

A STUDY IN THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF JAINISM

S. N. Srivastava



Rekha Publication

Gorakhpur

A Study in the Origins and Development of Jainism

Prof. Sachchidanand Srivastava

Ph.D.

Dept. of Ancient History,
Archaeology and Culture
D.D.U. Gorakhpur University,
Gorakhpur-273009
U.P.



Rekha Publication

Gorakhpur

Published By :

Rekha Publication

Ashok Nagar, Humayunpur North

Gorakhpur-273015

© **Srivastava, S. N.**

Edition : Ist 2002

Price : Rs. 325

Laser Composing & Design By :

Rekha Publication

Ashok Nagar, Humayunpur North

Gorakhpur-273015, U. P.

Printed By :

Rastriya Printers

Panchsheel Garden, Naveen Shahadara

Delhi-32

Dedicated
To
The Sacred Memory
of
My Parents
Surya Nath Lal Srivastava
Prema Devi Srivastava

CONTENTS

	Acknowledgement	(i-iv)
	Introduction	(v-vi)
1	The Origin, Antiquity and Profile of the Śramaṇa Tradition	1-18
2	The Antiquarian Significance of Some of the Basic Concepts of Jain Philosophy	19-53
	The Concept of <i>DHARMA</i> and <i>ADHARMA</i>	20-23
	The Doctrine of Karma and Transmigration	24-32
	Tribal or Non-Aryan Origin	32-36
	Śramaṇa Origin of the Doctrine of Karma and Rebirth	36-37
	The Buddhist Doctrine of Karma and Rebirth	37-41
	Jain Kriyāvāda	41-48
	Animism	52-53
3	Socio-Cultural Milieu of the Origin and Development of Jainism	54-71
4	Early History of Jainism	72-100
	Riṣabha Nātha	75-79
	Pārśva Nātha	79-84
	Vardhamāna Mahāvīra	84-98

5	Gaṇadharas of Mahāvīra	101-113
	Jain Saṃgha after Mahāvīra	102-103
	Schisms in the Jain Saṃgha	103-113
6.	The Doctrines of Jainism	114-133
	Philosophy	118-127
	Jain Ethics	128-133
	The Āstika-Nāstika Dichotomy-A Review	134-138
	General Bibliography	139-148

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the very outset I remember my teacher Prof. V. S. Pathak to whom I shall ever remain indebted. He has always been a source of knowledge and inspiration to me from whom, as an uncared surrogate, I derived strength and vitality whenever needed. I have always been yearning for his blessings which have been granted to me not much less than others. The present work is a material efflorescence of his spiritual seeds. I wish to remain down to his feet.

My elder brother Prof. V. B. Rao graciously played the role of my *Guru* without whose affection and indulgence the present work could not have seen the light of the day. His friendly touch courteous behaviour and matured intellectual suggestions have not only bolstered my courage but has also given me the strength to survive by worldly ordeals in direct or rebound manners. Words are failing to express my gratitude to him.

I feel deeply indebted to Prof. Shail nath Chaturvedi who was my teacher in the true sense of the term. Though later I happened to be his colleague, but his elderly affections and inspirations have gone a long way in shaping my intellectual personality.

I am highly indebted to Prof. Mata Prasad Tripathi who has cooperated with me at every step and has always been encouraging me to get the work completed and published as soon as possible. I express my high sense of ~~very~~ gratitude to him.

Dr. Ram Pyare Mishra, my old student and presently working as part-time lecturer in the Dept. has rendered great help to me by undertaking the task of proofreading and getting the typing errors corrected. I express my gratitude to him.

And, lastly, I express my all gratitude to one whose name has led us to worship Saraswati, who, being my *Dharmachari*, has always

goaded, encouraged and helped me at every step without apparent encumbrances. Without her help and co-operation the completion of the present work could not have been possible.

Mr. Santosh Kumar Srivastava has taken great pain in collecting and re-arranging the written matters and getting it typed & published. His ready services at any call is some thing very valuable. I express my gratitude to him.

Krishṇa Janmāṣṭami

2000 A. D.

S. N. Srivastava

INTRODUCTION

A number of theories regarding the origin of Religion have been propounded by scholars, and almost all of them proceed with the basic assumption that all the religions, which have come into existence in human history so far, have acquired their typical personalities owing to their specific course of historical development. Though generalisation is no more considered to be out of the purview of history, broad generalisations often engulf the particular which history is required to deal with. As such, the origin and development of a particular religion should be inquired in its specific historical perspective. It is satisfying to note that this field of inquiry is no more ignored.

Though several volumes on the history of Jain religion have appeared in past years, the question of the origin and early development of Jainism is still an enigma in ancient Indian history. A critical analysis of modern Jain historiography reveals that the approach of scholars was vitiated because of certain specific reasons. Many of the scholars who took interest in the history of Jainism happen to belong to the Jain community. Owing to their inherent psychological attitude they could not transcend the clouds of sectarian spiritual zeal, and they either blindly took legends for history or consciously advanced arguments based upon flimsy grounds in support of their traditional belief.

On the other hand, the European scholars, who seriously undertook the task of working out the history of ancient Indian religious tradition and whose writings on the Brāhmanical religio-philosophical tradition are still considered to be standard ones, have, by and large, rejected the early Jain tradition as a product of fiction. They are not prepared to take the antiquity of Jainism beyond Mahāvīra. The tradition of *Tīrthaṅkaras* is not acceptable to them. Even some of them ventured to suggest that Jainism is only an offshoot of Buddhism and that Mahāvīra was an imaginary person whose personality was conceived on the model

of the Buddha. But a few European scholars, among whom H. Jacobi outstands, genuinely delved into the problem of the early history of Jainism. H. Jacobi rendered invaluable service to Jainology by writing a number of research articles published in the reputed journals of the time as well as Introductions of the Jain Texts published in the two volumes of the S.B.E. series.

He strenuously collected data from the Buddhist and Jain sources and after subjecting them to careful and critical scrutiny convincingly asserted that Pārśva Nātha, the 23rd *Tīrthāṅkara* of the Jain tradition, was a historical person. He did a sterling job by pointing out the antiquarian significance of some of the basic concepts of Jain philosophy and, thus, paved the way for further researches. It is sad to note that the scholars to follow did not take up the task left by him. They remained busy with traversing the beaten track.

Undoubtedly, the task was in no way very easy. The existing Jain literature does not take us beyond sixth century B.C., leaving the scholars only to speculate about the history of Jainism in pre-Mahāvīra times. At times, some references from the Vedic literature were picked up by scholars and were utilised in support of their conjectures. Instead, attempt ought to have been made in the direction of tracing out the ideological development and stream-lining the interactions between different currents of thoughts during pre-Mahāvīra times and their bearing upon the early history of Jainism.

In past few years efforts have been made in this direction by some scholars which have yielded good results. For instance, G.C. Pande has strenuously tried to establish that the Śramana tradition is non-Aryan in origin and its antiquity may be traced back to pre-Rigvedic times and that it has exercised profound influence on the ideological development taking place during later Vedic period. While his contention about the origin of Buddhism is convincing to a great extent, his opinion that the

Śramaṇa tradition is a non-Aryan tradition is not maintainable. V. S. Pathak on the otherhand, has convincingly pleaded on linguistic and other grounds that Śramaṇa tradition is non-Vedic Aryan tradition and its antiquity may be traced back to the Indo-Irānian period. The writer of these lines is in full agreement with Pathak's views.

In the present work the problems of the origin, antiquity and profile of the Śramaṇa tradition have been exhaustively dealt with. The myth that whatever is non-Vedic is essentially non-Āryan has been exploded. The Aryan culture-complex had various shades, the ritualistic trend, though initially dominant, is one such. *Muni* of the Rīgveda is not a non-Aryan figure, but a representative of the non-Vedic Aryan tradition whose *weltanschauung* is different from that of the Vedic.

Though much has been written about the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth and its place in ancient Indian traditions, scholars are not unanimous on the point of its origin and development. While a great number of scholars believe that it was natural outcome of the development of the Vedic ideas in course of time, there are many who plead that the eschatological beliefs of non-Aryan aborigines of the Gangetic Valley were adopted by the Aryans when they forward the suggestion that through ethicisation the primitive eschatological beliefs turned into the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth and they have given the credit of ethicisation to the Buddha. In the present work this matter has been given exhaustive treatment and it has been demonstrated that it originated and developed in the Śramaṇic hot-house. The primitive character of the Jain doctrine of *karma* and its pivotal position in Jain religion is of particular importance in this context. In addition to it, the element of animism in Jain philosophy and the concepts of *dharma* and *adharma*, which have great antiquarian significance, have been critically discussed.

The *Purāṇas* are taken to be historical compositions as they are supposed to contain the early tales of the Aryans. Undoubtedly, their

historical character was somewhat polluted later on but this does not mean that the kernel of truth in them would be rejected outrightly. They need to be carefully examined and utilised in the reconstruction of early history of India. It is somewhat surprising that their evidence has been unhesitatingly utilised in the reconstruction of cultural history of India but the dynastic accounts in them which are of immense historical value have not been given their due importance. Had they been properly scrutinised they would have thrown sufficient light on the early expansion and settlements of the Aryans particularly in the lower Gangetic valley and the regions adjoining Hiamalayana foot-hills. A few have made attempts in this direction of whom Pargiter is the first and foremost but his reconstruction is full of errors and presents a misconceived picture. The evidence of the Purāṇas indicate that there was an Aryan settlement in the abovementioned region at a very early time.

In the reconstruction of the early history of Śramaṇa tradition, particularly of Jainism, the evidence related to the *Vrātyas* has not been taken into account. The texture of the *Vrātya* culture complex appears to have variegated fabric and there are indications that some of them had Śramaṇic connections.

In the present work an humble attempt has been made to review the early history of Jainism not only in the light of fresh interpretations of the known facts but, also in the light of new facts and their interpretations. The work deals with the history of Jainism from its beginning to the time of the schism of the Jain Order into *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbara* sects.

1

The Origin, Antiquity and Profile of the Śramaṇa Tradition

At least since the third or fourth century B. C. the religiophilosophic culture of India appears to have been divided into two major streams, namely, the Brāhmaṇa and the Śramaṇa as is evident from the numerous references of the compound Brāhmaṇa-Śramaṇa in the Pāli texts, Jain scriptures, works of Pāṇini and Patañjali, records of the Greek historians and the inscriptions of Aśoka¹. The tradition of such a bifurcation is corroborated by the division of *dharma* into *pravritti* (world accepting) and *nivritti* (world negating) by Śaṅkarāchārya. It is further supported by the use of the terms *āstika* and *nāstika* denoting two major categories of ancient Indian tradition. These two terms have been variously explained but the commonly accepted view is that the *āstikas* are those who believe in the authority of the Vedas whereas the *nāstikas* rejected the Vedas as authority (*nāstiko veda nindakaḥ*)². Needless to say that the Śramaṇas held a world view which was entirely different from the worldview of the followers of the Vedic tradition.

Though the Śramaṇa is rarely mentioned in the early Brāhmaṇical literature, the first being in the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, its profuse use in the Buddhist and Jain literature is conspicuous denoting a specific religious

connotation and has become a nickname of the heretical tradition.

As has been meticulously brought out by many scholars, the Śramaṇa tradition had a long history and passed through many stages of development before it could blossom into several schools and sects during the sixth century B.C. Though these schools assumed distinct personalities of their own, apparently quite different from one another, there are certain common essential features which justify their Śramaṇa calling. A critical study of these schools and the antecedent developments taken together reveals the following characteristic features of the Śramaṇa tradition.

- (a) it believes in wandering as a religious practice leading to the realisation of the highest spiritual goal.
- (b) it is ascetic.
- (c) it holds a theory of rebirth postulating continuity of cyclical nature and regarding death merely a prelude to renewed life.
- (d) a theory of *karma* which postulates that *karma* is the driving force of life and one's present and future existence is determined by the past and present actions respectively.
- (e) it holds a theory of *saṃsāra* which postulates that all existing things are in the cycle of endless continuity.
- (f) it envisages a theory of salvation which postulated, *interalia*, the cessation of rebirth and, thus, misery.
- (g) it adhered to *brahmacharya*, having a definite connotation, as an essential exercise of the religious discipline.
- (h) it did not delve into the problem of the origin of universe and took the world as it is, thus, rendering its attitude to be atheistic and realistic.

- (i) it had its own world-view and rejected the authority of the Vedas.
- (j) it is pluralistic.
- (k) it considers pleasure seeking, egoism and violence as main evils.

Origin and Antiquity

The problem of the origin and antiquity of Śramaṇa tradition has been one of the baffling problems of ancient Indian cultural history. Since, the literature pertaining to the Śramaṇa tradition does not predate the age of the Buddha, it has been a real problem for the historians to work out the pre-Buddhistic history of the Śramaṇa tradition, and more so, of its early reaches. The Jain tradition believes in the existence of *pūrva* literature in pre-Mahāvīra times, but it is said to have been lost and the portion preserved in the *dr̥ṣṭivāda*, the twelfth *aṅga*, is in its contaminated and altered form. It helps us in no way in reconstructing the early history of the Śramaṇa tradition. Thus, being handicapped by the nonavailability of the Śramaṇa literature, we are left with no alternative but to depend upon the early Brāhmanical literature to find out the glimpses of the Śramaṇa tradition, the ideological and philosophical developments in ancient India in order to trace out the Śramaṇic ideas and their impact on the Indian tradition and, finally, the linguistic study so that we may be able to lay bare the threads of cultural patterns and identify the ideological structure by way of studying the terms in which the meanings are enshrined.

The problem of the origin and antiquity of the Śramaṇa tradition has drawn the attention of scholars here and abroad and has been tackled by them from different angles. The views expressed, so far, in this regard may be classed into three categories.

- (a) Śramaṇa tradition is purely non-Aryan tradition

- (b) it originated out of the intellectual ferment and the socio-economic changes during the later Vedic period.
- (c) it is purely Aryan but non-Vedic tradition.
- (a) Since the ideological contents and ontological perspectives of the Śramaṇa tradition, mainly consisting of Jainism, Buddhism and Ājīvikism, were different from and opposed to the Vedic tradition, it was taken to be non-Vedic tradition by many scholars and its roots were searched in the non-Aryan culture complex of ancient India. Certain basic tenets of the Śramaṇa tradition such as atomism, doctrine of transmigration, the idea of salvation etc. were taken by some scholars to be continuation of the thought stream of the aborigines of the Gangetic valley.³

Commenting on the contribution of the proto-Austroloids to the development of Indian culture S. K. Chatterjee writes, "The bed-rock of Indian civilization is agriculture, and that, in all likelihood in connection with the cultivation of rice, goes back to the Austric proto-Austroloids of India. The germs of the idea of transmigration which has been so potent a force in Indian thought, religion and life, would probably go to this source".⁴ Since no traces of *yoga* are found in the Ṛigveda⁵, its existence in the Indus Valley culture is taken as an evidence to suggest that the Śramaṇa tradition had pre-Vedic non-Aryan roots⁶. The references of *muni* and *yati* in the Ṛigveda and later-vedic texts have been taken as pieces of evidence to prove the existence of alien Śramaṇa tradition in the Ṛigvedic and Pre-Vedic period⁷.

In fact, *vāṭarasanā muni* and *yati* have been taken to be the representatives of the Śramaṇa tradition during Vedic and Pre-Vedic period. *Vāṭarasanā* in collocation with *Muni* has been mentioned at several places, the first being the *Keśi Sūkta* of the Ṛigveda⁸. The reference of the Ṛigveda, *Taittirīya*⁹ *Āraṇyaka* and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*¹⁰ are cited in order to show that their features and practices

were alien and hence were out of the pale of Vedic society. Since, the *Vātarasanā Munis* are associated with Śramaṇa in two references, they were readily taken to be belonging to Śramaṇa tradition. Ṛṣabha, the first Jain *tīrthaṅkara*, is said in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* to have taken birth as Viṣṇu-incarnate to elucidate the *dharma* of *vātarasanā* Śramaṇa *ṛṣis*. On the basis of these reference some scholars believed that there was a continuing tradition of *vātarasanā muni* Śramaṇas at least from the R̥gvedic age to the time of *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. G. C. Pandey writes, "However we cannot overlook the possibility of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* actually having *Keśi Sūkta* in mind. In any case, it is clearly arguable that the Śramaṇa tradition existed in the Vedic period as an independent, though little known, tradition"¹¹ Referring to these pieces of evidence, attempt has also been made to take back the antiquity of Jain religion to the R̥gvedic period. Some scholars have tried to read the names of some Jain *tīrthaṅkaras* in the epigraphs on Indus clay sealings and identify a human figure on one of them with Jain *tīrthaṅkara*. G. C. Pandey has rigorously tried to draw parallel between the Brāhmaṇa tradition and the Śramaṇa tradition and prove that many of the ideas during the later Vedic period are results of the interaction between them¹². He attributes the origin of Buddhism¹³ to this interaction and believes that it exercised profound effects on the origin and development of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta¹⁴. In this context, attention has been drawn to the institution of mendicancy and is stated that it was quite foreign to the Vedic Aryan society and originated in an environment outside the pale of Aryan culture¹⁵.

(b) Scholars in great number are of the view that the Śramaṇa tradition came into existence during the later Vedic period as a result of changing cultural and historical milieu. It is stated that a new religious called Śramaṇas was formed during the days of Yāgyavalkya, not long before the time of the Buddha. They were different from both the hermits who practised penance into the woods and the Brāhmaṇas who were

householders¹⁶. The order of the Śramaṇas is said to have been 'evolved originally from the *Brahmachārins*, who did not enter upon the stage of the house-holder and who customarily begged their food'¹⁷. It is further stated that the Śramaṇas broke away from the past traditions and revolted against the Vedic system and dissented from the later form of the Brāhmaṇic religion, superstition and mysticism. Their dissent is expressed in shaving their hair, the rejection of the authority of scriptures, the search for inner purity and enlightenment in place of external religiosity and their concern for humanity at large instead of caste-distinctions obtaining in society¹⁸. The cause of misery, which is *sine-qua-non* of the Śramaṇa tradition, is also attributed to the existing conditions during the sixth century B. C.¹⁹ The issue of moral distinctions was raised which was variously tackled by the philosophers of the time. The new ethical consciousness necessitated the abandonment of such ideas as time, providence, chance, fate, nature or soul as the first cause of our happiness or misery and led the thinkers to concentrate their mind to manly strength.²⁰

The rise and development of the Śramaṇa tradition has been viewed and explained by many scholars in the light of the changed historical milieu during first millennium B. C.²¹ Around seventh century B. C. iron came to be used on wider scale providing effective weapons which brought cultivation on higher plane resulting into surplus produce which helped the growth of towns. Trade and commerce, a concomitant of this phenomenon, also played an important role in this process of urbanisation. The complex of economic activities had corresponding changes in social life. While new social groups of artisans and *setthhis* emerged in urban centres, a new class of peasant proprietors called *gahapatis* came into existence in the countryside which owned greater part of agricultural land. The emergence of these new wealthy classes of *setthhis* and *gahapatis* dealt a death blow to tribal life characterised by kinship and equality. The growing social inequality resulted into four fold social stratification.

The changes in the socio-economic structures during the first half of the first millenium B. C. exercised profound impact on the mind of the thinkers of the time. Old Vedic sacrificial religion was subjected to criticism. A new ideological perspective came into being which rejected the older explanations of life and universe. This ideological perspective keeping in with the basic changes in the material and social life of the period developed in the teachings of what came to be called the heterodox sects.²² Scholars, while attributing the emergence of the Śramaṇic sects to this changed historical contexts, have delineated their views differently. A. L. Bāsham, for example, thinks that this 'stirring of thought, which produced first the early Upaniṣads and then the numerous heterodox systems of which Buddhism was the chief, seems to have been in some way connected with the belief in transmigration'.²³ It has also been stated that 'the craving for salvation, which seems to have possessed many of the minds at the time of the Buddha, must have sprang from a deepseated fear of change and a profound sense of insecurity'.²⁴ The process of breaking of the tribal oligarchies during the life-time of the Buddha, or soon after, added to this fear of change and sense of insecurity. This prepared the ground of the origin and development of the new ideologies which, though propagated by men of *kshatriya* stock, appealed to the emerging new classes.²⁵ The material condition of flux created an ideological atmosphere in which permanence could no more be feasible or possible. An alternative system was to be envisaged which would subsume changing material conditions and yet remain viable²⁶. In this context attention has also been drawn to the despondence and despair in the urban life of the Gangetic valley which ultimately resulted into pessimistic world view.

Upaniṣads are also regarded to have been the springhead of Śramaṇism. The latter is said to be a degeneration of the Upaniṣadic philosophy.²⁷

Brāhmaṇa-Kshatriya skirmish is also said to be responsible for the rise of Śramaṇism in later Vedic period. Under the leadership of Mahāvīra and the Buddha the Kshatriyas launched a movement against the Brāhmaṇa ceremonial doctrines. The Upaniṣadic philosophy and, afterward, the Buddhism and Jainism were worked out by them as a reaction to the Vedic ideology.²⁸ The point of Brāhmaṇa-Kshatriya skirmish has been widely accepted by the scholars²⁹ and some of them believe that it played a limited role, *interalia*, in the origin of the Śramaṇa tradition.³⁰

(c) Recently, a few articles have appeared in which the earlier theories have been rejected after critical examination of the corpus of evidence both literary and archaeological, and it has been convincingly proved that the Śramaṇa tradition is Aryan but non-Vedic³¹. The antecedents of the developed Śramaṇa tradition as witnessed in the Buddhist, Jain and later literature have also been brilliantly worked out, though many a points still need further elaboration and investigation which will be taken up later on.

The term Śramaṇa has been hitherto etymologically explained as either derived from the root *śram* in the sense of 'toil' or 'labour'³² or from the root *śam*=to quieten, to control³³. Such explanations are meticulous and are based on the assumption that the Śramaṇas pursued harder spiritual exercises than others and they controlled their physical and psychic functions to the extreme. The term 'Śramaṇa' is derived from Indo-European root *klem=kram= śram* and its primary meaning is 'wanderer'³⁴. The verbal forms of the root *śram* occur in collocation of *char* in several passages of Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa definitely in the sense of movement or wandering.³⁵ This meaning is clearly brought out from a verse of Aitereya Brāhmaṇa in the context of the significance of movement or wandering where it is stated that, 'all the sins are done away with on the path by *śrama* or wandering.'³⁶ Even in the R̥gveda there are a few

references in which the word '*Śrama*' is associated with movement. V. S. Pathak has drawn the attention of scholars to the cognates of the term '*Śramaṇa*' in Indo European languages and the Finno-Ugrian word '*Shaman*' meaning priest. Pointing out the contacts between these two groups of languages at a very early stage, he has tried to establish that the *Śramaṇa* was a wanderer and that wandering was regarded a religious practice in the proto-Vedic period. Thus, according to V. S. Pathak, the *Śramaṇa* tradition is pre-Rigvedic Āryan tradition.³⁷

There were atleast two Indo-European religious groups of wanderers-*Śramaṇa* and *Charaṇa*. The profiles of these groups are entirely different from each other but for one common feature i.e. wandering. The *Charaṇa* wanderers are devoted to various gods and offered oblations. The *Charaṇa* institution had its own course of development. We shall dwell upon the distinct profile of the *Śramaṇa* group of wanderers a little later.

