruṣas*. The work of Jinasena may be called the Jaina encyclopaedia. It enlightens its readers on almost every topic regarding religion, philosophy, morals, and rituals. The philosophical knowledge of the author is demonstrated by his commentary, the *Jayadhavalā*, and his poetic ability is evinced by his *Pārśvābhyudaya-kāvya* in which he has transformed the lyrical poem *Meghaduta* by Kālidāsa into an equally charming epic on the life of the

twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara. This whole *Mahāpurāṇa* has been rendered into Apabhraṁśa with commensurate skill and in charming style by Puṣpadanta in his *Tisatthi-mahāpuriṣa-guṇālaṅkāra* (tenth century). Another Sanskrit version of it is found in the *Triṣaṣṭi-śalākāpuruṣa-carita* of Hemacandra which again has a charm of its own. Its historical value is enhanced by the additional section called the *Pariśiṣṭaparvan* or *Sthavirāvalī-carita* which gives valuable information about the Jaina community after Mahāvīra's *nirvāṇa*.

BIOGRAPHIES OF SAGES AND SAINTS IN SANSKRIT AND PRAKRIT

A large number of works have been written on the lives of individual Tīrthaṅkaras, and other personages of the hierarchy, in Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Apabhraṁśa. The more important of these are:

In Sanskrit: Life of the twelfth Tīrthaṅkara, Vāsupūjya, by Vardhamāna Sūri; life of the thirteenth Tīrthaṅkara, Vimala, by Kṛṣṇadeva; life of the fifteenth Tīrthaṅkara, Dharmanātha, by Haricandra; lives of the sixteenth Tīrthaṅkara, Śāntinātha, by Deva Sūri, Māṇikyanandin, and Sakalakīrti; lives of the twenty-second Tīrthaṅkara, Neminātha, by Vāgbhaṭṭa and Surācārya; and lives of the twenty-third Tīrthaṅkara, Pārśvanātha, by Jinasena, Vādirāja (eleventh century), Bhāvadeva, and Māṇikyacandra.

In Prakrit: *Ādināthacaria* of Vardhamāna (eleventh century), *Sumatināthacaria* of Somaprabha (twelfth century), *Supāsanāhacaria* of Lakṣmaṇagaṇi, and *Mahāvīracaria* of Guṇacandra and also of Devendra.

In Apabhraṁśa: The *Mehesaracariu* of Raidhu (fifteenth century) on the life of the first Tīrthaṅkara; the *Candappahacariu* of Yaśaḥkīrti (fifteenth century); the *Sāntināhacariu* of Mahīcandra (sixteenth century); the *Nemināhacariu* of Haribhadra (eighth century), of Dāmodara (thirteenth century), and of Lakhmadeva (sixteenth century), the *Pasanāhacariu* of Padmakīrti (tenth century), of Śrīdhara (twelfth century), of Asavāla (fifteenth century), and of

Raidhu; and the *Vaddhamānacariu* of Śrīdhara and of Jayamitra.

There is also a very vast literature in all the three languages concerning the lives of persons who attained fame for their religious zeal and sacrifice. The *Yaśastilaka-campū* of Somadeva (tenth century), the *Tilakamañjarī* of Dhanapāla (tenth century), the *Jīvandhara-campū* of Vādibha siṁha and of Haricandra are some of the Sanskrit works which belong to this category. The foregoing works are also noteworthy for their style which admits of an admixture of prose and verse, as well as for their diction which vies with the best prose style of the Sanskrit *kathās* and *ākhyāyikās*.

In Prakrit, the *Vasudeva-hiṇḍī* of Saṅghadāsagaṇi is remarkable for its style, and content, as are the *Samarāicca-kahā* of Haribhadra and the *Kuvalayamālā* of Udyotana Sūri which are also valuable for their mature literary style. The *Surasundarīcaria* of Dhaneśvara (eleventh century) and the *Pañcami-kahā* of Maheśvara (eleventh century) are other poems in Prakrit which are interesting for their story, flowing narrative, and poetic embellishment.

In Apabhraṁśa, some beautiful poems of this kind are the *Nāyakumāracariu* and the *Jasaharacariu* of Puṣpadanta; the *Bhavisatta-kahā* of Dhanapāla, and *Karakaṇḍacariu* of Kanakāmara.

JAINA SHORT STORIES

Jaina literature abounds in short stories written primarily for religious instruction, but which also serve for amusement. The best and oldest examples of these are found in the Sanskrit *Kathā-koṣa* of Hariṣeṇa (tenth century) and the Apabhraṁśa *Kathā-koṣa* of Śrīcandra (eleventh century). Some unique examples of satire intended for religious edification are found in the Prakrit *Dhūrtākhyāna* of Haribhadra, in the Apabhraṁśa *Dharma-parīkṣā* of Hariṣeṇa, and in the Sanskrit *Dharma-parīkṣā* of Amitagati (eleventh century).

STOTRAS AND LYRICS

Lyrical poetry in Jaina literature found expression in

hymns addressed to the Tīrthaṁkaras and holy saints. The *Bhaktāmbara-stotra* of Mānatuṅga and the *Kalyāṇa-mandira-stotra* of Vādirāja, the *Viṣāpahāra-stotra* of Dhanañjaya and the *Jina-caturviṁśatikā* of Bhūpāla are charming examples of these devotional songs.

A very large number of Jaina works are still lying in store in various places, and new works of considerable antiquity are coming to light every day. This literature has a beauty and grandeur of its own in form, matter, and spirit. The Jains never showed partiality for one language, like the Brāhmaṇas for Sanskrit and the Buddhists for Pali. Instead, they cultivated all the languages of their time and place, devoting almost equal attention to each. Even the Dravidian languages of the South were not neglected, and the earliest literature in Tamil and Kannada is found to have been developed and enriched by Jaina contributions. This literature was not meant as a pastime or as mere pedantry, but for the cultivation of those virtues without which man, through his so-called progress, may be led to his doom. Signs of this danger are not wanting in the present set-up of world forces and the trend of events. If humanity is to fulfil its role of establishing peace on earth and goodwill amongst mankind, it must extricate itself from greed and selfishness. In the task of realizing human destiny, Jaina literature, with its lessons of nobility and the virtue of tolerance, and with its message of non-violence, love for humanity, and supremacy of the spiritual over the material gain, has much to offer to mankind.

BRĀHMAṆIC AND ŚRAMAṆIK CULTURES —A COMPARATIVE STUDY

We cannot understand Indian culture completely without understanding its different constituents, i.e. Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism. So, one thing must be clear in our mind that studies and researches in the field of Indology are not possible in isolation. In fact, Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism are so intermingled and mutually influenced that to have a proper understanding of one, the understanding of the others is essential.

However, two distinct trends have been prevalent in Indian culture from its earliest days, known as Brāhmaṇic and Śramaṇik. No doubt, these two trends are distinguishable but at the same time we must be aware of the fact that they are not separable. Though on the basis of some peculiarities in theory, we can distinguish them, yet in practice, it is very difficult to bifurcate them because neither of the two remained uninfluenced by the other. The earlier Śramaṇik trends and its later phases, Jainism and Buddhism, were influenced by the Vedic tradition but at the same time they also influenced it. The concepts of tapas or austerity, ascetism, liberation, meditation, equanimity, and non-violence, which were earlier absent in the Vedas, came into existence in Hinduism through Śramaṇik influence. The Upanishads and the *Gītā* evolved some new spiritual definitions of Vedic rituals. Both are the representatives of the dialogue which had taken place in the Ś maṇik and Vedic traditions.

T Upaniṣadic trend of Hinduism is not a pure form of Vedic religion. It incorporated in itself various Śramaṇik tenets which gave a new dimension to Vedic religion. Thus we can say that our Hinduism is an intermingling of Vedic and Śramaṇik traditions.The voice which was raised by our

ancient Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis, Munis, and Śramaṇas against the ritualistic and worldly outlook of caste-ridden Brāhmiṇism, became more strong in the forms of Jainism and Buddhism along with other minor Śramaṇik sects. Thus the Upaniṣadic trend as well as Jainism and Buddhism provided refuge to those fed up with Vedic ritualism and the worldly outlook on life. Not only Jainism and Buddhism but some other sects and schools of Indian thought such as Ājīvakas and Sāṁkhyas also adopted more or less the same view towards Vedic ritualism. However, Jainism and Buddhism were more candid and vehement in their opposition towards Vedic ritualism. They outrightly rejected animal sacrifices in *yajnas*, the birth-based caste-system, and the infallibility of the Vedas. In Mahāvīra and Buddha, the most prominent preachers (exponents), we find the real crusaders; whose tirade against caste-ridden and ritualistic Brāhminism, which was touching a low watermark and crumbling under its inner inadequacies, gave a severe jolt to it. Jainism and Buddhism came forward to sweep away the long-accumulated excrescence which had grown on Indian culture in the form of rituals, casteism, and superstitions.

But we shall be mistaken if we presume that in their attempt to clear away the dirt of Vedic ritualism, Jainism and Buddhism remained untouched. They were also considerably influenced by Vedic rituals. Ritualism in the new form of Ṭāntric practices crept into Jainism and Buddhism and became part and parcel of their religious practices and mode of worship. With the impact of Hindu Tāntricism, Jainas adopted various Hindu deities and their mode of worship with some changes, which were suited to their religious temperament but were alien to Jainism in its pure form. The Jaina concept of *Śmaśān Devatās* or *Yakṣa-Yakṣis* is nothing but a Jain version of Hindu deities. As I have pointed out earlier, the influence has been reciprocal. This can be demonstrated by the fact that on one side Hinduism accepted Ṛṣabha and Buddha as Incarnation of God while on the other Jainism included Rāma and Kṛṣṇa in its list of *Śalāka Puruṣas*. A number of Hindu Gods and Goddesses were accepted as consorts of *Tīrthaṁkaras* such

as Saraswatī, Lakṣmī, Kālī, Mahākālī, Cakreśwarī, Ambikā, Padmāvatī, and Siddhikā.

The moot point I intend to make is that different religious traditions of our great Indian culture have borrowed various concepts from one another and that it is a duty to study and highlight this mutual impact, which is the need of the hour, and thus bridge the gulf existing between different religious systems.

Though it is true that the Śramaṇik tradition in general and Jainism and Buddhism in particular have some distinct features discriminating them from the Vedic or Brāhmaṇic tradition, yet they are not foreigners. They are the children of the same soil who came forward with a spirit of reform. It is sometimes mistakenly thought that Jainism and Buddhism were a revolt against Brāhmaṇism. Western scholars in particular maintain this notion. But here I would like to say that it was not revolt but reform. In fact, Vedic and Śramaṇik traditions are not rival traditions as some Western and Indian scholars think. There seems to have been a deliberate effort to create a gulf between Jainism and Buddhism on the one hand and Hinduism on the other, by Western scholars. Unfortunately some Indian scholars, even Jain scholars, also supported their views but in my humble opinion this was a step in the wrong direction. It is true that Śramaṇik and Vedic traditions have divergent views on certain religious and philosophical issues; their ideals of living also differ considerably. But this does not mean that they are rivals or enemies of each other. As passions and reason, *śreya* and *preya*, in spite of being different in their very nature, are the components of human personality, so is the case with Śramaṇik and Vedic traditions. Though inheriting distinct features, they are the components of one whole Indian culture. Jainism and Buddhism were not rivals to Hinduism, but what they preached to the Indian society was an advance stage in the field of spirituality compared to Vedic ritualism.

If the Upaniṣadic trend, in spite of taking a divergent stand from Vedic ritualism, is considered part and parcel of Hinduism, what is the difficulty in measuring Jainism and

Buddhism with the same yardstick? Again if Sāṁkhyas and Mimāṁsakas, Advaitists and Dvaitists, in spite of having different philosophies and pathways, belong to the same Hinduism, why not Jainism and Buddhism ? If the Upaniṣadic tradition is considered an advance from Vedic ritualism to spirituality, then we have to admit that Buddhism and Jainism have also followed the same path with a more enthusiastic spirit. They worked for the betterment of weaker sections of Indian society and redemption from priesthood and ritualism. They preached the religion of common men, which was founded on the firm footing of moral virtue instead of on some external rituals.

Today, researchers in the field of Jainology need a new approach to reinterpret the relationship between Jainism, Buddhism, and Hinduism—particularly the Upaniṣadic trend—in the light of ancient Jaina texts such as *Ācāranga, Sutrakṛtāṅga,* and *Iśibhāṣiyaim.* I am confident that an impartial and careful study of these texts will remove the misconception that Jainism and Hinduism are rival religions. In *Ācāranga* we find a number of passages similar to those of the Upaniṣads in word and style as well as essence. *Ācāranga* mentions Śramaṇa and Brāhmaṇa simultaneously. This proves that for the preacher of *Ācāranga,* Śramana and Brāhmana are not rival traditions as they were considered later. In *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* we find mention of some Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis such as Videhanami, Bāhuk, Asita Devala, Dvaipāyana, and Parāśara. They were accepted as the Ṛṣis of their own traditions though they followed a different code of conduct. *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* addresses them as great ascetics *(tapodhvā)* and great men *(mahāpuruṣa)* who attained the ultimate goal of life, i.e. liberation.

Ṛṣibhāṣita, which was considered as a part of Jaina canon, also mentions the teachings of Nārada, Asita Devala, Angirās, Parasara, Aruna, Nārāyana, Yājnavalkya, Uddālaka, Vidura, and others. They have been called *Arhat* Ṛṣis. Its writing in the Jaina tradition is a sign of the tolerance and openness of Jainism on the one hand, and on the other hand it shows that the stream of Indian spirituality is one

at its source, irrespective of being divided later into the Upaniṣadic, Buddhist, Jain, Ājīvak, and other rivulets. This work is a clear proof of the assimilative and tolerant nature of Indian thought. Today when we are deeply bogged down in communal separatism and strife, this great work could be an enlightening guide.

Thus the position these Upaniṣadic Ṛṣis held in early books of Jainism is clear evidence that the stream of Indian spirituality is one at its source. We cannot have a proper understanding of these trends if we treat them in isolation. *Ācāranga, Sūtrakṛtavya,* and *Ṛṣibhāṣita* may be understood in a better way only in the light of the Upaniṣads and vice versa; similarly the *Sūttanipāta, Dhammapada, Thergatha,* and other works of the Pāli canon can be properly studied only in the light of the Prākṛta Jaina canon and the Upaniṣads. Now I will speak a few words on the relevance of Jainism and Jainist studies in the present era.

NEED OF OUR AGE

The growth of scientific knowledge and outlook has destroyed our superstitions and false dogmas. But unfortunately and surprisingly it has shaken our faith in spiritual and human values. Today we know more about the atom and atomic forces than the values needed for a meaningful and peaceful life. Nowadays, due to tremendous advancement of science and technology, we have light-legged means of transportation. Physical distance is no bar to meeting people of different nationalities, cultures, and religions, and consequently we have come closer and more dependent on each other as we were never before. Our world is shrinking, but unluckily, the distance between our hearts is increasing day by day. Instead of developing mutual love and co-operation, we are spreading hatred and hostility and thus ignoring the values of co-existence and co-operation which are essential for our very existence. Rabindranath Tagore rightly observes, 'For men to come near to one another and yet to continue to ignore the claims of humanity is a sure process of suicide.' The advancement of our knowledge could not sublimate our animal and selfish nature. The

animal nature within us is still dominating our individual and social behaviour. And due to this, our life is full of excitement, emotional disorder, and mental tension. Though we are outwardly pleading for peace, non-violence, and co-existence, at heart we still have strong faith in the law of jungle, i.e. the dictum 'might is right'. The race of nuclear weapons of the powerful nations is strong evidence of our belief in this dictum. This race of nuclear weapons is a sign that we are proceeding towards a formidable funeral procession of mankind. Bertrand Russell, the eminent philosopher, implores us, 'I appeal as a human being to human beings, remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so the way lies open to a new paradise. If you cannot, nothing lies before you, but universal death.' We must be aware of the fact that this growth of science, technology, and commerce would lose its meaning if man is to eternally doubt others and ignore the claims to humanity. Iqbal has also rightly said :

Tumhāri tehzeebān āpne hāthon se khudā-
kuśk karegi ;
Jo sakhe nāzuk pe āśiyānā banegā nā
paye darā hogā.

O men ! your civilization will commit suicide by your own hands, the nest built on a very weak twig will be without foundation.

Today the only way for man to survive is to develop a firm belief in the principles of non-violence and mutual co-operation. It is the misfortune of mankind that on the one hand it wants peace and prosperity but on the other hand it still has a belief in the dictum 'might is right', i.e. violence. Peace and violence are contradictory, since through violence we cannot achieve peace.

Peace achieved through violence and war is the peace of the cremation ground and not a living peace. In *Ācāranga*, Mahāvīra said : *atthi sattham parena param, nātthi asattham parena param.* There are weapons superior to each other, but nothing is superior to *asastra*, i.e. non-violence. Peace

can be established and prosperity can be secured on earth through non-violence, mutual faith, co-operation, and the sacrifice of one's own interest for the sake of others.

THE MEANING OF PEACE

The term 'peace' has various connotations. It means freedom from, or cessation of, mental or spiritual disturbances or conflicts arising from passion and sense of guilt. It also means freedom from, or cessation of, war or hostilities. Intrinsically peace means a state of tranquillity of mind. It is inner peace or peace of mind. But extrinsically peace means cessation of war and hostilities. It is external peace of, or peace in, society. Peace requires a soul emptied of passions and desires. According to St. Aquinas, peace implies two things : first, we should not be disturbed by external things and second, our desires should find rest in one. This inner peace can also be described from negative and positive view-points. Negatively it is the state of the cessation of all the passions and desires. It is freedom from the victors of attachment and aversion. Positively it is the state of bliss and contentment. But these positive and negative aspects of inner peace are like the two sides of the same coin; they could not exist without each other. As far as outer peace or peace in society is concerned, it can be defined negatively as a cessation of war and hostilities and positively as a state of social harmony and co-existence. The real external peace is more than non-war. It is a vital peace. The real peace means progress of human race as a whole. But we must be aware of the fact that this external or environmental peace depends on the inner peace of individuals, since it is only an outcome of inner peace. These various phases of peace are not mutually exclusive, but inclusive. The peace of society is disturbed when the mental peace of individuals is disturbed and vice versa. Hostilities and wars are the expression and outcome of the aggressive and selfish mentality of individuals. Though the social conditions and disorder may be responsible for the disturbance of mental peace, yet they cannot disturb the persons who are spiritually strong. The inner peace of the

soul is the cause and the peace of the society is the effect, and so we must try first to attain inner peace or peace of the soul.

According to the Jaina view-point, inner peace or tranquillity is an essential nature of the self and it is also the ultimate goal of life. In an earlier Jaina text known as *Ācāranga* we have two definitions of religion, one as tranquillity and the other as non-violence. Lord Mahāvīra says, 'Worthy people preached the religion as *samai*.' The Prākṛt term *'samai'* means tranquillity or peace of mind is considered as the core of religion, because it is the real nature of all living beings including human beings. In another Jaina text known as *Bhagavati-sutra* there is a conversation between Lord Mahāvīra and Gautama. Gautama asked Mahāvīra, 'What is the nature of ṣoul ?' Mahavira answered, 'The nature of the soul is tranquillity/peace.' Gautama again asked, 'What is the ultimate end of the soul?' And Mahāvīra replied, 'The ultimate and of the soul is also to attain tranquillity/peace.'