A study of terms *Arhata* and *Tīrthaṅkara* used for the preceptor in *Śramaṇa* organisation also lends support to our contention that the *Śramaṇa* tradition is not only Aryan but its antiquity goes back to the Indo-Iranian period. The word *arhata* is derived from the Sanskrit root '*arh*' whose Indo-European form is root '*algu*'. Initially, the words begotten of it are of economic connotation such as Greek *alphe-alphano*, Iranian *arjah* and Sanskrit *argha* all meaning value or valuable. A number of other words also originated from it denoting worth and worthy. In the *Rigveda* the term *arhana* is often used in the sense of worshipful but sometimes it denoted *Agni* as the proto-type of human priest.³⁸ The *Āvestan* form of *arhata* is *aregi* which occurs in *yasna* (53.9). According to Bartholomae *areji* denotes prophet.³⁹ In the *pāli* and *ardhamāgadhi* texts the terms *arhata* is used in the sense of enlightened being or spiritual teacher. The derivations and explanations of this term given in *Itivuttaka-Atthakathā*, *Dhavalā-tīka* and elsewhere are fanciful. On the basis of

these facts it can be safely asserted, agreeing with V. S. Pathak, that the word *arhata* or its cognates had acquired a religious connotation at a very early stage, probably in the Indo-Iranian period.⁴⁰

The word *tīrthaṅkara* is derived from the root '*tri*' in the sense of '*tarane*'. The word '*tirtha*', derived from this root, means bridge. Thus, *tīrthaṅkara* is bridge-maker. It is to be noted here that bridge had become a spiritual symbol in many Indo-European traditions. In the Avestā one *chinavata* is mentioned which separates the world of men from the world of Āhuramazdā. Zoroaster is said to escort the worshippers of Āhuramazdā across the bridge. According to the Iranian belief the myth of *Chinavata* bridge is pre-Zoroastrian. If so, bridge had acquired spiritual significance at a very early stage. It is interesting to note that the term *pontiff* which denotes priest originally meant bridge-maker (*pons*=bridge, *ficare*=maker). Incidentally, the concept of such a separating bridge is not found in the R̥gveda. But this idea occurs in the Upanisads. Thus, it is clear that the concept of Tīrthaṅkara or the bridge maker having spiritual connotation is Aryan at the same time non-Vedic. As the concept of '*arhata tīrthaṅkar*' is typically Śramaṇa concept it might have been a part of the primitive Śramaṇa ideology. His status in the Śramaṇa tradition may be equalled to the status enjoyed by the priest and the god in the Vedic *charaṇas*.⁴¹ Tīrthaṅkara, by virtue of his spiritual achievements, is at par with god and by way of his teachings leads his followers from this miserable world to his position. It is to be pointed out here that, inspite of this striking parallel between primitive Śramaṇa and *charaṇa* traditions there is difference in their ontological perspective and world-view.

As is clear from the above discussion that the Śramaṇa tradition is non-Vedic Aryan tradition and its antiquity goes back to the pre-R̥gvedic times, but before we conclude our investigation of its genesis, it is incumbent on us to examine the validity and relevance of the views and arguments referred to earlier. So far as the proto-austoloid origin of the Śramaṇa tradition is concerned, there is no positive evidence and it is

more based on *argumentum ab silentia* and guess than any direct evidence. The arguments adduced and the evidence produced to prove that the *Śramaṇa* tradition is non-Aryan culture existing in pre-Rigvedic time in the Gangetic valley is not worth tenable. If at all any culture, so rich and advanced was existing in the region stretching from ancient Kośala to Magadha alongside the Himalayana foot-hills covering a major part of the Gangetic valley, it may be surmised to be Aryan, the evidence of which will be discussed later on. The conjecture that there is depiction of Jain Tīrthaṅkara on the clay sealing of the Indus valley is merely fanciful and the reading of the name of a tīrthaṅkara on Indus clay sealing is really fantastic as the Indus script is yet not finally deciphered. The association of the *Śramaṇa* tradition with the *munis* and *yatis* in the Vedic literature is also not maintainable though their *Śramaṇic* and non-Aryan complexion has been stressed by several scholars in high sounding tones as mentioned earlier. It is compelling to re-examine the meaning of these terms in the contexts in which they are used. We would like to refer to a note written by V. S. Pathak in which he has brilliantly worked out the cultural connotations of these terms and had successfully removed the illusion which has darkened the vision of historians so far.

The term *muni* has been interpreted by grammarians and commentators in two senses, firstly, *muni* means 'mute'⁴² and secondly, one having extra-sensory perception - *atīndriyārthadarśī*⁴³ (Rigveda X. 136.2). The word *muni* cannot be etymologically derived from the root '*muk*'.

The word *muni* meaning '*atīndriyārthadarśī*' has been used at many places in the Brāhmaṇa, Buddhist and Jain literature.⁴⁴ The Saṅskṛita grammarians have derived this term from root '*man=gyāne*'. The root '*man*' is very important in the Indo-Iranian religious literature as many terms like '*matī*', '*man-dha=mazda*' etc have been derived from it. But the word *muni* cannot be grammatically derived from the root '*man*', though the grammarians have dogmatically tried to do so.

In fact, *muni* is derived from the root 'mun=*pratigyāne*'⁴⁵ and the *Dhammapada* explains it in this sense.⁴⁶ The absence of this root in the Vedic and classical Saṅskṛita literature is conspicuous excepting one in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka.⁴⁷ But it has been profusely used in the Pāli and Prākṛit literature. Pischel has cited a number of contexts in which various forms of this root have been used.⁴⁸ Agreeing with V. S. pathaka⁴⁹, it can be safely concluded that the root 'mun' and the word *muni* derived from it belongs to the pre-Rigvedic Indo-European vocabulary, the legacy of which is to be found in the *prākṛit* languages.

Here it is to be noted that the '*muni*' or the *vātarasanā muni* of the R̥gveda is no way connected with the *Śramaṇa* tradition. V. S. Pathaka⁵⁰ has critically examined all the contexts of the R̥gveda, Taittirīya Āraṇyaka Bhāgavata Purāṇa and has convincingly established that the *vātarasanā munis* of R̥gveda are different from the *vatarasanā ṛishi* of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka. The *Vātarasanā muni* of the R̥gveda is described as clad in ochre-coloured garment and engaged in meditation by the exercise of controlling the breath and remained in high state of ecstasy. The *vātarasanā* sages of the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, on the other hand, were associated with Rudra and performed fireworship and *kuṣmāṇḍa rite*. He has also pointed out the contradictions in the details of the life history of R̥ṣabha Nātha as described in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and the Jain *Ādi Purāṇa*. It is historically unintelligible to take R̥ṣabha Nātha, a progenitor of hundred sons and follower of *gṛihastha dharma*, so described in *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* as *vātarasanā ūrdhwamanthi* and *Śramaṇa*. In fact what appears to be true is that the *Bhāgavata* account of R̥ṣabha Nātha is an attempt to present Jain legend in the *Bhāgavata* fold. The terminology of *vātarasanā ūrdhwamanthi* must have been in circulation among the *Vaikhāṇasa* and not in the Jain tradition. This contention is supported by Śridharaswāmi the commentator of *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* who says that the term *vātarasanā* has been used in the context of R̥ṣabhanātha in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* in order to distinguish him from Digambara R̥ṣabhadeo of Jain tradition.

Bhāgavata Purāṇa was composed, at least, a millenium years after the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka and the latter was composed a millenium years after the R̥gveda. Thus, on the basis of the facts mentioned above it is not proper to connect the Śramaṇas with the *vātarasanā munis* and reconstruct their history. In fact the *vātarasanā ūrdhwamanthi* sages were connected with Rudra.

There appears to have been two traditions of *muni* in the Vedic literature as has been pointed out by V. S. Pathaka,⁵¹ one, preserved in the *Keśi Sūkta* of the R̥gveda, and the other in the narrative of *muni* Turakāvaṣeya in the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka. They were perapatatics, rejected the study of the Vedas and *agnicharyā* as meaningless, wore ochre coloured garment and their main goal of spiritual strive was to realise *brahma vidyā* through breath-control and mediation.

In Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Aitareya Āraṇyaka and Brihadāra nyaka Upaniṣad, Tura Kāvaṣeya is associated with *brahma vidyā*. He is said to have rejected the idea of *swarga* and the importance of *agni-chiti*⁵². It is to be noted here, that he is addressed as *muni*. In Aitareya Āraṇyaka⁵³ he is said to have questioned the validity of the study of the Vedas and Vedic sacrifices, talked of an alternative systems of *praṇopāsanā* also known as outer *agnihotra* is referred in *Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad*. This is also known as *Samyamana* doctrine of Pratardana but in the opinion of B. M. Barua and V. S. Pathak the real propounder of this doctrine was *muni* Kāvaṣeya.⁵⁴

The devotion of *muni* to *brahma-vidya* is proved by the references of *muni* in Brihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad⁵⁵. It is said, 'One becomes *muni* after knowing *brahma*. Desiring for *brahmaloka* the *parivrājaka*s renounce the world. Abandoning the desire of worldly honour, they resort to mendicancy'.

After the Upaniṣadic period the terms *muni*, *bhikṣu*, *parivrājaka*

and *sanyāsi* became synonymous. The *muni* tradition got merged into *sanyāsa*.

The *yatis* were also not connected with Śramaṇa tradition as has been held by some scholars. The word *yati* is an Aryan term and is derived from the root *yat-yāt*. According to Benveniste, Belley, Toporov and V. S. Pathak the original meaning of this root is to 'assign the proper place' and 'distribute the necessities'. Derivatively, it meant 'god', particularly, Mitra who determines the fate of god worshipper.

The root *yat-yāt* has been numerously used in the Rigveda in the context of Mitravaruṇa. It has been used in the Avestā as well in the context of Mithra-Mihira. Thus the conclusion becomes irresistible that the *yati* was associated with Mitra-Varuṇa and Mithra-Mihira. The *yatis* are also associated with *Bhrigus*⁵⁶, *Āngirasas*⁵⁷ and *Āsuras*⁵⁸. *Bhrigus*, *Āngirasas* and *Ātharvans* were pre-Rigvedic Indo-Aryans.

Thus, the tradition of *yatis* is Indo-Iranian tradition. It was gradually lost and the surviving term *yati* came to be used in sense of *parivrājakas* and śramaṇas⁵⁹.

1. R. E. VIII, IX, XI, XIII ; STrabo, XV. 1.59 M'crindle, 1901, p. 65, Fn. ; Udāna, P.T.S. Edn. p. 66-67.
2. Manusmṛiti II, 11.
3. 'Perhaps the entire concept that a person's situation and experiences are, infact, the results of deeds committed in various lives may be not of Aryan origin at all, but rather may have developed as part of the indigenous Gangetic tradition from which the various Śramaṇa move ments arose'. Jaini, P. S. 'Karma and Bebirth in Classical Indian Tradition.' p. 218 ; Gaṇanāth Obeyeskar, 'Karma and Rebirth' in Classical Indian Tradition. p. 137 fn.

'It is indeed possible to point to some other concepts in Indian thought, such as atomism, for which it is not possible to posit any Vedic origin. Further, a critical study of some later systems of Indian philosophy like Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism and Jainism would show that there existed in these systems a substratum of common concepts which are definitely not derived from the Vedas but which might be traced back to a pre-Vedic Magadhan thought complex. The traditions regarding the various lives of Gautam. Buddha and the twenty four *tīrhaṅkaras* who preceded Māhāvīra are certainly quite significant in this connection. It would seem that the pre-Vedic current of thought with its ramifications continued through centuries to serve as a significant source for the later Indian thought to draw upon. The Vedic Aryan current which was in a sense, foreign to the Indian soil, never succeeded in superceding it completely. As a matter of fact, a large number of elements in the classical Hindu, way of life and thought clearly betray a pre-Vedic non-Aryan origin". Dandekar, R. N. Exercises in Indology, p. 339.

Chatterjee, S. K. The Vedic Age, P. 151.

Dandekar, R. N. Exercises in Indology, P. 338

Pandey G. C. Origins of Buddhism ; Chakravorty, Harpad, Asceticism in Ancient India.

Pandey G. C. Origins of Buddhism ; Dandekar R. N. Exercises in Indology p. 338. 'In this connection we may indeed speak, in very broad term, of two traditions- the pre-Vedic, non-Āryan *Muni-Yati*

tradition and the Vedic Aryan Rishi tradition.

8. Rigveda X. 136
9. Taittiriya Āranyaka, 1.23.2; 1.24-5;2.7
10. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 5.3.20
11. Pandey G. C., Śramaṇa Tradition- Its history and contribution to Indian culture p. 3.
12. ibid p. 4-5
13. Pandey G. C., A study in the Origins and Development of Buddhism.
14. Pandey G. C., Śramaṇa Tradition- Its history and contribution to Indian culture, p. 4.
15. Dutta N., 'Early Buddhist Minachism'. p. 60-63.
16. Barua B. M. 'Pre-Buddhistic Indian philosophy', 239.
17. ibid p. 240; Originally this idea was expressed by Rhys Davids
18. ibid. p. 242.
19. ibid. p. 364-370 'If we think of the misery of the people, the domination of one caste over another, of men over women and masters over slaves and servants, the truthfulness of criminal laws, the system of usury, and such other corrupt social practices, we may almost say that the general conditions of society brought the problem of the misery to the fore-front"
20. ibid. p. 371
21. Jha, D. N. Anct. India-An Introductory Outline p. 28-32 Sharma. R. S. - 'Material Milieu of the Birth of Buddhism' paper presented to the Twenty-Ninth International Congress of Orientalists Paris, 1973.
Thapar Romila, Ancient Indian Social History, p. 41.
22. Thapar Romila, Studies in the Social History of Ancient India, p. 41.
23. Basham, A. L. Studies in History of Buddhism p. 14.
24. ibid. p. 15
25. ibid., p. 16-17
26. Thapar Romila- Ancient Indian Social History, p. 48

27. Deussen - Indian Antiquary Vol. xxix, p. 397
28. Rhys Davids - Buddhist India, p. 257
29. Sharma R. S. Material-Culture and Social Formation; Kosambi D. D. An Introduction to the Study of Indian History, p. 120.
30. Basham, A. L., ibid., p. 16.
31. Pathak V. S. Preface - A History of Indian Buddhism.
32. *Śrāmyati tapasyatīti Śramaṇaḥ*.
33. N. Dutta, Early Buddhist Monachism, p. 63
34. Pathak V. S. preface - A History of Indian Buddhism, p. XIII
35. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa - 1.2.5.8; 1.6.2.3; 1.5.3.3; 1.8.1.7; 1.8.1.10; 3.9.1.4; 11.1.6.7.
36. Aitereya Brāhmaṇa, VII. 3.
37. Pathak V. S. Preface- A History of Indian Buddhism, p. XIV.
38. Rigveda II. 3.1; II. 3.3.
39. Worterbuck p. 34, n. 1.
40. Pathak V. S. Preface- A History of Indian Buddhism, p. XVIII.
41. Pathak V. S. Preface- A History of Indian Buddhism, p. XX.
42. Vācham yamo mṇi- Amara Kośa 2.42.
43. Sāyana Bhāṣya, Rigveda X. 136.2
44. *Viditvā munirbhavati* - Brihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.22; Uttarādhyayana Sūtra 25.32.
45. V. S. Pathak Purovāk- Bauddha Saṃgha Kā Prārambhika Itihāsa- p.7.
46. Dhammapada- 269- Yo *Munāti ubheloka muni ten pavucchatī*
47. T. A.- 1.27.6 *nṛi munantu-* explained by Bhattabhāskara as *narāḥ pratijānantu*.
48. Pīscel- Prākṛit Grammer- 489.
49. Pathaka V. S. ibid. p. 8.
50. Pathaka, V. S. ibid., p. 12-15.

51. V. S. Pathak ibid. p. 18.
52. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 9.5.2. 15-16
53. Aitereya Āraṇyaka 3.2.6
54. Barua B. M. Pre-buddhistic Indian philosophy, p. 111-112. Pathak, V. S. *Purovāk-Buddha Saṃgha kā Prārambhika* Itihās p. 17
55. Brh. Up. 4.4.2.2. - *Etameva viditvā muniḥ bhavati Etameva pravajino Lokamicchanṭaḥ pravrajanti Lokaiṣaṇāścha vyuthāya bhikṣācharyaṃ charanti.*
56. Rigveda- VIII. 6.18.
57. Rigveda- VIII. 3.9; V. 45.7- Commentary of Sāyaṇa them.
58. Atharvaveda II
59. Pathak, V. S. *Purovāk, Bauddha Saṃgha kā Prārambhik Itihāsa* - see for details.

2

The Antiquarian Significance of Some of the Basic Concepts of Jain Philosophy

The elements of the Jain religion and philosophy may be traced back to inchoate thoughts of a very early period. About a century ago Hermann Jacobi had pointed out the ancient character of the Jain philosophy in his scholarly notes in the introductions of the Jain Sūtras, published in the Sacred Books of the East series¹. While dwelling upon the data available from the Buddhist and the Jain literature regarding the antiquity of Jainism, he specifically took note of three points of the Jain philosophy which are of great antiquarian significance, viz.

1. The animistic beliefs of the Jains
2. The absence of the category of quality in their enumeration of the principal constituent elements of the universe.
3. The inclusion of *dharma* and *adharma*, the principles of motion and stationariness, in the class of substances².

It is to be noted that H. Jacobi did the commendable task of drawing the attention of scholars to these important points of the Jain studies but left them to be taken up by the coming generations. It is

strange that several volumes on the Jain religion and philosophy have appeared since then, but the issues raised by him have failed to catch the attention of scholars.

The Concept of *DHARMA* and *ADHARMA*

The concept of the *dharma* as action inherent in matter is the characteristic feature of the Jain philosophy, which distinguishes it from the contemporary Brāhmaṇical tradition. In the latter the term *dharma* was used in the sense of religious rite, duty, ordinance etc.³ While these connotations of the word *dharma* were well-established, it is baffling to note as to how Mahāvīra, a great philosopher of the time, used this term to denote a category of substance serving as conditions for motion. In fact, what appears to be true is that Mahāvīra did not coin this term to denote the above noted sense, but simply carried on the tradition coming from early times.

It is interesting to note that the term *dharma* in this sense occurs in some of the Ṛigvedic hymns. In the Ṛigveda two broad semantic traditions of this word are found; (1) in the sense of 'ordinance', 'religious ritual', 'sacrifice' etc.; (2) - principle of action inherent in matter. The word *dharma* is mentioned one hundred and thirty four times in the Ṛigveda out of which it occurs sixty times without any prefix or being compounded with any other word, eighteen times in combination with the prefix 'vi' and fifty six times as a compound with 'sva' and 'satya'. It appears either as an adjective or as a noun and is found in neuter and masculine genders. So far as the first of the above noted semantic traditions is concerned, the Ṛigvedic references are numerous and they have been discussed by many scholars⁴. However, there are several hymns in which this word has been used and this sense does not suit the context and the second above noted semantic tradition is brought out. Thus, in the Ṛigveda X.175.1, the *soma*-grinding stones (*grāvāṇah*) are invoked to squeeze the *soma* by virtue of *dharma* with the inspiration of Savitā. Here the

term *dharmaṇā* is used which has been interpreted by Sāyana as '*ātmiyena dhāraṇena karmaṇā*'. The efficacy of stones in squeezing the *soma* by virtue of *dharma* clearly indicates that the word *dharma* means 'power of action inherent' in them. This meaning is clearly brought out by the following verse :

पवमान धिया हितो भिऽयोनिः कनिक्रदत् ।
धर्मणा वायुमाविश ॥

[*Pavamāna dhiyā hito bhihyonih kanikradat
dharmaṇa vāyumaviśa*]

Commenting on this verse Sāyana writes :

He pavamāna soma dhiyā karmaṇāsmad vyāpāreṇa Angulyā vā hitaḥ dhrītaḥ san kani kradat śabdam kurvayan yoni sthanam graham vā abhiviśeti śeṣaḥ. Tadevāḥ. Dharmaṇā vāyum sambandhi pātramityarthaḥ. Tat āviśa praviśa.

हे पवमान सोम धिया कर्मणास्मद् व्यापारेण अङ्गुल्या वा हितः धृतः सन् कनि क्रदत् शब्दं कुर्वन् योनिः स्थानं ग्रहं वा अभिविशेति शेषः । तदेवाह । धर्मणा वायुम् सम्बन्धि पात्रमित्यर्थः । तत् आविश प्रविश ।

In the foot-note he explains *dharmaṇā* as *karmaṇā*. Here, *soma* is invoked to take its place making noise and enter into the pot by virtue of *dharma*. The word *dharma* undoubtedly, denoted the principle of action inherent in *soma* because of which the act of flowing and entering into the pots is rendered possible. It is interesting to note that the word *dharma* does not carry any other sense than a characteristic or condition of action or motion inherent in matter and reminds us of the Jain concept of *dharma* as a category of substance serving as conditions of motion. This term has been used in the same sense in another verse of *Rigveda* (X.175.1) where *soma* is invoked to flow and reach Indra and ascend

vāyu or enter into the pot by virtue of *dharma* i.e. inherent power of action.

There are several other passages in the Ṛigveda, which lend support to our contention. For example, in the Ṛigveda 1.160.1 the sun is said to move between earth and sky by virtue of *dharma*. Here, the term has been used in the instrumental (*dharmāṇā*) and has been interpreted by Sāyana as-

प्रकाशोदकादादि धारणेन युक्तः सन् -

Prakaśodakādādi dhāraṇena yuktaḥ san

But such an interpretation appears to be speculative and sun's movement by virtue of *dharma* may be explained taking *dharma* either to mean inherent power of action/movement or material factor serving as condition for movement. Likewise, in an another verse (R. V. VIII. 7.5) mountains and rivers are said to be self regulated for the chariots of the Marutas. Here the word '*vidharmaṇe*' is used and is connected with '*yamaya*'. The characteristics of chariot is movement.

Hence '*vidharmaṇe*' may be interpreted either as inherent characteristic of movement of chariot or as a material factor serving as condition for movement. If otherwise, '*yamaya*' means 'for the movement' of Marutas and the '*sindhavaḥ*' and '*giriḥ*' get regulated' (*yemire*) out of the fear of '*vidharmaṇe suṣmaya*' the word *dharma* means inherent characteristic of action or movement. In the Ṛigveda IX.107.24 Soma is said to flow by virtue of *dharma* (*pavasya soma dharmabhiḥ*) confirming above meaning of the word *dharma*. A very interesting reference of this word is found in the R.V.X. 44.5 in which Indra, who is master and bestower of riches, is invoked and prayed to be present in the sacrifice. His pots containing *soma* are said to be '*dharmāṇā anādhiṣyāṇi*'. Sāyana interprets '*dharmāṇa*' as '*karmāṇa*'. Its more

acceptable interpretation may be that the pots are '*anādhriṣyāṇi*' because of some characteristic inherent in the pots themselves.

In two passages of the Rigveda, the word '*dharmānam*' in masculine has been used as adjective. In Rig.veda 1.187.1 it is used as adjective to '*pitum*'. Sāyaṇa interpretes '*pitum*' as '*annam*' and '*dharmāṇam*' as '*sarvasya dhārakam*'. *Anna* sustains and its action of sustenance is inherent in it. Likewise, in the Rigveda X.92.2 it is used as adjective to Agni (*dharmāṇamagniṁ*) who is said to be source of sacrifice and makes it fruitful. Sāyaṇa interprets it as '*dhārakam*'. The Agni upholds the oblations and takes them to gods. Upholding is a characteristic inherent in Agni. Thus both the reference support our contention.

The above noted reference furnish us sufficient evidence to conclude that during the Rigvedic period the word *dharma* was used in the sense or 'principle of action inherent in matter' or 'matter serving as condition for action'. This meaning of the word *dharma* was subsequently lost and it continued to be used in the sense of 'ordinance' 'ritual' etc. in the following periods. In this semantic tradition the meaning of the word *dharma* proliferated but this proliferation was organic one.

As has been pointed out earlier the survival of the word in the sense of 'inherent power of action' in the Jain tradition indicates that the word *dharma* was picked up by the Jain philosophers for a category of substance denoting principle of motion much before the sixth cent. B. C. Its antiquity may be taken back at least up to the Rigvedic period.

1. SB.E.Vol. XXII part I 1884, Reprinted 1964; SBE Vol. XLV Part II 1895 Reprinted 1964.
2. S. B. E. Vol. XLV Part II 1964 Introduction P. XXXIII-IV
3. *Aiterey Brāhmaṇa*, & *Chhāndogya Upaniṣada* 2.23 *Taittirīya Upaniṣada* 1.11.
4. Kane, P. V. The History of Dharmasāstras Vol. I P. 1-2.

The Doctrine of Karma and Transmigration

The doctrine of *Karma* and transmigration is one of the most important doctrines of ancient Indian religions and systems of philosophies. All the major ancient Indian religio-philosophic traditions, except the Chārvākas, upheld it, though they developed it in their own distinctive ways, as a result several theories of *karma* and rebirth emerged. The doctrine of *karma* and rebirth or transmigration is a complex of a number of ideas, viz. (i) beings can not escape from the fruits of their deeds, their present and future situation and experiences are determined by their deeds done in past and present lives respectively (ii) an entity, spiritual or otherwise, different from body, survives the death; (iii) this surviving entity is subjected to repeated incarnations, that is, the idea of *saṁsāra*. In spite of divergence of approaches to this doctrine, these ideas are commonly shared by the major traditions. The doctrine was so important that all the schools have paid a great deal of attention to it and copious literature on this subject has emerged in ancient India.