In Jainism, religion is nothing but a practice for the realization of one's own essential nature or *sva-svabhāva* which is nothing but the state of tranquillity or peace of mind. This enjoying of one's own essential nature means to remain constant in *sākṣībhāva*, i.e. to remain undisturbed by external factors. It is the state of pure subjectivity which is technically known in Jainism as *sāmayika*. In this state the mind is completely free from constant flickering, excitement, and emotional disorder. To get freedom from mental tensions, which are the *vibhāvas* or impure states of mind, is the precondition for enjoying spiritual happiness which is also a positive aspect of inner peace. Nobody wants to live in a state of mental tension, everyone would like no tension but relaxation, no anxiety but contentment. This shows that our real nature is working in us for tranquillity or mental peace. Religion is nothing but a way of achieving this inner peace. According to Jainism, the duty of a religious order is to explain the means by which man can achieve this peace, inner as well as external. In Jainism this method of achieving mental and environmental peace is called

sāmayika, which is the first and foremost duty among six essential duties of monks and householders. Now the question is how this peace can be attained. According to the Jaina view-point, it is through the practice of non-attachment or non-hoarding *(aparigraha* or *asaṁgraha)*, non-violence *(ahiṁsā)*, and non-absolutism *(anekānta* or *anāgraha)* that we establish peace and harmony in the world.

ATTACHMENT THE CAUSE OF MENTAL TENSIONS

As I have already mentioned, the most burning problem of our age is the problem of mental tension. Nations that claim to be more civilized and more economically advanced are much more in the grip of mental tension. The main object of Jainism is to emancipate man from his sufferings and mental tensions. First of all, we must know the cause of these mental tensions. For Jainism the basic human suffering is not physical, but mental. Mental suffering or tension is due to our attachment to worldly objects. It is attachment which is fully responsible for them. The famous Jaina text *Uttaradhyayana-sūtra* states, 'The root of all suffering, physical as well as mental, of everybody, including gods, is attachment to the objects of worldly enjoyment.' It is attachment which is the root cause of mental tension. Only a detached attitude towards the objects of worldly enjoyment can free mankind from mental tension. According to Lord Mahāvīra, 'to remain attached to sensuous objects is to remain in the whirl.' He says, 'Misery is gone in the case of a man who has no delusion, while delusion is gone in the case of a man who has no desire; desire is gone in the case of a man who has no greed, while greed is gone in the case of a man who has no attachment.' The efforts made to satisfy human desires through material objects can be likened to the chopping off of the branches while watering the roots. Thus we can conclude that the lust for and the attachment to the objects of worldly pleasure is the sole cause of human suffering.

If mankind is to be freed from mental tension, it is necessary to grow a detached outlook on life. Jainism believes

that the lesser the attachment, the greater the mental peace. It is only when attachment vanishes that the human mind will be free from mental tension and emotional disorders.

NON-VIOLENCE AS A MEANS TO PEACE

Tranquillity is a personal or inner experience of peace. When it is applied in social life or is practised outwardly, it becomes non-violence. Non-violence is a social or outer expression of this inner peace. In *Ācāranga*, Lord Mahāvīra remarks,

> The worthy men of the past, present, and future all say thus, speak thus, declare thus, explain thus : all breathing, existing, living and sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented. This is the pure, eternal and unchangeable law or the tenet of religion.

In other words, non-violence is the eternal and pure form of religion. In Jainism non-violence is the pivot on which its whole ethics revolves. In other words, violence represents all the vices and non-violence represents all the virtues. Non-violence is not a single virture, but it is a group of virtues. In the *Prasnavyākaraṇa-sutra*, the term 'non-violence' is equated with sixty virtuous qualities, namely : peace, harmony, welfare, trust, fearlessness, etc. Thus non-violence is a wide term, which comprehends all the good qualities and virtues.

The concept of non-violence and regard for life is accepted by almost all the religions of the world. But none of the religions observes it so minutely as Jainism. Jainism prohibits not only killing of human beings and animals but also killing of vegetable life. To hurt the plants is also an act of violence or *himsā*. Its basic principle is that life, in whatever form it may be, should be respected. We have no right to take another's life, because everyone wants to live as we do. The *Dāsavaikālika* mentions that everyone wants to live and not to die, for this simple reason, Niggaṇṭhas prohibit violence. It can be said that the Jaina concept of

non-violence is not practical, even then we cannot challenge its relevance for human society. Though Jainism sets as its goal the ideal of total non-violence, external as well as internal, the realization of this ideal in practical life is by no means easy. Non-violence is a spiritual ideal which is fully realizable only on the spiritual plane. The real life of an individual is a physico-spiritual complex; at this level complete non-violence is not possible. A person can proceed towards the fullness of non-violent life only when he rises above the physical level.

All human beings have an equal right to lead a peaceful life. Though violence is unavoidable, yet it cannot be the guiding principle of our lives, because it goes against the judgement of our faculty of reasoning and the concept of natural law. If I think that nobody has any right to take my life, then on the ground of the same reasoning I also have no right to take another's life. The principle of equality propounds that everyone has a right to live. The directive principle of living is not 'Living on others' or 'Living by killing,' but 'Living with others' or 'Living for others'.

Though in our world complete non-violence is not possible, yet our motto should be 'Lesser killing is better living'.

Further we must be aware of the fact that in Jainism non-violence is not merely a negative concept, i.e. not to kill; but it has a positive side also, as service to mankind. Once a question was put to Mahāvīra, 'O Lord, one person is rendering his services to the needy persons, while the other is offering puja to you; among these two, who is the real follower of yours?' Mahāvīra answered, 'The first one is the real follower of mine, because he is following my teachings.'

Though violence in some form or other is inevitable in our life, yet on this basis we cannot conclude that non-violence is not necessary at all. Just as violence is inevitable for living, non-violence is also inevitable for social living. As far as the existence of human society is concerned, it depends on mutual co-operation, sacrifice of self-interest for the sake of fellow-beings, and regard for others' life. If the above-

mentioned elements are essential for our social life, how can we say that non-violence is not necessary for human life? Society exists not on violence but on non-violence, not on fulfilment of self-interest but on the sacrifice of self-interest, not on claiming our own rights but on accepting the rights of others as our duty. Thus we can say that non-violence is an inevitable principle for the existence of human society. At present we are living in an age of nuclear weapons and due to this the existence of the human race is in danger. At present it is only the firm faith in, and the observance of, non-violence that can save the human race. It is mutual trust and the belief in the equality of human beings which can restore peace and harmony in human society.

REGARD FOR OTHERS' IDEOLOGIES AND FAITHS

Jainism holds that reality is complex. It can be looked at and understood from various view-points or angles. For example, we can have hundreds of photographs of one tree from different angles. Though all of them give a true picture of it, yet they differ from each other. Not only this but neither each of them, nor the total of them can give us a complete picture of that tree. They individually as well as jointly will give only a partial picture of it. So is the case with human knowledge and understanding: we can have only a partial and relative picture of reality, we can know and describe the reality only from a certain angle or view-point. Though every angle or view-point can claim that it gives a picture of reality, yet it gives only a partial and relative picture of reality. In fact, we cannot challenge its validity or truth-value, but at the sametime we must be aware of the fact that it is only a partial truth or one-sided view. One who knows only partial truth or has a one-sided picture of reality, has no right to discard the views of his opponents as totally false. We must admit that the views of our opponents may also be true. The Jaina theory of Anekāntavāda emphasizes the truth that all the approaches to reality give partial but true pictures of reality, and because of their truth-value from a certain angle, we should have regard for others' ideologies and faiths. Thus Anekāntavāda forbids us to be dogmatic and

one-sided in our approach. It preaches a broader outlook and open-mindedness, which is essential to solve the conflicts caused by differences in ideologies and faiths. Prof. T. G. Kalghatgi rightly observes, 'The spirit of Anekānta is very much necessary in society, specially in the present day, when conflicting ideologies are trying to assert supremacy aggressively'. Anekānta brings the spirit of intellectual and social tolerance.

For the present-day society what is awfully needed is the virtue of tolerance. This virtue of tolerance, i.e. regard for others' ideologies and faiths, is maintained in Jainism from the very beginning. Mahāvīra mentions in the *Sūtrakṛtānga*, 'Those who praise their own faiths and ideologies and blame those of their opponents and thus distort the truth will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death.' Jaina philosophers always maintain that all the view-points are true in respect of what they have themselves to say, but they are false in so far as they totally refute others' view-points. Here I would like to quote some beautiful verses of Haribhadra (8th century A.D.) and Hemchandra (12th Century A.D.), which are the best examples of religious tolerance. Haribhadra says : 'I bear no bias towards Lord Mahāvīra and no disregard to Kapila and other saints and thinkers, whatsoever is rational and logical ought to be accepted.' Hemchandra says : 'I bow to all those who have overcome the attachment and hatred that are the cause of worldly existence, be they Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śiva or Jina.'

Jaina saints have tried at all times to maintain harmony among different religious faiths and they tried to avoid religious conflicts. That is why Jainism has survived through the ages.

The basic problems of the present society are mental tension, violence, and the conflicts between different ideologies and faiths. Jainism has tried to solve these problems of mankind through the three basic tenets of non-attachment *(aparigraha)*, non-violence *(ahiṁsā)*, and non-absolutism *(anekānta)*. If mankind observes these three principles, peace and harmony can certainly be established in the world.

I would like to conclude my paper by quoting a beautiful verse of religious tolerance by Ācārya Amitagati :

Sattveṣu maitṛṁ guṇiṣu pramodaṁ
kliṣṭeṣu jīveṣu kṛpāparatvam ;
Madhyasthabhāvaṁ viparita vratau
sadā mamātmā vidadhātu Deva.

(Oh Lord! I should be friendly to all the creatures of the world and feel delight in meeting the virtuous people. I should always be helpful to those who are in miserable conditions and indifferent to my opponents.)

REFLECTIONS ON ANUVRATA – THE DOCTRINE OF SMALL VOWS

Jainism may simply be defined as a *religion of conduct* or a faith that embodies a code of conduct for the individual essentially or, at least, largely. The followers of the religion, to be true to the faith, are to take certain vows and observe them. Any violator of the strict code is regarded as an apostate. But the strictness of the code militates against its observance, and the passage of time has contributed to their obsolescence to a considerable extent. For instance, *respect for all life*, which is the most fundamental tenet of Jainism, can hardly be respected in the present ambiance, nay, for that purpose, could hardly be in the days when Jainism was flourshing. In other words, non-violence, in the full sense of the term, has always been an impossible proposition – a chimera as, in the Mahābhārata, Mārkandeya informed Yudhisthera, that even an innocent pastime like agriculture results in the killing of thousands of insects. In these days pesticides are used for preserving the crops, insecticides are applied for prevention, at least, of diseases like malaria and cholera, medicinal remedies are made from animal bodies, and violence is done even to the calf when cow-milk is consumed, in one form or another. Again, granted that trees and plants are animate entities, they should not be felled or mutilated for any purpose whatever, and grass or weeds should not be uprooted in any circumstances. Thus, violence to other lives, if it can be termed as such, has to be done not only for keeping what is called 'civilization' going on but for enabling the existence of human beings on this planet. Certainly the irreducible minimum. To see it from another angle, full respect for all life can at best be regarded as the way of what in Śrī Aurobindo's category is successful suicide.[1]

1. *Renaissance in India.*

It is for eschewing the hate of suicide, on one hand and avoiding being dubbed as an apostate, on the other, that one of our contemporary Jaina Ṛṣis[2] has modified, rather moderated, the *doctrine of vows* and named it *The Doctrine of Small Vows* – the *Aṇuvrata*. A movement has already been launched for spreading the doctrine.

The point is that changed milieu and needs demand new emphasis on old values and ideas, as well as reorientation of them. For life never remains static. Necessarily, no living religion has ever been a stagnant pool, for it is essentially the outpouring of the heart's spring in response to the new demands which new life entails. For example, taking a dip in the Ganga may be an article of liturgy enjoined by the ancients, but today Ganga is 'the most polluted of all rivers'— most sacred though, and thus to take a dip in it approximates to doing it practically in sewage. The dip then should at best be symbolized in sprinkling a few drops of it on the head and body, thus finishing the act of ablution.

Likewise, 'respect for all life' may not well demand avoidance of food-taking after dusk, for in these days of florescent or halozen light nights are practically converted into days, making even the small particles visible. For the purpose, again, straining of drinking water is not necessary, because filteration of drinking water has become one of the hygenic prescriptions. That too is not fully relied upon— mechanical process is used to make bacteria-free potable water. How can then the *big vows*, prescribed by the ancient Jaina Ṛṣis, be scrupulously observed?

The fact is that originally Jainism was a *Śramaṇik* religion the way of life for the world-renouncers. Later it was extended to the householding sector. The householders, by compulsion, can never be as strict in the observance of vows as the *Śramaṇa*. The difference in their lifestyles makes for variation in the vows to be adopted and observed.

---

2. A Ṛṣi is a qualified teacher.

Again, individual life in ancient times was largely monastic. He owed allegiance to the family and, in peripheral way, to the (village) society. Changes in political authority did not affect him much. When one authority was supplanted by another, it was no bother for him. He paid a portion of his produce as tax, and went on living out his life more or less uninterruptedly. But with the growth of urbanization and complexities of political and economic life a pluralistic society has emerged, each unit of which claims the individual's allegiance and attention.

Today a man is a member of his State, of the trade union or the traders' assembly or the professional group, of consumer forum and so on. He has also interest in the well-functioning of the educational institution where his ward studies, in employment generation as well as in the qualitative improvement and quantitative increase of civic amenities, which are a demand of urbanized life. Big vows, in the changed milieu, cannot but be regarded as anachronistic—they can hardly be observed at present. For example, when *gurukula system* of imparting instructions does not obtain, when must of necessity the child be sent to school where he must sit for examinations for receiving the stamp of qualifications, how can one avoid associating oneself with the system of public instruction? The incumbency of associativeness imposes on the individual certain obligations, which have been taken note of and listed by the Jaina Ācārya in delineation of his Aṇuvrata doctrine.

Furthermore, expansion of social life that is witnessed today was not envisaged by the Jaina prophets. They conceived of their religion within the periphery of the land of Bharata; its transcending the border was not envisioned by them. The context has changed phenomenally, making it compulsive for one to think internationally.

This aspect of the changed context has also necessitated change in the volume, composition and direction of the Doctrine of Vows. In one sense, super vows – the mega vows demand to be smaller, if they are to attain universal approbation and acceptance.

THE AṆUVRATA MOVEMENT :

In the wake of changed outlook and necessitated by it, one Jaina *Muni*, rather *Ṛṣi*, has formulated a moderated doctrine of behaviour, the Doctrine of Small Vows- *Aṇuvrata*. He is Ācārya Śrī Tulsi, a great thinker of modern times, though not that widely known as yet.

Behaviourism has become the key concept of all social sciences – Political Science, Economics, Sociology and Ethics. Following the Americans in particular, the entire advanced world is now engrossed in the analysis of human behaviour scientifically. But a well-knit, co-ordinated philosophy of behaviourism has not yet been on the scene - the philosophy of behaviourism has not yet taken proper shape. The Aṇuvrata Movement pioneered by the aforesaid Jaina Ācārya is a significant attempt at this.

THE CODE :

Aṇuvrata has been defined by its inaugurators as *a code of conduct for building a healthy society*. Alternatively, the description has been condensed in a single word : *Aṇuśāstra*, implying a summary code (of behaviour).

Indeed, the code in *a summary of social ethic*, and since from the broader perspective society is composed of individual cells, is the ethic for individual, too.

The traffic is rather a two-way one, social behaviour moderating the individual, and the individual securing social development. The distinction advanced by John Stuart Mill between self-regarding and other-regarding activities vanishes under *Aṇuvrata* philosophy. For any individual activity cannot but touch the social fabric, and any group-action is found to mould the individual – his behaviour rather. The obverse and reverse of the same coin can hardly be distinguished from each other in *Aṇuvrata* philosophy. Indeed, life itself is an integrated whole. How can one aspect of it be separated from another? The Jaina view of life negates the idea of compartmentalism altogether.

THE PREAMBLE :

The preamble to the code of behaviour—the *Aṇuvrata* clearly displays the negation. While it lists unity of mankind, co-existence and communal harmony, it lays equal emphasis on limited individual acquisition and consumption, Fearlessness, objectivity and truthfulness. Prof. Ernest Barker, the noted British theorist and analyst, in his widely read *Social and Political Theory* has reproduced the preamble to *The Constitution of India* in its entirety, with the observation that never before all political ideals of ages had been so assembled together and integrated. Still more so is perhaps the preamble to the *Aṇuvrata* Code. The ideals or *Vratas* listed in the preamble to *Aṇuvrata*, sometimes called Directive Principles of the same, will authenticate our contention. The list : (i) sensitivity to the existence of others, (ii) unity of mankind, (iii) Co-existence, (iv) communal harmony, (v) non-violent resistance, (vi) limited individual acquisition and consumption, (vii) integrity in behaviour, (viii) belief in the purity of the means, and (ix) fearlessness, objectivity and truthfulness.

Each of the principles, rather ideals, will perhaps bear some comment. The first one, sensitivity to the existence of others, is rather a different way of expressing the *first principle* of Jainism : respect for all life. In simple terms, it implies the cliche, so to say, *live and let live.* A derivation from this is found in the modern arresting phase that is demanded for democracy—*imaginative sympathy.* Sympathy or respect alone is not enough; it should also be imaginative. This means discrimination. Without discrimination *sensitivity* becomes a meaningless principle of action in modern times. *Aṇuvrata* really emphasizes this.

Unity of mankind, the second item, seeks to cultivate what may be called the anthropocentric outlook, which must be regarded as a *narrower* view of life. But in the changed context, this has to be accepted. Unity of all life is a broader cosmological view no doubt, but it hardly accords with practicality of life today.

Unity of life—of all existence is the purport of *Advaita*

Vedanta, which is regarded as the summit of Indian Philosophical thoughts. Swami Vivekananda brought it from forests and recluses and gave it a practical bent. His *Practical Vedanta* was directed only to the humankind. The prophet(s) of *Anuvrata* have done the same. *Unity* is an ideal that does not find place in the *Ideas of 1793*, popularly called the French Revolutionary Slogan. It came to be incorporated later in the Socio-Political-Economic thought, notwithstanding thinking internationally by a many before. It was after the devastating World War II that the unity of mankind came to be emphasized. Humanists perceived that unless we had planned our civilization, we would perish. The *Anuvrata* is only a reiteration of the perception.

Co-existence is a corollary of the unity of mankind. It is also another way of expressing the principle of 'Live and let Live'. perhaps it can be extended to the entire sentiment of creation, for its informing spirit is that man cannot live by all alone. In modern time it has taken the form of *ecological balance*. *Anuvrata* in fact emphasizes this equipoise. The entire nature is dependent on counter-balancing forces. Can human life be isolated from this fundamental principle? Anuvrat's answer is an emphatic 'No'.

Communal harmony is related to what Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) describes as 'unsocial sociableness'. The Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle, asserted that man is a social animal, by which they meant that in his essential nature man is a gregarious animal - the instinct of associativeness is the most important driving force for him. Kant modifies the idea a bit, holding that innate sociableness of man is inextricably mixed with his pugnacity. For he is egotistic, too, in his essential nature. This trait of his character—egotism find expression *inter alia* in religious exclusivism—making, in the words of Alexandar Pope, "Heaven's gate a lock to his (one's) own key". Religious conflicts naturally arise which annihilates human sociableness.

Besides, it becomes a flat denial of the fundamental ideal of the unity of mankind. In a multi-religious country the problem assume serious proportions. Even where one single

faith predominates, sects fight with one another, thus putting the clock of human civilization back. The growth of man's soul is retarded. Thus harmony - communal harmony is the fiat for mankind. The fiat has been issued throughout the recorded history. In our age Sri Ramakrishna did it, and Swami Vivekananda shouted from the platform of the Parliament of Religions (1893) : "The Christian is not to become a Hindu or a Buddhist to become a Christian. But each must assimilate the spirit of the others, and yet preserve his own individuality and grow according to his own law of growth."

He further expressed the hope that upon the banner of each religion shall be written: "Help and not Fight". "Assimilation and not Destruction." "Harmony and Peace and not Dissension".