The problem of the origin of the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration has been a matter of investigation for more than a century in modern times. The origin of this doctrine has often been viewed in terms of Aryan and non-Aryan. As early as 1882 A.D., Gough pointed out that there is no clear reference to transmigration of soul in the Vedic literature prior to the Upaniṣads. He conjectured that the *Hindus* borrowed this idea from the indigenes in the process of intermingling of the Aryans and the indigenous non-Aryans. Sincere efforts in the direction of solving the problem of the origin of this doctrine are being made and as a result voluminous literature on the subject has come into existence. Though various aspects of the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth have been elaborately worked out, the intriguing question of its genesis is still evading a satisfactory explanation.

In the following statements, a humble attempt is being made to tackle this problem in historical perspective. This is not to say that in tackling this problem, the historical perspective has been overlooked, our humble submission is that a comparative study of the ideological development of various religio-philosophical traditions in historical contexts and the interactions obtaining between them have not been properly attempted.

We shall proceed with a critical review of the theories advanced so far.

1. Vedic Origin of the Doctrine of Karma and Transmigration :

Many scholars have strongly advocated that the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth is Vedic in origin. The first rudiments of this doctrine may be seen in the Vedic sacrifices.¹ Some verses of the R̥gveda have been picked up to show that the idea of transmigration was in formation during the R̥gvedic period². P. V. Kane has critically reviewed all the verses of the R̥gveda which are said to contain the evidence of transmigration. He has convincingly established that in the said references there is nothing to prove that the idea of *karma* and rebirth was in existence during the R̥gvedic period.³ In fact, the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration is conspicuous by its absence in the early Vedic thought.

Though there are a few indications of the idea of redeath in the R̥gveda, the idea of rebirth appears nowhere in it. In the R̥gveda IX.113.7-11 immortality is prayed in the *pitṛloka* where the departed forefathers live. The prayer for immortality in the *pitṛloka* presupposes redeath otherwise what is the sense of immortality. The distinction between mortal and immortal in the R̥gvedic context may be explained only when it is assumed that there was an end to the life of mortal in the higher world.

In the R̥gveda nothing is clearly stated as to what happens to one whose sojourn in the *pit̥ṛiloka* or heaven is terminated. It is difficult to agree with the contention that termination of sojourn in the *pit̥ṛiloka* presupposes the return of the being from the *pit̥ṛiloka* to the physical world.⁴ Had it been so, there would have been some indications of it in the R̥gveda.

P. V. Kane has elaborately dwelt upon the problem of the antiquity and origin of the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth. He, while critically reviewing the evidence and arguments adduced by Deussen, Ranade, Karandikar and others, has convincingly demonstrated that there is no clear statement on this doctrine in the Vedas. According to him, this doctrine had taken a definite shape in the Upaniṣadic period. In support of this view he cites the evidence of *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*. He makes no definite statement as to how the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth appeared in the Upaniṣadic period, but he appears to believe that it was a natural philosophical development occurring in the Vedic tradition. In this connection, he refers to the ideas of *pit̥ṛiyāna*, *devayāna* and *punarmṛityu* as predating the idea of rebirth. He draws our attention to a passage of *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* in which it is stated "whoever threatens, a Brāhmaṇa, he shall atone for it with a hundred years. He who strikes him (shall atone) with a thousand years; he who sheds the blood of a Brāhmaṇa would be moistened into a ball by the stream of blood".⁵ Commenting on this passage he writes, "This passage is important as conveying that for a very mortal sin the offender would have to suffer for a thousand years or even several thousand years and, therefore, would have to be born for several lives, since one human life was held to extend to one hundred years only".⁶

The first clear mention of the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth is found in a few references of *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*. In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* it is stated,

'So truly as he works and according as he behaves, so will he be, a man of good deeds will become (be born) good, a man of evil deeds will become (be born) evil; he becomes holy by holy deeds, evil by evil deeds. Here they say a person consists of desires (or is fashioned out of) desires and as his desire so will he be, his (determination or) will and as is his will, so is his deed; and whatever deeds he does that he will become (reap).⁷ In another passage of *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, it is stated 'Just as the caterpillar, having reached the tip of one blade of grass, makes an approach to another blade, draws itself towards it and establishes itself thereon, so this (individual self) casting down this body in death, dispelling *avidyā* and making approach to another body and establishes therein.'⁸ Another significant passage of *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* which bears an indubitable evidence of the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration, contains the dialogue between Yāgyavalkya and Ārtabhāga about the question as to what happens to a man when the body expires. Yāgyavalkya takes Ārtabhāga away and speaks in private, 'what they said was *karma* alone, what they praised was *karma* alone, that a man becomes good by good works and evil by evil works.'⁹

Discussing these and few other passages of *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, P. V. Kane writes, "The above *Upaniṣad* passages are enough to show how the doctrine of transmigration was being moulded in the *Upaniṣadic* period. The *Rigveda* knows the two paths of *Devayāna* and *Pitryāna* and also that in heaven there were joys and delights but the *Rig. Veda* does not say how long the joys of heaven were to last and makes no clear and definite statement of the doctrine of transmigration. In the *Brāhmaṇa* period the two paths were referred to and the conception had dawned upon the minds of thinkers that man might have to pass through death several times (*punarmanītyu*). But, even then there is hardly any definite theory of *punarjanma* based on good or bad deeds. The clearest statements (and probably earliest) of the origin of the doctrine of transmigration are the

two passages. (*Brh. Up.* III.3.13; IV.4.5-7) in which Yāgyavalkya emphasises that it is man's own works and conduct that lead a man to new births. In both these passages the *Devayāna* and *Pitryāna* paths are not mentioned at all. But the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* VI.2.16 and *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* V.10. relate the two paths to transmigration and speak of a third place for those born as worms and flies.¹⁰

Thus, P. V. Kane is inclined to show that the emergence of the law of *karma* and rebirth during Upaniṣad period is a natural outcome of the development of the Vedic tradition without having any influence *ab extra*.

Among other scholars who have tried to establish the Vedic origins of the *karma* theory, David M. Knipe and Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty deserve special mention. Wendy Doiger O'Flaherty writes, 'The theory of rebirth does not appear in the Vedas; but the theory of re-death appears at very early stage indeed. It may be that ancient Indian ideas about death predate and indeed predetermine the later theory of birth. Moreover, the idea of *karma* in its broader sense, (including the concept of merit transfer) may well have preceded the idea of rebirth, giving strong grounds for postulating Vedic origins of the *karma* theory.'¹¹ The main arguments adduced in favour of the Vedic origin of the theory of *karma* and rebirth are: (1) The idea of re-death, which is mentioned in the *R̥gveda* is earlier than the idea of rebirth and the later is a natural and logical outcome of the idea of re-death. (2) The concept of merit transfer, which is a basic component of *karma* theory in the Brāhmanical tradition, is of Vedic origin and antiquity. (3) The origin of the theory of *karma* is connected with the *Śrāddha* and *Sapindikaraṇa* rites.¹² The motivation underlying the Vedic funeral rites is either to prevent rebirth from heaven or to assume rebirth from hell. It is precisely the reason that son who performs the funeral rites is said to save his father from hell and in whose absence a man can not attain *mukti*. (4) The *śrāddha* rites and rites at birth (*jātakarman*) are parallel in structure indicating there by that

śrāddha is linked with rebirth. It is worthwhile to quote Knipe, 'Incidentally, among the *samsakāras* (Vedic Hindu rites of passage), it is remarkable to note the parallel structures of these postcremation *śrāddha* and the rites at birth (*jātakarman*). In each case, following the day of birth/death there are ten days of offerings of rice, sesame, etc. ten being a homology to the human gestation period of ten (Lunar) months. It may be the case, then, that the completion of the temporary body on the tenth day in an intentional rebirth expression.¹³ Following this line of argument Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty writes: "Numerous peculiarities in the classical *karma* doctrine begin to make good sense when viewed as developments or inversions of the process of death and the view of after life implicit in the *śrāddha* ritual. That it can all be put together from an assumption of the primacy of death is a genuinely Brāhmaṇic ritualistic view; all the *karma* texts on rebirth begin with death and then proceed to describe birth It is chicken-egg problem; *śrāddha* is the chicken, and birth is the egg.¹⁴ Furthering this argument he writes, 'One linguistic clue to the manner in which the Vedic *śrāddha* system leads to the post-Vedic *karma*/rebirth model is the development of the word '*pinda*'. The *pinda* is a ball of cooked rice Now this ball of rice is often explicitly said to be symbolic of seed The *pinda* is thus a food strongly symbolic of the commingled substances of human procreation."¹⁵

An analysis of the facts and arguments given in support of the Vedic origin of the theory of *karma* and rebirth reveals that it is not a linear development from the Vedic and Upaniṣadic ideas. In fact, the *karma* and rebirth theory is of composite structure. Any attempt to explain the genesis of this doctrine would necessarily entail to separate the various strands and determine the chronological order of their development. Though all the schools of philosophy in ancient India, except the Chārvāka, accepted the theory of *karma* and rebirth, each one developed it in its own way and no two theories of *karma* and rebirth are identical. While it is generally agreed in all the schools and traditions that man's

situations and experiences are determined or influenced by his deeds, they differ in matters of detail. The theory of *karma* and rebirth in Brāhmanical tradition had typical features. One of the basic components of this theory is merit transfer, that is, merit accruing to some one on account of his deeds may be transferred to another person. The concept of merit transfer is Vedic in origin and remains in existence even in later times in the Brāhmanical tradition. But on the basis of the presence of merit transfer in the Vedic texts, its association with theory of *karma* and rebirth later, it would not be proper to assume that the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth developed out of it. This concept is associated with the Vedic eschatology and continued to remain in later times as an archaism when eschatology outlooks underwent transformation. In fact, when the theory of *karma* and transmigration came to be accepted in the Brāhmanical tradition during the Upaniṣadic period, it was super imposed on the Vedic eschatology and the concept of merit transfer without superceding them. The argument that the rudiments of the *karma* theory may be seen in the Vedic sacrifice on account of the fact that the term *karma* is often used in the Ṛigveda for religious rites or sacrifice is a very frail argument and needs no serious consideration.

The urge of immortality in the Ṛigveda emanates from the fear of death. To discern any idea of transmigration from the longing for immortality would be a historical fallacy since the idea of transmigration has certain pre-requisites such as the concepts of soul and *saṃsāra* etc. and no traces of these concepts are available in the Ṛigveda. So far as the Ṛigvedic evidence is concerned, no doubt, the idea of redeath predates the idea of rebirth, but the idea of redeath should be viewed in the context of the Vedic eschatology. Redeath simply means termination from the heaven or *pitṛloka*. Thus, rebirth is not linked with redeath and idea of rebirth can not be said to be natural outcome of the idea of redeath.

The *śrāddha* rite and doctrine of *karma* and transmigration are irreconcilable. While the latter believes in the cycle of birth and death

caused by *karma*, the former is directly linked with the Vedic eschatological beliefs. Though the Vedic eschatological beliefs underwent tremendous changes in later period, some beliefs and connected rituals persisted stubbornly amidst the changes and the *srāddha* rite is one of them. It remained in vogue even after the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration was accepted in the Brāhmaṇical tradition. In fact, it was superimposed on the existing system. It would be anachronistic to search the roots of the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration in the rituals of *jātakarma* and *sapindikaraṇa*. These rituals are later developments and might have been partly influenced by the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth.

It is significant to note here that in the Upaniṣads where the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration first appears, *karma* is not considered to be the sole factor shaping one's destiny; it is one of the many factors. In the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas, though the inexorable nature of *karma* is accepted the importance of gifts to *Brāhmaṇas*, visits to holy places, baths in holy rivers and divine grace which emerged in the form of *bhakti* ran parallel to the doctrine of *karma*. When the belief in omnipotence of God was established, the affairs of the world were sought to be explained in terms of divine ordination, the world was conceived as a divine scheme, controlled and regulated by divine agencies. In such an ontological perspective, worldly well-being, spiritual progress and realisation of ultimate goal could be possible only on account of divine grace. As such devotion to God emerged as a powerful mode of spiritual exercise. Any amount of sin accruing to a misdoer could be done away with by devotion to God. How could, then, *karma* be taken as a sole potent force in shaping one's destiny? The idea of divine grace has a long course of antecedent development. Right from the R̥gvedic period to the Purāṇas, there has been an unbroken tradition of the world being a divine scheme and the supremacy of the divine agencies in temporal affairs. As the doctrine of *karma* had received wide acceptance, a compromise between the two contradictory view points was rendered inevitable. In fact, what

appears to be true is that the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration was grafted into the existing Brāhmaṇical tradition when the contact between the Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa traditions was established and the process of intermingling had started.

Thus, the theory of the Vedic origin of the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration is not historically maintainable.

Tribal or Non-Aryan Origin :

The absence of a clear statement about the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth in the Vedas has led a number of scholars to speculate the tribal or non-Aryan origin of the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth. A. L. Basham writes, - 'The theory of transmigration must have been developed from older animist theories very widespread among primitive peoples, and its first propagators may have been non-Aryans stimulated by the invaders to develop their cruder ideas of metempsychosis by giving them an ethical basis in the form of *karma*.¹⁶ In the same vein Padmanabha S. Jaini writes, 'perhaps the entire concept that a person's situation and experiences are, in fact, the results of deeds committed in various lives may not be of Aryan origin at all, but rather may have developed as part of the indigenous Gangetic tradition from which the various Śramaṇa movements arose'¹⁷. Gaṇanāth Obeyeskere has dwelt upon this problem at some length and tried to give logical and evidential basis of this conclusion. The main idea underlying this assumption is that the Śramaṇa religions originated out of the indigenous Gangetic tradition and are non-Aryan. The reasons for the assumption that the Śramaṇa tradition is of non-Aryan roots are precisely ; (1) it had antagonistic attitude to the Brāhmaṇical tradition, (2) its *locus classicus* was the Gangetic region and not Brahmāvarta.

In support of the tribal origin of the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth, it is stated that rebirth theories were wide spread in tribal peoples in

different parts of the world. Such theories were held even by tribal peoples of Gangetic region where the Śramaṇa religions flourished. Indian religious philosophers did not invent rebirth theory, they simply transformed the simple, to use the terms of Gaṇanath Obeyeskere, " 'rebirth' to 'karmic eschatology' through the process of 'ethicisation'. The rebirth theory of the tribal people lacks ethicisation; the deeds of individual have no retributive character because they are not morally or religiously evaluated. The conversion of moral evaluation into religious evaluation evolves out of primitive base. In the primitive rebirth eschatology the other world is for all; the transfer to the other world depends on the proper performance of the funeral rites. But when this system is ethicised, entry to the otherworld must be contingent., depending on the ethical nature of person's this worldly actions".¹⁸ The other world is logically split into two worlds of retribution and reward i.e. hell and heaven. Souls stay in heaven or hell is temporary and are reborn in human world which is already ethicised. Souls quality of life in human world is determined by the character of deeds done in previous life. 'Thus ethicisation of a rebirth eschatology, pushed to its logical extreme, links one life time with another or in a continuing series of ethical links: which simply means that the South Asian theory of *Samsāra* and *karma* has fully developed'.¹⁹ One of the three factors i.e. (i) a highly specialised priesthood engaged in speculative activity (ii) ethical prophesy (iii) ethical asceticism, is said to be responsible for ethicisation.²⁰

Two categories of ethicisation have been envisaged i.e. primary ethicisation and secondary ethicisation. In primary 'ethicisation a social and secular morality is converted into religious morality' while, 'the imposition of symbolic ethical meaning on preexisting beliefs is secondary ethicisation'.

Ethicisation of ancient Indian religions occurred through ethical asceticism and Obeyesker gives the credit of it to the Buddha. The

Buddha not only ethicised the simple rebirth eschatology but also gave 'a radical secondary ethical interpretation to popular Brāhmaṇic beliefs and institutions that prevailed in the middle Ganges'.²¹ The intellectual climate of the Buddha's times was conducive to it. It is also stated that a systematic ethicisation of a religion occurs only in relation to a lay community. The Upaniṣadic ascetics were seekers of individual salvation and were not interested in lay soteriology. It was precisely the reason that 'the Upaniṣad produced a great speculative soteriology but not an ethical religion'.²² The Buddhism and Jainism on the other hand were interested in lay community and hence maximum ethicisation occurred in them.

Thus, the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration is said to have developed out of tribal eschatology of the Gangetic region through the speculative activities of the Śramaṇas who belonged to the non-Āryan Gangetic tradition. The credit of ethicisation has been given to the Buddha particularly though the contributions of the thinkers of other Śramaṇa schools and community and community consciousness are not denied.

A critical appraisal of the thesis of tribal origin of the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration reveals that it is based mainly on two fundamental assumptions :

1. the tribal stratum came first ; the tribes of the Gangetic region had a simple theory of rebirth.
2. the Śramaṇas, particularly the Buddha converted this primitive tribal eschatology into the theory of *karma* and rebirth.

If the Brāhmaṇic (Vedic) origin of the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth is denied it is quite natural to look for it to the Śramaṇa tradition. We have already noted that Brāhmaṇism and Śramaṇism were the two major religio-philosophical traditions of ancient India. If the Brāhmaṇical tradition is Āryan and there is no doubt about it, will it be, then, proper to assume that the Śramaṇa tradition is non-Āryan all because it is antagonistic to

the former? Here lies the crux of the matter, Most of the historians have dubbed the Śramaṇa tradition as non-Aryan under the effect of the basic assumption that the Vedic culture, which is the springhead of the Brāhmaṇa tradition, is of monolithic structure and non-conformers are non-Aryan. But now it is generally accepted that the Vedas represented only one aspect of the Aryan culture and some glimpses of the other aspects may be gathered from the Vedas themselves. There were men who did not conform to the Vedic ritualism and maintained different view points. As has been shown earlier, the *munis* of the R̥gveda were men of this category. The possibility of the presence of the Aryans in the region stretching from Kośala to Magadha prior to the R̥gvedic Aryan is not ruled out and some pieces of linguistic, literary and archaeological evidence have already been pointed out. It was among the Aryan that the roots of the Śramaṇa tradition originated though the climate and other material conditions of the Gangetic valley provided the conducive grounds for its development. It is precisely the reason that the Śramaṇa tradition, though Aryan in origin, could develop and flourish in India and no where else.

So far as the tribes of the Gangetic region, before the advent of Aryans there, are concerned, we virtually know nothing about them. Since, nothing definite is known about these non-Aryan tribes during the Buddha's time or a little before him from any of the sources- the Buddhist, Jain or Brāhmaṇical any opinion about them is a mere conjecture. Instead, the peoples, who had tribal names and structure during this period and who had developed democratic institutions, were in all probability the Aryan peoples. The *Śākyas*, *Mallas*, *Ugras*, *Gyātṛikas*, *Moriyas* etc. were most probably the Aryan peoples as is suggested by their language and lineage. Moreover, in the absence of any definite information about the non-Aryan tribes and their culture in the Gangetic region, is it reasonable to surmise about them and draw a parallel between them and the modern tribes? As such, any conclusion, thus drawn, would be purely hypothetical and cannot be historically maintained.

So far as the speculation about the ethicisation of the simple tribal birth eschatology and its consequent conversion into an ethical system by the Buddha is concerned, it is to be noted that this doctrine had already come into existence before him. The Buddhist texts inform us that the Buddha used to discuss the shortcomings of the Jain doctrine of *karma* and rebirth indicating thereby that the Jain doctrine was popularly known during the Buddha's time and that the Buddha's doctrine of *karma* and rebirth must be posterior to the Jain doctrine. In fact, the Buddha is indebted to both the Brāhmaṇa and Śramaṇa traditions for his doctrine of *karma* and rebirth, as will be shown a little later. The credit for ethicisation or developing an ethical system should be given to the pre-Buddhistic Śramaṇa tradition.

Drawing a distinction between the Upniṣadic ascetic ethicisation and Śramaṇa ascetic ethicisation on account of the concern for lay community is based on wrong notions. Infact, the difference between them is ontological. Moreover, the Buddhism and the Jainism were primarily concerned with individual personal salvation and in them laity concern is a later development.²³ Once we reject the view of the tribal origin of the theory of *karma* and rebirth, the question of primary ethicisation disappears. So far as the secondary ethicisation, that is, symbolic interpretation of earlier beliefs, is concerned, it should be noted that inner ideological developments and changing ontological perspectives in the Vedic tradition necessitated such interpretation and the *vedantins* and *mimāṃsakas* are good examples of it.

Śramaṇa Origin of the Doctrine of Karma and Rebirth

One of the original contributions of the Śramaṇa tradition to ancient Indian culture is the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth. This doctrine originally grew up in the Śramaṇa hothouse and was later adopted by the Brāhmaṇical tradition when the contact between the two was fully established during the later Vedic period. As we have seen earlier that

the earliest references of this doctrine are found in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and *Chhāndogya Upaniṣads* and the contexts reveal that it was a less known doctrine. When asked by Yāgyavalkya about the root from which man is born again and again after death in a symposium at the court of Janaka, the gathering remains silent and he himself answers that a man becomes good by good work and evil by evil works. Silence on the part of the gathering of scholars clearly shows that it was not a well known theory in the Brāhmanical fold.

In order to show that the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration is basically a Śramaṇa doctrine, we shall have to survey the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth as held in different Śramaṇa schools. As is well known, the Ājīvikas did not entertain any theory of *karma* and rebirth, we shall, therefore take up the Buddhist and Jain doctrines of *karma* and rebirth.

The Buddhist Doctrine of Karma and Rebirth

Instead of going into the details of the doctrine of *karma* as developed in the Buddhist tradition, we shall keep ourselves confined to its salient features, particularly to its position in early Buddhism. It is of pivotal significance in early Buddhist tradition according to which a person's situation and experiences are the results of deeds committed by him in previous lives. Beings pass from one life to other in accordance with the nature of their deeds. Thus the *Majjhima Nikāya* states: ".....With divine, purified, superhuman eyes he (Buddha) sees beings passing away and being reborn, he knows that beings are inferior, exalted, beautiful, ugly, -well-faring ill-faring according to their *karma*."²⁴ In the same text it is stated, 'Indeed, these venerable beings who are endowed with good conduct of body of speech and of mind, who do not abuse noble ones, who are of right view, acquiring for them selves the *kamma* of the right view, after the breaking up of the body after death, there are the ones who attain happiness (*sugati*), a heaven (*saggam lokam*)they are ones who attain existence among men. Indeed these

venerable beings who are endowed with misconduct of body, of speed, andof mind, who abuse noble ones, who are of wrong views, acquiring for themselves the *kamma* of the wrong view, they, after the breaking up the body after death, are ones who attain existence in the realm of the shadesin an animal womb (*Tirchhanayoni*) who attain a state of loss (*apaya*), a miserable course (*duggati*), destruction (*vinipāta*), *niraya*.'"²⁵ This refrain is frequent in the this text.²⁶

This basic idea of *karma* has assumed somewhat different shapes in the various schools of Buddhism, a discussion of which is not desirable here. On the whole what we find is that the problem of *karma* and rebirth has been approached from a purely psychological point of view. Infact, the Buddhists have attached much importance to the state of mind (*chetanā*) and sometimes *karma* has been defined as *chetanā*²⁷ implying thereby that an action is a manifestation of will. *Karma* is determined by will which exercises its power over the mental faculties. Only for volitional or intentional actions one is morally responsible. Further, volitional deeds (*sanchetikā*) can not be annulled; the doer will have to experience their results inevitably.²⁸

The doctrine of *karma* is so pervasive that even the gods are subjected to its control. They are doomed to births in lower states if their deeds are not righteous. Even the beginning of cosmic periods has been explained in terms of *karmic* effects. The cycles of rebirths and cosmic periods are said to be innumerable and unending.²⁹

The general moral character of a man has also a role to play in the fruition of *karma*. Individual's thoughts and deeds at the time of death are said to affect rebirth. This is not to say that the effects of accumulated *karmas* are negated by the thoughts and deeds of last moment; only an extra weightage is given to it. But the proper outlook at the time of death is indicative of general moral character of man.

What the Buddha has said in connection with retribution of *karma*, has been variously developed by the different schools of Buddhism. The *Vaibhāṣikas* have discussed the retribution in terms of *svabhāva*, *prāpti* and *avigyapti*. *Avigyapti* is an intermediary form which operates as a means by which merit and demerit are rewarded. Contrary to it, the *Sautrāntikas* hold a different position and believe that deeds cease to be as soon as they are done, but they affect the psycho-physical series. The potentiality working behind it is called *bīja*.³⁰

A significant feature of the Buddhist doctrine of *karma* is transfer of merit. Though generally, the personal nature of *karma* is recognised through out the *Pāli* texts, transfer of merit has been mentioned at several places. Thus, in the *Petavatthu*, the importance of gifts to the *samgha* has been frequently discussed. The act of charity by the benefactor becomes the act of the *peta* to whom it is ascribed. The merit ultimately goes to the *peta*. The *Jātakas*, *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* and *Aṅguttara Nikāya* also furnish some very important pieces of evidence in support of merit transfer. In *Aṅguttara Nikāya* the mother of Nand is mentioned who gives food to monks in the name of King Vessavana for his welfare.³¹ Likewise *Machhudāna Jātaka* mentions an act of gift by the Buddha to a fish from which the spirit of river benefitted.³²

The *karma* is inextinguishable in nature and its effects can not be negated by any means. The Buddha rejected the idea of self-mortification or severe austerity as a means to counteracting the effects of *karma*. *Karmanirodha*, which involves both the exhaustion of past deleterious deeds and avoidance of further accumulation of such deeds, is possible only by recouring to the eightfold path.