This is nothing but preaching oneness of the God-head (the Jainas however are largely atheists), the ball was set rolling by the Sants in this country in the Middle Ages when the rugged followers of Islam sought to impose their tenets at the point of sword and the natives were to resist it. Kabir, originally a Muslim weaver of Varanasi, is perhaps the most luminous representative of the Sants, who summed up the tenor thus :

"Rāma, Khudā, Śakti, Śiva are one."

This has been called Indian *Tapasyā* (spiritual quest) or the *Bharat Panth* - the Indian way. The followers of the *Panth* have been designated as the *Bhārat Pathiks* - the Indian Pilgrims. The Jaina Munis – Ācārya Tulsi and Ācārya Mahāprajñā who have launched the *Aṇuvrata* Movement have themselves joined and enjoined others to join the band of Indian pilgrims. Tagore has written in his *Society and State* (Towards Universal Man) that India's special contribution to world civilization lay in the exaltation of the principle of unity in diversity. *Aṇuvrata* further rediscovers in this signal contribution of India what may be described as spiritual liberalism.

Resistance is presented as an ideal in the preamble to the *Aṇuvrata* code of conduct, but resistance, it is made

clear. should be of non-violent character. This is both a departure from and an addition to Christ's prescription of turning the other cheek to the person who smites on the one. Swami Vivekananda opined that resistance was for the householder, though non-resistance should be the motto for the *Sannyāsins*. Furthermore, non-resistance should not issue out of inability or cowardice. "A mouse hardly forgives a cat when it allows itself to be torn by it". Mahatma Gandhi, a personality of Jaina temperament and outlook declares in the same vein. He preaches non-violent resistance.

Non-violent resistance implies strength, never weakness, on the part of the resistor. In Gandhiji's view forgiveness adorns the hero, while pugnacity bespeaks cowardice. Just before the great battle of Kurukshetra started, Arjuna was overtaken by remorse. He was disinclined to fight which might result in the killing of his senior kinsmen and revered superiors. Śrī Kṛṣṇa called Arjuna a coward. For it was not his compunction, said Śrī Kṛṣṇa, that came to possess Arjuna but it was the vast array of the Kaurava with its galaxy of reputed commanders that swayed the mind of *Pāndava* towards despondency. *Aṇuvrata* commends to foresake despondency and to fight, but in a non-violent way.

Aṇuvrata is clear about moderation of acquisitiveness, which is perhaps the strongest of all human impulses and which knows no limit. In the *Mahābhārata* the story of Jajati underscores both the traits of acquisitiveness declaring through the lips of Jajati that all kinds of wealth : corn, cattle and women[1] — in their entirety would not be adequate for a single individual, and therefore acquisitiveness should be chastised, i.e., should be moderated.

This is rather the eternal Indian lesson which teaches how little one can live with. Jesus Christ has also warned against unbridled acquisition, declaring that it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to reach heaven, i.e., to enjoy blissful existence.

Sociologically, the acquisitive drive leads to all conflicts

1. In those days these were the chief forms of wealth.

on the material plane, and because of that human life really becomes 'solitary, nasty, poor, brutish' and precarious. It is to be remembered in this connection that acquisitiveness includes the lust for power - the desire to dominate over others - politically, economically, socially and culturally.

Socially and culturally acquisitiveness has its direction to what Thorstein Bunde Veblen calls 'conspicuous consumption' as also 'pecuniary waste', which may be regarded as individual and social waste. The *demonstration effect*, in the words of a modern economist (Dussenbury), translates itself into base imitation, which results in the production of 'wrong commodities'. Social benefit naturally suffers. *Aṇuvrata* therefore advises to moderate his acquisitiveness.

Moderation of acquisitiveness should be supplemented by limitation of consumption, injuncts *Aṇuvrata*. In other words, it cries a halt to pleasure and thus runs counter to unbridled hedonism but comes near to Vātsyāyana, whose philosophy of life also emphasizes moderation. From the broader standpoint it may be likened to the category of renunciation. "Renounce and enjoy". "Tena Taktvena Bhunjithā" directed the Upanishadic seers. The *Aṇuvrata's* commandment meets it on the same plane.

While elaborating the principle of 'integrity in behaviour', an article of *Aṇuvrata* creed, recourse may be had to what has already been stated : in modern times social sciences are analyzed and elucidated having behaviourism as the central concept. As a social philosophy Aṇuvrata does just the same. Furthermore, it demands idealisation of behaviour, and thus it tends to become both light-bearing and fruit bearing—normative and positive as well.

On any showing, integrity of behaviour means eschewing hypocrisy, which is a very common trait in the behaviour of politicians, traders, different professional and occupational groups. This clearly means divorce from life and truth with all its implications. *Aṇuvrata* seeks to reverse the process. It wants to ensure a truth-bound Journey for realising the divine potentiality that lies talent in human soul.

The ancient idealists, both in the west and in the East, decreed that the means should be as noble as the end itself. For this reason social sciences like politics were a part of the broader *śāstra* of Ethics. It was Florentine Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) who effected the separation between politics and Ethics in the West, holding that success alone counted in politics, not virtue.

Because of the spread of the thesis - Machiavellism, as Edmund Burka lamented: gone are the days of 'the statesmen, and those of sophists, calculators and economists had arrived'. In our own country the codified *Rājadharma* of Manu, Sukrācārya, as also of Kauṭilya had been modified to make room for statism and politics, which is called a policy-science.

In modern times Mahatma Gandhi sought to recapture the ethical penumbra by emphasizing the noble ends should be sought to be achieved through noble means alone — success should be discounted to the extent of ignominy of the means. (And Mahatma Gandhi was a Jaina in outlook and attitude).

To the *Aṇuvrati* purity of the means should be an article of his faith. He shall have to take the small vow of being faithful to the principle of purity, which is equated with truth. Purity should permeate the total behaviour of the *Aṇuvrati*. Thus, winning an election, passing an examination, getting a contract or a job should be purity-tinged. In this way, it comes to coalesce with behaviour - it is indeed an aspect of behaviourism. The *Aṇuvrata* document of course mentions truthfulness as a separate category which goes alongwith *fearlessness* and *objectivity*.

It is rather difficult to put these values in the same conceptual system. Truthfulness and fearlessness may well go together, but how can *objectivity* be conjucted with them? The first two speak of facets of the state of mind, that is to say, they are essentially subjective in character, while objectivity refers to externalities. Can really a tangible synthesis be made of internal objectives with an external value?

Perhaps the fashioners of the doctrine of small vows—

Aṇuvrata wanted fearlessness and truthfulness applied to the work-a-day life. If so, the philosophy of *Aṇuvrata* partakes of pragmatic character. As an individualistic philosophy pragmatism may not have that profundity which is claimed for others, but as a social philosophy it can hardly be discounted on any score. By selecting small vows and collecting them as the code of conduct, *Aṇuvrata* brings to birth a new social philosophy for adoption by men and women with a view to make life meaningful and purposive. Denominational hindrances or scriptural barriers will not be placed in the way of its adoption - it can well be embraced universally while each remaining within the fold of his own spiritual religion, codified or uncodified.

THE MANIFESTO :

The *Aṇuvrata* manifesto released by the sponsors of the movement is a short one, but is exhaustive. It deals with *aims* and *means* of *Aṇuvrata* and specifies the vows for *all* as well as for a few particular social groups — students, teachers, businessmen, the working class and their superintendants, politicians and the citizens. Other professional classes — the lawyers, medical practitioners, brokers and the like have not been specifically listed. Perhaps they have been included in 'all' — the general class, or, in a way, in the category of businessmen. For the professionals are also traders — they trade in their skill and good-will. Speaking in economic terms, they deal in *service-utility*, and are adjuncts to different social services like the dispensing of justice, dispensing of health services either for purpose of maintenance or as remedial measures. While revising the document, editors will think of specifying the codes for each of these groups insofar as it pertains to their respective station of life. For some may consider their non-specification to be a lacuna in the documentation.

AIMS AND MEANS :

The manifesto starts with delineation of the *aims* and *means*, implying what the Aṇuvrata Movement aims at and indicating the needed measures for adoption.

The aim is a threefold one :—

(a) to exhort people universally to *observe self-restraint*, which may be likened, in a way, to the Aristotlean *golden mean*. But, in a way, not fully. For the directive seems to be : covet the minimum.

(b) 'to establish the values of friendship, unity, peace and true morality'. The first three go together inasmuch as true friendship implies unity and in unity there cannot be any conflict. And peace follows as a natural corollary. Perhaps the last one morality stands a little apart, but at the same time, goes hand - in - hand with the first three. For friendship - fraternity cannot be forged by any bond of immorality, and if endeavoured to be forged, it can never be a unity. A gang of dacoits or highwaymen can at best a union, but never a unity. So cannot be a political clique or coterie. For that purpose an ethical bond is necessary. This is emphasized in Plato's search for philosopher kings and in our own *Rājadharma* as well as in the *Prajādharma*.

A society based on values like fraternity, unity and peace has to be non-violent for the reason that it has to discard its acquisitve character. Violence arises out of conflicts of self-interest. If fraternal unity is forged *ipso facto* non-violence emerges. If my wife and I make a unity, she cannot do any violence to me; nor, for that purpose, can I. *Aṇuvrata* wants to extend the principle to the entire *mineral* world though in a modified form.

MEANS : Means should be as noble as the end itself, asserted the teachers of humanity like Socrates and Gandhi. For the individual it demands a *twofold revolution* : intellectual and behavioural. Intellectually, he has to realize the value and efficacy of small vows - *Aṇuvrata*, and then to win converts to it. The second aspect is as important as the first one inasmuch as *Aṇuvrata* is intended to be a *social* philosophy of action, not just an individual code of conduct.

The converts will have to be converts in full – fully believing in *the doctrine of Aṇuvrata* as a pragmatic

philosophy of life. Soldiering of *Aṇuvrata* should be an avowed trait of the *Aṇuvrati's* behaviour. He should further resolve for his behaviour a change of heart and consequential change of attitude towards collective life, nay, to the entire sentient creation. He should be more guided by abnegation and duties than by assertions and rights. In this way one is to bring out harmony in oneself and, thus, the same in the social order. To be an *Aṇuvrati* sustained-practice is demanded of the individual.

THE VOWS :

The vows which constitute the code of conduct for every individual consist of—

(i) not to kill any innocent creature ;

(ii) not to commit suicide ;

(iii) not to commit foeticide.

COMMENT : How far these three are, without qualification, in consonance with the needs and dictates of particular societies is of course debatable. The three together should have been adjuncted with the qualification 'except under extenuating circumstances'.

(iv) not to be aggressive against anybody, i.e., to discard pugnacity in one's own spirit.

(v) not to forsake the path of a commited pacifist;

(vi) (Thus) not to stay apart from the supporters of disarmament and world peace.

(vii) not to take part in any violent agitation or activity.

(viii) not to discriminate among persons on the ground of race, colour, caste, sex or political belief.

COMMENT :Directed to oneself the last named vow is in accord with the egalitarian principle, and broadly follows the pattern of the Constitution of India in its enunciation of one of the Fundamental Rights - Right to equality (Art. 16 of the Constitution of India).

As in the Constitution of India, untouchability finds a special mention, but colour bar - Jim Crowism is left out, which should have been included to give the vow a universal tenor.

(ix) not to practise religious intolerance, and thus nor to rouse sectarian frenzy.

COMMENT : Here, in the manifesto, positive and negative are joined to make an amalgam - the vow to practise religious toleration is joined with its natural corollary ; not to participate in the arousal of any communal frenzy. It would have been perhaps better if, following the assertion of Swami Vivekananda, 'toleration' were substituted by 'acceptance'. Really, that - the acceptance of all religions as true - has been the age-old Indian way of outlook.

ANUVRATA could well reiterate that.

(x) not to indulge in unrighteousness in business and other kinds of money-earning activity in any manner.

COMMENT : While we have put it as unrighteousness, the manifesto uses the word 'rectitude'. Both of them connote the same thing, but essentially it is a matter of value-judgement which cannot but have wide variation, dependent as it is upon the melieu. For example, acceptance of interest on 'barren money' (an Aristotelean insinuation) lent is regarded as unrighteous in certain quarters of believers, while it is accepted as quite normal and, therefore, moral in others.

(xi) not to practise deceit.

Note : This also has a moral penumbra, which is perhaps of absolute and universal nature, but is, in a sense, repetition of making end and means meet-means should be as noble as the end itself. Yet, it perhaps demands repetition. For, like the note of a music, it gets ingrained more and more with every repetition.

(xii) not to go in for unbridled acquisition.

Note : This means that the acquisitive instinct of the individual is to be blunted, which follows from the Indian precept to

learn how little one can live with, which, again, is in contradistinction of the materialistic Western outlook : how much one can acquire and possess.

Acquisitiveness transcends material possessions to include such non-qualities as power and influence. Thus, if acquisitiveness is moderated and continence practised, one of the breeding grounds of conflicts - regional, national or international - is rendered largely barren.

(xiii) not to have recourse to unethical practice is elections.

Note : Taking part in elections in indirectly democratically organised political societies is both a right and a duty of the citizen. But this right-cum-duty demands, for being real, free and fair conduct of elections. This political ethic largely depends on the sturdy and ethic-hued independence of the citizen.

(xiv) not to encourage socially evil customs.

Note : This is certainly relative to time and place. For example, child-marriage is regarded as a social evil today ; but it was not so at one time, or, polygamy is frowned upon in most countries today, but not in some others. Thus, socially evil customs has reference to time and place. The vow is limited by its own social nature.

(xv) not to take intoxicants including tobacco.

COMMENT : This is both for individual and social welfare, and assuming organic nature of society, these two coalesce. The observance of the vow prevents men from becoming unhealthy and therefore, small, and, as J. S. Mill has asserted, with small men, no great thing can be achieved. The purpose of social organization is to create an atmosphere so that individuals composing it can blossom forth—can realize their potentialities. This is dependent both upon individual and collective action. And collective action is a collection of individual actions. Here the individualistic principle of distinction between 'self-regarding' and 'other-regarding' actions vanishes altogether inasmuch as the individual keeps away from intoxicants for his own good as well as for society's well-being.

(xvi) not to keep away eyes from the problem of environmental pollution; not to denude the earth's surface from vegetation; and not to waste water.

Note : All these inhibitions are for collective well-being, from which source individaul welfare emerges, though not perceptibly. These three vows are items of what is said to be enlightened self-interest.

CLASS ANUVRATS :

Besides the above small vows, meant for all, specific vows, which are of slightly different nature, are for different classes or groups. For example, students are to take the vow of refraining from unfair practice at examinations, the teacher is not to assist any student in the adoption of illegal or unethical means; the businessman is to refrain from unethical trade practices; officers are not to accept grafts or take advantage of their authority for furthering their own personal ends; politicians are not to indulge in character-assassination of rivals; and the elector is not to cast his vote out of fear or temptation.

EPILOGUE :

The *Anuvrata* Movement seeks and build a *moral society* based on cherished values. It is a pragmatic philosophy of life in the sense that the code is observable, for it is not much of demanding nature. It is modern too - modernised version of Jainism whos guest has been peace, called *Ta Magista* - the greatest good by Max-Muller. The *Anuvrata* lays down a number of *commandments* for this, which are in consonance of society's need at the present moment. The commandments will certainly undergo variation with the passage of time. For new needs, new issues and new problems will surely crop up. The *Anuvrata is not fundamentalism.* It is not ritualism either; the commandments are just individual accompaniments which aim at, secularly described, character-building, or in the arresting phrase of Swami Vivekananda, *man-making* or in

Rousseau's preparing the moral compass of mankind. When this is done men's social adventure comes to fruition, though then journey cannot come to an end. Human psyche, composed as it is, can never attain the final happiness, but it can attain peace, which *Aṇuvrata* as a philosophy of life seeks to guarantee.

THE ŚVETĀMBAR AND DIGAMBAR SECTS*

Much activity is seen both among western and eastern scholars to unfold the hidden pages of the past history of the Jains, the followers of the Jinas or the Tīrthaṅkaras, their philosophy and rules of conduct. Apart from several works from the pen of educated Indian Jain or non-Jain scholars, it is very gratifying to look to the big volumes on Jainism from Germany and France containing the results of modern researches on the Digambar and Śvetâmbar sects. The very words at the first sight conjure up before the casual reader the idea of nudity, or remote antiquity, and the idea of the dressed, or a later period.

But the fact is otherwise. Let us remember the period of the Vedas. Although the very word Prâkṛit conveys the idea of the earlier existence and Sanskrit of the later, after undergoing change, yet there is hardly any Prâkṛit literature that we come across existing before the Vedas. It has now been accepted in all quarters that Pârśvanâtha, the 23rd Tīrthaṅkara, was a historical personage : and the Jain ascetics of his period and those of his predecessors' times used to wear clothes. It is only at a later period, during the regime of Mahâvīra, the 24th Tīrthaṅkara that the fashion of discarding clothes had its origin, perhaps due to the prevalence of extreme asceticism at the time.

The word Nirgrantha, generally applied to the order of the Jains, did not literally mean without any clothes or naked, but did mean without any bond, or free from bondage or *karma*. It is certainly difficult to trace the cause which led our Lord Mahâvīra to embrace nudity. But so far as we can gather from the then existing circumstances it is clear that the time of Mahâvīra was a period of great religious revival, and religious speculation was at its height. A very

* Reproduced from *The Indian Antiquary*—September 1929.

large number of mendicants, heretics and religious speculators were traversing the country from one end to the other, and it was a time of very hard religious competition, and severe austerities and absolute renunciation were the only criterion of excellence. Mahâvîra advocated giving up of clothes for only the highest order known as Jinakalpî, but not for anybody or everybody of the order or for all ages. And it is only among the Digambars that the fashion of nudity has survived even to the present day, and as a matter of fact we actually find southern Digambar *sâdhus* practising this as an indispensable part of their conduct.

It has now been proved without a shadow of doubt that image worship is a very ancient institution, and the Jains also used to worship images. It was several centuries after Mahâvîra that his followers divided themselves into Śvetâmbars and Digambars. The ancient images of Tîrthaṅkaras consecrated before the division cannot properly be said to belong to any particular sect, rather they belong to the Jains as a whole, irrespective of any other question. We find a good number of sitting Jain images without any signs of nudity, which can be assigned almost with certainty to early times before the division. It was sometime after the *nirvana* of Mahâvîra that far reaching changes took place in the principles as propagated by Him and laid down by Jaina *âgamas*.

The most important diversity in the principle which gradually developed and ultimately led to the schism is the assignment of a distinctly inferior status to woman by denying her the possibility of full spiritual emancipation. This little fact, hardly noticed, is of profound significance in fixing with a good deal of certainty a considerably later date for the origin of the Digambars. For such narrow dogmas had their birth in times when a strong reaction had already set in against the broad-minded democratic religions of Buddha and Mahâvîra sweeping before them the false and petty distinctions of caste and creed, and when people were reverting back to old standards of conservatism and bigotry.

It was lord Mahâvîra who established the blessed order

of the *Śrī-saṅgha* or *Caturvidhaṣaṅgha*, composed of sâdhus and *sâdhvis*, *srâvakas* and *srâvikâs*, with equal share in the order.

No question of superiority or inferiority was involved. A soul is a soul whether it be of man or woman, and no obstacle stands in the way of full spiritual liberation for one who can destroy by *nirjarâ* all *karmas*.

With such cardinal difference of principles, the followers could not remain united, and they gradually drifted apart. Those that advocated the most conservative ideas became known as the Digambar sect, and in order to establish the new theory, these Digambars had to discard the whole of the then existing Jaina canons, which are respected and recognized by the Śvetâmbars alone, who are the other remaining original followers of Mahâvîra, propagating the same old principles as those of Mahâvîra.