A critical analysis of the preceding remarks shows that the Buddha formulated his doctrine of *karma* and transmigration mainly drawing upon an older Śramaṇa tradition and incorporating certain ideas from the Vedic tradition. While he accepted the idea of *karma* as the sole basis of

Samsāra, a Śramaṇa idea, he adopted some Vedic ideas such as merit transfer. Merit is basically linked with the *śrāddha* rites. Though the Buddha denied the efficacy of the *śrāddha* rites but he could not keep his thinking aloof from the influences of such popular beliefs. The current popular beliefs affected his doctrine of *karma* is evident from a reference of *Devadutta-Sutta* where it is stated that Yama is the lord of netherworld, who looks into the deeds of sinners and awards punishments accordingly.

A very significant point, which has been given due importance and which puts a question mark to the Buddhist origin of the doctrine of *karma*, is that the idea of *samsāra* and transmigration presupposes a spiritual entity which does not perish with body and survives the death. The Buddha, who believes in the doctrine of *samsāra* i.e. *karma* and transmigration, and does not clearly admit the existence of soul as permanent entity, makes rigorous efforts to reconcile the two opposite views. His basic tenet of *kṣaṇikavāda* does not permit him to accept the idea of self as permanent entity and he is constrained to deny it owing to his commitment to the ideas of *samsāra* and transmigration.³⁴ In order to reconcile this tension he envisages the theories of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *pañc-skandhas*. But this tension remains in Buddhism from the very beginning to the later times. It is precisely the reason that there is divergence of opinion about birth mechanism in later Buddhism. The *Pudgalavādins* maintain that *pudgala*, a personal entity, exists after death and by force of *karma* migrates from existence to existence. It is neither identical with the *pañc-skandha* nor different from it. The relationship between *pudgala* and *pañc-skandha* is ineffable. The *Theravāda*, on the otherhand, does not accept any intermediate state of being existing between death and rebirth. The *Vibhajyavādins* and *Mahāsāṃghikas* also appear to share the views of *Theravāda* in as much as they do not clearly speak about the intermediate state (*antarābhāva*). The *Sarvāstivādins* and a few others, though, accept the *antarābhāva* but they explain it differently³⁵. Thus, it may be assumed

that the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration (the idea of *saṃsāra*) which is not consonant with *Kṣhāṇikavāda* is not a natural corollary of it. The Buddha picked up the idea of *karma* and rebirth or *saṃsāra* from the pre-existing Śramaṇa tradition and, after fashioning it in his own way, utilised it as one of the basic tenets of his system of thought.

Jain Kriyāvāda

The evidence of the early Jain texts indicates that the four major schools of thoughts which were in existence in the time of Mahāvīra were: 1. *Akriyāvāda* 2. *Agyānavāda* 3. *Vinayavāda* and 4. *Kriyāvāda*³⁶. Of these *Kriyāvāda* was the creed upheld and preached by Mahāvīra. It is interesting to note that Mahāvīra himself designates his creed as *Kriyāvāda* and it is quite possible that it was the philosophical name of Jainism in the time of Mahāvīra though it is evident from the references of the Buddhist and the Jain texts that the creed was popularly known as *nigantha* or *nirgrantha*. Notionally, the terms *kriyāvāda* and *nirgrantha* are coincidental.

The *kiriya* or *Kriyāvāda* has not been defined in the early Jain texts. But, we can have an idea of it once we critically look into the contexts in which this term has been used in contradistinction to other schools of thoughts. Thus, in the *Sutrakritāṅga* where *Kriyāvāda* is mentioned as one of the four creeds above mentioned, after the critique of contemporary philosophical doctrines, it is stated. "The (*kriyāvādin*) Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, understanding the world, speak thus: misery is produced by one's own works not by those of somebody else. But right knowledge and conduct lead to liberation".³⁷ The same text further states: "Sinners can not annihilate their works by new works; the pious annihilate their works by abstention from works; the wise and happy men who got rid of the effects of greed, do not commit sins"³⁸. While commenting on this term, Śīlāṅka has quoted averse from a canonical source '*acchittikiriyaṇi vāyanti nacchitti, akiriyaṇi vāyanti*, (the

kriyāvādins speak of existence, while the *akriyāvādins* of non-existence) and says '*kriyā jivādi padārthostityādikaṃ vaditum śīlaṃ yeṣāṃ te kriyāvādināḥ. Etad viparyasta akriyāvādināḥ. lokāyatikaḥ, sākyādayaśca teṣāṃ ātmaiva nāsti kutastat kriyā tajjanito vā karmabandha iti*³⁹. Obviously, here Śīlāṅka has soul as the substratum of *kriyā* in his mind while discussing *kriyāvāda*. These references and a number of others found in the Jain and the Buddhist texts amply prove that the *Kriyāvāda* is a doctrine of action opposed to the *Akriyāvāda* and distinguished from the *Vinayavāda* and the *Agyānavāda*. This doctrine of action has been called '*Kammavāda*' by the Buddha.⁴⁰

In order to comprehend the *kriyāvāda* properly, we shall have to look into other doctrines in contrast to which it has often been referred to in the Jain and the Buddhist texts. According to *Sūtrakritāṅga*, the *akriyāvādins* believe in the annihilation of good deeds by denying the potentiality of *karma* in future existence.⁴¹ They 'do not understand the truth, bring forward various opinions; many men believing in them will whirl round in the endless cycle of births.'⁴² 'As a blind man, though he have a light, does not see colours, because he is deprived of his eye (sight), so the *kriyāvādin* having a perverted intellect, does not recognise the action (of the soul) though it does exist'⁴³. Thus, *akriyāvāda* is a theory of life and existence which does not believe in the fruition of action and that one's present experiences and situations are determined by his deeds in previous life and his future in determined by his present deeds. Mahāvīra had contemptuous attitude towards it and bitterly condemned it as it was diametrically opposed to *kriyāvāda*.

That *akriyāvāda* was a very popular and important doctrine is indicated by the fact that it was adhered to by a number of schools of thought. In the *Śthānāṅga Sūtra* eight types of philosophers have been designated as *akriyāvādins*, viz. (1) *Ekkavādins* or monists; (2) *Anikkavādins* or pluralists; (3) *Mitavādins* or extensionalists; (4)

Nimmitavidins or cosmogonists; (5) *Sayavādins* or sensualists; (6) *Samucchedavadins* or annihilationists; (7) *Niyavādins* or eternalists; (8) *Na-santi-paralokavādins* or materialists.⁴⁴ In his commentary on the *Achārāṅga Sūtra*, *Śīlāṅka* also mentions six types of *akriyāvāda* - (i) *Kālavāda*; (ii) *Īśvaravāda*; (iii) *Ātmavāda*; (iv) *Niyativāda*; (v) *Svabhāvavāda* and (vi) *Yadricchā-vāda*.⁴⁵ These schools of thoughts have been mentioned several times in the Jain and the Buddhist texts and sometimes their view points have been critically discussed. It is to be noted in this context that *Śīlāṅka*, commenting on some passages of the *Sūtrakritāṅga*, identifies the Buddhists with the *akriyāvādins*, perhaps, the underlying idea was that the Buddhists maintained the theory of momentariness of existence and, hence, there can not be any connection between the thing as it is now and as it will be in the next moment.⁴⁶ But *Śīlāṅka* was misled by later polemics and there is no doubt in the fact that the Buddhists were *kriyāvādins*.

In the fine, we may say that *akriyāvāda* is doctrine which envisages either that a soul does not exist or it does not act or is not affected by acts.⁴⁷

The next heretical doctrine mentioned in the *Sūtrakritāṅga* and other Jain texts⁴⁸ is that of the *agyānikas*. About the *agyanikas* it is stated in the *Sūtrakritāṅga*, though they (pretend to) be clever, reason incoherently and do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas. Ignorant (teachers) speak to ignorant (pupils), and without reflection they speak untruth'.⁴⁹ But statements of the Jain texts do not bring out clearly as to what were the central ideas of the *agyānavāda*. However, from the Buddhist texts and the commentary of *Śīlāṅka* we are able to discern as to what *agyānavāda* denoted. *Agyānavāda* refers to the views of Sanjaya Belatthiputta. The *Śamañña phala Sutta* provides the following account about the doctrine of Sanjaya: 'If you inquire of me whether there be a future state of being, I answer: If I experience a future state of

existence, I will then explain the nature of that state. If you inquire, is it after this manner? that is not my concern. Is it after that fashion? that is not my concern. Is it different from these? that is not my concern. Is it not? that is not my concern. No, is it not? It is no concern of mine⁵⁰. According to *Śīlārka*, they think : 'Even if we avowedly, maintain a view- 'that this is good (*Kuśala*), we are conscious that we are not acquainted with truth, the matter is not familiar to our knowledge. Indeed we have not as yet got beyond perplexity-perplexity which is blindness and delusion of the mind (*cittāśuddhi, cittabhrānti*)⁵¹.

The Buddhist and the Jain treatment of doctrine of *agyānavādins* is not very fair and their views have been loosely analysed and sometimes misstated. Yet, what we are able to gather from the references of the Buddhist and Jain sources is that the *agyānavādins* believed that the transcendental issues evade the efficacy of human speculation and they suspended their judgement on such matters. In their eyes such inquiries tend to be fruitless and serve no purpose in the realisation of *summum bonum*.

If the philosophical position of *agyānavādins* is viewed from the Jain spectacle, it will appear that they were not *kriyāvādins* and infact, their philosophical standpoint could not permit them to uphold such a doctrine which gives a definite moral explanation of life and existence.

The last heretical creed which has been dealt with in the Jain texts is *Vinayavāda*. This has been mentioned in the Buddhist texts as *Śīlbbata-paramāsa* or *Śīlabbatam*. According to *Sūtrakritāṅga* the adherents of *Vinayavāda* believed truth to be untruth and called a bad man good. Without perceiving the truth they say that the object of desire (*atthā*?) is realised by *vinaya* alone⁵². According to *Śīlārka* the *Vainayikas* thought of gaining the desired other world through *vinaya* only⁵³. In the opinion of H. Jacobi, the *Vainayikas* believed in idolatry or sought salvation through *bhakti*⁵⁴ B. M. Barua, on the otherhand,

mainly dwelling upon the references about *Śīlabbata-paramāsa* or *Śīlabbatam* and taking it identical with *Vinayavāda*, thinks that the *vainayikas* were moralists. But the morality as held by them was different from that of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. On the basis of the collective evidence available from the Buddhist and the Jain texts about *Vinayavāda*, Barua says that the moral teachings and practices prevalent in the time of Mahāvīra and the Buddha represent three systems of moral discipline viz. (i). system as expounded in the *Dharmasūtras* and *Gṛhya-Sūtras*; (ii). system detailed in the *Nṛti* literature; (iii). system embodied in the *Kāma-Sūtras*. It is interesting to note that these systems of moral discipline are distinguished from *Ānvikshiki* which was a system of speculation about *moksha* or salvation.⁵⁵ This is quite in keeping with the stand taken by Mahāvīra and the Buddha who in their respective contexts have condemned *Vinayavāda* and have shown their disagreement with it. The *Vinayvāda*, no less than the *Akriyāvāda* and *Agyānavāda*, is opposed to the Jain doctrine of *Kriyāvāda*. The adherents of *Vinayvāda* observed only a set of moral rules of conduct and did not bother about ontological issues.

The above short account of the prominent creeds existing in the time of Mahāvīra has been given only in order to bring out the distinctive position of the *kriyāvāda* which constitutes the core of Jainism. Though the Buddha also believed in the *kriyāvāda* which he called *kammavāda*, but his *kammavāda* differed a little from the Jain *kriyāvāda*. While, according to Mahāvīra an individual is morally responsible for any act or deed done at the mental, oral or physical level, whether willfully or unintentionally, the Buddha disagreeing with Mahāvīra, advocated that one is morally responsible only for those acts which are done volitionally. This point is often referred to in both the Buddhist and the Jain sources.⁵⁶

According to Mahāvīra the experiences and situations of the self is brought about by one's deeds and not by any other cause. Thus, he was individualistic and denied any kind of merit transfer.

As is clear from the above discussion that the *kriyāvāda* is the doctrine of action which envisages that deed is the prime-mover of life in this universe. The basic premise of the *kriyāvāda*, as upheld in Jainism, is the retribution of *karma* and the emancipation from the bondage arising out of it.

In the Jain view the world or *saṁsāra* is a process of transformation of 'living' (*jīva*) through the interaction of non-living (*ajīva*) the two ultimate entities (*dravyas*) without beginning and end. The contact between *jīva* and *ajīva* is caused by the deeds done mentally, vocally or physically by the being. Thus, the deed is the determining factor of the process of transformation of the living. In this unending process of transformation, death is only the prelude to renewed life. The termination of this process is possible only by recouring to restraint from deeds of anykind, mental, vocal or physical, (*saṁvara*) and subjecting oneself to severe austerity (*nirjarā*). Bondage is thus eliminated and *mukti* or emancipation is achieved.

A critical review of the Jain *kriyāvāda* reveals certain glaring facts which have great bearing on the problem of the origin of the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration. The first point to be noted in this context is that the doctrine of *kriyāvāda* is mentioned in the earliest Jain texts such as the *Sūtrakṛitāṅga*, *Āchārāṅga*, *Sthānāṅga* etc. The *aṅgas* are oldest texts of the Jain canonical literature. As is indicated by the Jain tradition, they were compiled in the council of Pataliputra held in the fourth century B. C. But it should be kept in mind that the contents of the *aṅga* texts were preserved orally as the original teachings of Mahāvīra from his very time. The *aṅgas* were orally preserved is indicated by the evidence of the Jain texts that the celebrated Jain monk Bhadrabahu was master of all the twelve *aṅgas* and Sthūlabhadra was having the knowledge of eleven *aṅgas* at the time of Pataliputra council. This fact is very important from the point of view that the *kriyāvāda* is an original tenet of Jainism

and not a later development though subtleties and details were worked out afterward. It is from the standpoint of *kriyāvāda* that Mahāvīra distinguished his creed from the rest others and condemned them.

If we carefully look into the categories of contemporary philosophical doctrines of *Agyānavāda*, *Vinayavāda* and *Akriyāvāda* and the subcategories of the latter, as mentioned above, it appears that Mahāvīra had the entire gamut of contemporary philosophical speculations in his purview while expounding his distinct philosophical position from the point of view of the *kriyāvāda*. It is highly significant to note that he dubbed all the existing doctrines as *Akriyāvāda* explicitly or implicitly. The lists of the subcategories of the *Akriyāvāda* available from the Jain texts are really confusing, as has been pointed out by Barua, but there remains little doubt that the lists refer to all the major schools of the Brāhmaṇical tradition, the Ājīvikas and the materialists. The Buddhism is conspicuous by its absence from the lists opposed to the Jain *kriyāvāda* but the reason for it is that the Buddhism was also committed to the *kriyāvāda* and the part of it which was opposed to the Jain stand point was clearly criticised. Later on the Buddhist doctrine was also declared as *akriyāvāda* as is clear from the statement of *Śilāṅka* mentioned above.

The fact that Mahāvīra designates his creed as *kriyāvāda* and rest other opposite doctrines as *akriyāvāda* leads us to the irresistible conclusion that it is a Jain invention in the hothouse of Śramaṇa tradition. How and when it was invented is shrouded in mystery, but it appears to be almost certain that it was an established doctrine in the time of Mahāvīra. There is no evidence to suggest that it was invented by Mahāvīra like many other ideas of Jainism; he simply preached it and there is strong possibility that it was a legacy of the past and Mahāvīra simply carried it on.

This contention gets further support by the Jain concept of *karma-paramāṇu*. When *jīva* acts at any level of speech, mind or body, there is created a stirring in the inner regions of *jīva* and the atoms (*paramāṇu*, the smallest particle of matter as conceived in Jainism) scattered round it, endowed with different potentialities, are attracted according to the nature of deeds and they cling to the inner regions. Thus, the bondage between *jīva* and *karma-paramāṇu* is created. The *karma-paramāṇus*, in turn, control the oral, mental and physical functions of *jīva*. Until the effects of *karma-paramāṇu* are exhausted, *jīva* remains under their influence. This is a materialistic conception of *karma*, unique in the history of Indian philosophy. An attempt to draw a parallel between the concept of *liṅga-śarīra* in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* and *Vedānta* is based on wrong notions⁵⁷. The concept of *liṅga-śarīra* pertains to that subtle-body which transmigrates to the next birth after death. At most this is comparable with the concept of subtle *kārmaṇa-śarīra* of the Jains. This atomic concept of *karma* betrays its primitive character.

It is interesting to note in this connection that some animistic beliefs were upheld in Jainism which will be discussed a little later. Links between the concept of transmigration and animism have often been pointed out.⁵⁸ It is quite possible that the Jain thinkers developed their concept of *karma* and transmigration out of their animistic beliefs without any influence *ab extra*.

1. 'It is interesting to note in this connection that it is here (sacrifice) that we find the first germs of the law of *karma*, which exercise such a dominating control over Indian thought upto present day'. Das Gupta, S. N. A History of Indian Philosophy, 1975, Vol. I. P. 22.
2. Ranade, R. D. Constructive Survey of the Upniṣadic philosophy p. 145-166.
3. Kane, P. V., History of Dharmaśāstras, Vol. V, Part-II, 1537-44.
4. Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. I. p. 207.
5. Taittirīya Samhitā II, 6. 10. 2.
6. Kane P. V. History of Dharmaśāstras, Vol. V, Part - II, p. 1545.
7. Brihadāranyaka Upniṣad IV. 4.5-7.
8. ibid. IV. 4.3; Kane P. V. History of Dharmaśāstras, p. 1546
9. *Atha yatpraśaṇśasatuh karma haiva tatpraśaṇśasatuh*. Puṇyo vai puṇyena karmanā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpeneti. Ibid. III. 3.13.
10. Kane, P. V. History of Dharmaśāstras, Vol. V, pt. II, 1977 p. 1551
11. Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition p. 3
12. Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition p. 4-5.
13. "Sapindikarana : The Hindu Rite of Entry into heaven" - David M. Kniepe, p. 115 of Religious Encounters with Death, Insights from the History and Anthropology of Religions, edited by Frank Reynolds and Earle H. Waugh (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977)
14. Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions p. 5-6.
15. ibid.
16. Basham, A. L. History and Doctrine of the Ajivikas 1981, p. 4-5.
17. Jaini, Padmanabh S. Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition p. 218.
18. Obeyeskere, Gananath, 'Rebirth eschatology and its transformation, -in 'Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition. p. 149.
19. Obeyesker, Gana Nath: 'Rebirth eschatology and its Transformation' in Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition'. p. 149.
20. ibid. p. 147
21. ibid. p. 159

22. *ibid.* p. 160.
23. Pandey, G. C., *Fundamentals of Indian Culture* Vol. I. p. 68. "The doctrine of karman in its original Śramaṇa form was wholly individualistic and had little direct interests in social welfare."
24. *Majjhima-Nikāya*, 1.183 (P. T. S.)
25. *Majjhima-Nikāya* - 3. 178-179.
26. *Majjhima-Nikāya* 1.23; 1.482; 2.331; 3.203, 3.178-187 etc
27. *Aṅguttar-Nikāya* (PTS) III. p. 415. Cf. Atthasālini pp. 88ff.
28. *Aṅguttar-Nikāya* (PTS) v. 292.
29. *Dīgha Nikāya* 1. 17-18.
30. *Abhidharma Kośa* - Sects 20-26; Also see 'Sautrāntika Theory of bīja' - Jaini P. S. *Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 22, p. 236-249.
31. *Aṅguttar-Nikāya* 4.63.
32. Fausball. *Jatakās*, no. 88 Vol. 2. p. 423.
33. *Saṃyukta Nikāya* 4.400-401. It describes an encounter between the Buddha and Vacchagotra about self (attā). The Buddha remains silent. Later he explains his silence to his disciple Ānand - 'to say there is self is to side with the eternalists, to say that there is no self is to side with the annihilationist who rejected any idea of rebirth as untenable. Thus the Buddha takes the middle view and remains silent.'
In *Saṃyukta Nikāya* 2.76. The Buddha points out that there are two extremes which are to be avoided- (1) The doer experiences the results of deeds (2) one who does the deed is different from one who experiences the results.
34. In this connection the commentary of *Śīlāṅka* on *Sūtrakritāṅga* assumes significance. He brackets the Buddhists with *Lokāyatikas* as *Akriyavādins* saying that they did not believe in the existence of soul hence the question of soul's deeds and the consequent bondage does not arise. This statement of *Śīlāṅka* in the context of *kriyāvada* indicates that this tension was noticed even in ancient times.
35. *Sūtrakritāṅga*. I. 12.1.
36. *ibid.* I. 12.11.

37. *ibid.* 1. 12. 15.
 38. *Sūtrakritāṅga* (Ed. Dhanapati), p. 456.
 39. *Aṅguttar Nikāya* p. p. 286.
 40. *Sūtrakritāṅga* 1. 12. 8, S. B. E. XLV, II. p. 317.
 41. *Sūtrakritāṅga* 1. 12.4.
 42. *ibid.* 1. 12.6.
 43. *Sthānāṅga Sūtra* IV. 4; See also Barua B. M. 'Pre-Buddhistic Indian philosophy', 1981, p. 197.
 44. *Achārāṅga Tīkā* (Ed. Dhanapati) p. 14.
 45. S. B. E. XLV, Jain Sutras Vol. II. p. 316, f.n. 3.
 46. Jacobi H. SBE XLV, Jain Sutras Vol. II, p. XXV
 47. *Uttarādhyayan Sūtra* XVIII. 23.
 48. *Sūtrakritāṅg* 1. 12.2.
 49. Taken from S.B.E. Vol. XLV p. 26-27.
 50. *Sūtrakritāṅga Tīkā* p. 451-452 - taken from Barua B. M. Pre-Buddhistic Philosophies of India, p. 330.
 51. *Sūtrakritāṅga* 1. 12 3-4, SBE XLV, II, p. 316.
 52. *Sūtrakritāṅga Tīkā* p. 447 - *Vainayikānaṃ Vinayād eva kevala paralokaṃ apicchatam.*
 53. S. B. E. Vol. XLV. Jain Sutra S. p. 83
 54. Barua, B. M. *ibid.*, p. 335-36
 55. *Sūtrakritāṅga* I, 1.2.28; Jacobi H, SBE, Jain Sutras pt. II, p. 414. *Majjhima Nikāya*, I. 377.
 56. The Cultural Heritage of India Vol. I. 1970, p. 438.
 57. The Primitive Heritage -Ed. by Margaret Mead and Nicolas Colas. 'Animism' - 'Edward B. Tylor - It is habitually found that the theory of animism divides into two great dogmas, forming parts of one consistent doctrine; first concerning souls of individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of body; second, concerning other spirits, upward to the rank of powerful deities.' p.48.
- Thapar Romila - Ancient India Social History, p. 70

Animism

Another element of the Jain philosophy which is of immense value from the point of view of the origin and antiquity of Jainism is the animistic belief. Animism is the belief that the objects in nature possess or are abodes of souls or spirits¹. Tylor takes it as a general belief in spiritual beings, spiritual not in particular sense but in the sense of wider acceptance². He writes, 'Animism is, in fact, the groundwork of the philosophy of religion from that of savages up to that of civilization. And although it may at first sight seem to afford but a bare and meagre definition of a minimum of religion, it will be found practically sufficient: for where the root is, the branches will generally be produced³. It is this concept which later develops into the theories of soul and divinities, Thus animism constitutes the earliest phase of religious consciousness.

The Jains divide the existents of the world into two broad categories of *jīva* and *ajīva*. *Jīva* is a spiritual entity and is absolutely different from *ajīva*. It is conceived as substance (*dravya*) ever existing without beginning and end. *jīva*, in its purest state, is possessed of infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power. *Jīva* attains this state only after liberation from bondage. But the number of such *jīvas* is limited. In worldly state the purity of *jīvas* is contaminated by *karmic* bondage. *Jīvas* are infinite in number and occupy innumerable space points of *lokākāśa*. Even the earth, water, air and fire are regarded as living beings. The particles of earth possess souls; the entire *lokākāśa* is full of lowest kind of *jīvas* called *nigodas*.