I need hardly say that the Digambars hold just the opposite view and boast of their antiquity, placing the origin of the Śvetâmbars at a very late period. There is good scope for research in this important and interesting subject of the antiquity of these sects. Any scholar can satisfy himself after a glance at page 25 of Vincent Smith's *Jain stupa and other Antiquities of Mathurā* that Lord Mahâvîra is depicted there as being taken from the womb of Devânandâ by Harinegameshi, a god. This ancient story is entirely discarded and has no place in any Digambar work, while every Śvetâmbar Jain believes the story of this *garbhâpahâra*, which is another point of difference between the two sects. It has also to be noted that the different *Gaṇas*, *Kulas*, *Śākhâs* and *Gacchas* found inscribed on these relics of antiquity are identical with those mentioned in the *Kalpasûtra* and other old Jain *âgamas* respected by the Śvetâmbars, while these names do not occur in any of the Digambar works. And these facts above referred to are very significant in tracing the question of antiquity, as the sculptures with inscriptions are all genuine irrefutable pieces of evidence that place the Śvetâmbars at a very early period.

Lord Mahâvîra and his principles were as liberal as could

be expected, and all souls, whether of a Śvetâmbar or a Digambar, or a non-Jain even, could attain *nirvâṇa;* while according to the Digambars, only a male Jain holding Digambar doctrine may be liberated. The true ancient principles of the religion of the Tîrthaṅkaras are simply this much, that a soul which realizes the oneness of all and is seated in equality, is fully entitled to emancipation. The Śvetâmbars hold this view and will ever hold the same in spite of all reproaches from the other sect. This liberal idea is quite clear from the anicent Jaina texts. The age of these texts has, of late, also been scientifically tested, but unfortunately the Digambars do not recognize them. It is perhaps by reason of these short-sighted principles of the Digambar Jains that they did not flourish during Muhammadan times, and it is only during these latter days of English rule that they are trying to gain popularity.

N.B. The religion of the Jainas-Jainism, has much in common with Buddhism and as such was sometimes considered as merely a Buddhist sect, which view of course has been refuted (for which see, Jacobi, SBE, Introduction; as also in the introduction of his edition of the *Kalpasūtras*). In general, it may be stated that while Buddhism in course of its march was developed into a world-religion, Jainism remained a national Indian religion. It is rightly pointed out that the Jainas have retained the Indian system of castes and classes, more or less in its entirety and Jainism exhibits a stronger tendency than Buddhism to adapt itself to Brahmanism and Hinduism.

(See. H.V. Glasenapp, Der Jainismus, pp. 314 ff. see also, Erich Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 194 ff, tr. from German into English by V.M. Bedekar, Delhi, 1984).

With a view to be accessible to the masses, the Jainas have utilised the *Māgadhi* and the *Mahārāstrī* dialects for their canonical writings and the earliest commentaries. Later on, however, the Śvetāmbaras from the eight century and the Digambaras somewhat earlier, made use of Sanskrit for their commentaries and scholastic works.

(See, M. Bloomfield, *Some Aspects of Jaina Sanskrit*, in Festschrift Wackernagel, 1923, p. 220ff).

As early as in the first century A.D. the schism was effected in the Jaina religion through the formation of two great sects, namely, the Śvetāmbaras (lit. these clad in white), and the Digambaras (naked, lit. these clad in the air). The collective term ascribed by the Jainas to their sacred books, is *Siddhanta* or *Āgama*. Regarding the antiquity and the authority of the Canon, the Śvetāmbara Jainas have a tradition, according to which the authority of their sacred texts do not go beyond the fifth century A.D. There are inscriptions of the first and second centuries A.D. proving that the Jainas were split into those aforesaid sects.

(For full detailed information relating to the Śvetāmbara Jainas, see amongst other texts, Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II, First edition, University of Calcutta, 1933; Second edition, 1972; pp. 431ff).

Little is known about the *Siddhānta* of the Digambaras. (A complete survey of the Canon of the Digambaras is presented by Bhandarkar, Report, 1883-4, p. 106ff; See also, J.L. Jani, in SBJ, Vol. V, Preface, p. 12ff).

The Digambaras too recognize the 12 *Aṅgas*, the sixth Aṅga being *Jñāṭṛ-dharma-Kathāṅga*. 'It is feasible to assume that these texts which are common to both the sects, present the earliest portions of the sacred writings of the Jainas.'

The Digambaras of the present day, have, in addition, a second Canon, more correctly is to be called 'a substitute Canon', which has been described by them as "the four Vedas".

It may be noted here that the Digambaras relate a legend about the origin of the schism, which however, differs from the legend recorded by the Śvetāmbaras.

(See in this context, H.V. Glasenapp, Der Jainismus, p. 347ff).

It may further be mentioned that we have a rich Non-canonical Jaina literature, composed partly in *Prākṛta*—the

so-called *Jaina-Mahārastrī* and partly Sanskrit, (Winternitz, H. O. I. Lit. 475ff).

We should also note that corresponding to the *Purāṇas* of the Digambaras, the Śvetāmbaras have the *Caritras*, some of which describe the lives of individual Jinas, whilst others treat of the lives of all the 63 *Śalākapuruṣas* or "excellent man".

For general interest regarding comparative study of Buddha and the Jina special reference is to be made to.

E. Leumann, Buddha and Mahāvīra, the two founders of Indian religions, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Buddhismus, Miinchen O. J. (1921), See specially p. 27ff.

— Prof. Heramba Chatterjee Shastri

ETHICO-RELIGIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS OF MANKIND AS EMBODIED IN THE JAINA CANON*

The problem of studying mankind is complicated; so various methods have been adopted to solve it. One of them is that of scientific classification – an art well-known to India from hoary antiquity. Consequently it is no wonder, if the *Jainas* in ancient times possessed a remarkable mastery therein. As a corroborative evidence may be pointed out plenty of *bhaṅgas* or permutations and combinations one comes across, in the *Jaina* philosophy. The attitude of the *Jainas* in systematically grouping the different entities may very well account for the various sorts of classifications of human beings[1] expounded in the *Jaina* canonical literature. As the main object of this article is to throw some light on this subject, I shall begin with a classification having an ethical tinge about it.

Sādhu and Asādhu–

In Sūtrakṛtāṅga (I.13. v. 1 and 4[2]) humanity in its entirety is divided into two classes : (1) *sādhu* or the virtuous and (2) *asādhu* or the wicked, the natural divisions of mankind one can expect and approve of. Each of these can be further divided into two groups:- (a) happy and (b) unhappy. This means that we have four types of

---

* By courtesy: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. 15, pp. 97ff.

1. Even the minimum and maximum numbers of human beings existing at any time are pointed out in *Anuyogadvārasūtra* (Sūtra 142). This topic is discussed by me in the paper communicated to the Jubilee Sessions of the Indian Mathematical Society held in December 1932.
2. For the English translation of these two verses see S.B.E. vol. XLV, p. 320.

human beings on the surface of this globe: (i) virtuous and happy, (ii) virtuous but unhappy, (iii) wicked but happy and (iv) wicked and unhappy. The origin of these types is satisfactorily explained by the four kinds of *karmans*, technically known as (1) *puṇyānubandhi-puṇya*[3], (2) *puṇyānubandhi-pāpa*, (3) *pāpānubandhi-puṇya* and (4) *pāpānubandhi-pāpa*.[4]

Before proceeding further it will not be amiss to take a note of the fact that Jainism divides all the unliberated living beings into two classes: (1) those who are incompetent to attain liberation and (2) those who are competent to do so. The former class is designated as *abhavya*, and the latter as *bhavya*. The *bhavyas* are subdivided into two categories : (1) those who are sure to be liberated in near or distant future, and (2) the *jāti-bhavyas* or those who will never be liberated, since they will never get the right opportunity of utilizing their potency for achieving salvation.

Ārya and Mleccha—

If we refer to Prajnāpanāsūtra[5] (I, 37) of Śyāmācārya we find mankind divided into two classes viz. (a) *āriya* or the *Āryas*[6] and (b) *milikkhu*[7] or the *Melcchas*.[8] Vācakamukhya

---

3. Merit-engendering merit. It is a kind of merit, which makes the individual lead a holy life, while he or she, at the same time, enjoys happiness as a result of the merit acquired in a previous birth or births.
4. This line of agrument, if properly followed, solves the question, viz. "why do the innocent suffer?"
5. This is looked upon as the second *upāṅga* and is divided into 36 chapters known as *pādas* with their subdivisions styled as *sūtras*.

6,8. These have been explained in the commentary as under by Malayagiri Sūri :-
"आराद् हेयधर्मेभ्यो याताः- प्राप्ता उपादेयधर्मेरित्यार्थाः, पृषोद्रादयः' इति रूपनिष्पत्तिः, म्लेच्छा अव्यक्तभाषासमाचाराः, 'म्लेच्छ अव्यक्तायां वाचि' इति वचनात्, भाषाग्रहणं चोपलक्षणं, तेन शिष्टाऽसंमतसकलव्यवहारा म्लेच्छा इति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।"
This word (milikkhu) occurs in Sūtrakṛtāṅga (I.I.2. v. 15-16).

Umāsvāti, too, has mentioned these classes, in his Tattvārthādhigamasūtra[9] (III, 15) and has also indicated their various varieties, in the *svopajña*[10] bhāṣya (pp. 265-266). But he has not classified the *Āryas* under two heads viz. (a) *Ṛddhi-prāpta* and *Ṛddhi-aprāpta* or *Amṛddhi-prāpta*. These groups are however pointed out in Prajñapanāsūtra (ch. I.) where the former group is further divided into six classes viz. (1) *Tīrthaṁkara*, (2) *Cakravartin*, (3) *Baladeva*, (4) *Vāsudeva*, (5) *Cāraṇa* and (6) *Vidyādhara*, and the latter into nine known as (a) *kṣetra-ārya*, (b) *jātu-ārya*, (c) *kula-ārya*, (d) *karma-ārya*, (e) *śilpa*[11] *-ārya*, (f) *bhāṣā-ārya*, (g) *jñāna-ārya*, (h) *darśana-ārya* and (i) *cāritra-ārya*.[12] Umāsvāti has mentioned only six varieties[13] of the *Āryas* in his bhāṣya (p.265). They correspond to the first six classes of *Anṛddhi-prāpta Āryas*. Sarvārthasiddhi strikes altogether a different note, since it mentions 7 types of the *Ṛddhi-prāpta Āryas* and 5 types of the *Anṛddhi-prāpta Āryas*.[14]

. In the case of the *Mlecchas*, the number of the varieties does not seem to be fixed; for, in Prajñāpanāsūtra (I, 37) we

---

9. Out of a number of commentaries written on it (vide pp. 16-18 of my Sanskrit Introduction to pt. I), I shall point out a few where the word *Ārya* has been defined. They are : (1) Sarvārthasiddhi (Kolhapur, ed. p. 130), Siddhasena Gaṇi's ṭīkā (p. 265) and (3) Tattvārthaślokavārtika (p. 356).
10. I have expressed my reasons of considering the *bhāṣya* as *svopajña*, in my introduction (pt. II, p. 36ff.). So it will be a matter of great pleasure, if any scholar will examine them and give his sober verdict.
11. In Jambūdvīpaprajñapti, we come across *sippasaya*. The names of the five main śilpas are given in Āvaśyaka-niryukti (v.207). Each is there referred to as having 20 sub-divisions; but I have not succeeded up till now in tracing their names etc. The 18 śreṇis have been however discussed by me in my edition of Padmānanda Mahākāvya (Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. LVIII, pp. 362, 592-593).
12. For an explanation in English the reader is referred to G.O.S. No. LI, pp. 392-393.
13. These have been elucidated by him in the bhāṣya (p. 265).
14. "अनृद्धिप्राप्तार्याः पञ्चविधाः- क्षेत्रार्या जात्यार्याः कर्मार्याश्चारित्रार्या दर्शनार्याश्चेति । ऋद्धिप्राप्तार्याः सप्तविधाः, बुद्धि-विक्रिया-तपो-बलौ-षधि-रसा-ऽक्षीणभेदात् ।"

have about 55 types mentioned. These[15] with some variations in their number and names are found in Nemicandra Sūri's Pravacana-sāroddhāra (274th dvāra, v. 1583-85).[16]

Umāsvāti does not give such a list; but, after pointing out on p.266 "अतो विपरीता म्लिशः" mentions the 56[17] antaradvīpas, the residents of which come under the category of the *Mlecchas*.

As this topic is, I believe, sufficiently discussed, I shall now take up another which is more or less a special tenet of Jainism.

Mithyātvin and Samyaktvin—

From the *Jaina* view-point human beings and other animate objects as well are either *mithyātvin* or *samyaktvin*, according as they have right or wrong conception about the characteristics of *deva*, *guru* and *dharma*. *Mithyātva* is of two types: (a) *anabhigṛhīta* and (b) *abhigṛhīta*. The former is due to ignorance, prejudice or prepossession, while the latter is mainly due to deliberate misunderstanding or perversion of facts. A student of Jainism needs hardly to be reminded of the 363 types[18] of the *Abhigṛhīta-mithyātvins*, the sum-total of 180 kinds of the *Kriyāvādins*, 84 of the *Akriyāvādins*, 67 of the *Ajñānavādins* and 32 of the *Vinayavādins*.[19] The names of the important persons connected with these schools are mentioned by Siddhasena in his commentary to Tattvārtha (VIII, 1). A rough attempt has been made by me to identify them,[20] with a view that some erudite scholar may be inclined to take up this topic for a thorough investigation.

---

15. For the Sanskrit names, the reader is referred to G.O.S. No. LI, pp. 393-394.
16. Praśnavyākaraṇa and Āvaśyakasūtra may be consulted in this connection; they, too, refer to the *anārya deśas*.
17. According to Sarvārthasiddhi (pp. 130-131) the number is 96.
18. These have been discussed at some length in "Schools and sects in Jaina literature" (pp. 29-37) by Amulyachandra Sen M.A., B.L.
19. For sources of information see my introduction to Tattvāthādhigamasūtra (pt. II, p. 54).
20. Ibid., pp. 55-63.

It may be remarked that *samyaktva* and *abhigṛhīta-mithyātva*, too, are not within the reach of each and every human being. They are as it were the sole properties of the *Saṅjnis* or those whose mind is fairly developed. Thus the human beings known as *Asaṅjnis* and having practically no brain are under the influence of *anabhigṛhīta mithyātva*. They are the persons, who, in virtue of their manner of being born, are debarred from possessing *samyaktva*. To elucidate this point, it may be mentioned that Jainism admits of three types of birth[21] viz. (1) sammūrcchana,[22] (2) garbha and (3) upapāta. Out of them only the first two types are possible for the human beings.[23] So they can be classified as (a) garbhaja and (b) sammurcchanaja. The latter are said to be born in 14 dirty things such as excreto, urine etc., and their life-span never exceeds 48 minutes.

It may be observed that in the case of a human being, it is the *gotra-karman* which determines the family where one can be born. This *karman* is of two kinds : (a) high and (b) low.[24] On this basis, human beings are divided in Jainism into two classes: (i) born in a high family and (ii) born in a low family.

In this connection it may be stated that the *Jainas* consider the *Kṣatriyas* as the best class of men; for, they assign to them even a higher place than what is generally assigned to the *Brāhmaṇas*. This will be clear, if one were to refer to Kalpasūtra where several *ucca* and *nīca kulas* are mentioned.[25]

From this it can be safely inferred that Jainism draws a

21. Birth as well as its varieties have been beautifully explained in Sanskrit by Siddhasena Gaṇi. See pt. I, pp. 189-190. This subject has been briefly treated in English in G.O.S. (No. LI, p. 21).
22. This is translated as "generatio acquivoca" in S.B.E. (vol. XLV, p. 224).
23. See Uttarādhyayanasūtra (ch. xxxvi, v. 194).
24. See Uttarādhyayanasūtra (xxiii, 14). There each of these types of *gotra-karman* is pointed out as having eight varieties. Bhāvavijaya observes in his commentary to this work that these are due to the causes of bondage connected with pride pertaining to *jāti, kula* etc. See the bhāṣya of Tattvārtha (ix. 6).
25. For the English translation see S.B.E. (vol. xxii, p. 225).

line of demarcation between the high and the low families. But, thereby it does not permit a person born in a high family to be puffed up with pride and despise those born in a low family. For, such an attitude is deprecated in unequivocal terms in the *Jaina Āgamas*, e.g. in Sūtrakṛtāṅga (I.13; 10,11,15,16). As an illustration, it will suffice to refer to the incident in the life of the *Marīci*, who, by praising his family to the skies, amalgamated the *nīcagotra-karman*.[26]

Jaina saints and low families—

It may be added *en passant* that a *Jaina* saint is not debarred from accepting alms even from a low family. This is borne out by Uttarādhyayanasūtra (xii, 15) and Daśavaikālikasūtra (V. i. 14; V. 2. 25; VIII. 23). As an additional proof it may be stated that in the 16th adhyayana of Jñātādharmakathāṅga, Dharmaruci, pupil of Dharmaghoṣa, is referred to as going to all families high, low and middle, for alms. In Upāsakadaśāṅga, the 7th *aṅga*, we find a similar fact noted in the case of Indrabhūti Gautama, the first disciple of Lord Mahāvīra. This will show that Jainism lays stress upon the purity of alms and not upon the status of an individual from whom alms is to be accepted.

Furthermore, that a birth in a low family is not by itself a stumbling block for spiritual evolution is a clear verdict of Jainism, a fact on which the 12th and the 13th adhyayanas of Uttarādhyayanasūtra throw flood of light. For, therein we distinctly notice the spiritual rise of Harikeśa-bala and Caitra, in spite of their birth in a family of *Śvapākas (Cāṇḍāla)*. Even an *Antyaja* is fully respected in Jainism, if adorned with a *vidyā* (lore). This will be clear by studying the narrative of king *Śreṇika* who made an *Antyaja* sit on his royal throne,[27] while learning the *vidyā* from him.

---

26. For details see Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra (I.5. v. 370ff.) or G.O.S. (No. LI, pp. 352-353).
27. This will suggest that there is no room for untouchability in Jainism. This fact is beautifully stated by Malayagiri Sūri, while commenting upon Nandīsūtra (p. 172) as under :-
"यद्यपि चोक्तं 'चाण्डालस्पर्शदोषः प्राप्नोतीति, तदपि चेननाविकलपुरुषभाषितमिवासमीचीनं, स्पर्शास्पर्शव्यवस्थाया लोके काल्पनिकत्वात् । तथाहि स्पर्शव्यवस्था न पारमार्थिकी ।"

From this it can be easily deduced that Jainism cares more for the merits of an individual than his or her birth in a high-class family.

No place for varṇāśrama in Jainism—

Out of the four *varṇas* populary known as (1) Brāhmaṇa, (2) Kṣatriya, (3) Vaiśya and (4) Śūdra, we find in the earlier portion of the *Ṛgveda* the first three under the appelations *Brahma, Kṣatra* and *Viś*. It is rather in the subsequent *puruṣa-sūkta* where *Śudra* is mentioned along with *Brāhmaṇa, Rājanya* and *Vaiśya*. In Sūtrakṛtāṅga (II. 6.48) we come across the words *Māhana, Khattiya, Vesa* and *Pesa*.

This, by no means, implies that Jainism sanctions the water-tight compartments generally accepted by the so-called *Sanātanists*. This is clearly borne out in the following verse of Uttarādhyayanasūtra (XXV):

"कम्मुणा बंभणो होइ कम्मुणा होइ खत्तिओ ।
वइसो कम्मुणा होइ सुद्दो हवइ कम्मुणा ॥ ३३ ॥"

In this very canon (XXV, 19-29, 31-32.) we find the word *Māhana* used in the sense of *Bambhaṇa*. From the characteristics of *Māhana* mentioned there,[28] we learn that a person is so called, in case he leads a very very high standard of life.[29] Even Lord Mahāvīra is himself so addressed

---

He has practically expressed the same opinion in his commentary (p. 28) to Āvaśyakasūtra. In this connection it may be noted that the *jāti-jungitas* such as Mātaṅga, Kokila, Baruda, Sūcika, and Chimpa and others are considered as *aspṛśya* by Siddhasena Sūri in his commentary (p. 230) to Pravacanasāroddhāra (v. 791) The author of Niśīthacūrṇi, too, seems to hold the same opinion.

28. See also ch. xii, v. 14.

29. In Kalpasūtra, we notice the word *Māhana*, used rather in a deteriorated sense; for, there, it implies a family unfit to be blessed with the birth of a *Tīrthaṅkara*, a *Cakravartin*, a *Baladeva* or a *Vāsudeva*. From this it may be inferred that by the time of Bhadrabāhusvāmin, the *Māhanas* had lost their original position and reputation, probably because they had given up the high ideals. Perhaps this is the reason why the word *Dhijjāia*, an apabhraṣṭa form of *Dvijātika*, according to P. Bechardas is explained as *Dhig-jātīya*, in the commentary to *Āvaśyakasūtra*.

in Sūtrakṛtāṅga (I. ii.1), since *Māhana* is considered as an honorific title.

Thus it will be seen that Jainism does not endorse the view taken by the so-called *Sanātanists* regarding the four *vaṃas;* consequently it does not reserve the highest stage[30] of life viz. *saṁnyāsa (dīkṣā)* for a special class like that of the *Brāhmaṇas;* but it considers persons of backward and even depressed classes eligible for it, thus keeping the entrance to final emancipation open for any and every *mumukṣu*[31] of any class whatsoever.

There is however a restriction regarding some of the human beings; for, 18 types of them are considered unfit for dīkṣā. See Pravacanasāroddhāra (v. 790-791).

Six types of human beings—

According to Jainism all mundane living beings can be classified under four heads : (1) human beings, (2) the celestial *(devas),* (3) the hellish *(nārakas)* and (4) the *tiryacs.*[32] It may be noted that it is only the birth as a human being, which, when properly utilized leads to liberation. Thus, though the acquisition of birth as a human being is an essential preliminary to the attainment of final emancipation, yet it alone is not a sufficient means to reach the final goal.

---

30. Vidyāraṇya observes in Jīvanmuktiviveka (ch. V):-
"शूद्रस्यापि संन्यासेऽधिकारः, वैराग्यस्याविशंषेत्वात् ।"
31. In Jainism, there is no hard and fast rule that an aspirant for liberation should successively pass through all the four stages of life, viz. (1) *brahmacarya,* (2) *gārhasthya,* (3) *vānaprastha* and (4) *saṁnyāsa.* For, the *Jainas* are chiefly divided into two orders : (1) the *Agārins* (house-holders) or practically *deśavirata* and (2) the *Anagāra* (those who have renounced the world) or *sarvavirata.* See Tattvārtha (VII. 14) and Aupapātikasūtra (s. 57 p. 55). Nevertheless, we can divide even the life of a *Jaina* into four stages, if we were to look upon the stage of a *Jaina* house-holder practising *padimās* or a *Siddhaputra* as *vānaprastha.*
32. Under this head are included all those mundane living beings that do not come under any one of the first three heads. To express the idea positively beasts, birds, the vegetable and the mineral kingdom etc. go by the name of *tiryac.*

So it is only those persons who actually fully adpot the right means of achieving salvation become entirely free from the worldly fetters and from the encagement of body. Hence, from the point of view of the life spent mankind can be variously classified. On this basis Umāsvāti has suggested six broad classes viz. (1) *adhamādhama*, (2) *adhama*, (3) *vimadhyama*, (4) *madhyama*, (5) *uttama* and (6) *uttamottama*.

These classifications are due to the four types of *karmans* viz. (1) *akuśalānubandha* or *ahita*, (2) *kuśalākuśalānubandha or hitāhita*, (3) *kuśalānubandha* or *hita* and (4) *niranubandha*. The first three sorts of human beings perform the first kind of *karman;* and the rest, the remaining ones in order. This subject is treated by Umāsvāti in his Sambandhakārikas (v. 4-6) to Tattvārtha, and they are elucidated by Siddhasena Gaṇi in his splendid commentary (pp. 6-8) to this excellent work. To put it in a nut-shell, one who commits an atrocious deed and hence ruins his present life and the future one, too, is *adhamādhama*. One who cares for the present life and is completely indifferent to the future is *adhama*. One who spends his time in realizing sensual happiness for this life and hereafter is *vimadhyama*. One who cares for future life only is *madhyama*. One who leads a virtuous life with unadulterated motive of attaining final beatitude is *uttama*. One who after having cultivated the highest and purest type of religious mentality and having translated it into action delivers noble and ennobling sermons, though *kṛta-kṛtya*, is *uttamottama*.

Six Categories for mundane living beings—

Jainism divides all the mundane living beings according to their *leśyā*[33] or so to say their mentality. In all, there are

33. I intend to write an article in English in this connection chiefly based upon my work Ārhatadarśanadīpikā, where this subject is treated in Gujarātī on pp. 350-363. In the meanwhile, I may point out some of the Prakrit, Sanskrit and English sources dealing with it as under :-
Uttarādhyayanasūtra (xxxiv) and its English translation by H. Jacobi along with a foot-note on p. 196 (S.B.E. vol. xiv), Prajñāpanāsūtra (xvii), Lokaprakāśa (III. v. 92-97), Gommaṭasāra (v. 488-555), Outlines of Jainism (pp. 45-47), etc.

six *leśyas* and hence all the animate objects in general and human beings[34] in special, give rise to six categories.

Fourteen Groups—

According to the Jaina philosophy the ladder leading to liberation consists of 14 steps known as *guṇasthānas.*[35] A living being may be at either of these steps according to the extent of his or her or its spiritual evolution. The human beings are in no way, an exception, to this rule. This will suggest that there are 14 groups under which mankind can be classified.

One who is conversant with this branch of the *Jaina* philosophy will easily see that broadly speaking, human beings can be divided into two classes, too. For, all those who are at any one of the first three *guṇasthānas* are non-Jainas and the rest, Jainas. It is only on reaching the fourth step that one ceases to be a non-Jaina and becomes a Jaina.[36] The arrival at the 5th step is no doubt a step nearer to salvation; but the real spiritual progress commences after reaching the sixth step. This as well as the remaining 8 steps are within the reach of saintly characters only.[37] That is to say, Jaina lay-men are on the 4th or the 5th step and saints, on any step beginning with the sixth and ending with the 14th.

It is also possible to form two groups of human beings, viz. (1) the *chadmastha* and the *vītarāga*, in case these two words are interpreted etymologically.

---

34. Of course those who are *ayogikevalins* have no *leśyā* whatsoever. They are the holy persons on the point of attaining *mukti* and bidding a good-bye to *saṁsāra* or metempsychosis.
35. For the discussion of this subject in English, the reader is referred to G.O.S. No. LI (pp. 429-439).
36. Before one can attain the status of a Jaina, he or she should have 35 mārgānusāri-guṇas or the qualities leading to the path of Jainism.
37. The mere *veṣa* of a Jaina saint counts for nothing. Such an individual is denounced as a hypocrite. It may be added that the absence of any external Jaina characteristics is not necessarily a disqualification for the attainment of salvation, in case that individual is really imbibed with the true spirit of saintliness.

Classifications according to varieties in structure, stature etc.—

The mundane beings or the unliberated possess one of six kinds of *saṁhanana*[38] or osseous structure. On this basis human beings can be divided into six groups.

Saṁsthāna or the figure of the body can be considered as another basis to divide mankind into six groups, since there are six types of *saṁsthāna.*[39]

Jambūdvīpa, the eastern and the western halves of Dhātakīdvīpa, and those of Puṣkarārdhadvīpa as well, together with the antaradvīpas are the six places where a human being can be born. So, from this stand-point, too, mankind forms six different groups.

According to Jainism, in Bharata and Airāvata *kṣetras* the twelve-spoked wheel of time is the basis of the law of time. In other words time is divided into *avasarpiṇī* and *utsarpiṇī*, each of which has six spokes. From this view-point, too, human beings can be divided into six kinds according as they are affected by the type of the spoke, out of six.

All human beings have not necessarily the same sort of *karmans*. Hence this may also serve as a basis of grouping them. But this is not the place to do so. Consequently only the four types of human beings are here referred to : (1) *puruṣavedin*, (2) *strīvedin*, (3) *napuṁsakavedin* and (4) *avedin*. Here *veda* signifies carnal desire.

Some groups[42] *of humanity—*

In the 15th adhyayana of Jñātādharmakathāṅga, we come across certain classes of human beings e.g. Caraka, Cīrika, Carmakhaṇḍika, Bhicchunda, Paṇḍuraṅga, Gautama,[40] Govratin,[41] Gṛhidharmin, Dharmacintaka,

38,39. The English explanation of these two technical words is given in G.O. S.No. LI (pp. 405-406), and in "Outlines of Jainism" (p.34); but it seems to be rather inconsistent, at least from the Śvetāmbara point of view.

40,41. These two types of human beings are described at some length in Aupapātikasūtra and its Sanskrit commentary.

42. From the standpoint of the type of the *yoni* (nucleous) human beings are divided into 14 lacs of groups.

Aviruddha, Viruddha, Vṛddha, Śrāvaka, Vṛddha Śrāvaka and Raktapata.

Now a few words about the various classifications of the Jainas only. As already observed they can be divided into two classes viz. (1) the *upāsakas* and (2) the *śramaṇas*, each of whom has two subdivisions, if we were to distinguish females from males. These four varieties well-known as (1) the *śrāvaka* (2) the *śrāvika* (3) the *sādhu* and (4) the *sādhavī* make up a *tīrtha* established by a *Tīrthaṁkara*. This *tīrtha* is also known as *saṅgha* or the Jaina church, and even each of its four branches goes by the same name *(saṅgha)*.

The *Śramaṇas* can be divided into four groups : (1) the *Tīrthaṁkara*, (2) the *Ācārya*, (3) the *Upādhyāya* and (4) the *Sādhu*. Moreover, the *Śramaṇas* can be classified as (1) *Pulāka*, (2) *Bakuśa*, (3) *Kuśīla*,[43] (4) *Nirgrantha* and (5) *Snātaka*.[44]

The *Śramaṇas* can be also divided according to the *gaccha* or its sub-section they belong to. It may be remarked that it is generally the difference in rituals which distinguishes one *gaccha* from another. So, to lay undue stress upon such differences will be tantamount to disfiguring the magnificent edifice of liberalism in Jainism.

The Jainas can be also divided according to the type of their *nirjarā* or the act of shedding off of *karmans*. This basis leads us to form 10 groups,[45] indicated in Tattvārtha (ix, 47).

The 63 Śalākā-puruṣas, 11 Rudras, 9 Nāradas, 7 Kulkaras and others are some of the special groups referred to, in Jainism. They have nothing to do with castes and

---

43. For the five types of this group see the bhāṣya (p. 208) of Tattvārtha (ix, 6).
44. In this connection the reader may consult Tattvārtha (ix, 48), its bhāṣya and its commentary by Siddhasena Gaṇi. Even Bhagavatīsūtra (xxv, 6) may be referred to.
45. From the stand point of *vaiyāvṛtya* (service), too, we have 10 groups. For details see Tattvārtha (ix, 24) and its elucidative literature.

sub-castes amongst which the Jaina community is at present divided; for, the origin of these castes etc., is not religious but probably it is a matter of convenience of the Jaina society. It may be added that these castes are not a barrier for taking part in a common dinner like *Navakārśi*, having a religious tint of *sādharmika.vātsalya*. Even the question of inter-marriage amongst the Jainas does not depend upon castes; for, Yākinīmahattarāsūnu Haribhadra Sūri observes in Dharmabindu as under :

"समानकुलशीलादिभिरगोत्रजैर्वैवाह्यम्, अन्यत्र बहुविरुद्धेभ्य इति"

Four types of Jaina Saints—

In the seventh adhyayana of Jñātādharmakathāṅga, the 6th *aṅga*, we come across four varieties of Jaina saints: (1) those who discard the five holy vows *(mahāvratas)* after they have taken the same, (2) those who observe the five *mahāvratas* only for the sake of livelihood and who remain unduly attached to food etc., which they get from laymen in virtue of their outward get-up of a saint, (3) those who observe the five *mahāvratas* as enjoined by the scriptures after they have renounced the world and (4) those who not only observe the vows only in spirit but even continue practising them very rigidly.

The eleventh chapter of this 6th *aṅga*, too, furnishes us with another sort of the four types of *Jaina* saints. It is the presence or absence of forbearance in part or in toto, which gives rise to these four types. To express it explicitly, there are some saints who do not lose their temper, when offended by their correligiounists but do so, in case they come in contact with the heterodox. There are some saints whose conduct is just the reverse of this. There is another class of saints who get provoked, no matter whether the individual concerned is a Jaina or a non-Jaina. There is still another class of saints, who, under no circumstances become angry and who maintain the spirit of forbearance in speech and thought as well.

Out of these four types, the first includes those saints who are partially *virādhaka* i.e. those who do not partly conform to the sermon of Lord Mahāvīra. The second

includes those who are partly *ārādhaka* i.e. those who partially observe the rules laid down by Lord Mahāvīra. The third has within its fold those saints who are entirely *virādhaka*. The fourth or the last consists of the group of such saints who are completely *ārādhaka*.

Thus, an attempt is here made by me to point out from the *Jaina* view-point different groups of humanity which can be formed on various grounds, with the hope that scholars well-versed in non-Jaina schools of thought will throw ample light on this subject from a comparative point of view.

MARRIAGE IN JAINA LITERATURE*

Marriage Defined

Jainism is one of the most ancient religions of India. It teaches that the soul is perfect, happy and all-powerful, but it is in bondage to matter ; consequently, by transmigration it undergoes all sorts of suffering. The acts of *Rāga* (Love) and *Dveṣa* (Aversion), which it performs through the *Yoga* (vibration or impulse) of mind, speech and body, attract to it a subtle Karmic matter that causes its various conditions. Hence in Jainism, marriage is one of the results of these *Karmas.*[1] In consequence of the 'conduct-deluding karma' (cāritramohaniyakarma), the couples are tempted to marry.[2] As the said Karma operates in the individuals, their sensual desire is awakened and they get united.

Marriage in the Bhogabhūmi

The Jaina Purāṇas corroborate this. In the beginning of the present *Kalpa*, there existed the *Bhogabhūmi* in *Bhāratakṣetrā*,[3] and men and women were born in couples. After their birth, the parents breathed their last and then the couples, who in the meantime had gained youth, lived as husband and wife.[4] This is a simple but natural love in consequence of the operation of the *Cāritra-moha.*

---

*. By courtesy: *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol V, pp. 146ff.

1 Vide "The Jaina Gem Dictionary," p. 57.

2. "Cāritramohodayāt vivahanaṃ Vivāhaḥ—The Rājavārtika.

3. "Bhogabhūmi—The regions where there is enjoyment only, i.e., people do not have to work for their sustenance, and the arts of agriculture etc. are neither necessary nor known. All that the people want, they get from the wishing-trees called *Kalpavṛkṣas.*",—The Jaina Gem Dictionary, p. 35.

4. The Mahāpurāṇa, 3, sls, I4-239. 5 Ibid., 44ff.

Karmabhūmi; Svayaṃvara and other kinds of marriage

After the *Bhogabhūmi*, the period of individual exertion or the *Karmabhūmi* followed and the birth by couples came to an end. Issues were born single as we find it now-a-days. Accordingly a new mode of marriage, viz., Svayaṃvara came into use. This was the so-called *sanātana mārga* and the best of all the forms of marriages such as *gāndharva* (love-marriage by mutual consent), *Rākṣasa* (taking away the bride by force), *Āsura* (giving one's daughter for money) etc., which were eight in all.[5] At the beginning of the *Karmabhūmi* of this *yuga*, Svayaṃvara was re-introduced for the first time by Rājā Akaṃpaṇa of Benares. Bharat, the then reigning monarch of India, welcomed it in all sincerity.[6] Ere this the wives of Sri Ṛṣabha, the first Tīrthaṅkara's father selected two virgin princesses for him and he had to marry them.[7] Polygamy has been in vogue amongst the Jainas from the very beginning of this age, and even today it has not quite disappeared. The wives of Ṛṣabhadeva were indeed selected by his father; but it does not mean that this was the rule or that it was not considered the next best after Svayaṃvara. Anyway, it seems certain from the evidence of the Jaina Purāṇas that both the forms were in use from very early times.

Marriages between the four varṇas

In Svayaṃvara no distinction of caste and creed was made. Hence the field of selection was very wide. *Pratiloma* and *Anuloma vivāhas* were freely contracted. A few examples from Jaina Purāṇas are cited below :

(1) Vāsudeva was a Kṣtriya prince of Jaduvaṃśa. He married a Brāhmana girl named Somaśri after defeating her in Dhanurvidyā[8]

(2) Śri Kṛṣṇa contracted the marriage of his brother Gajakumāra with Somā, the daughter of Somaṣarmā Brāhmaṇa.[9]

5. Vide Nītivākyāmṛta.
6. Mahāpurāṇa, 45, 54f.
7. Mahāpuraṇa, p. 15, sls, 50-99.
8. Harivaṃśa, Sarga 23, sls, 49-51.
9. Harivaṃśapurāṇa by Jinadas quoted in the Vivāhakṣetraprakāśa.

(3) Dhanyakumāra was the son of a merchant of Ujjayini. Though he definitely made himself known as a Vaiśvaputra, Śreṇika Bimbasāra, king of Rājagṛha, gave his daughter Guṇavti away to him in marriage.[10]

(4) Bhaviṣyadatta was from the class of traders, but he was married to the daughter of a Kṣatriya king.[11]

(5) Śreṇika Bimbasāra, a Kṣatriya of course, while in exile, married the daughter of a Brāhmaṇa.[12]

(6) Pārāśara was the king of Gajapura in Kurujāṅgāladeśa. He was in love with the daughter of a fisherman, named Guṇavati, but the fisherman was not willing to marry his daughter, unless the king promised to give the throne to the son who might be born to his daughter. Then the Crown Prince gave up his claim to the throne and the king was married to the fisherman's daughter. This shows that the Śūdras were not willing to give their daughters away in marriage to the people of the upper classes. The obvious reason was that the Śūdras and other low-borns were not allowed to marry the girls of upper classes. Once a Brāhmaṇa Dāsīputra married a Brāhmaṇa girl; but when the latter came to know about the former's low birth, she at once severed her connections with him and lived a lonely life (See Śāntipurāṇa 5, 4, 29).

Marriages with non-Jainas and new converts

Instances might be multiplied, but these, I hope, will suffice. We should note, however, that marriages were contracted not only among the Jainas themselves, but also among parties, of which either was a non-Jaina or a convert to Jainism.

For instance : (1) Rājā Ceṭaka of Vaiśāli was a staunch Jaina. Still his daughter Celanā was married to king Śreṇika Bimbasāra, Buddhist at the time. It was through the efforts of Celanā that the great king was converted to Jainism.[13]

(2) King Dhanasena of Kauśāmbi followed the Vedic religion, but his queen Dhanaśri professed Jainism.[14]

10. Vivāhaprakāśa, pp. 163-170.
11. Bhavisayattakahā, G.O.S., No xx, pp. 76 and 90-96.
12. Uttarapurāṇa, Parva 73.
13. Vimalapurāṇa, pp. 53-60.
14. Ārādhanākathākoṣa, III, 89.