This concept of *jīva* of the Jains amounts to animism. As has been pointed out, animistic beliefs constitute the early phase of religious consciousness as such the primitive character of the Jain philosophy is brought out beyond doubt.

The point to be noted here is that during the middle of first millenium B. C. when religious thinking had reached a very advanced stage leaving animism far behind, is it plausible to hold, firstly, that such an animistic concept was envisaged and articulated by Mahāvīra and, secondly, that the people among whom Jainism originated and was being spread were still in primitive stage ready to accept animistic beliefs? May it not be humbly suggested that it is not an invention of sixth century B. C.; such an animistic conception is an archaism and Mahāvīra simply carried it on like many other ideas bequeathed by early *Tīrthāṅkaras*.

The animistic belief in Jainism takes its antiquity back to the early reaches of religious consciousness. As such it may not be taken to have come into existence as a revolt or reaction against any established religious tradition at a later stage, rather, it had an independent and natural course of origin at a very early stage.

1. Drever James - A Dictionary of Psychology, 1961-p. 15.
2. Edward B. Tylor - 'Animism' - in Primitive Heritage Ed. Margaret Mead and Nicolas Calas - "It is habitually found that the theory of animism divides into two great dogmas, forming parts of one consistent doctrine; first concerning souls of an individual creatures, capable of continued existence after the death or destruction of body; second, concerning other spirits, upwards to the rank of powerful deities. p.48
3. Ibid. p. 48.

3

Socio-Cultural Milieu of the Origin and Development of Jainism

There has been an attempt on the part of a number of scholars to search the roots of Jainism, Buddhism and some other non-orthodox schools in the socio-economic and cultural milieu of sixth cent B. C. In this context attention has been drawn to the interactions between the Brāhmanic and the Śramaṇic traditions and their consequent impact on the intellectual activity during the first half of the first millennium B. C. Attention has also been focused on the unprecedented economic changes during this period due to introduction of iron technology. Forests were cleared, new fields of agriculture were prepared resulting into surplus production. This change in economy affected all the spheres of life. Trade and commerce activities enhanced, new market centres came into existence and finally, a number of urban centres emerged. This change is designated as 'second urban revolution'. Massive developments in the fields of agriculture, trade and commerce paved the way for the rise of a neocapitalist class often mentioned as *setthis* in the Buddhist and Jain texts. These *setthis*, though rich and influential, were *vaiśyas* enjoying only relatively lower position in the *Varṇa* hierarchy. As such their dissatisfaction with existing orthodox social order is plausible. In this

context, growing ritualism in Brāhmaṇical tradition, violence in Vedic sacrifices, damaging animal power which was greatly needed for cultivation, monopoly of the *Brāhmaṇas* over religious and ritualistic activities, *Brāhmaṇa-Kshatriya* rivalry for spiritual supremacy were, *inter alia*, some of the facts over which attention was paid. These factors were sufficient to convince these scholars that the existing orthodox view of life and ethos was no longer satisfying to the urges and aspirations of some sensitive men, in particular, and a section of people, in general, in changed circumstances. Search for alternative view of life, new ethos and values began which resulted into the emergence of a number of new ideologies of which Jainism, Buddhism and Ājīvikism were most important.

So far as the origins of Buddhism and Ājīvikism are concerned, the facts and arguments pointed out above are highly enlightening and convincing to a great extent, though the textures of historical constructions by different historians are not identical. But the same can not be said to be true about Jainism. It appears that there was a specific socio-cultural milieu in which Jainism grew and developed and we shall dwell upon it a little later.

It is significant to note that the changed situations in the first half of the first millennium B. C. provided the congenial atmosphere for the proliferation and growth of pre-existing Śramaṇa tradition. We have seen earlier that the antiquity of the Śramaṇa tradition may be traced back to the Vedic and pre-Vedic times. Of the several sects of the Śramaṇa tradition Jainism is the oldest. Mahāvīra, who flourished in the sixth cent. B. C., was the twenty fourth *Tīrthāṅkara*. According to Jain tradition as preserved in the Jain literature twenty three *Tīrthāṅkara* existed before Mahāvīra. Of these the historicity of Pārśvanātha, the twenty third *Tīrthāṅkara*, has been convincingly established by Hermann Jacoby. If

any reliance can be placed on Jain tradition, Pārśvanātha obtained *moksha* two hundred fifty years before Mahāvīra. As such he may have flourished in at least eighth cent. B. C. According to some historians the theory of twenty four *Tīrthaṅkaras* is a later fabrication and, hence, should not be accorded historical value. So far as historical value of tradition is concerned, we should have sober attitude. Any tradition which develops in long course of time necessarily contains some historical truth. Even myths contain in themselves some historical reality how so ever wrapped they may be in fanciful imaginations. Instead of rejecting any tradition lock, stock and barrel it is profitable to cull out the historical reality from the stock of legendary, imaginary and fictitious elements. Moreover, tradition is a good source of history. We have seen earlier that the concept of *Tīrthaṅkara* and *Arhat* is very old and its antiquity may be traced back to Indo-European period. As such, the possibility of the existence of such enlightened persons who professed some faith and preached people may not be ruled out. It is true that the historicity of first *Tīrthaṅkara* Rṣabha Nātha and others can not be proved beyond doubt for paucity of evidence though a few have tried to do so. No doubt, the evidence and arguments put forth by them are not very conclusive and convincing, yet, it is not proper to reject outrightly the historicity of the first *Tīrthaṅkara* Rṣabha Nātha. The existence of a renowned ascetic is referred to in a number of texts some of which belong to the Brāhmaṇical tradition. Not only he has been mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*, his detailed biography is also found in the *Bhāgawata Purāṇa*. In the latter work he is said to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu, the purpose of which was the exposition of Śramaṇa religion. It is of great significance to note that many a details of his biography as described in the *Bhāgawata Purāṇa* are indentical to those preserved in the Jain texts. Even the name of Bharata of this country is said to have been given after the name of his son Bharata. These and a few other facts clearly

indicate that a person named Rīṣabha Nātha, most probably a king who renounced the world and adopted Śramaṇa way of life, existed in flesh and blood in early times whose echo of presence is preserved in the texts of later times.

Of the other *Tīrthaṅkaras* we have some informations about Nami Nāth and Ariṣṭanemi. Nami Nāth, who is said to be the 21st *Tīrthaṅkara* was an ascetic of repute. His biography is not only described in the Jain texts, he has attracted the authors of the Brāhmanical texts as well. For instance, the *Mahābhārata* describes his equanimity in high sounding words. Some of his utterances display sense of resignation and detachment were very popular and are quoted both in the Jain texts and the *Mahābhārata*. Ariṣṭanemi, the twenty second *Tīrthaṅkara*, is said to be a cousin of Kriṣṇa. His life history has not only been described in detail in the Jain texts, but his name figures in the non-Jain sources as well.

Thus, there are indications that the tradition of twenty four *Tīrthaṅkaras* contains some elements of truth and its outright rejection will be a disservice to history.

As has already been discussed and also pointed out by Hermann Jacobi, some basic concepts of Jain philosophy indicate its high antiquity. The concepts of *dharma* and *adharma* as categories of substance, the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration as also animistic belief all point to the fact that Jainism came into existence in very early times. Its antiquity goes back to Vedic/pre Vedic times.

If these points are kept into mind while delving into the problem of the origins and antiquity of Jainism, the explanations given in the context of the material and cultural milieu of the sixth cent B. C. become redundant. As such, we shall have to search that socio-cultural milieu in which Jainism emerged and developed. On this point we have some suggestions.

It is a well known fact that all the prominent sects of Śramaṇa tradition, namely Jainism, Buddhism and Ājīvikism flourished in the region stretching from Kośala to Magadha-Videha covering modern eastern Uttar-Pradesh and north-western Bihar touching Himalayan foot-hills. This region has long remained away from the influence of the culture of the Rigvedic Aryans. The extension of Rigvedic culture in this area could be possible only in the later Vedic period. Initially, it was believed and still some scholars hold, that this area was inhibited by the non-Aryans. It was also believed that the Rigveda represents the Aryan culture and any culture which is not Rigvedic in its complexion is necessarily non-Aryan. It is precisely the reason that the Śramaṇa sects including Jainism whose *weltanschauung* was entirely different from that of the Vedic were designated as non-Aryan. We have already discussed that the Śramaṇa tradition, though non-Vedic, is not non-Aryan. Now, it is being generally accepted that the Aryan culture had different streams and the Rigvedic tradition is one of them.

Recently, a number of scholars have come forward to assert that there was an Aryan settlement in the region which was cradle land of Śramaṇa sects parallel to the settlement of the Rigvedic Aryans in the north-western India or even earlier than that. In order to prove this point a number of literary, linguistic and archaeological evidence have been advanced. A critical study of the Purāṇic accounts shows that, of the eight sons of Manu, Ikshwāku, the eldest had established a kingdom in Kośal with Ayodhyā as its capital. The dynasty of Ikshwāku mustered enough political power in course of time so much so that it influenced the entire politics of Indian sub continent for quite some time. In the Purāṇic tradition the dynasty of Ikshwāku appears to be the most important where as in the Vedic tradition it enjoyed no special status. Though Ikshwākus are mentioned in the Rigveda, most important people of the Rigveda are Bharatas, Kurus, Purus, Tritsus and Yadus. This clearly indicates that the Ikshwakus did not constitute the core of the Rigvedic Aryans and

perhaps they are distantly related with the latter. The antiquity of the presence of the Ikshwākus in the eastern regions is established beyond doubt by the Purāṇic tradition.

There has been controversy about the relative value of the Purāṇic accounts as against the information furnished by the Vedic tradition as source of Indian history and culture. Recent works on ancient Indian historiography have disclosed that Purāṇa was one of the forms of earliest historical compositions along with *Nārāśaṃsi*, *Gāthā*, *Ākhyāna* and *Itihāsa*. The intimate connection of *Purāṇa* with *Itihāsa* is clearly brought out by the compound *Itihāsa-Purāṇa* often mentioned as such in ancient Indian literary works. Thus, initially *Purāṇa* was a literary composition dealing with the deeds of kings and greatmen. As the tradition goes, there was a professional class preserving the accounts of great men and events. Later on, there was proliferation in Purāṇic literature and also the authorship passed on to the hands of priests and the *Brāhmaṇas*. As such, the Purāṇic literature could not remain secular and matters related with religion crept into it. By virtue of being handed down from generation to generation, its historical character contaminated.

Pargiter points out that there must have been two great streams of distinct traditions; *Kshatriya* tradition and *Brāhmaṇa* tradition. Sacred lore is the subject matter of the literature connected with the *Brāhmaṇa* tradition and references to secular matters are generally incidental for the purpose of illustrating some religious points. He writes, "The ancient portion of the *Purāṇas* consists largely of the royal geneologies and *Kshatriya* ballads and tales, while most of their teaching on religious matters was added by *Brāhmaṇas* in later times. Dynastic accounts and heroic tales were principal subjects of the *Kshatriya* record. He further remarks, "It is absurd to suppose that all the genuine *Kshatriya* tradition has been lost or utterly corrupted, and that the traditions which we have now are spurious. If the *Brāhmaṇas* could and did preserve their religious

compositions with the most scrupulous care and fidelity, it is absurd to suppose the opposite about the *Kshatriya* tradition, when there were men whose business it was to preserve such tradition. The general trustworthiness of tradition is the fact demonstrated, wherever it has been possible to test tradition by the result of discoveries and excavations, and we should distrust scepticism born of ignorance. The position now is this - there is strong presumption in favour of tradition, if any one contests tradition, the burden lies on him to show that it is wrong: and till he does that tradition holds the field²".

According to the tradition as preserved in the *Purāṇas*, all the dynasties which ruled in India in the beginning descended from a primaeval king Manu Vaivasvanta son of Vivasvanta (the sun). Manu had ten sons of whom Īla was the eldest. Īla while on conquest entered Śiva's groove Saravana and became changed into a woman Ilā. Ilā was consorted with Buddha, son of Soma, and had by him a son named Purūravas Aila. The other nine sons of Manu were Ikshvāku, Nābhāga, Dhrista, Śaryāti, Narisyanta, Prāmsu, Nābhānedistha, Karusa and Prisadhra. Manu divided the earth, that is India in ten portions and distributed them among his sons. According to Pargiter, 'three different myths appear to have blended together in an attempt to unify the origins of three different dominant races which are said to have been derived from Manu, Purūravas and Sudyumna. They constituted three different stocks. Ikshvāku, the eldest and chief son obtained Madhyadesha and was progenitor of the solar race or dynasty with its capital at Ayodhyā. His eldest son Vikukshi succeeded him and reigned at Ayodhyā. From Ikshvāku's another son Nimi or Nemi sprang the dynasty that reigned in Videha whose capital Mithilā was named after his son Mithi'. Another son of Manu, Nābhānedistha reigned in Vaiśālī and from him started a dynasty later on called the Vaiśālakas³.

Thus, it is indicated by the tradition that the regions stretching from ancient Kośala of Videha was ruled by the descendants of Manu and are called Mānavas. Of these Mānavas, Ikshvākus were the most important.

Pargiter takes Aila race, which began in a small principality at Allahabad and in course of time, dominated the whole of north India with the exception of Ayodhyā, Videha and Vaiśālī, as the Aryan race by equating Aila with Arya on the one hand, and, the expansion of Ailas with the expansion of Aryans on the other. In his opinion the Mānavas were Dravidians⁴. In support of his contention Pargiter refers to the evidence of language as set out by G. Grierson. It is very difficult to agree with Pargiter's contention that the descendants of Manu, at least the Ikshavākus, were Dravidians. He himself admits that "in the geneological accounts the post of honour in being described first is always given to the Solar or Mānava race"⁵. Moreover, the high esteem which has been accorded to the legendary figures like Sagar, Māndhātā, Rāma etc. in tradition could not have been possible if they had any affiliation with Dravidian race. The conception of Rāma being God incarnate and saviour of Aryan faith and culture also contradicts such a conclusion. In fact, when Pargiter was writing there was no conception that there was an Aryan settlement in eastern regions simultaneous with or prior to the settlement of the Rigvedic Aryans in the northwest and the upper Gangetic valley. Though he himself rejects the theory of Aryan migration from North-west and pleads for the immigration of the Ailas from the middle Himalayan region.

The presence of Aryans in this region is indicated by archaeological as well as literary sources. Recently G. R. Sharma has drawn the attention of scholars to the discovery of horse bone from Koldihawā dating 6th millennium B. C.⁶ Referring to Āluar he says that the tradition of horse-taming had reached south India by fourth millenium B. C. Aryans's association with horse is well-known and it is one of the grounds on the basis of which attempts have been made to determine their original homeland. Moreover, the tradition of horse-sacrifice was established in India in very early times.

In this context the evidence of the *vrātyas* known from the xvth chapter of *Atharva Veda*, *Pañchavimśa Brāhmaṇa* and *Dharm Sūtras*

is very interesting and enlightening. The term '*vrātya*' is usually derived from *vrata* meaning multitude, group, horde etc. though attempts have also been made to derive it from '*vrata*' meaning 'vow'. If *vrātya* is to be taken as a derivative of '*vrata*' which seems to be proper, it indicates that *vrātya* people had a very primitive type of organisation. The evidence of *Pañchavimśa* Brāhmaṇa clearly shows that the *vrātyas* neither pursued the occupation of agriculture nor trade and commerce. Naturally, they were in primitive stage and must have been cattle rearers. That they were nomadic people is born out by the evidence of *Atharva Veda*.

The *vrātya* problem has been one of the knotty problems of Indian history and has attracted the attention of scholars both here and abroad and a great volume of literature has appeared on this subject. Scholars are not unanimous on the point as to the whether the *vrātyas* are Aryans or non-Aryans. But there are strong indications, as has been pointed out by Zimmer, Bloomfield, Weber, Kshetresh Chandra Chattopadhyaya, Rahul Sankrityayana G. R. Sharma and several others, that the *vrātyas* are Āryans though different from the Rigvedic Aryans. Thus, the *Pañchavimśa* Brāhmaṇa states that they spoke the language of the initiated though being not initiated⁷. Commenting on it A. B. Keith writes, "That they (*vrātyas*) were non-Aryans is not probable for it is expressly said that though unconsecrated, they spoke the tongue of the consecrated they were, thus, apparently Aryans"⁸. Like Aryans they also moved by chariot drawn by horse called '*vipatha*' which according to *Lāṭyāyana Śrauta Sūtra* was '*prāchyaratha*' that is, eastern chariot. The knowledge and use of horse by the *vrātyas* is of great significance so far as the question of their association with the Aryan community is concerned. They have highly been glorified in the *Atharva Veda* and had they belonged to some non-Aryan stock they would have received the treatment otherwise. Here a comment of Śaṅkara about the '*vrātya*' in *Praśnopaniṣad* (2.11) is worth mentioning. According to him '*vrātya*' means 'uninitiated' because of his being the first born, and there being no one

else to initiate him. This note-worthy characterisation is quite in consonance with the dignity which has been accorded to *vrātya* in the *Atharva Veda*.

That the '*vratyas*' belonged to the eastern region is clearly brought out by the references of *Atharva Veda* and *Lātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra*. In the latter he is expressly called '*Māgadhadeśīya*'. It is precisely the reason that '*vipatha*' the chariot of *vratyas*, is called '*prāchya-ratha*'. Whether they originally belonged to this region or came from out side is a matter of debate. But one thing is quite clear that they have been living in eastern region since very early times much before the *vrātya-kānda* of *Atharva Veda* was composed. The *vrātya* deification had reached its highest point in *eka vrātya* who is represented as a cosmogonic power in the *Atharva Veda* xv. It must have taken a long course of time for antecedent development.

Thus, the *vrātyas* were a branch of Aryans different from the Rigvedic Aryans. They had settled in Magadha and adjoining regions in a very early time. They had a long tradition of nomadic life. The fact that they neither pursued the profession of agriculture nor trade indicates that they were pastoral people. Their culture was quite distinct from the culture of the Rigvedic Aryans. They did not subscribe to the Vedic ritualism, and wandering and asceticism characterise their religious life.

Close relationship between the religious cult of the *vrātyas* and the worship of Rudra has been pointed out by R. N. Dandekar⁹. Bhandarkar has identified *eka vrātya* of *Atharva Veda* with the original Śiva. No doubt, the religious cult of the *vrātyas* had some elements of the cult of Rudra, but bringing the *vrātya* cult within the fold of Śaivism is not warranted by the evidence. The religious ideology of the *vrātya* appears to the unarticulated and broad based. In fact, the *vrātya* religious ideology, is spring head of a number of cults.

Due attention has not been paid to the historical significance of the *vrātya* community being broadly divided into two classes, namely

(1) *arhatas*, (2) *yaudhās* as according to *Pañchavimśa Brāhmaṇa*. The term *yaudhāḥ* clearly denotes the class of warriors. Bhandarkar and many others following him have equated *arhatās* with *Brāhmaṇas*, but this conjecture is not maintainable. The term *arhata* is typically a Śramaṇa term and has a specific connotation. *Arhata* is an honourable term and is applied to such persons who have either attained salvation or reached the stage of salvation in the Jain and Buddhist traditions. The equation of *arhatas* and *yaudhās* of the *vrātya* community with the *Brāhmaṇas* and *Kshatriyas* of the orthodox society is misleading.

It is significant to note that the classification of the *vrātya* community into *yaudhās* and *arhatas* has a great bearing on the cultural history of India. Coming from the same stock, the *arhatas*, like the *Brāhmaṇas*, were men who were spiritual seekers while the *yaudhās*, like the *Kshatriyas*, were engaged in managing the mundane affairs. Both these groups constituted the *vrātya rājanya* class. There is no trace of the division of the *vrātya* community into *Brāhmaṇa*, *Vaisya* and *Śūdra* categories in the early literature. The classification of the *vrātyas* in these categories is a later development when people coming from different stocks were included in these categories opposed to Vedic orthodoxy. Infact, the *arhatas* as a category of the *vrātyas* belonging to Śramaṇa tradition had a definite religious ideology and were wandering ascetics. Their *weltanschauung* was opposed to the Vedic outlooks. Since the *arhatas* were related with Śramaṇa tradition and belonged to the *rājanya* class, it is quite reasonable to conclude that Jainism developed from the institution of these *arhatas*.

This inference gets support from another reference of the *Pañchavimśa Brāhmaṇa* in which it is stated that the *vrātyas* were divided into four classes, namely, *hīna*, *gargira*, *samanīchmedhra* and *nindita*. In the opinion of R. N. Dandekar the categories of *gargira* and *samanīchmedhra* indicate close relationship between Rudra and the

cult of *vrātyas*. Of these four categories, *samanīchamedhra* is of great significance from the point of view of Jainism. *Smanīchmedhra* were the people whose penis hanged down through the control of passion. Needless to say that austerity and control over senses constitute the core of the Jain ethics and without which emancipation from the bondage of *karma* and rebirth and realisation of highest bliss and knowledge is not possible. Moreover, the portrayal of penis hanging down is a characteristic feature of the Jain iconography where as *penis erectus* and phallic worship are associated with Saivism. Thus, the category of *samanīchamedhra* indicates the association of Jainism with the *vrātyas*.

The cult of the *vrātyas* was different from the orthodox Brāhmaṇism. They appear to be associated with the '*rājanya*' class. The retinue of the *vrātya* comprising '*puṁśchali*' (hetaria), '*magadha*, '*pariskanda*' (attendant), '*vipathavāha*' (chariot horses), '*vipatha*' (chariot) with '*sārathi*' (charioteer) and '*puraḥsara*' (foverunner) clearly indicates that they were not associated with the *Brāhmaṇa* class. We agree with the observation of A. C. Banerjee who writes, "The peculiar outfit consisting of the '*pravartan*' (two round ornaments), the '*maṇi*, (jewel), the '*uṣṇīśa*' (turban) can hardly be considered to be fit for a *Brāhmaṇa*"¹¹. In his opinion, the reference of '*āsandi*' in connection with the *eka vrātya* of the *Atharva Veda* clearly shows the association of *vrātyas* with the *rājanya* class because '*āsandi*' is usually meant for a *rājanya* and not *Brāhmaṇa* as is clear from the description of *Rājasūya* in the *Brāhmaṇa* texts¹². In this context it is worthwhile to quote Banerjee 'The *Rajanya* like character of the divine *Vrātya* as well as his earthy prototypes presupposes that the supposed ritual of rituals should be meant specially for the *Rājanya* sacrificer. Now, the *Rājasūya* according to the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Sūtras*, is to be performed only by the *Rajanya* or *Kshatra*, and not by the *Brāhmaṇa*, who is given the option of performing the *Vājapeya*. Secondly, the mention of the *Sāman* in the context of the *abhiṣechaniya* (sprinkling ceremony in the *Rājasūya*)

while the king is made to ascend the regions, and bringing forth of the throne seat (*āsandi*) made of '*khadira*', clinch the suggested connection still further. Again the supreme position of the *vrātya* among the immortals as well as the mortal beings, reminds us of the Absolute sovereignty of the consecrated monarch (*rājyābhiṣikta*) and the *Atharvan Eka Vrātya* seems more akin to the *Eka-rāt* of the *Brāhmaṇas*, than to the *Ekarṣi* of the *Upaniṣads* as suggested by Hauer"¹³ At another place he writes. "The setting out of the *vrātya* to all directions, can only remind us of the 'symbolic conquest in all directions' mentioned in the context of the *Rājasūya*. Similar is the case with the receptions of the *vrātyas* as an honoured guest referred to towards the end of this book, who is none other than the king or warrior-noble as guest. These characteristics of the *Atharvan vrātya* link up his followers, the earthly *vrātya* with the original *Rājanya*, who remained independent and had a glorious tradition and were disliked by the *Brāhmaṇas*¹⁴.