(3) Vasumitra, the merchant, paid reverence to the Jaina gurus; but his wife Dhanaśrī was a non-Jaina.[15]

(4) Nilī was the daughter of the Jaina Seṭh Jinadatta of Bhṛgukacha. Sāgardatta of the same place was a non-Jaina. He found that the Jaina Seṭh was not willing to marry his daughter to a non-Jaina. Consequently, he adopted the Jaina faith, When the Jaina Seṭh found nothing wanting in him, the marriage was celebrated. But soon after, Sāgaradatta got back to his former religion. This was a calamity for the Jainas as well as for Nīlī, who was tortured to give up her faith.[16]

Such instances, I think, obliged the later Jainas to limit the field of marriage to their own caste and religion. But in the early periods, when there was not much hostility between the followers of various sects in India, the marriages were freely contracted between them. Even historical persons like the Jaina Kavi Dhanañjaya, and the famous Buddhist Lexicographer Amara Siṃha, had their wives from amongst the Buddhists and Jainas respectively.

Marriages with Foreigners and Mlecchas

At that time marriages were also contracted with people, who were either not of the Aryan stock and were called Mlecchas or who resided in foreign countries. Below are given a few instances :

(1) King Bharat, the first monarch of India, had a good number of Mlecchа girls as his consorts.[17]

(2) Vāsudeva married a Mleccha-kanyā Jarā and he had by her a son Jaratkumāra.[18]

(3) Bhaviṣyadatta married a lady of Tilakadvīpa, by name Tilakasundarī, who was not of his own caste and country.[19]

---

15. Ibid., III, 113.
16. Ibid., II, 28.
17. Mahāpurāṇa, 37
18. Harivaṃśapurāṇa.
19. Bhavisayattakahā, Sandhi 5, pp. 29-38.

(4) King of Ceylon gave his daughter in marriage to Prince Karkaṇḍu.[20]

(5) Upaśreṇika, the father of the famous king of Rājagṛha, fell in love with the daughter of a chief of *Bhīlas* and the same *Bhīlakanyā* was married to him.[21]

(6) Pālita was a Jaina merchant of Campā. He sailed to Pihuṇḍanagara for business, where he got himself married. While coming back, a son was born to his wife on the deck of the ship, and was named Samudrapāla.[22]

Marriages with out-castes etc.

It is noteworthy that there is hardly an instance of a marriage where the Jaina girls were given in marriage to foreigners. On the contrary, we find that the Vidyādharas or Nabhaścaras who possessed various extraordinary powers and thought themselves more cultured than the Bhūmagacaris or Thalacaras (of India and outside) brought their girls to present to the latter. For instance, Jvalanjatī Vidyādhara came to Podanapura with his daughter and married her to Triprasta, the Crown Prince of Bhūmagacarīs of the said place (See Śāntināthapurāṅa, 3,44-50). Besides the above, illegal daughters born out of wedlock or of prostitutes were accepted even by eminent Jainas.[23] Duṣyanta accepted Śakuntalā as his wife who was illegally born. It seems that in ancient India, it was not thought unnatural to marry a befitting girl from any position or caste. Instances of not forsaking the girls of one's won family and gotra are not wanting; though they are not found in abundance.[24] In short, it is certain that in the early Jaina Church, when the great Tīrthaṅkaras were living, the field of marriage was not so cramped and limited as it is now. At that time, it was found in its natural stage. The Jaina

20. Karakaṇḍucarita.
21. Vivāhakṣetraprakāśa, p. 103.
22. Uttarādhyanasūtra, 21.
23. Vivāhakṣetraprakāśa, p. 39 and 123; Harivaṃśapurāṇa, sarga 21.
24. Ibid., p. 51 and 148.

Tīrthaṅkaras made it clearly- known that there was only one class of men[25] and that there was no difference between man and man.[26] The divisions into Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra were simply to facilitate the earning of livelihood.

Marriage afterwards

But in later times the circumstances changed and with that the custom of marriage also changed. The next earliest law-giver is Śrī Jinasenācārya. He enjoined upon the Jainas to follow the marriage rule in the *Anuloma* form, i. e., a Brāhmaṇa may marry in all the four *vaṃas*, but the Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, and Śūdra in their own and in that which is lower than theirs.[27] This shows that, even in the early centuries of the Christian era, the field of marriage was not so limited,[28] and the girls of Sūdras and Dāsas were accepted by the men of higher classes, as is evident from the Jaina Law books on Partition etc.[29] But it seems that the things were changed when the Muhammadan conquests began. The Śūdras and Dāsas were discarded. Only the upper three classes—Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaiśya were allowed to marry between themselves.

Later on the field of marriage was further restricted. With the advent of the Muhammadans, it was almost impossible to stick to the old customs. The people were influenced by circumstances. Accordingly, we find that many a small sect came into existence among the Jainas during this period. These sects simply denote that they are different groups of the Jainas of certain districts and towns. The marriage was limited to each of the sects only. Although a few examples of inter-marriages in these different sects may

25. Mahāpurāṇa, parva 38, 45.
26. Uttarapurāṇa 24, 491, 492.
27. Rājā Kakkuka Pratihāra of Mārwāḍa was a Jaina and one of his ancestors married a Kṣatriya lady. Thus he was a Brāhmaṇa Kṣatriya (See Prāchīnalipimālā, p. 65).
28. Jaina Law (Madras), pp. 61-64.
29. See Dharmasaṃgrahaśrāvakācāra.

be traced,[30] yet the general rule was and still is to marry in one's own sect only. This rigidness is now being slackened.

Age for marriage

The earlier Jainas at the time of Tīrthaṁkaras considered full youth to be the appropriate age for marriage.[31] The couples were married when young and the honeymoon ceremony followed soon. When the parents saw that their children had reached the teens, they arranged for their marriages either by Svayaṃvara or selection. The *gāndharva-vivāhas*, of which we hear now and then in that age, corroborate this fact. This love-marriage was possible only when the couples had stepped over their respective periods of maturity. But after the Tīrthaṁkaras in later times, the parents did not wait to this age. They married their children when the bride reached the age of 16 and the bridegroom 20 years. Later on, during the Muhammadan period, however, it became necessary to marry one's daughter as early as possible. This is why we find the Jaina Śāstras of this period advocating 12 years as the age for bride and 16 years as that for the bridegroom. Even to this day, the Jainas are sticking to this principle of *Āptikāla* of the *Jainācāryas*; but there are signs also of a new turn now.

Customs and Ceremonies

At present, the rites and customs of marriage among the Jainas very according to the influences of the provinces in which they live; though they are still to be regarded the same in their main features as in ancient times. We find that Sulocanā, who was married in Svayaṃvara at the time of Śri Ṛṣabhadeva, was first taken by certain married ladies, her relations, into the *Vivāhamaṇḍapa*, erected on the occasion in a befitting manner, and then as she reached and sat there facing east, she was bathed and anointed with fragrance. After that they all went with Sulocanā to the *Jina-*

30. See the inscription of Tejapāla in the Jaina Temple, Dilwārā Ābū, in which mention of a marriage between the Podawāla and Moḍa—two different sects of the Jaina is made.
31. Harivaṃśapurāṇa, sarga 55, Slokas 73 ff.

caityālaya (temple) and performed *Jinapujā* (worship) with great devotion. Then at the fixed *lagna* (auspicious moment), she was carried to the *Svayaṃvaramaṇḍapa*, where all the guests, royal and otherwise, were present and from whom she selected a youth of her choice, and placed garland round his neck. Then followed the performance of Jinapujā, a great feast and rejoicings. The bride and bridegroom were to observe the recorded rites consisting of the Jinapuja and "Saptapadī denoting mutual consent." In case the marriage was not according to the Svayaṃvara rule, the Only difference made was that there were no *Svayaṃvaramaṇḍapa* and the ceremonies in it. Instead, the *Vāgdāna* ceremony took place, which was but a kind of betrothal. The bridegroom with his relatives and friends came on the fixed date to the house of the bride and then the avove rites were observed. But in later times, under the influence of the Vedic Brāhmaṇas, the worship of Agni, Vināyaka etc. entered into the Jaina marriage and is to be found to this day.[32] These ceremonies in the name of Jaina marriage are useless and worth abandoning. So the marriage among the modern Jainas is not of the same kind throughout. In South India, even widow-marriage is permissible since the mediaeval times; though in earlier Jaina literature not a single instance of it is to be traced. But the Jaina Śāstras declare that if after the marriage has taken place, either of the couples finds any defect in the other within the time prescribed for honeymoon and complains of it, then that marriage is null and void and the bride is free to marry again.[33]

The object of Marriage

The object of marriage in Jainism is twofold : viz. (I) to give a legitimate outlet to sensual feelings so that the human being may rightly live a useful life, enjoying the fruits of Dharma, Artha and Kāma,[34] and thus be entitled to attain the great object—the *Mokṣa;* (2) and to promote the cause of

32. Ādipurāṇa, 38, 127-131.
33. Trivarṇācāra, ch II, 171-173.
34. Nītivākyāmṛta.

Dharma (Law) by generating righteous and chivalrous sons and daughters. It is a duty of the householder to be contented with his own wife and to contrive for the continuance of the human race.[35]

Thus we find that though marriage is advocated in Jainism, it is no less condemned there; for, it is an outcome of the *Karmas* after all. Besides, in Jainism, the great aspiration of the householder is *Mokṣa* which cannot be gained until one observes full Brahmacarya and subdues the senses. But as this is no easy task and the worldly man cannot at once adopt the hard and rigid Brahmacarya, he is allowed to marry and to live a contented life.

N.B. In this short paper on the marriage systems of the Jainas as recorded in the literature, the author of the article has touched on several points including the customs and ceremonies as also the purpose of marriage. In spirit they have similarities with those of the marriage system of the Hindus. The inquisitive reader may feel interested in the following texts for important points :

P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. II, part 1, Second Edition; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1974, pp. 426-574; Heramba Chatterjee Śāstrī, *Studies in the Social Background of the Forms of Marriage in Ancient India*, Vols. 1 and II., Calcutta, 1972; Dr. Chanchal Kumar Chatterjee, *Studies in the Rites and Rituals of Hindu Marriage in Ancient India*, Calcutta, 1978.

It would be of interest to note here that in the Brāhmaṇical concept, marriage is regarded as most important of the Saṁskāras and since the period of the Śrutis its sacredness and indispensability have been stressed to a considerable extent. The *Ṛgveda* eulogizes the utility of sons through which immortality may be secured. It would be astonishing to record here that amongst the ancient people of the civilized countries

35. Mahāpurāṇa, 15, 61-64.

this was a belief in general for which reference may be made to *A History of the Laws, Manners and Customs of the People (of China)*-Gray, J. H., London, 1878, 1.183; (For Japan) : *Travels and Researches* (Trans), 423; (Greek) : Article on Marriage by W. J. Woodhouse in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, VIII., 444. In the same text (p. 460), see Jewish Concept of Marriage by J. Abrahams. For Roman marriage, see the article by W. Ward Fowler, p. 466.

– Prof. Heramba Chatterjee Shastri

THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL IN JAINISM*

Various conceptions about the form and nature of the soul have been current among the different peoples of the world from the primitives of the present day scientist. In India alone is found a number of such conceptions. In the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* (X. 58. 1-12) we read that the soul of a man after death is invited to come back to him from the trees, herbs, the sky, the sun etc. Coming down to the Upaniṣadic literature, in one place we find that "the intelligent luminous self in the heart is as small as a grain of rice or barley, and yet it is the ruler of all this and whatever else exists",[1] while in another, the soul is said to be of the size of the thumb.[2] In the Upaniṣads not often the *ātman* is spoken of as filling the whole extent of the body. It is said that "as razor is placed in the razor-case, or fire in the fire-hearth, so does this conscious self pervade the body up to hairs and nails."[3] Finally, here we meet with the conception that the soul is not being restricted to any part of the body but as being infinite and occupying all space. "It is eternal, all-prevailing, omnipresent, subtle and imperishable and is the origin of all beings, and the wise alone can perceive it."[4] Next to the Upaniṣads, we come to the different philosophical systems. Sāṃkhya-philosophers believe in the plurality of the *ātman (Puruṣa)*. According to them the *ātman* is formless, pure consciousness, eternal, all-pervading and subtle. It is a passive spectator and not an independent enjoyer of its actions. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system of thought treats the soul as a qualityless, characterless, indeterminate unconscious entity. It is absolutely immutable, all-pervading,

---

* By courtesy: *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XI, p. 137ff.

1. Br. Up., V. 6.1
2. *Kaṭha Up.*, II. 2. 12.
3. *Kauṣhtaki Up.*, IV. 20.
4. *Muṇḍaka Up.*, I. 6.

in itself unconscious and devoid of all attributes. The *ātman*, according to them, acquires consciousness only as a result of suitable collocations. In order to avoid the absolute eternalism on the one hand, and the absolute nihilism on the other, the Buddha neither accepted nor denied the existence of the soul.[5] According to *Saṅkara Vedānta*, the *ātman* which is *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, is identical with Brahman.

Having a kinship with the above systems in some respects, the Jaina school of philosophers believes that the soul is eternal, conscious, blissful and pure in its nature; it has plurality and possesses infinite energy. It is "a doer and an enjoyer. It migrates in a series of existences, and, in fact, is free from *Karmas*."[6] In Jaina philosophy, consciousness is not an attribute of the soul but it is the very nature of it. It is not held to be absolutely immutable and unmodifiable; it undergoes modifications *(vivartamān)* such as the forms of god, man etc. The most noteworthy conception of the soul in Jainism is that it conforms to the dimension of the body it lives in. In this sense, the soul occupies the whole body from tip of the hair to the nail of the foot. Thus the soul can be contracted or expanded according to the body it possesses. It is of a very small size while the foetus is in the womb and goes on expanding gradually with its body till it attains its full dimension. It is said that as a lamp placed in a small pot or in a room illumines the whole space, so the soul expands and contracts according to the body of an ant or an elephant. A better example can be cited by mentioning

---

5. Kiṃ nu kho bho Gotama atth'attā ti.
Evaṃ vutte Bhagavā tuṇhī ahosi.
Kiṃ pana bho Gotama natth'attā ti.
Dutiyam pi kho Bhagavā tuṇhī ahosi.
Saṃyutta Nikāya, IV, 400.

6. कर्ता च कर्मभेदानां भोक्ता कर्मफलस्य च ।
संसर्ता परिनिर्वाता स ह्यात्मा नान्यलक्षणाः ॥
This śloka is very old and often quoted by Haribhadra Sūri *Śāstra-vārttā-samuccaya*, 1.9) and other writers.

7. अणुगुरुदेहपमाणो उवसंहारप्पसप्पदो चेदा ।
Dravya-saṃgraha, 9.

the case of a gas-like-oxygen which fills up the whole of the space within different vessels, having small or large dimensions. The Jaina conception that the soul has a measure of its body can be compared with its similar conception in the *Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad* referred to above.

It should be noted that this Jaina conception of soul is viewed only from the practical point of view *(vyavahāranaya)*. From the real standpoint the soul is viewed to occupy the whole universe. Upādhyāya Yaśovijayaji, a great saint of the eighteenth century, has described it in *Adhyātmasāra*. He says that it is from the ordinary point of view that the soul has dimension and plurality. A jaundiced person due to the defects in his eyes perceives two moons instead of one, in the same way the man who has not realized the *ātman* sees it as many. It is due to illusion that in relation to its material *karmas*, we call the *ātman* as material, but in fact; it possesses neither form nor dimension; it is one unity (from the point of view of consciousness as one). It exists, it is consciousness, bliss and beyond all description.[9]

According to the Jaina school all existing souls are divided into two classes, the liberated *(mukta)* and the non-liberated *(saṃsārin)*. The latter are either mobile *(trasa)* or immobile *(sthāvara)*. Further, the mobile ones are two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed or five-sensed, possessing respectively the sense or senses of taste, smell, sight and

---

8. संकुचियविय्सियत्तं जीवस्स होइ जीवगुणो ।
पूरेइ हंदि लोगं बदुप्पएहसत्तण गुणोणं ॥
Ācārāṅganiryukti, Āgamodaya-samiti edition, p. 171.

9. यथा तैमिरिकश्चन्द्रमप्येकं मन्यते द्विधा ।
अनिश्चयकृतोन्मादस्तथात्मानमनेकधा ॥
तथामूर्तांगसंबंधादात्मा मूर्त इति भूमः ।
न रूपं न रसो गंधो न च स्पर्शो न चाकृतिः ।
यस्य धर्मा न शब्दो वा तस्य का नाम मूर्तता ॥
चैतन्यपरसामान्यात् सर्वेपामेकतात्मनाम् ।
आत्मा सत्यचिदानन्दः सूक्ष्मात्सूक्ष्मः परात्परः ॥
Adhyātmasāra, XVIII.

hearing. The immobile beings are called microscopic organisms *(sukṣma ekendriya jīva)* having only one sense, viz., touch. These are said to contain in the earth, water, air, fire and plants. The characteristic of all these organisms is the possession of the vitalities, which are ten in number: the five senses, the three powers of the body, speech and mind, respiration, and the age *(āyuḥ)*. Out of these, the four vitalities must be present in every living being, however low in the scale of beings, e.g., the tiniest, lowest amœba possesses the sense of touch, the bodily power by which it moves, respiration, and the life-span. As we ascend the scale of beings, the vitalities grow till we reach the man with all the five senses, the three powers, respiration and the span of life.

Strange to say, that from the Jaina doctrine of microscopic being filling the whole universe, some scholars are led to believe that Jainism is very primitive since it believes "that nearly everything is possessed of a soul; not only have plants their own souls but particles of earth, cold water, fire and wind also."[10] They call this belief of Jaina philosophers as animistic or hylozoistic. But a careful study of the Jaina scriptures shows that Jainism is not an animistic faith. Jaina philosophy does not teach that "everything from the solar system to the dew-drops has a soul,"[11] although the whole universe is packed up with minute beings imbued with a soul. In fact, if "there are souls even in the inorganic objects like metals and stones,"[12] what is the object of the Jaina metaphysics in making a distinction between the *jīva* and *ajīva* or *cetana* and *acetana* ?

The division of living-matter *(sacitta)* and dead-matter *(acitta)*, according to Jainism, is noteworthy in this connection. It is said that as long as a piece of rock has the vitalities and possesses the capacity of growing, it comes under the category of immobile organisms. But when this rock is taken out, it loses all the vitalities together with its capacity of growing, coming in contact with dissimilar objects

10. Vide Jacobi's *Jaina Sūtras*, SBE, part II, p. xxxiii.
11. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 322.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

such as water, air etc. It is then called *acitta* and it possesses no more a soul. The same is the case with water-bodied, fire-bodied, and plant-bodied souls.[13] To take another example, water is a living-matter according to Jaina biology, but when it is taken out from the well and heated, it loses all the characteristics of a *jīva*. Similarly a fruit, as long as it is green is a living-matter, but it becomes dead matter, or *ajīva* when it is ripe. Thus it is very clear that Jainism is not animism in the sense that "every thing is possessed of a soul,"[14] but on the other hand, it makes a clear distinction between soul and non-soul.

As regards life in the vegetable kingdom, Jainism holds a very important view. "Though some other Indian philosophers admit that the plants possess souls, the Jaina thinkers have developed this theory in a remarkable way." Jainism holds that the plants may be the body of one soul *(pratyeka)*, or it may possess a multitude of embodied souls *(sādhāraṇa)*. In the former case, the plants are always gross, while in the latter the beings are very subtle and invisible and they possess a common body and have their respiration and nourishment in common, but are otherwise separate and distinct from each other. These beings are technically called the *Nigodas* or monads. It is said that these organisms are in the lowest and most miserable condition of existence. They supply souls to the vacant space caused by the liberated souls.

The Jaina philosophers were great observers of Nature. They had a direct approach to her heart. They loved Nature as they loved their own self. That is why they could see souls not only in earth, water and plant but even in substances like fire and air. Jaina philosophers do not take an ordinary view of these *jīvas* but they go into deeper and greater details and place before us such a remarkable and minute description of the little beings, as was not attempted by any other philosopher in ancient India. The Jaina

---

13. *Daśvaikālika Sūtra*, IV. I, Āgamodaya-samiti edition, p. 136.
14. Colebrooke : *Miscellaneous Essays*, ii, p. 276.

scriptures are full of these details. Indeed all this shows the 'all-merciful' spirit of Jaina *ācāryas*. Their highest religion was that "all breathing, existing, living, sentient creatures should not be slain, nor treated with violence, non abused, nor tormented, nor driven away."[15]

N.B. The concept of soul has invited attention of most of the philosophers of ancient India. Since the dawn of Indian wisdom as reflected in the twelve mantras of the *Ṛgveda* (X. 58, 1-12) we notice the tendency of the seers to speak about the soul and philosophical discussions on the topic are best exhibited in the texts of the Upaniṣads. For further studies special reference may be made to the following : Prameyakalamartanda by Sri Prabhacandra, it being a commentary on the Pariksamukhasutra of Manikyanandi, edited critically by Pt. Mahendra Kumar Sastri, Bombay, 1941 (Second edition). Jacobi, Article on Jainism and the Jaina Atomic theory in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. VII; Jaini, *Outlines of Jainism;* S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Eleventh Impression, 1983, specially pp. 294ff; J.N. Sinha, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1952, specially the pages, 247-49; E. Frauwallner, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1; R.C. Dwivedi, *Contribution of Jainism to Indian Culture*, ed. Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1975; of special interest for the purpose : A.L. Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvakas*, Delhi, First edition, London, 1951; Reprint, Delhi, 1981; and S.N. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, Cambridge, 1932, pp. 188ff.

—Prof. Heramba Chatterjee Shastri

15. *Ācārāṅga*, IV. I.

THE JAINA RĀMĀYAṆAS*

It is a well-known fact in the history of Indian literature that the *Rāmāyaṇa* owes its origin to a single poet while the *Mahābhārata* is a compendium prepared by several writers. The first and last books of the *Rāmāyaṇa* are not considered to be genuine in their entirety. They contain stories and legends which have little to do with the main story of Rāma. Fresh stories and legends have flowed freely into them. The *Rāmāyaṇa* has thus grown in bulk though not to the same extent as the *Mahābhārata*. Several scholars have made attempts in separating or at least, in distinguishing the genuine from the spurious. Dealing with this problem a considerable amount of literature has accumulated within the last half a century. A study of the Jaina *Rāmāyaṇa* is interesting regarding the origin and development of the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

The epic is the natural outcome of the ballad poetry of a nation. It has the stamp of a single genius who takes care to bring unity into his work. Ballads singing the story of Rāma must have been current before Vālmīki. He must have found it possible to arrange the ballads around a central action and a central hero. The result of this attempt was the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Vālmīki narrated the story in his own way after dressing up the raw material of ballad poetry prior to him. After Vālmīki the *Rāmāyaṇa* has had some more development. Normally this is the way in which any story develops to unwieldly proportions. But there are other ways also. Owing to several religious and social influences a story current at a time may radiate in several directions and every offshoot or set of offshoots may assume independence in course of time. This seems to be the process by which the

---

* By courtesy: *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. xv, pp. 575ff.

Jaina Rāmāyaṇas as well as the several other versions of the *Rāmāyaṇa* like the *Adbhuta-*, the *Vāsiṣṭha-* and the *Adhyātma-*have come into being. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the origin and growth of the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇas* starting from the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* which as far as I know, has not been fully set forth hitherto anywhere.* Though Dr. Winternitz has noticed a few of these *Rāmāyaṇas*, his treatment is not as adequate as the subject demands. The learned Doctor himself is aware[1] of this deficiency, for he states "It is very desirable however that a careful comparison of all the Jinistic adaptations of the Rāma legend be made."[2] Not only are the Jaina versions of this epic both in Sanskrit and Prakrit considered in this essay but also adaptations of the same by Jaina writers in Kaṇṇada literature which is particularly rich in *Jaina Rāmāyaṇas*. I am not aware of the existence of any *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* in any other modern Indian language either Dravidian or Indo-Aryan.

It is well to start with a tradition concerning the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇas*. It was current even as late as the eighteenth century. Devacandra,[3] the author of the *Rāmakathāvatāra*,[4] the last but one of the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇas* in Kaṇṇada, traces back the origin of the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* to the times of Ādideva, the first of the *Tīrthaṅkaras*, who narrated the story to his son, Bharata. This was handed down from generation to generation till at last Mahāvīra, the last of the *Tīrthaṅkaras*, came to be its possessor. He, in his turn, told the story to king Śreṇika of Magadha, his devout disciple. In course of time several writers like Kūci Bhaṭṭāraka, Nandi Muṇi, Kavi Parameṣṭhi, Raviṣena, Vīraṣena, Siddhaṣena,

---

* I am indebted to Prof. A. N. Upadhye of Kolhapur for bringing to my notice an article on the subject by Prof. Chakravarti in the 20th volume of the *Jaina Gazette*.

1 *HIL*, vol. II, pp. 489-494. 2 Ibid., 494, note 3.

3 *Lives of Kaṇṇada Poets*, vol. III, 150. It is interesting to note that it was this writer who helped Col. Mackenzie in his tour through Mysore in search of antiquities.

4 This was written in 1797 A.D. (*Ibid.*, 147).

Padmanandi, Guṇabhadra, and Sakalakīrti wrote the same story. Kaṇṇada writers like Cāmuṇḍarāya, Nāgacandra, Māghanandi Siddhānti, Kumudendu, Nayasena and others, continued the same tradition. Devacandra, at the close of his work, adds that he is rectifying a few doubtful points in the story as given by Nāgacandra on the basis of the Rāmāyaṇa story occurring in Guṇabhadra's *Triṣaṣṭhilakṣaṇa-mahāpuruṣa-purāna* and other similar stories in the legendary lore of the Jainas.[5]

The early part of this tradition that the first *Tīrthaṅkara* was the originator of the story may be dismissed as unhistorical, because the story of Rāma is said to have come into existence, according to Jaina mythology, during the time of Muni Suvrata, the twentieth Tirthaṅkara. In the latter part of the tradition, from Mahāvīra onwards Devacandra is probably travesting historical ground, for the works of some of the writers he mentions are even now available. Though very little is known about Kūci Bhaṭṭāraka and Nandimuṇi, Cāmuṇḍarāya (978 A.D.) tells us that each of them worte a *Mahāpurāṇa*.[6] Kavi Parameṣṭhi may be a writer of the same name who has been praised by Pampa (941 A.D.). He is said to have written a *purāṇa* on the lives of sixty-three Jaina saints.[7] Cāmuṇḍarāya who mentions this fact also adds that Jinasṣena, for whom we have a date in 783 A.D., wrote his *Ādipurāṇa* on the basis of the *Mahāpurāṇa* of Kavi Parameṣṭhi must be somewhere before 783 A.D. His work must necessarily contain the Rāmāyaṇa story because, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa are included in the sixty-three saints. Raviṣena is the celebrated author of the *Padmapurāṇa*, alias the *Mahārāmāyaṇa*, which was composed in 678 A.D.[8] Vīrasena and Siddhasena have come down to us as mere names. The first might be the same individual who was the preceptor of Jinasena. The second has been praised very highly by Cāmuṇḍarāya as a poet whose extraordinary imagination steeped in wonder a throng of poets.[9] Siddhasena of the above tradition, may perhaps be identical

5 For the original of this passage see *Ibid., 150.*
6 *Ch. Pu*, 24 (verse). 7 *Ibid., verse* 5. 8 Hiralal's *Catalogue*, XXI.
9 *Ch. Pu.*, verse, 4. 9a *HIL., II*, 496, 592.

with this poet. Padmanandi, if he is not Kuṇḍa-Kuṇḍācārya of the first century A.D. who had the same surname; has the honour of remaining entirely obscure. Guṇabhadra is a familiar name in Jaina literature. An author by name Sakalakīrti is known to have lived in the 15th century[9a] A.D., but he is not known to be a writer of any *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa*. So it is not possible to say who this traditional Sakalakīrti was. The Kaṇṇada writers mentioned by Devacandra are very well-known and it is needless to dwell on them. One thing, namely that the *Rāmāyaṇas* said to have been written by Māghanandi and Nayasena are not now extant, may however, be noted.

From the above examination, it is clear that a fairly considerable part of this tradition is supported by Jaina literary history. Though many of the works have not survived, those of Raviṣena and Guṇabhadra are still existing. It is indeed quite strange why Vimalasūri, the earliest writer so far known of the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa*, and a host of other names such as those of the encyclopaedic Hemacandra and Caumuha, author of *Paumacaria* in Prakrit, are missing in the above list. Probably Devacandra was not aware of them. Be this as it may, the heritage of the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇas* that we have is "truly plenteous."

The attitude of some of these Jaina writers towards the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* is plainly set forth by Vimalasūri and his close follower Raviṣena. Though it is mainly religious, it is also full of artistic possibilities. Vimalasūri wrote his *Paumacaria*, according to his own statement, five hundred and thirty years after the death of Mahāvīra,[10] i.e., about the 3rd or 4th tear of the Christian era, since the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra is generally accepted to have taken place in 527 B.C.[11] As far as our present knowledge of Jaina literature

---

10. पञ्चेव वाससया दुसमाये तीसवरिससंजुत्ते
वीरे सिद्धिमुवसये तओनिवद्धमिमं चरिअं ॥
But this date is questioned by some scholars like Jacobi (*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, VII, 467) and others (*ABORI.*, Vol. XV, Parts I & II; *POC.*, VII, 109).
11. *Heart of Jainism*, 43.

goes, it may be said that he was the first great Jaina poet to view *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* from the standpoint of Jaina religion and ethics. This view is put into the mouth of king Śreṇika, whose mind was troubled about the many inconsistencies in the earlier Rāmāyaṇa versions and who sought instruction and enlightenment at the hands of Gautama, the chief of the disciples of Mahāvīra. Thus thinks Śreṇika : "How could the most powerful of the Rākṣasas be defeated by monkeys? Is it not unbelievable that Kumbhakarṇa slept soundly for the first six months of a year without any fear or hunger or distraction even when he was being crushed by sledge hammers, and multitudinous claps of the thundering drums resounded in his ears? Is it not still more ridiculous that as soon as he got up from his death-like stupor, he swallowed elephants and buffaloes? How could Rāvaṇa and other Rākṣasas who were good Jainas, eat and drink human flesh and blood without any disgust and compunction? Oh! the *Rāmāyaṇa* that has been written is false and foul and distorted. There are many learned men in this world to whom I can go and clear these, my doubts."[12]

Therefore, Śreṇika approaches Gautama and requests him to clear his doubts. Gautama being very obligingly sensitive to such requests,[13] begins the narration of the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa* with these words : "King Śreṇika, be attentive and listen. I will tell what the *Kevalis* have said before. Rāvaṇa is not a demon eating human flesh. All the things said by bad and foolish poets are entirely false."[14]

This view may belong to the region of mythological polemics but it is not without its importance. We must get a glimpse of the mind behind it. To Vimalasūri, a pious Jaina that he was, all the hideous, nasty and terrible customs of the Rākṣasas, as described by Vālmīki, must have seemed thoroughly inhuman and outrageous. His sensibility must

12 *PC.*, II, 104-118. The same is repeated by Raviṣena in Sanskrit more elaborately.

13 Gautama is the traditional narrator in Jaina mythology and king Śreṇika is always his devout and willing subject. They occupy the same position as Vaiśampāyana and Janamejaya have in Brahmanic mythology.

14 *PC.*, 3-14, 15,; *R.* 3-27-28.

have been severely shocked. Even so, he could not refrain from the task he had set for himself of giving to his co-religionists a substitute for the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa*. For, the *Rāmāyaṇa* was as popular in his days as it is to-day. It had become the very life-blood of the people for whom it was composed. Its influence in moulding the mind of the nation along the path of duty and righteousness was so universal and compelling that almost every religion wished to include the *Rāmāyaṇa* among its sacred texts, and so earn, if possible, some additional following and popularity for itself. Buddhism seems to have done so. In the *Daśaratha Jātaka*,[15] only a part of the Rāmāyaṇa story is depicted. Even the name of Rāvaṇa does not occur in that story. In the eyes of the Buddhists the importance of the *Rāmāyaṇa* was mainly due to the character of Rāma—the gentle, pious, austere and dutiful Rāma. They cared more for that character which was in some essential aspects the prototype of Buddha. They went so far even as to believe that one of the previous births of the Buddha was that of Rāma. They must have found it rather difficult to reconcile the character of Rāvaṇa with their religious doctrines and beliefs and so it may be, Rāvaṇa could not find a place in the story. But a few centuries later, the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (compiled before 443 A.D.)[16] seems to have looked at Rāvaṇa with a benevolent eye. Here, Rāvaṇa is represented as a great sage who holds philosophical discourses with the Buddha, whose disciple he was. He wore the garb of Mahāyāna Buddhism. But no mention is made of his tragic passion for Sītā, and her abduction and the consequences that followed in their train. As stories, these Buddhist representations are insipid and devoid of human interest.

The Jaina view is more interesting. Though it is true that "The sacred books of the Jainas are written in a dry as dust, matter of fact didactic tone, and as far as we know them are seldom instinct with that general human interest

15 There is much controversy regarding the relative priority of this Jātaka and the *Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa*. The question cannot be decided with any approach to finality as the evidence on both sides are scanty and indefinite.

16 The *L.S.*, trs., Suzuki, p. 7.

which so many Buddhist texts possess,"[17] the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* is a notable exception to this dictum and in the main manifests the large-heartedness of the Jaina religion and its adherents. The Jainas acheived what the Buddhists did not, in humanising the character of Rāvaṇa and lifting him to the heights of tragic sublimity. It is worthwhile to know how this transformation came about.

The Jaina religion claims to be a universal religion. Even animals and the denizens of hell are endowed with the possibility of becoming perfect if they believe in, and act according to, the dictates of the Jaina religion. However, bad and degraded a soul may be under the fetters of *Karma*, it can realize its own true self when it seizes hold of a proper and auspicious occasion. The doctrine of Karma plays a very prominent part in the Journey of the soul through various cycles of births and deaths. Looked at from this point of view the character of Rāvaṇa does not evoke any feeling of hatred or disgust. Instead, it draws out our sympathy. Vimalasūri took this sympathetic attitude. In the opening section of his book, he has already told us that Rāvaṇa was not a Rākṣasa addicted to savage habits. To Vālmīki, Rāvaṇa was a monster, a non-Aryan, a terrible and hideous Rākṣasa, who was the 'scourge of the world' of gods and men. There is no bright spot in that dark picture. It appears as though Rāvaṇa is the sum-total of all the evil in the world, as though he is evil incarnate. Vimalasūri took a different attitude— a thoroughly human one. Human nature cannot be perfectly good or perfectly bad. It is a mixture of both good and evil. It is the predominance of the one over the other that makes man good or bad. So the picture of Rāvaṇa as given by Vālmīki suffers from a gross exaggeration. It smacks of the racial prejudice of an Aryan towards a non-Aryan. Vimalasūri realized this injustice done to Rāvaṇa and at one stroke— not of pen only but of imagination also—humanized him. At once the demon's ungainly outward shape disappeared like a dark cloud. It became beautiful. Rāvaṇa now shines in all the glory of outward form that is the gift for man. He becomes almost a Cupid as far as his bodily perfection is concerned.

17 *HIL.*, II-476.

Vimalasūri thus describes him : "Body, dark brown like a shining emerald, face beautiful like a full-blown lotus, large and expansive chest, powerful and long arms, waist so slender as to be taken in a grip, hips like those of a lion, thighs like the trunk of an elephant, feet elegant like those of a tortoise, possessing the thirty two auspicious marks, adorned by the Śrīvatsa jewel and dress of a nice finish— this Rāvaṇa appeared to the men of the world like the great god Indra."[18] Surely this transformation is rather enviable. All his superfluous heads and arms vanish with their weirdness leaving behind the human form.

Not only did Rāvaṇa come to possess human form but a large share of the human heart also under the magic touch of Vimalasūri. His heart becomes the seat of tender and noble emotions. There are numerous incidents scattered through the *Paumacaria* wherein the heart of Rāvaṇa is revealed. One or two of such incidents can be noticed here. Once, in his campaign for conquering the three worlds, he defeated Varuṇa and took him prisoner. The subjects of Varuṇa, overcome by grief, were crying sorely. Rāvaṇa heard their lament and pacified them by kindly restoring to Varuṇa his liberty and kngdom.[19] On the last day of his life, when death and disgrace were hanging heavily upon his aggrieved soul, he repents as nobody has repented since then, either in poetry or in actual life, for the wrong that he did to Sītā in separating her by stealth from her beloved husband and the misery he inflicted upon her. He hates himself; he cries, out of pity for poor Sītā, like a lonely child bereaved of its mother.[20] Vimalasūri succeeds in convincing us, poetically, that Rāvaṇa's nature was more human than that of the noblest of men.

---

18 *PC.*, XI, 105-108. It is true that the Jainas call Rāvaṇa by the name of Daśamukha also. But this does not indicate that he had actually ten heads. When he was born his face was reflected in a decagonal ruby and the child Rāvana appeared as if he had ten heads. The ruby was a heir-loom in his family.

19 *PC.*, XIX, 31-32.

20 *Ibid.*, L.XIX, 29-39

The poet takes a step further and converts Rāvaṇa to the Jaina religion. This means, among other things, that Rāvaṇa must necessarily abstain from *hiṁsā* or injury to any living being. This attitude is consistently kept up by the poet in the description of the campaigns of Rāvaṇa. Rāvaṇa becomes an invincible emperor of the three worlds not by killing all the kings that opposed him but by defeating them and making them his vassals. Kings seldom die at the hands of Rāvaṇa. He cared much for the doctrine of *ahiṁsā*—non-injury. Once king Marut of Rājapura was performing a sacrifice. Rāvaṇa coming to know of this affair rushed to the spot, not with any idea of killing the participants in it but only with the idea of preventing it. It was an act of righteousness on his part to do so, because sacrifice is associated with *hiṁsā*. Unlike the Rāvaṇa of Vālmīki, who was a tormentor of sages, this Rāvaṇa has great reverence towards Jaina ascetics. He bows before them and listens to their preaching of *Dharma*. Once he approached a sage named Anantavīrya Kevali and with interest, heard his discourse on religion. He was fascinated by the pious story of Hariṣena. After his conquest of the three worlds Rāvaṇa protected and helped in the propagation of Jaina religion by constructing several temples to the *Tīrthaṅkaras*. So Vimalasūri by making Rāvana a Jain, has further ennobled him.

When these facts are borne in mind, it does not seem to be a matter of surprise, if Vimalasūri maintains that Rāvaṇa was an ideal king. As a king, he is powerful, great, and matchless. Vālmīki concedes to Rāvaṇa this kingly stateliness and pomp. Vimalasūri retains the same and enhances their value. At the end of his conquest Rāvaṇa is the abode of fame and wealth; several *Vidyādhara* kings bow before him; he has no enemy in all the three *khaṇḍas* (continents); all the citizens of his city praise him. Any country that he visits becomes a veritable heaven full of wealth, corn, and rubies and free from the fear of famines; it also becomes the abode of *puṇya*. The green earth, decorated by mountain streams and *kuṭaja* flowers, like a maiden, smiles at the approach of Daśānana and welcomes

21 *PC.*, XI, 107-110.

him.[21] On account of the meritorious deeds of Rāvaṇa in his previous births, he is now enjoying great fame and riches. Vimalasūri sums up the greatness of Rāvaṇa in one word viz., *Pravarapuruṣa* or best of men. We need not grudge him the epithet and all its implications.