The association of the *vrātyas* with the *rājanya* class and the assumption that the Śramaṇa tradition, and in that particularly the Jainism, was related with the *vrātyas* enable us to explain the *Kshatriya* bias and anti *Brāhmaṇa* attitude of the Jains. The story of transfer of the embryo of Mahāvīra from the womb *Brāhmaṇi* Devānandā to that of *Kshatrāṇi* Trisāla as described in the *Kalpasūtra* clearly brings out the *Kshatriya* bias of the Jains. In the *Kalpasūtra* it is stated, 'It never has happened, nor does it happen, nor will it happen, that *Arhats*, *Chakravartins*, *Baladevas*, or *Vāsudevas*, in the past, present or future, should be born in low families, poor families, indigent families, begger families or Brāhmaṇical families. For indeed, *Arhats*, *Chakravartins*, *Baladevas* and *Vāsudevas*, in the past, present and future, are born in high families, noble families, royal families, noblemen's families, in families belonging to the race of Ikshvāku or of Hari, or in other such like families of pure descent on both sides This venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra, now in the continent Jambūdvīpa, in Bhārata Varṣa, in the Brāhmaṇical part of the town Kundagrāma, has

taken the form of an embryo in the womb of the *Brāhmaṇi* Devenandā of *Jālandharāyaṇa gotra*, wife of the *Brāhmaṇa* Rīṣabhadatta of the *gotra* of *Kodāl*. Hence, it is established custom of all past, present and future Śakras, cheif and king of the gods to cause the Arhatas and Bhāgawatas to be removed from such like low, mean, & C families to such like high, noble & C. families. It is therefore, better that I should cause the Venerable ascetic Mahāvīra, the last of the Tīrthaṅkars, to be removed from the Brāhmaṇical part of the town Kundagrāma, from the womb of the Brāhmaṇi Devānandā of the *Jālandharāyaṇa gotra* wife of the *Brāhmaṇa* Rīṣabhadatta of the *gotra* of *Kodal* to the *Kshatriya* part of the town Kundagrāma, and to be placed as an embryo in the womb of the *Kshatriyāṇi* Trīśalā of the *Vaśiṣṭha gotra*, wife of *Kshatriya* Siddhārtha of the *Kāśyapa gotra*, belonging to the clan of the *gyātṛi Kshatriyas*; and to cause the embryo of the *Kshatriyaṇi* Trīśalā of the *vaśiṣṭha gotra* to be palced in the womb of the *Brāhmaṇi* Devānandā of the *Jālandharāyaṇa gotra*”¹⁵. The fact that all the twenty four *Tīrthaṅkaras* were born in the *Kshatriya* class lends support to this contention.

A significant point to be noted in this connection is that the Jains rejected the heirarchy of the *Varṇas* as accepted in the Brāhmaṇical tradition. They are inclined to place *Kshatriyas* in higher position than the *Brāhmaṇas*. According to the Jain conception a being's position in this world is determined by the nature of his deeds. As such, if a being has reached near liberation and is to be born for the last time in this world only to be liberated and become an *arhata* or *tīrthaṅkara*, he must necessarily be born in the highest class i.e. the *Brāhmaṇa* class. This clearly indicates that in the opinion of the Jains, the *Kshatriya* class is superior to the *Brāhmaṇa* class.

Once it is accepted that there was a pre-Rigvedic Aryan settlement in the middle Gangetic valley, including the region stretching from kośala to videh enjoining Himalayan foot-hills;¹⁶ that Atharvavedic Aryans who had settled in the eastern regions and were pre-Rigvedic Aryans; that the *vrātyas*

were pre-Rigvedic nomadic Aryans, the problem of the origin and development of Śramaṇa tradition in general, and Jainism in particular, is obviated. It is not an accident that all the Śramaṇa sects originated and developed in this region. The socio-cultural milieu of this region provided the background and congenial atmosphere necessary for it.

It is to be noted that the socio-political development of this region is not identical with that of the central and north-western regions of north India. On political plane we see that the states, which existed during Buddha's time and about whom informations are furnished by the Buddhist and Jain texts, did not have uniform political organisation. The states which existed in this region viz., Śākya, Mallas, Licchavisa etc. had republican form of government as against the states of other regions. They also bear tribal names instead of territorial ones. This clearly indicates that they still had tribal organisation, howsoever loose that might be, and their republican form of political organisation was an outcome of initial tribal collectivism. The people who developed republican form of government have been dubbed as non-Aryans by earlier historians because, then, they did not have the imagination that this region was inhabited by Aryans from very early times. But as we have seen earlier, they were Aryan people and had distinct cultural profile from the Rigvedic Aryans.

The social development of these people was also not identical with the people of the Saraswati-Pañchanada regions. While Rig-vedic Aryans inhabiting in the Saraswati-Pañchanada regions evolved social stratification in the form of *chaturvarṇa* the same could not occur in the social development of eastern people. In fact, the emergence of *varṇa* system gave death-blow to the tribal organisation of the Rigvedic Aryans, while, the absence of such a development gave a lease of life to the tribal pattern of social organisation of these eastern Aryans.

It is very important to understand the pattern of social organisation of the Indo-European people in order to understand the socio-cultural development of the different groups of the Indo-Aryans who settled in different

parts of India. During Indo-European period the concept of *jana* denoting a certain community coming down from an ancestor had already developed. In the R̥gved there are a number of references of the term *jana* denoting an unit of social organisation. That the R̥gvedic society was divided into *janas* such as Puru-*jana*, Kuru-*jana*, Bharata-*jana*, Druhyu-*jana* etc. clearly indicates that the *jana* organisation was the characteristic feature of the social organisation of the R̥gvedic Aryans. The Pāli and Prākṛita texts also provide ample evidence of such organisation in the form of *jana*. Ikshvākus, Licchavis, Śākyas and Mallas are some examples of such an organisation. The concept of *jana* is also seen in the Graeco-Roman tradition.

The Greek term *genos* and Latin term *gene* are synonyms of Sanskrit term *jana*. Like *jana*, the terms *genos* and *gene* also denote a community descending from a common ancestor. The *gene* organisation turns into *tribus* (*tribhava*) when three important communities of Romans got merged into one. Thus, the cumulative evidence of ancient Greek, Roman and Indian traditions make it amply clear that the concept of *jana* had already come into existence during Indo-European stage.

Though there appears to be somewhat similarity in the general features of the development of the concept of *jana* and social organisation based on it in the Greek, Roman, Iranian and R̥gvedic Indian traditions, it takes a different course in the Śramaṇa tradition. In the R̥gvedic tradition *jana* is replaced by *varṇa* organisation. *Jana* gets divided into *brahma*, *kshatra* and *viś*. Its political organisation is characterised by monarchy. In the Śramaṇa tradition *jana* remained unstratified and entire *jana* came to be known as *khattiyas* as is evident from the Buddhist and Jain sources others who did not subscribe to the Śramaṇa way of life maintained their social identities on professional and ritualistic basis.

The *jana* organisations which remained away from the pale of *varṇa* organisation succeeded in maintaining their collective identity for a long period of time. They were divided into *kulas* (families). Since, collectivism was their binding force, they developed republican form of political organisation represented by all the heads of the *kulas* on the

basis of equality. This political system was known as *gaṇa-rājya*. It is remarkable to note that this political collectivism in the form of *gaṇa-rājya* is nothing but a natural manifestation of social collectivism in the form of *jana*. If this correspondence between social reality and political actuality is kept into mind, the confusion about the meaning of the term *gana* is automatically abviated. In this light, we can very well understand as to how corporate bodies of traders and artisans known as *sreṇis* as also *saṃgh* type religious organisations emerged in this region.

The *khattiya* of the Śramaṇa tradition can not be equated with the *kshatriya* of the R̥gvedic *varṇa* institution, though the term *kshatriya* is Saṅskrit form of the Pāli-Prākṛit term *khattiya*. The term *kshatriya* has been derived from the term *kshatra* which has been etymologically explained by Indian commentators in different ways.¹⁷ But the explanation given by V. Pokorni appears to be more realistic according to which the term *kshatra* has been derived from the Saṅskrit root 'kshi' as also from Avestan root 'si' to be powerful or to rule from which the term *kshathra* =ruler has been derived.¹⁸ This term is connected with the Saṅskrit and Avestan term *kshaya* which, in the latter, denoted not only dwelling but also royal authority as weall as royal territory.

As in Iran the Avestan *kshathra* could not be denotive of a particular class in the social stratification, so also, in the social segment covered by Śramaṇa tradition the term *khattiya* (*kshatriya*), Avestan *kshayathiyā* was used for the ruling class, not to be likened with the *kshatiriyas* of the *varṇa* organisation of the R̥gvedic Aryans. Thus, the *khattiyas* are not the same as *kshatriyas* of the *varṇa* organisation of the R̥gvedic traditions. Thus, the *khattiyas* belonged to the Indo-Iranian stock who got settled in the region covered by modern eastern U.P. and western and northern Bihar. Their language was Pāli and Prākṛit. Because of their association with the Śramaṇa tradition and the Vrātyas, whose cultural profile was entirely different from that of the vedic tradition, they

have been regarded as degraded people by the vedic authorities. Viewed in this light, it becomes clear as to why Manu designates peoples like Licchavis and Mallas as *vrātyas*.¹⁹

As we have seen earlier, the *khattiyas* constituted the ruling class of the region which they occupied their *rājanya* character is obvious. Since the Śramaṇa tradition originated and developed in the socio-cultural milieu dominated by the *khattiyas* the *rājanya* or *kshatriya* bias of the Śramaṇa tradition, particularly of Jainism, is rendered intelligible.

1. Pargiter, F. E., The Ancient Indian Historical Tradition p. 5.
2. *ibid* p. 6.
3. Pargiter, F. E., Ancient Indian Historical Tradition p. 288.
4. *ibid* p. 296.
5. *ibid* p. 296.
6. Sharma G. R. *Bhārtīya Saṁskṛiti ke Purātātvika Ādhāra*.
7. *Pañcha vimśa Brāhmaṇa*. 17.1.2- न ही बम्हचर्यं चरन्ति, न कृषिं न वाणिज्यं।
8. J. R. A. S, 1913 Vol. VI-II, p. 155.
9. Dandekar, R. N. Vedic Mythological Tract p. 209-10.
10. *ibid* p. 210 (R. N. Dandekar)
11. Banerjee A. C. "Studies in the Brāhmaṇas" p. 126.
12. *ibid*. p. 126.
13. *ibid*. p. 129.
14. *ibid* p. 126-27
15. S. B. E. Vol. XXII, Jain Sūtras Vol. I. p. 225-27; *Kalpasūtra* 1.17-22
16. The region stretching from Aṅga-magadha in the east, Kośāmbi in the south, Sthūṇa in the west and Kuṇāla in the north has been said to be Arya-kshetra in the Jain texts- *Bṛihadkalpasūtra*-1.50; In the Gilgit Manuscript of the Vinaya Pitaka Magadha people have been called wiser than people of other regions- Indian Historical Quarterly, 1938, p. 416.
17. Mishra, S. N. - *Prāchīna Bhārata men Grāma evam Grāmya Saṁskṛitiyan*, p. 165.
18. *ibid* p. 165.
19. Manusmṛiti-X. 20, 21, 22, 23; II. 39, 40

4

Early History of Jainism

Inspite of sincere and meticulous effort by a host of historians, it has not been possible to bring out convincing details of the early history of Jainism. Though, the Jain tradition records its hoary antiquity, the literature pertaining to it dates not much earlier than a few centuries before the Christian era. As such, it is very difficult to cull out the historical facts from the legendary tales preserved in the tradition. However, some glimpses of the early history of Jainism can be gleaned from the Jain literature itself.

The Jains do not believe in the existence of a primordial cause and take the world as existing without beginning or end. It is eternal. Time is likened by them with wheel having twelve spokes. The wheel of time is turning round and round infinitely. In turning half, the wheel is ascending while in the rest half, it is descending. The ascending and descending orders have been termed as *utsarpiṇī* and *avasarpiṇī* respectively. They are further divided into sub-periods. The Jain believe that their religion is eternal as it has been revealed again and again in every one of the succeeding eras or periods by *Tīrthaṅkars*. The present period belongs to *avasarpiṇī* whose eras are - (i) *Suṣāmā Suṣāmā*, (ii) *Suṣāmā*, (iii) *Suṣāmā, Duṣāmā*, (iv) *Duṣāmā Suṣāmā* (v) *Duṣāmā* (vi) *Duṣāmā Duṣāmā*.

The same eras occur in *utsarpiṇī* period also but the order is reverse. According to the Jain tradition the history of Jainism begins from the ending period of the third era i.e. *suṣamā-duṣamā*.

It is stated in the Jain *Purāṇas* that in the most ancient time's man depended on nature and its resources for his livelihood. He had not to earn his livelihood rather he had to live on the resources provided by nature. This period has been called '*bhoga-bhūmi*' by the Jain authors simply because man, then, was consumer and not a producer. Because of absolute dependence on nature and its vegetation the concept of '*kalpa-vriksha*', so popular in Jainism as well as Hinduism, originated. Looked upon historically, this period may be compared with the stage of 'hunting and food-gathering economy' of the history of mankind. According to the Jain tradition the period which followed '*bhoga-bhūmi*' is '*karma-bhūmi*'. It is during this period that man learnt the art of cultivation, taming and domestication of animals, various crafts, industries and commerce. This again is comparable with the stage of civilisation which succeeded the hunting and food-gathering economy of the general history of mankind. It is significant to note here that the ancient Jains had a view of history very akin to the modern view of history.

The credit of bringing about the change from '*bhoga-bhūmi*' to '*karma-bhūmi*' has been given to greatmen who have been called *kulakaras* and *śālākāpuruṣas* and their number is stated to be sixty-three. The list of sixty-three *śālākāpuruṣas* (distinguished men) consists of twenty-four *Tīrthārkaras*, twelve *Chakravartins*, nine *Balabhadras*, nine *Vāsudevas* and nine *Prati Vāsudevas*. In *Digambara* tradition the names of the categories of these distinguished men are a little different. In place of *Vāsudevas* and *Prati Vāsudevas*, this tradition mentions *Nārāyaṇas* and *Prati Nārāyaṇas* respectively. The *Kulakaras* preceded the *Tīrthārkaras* and the first *Tīrthārka* Rīṣabha was also the last *kulakara*. Though there are stray references of these distinguished

persons in various texts of the Jain literature, a systematic and detailed description of these are found in the *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣa Charit* of Hema chandra. Their names are :

TĪRTHANKARA - 1. Ṛṣabha Nātha 2. Ajitanātha 3. Sambhavanātha 4. Abhinandan 5. Sumati 6. Padamaprabha or Suprabha 7. Supārśva 8. Chandraprabha 9. Puṣpadanta or Suvidhi 10. Śitalanātha 11. Śreyāmsa 12. Vasupūjya 13. Vimala 14. Ananta 15. Dharmanātha 16. Śāntinātha 17. Kunṭhu 18. Aranātha 19. Malli 20. Suvrata 21. Naminātha 22. Ariṣtanemi 23. Pārśvanātha 24. Mahāvīra

CHAKRAVARTI- 1. Bharata 2. Sagara 3. Mādhava 4. Sanatkumāra 5. Shānti 6. Kunṭhu 7. Arah 8. Subhūma 9. Mahāpadma 10. Hariṣeṇa 11. Jaya 12. Brahmadata.

BALABHADRA- 1. Achala 2. Vijai 3. Bhadra 4. Suprabha 5. Sudarśana 6. Ānanda 7. Nandana 8. Padma 9. Balarāma.

VĀSUDEVA- 1. Tripriṣṭha 2. Dvipriṣṭha 3. Svayambhū 4. Puruṣottama 5. Puruṣa Singh 6. Puruṣa Puṇḍarika 7. Datta 8. Nārāyaṇa 9. Kriṣṇa.

PRATI-VĀSUDEVA- 1. Aśvagrīva 2. Tāraka 3. Meraka 4. Madhu 5. Niśumbha 6. Bali 7. Prahalāda 8. Rāvaṇa 9. Jarāsaṁdha.

A perusal of these lists of names shows that some of the names are overlapping. They also contain the names of *Hindu* deities, which indicates intermingling of traditions.

The Jain tradition gives credit of rise, development and propagation of Jainism to these distinguished men. It is unfortunate to note that excepting a few *Tīrthāṅkaras*, no details of these distinguished men are available and only their names are mentioned in Jain texts. More unfortunate is the fact that whatever detailed accounts of some of the *Tīrthāṅkaras* are

available they are legendary in character and are so stereotyped that a modern student of history will at first look reject them as unhistorical. In fact, traditional accounts often mix up facts with fiction and the Jain tradition is not an exception to it. But tradition as such can not be rejected lock, stock and barrel. Efforts should be made, how so ever rigorous it may be, in order to bring out the historical reality to whatever extent it is possible.

Some scholars have outrightly rejected the theory of *Tīrthaṅkaras* and have ventured to suggest that it was fabricated after a few centuries of the death of Mahāvīra. Such a conjecture has no solid basis and now it has become a matter of general acceptance that the twenty-third *Tīrthaṅkara* Pārśva Nātha is a historical person. We shall now see what informations are furnished by our sources and critically analyse them.

Riṣabha Nātha:

Though, detailed accounts of the life-history of Riṣabha Nātha are found in the later Jain texts, some early texts like *Kalpasūtra*, *Samavāyāṅga Sūtra*, *Āvaśyaka Nirvyūkti*, *Bhāgawati Sūtra* and *Bhāgawata Purāṇa* throw sufficient light on the biography of Riṣabha Nātha. All the texts are unanimous in declaring him to be the first *Tīrthaṅkara* of the present *avasarpinī*. He is said to be the son of *Kulakara* Nābhi born of Marudevi. He belonged to Kośala as is evident by his nickname *Kosaliye*. He was king of Kośala and belonged to the dynasty of *Ikshavāku* though his name does not figure in the *Purāṇa*-list of the *Ikshavāku* kings of Ayodhya.

The description of his personality and life-span as given in canonical texts is simply incredible as he is said to be five hundred *dhanuṣas* (bow-lengths) tall and lived for 84 lac years. The *Āvaśyaka Nirvyūkti* informs us that he had two wives named Sumangalā and Sunandā and had hundred sons of which Bharata was the eldest. It is said in the same text

that he taught his people 72 *kalās*, 64 *mahilākalās*, 100 arts and 3 occupations. After dividing his kindom among his hundred sons he renounced the world and started living the life of an ascetic wandering from place to place. During his wanderings he visited a number of places in eastern and southern India. Finally, he attained omniscience at Purimatāla which is said to be located near Ayodhya. According to *Bhāḡawata Purāṇa* he died burnt of fire set ablaze in bamboo jungle at Kutakāchala mountain in south India. It is said in *Kalpasūtra* and *Samavāyāṅga* that he had established a monastic order, which consisted of 84 *gaṇas*, each under the leadership of an *gaṇadhara*. The number of monks and nuns is stated to be 84000 and 3 lacs respectively. The monks were organised under the leadership of Rīṣabha sen and the nuns under the leadership of Brāhmi and Sundari. Śreyāṃśa and Subhadra are said to be his chief disciples.

The above account of the life of Rīṣabha Nātha in all its details should not be treated as historical facts for many reasons. The fact that Rīṣabha Nātha, in individual capacity, taught men about various arts, crafts and occupations can not be taken as historical reality. We know that man acquired the knowledge of all these in a long process of historical development. The process of the acquisition of knowledge was gradual. All that which can be inferred from such statements is that he belonged to very ancient times. Likewise, the number of monks, nuns and lay-disciples and also their organisation in *saṃgha* can not be taken for granted. If we look into the historical contexts in which beginning of monastic life could have been possible, it does not appear feasible that it will have begun with the first *Tīrtharka*, Rīṣabha Nātha. The statements of Jain texts in this regard should be outrightly rejected.

The *Bhāḡawata Pūraṇa*, a Brāhmaṇical text, gives us some important informations about Rīṣabha Nātha. In this text he is described as a son of Nābhirāja born of Marudevi. He is Viṣṇu-incarnate and the

cause of this incarnation is said to be the promulgation of the *dharma* of the *Vātarasanā Śramaṇas*¹. He had long and scattered hair. He moved naked and ultimately died in South India. Much of the details of the life of Ṛṣabha Nātha given in the *Bhāḡawata Pūraṇa* are similar to those found in the Jain texts. The fact that he came on this earth in order to promulgate *Śramaṇa* dharma leaves on doubt that Ṛṣabha Nāth in reference is no other than Ṛṣabha Nātha, the first Jain *Tīrthaṅkara*. Because of being renowned and revered as a spiritual seeder as also the assimilative attitude of the Brāhmanical tradition he is dubbed as Viṣṇu-incarnate. It is interesting to note that while the author of the *Bhāḡawata Pūraṇa* shows all respect to him, he condemns his followers. They are said to be indulged in disparaging *Brahma*, *Brāhmaṇa* and *Yagya*². The anti-orthodoxical views of the Jains are well known and it is precisely the reason that the *Bhāḡawata Pūraṇa* is critical about them. But the reverence shown to the first *Tīrthaṅkara* by its author in this context assumes significance. This clearly shows that the *Tīrthaṅkara* Ṛṣabha Nātha had earned a high reputation as a spiritual seeker and he was not considered a property exclusively of Jain tradition. Even the Brāhmanical tradition held him in high esteem as is evident from conceiving him as Viṣṇu-incarnate. This fact strongly supports the historicity and remote antiquity of the first *Tīrthaṅkara* Ṛṣabha Nātha.

We do not know anything about the identity of king Ṛṣabha mentioned in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* or a Ṛṣabha son of Viśwāmitra mentioned in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*³. The *Mahābhārata* also mentions a king as well as saint Ṛṣabha Nātha. A *tīrtha* named Ṛṣabha is also mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*⁴

Attempt has been made at finding out the references of the first *Tīrthaṅkara* Ṛṣabha Nātha in the *Rigveda*. But the evidence produced in this context is highly speculative and unconvincing⁵. There is no doubt that reference of the *vātarasanā muni* in the *Rigveda* is of great historical

value. The entire *Sūkta* in which the *vātarasanā Muni* is mentioned does not fit in the culture-complex of the *Rigveda*. The *vātarasanā Muni* appears to be quite an alien, when the description of *vātarasanā Muni* in the *Rigveda* and the account of the *vātarasanā Śramaṇa* in the *Bhāḡawata Pūraṇa* are read together, it becomes almost clear that in this *sūkta* of the *Rigveda* there is a reference of the Śramaṇas. Since Rīṣabha Nātha is said to be the progenitor of the Śramaṇas, it may be inferred that Rīṣabha Nātha was well known when this *sūkta* was composed. However, V. S. Pathak holds a different opinion⁶. According to him the *vātarasanā ṛṣis* and *munis* mentioned in the *Rigveda* (x. 136), *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* (1.23.2; 1-24, 2-5; 2.7) and *Bhāḡawata Pūraṇa* (5.3.20) are distinct from the Śramaṇas. He has very succinctly brought out that the *muni* of the *Rigveda*, *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* is an ascetic seeking transcendental knowledge through *prapāsanā* and has a profile quite distinct from Vedic sacrificers and Śramaṇas. Pathak's elucidation is so brilliant that one can hardly disagree with him so far as the profile of *mūni* is concerned. But the association of the Śramaṇas with the *Vātarasanās* can hardly be denied. Neither the cannotaion of the term *Vātarasanā* as fixed by Pathaka nor the time-gap between the *Rigveda* and the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* or between the latter and the *Bhāḡawata Pūraṇa* creates any problem in accepting the continuity of the Śramaṇa tradition. It is also very difficult to agree with him that Rīṣabha Nātha of the *Bhāḡawata Pūraṇa* is district from Rīṣabha Nātha, the first *Tīrthaṅkara* of the Jain tradition.

H. L. Jain has identified Keśi of the *Rigveda* (x. 136) with Rīṣabha Nātha⁷. He also sees a glimpse of Rīṣabha Nātha in some other verses of the *Rigveda*⁸. But viewed in the light of entire contexts his interpretations are quite unconvincing.

Though in the present state of our knowledge it is not possible to fix the place of Rīṣabha Nātha in historical time-scale, the historicity of an ascetic nemed Rīṣabha Nātha and his association with Jain tradition

can not be rejected outrightly. The view that he was inducted in Jain tradition in the third cent B. C. or a little afterward, as suggested by some scholars, is hardly maintainable⁹. He was regularly worshipped, as a *Tīrthaṅkara* in the early centuries of Christian era is evident from the epigraphic, sculptural and literary sources.

Pārśva Nātha :

In the series of twenty-four *tīrthaṅkaras* Pārśva Nātha is reckoned as twenty-third. The early Jain texts, which furnish some valuable informations about him, are *Sūtrakṛitāṅga*, *Bhagwati Sūtra*, *Kalpa Sūtra*, *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, *Niryāvalikā* and *Nāyādhammakahāo*. A brief account of the life of Pārśva Nātha has been given in the *Kalpa Sūtra*, according to which he was son of Aśva Sena, king of Vārāṇasi by his wife Vāmā. He lived the life of a householder up to the age of thirty and then renounced the world. He practiced penance for eighty-three days and obtained omniscience. He lived the life of a *kevalin* for seventy years and at the age of hundred he breathed his last on the summit of Sammed Mountain.

Now, it is a matter of general acceptance among historians that Pārśva Nātha was historical person. Hermann Jacobi has critically dealt with the problem taking into account all the pieces of evidence available from the Buddhist and Jain records¹⁰. According to him the *chāturyāma* described in the *Sāmaññayaphala Sutta* of *Dīgha Nikāya* and ascribed to *Nigaṇṭha* Nātaputta was infact *chāturyāma dhamma* of Pārśva Nātha. The *dhamma* of Mahāvīra was popularly known as *pañcamahāvṛata*. Jacobi writes - "Here, then the Buddhists, I suppose, have made a mistake in ascribing to Nātaputta Mahāvīra a doctrine which properly belonged to his predecessor Pārśva. This is a significant mistake; for the Buddhists could not have used the above term as descriptive of the *Nigaṇṭha* creed unless they had heard it from followers of Pārśva, and they would not have used it if the reforms of Mahāvīra had already

been generally adopted by the Nigaṇṭhas at the time of the Buddha. I therefore look on this blunder of the Buddhists as a proof for the correctness of the Jain tradition, that followers of Pārśva actually existed at the time of Mahāvīra."¹¹ He further holds that the *nigaṇṭhas* existed before Mahāvīra. They are frequently mentioned in the *Pitakas* as opponents or converts of the Buddha. This clearly indicates that the *nigaṇṭhas* must have been an important sect in the time of the Buddha. In his opinion they had been in existence for a considerable period of time before the advent of the Buddha. In support of his contention he refers to the division of mankind into six classes by Maṅkkhali Gośāla, a contemporary of Buddha and Mahāvīra in which the *nigaṇṭhas* constitute the third class. In his opinion, "Gośāla probably would not have ranked them as a separate i.e. fundamental subdivision of mankind, if they had only recently come into existence, he must have looked upon them as a very important and at the same time, an old sect."¹² The historicity of Pārśva Nātha is also proved by the fact that his followers, some of whom were contemporary of Mahāvīra, are frequently mentioned in the Jain *Sūtras*. In the *Uttarādhyayan Sūtra* a dialogue between Keśi and Gautama is recorded.¹³ Keśi and Gautama were heads of the orders of Pārśva and Mahāvīra respectively. They met in a park near Śravāsti and realising that there is no difference in the fundamental ethical ideas of their creeds they held discussions concerning differences in number of vows and use and nonuse of clothes by the monks. Ultimately, unity in the two orders was established. The fact that the *saṃgha* established by Pārśva Nātha remained in operation for more than two centuries after his demise leaves no room for doubt about the historicity of Pārśva Nātha.

The Jain authors have depicted all their *Tīrthaṅkaras* as scions of royal families. Since no king of Vārāṇasi named Aśvasena is known from the *Brāhmaṇa* records as has been pointed out by Charpentier the statement of *Kalpa Sūtra* should not be readily accepted. He might have belonged to a well-to-do *kshatriya* family.

A. K. Chatterjee is right in his surmise that being associated with Vārāṇasi, which has been spiritual and intellectual centre of India from most ancient times, he might have received 'serious training in religion and philosophy in his early youth.'¹⁴

Jainism appears to have been indebted much to Pārśva Nātha both on philosophical and organisational levels. As has been pointed out by Jacobi the followers of Pārśva Nātha were known as *nigārīṭhas*, and we get some glimpses of their doctrine from the early Buddhist texts. They held that the cause of misery is deed done by the beings. Deeds are accomplished at the levels of mind, body and speech. If deeds cease misery ends. If deeds done are done away with austerity, the being is blessed with omniscience and highest bliss. *Jīva* is eternal and it is never subjected to contamination once it is released. They had strong belief in the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth. They strictly adhered to the principle of non-violence. These ideas of the *nigārīṭhas* comprise some of the fundamental tenets of Jainism known from the early Jain *Sūtras* as has rightly been pointed out by Jacobi.¹⁵ The practices of *uposatha* and *varṣāvāsa* also appear to have been in prevalence in the time of Pārśva Nātha.

The doctrine of Pārśva Nātha has been described as '*chāturyāma dharma*' in the Jain *Sūtras*. The '*chāturyāma dharma*' has been mentioned in the *Pāli* texts in connection with the *nigārīṭhas* who, according to Jacobi were the followers of Pārśva Nātha. According to the Jain canonical texts these four *yāmas* or doctrinal principles are: 1) *sarvaprātikrama se viramaṇa*, 2) *sarva mṛṣāvāda se viramaṇa* 3) *sarva adattādāna se viramaṇa*, 4) *sarva bahisthādāna se viramaṇa*. These four precepts of Pārśva Nātha are identical with four of the five vows taught by Mahāvīra which are truthfulness, non-violence, non-stealing and non-possession respectively. To this list of four vows, Mahāvīra added celibacy as the fifth one.¹⁶ The Jains believe that in the fourth precept of Pārśva Nātha i.e. non-possession the vow of celibacy

is included and it becomes plausible once we take into account the explanation given by Guatama to Keśi when the latter raised the question of difference in the number of vows preached by Pārśva Nātha and Mahāvīra as depicted in the '*Gautama Keśi Samavāda*' of *Uttarādhyāyana Sūtra*. This text also tells us that the followers of Pārśva Nātha used to wear clothes.

The four precepts preached by Pārśva are only ethical regulations and have only practical implications. Because of the practical nature of his teaching B. M. Barua dubs him as a religious leader and his order merely as a 'religious order' different from that of Mahāvīra which was not only a religious order, but also a distinct school of thought'.¹⁷ But it is very difficult to agree with Barua on this point. No religious teacher can convince his followers unless he tells them that the rules taught by him are not arbitrary and will lead them to the *summum bonum* of life. For it is required an ontological perspective in which the spectacles of flux and constant of life and world could be systematically explained. It is true that the *Pāli* and Jain texts do not give us any information about the philosophical ideas of Pārśva Nātha. But it will be unwise to take that he had no philosophical justification of his ethical teachings. Had he not been a philosopher, he would not have been able in attracting people in a great number, which necessitated the establishment of *saṃgha* comprising thousands of monks and nuns and remained in function even centuries after his demise. It is too much to give all the credit to Mahāvīra for all the doctrinal propositions, which constitute the early Jainism. It may be surmised that a great part of that was coming from earlier *Tīrthārkaras* and, particularly, from Pārśva Nātha. No doubt, Mahāvīra christened, developed and systematised it. Unfortunately, *pūrva* literature is lost otherwise we would had been more accurate on the form of Jainism before Mahāvīra and also on the point of contribution of Pārśva Nātha to Jainism.

Pārśva Nātha played a great role in propagating Jainism to masses.

For its propularisation he established a *saṃgha* which consisted of eight *gaṇas* each under the leadership of a *gaṇadhara*. The *Śvetāmbara* tradition has recorded the names of *gaṇadharas*, which are Śubha, Āryaghoṣa, Vaśiṣṭha, Brahma Chārin, Saumya, Śridhara, Vīrabhadra and Yaśa. The number of monks is stated to be 16000 and those of nuns 38000 who were organised under the leadership of Āryadatta and Puṣpachūlā respectively. The number of lay followers both male and females are stated to be 164000 and 372000 respectively. These figures are undoubtedly exaggerated. Only this much can be said in this regard that he attracted a large number of followers. The *Digambara* tradition does not agree with *Śvetāmbara* tradition on the points of number of *gaṇas* and followers.

The important places which Pārśva Nātha visited in course of his wanderings are stated to be Ahichchhatra, Amalakappa, Śrāvasti, Kāmpilyapura, Rājagriha and Kośāmbi etc.

The Jain texts tell us that a number of contemporary kings were converted to his faith by Pārśva Nātha. Some of them are Nagnajit, king of Gaṇdhāra, Nimi, king of Videha, Durmukha, king of Pāñchāla, Bhīma, king of Vidarbha and Karkandu, king of Kalinga. We are neither sure as to whether Pārśva Nātha traversed such long distances in order to propagate his faith, nor the historicity of these kings can be verified. Hence, there is no need to take such statements very seriously. Only this much is proper to say the Pārśva Nātha succeeded in bringing some contemporary rulers under influence.

As a result of Pārśva Nātha's effort Jainism became very popular in different parts of north India. The followers of Pārśva Nātha who were contemporary of Mahāvīra have frequently been mentioned in the Jain Sūtras. In the *Bhagawati Sūtra* dialogues between the followers of Pārśva and Mahāvīra and his followers are described. Kālāsavesiyaputta and Gāngeya were followers of Pārśva who had entered in dialogue

with Mahāvīra and the latter had finally succeeded in converting them to his faith. Other followers of Pārśva who have been mentioned in the Jain Sūtras are Kāliya-putta, Mehila, Kāsava, Ānandarakkhiya and Udaya Pedhālputta. According to *Āchārāṅga Sūtra* the parents of Mahāvīra were also followers of Pārśva. We learn from the *Aṅguttar Nikāya*, *Chatukkaṇṇipāṭa* and its *Atṭhakathā* that even Bappā Sākya, the uncle of Gautama Buddha, was also his follower. A significant feature of the monastic organisation of Pārśva Nātha was that women were free to join his order. *Nirayāvalikā* and *Nāyādhammankahāo* have recorded several events of women being admitted into his order.

In Jain texts, it is stated that Pārśva Nātha died 250 years before the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra.¹⁸ Since, the scholars are not unanimous on the exact date of the demise of Mahāvīra, it must have occurred some time in the second half of the sixth or first half of the fifth cent. BC. Thus, Pārśva Nātha may conveniently be placed in the second half of the ninth or the first half of the eighth cent BC.

Vardhamāna Mahāvīra

Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, a contemporary of Gautam Buddha was twenty-fourth and last *Tīrthaṅkara* of the Jains. He was a great ascetic, a great philosopher and efficient organiser and as a result of his talents and efforts Jainism took its final shape, got itself established on such a firm foundation that it is still existing almost in its original form.

Mahāvīra- Great Hero- was not the personal name of the twenty-fourth *Tīrthaṅkara*. According to *Kalpa Sūtra* he was named 'Vardhamāna' the increasing one-as the riches of the family went on increasing from the time of his birth. He was probably nicknamed as Mahāvīra because of his spiritual strength in fighting out vices, fears and dangers. The Buddhist and Jain texts call him also by such names as *Samaṇa*, *Māhaṇa*, *Nigraṇtha Nātaputta*, *Vesālie* and *Videhadiṇṇa*.

He was known as '*samaṇa*' because he always remained equiposed and enagaged in penances. The term '*māhaṇa*' is a *prākṛit* metathesis of '*brāhmaṇa*' and is used as an epithet of Mahāvīra because of his high spiritual life and attainments. The Buddhist texts often mention him as *nigaṛṭha* because he was a scion of *gyātri* clan of *kshatriyas* pronounced as *nāya* and *nāta* in *prākṛit* and *pāli* respectively. The epithet *nigaṛṭha* denotes his physical nakedness as well as his emancipation from worldly bonds. Since, he was born in suburbs of Vaiśālī, which lay within the territory of Videha, he has been called *vesālie* and *vidahadiñña*.

Because of close proximity in time the authors of Jain canonical text are supposed to have better and more informations about Mahāvīra's life, consequently it has received extensive treatment by them as compared to earlier *tīrthaṅkaras*. The early Jain texts, which throw considerable light on the life history of Mahāvīra are *Ācharāṅga Sūtra*, *Bhagawati Sūtra* and *Kalpa Sūtra* of which *Āchārāṅga Sūtra* is the earliest.

The Jain texts unanimously tell us that he was a scion of *gyātri* clan of the *kshatriyas* who were, perhaps an important constituent of the *Vajji Saṃgha* during sixth cent. BC. His father Siddhārtha was an influential member of the *gyatri* clan. The *Āchārāṅga Sūtra* and *Kalpa Sūtra* inform us that Mahāvīra entered in the womb of Devānandā, a *brāhmaṇa* woman of the *Jālandharāyaṇa gotra*, wife of the *Brāhmaṇa* Rishhadatta of the *Kodāla gotra* belonging to the Brāhmanical part of Kundagrāma, when the moon was in conjunction with the asterism *uttaraphālguni*. The *Kalpa Sūtra* mentions the fourteen objects which Devānandā had seen in dream on this occasion. The *Kalpa Sūtra* further tells us that the following idea occurred to the head of Śakra: "It never has happened, nor does it happen that *Arhatas*, *Chakravartins*, *Baladevas* or *Vāsudevas*, in the past, present or future should be born in low families mean families, indigent families, beggar's families of

Brāhmanical families (they) are born in high families, noble families, in families belonging to the race of Ikashvāku, or of Hari or in other such families of pure descent on both sides."¹⁹ Śakra, then ordered Harinegameśi, the commander of army to transfer the embryo of Mahāvīra from the womb of Devānandā to that of Triśalā of the *Vasiṣṭha* gotra wife of *kshatriya* Kundagrama. According to *Kalpa Sūtra* the event of the transfer of embryo took place on the eighty-third day after the conception of Devānandā. It is also stated in this text that in the night of eighty-third day Triśalā also saw all those fourteen objects in dream which Devānandā had seen. The embryo-transfer event occurred on the thirteenth day of the dark half of the month of *Āśvina* when the moon was in conjunction with *uttarpahālguni*.

Needless to say that the above-mentioned story of embryo transfer is a fiction. But the question to be answered is as to why this story was concocted by Bhadrabāhu, the author of *Kalpa Sūtra*. On this point the opinion of Jacobi is that 'Siddhartha had two wives, the *brāhmaṇi* Devānandā, the real mother of Mahāvīra, and the *kshatriyāni* Triśalā'. According to him, 'the name of the alleged husband of the former, viz. Rīṣabhadatta cannot be very old because its *prākṛit* form would in that case probably be *Uṣabhadīṇṇa* instead of Uṣabhadatta. Besides, the name is such as could be given to a Jain only not to a *brāhmaṇa*. I therefore, make no doubt that Rīṣabhadatta has been invented by the Jains to provide Devānandā with another husband'.²⁰ In his view the marriage of Siddhārtha with Triśalā had brought him in connection with 'persons of high rank and great influence. It was, therefore probably thought more profitable to give out that Mahāvīra was the son, and not merely the step son of Triśalā, for this reason that he should be entitled to the patronage of her relations'.²¹ He further writes, 'But as the real state of things could not totally have been erased from the memory of the people, the story of the transfer of the embryo was invented'.²² According to A. K. Chatterjee, Devānandā was probably the real mother of

Mahāvīra. He was adopted as son by *kshatriya* Siddhartha. In this connection he refers to the story described in the *Bhagawati Sūtra* in which it is stated that when Devānandā saw Mahāvīra in the Brāhmanical part of Kundagrāma milk oozed from her breast. Mahāvīra explained this event by saying that Devānandā was his mother and because of motherly affection milk oozed from her breasts. Chatterji writes, 'This beautiful incident narrated in such an early text as the *Bhagawati* abundantly explodes the popular Jain belief that Mahāvīra was the son of the *kshatriya* lady Triśālā.'²³ He does not endorse the view of Jacobi that Devānandā was another wife of Siddhārtha. But they both agree on the point that the invention of embryo story was inspired by the story of Kṛṣṇa's birth as told in the Purāṇas.

The embryo-transfer story of Mahāvīra as narrated in the *Kalpasūtra* and the related evidence of the *Bhagawati Sūtra* deserve a more serious thought. If we carefully read the passage of the *Kalpasūtra* depicting the story of embryo-transfer, the conclusion becomes irresistible that the author of this passage had *kshatriya* bias and was having antagonistic attitude of the *Brāhmaṇa* class. The hostility between the *brāhmaṇas* and *śramaṇas* is clearly attested by other sources where their prevailing relationship is characterised as '*ahi-nakulawat*', '*go-byaghrawat*' during a few centuries preceding Christian era. Probably this was the period in which *Kalpa Sūtra* was composed. The author of the *Kalpa Sūtra* brackets the Brāhmanical families with 'low families, mean families, degraded families, poor families, indigent families, beggar's families', and says that 'it has never happened, nor does it happen that *arhats*, *chakravartins*, *baladevas*, or *vāsudevas*, in the past, present or future should be born in such families.'²⁴ On the other hand, he has every sense of respect and honour for the race of *Ikśvāku* or *Hari* and brackets them with 'high families, noble families, royal families, noblemen's families' and calls them of pure descent.²⁵ It is this anti-Brāhmanical attitude of the Jains, which led the Jain author to concoct the story of embryo-

transfer. Had Mahāvīra really been born of Devānandā, the Jain author would not have used such derogatory terms for the *brāhmaṇas*. The truth is that the embryo-transfer story is absolutely imaginary and it has no grain of historical truth. The intention of the author was simply to highlight the Kshatriya tradition and show his hatred for the *brāhmaṇas* and thereby the Brāhmaṇical tradition. We have shown elsewhere that the origin of Jainism is associated with the *rājanya* class. So far as the evidence of the *Bhagawati Sūtra* is concerned, Chatterjee has derived the conclusion from the expression '*puvva puttasingharāgeṇam*' that Mahāvīra was the son of Devānandā. Had Mahāvīra been the son of Devānandā, there was no need to add '*puvva*' before '*puttasineharāgeṇam*'. Perhaps the intention of the author of the *Bhagawati Sūtra* was to tell that milk oozed from the breast of Devānandā after seeing Mahāvīra was because of her love and affection for her son in former life. The conjecture of receiving the inspiration for the invention of embryo story by the Jain author from the story of Kṛṣṇa's birth as told in the *vaiṣṇava* literature²⁶ can be accepted only when chronological precedence of the latter is established over the former. Mahāvīra's embryo-transfer story may be earlier than the birth story of Kṛṣṇa.

There is a little controversy about the actual birthplace of Mahāvīra. The early texts of both the *Digambara* and the *Śvetāmbara* traditions are unanimous on the point that Kundapur or Kundagrāma was his birthplace. While the *Digambaras* believe that Kundalapura near Nālandā is the ancient Kundapura the *Śvetambaras* have identified it with Lachhuwāda or Lachhuāra in south Monghera. But the claims of both the traditions are not justified as they are not keeping with the indications available from the early Jain texts. Mahāvīra belonged to the Videha-Vaiśālī region is evident from the fact that he was called by such names as *Videhadiñṇ* and *Vesālīa*. As such his birthplace must be located somewhere in this region. Unfortunately both Lachhuwāda and

Kshtriyakunda held as Kundapura by *Śvetāmbaras* and *Digambaras* respectively are situated in the Magadha region and not Videha or Vaiśālī region. Moreover, no traces of those places which are associated with Mahāvīra and situated in the nearby of Kundapura are found near Lachhuwāda. H. Jacobi has identified Kundagāma of the Jain texts with Kotiggāma of Buddhist texts where the Buddha had sojourned for sometime. But this identification is doubtful as the *Mahāvagga* tells us that from Kotiggāma he went to the place wherer the *nātikas* lived and stayed in their brickhall. Kundagāma was the capital of the *gyātrikas* (*nātikas*) and if Kotiggāma was Kundagāma of the Jain texts the birth place of Mahāvīra there was no question of the movement of the Buddha from Kotiggāma to the place where the *nātikas* lived. The indentification proposed by H. L. Jain is highly convincing. He has identified Kundagāma with Vasukunda village situated near Vaiśālī, modern Basārha in Mujjafarpur district in Bihar. The residents of this village still hold it as the pious birthplace of Mahāvīra.²⁷

The *Āchārāṅga* and *Kalpasūtra* inform us that Mahāvīra was born on the 13th day of the bright half of *chaitra* month.

The Jain texts describe several legends and fanciful stories associated with the childhold of Mahāvīra which the students of history need not to take seriously. But the statement of *Āchārāṅga Sūtra* that Mahāvīra's parents were followers of Pārśva Nātha is of great historical value. Mahāvīra must have been deeply influenced by the teachings of Pārśva Nātha in his early years. We know from the early Jain texts that the followers of Pārśva Nātha were propagaing the *nirgrantha* religion in Vaiśālī and adjoining regions during this period. This spiritual orientation and the impact of prevailing religious phenomenon in the formative period of his life must have played crucial role in turning his career into that of a spiritual seeker.

Though, the *Digambara* tradition denies that Mahāvīra was ever

married the fact that the early texts like *Āchārāṅga Sūtra* and *Kalpasūtra* mention his marriage with Yaśodā of *kaundinya gotra* leaves no room for doubt in his regard. It is stated in these texts that Mahāvīra had a daughter named Priyadarśanā also called Anojjā from Yaśodā. Priyadarśanā's marriage and her daughter named Yaśovati are mentioned in early Jain texts but is only in late Jain texts like *Āvaśyaka Churni*,²⁸ *Kalpasūtra Vritti*²⁹ and *Uttarādhyayana Vritti*³⁰ that Jāmālī is referred to as her husband who is said to have led a *nihlava* in the life time of Mahāvīra.

Both *Āchārāṅga Sūtra* and *Kalpasūtra* inform us that Mahāvīra lived the life of a householder upto the age of thirty. After the death of his parents and seeking the permission of his elder brother he renounced the worldly life and embarked upon the career of a monk. This event of renunciation is said to have taken place on the tenth day of the month of *Mārgaśīrṣa*.³¹ After leaving home, Mahāvīra put out his ornaments and plucked his hair in five handfuls. The *Digambaras* believe that he abandoned clothes also. But according to the *Śwetāmbaras* he did not discard his clothes upto 13 months after his renouncement. Thenafter he wandered about naked.

Mahāvīra had to live a hard and strenuous ascetic life for twelve years before he obtained omniscience i.e. *Kaivalya*. The *Kalpasūtra* has succinctly described the restraints he exercised and the hardships he underwent. Some of its passages are worth to be quoted :

"For more then twelve years the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra neglected his body and abandoned the care of it, he with equanimity bore, underwent, and suffered all pleasant or unpleasant occurrences arising from divine powers, men or animals."³²

"Hence forth the Venerable ascetic Mahāvīra was houseless, circumspect in his walking circumspect in his speaking, circumspect in his begging, circumspect in his-accepting (anything), in the carrying of his

outfit and drinking vessel; circumspect in evacuating excrements, urine, saliva, mucus, and uncleanness of body; circumspect in his acts; guarding his thoughts, guarding his senses, guarding his chastity; without wrath, without pride, without deceit, without greed; calm, tranquil, composed, liberated, free from temptations, without egoism, without property; he had cut off all earthly ties, and was not stained by any worldliness; as water does not adhere to a copper vessel, or collyrium to mother of pearl (so sins found no place in him); his course was unobstructed like that of life; like the firmament he wanted no support; like the wind he knew no obstacles; his heart was pure like the water (of rivers or tanks) in autumn: nothing could soil him like the leaf of a lotus; his senses were well protected like those of a tortoise; he was single and alone like the horn of a rhinoceros; he was free like the fabulous bird *bharunda*; valorous like an elephant, strong like a bull; difficult to attack like a lion, steady and firm like mount Mandara, deep like the ocean, mild like the moon, refulgent like the sun, pure like excellent gold; like the earth he patiently bore everything; like a well-kindled fire he shone in his splendour³³"

"The Venerable one lived, except in the rainy season, all the eight months of summer and winter, in villages only a single night, he was indifferent alike to the smell of odour and of *sandal*, to straw and jewels, dirt and gold, pleasure and pain, attached neither to this world nor to that beyond, desiring neither life nor death; arrived at the other shore of the *saṃsāra*, and he exerted himself for the suppression of the defilement of *karman*³⁴"

"With supreme knowledge, with supreme intuition, with supreme conduct, in blameless lodgings, in blameless wandering, with supreme valour, with supreme uprightness, with supreme mildness, with supreme dexterity with supreme patience, with supreme freedom from passions, with supreme control, with supreme contentment, with supreme understanding, on the supreme path to final liberation, which is the fruit

of veracity, control, penance, and good conduct, the Venerable One meditated on himself for twelve years."³⁵

According to the *Kalpa Sūtra* in the thirteenth year on the tenth day of the month *vaiśākha* Mahāvīra obtained *kaivalya* in the field of the householder Samaga near the town Jrimbhikagrāma situated on the bank of the river Rijupālikā. Now, ascetic Mahāvīra had become a *jīna*, an *arhat*, a *kevalin* endowed with omniscience.

The later Jain texts mention the names of places visited by Mahāvīra during his ascetic life.³⁶ Some scholars have ventured to identify those places and fix chronological order of their visits by Mahāvīra³⁷. But their conjectures are highly doubtful. Further researches and explorations are needed on this point.