I have briefly indicated the attitude of Vimalasūri in conceiving the character of Rāvana. He has made him the noblest of men, a Jaina, and an ideal king. But even such a mighty man must die. Here it is that Destiny comes into play. Vimalasūri makes Rāvaṇa a *prativāsudeva*, one of the 63 *Śalāka-puruṣas*. He is doomed to die at the hands of the *Vāsudeva*, his contemporary. In this case Lakṣmaṇa is the Vāsudeva. There must be some cause of embitterment between them. Rāvaṇa's abducting Sītā is the incident that brings about his downfall. This was a fact that Rāvaṇa knew full well through the sage Nārada. There was a prophecy, which Vimalasūri has deftly indicated just after descrbing the greatness of Rāvaṇa and his prowess, that Rāvaṇa was fated to die at the hands of Dāśarathi on account of the daughter of Janaka. Rāvaṇa tried to avoid such a death by killing Janaka and Daśaratha before the birth of the persons concerned. But, as his ill-luck would have it, both of them escaped from the hands of Vibhiṣaṇa who had gone to kill them, out of anxiety for his brother's safety. Vibhiṣaṇa, cutting the heads of their waxen images, thought he had actually killed them. Here Destiny deceived Rāvaṇa and was for some time working secretly but surely.

There is another point to be noted in this connection. Rāvana died on account of his passion for Sītā. Vimalasūri wanted to illustrate, by means of his characterisation of Rāvaṇa, the disastrous consequences of an unchaste life. One of the five vows of Jainism is *Brahmacarya*—i.e. chastity. However, good and great a man may be, his life is sure to end in disgrace and misery, if he becomes unchaste at any time. There is no cause for pity in the death of a man habitually unchaste. So Vimalasūri takes care to instil the idea of Rāvaṇa's chastity before he met Sītā. In addition to Mandodari, Rāvaṇa has numerous wives, all legally married. Once, he happened to come in his march over the world as a warrior, to the city of Nalakūbara. Nalakūbara's wife

Uparambhā, who was dissatisfied with her husband and who liked Rāvaṇa from her girl-hood, knowing that her dear Rāvaṇa was so near on that occasion, intrigued to enslave him by her beauty. But he did not yield to her ravishing words. Instead he counselled her to behave properly towards her husband as befitted her noble lineage and carefully to guard her priceless jewel of chastity.[22] Rāvaṇa passed unsullied this severe test. Still there was in him a hidden fear of his weakness for woman and so he went to the sage Anantavīrya and took upon himself the vow of chastity—the *parāṅganā virati vrata*. He fortified himself with this restraint against temptation for a woman. So his abduction of Sītā is a lapse from his normal behaviour and he paid dearly for it. This constitutes the tragic weakness of Rāvaṇa. He is not perfectly virtuous.

From the above, it is clear that this conception of Vimalasūri, born out of the application of Jaina ideals of life and conduct to the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa*, is peculiarly tragic in spirit. Aristotle's dictum that a tragic hero must be a "man, not pre-eminently virtuous, and just, whose misfortune, however is brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of judgment" holds good literally for Vimalasūri's Rāvaṇa. The subsequent development of the story as Vimalasūri narrates it, is in keeping with the spirit of tragedy rousing abundant pity for the fate of Rāvaṇa. Vimalasūri's genius as a poet and artist is fully manifested in his conception of the character of Rāvaṇa, whom he takes to be the real hero of his work, though he calls it the "*Cariam of Paüma*" alias Rāma. More than Rāma, Rāvaṇa catches our imagination and dwells there permanently. His character is full of human interest.[22a]

22 *PC.*, XII, 52-73.

22a This tragic aspect was first discerned by Prof. B. M. Śrikantia in his essay called *'Tragic Rāvaṇa' (Mysore University Magazine*, vol. VII). He has based his interpretation on the well known Kaṇṇada work called *'Rāmcandra carita purāṇa* or *Pampā Rāmāyaṇa'* by Nāgacandra, a poet of the 11th century A.D. The work belongs to the school of Vimalasūri and closely follows it with some slight changes of incident here and there. On the whole it can be said that its characterisation of Rāvana resembles that of *Paumacaria*.

I have given an idea of the attitude of Vimalasūri in adapting the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* and the beauty of that adaptation. He has given us a new Rāvaṇa with whom we can sympathise. His bold venture resulted in a new creation. His work stands as a monument of his creative imagination. He set the model for all the later poets to imitate. Thus he formed a school of his own. Of writers in Prakrit i.e., Jaina Apabhraṁsa, on the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* imitating Vimalasūri may be mentioned the poet Caumuha, author of *Paumacaria*. He is mentioned by Dhavala, author of the *Harivaṁsa-purāṇa*, which was composed in the tenth century.[23] Another work of the same name containing 12,000 ślokas composed, in part, by Svayambhudeva is known to exist. He could not finish his work. Tribhuvana Svayambhu, another writer, completed it. But in course of time the portion of the work so completed by him was lost and Jaśakīrti Bhaṭṭāraka of Gwalior restored it by composing it anew. The date of Svayambhudeva falls between the 7th and the 10th centuries.[24] I have not been able to get at these two works and my inclusion of them under the school of Vimalasūri, though tentative, is based upon the similarity of the titles of the works and the known voluminous nature of one of them.

The earliest Sanskrit writer following Vimalasūri is Ravisena, author of the *Padma Purāṇa* or *Mahā Rāmāyaṇa*. His is an enlarged edition of Vimalasūri. Descriptive passages abound in great numbers swelling the size of the work. His diction is easy and direct. Sometimes his stanzas appear to

---

Vimalasūri has a charming and flowing style well-suited for the movement of narravive poetry. It has grace, dignity, and polish. It rises to heroic grandeur or moving pathos as the incidents and situations demand. His work, as it is, is very voluminous on account of the many dreary tales connected with the several personages of the story and the main story is surrounded by a lot of extraneous matter. Realising the tragic conception of the character of Rāvaṇa, if one takes upon himself the task of giving an unified and abridged version of *Paumacaria*, he will be rendering valuable service to Prakrit literature.

23 *Allahabad University Series*, vol. I, pp. 157-185.

24 *Ibid.*

be translations of the corresponding ones of Vimalasūri. His closeness to the original is quite patent. Next in importance, is Hemacandra's *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa*, which is familiar to scholars. Devavijaya Gaṇin wrote a *Rāmacarita* in Sanskrit prose in 1576 A.D.[25] He follows Hemacandra.

The outstanding figure in Kaṇṇada literature among the authors on the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* of the school of Vimalasūri, is Nāgacandra, called also Abhinava Pampa. He has skilfully abridged the story cutting off most of the superfluous and cumbrous episodes and achieving greater unity than that of the original. His style is sweet and simple. He has become a model in Kaṇṇada for all later writers of the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa*. Chief of them is Kumudendu whose work is called after his name as *Kumudendu Rāmāyaṇa*, composed in the 13th century. It is written in the popular six-footed metre (Ṣaṭpadi), all the six varieties of which are said to be fully represented in the work, in addition to stanzas in the *Ragale*, metre interspersed here and there. He is very fond of repeating the similes and metaphors of Nāgacandra almost *verbatim* which proves his indebtedness to the earlier poet. Devappa wrote his *Rāmavijaya Carita* in the *sangatya* metre in about 1525 A.D. Devacandra, who has been mentioned already, takes up many passages bodily from the work of Nāgacandra in his *Rāmakathāvatāra*. Next comes Candrasāgara Varṇin who wrote his *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* in the *Bhāminī-ṣaṭpadi* metre, in the beginning of the 19th century.

The school of Vimalasūri can be represented thus :

Paumacaria
(Vimalasūri)

Prakrit	**Sanskrit**	**Kaṇṇada**
(1) *Paumacaria* (Caumuha)	(1) *Padmapurāṇa* (Ravisena)	(1) *Pampa Rāmāyaṇa* (Nāgacandra)
(2) *Paumacaria* (Svayambhudeva Tribhavana Svayambhu Jasakīrti Bhaṭṭāraka)	(2) *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa* (Hemacaṇdra)	(2) *Kumudendu Rāmāyaṇa* (Kumudendu)
	(3) *Rāmacarita* (Devavijaya Gaṇṇin)	(3) *Rāmavijaya carita* (Devappa)
		(4) *Rāmakathāvatāra* (Devacandra)
		(5) *Jina Rāmāyaṇa* (Candrasāgara Varṇin)

25 *HIL.*, II, 495.

A few points of divergence between Vālmīki and Vimalasūri in their respective stories may be noted here. The main story in the *Paumacaria* is substantially the same as that of Vālmīki's poem. The death of Sambuka, a low caste man, who was doing penance like an ascetic, at the hands of Rāma is narrated in the *Uttara-kāṇḍa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Vimalasūri takes up this incident and cleverly manages to achieve his own ends. Sambuka is represented here as the son of Candranakhā, wife of Khara and sister of Rāvaṇa. Lakṣmaṇa, to his surprise, beholds the severed head of a lad. This lad is Sambuka. Lakṣmaṇa in his wanderings through the forest, sees a grove of bamboos and a sword worshipped with flowers near by. To test its sharpness he grips the sword and cuts down the grove at one stroke. In the midst of the falling bamboos, Lakṣmaṇa, to his surprise, beholds the severed head of a lad. This lad is Sambuka. Lakṣmaṇa is full of remorse for his act, committed though unknowingly. But its consequences will be disastrous ending in the kidnapping of Sītā by Rāvaṇa. Vimalasūri has made this incident the central pivot in the plot of his story and from an artistic point of view this change is creditable. In the *Paumacaria*, Sugrīva and Hanumān who were lords over people with monkey-banners, are all vassals of Rāvaṇa. Hanumān helps Rāvaṇa in his battle against Varuṇa. Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Hanumān are married here to many women. This change appears to mar the intensity of love between Rāma and Sītā, and so is not praiseworthy. It is Lakṣmaṇa, *the Vāsudeva*, that kills Rāvaṇa. Rāma must not Kill him, because he was a last-bodied-man (*carama-dehadhārin*) and was destined to become a *Siddha* and so committing an act of *himsā* by kiling Rāvaṇa would cast him into hell. Lakṣmaṇa goes to hell for killing Rāvana. Sītā has been endowed with a brother named Pradhāmaṇḍala whose adventures are narrated at great length. Changes like these appear off and on but mainly the story follows that of Vālmīki. Hence it may be said that the school of Vimalasūri follows the *Vāmīki Rāmāyaṇa*. This school is more popular on account of the intense human interest with which the characterization of Rāvaṇa has been suffused.

I may now pass on to the consideration of another school

of the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇa*. Since I am not aware of any work of this class, earlier than that of Guṇabhadra, I may call this school by his name. Guṇabhadra gives his version of the *Rāmāyaṇa* story as a supplement to the life of Muṇi Suvrata Jina in chapter 68 of his *Uttarapurāṇa*. An outline of the story is as follows :

To king Prajāpati of Ratnapura and his queen Guṇakānta is born a son named Candracūḍa whose companion was Vijaya, son of the minister of the king. Both are banished by the king on account of an outrage which they attempted to commit, on the daughter of Kuvera. They are left on a hill where an ascetic named Mahābala was living. They go to the sage with reverence and become monks. He predicts that they are destined to become the eighth *Baladeva* and *Vasudeva* after three successive births. In course of time they die and are born in the heaven of Sanatkumāra, as Kaṇakacūla and Maṇicūla. After this birth they are born as Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa to king Daśaratha whose capital was Vārāṇasīpura in the territory of Kāśi. After their birth Daśaratha changes his capital to Sāketapura, where Bharata and Śatrughna are born. King Janaka of Mithilā and his wife Vasudhā get a child whom they name Sītā. She was a foundling. Once Janaka wanted to perform a sacrifice, but on account of the fear of Rāvaṇa, he could not do it. So he decided that any man who could help him against Rāvaṇa would be worthy to become the husband of Sītā. Herein follows a lengthy protest against the sinful nature of all sacrificial acts.

The birth of Rāvaṇa is then narrated. In the third of his former births, he was born as Naradeva in the *Sārasamuccaya* country. After this birth he was again born in *Saudharma-kalpa* as a god. This god was born as Rāvaṇa to Pulastya and his wife Meghaśrī, who was the king of Laṅkā. Once Rāvaṇa met a woman named Maṇimati who was engaged in penance and attempted to win her. Enraged at this, Maṇimati, having decided to kill Rāvaṇa in the capacity of his daughter, died and entered the womb of Mandodari, who in course of time gave birth to a girl-child. There were many inauspicious omens when it was born. She was advised to abandon the child. She did so after having it packed in a box. Mārīca took away the box and buried it

in the cemetery near the garden of Mithilā. Janaka who was testing the soil for his intended sacrifice found this box and the child still alive in it. He gave the child the name of Sītā whom he entrusted to the care of Vasudhādevī.

Rāma went to Mithilā at the request of Janaka, who at the end of the sacrifice was very much pleased with the beauty and goodness of Rāma. He gave his daughter to him in marriage. Rāma returned to Sāketa and after sometime went with his brother Lakṣmaṇa and wife Sītā to live in Vārāṇasī. Daśaratha could not bear the separation but consented with difficulty after a discourse by Rāma on the duties of Kingship. Nārada comes to Rāvaṇa and describing to him the beauty of Sītā in glowing terms, infatuates his mind. Rāvaṇa sent Sūrpaṇakhī, his sister, to test the constancy of Sītā. She could not succeed in tempting her. She returned and sent her brother. Rāvaṇa came to the garden Citrakuṭa near Vārāṇasī and beheld Sītā disporting herself with Rāma. By his magical power he transformed Mārīca in to a golden deer (*Maṇi-hariṇa-potaka*) and asked him to go and move about before Sīta. Sītā wished to have the deer and so Rāma pursued it. It took him a long way off. By this time Rāvaṇa in the guise of Rāma came to Sītā and told her that the deer was secured and that they must go into the city as it was already evening. He converted his aerial car, *Puṣpaka*, into a palanquin and himself having mounted a horse, asked Jānaki to sit in it. By this trick, Rāvaṇa was able to steal Sītā. He went with her to Laṅkā and told her everything. He tempted her very much but she took a vow of fasting unto death till she could hear of the welfare of Rāma.

In vain Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa searched for Sītā. They are informed of a bad dream by Daśaratha indicating danger to Sītā from Rāvaṇa. They meet Vāli, Sugrīva and Añjaneya in their wanderings. Vāli dies at the hands of Lakṣmaṇa. Añjaneya brings news about Sītā. Mandodari, by some unknown feeling raging in her, recognizes Sītā to be her abandoned daughter and advises Rāvaṇa to give her back. War becomes inevitable. Añjaneya again goes to Laṅkā with a message from Rāma to Rāvaṇa and with the idea of winning over Vibhīṣaṇa to his side. He succeeds in his errand. To draw out Rāvaṇa into the battle-field Añjaneya burns Laṅkā

and destroys all the gardens. But Rāvaṇa sits on the hill Ādityagiri to achieve some mighty powers. In the war that ensued Rāvaṇa cuts off the head of an artificial Sītā. Rāma is struck with grief. Vibhīṣaṇa consoles him. Rāvaṇa dies by the discus of Lakṣmaṇa. Returning to Vārāṇasī, Rāma becomes a Kevalin. Lakṣmaṇa enters a hell called Paṅkaprabhā.[26]

Such in brief is the story as narrated by Guṇabhadra. I do not know of any work in the Prakrit language dealing with this story. The *Tisaṭṭhī-mahāpurisa-guṇālaṅkāra* of Puṣpadanta, which is based on the *Uttarapurāṇa*, may give this version of the Rāmāyaṇa story. In Sanskrit there is a work called *Puṇya-candrodaya Purāṇa* by Kṛṣṇa, written in 1528 A.D. Judged from the contents of the work as given by Rajendralala Mitra,[27] it appears to belong to the tradition of Guṇabhadra. Another work called *Puṇyasrava* by Rāmacandra Mumukṣu, written some time before 1331 A.D., contains a Rāmāyaṇa story which in part seems to be similar to Guṇabhadra's narrative. Coming to Kaṇṇada writers of this school, the earliest representative is Cāmuṇḍarāya, who wrote his *Triṣaṣṭī-salākā-puruṣa Purāṇa* or as it is popularly called *Cāmuṇḍarāya Purāṇa* composed in 978 A.D. on the basis of Guṇabhadra's work. Next in importance is Nāgarāja, author of *Puṇyasrava Kathāsāra*, written in 1331 A.D. following the work of Rāmacandra Mumukṣu. The story occuring in this work reminds one of the Guṇabhadra school. Another story of a miscellaneous character occurs in the *Jīva Sambodhane* of Bandhuvarmā written in 1200 A.D.

The school may be represented in tabular form :

Guṇabhadra

Prakrit.	**Sanskrit.**	**Kaṇṇada**
(1) Story in Puṣpadanta's *Tisaṭṭhi-mahāpurisa-guṇālaṅkāra (?)*	(1) *Puṇyasrava (?)* (Rāmacandra Mumukṣu)	(1) Story in *(Cāmuṇḍa-rāya Purāṇa)*
	(2) *Puṇyacandrodaya Purāṇa* (Kṛṣṇa)	(2) Story in *Puṇyasrava* (Nāgarāja)
		(3) Miscellaneous (Bandhuvarmā)

26 The summary is based upon the already summarised story in the *Cāmuṇḍarāya Purāṇa*, a Kaṇṇada work, which is based upon Guṇabhadra's *purāṇa*.

27 *Notices of Sanskrit MSS.*, vol. VI, 70-74.

It will be seen from the summary given above that this version of the story is entirely different from that of Vimalasūri. It takes Sītā to be the daughter of Rāvaṇa. There are several stories in which Sītā is to be seen as Rāvaṇa's daughter.[28] It is difficult to say wherefrom Guṇabhadra derived this idea. Is there any influence of the *Adbhuta Rāmāyaṇa* story? Sītā's abduction occurs in the precincts of Benares. Does this indicate the influence of the *Daśaratha Jātaka* wherein Daśaratha is stated to have been ruling in Benares. This is further strengthened by the intensely ascetic nature ascribed to the character of Rāma, just as in the Buddhist story. Mārīca assuming the form of a golden deer to separate Rāma from Sītā points to the direct influence of the *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa*. These facts make it difficult to trace back this Rāma story to any single source. It seems to be a conglomeration of various legends pertaining to Rāma. The only point of similarity between this and Vimalasūr's school is the common protest against sacrifices found in both, though not in the same language, and the story of Harisena. It does not seem to be imbued with any human interest and is insipid as a work of art. Hence its lesser popularity.

A few words may be said on the influence of these *Jaina Rāmāyaṇas* on some other versions of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in Indian literature. Mr. D.C. Sen in his work entitled *The Bengali Rāmāyaṇas* claims to have found some such influence in some of the *Bengali Rāmāyaṇas*. Dr. F. W. Thomas has written at length on some Tibetan versions of the Rāmāyaṇa story.[29] Three manuscripts of this story were discovered in Chinese Turkestan. They have been assigned to the period between 700 and 900 A.D. As the Doctor states "they are mutually independent." There are some variations of names and incidents in all the three documents. Jaina influence is clearly to be seen in these stories. According to Vimalasūri the name of Rāvaṇa's father was Rayanāsava (Ratnasrava) and the same occurs in these documents. Sītā is the daughter of Rāvaṇa as in the story of Guṇabhadra.

---

28 *HIL.*, II, 494, n. 4.

29 *Indian Studies* (Laumann Memorial Volume) 193-212.

These points indicate some Jaina influence in the story of the Tibetan versions. Other Rāmāyaṇa versions in Kaṇṇada show no Jaina touch. I do not know what it is in the remaining Indian languages.

To sum up : it is clear that there are two schools of the *Jaina Rāmāyaṇas* which differ greatly from each other; that of Vimalasūri is an adaptation of *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa;* that of the Guṇabhadra school has no unitary source for it; that while one is artistic, the other is a drab story. The *Jaina Rāmāyaṇas* from an important branch of study in the history of the *Rāmāyaṇa.*