The *Kalpa Sūtra* gives an account of the sojourns of Mahāvīra in forty two rainy seasons after his renunciation. It is stated, 'In that period, in that age the Venerable Ascetic Mahāvīra stayed the first rainy season in Asthikāgrāma, three rainy seasons in Champā and Prīṣṭhichampā, twelve in Vaiśālī and Vaniyagrāma, fourteen in Rājagriha and the suburbs of Nālandā, six in Mithilā, two in Bhadrīkā, one in Ālabhikā, one in Paṇitabhumi, one in Śrāvastī, one in the town of Pāpā in king Hastipāla's office of the writers: that was his very last rainy season.'³⁸ The *Bhagawati Sūtra* also gives a list of the places visited by Mahāvīra which includes Nālandā, Rājagriha, Paniyabhumi, Siddhārthagāma and Kumārgāma. According to *Uvāsagadasāo* Vāṇijyagrāma, Polāspura, Rājagriha and Śrāvastī were visited by Mahāvīra. Thus, the accounts of the *Bhagawati Sūtra* and *Uvāsagadasāo* do not tally with that of *Kalpa Sūtra*. A critical look upon these accounts reveal that, by and large, the movement of Mahāvīra remained confined to some parts of eastern Uttar Pradesh and Western Northern and Central parts of Bihar. He casually visited the places outside these regions.

An important event of the early ascetic life of Mahāvīra is his meeting with Maṅkhaliputta Gośāla. It is stated in the *Bhagawati Sūtra* that Gośāla, being attracted by the extraordinary ascetic practices of Mahāvīra and the respect bestowed upon him by the people who mattered those days, met him at Nālandā and requested him to accept him as his disciple. Mahāvīra at first refused to oblige him, but accepted his request second time at Paṇiyabhūmi. Both Mahāvīra and Gośāla stayed at Paṇiyabhūmi and practiced asceticism together. After six years they moved to Kurmāra gram a from Paṇiyabhūmi and from there to Siddhārtha grama. On their way to Siddhārtha grāma a dispute between them arose on the point of the survival and fate of the seeds of a full bloomed sesamum plant which ultimately resulted into doctrinal difference between Mahāvīra and Gośāla. Gośāla then left the company of Mahāvīra, and afterwards, declared himself a 'jīna' and founded his own sect known as 'Ājīvika'.

There are three points to be noted in the entire concerned account of the *Bhagawati Sūtra*: (1) the meeting of Gośāla with Mahāvīra took place in the second year of the ascetic life of Mahāvīra after renunciation; (2) Gośāla joined the company of Mahāvīra as his disciple; (3) the doctrinal difference between Gośāla and Mahāvīra after six years led the former to separate from the latter and to found another sect called 'Ājīvika'. The fact that it was just the second year of the twelve years ascetic life of Mahāvīra presupposes that he was still a learner though by this time, it seems that he had earned reputation as an ascetic. He obtained enlightenment almost ten years after this incident. It is also clear from the relevant account of the *Bhagawati Sūtra* that Gośāla was not an ascetic in the true sense of the term when he was attracted by the reputation of Mahāvīra as he is depicted wandering from place to place and showing pictures to people. Thus it is clear that neither Gośāla was the leader of the Ājīvikas nor Mahāvīra had been able to crystallise his doctrinal propositions and set up his independent organisation at the time of their

meeting. So the suggestion of Jacobi 'that Mahāvīra and Gośāla associated with the intention of combining their sects and fusing them into one'³⁹ can hardly be accepted. So far as joining Mahāvīra by Gośāla as disciple is concerned, we should keep in our mind that the author of the *Bhagawati Sūtra* is simply placing his master at higher pedestal than Gośāla and most probably he is not very wrong. It is quite possible that the spiritual interest in Gośāla might have led him to Mahāvīra who had already earned quite a good reputation as an ascetic in order to learn ascetic practices. We have no other source to tell us that Gośāla had turned to be an ascetic of repute before he joined Mahāvīra. Six years rigorous ascetic practices and constant spiritual thought churning might have brought them to the level of intellectual thinking where doctrinal differences are quite natural. I feel constrained to agree with Basham and Chatterjee that '*Bhagawati* account is pervaded by deadly sectarian prejudice'⁴⁰. It is true that Gośāla was not a disciple of Mahāvīra in the true sense of the term since Mahāvīra himself was not enlightened and master of the creed at that time. But it is quite unreasonable to say, as has been done by Barua, that 'Gośāla was not a disciple of Mahāvīra, but the latter was in all likelihood either a disciple of or at least in some way connected with, the former'⁴¹. In this context it has been asserted that Gośāla was a jīna when Mahāvīra was merely a learner and also Gośāla died about sixteen years before the death of Mahāvīra, but these facts do not appear to have any bearing on the nature of relationship between Gośāla and Mahāvīra. When viewed from the point of view of history, Jinahood may be taken as a state of consummation of spiritual thinking and there may not be any fixed time limit for its attainment. The time gap of sixteen years between the death Gośāla and that of Mahāvīra is contradicted by another passage of *Bhagawati Sūtra* in which it is stated that the death of the former coincided with the battle fought between Ajātaśatru and the joint forces of the Licchavis and Mallas⁴². We know from the Buddhist sources that Ajātaśatru became king eight years before the death of the Buddha. The Buddhist sources also tell us that Mahāvīra

died when Buddha was alive. Thus sixteen years gap between the death of Mahāvīra and that of Gośāla as given in the *Bhagawati* is rendered doubtful.

After obtaining enlightenment at the age of forty two Mahāvīra remained busy with propagating the cardinal tenets of his creed for the next thirty years. During his career as a teacher he visited a number of places in U. P., Bihar and West Bengal, the details of which are given in the Jain texts. The accounts of different texts do not tally and it is very difficult to determine a chronological order of his visits of different places. The accounts of the late Jain texts are quite undepedable as some of them mention the names of places visited by Mahāvīra which were not in existence at that time.

The *Śwetāmbara* and *Digāmbara* traditions are not unanimous on the point as to when and where Mahāvīra delivered his first sermon. According to the *Śwetāmbara* tradition the first *samavasaraṇa* i.e. religious conference was held on the bank of the river Ujjuvalīā but it could not be successful. After sometime next *samavasaraṇa* was convened in Majjhima Pāvā which proved to be successful and Mahāvīra converted eleven learned *Brāhmaṇas* who not only became his disciple but later on played vital role as *gaṇadhara*s in the organisation and propagation of Jainism. *Digāmbara* tradition, on the otherhand, holds that Mahāvīra wandered for sixty three days observing the vow of silence after obtaining *kaivalya* at Jṛimbhikagrāma reached Rājagṛiha. There, at Vipulāchala near Rājagṛiha, a *samavasaraṇa* was held and he delivered his first sermon. It is here that Mahāvīra succeeded in converting the eleven learned *Brahmaṇs* who are described as *gaṇadhara*s in the Jain texts. It is also said that king Śreṇika with his family and army attended this *samavasaraṇa*.

It is very difficult to determine as to which of the two accounts is correct. But it can be said with certainty that soon after obtaining.

kaivalya Mahāvīra set him on the career of a religious teacher and his first achievement was the conversion of eleven learned *Brāhmaṇas*. The names of these first disciple are: Indra bhūti, Agnibhūti, Vāyubhūti, Vyakta, Sudharma, Mandikata, Mauryaputra, Akāmpita, Achalabhrātā, Metārya and Prabhāsa. The Jain texts mention the names of their *gotra* and place of residence also. In the *Digambara* tradition the names of these *gaṇadharas* are Indrabhūti, Vāyubhūti, Agnibhūti, Sudharma, Maurya, Maundra Putra, Māitreya, Akāmpana, Andhavela or Anvachela and Prabhāsa.

The fact that all these first converts of Mahāvīra belonged to the *Brāhmaṇa* class clearly indicates that the animosity between the *brāhmaṇas* and *śramaṇas* which we find in the centuries to follow was not in existence in the beginning.

Mahāvīra wandered far and wide propagating his creed. Late Jain texts describe his wandering exhaustively the details of which are hardly acceptable. The names of the place where he passed his thirty rainy seasons are stated to be : (1) Rājagriha, (2) Vaiśāli, (3) Vāṇijyagrāma, (4) Rājagriha, (5) Vāṇijyagrāma, (6) Rājagriha, (7) Rājagriha, (8) Vaiśāli, (9) Vaiśāli, (10) Rājagriha, (11) Vāṇijyagrāma, (12) Rājagriha, (13) Rājagiri, (14) Champā, (15) Mithilā, (16) Vāṇijyagrāma, (17) Rājagriha, (18) Vāṇijyagrāma, (19) Vaiśāli, (20) Vaiśāli, (21) Rājagriha, (22) Nālandā, (23) Vaiśāli, (24) Vaiśāli, (25) Rājagriha, (26) Nālandā, (27) Mithilā, (29) Rājagriha, (30) Apāpāpuri.

Slowly and gradually the numbers of the followers of Mahāvīra increased. He succeeded in convincing most of the followers of Pārśva Nātha to join his *saṃgha*. In this task he was helped by his eleven *gaṇadharas* who were well-versed in the Jain doctrine. There was no restriction of class, caste and sex in joining the *saṃgha*. As such people of all sections accepted his creed. Those who could not join the order as

monks were allowed to do so as lay disciples. As a result, a great number of householders became his lay disciples. Some of them were very rich and influential. Among them mention may be made of Upāli of Balakargrāma near Vaiśālī, Vijai of Rājagriha Ānanda and his wife Śivānandā from Vāṇiyagrāma, Kāmadeva and his wife Bhadrā from Champā, Suradeva and his wife Dhanyā from Vārānasi, Mahāsataka from Rājagriha and Mṛigadhara from Śrāvastī.

One of the important factors which greatly helped Mahāvīra in establishing his order was his royal connections and royal patronage. Through his mother he was connected with Chetaka, the leader of the *Licchavis*. He himself hailed from the ruling clan of the *Gyatrikas* who were an important constituent of the *Vajji* confederacy. Śreṇika, the king of Magadha, is said to have high regards for Mahāvīra though he appears to be more inclined towards Buddhism. His son Abhaya was deeply influenced by Mahāvīra. It was under his patronage that Jīvaka, a destitute child of a prostitute, was brought up who later on became a renowned physician. Ajātaśatru, son of Bimbisāra and king of Magadha, appears more favourably inclined towards Jainism though the *Pāli* texts paint him as a supporter of Buddha. Because of his support to Jainism the Jain texts thoroughly absolve him of the charge of patricide. Moreover, the events of Ajātaśatru's life have received extensive treatment in the Jain texts. Though the Jain texts mention a number of kings including Pradyota and Uddayana as his followers, nothing can be said with certainty. Infact, it is very difficult to indentify many of the contemporary kings mentioned in the Jain texts. A very exaggerated picture of the influence of Mahāvīra on the contemporary royal families has been presented in some late Jain texts.

In the fine, it can be said that Mahāvīra greatly succeeded in establishing his creed in Bihar and some parts of U. P. and Bengal. In his missionary efforts he received immense support and patronage from many of the contemporary rulers.

In order to regulate the ascetic life of adherents and perpetuate the propagation of the creed Mahāvīra established a *saṃgha* which consisted of monks, nuns, male lay disciples and female lay disciples. He divided his followers in four categories known as *muni* (monk), *āryikā* (nun), *śrāvaka* (male lay disciple) and *śrāvikā* (female lay disciple). Monks and nuns were houseless wanderers (*paribrājakas*) while *śrāvaka* and *śrāvikā* disciples were householders. He laid down separate rules for houseless wanderers and householder. While the monks and nuns had to observe ethical rules very strictly, the householders were granted some concessions.

The monks were organised under the leadership of Indrabhūti Gautama. Since the number of monks was very large and according to the *Kalpa Sūtra*⁴³ their number was 14000, he further divided them in nine *Gaṇas* each under the leadership of a competent disciple. They were known as *gaṇadharas*. The nuns who were also in great number were placed under the supervision and headship of Chandanā who was either first cousin or aunt of Mahāvīra.

After preaching his doctrine for thirty years Mahāvīra died at the age of seventy two at Pāvā on the 15th day of the dark fortnight of *kārtika*. The *Kalpa Sūtra* states that “the eighteen confederate kings of Kāśi and Kośala, nine Mallakis and nine Likkhavis on the day of new moon, instituted an illumination for they said; 'Since the light of intelligence is gone, let us make an illumination of material matter'”.⁴⁴ The fact that Mahāvīra breathed his last at Pāvā is supported by the *pāli* texts as well⁴⁵.

1. बहिषि तस्मिन्नेव विष्णुदत्त भगवान् परमर्षिभिः प्रसादितो नाभः प्रियचिकीर्षया तदरोधायने मेरुदेव्यां धर्मान् दर्शयितुकामो वातरसनानां ऊर्ध्वमन्थिनानां शुक्लया तन्वावततार-*Bhāgawata Purāṇa* -v.3.20
2. ब्रह्म ब्राह्मण यज्ञ पुरुषलोक विदूषकाः प्रायेण भविष्यन्ति- *Bhāgawata Purāṇa*. v. 6.10.

3. *Aitereya Brāhmaṇa* 7.17.
4. *Mahābhārata* - III. 85. 10-11.
5. Jain, H. L. - *Bhārtīya Saṁskṛti mein Jain Dharma kā Yogadāna* - p.13-17
6. Pathak, V. S. - *Bauddha Saṁgha ke Vikāsa kā Itihās*, Purovāk p. 7-18.
7. See for details - H. L. Jain
8. *ibid.*
9. Chatterjee, A. K. - *Comprehensive History of Jainism*, p-4.
10. *Indian Antiquary* IX. 150 ff "On Mahāvira and His Predecessors"
S. B. E. XLV, p. 20-23.
11. *Ibid.* p. 21
12. S. B. E. XLV p. 21
13. *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra*, chapter XXIII.
14. Chatterjee, A. K. - *Comprehensive History of Jainism*, p. 12.
15. S. B. E. XLV, p. 20.
16. B. M. Barua writes, "we may conclude on the authority of both Jain and Buddhist texts that the first four of these precepts were originally laid down by Pārśva while the fifth was added later by Mahāvira himself".
"A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy" p. 380
17. *Ibid* p. 381.
18. *Āvaśyaka Bhāṣya*-verse 17; *Kalpa Sūtra* - S. B. E. 27, p. 270, 275.
19. *Kalpa Sūtra* S. B. E. vol. XXII p. 225.
20. *Kalpa Sūtra* S. B. E. vol. XXII p. 31.
21. *Ibid* p. 31
22. *ibid* p. 31
23. Chatterjee A. K. - *Comprehensive History of Jainism*. p. 19.
24. *Kalpa Sūtra* S. B. E. vol. XXII. p. 225.
25. *Ibid* p. 225.
26. Chatterjee A. K. - *Comprehensive History of Jainism*. p. 19. ; *Kalpa Sūtra* S. B. E. vol. XXII.

27. See for details : Jain, H. L. - *Bhārtīya Saṁskṛiti mein Jain Dharma kā Yogdāna*. p. 23-24.
28. *Āvaśyakachurṇi* p. 416.
29. *Kalpa Sūtra Vritti* (Dharma Sagare) p. 92.
30. *Uttarādhyayan Vritti* (Śānti Sūri) p. 154.
31. *Kalpa Sūtra* S.B.E. Vol. XXII p. 256.
32. Ibid p. 260.
33. Ibid p. 260-261.
34. Ibid p. 262.
35. Ibid p. 263.
36. *Āvaśyak Nirukti* (458-527), *Āvaśyaka Churṇi* (268-333), *Āvaśyaka Bhaṣya* III, *Kalpa Sūtra Tika*, 5-121.
37. Law, B. C. - Mahāvīra ; His Life and Teachings, p. 32.
Jain, K. C. - Lord Mahāvīra and His Times, p. 45-46.
38. *Kalpa Sūtra* S. B. E. vol. 22, p. 264.
39. S. B. E. vol. XLV, part 'B' p. 31-32.
40. Chatterjee A. K. - Comprehensive History of India - p. 343.
Basham, A. L. - History and Doctrines of Agivikas p. 66.
41. Barua, B. M. - A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, p. 300
42. See for detail - Chatterjee A. K. - Comprehensive History of Jainism, p. 344.
43. *Kalpa Sūtra* S. B. E. vol. XXII p. 267.
44. Ibid p. 266.
45. *Dīgha Nikāya* vol III. p. 91.
Majjhim Nikāya vol. III. p. 37.

5

Gaṇadharas of Mahāvīra

Soon after the attainment of *kaivalya* Mahāvīra visited Pāvā and held religious discourse in the garden of one Mahāsena. In the same garden a *Brāhmaṇa* named Somila had made arrangement for a *yagya* and invited learned *Brāhmaṇas*. Eleven of them came to Mahāvīra with a desire to have religious discussion with him. They were influenced by the personality and spiritual attainments of Mahāvīra so, much so, that they decided to join him as his disciples. Incidentally, the first disciples of Mahāvīra turned to be his principal disciples known as *Gaṇadharas*. They became well-versed in the twelve *aṅgas* and fourteen *pūrvas*. Details about them are :

	<i>Name</i>	<i>Caste</i>	<i>Gotra</i>	<i>Residence</i>
1.	Indrabhūti	Brāhmaṇa	Gautama	Gobbaragrāma
2.	Agnibhūti	Brāhmaṇa	Gautama	Gobbaragrāma
3.	Vāyubhūti	Brāhmaṇa	Gautama	Gobbaragrāma
4.	Vyakta	Brāhmaṇa	Bhāradvāja	Kottaga Sannivesa
5.	Sudharman	Brāhmaṇa	Agniveśyāyana	Kottaga Sannivesa
6.	Mandita	Brāhmaṇa	Vaśiṣṭa	Mauriya Sannivesa
7.	Moriyaputra	Brāhmaṇa	Kāśyapa	Mauriya Saṇnivesa

8.	Akampita	Brāhmaṇa	Gautam	Mithilā
9.	Achalabhrātā	Brāhmaṇa	Haritāyana	Kośal
10.	Metārya	Brāhmaṇa	Kaundinya	Tungīya Sannivesa
11.	Prabhāsa	Brāhmaṇa	Kaundinya	Rājagṛiha

Though the *saṃgha* consisted of only nine *gaṇas* all these eleven chief disciples were called *gaṇadharas* because they had instructed Śramaṇas in great number. The *Kalpa Sūtra*¹ mentions exact number of Śramaṇas instructed by each one of them, but we can not be sure on this point. Except Indrabhūti and Sudharman, rest nine *gaṇadharas* died in the very life time of Mahāvīra. Indrabhūti is said to have died twelve years after the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra at the age of 92. Though he was favourite of Mahāvīra and survived him, it was Sudharman who became head of the Jain *Samgha* after Mahāvīra². Sudharman died twenty years after the demise of Mahāvīra. The *Kalpa Sūtra* states that all the *nirgrantha Śramaṇas* of the present time are descendants of Sudharman and rest of the *Gaṇadharas* left no descendants.³

Jain Samgha after Mahāvīra :

The sources which contain informations about the successors of Mahāvīra in the pontificate of the *Samgha* are *Kalpa Sūtra Therāvali* (*Sthavirāvali*), *Nandi Sūtra* and *Āvaśyaka Sūtra*. The list of the pontiffs given in the *Nandi* and *Āvaśyaka Sūtras* is quite in agreement with the list given in the *Kalpa Sūtra* upto Mahāgiri and Suhastin who belonged to the eighth generation after Mahāvīra. After it the succession list of the pontificates gets divided into two branches, one starting from Mahāgiri and the other starting from Suhastin. The list of patriarchs given in the *Nandi* and *Āvaśyaka Sūtras* is quite distinct from the one given in the *Kalpa Sūtra*. The list of the *Kalpa Sūtra* begins from Suhastin and this was the most prominent line of succession as almost all the legends found in the *Pariśiṣṭa parvan* of Hema Chandra and other later Jain texts

pertain to the lives of the patriarchs of this line. The names of first six successive leaders of the Jain *saṃgha* are : (i) Sudharman, (ii) Jambū, (iii) Prabhava, (iv) Svayambhava, (v) Yaśobhadra, (vi) Bhadrabāhu and Sambhūtavijai. Then after the burden of the leadership of the *saṃgha* fell on the shoulders of Sthūlabhadra. It was during this period that the Council of Pāṭaliputra was held and the *aṅgas* took a definite shape. Sthūlabhadra had two disciples, Mahāgiri and Suhastin. With Mahāgiri and Suhastin started two lines of succession. It appears that at this stage the unity of the *saṃgha* was shattered and finally the *saṃgha* was split into *Śvetāmbara* and *Digāmbara* sects.

Schisms in the Jain Saṃgha :

The evidence of the early Jain texts clearly indicate that the monastic life in Jain religion had started in quite early times. The *saṃgha* organised by twenty third *tīrthaṅkara* Pārśva Nātha was very effective and remained functioning centuries after his demise. The twenty third chapter of the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* entitled "*Gautam-Keśi Samvāda*" clearly tells us that the monastic orders of Pārśva Nātha and Mahāvīra functioned simultaneously as separate organisations for sometime. The same text tells us that the unity between the two orders was forged as a compromise between Keśi Kumāra and Indrabhūti Gautama, the followers of Pārśva Nātha and Mahāvīra respectively.

It appears that the Jain *saṃgha* was clearly split into two sects, *Digāmbara* and *Śvetāmbara*, after a few centuries of the demise of Mahāvīra. This division proved to be of lasting effect and even to day the Jain community is divided into these two major schools.

Even before the division of the Jain *saṃgha* into *Digāmbara* and *Śvetāmbara* sects some minor schisms had already taken place in the Jain order. These splits have been chistened as *Nihnavas* in the Jain texts. These *Nihnavas* are said to be seven in number.

First Nihnava :

This *nihnava* is known as *bahurayavāda* and was started by Jāmāli the son-in-law of Mahāvīra. Jāmāli has been referred to in a number of Jain texts such as *Viśeṣāvaśyaka bhāṣya*, *Āvaśyaka Haribhadriya Tīkā*, *Sthānāṅga* commentary and *Uttarādhayayana* commentary by Nemichandra.

Jāmāli, a resident of Kshatriya Kunda, was initiated as a monk by Mahāvīra. However, he developed doctrinal difference with Mahāvīra and finally separated himself with his followers from the *saṅgha* and started the first *nihnava* fourteen years after Mahāvīra obtained omniscience. The sect started by him could not last long and finally most of his followers rejoined the original *saṅgha*.

Second Nihnava :

The second *nihnava* is known as *jīvapaesiya nihnava* and was started by Tiṣyagupta sixteen years after the attainment of *kaivalya* by Mahāvīra. He disagreed with the tenet that *jīva* is the composition of all the parts of an animate being into one whole and instead held that the last part of the soul which completes its composition is *jīva*. The sect started by Tiṣyagupta also could not last long. Finally, his followers realised the falsity of his views and came back to the original *saṅgha*.

Third Nihnava :

The third *nihnava* is known as *avvattagavādin*. This schism was started by Aśādhabhūti at Seyaviya two hundred fourteen years after the death of Mahāvīra. The adherents of this sect believed that there is nothing *vyakta* in the world. Hence they disregarded all the external observances. This is precisely the reason that this *nihnava* has been named *Avyakta nihnava*.

Fourth Nihnava :

This split was started by Aśvamiṭra two hundred twenty years after the death of Mahāvīra. The followers of Aśvamiṭra were known as *samuccheiyavādin*. They held that everything of the world is transient and is destroyed after its origination. So, the effects of good or bad deeds are immaterial.

Fifth Nihnava :

This *nihnava* came into existence two hundred twenty eight years after the death of Mahāvīra and was started by Gaṅga, a disciple of Dhana Gupta. The followers of Gaṅga were called '*dokriyāvādin*'. They did not agree with the original Jain tenet that the experience of different actions can not be had simultaneously. Instead, they held that opposite feelings, such as warmth and cold, can be experienced simultaneously.

Sixth Nihnava :

This schism was started by Roha Gupta at a place named Antaranjīa five hundred and forty four years after the death of Mahāvīra. The adherents of this school were called *nojivavādin* as well as *Terāsiya* (*trairāśika*). They held that there is a third category of *dravya* called *Nojiva* in addition to *jīva* and *ajīva*.

Seventh Nihnava :

The leader of this split was Goṣṭhamāhila. It was started by him at Daśapur five hundred and eighty four years after the death of Mahāvīra. The followers of Goṣṭhanmāhila were called *Abadhiyavādin*. They believed that the soul is simply touched by the *karma-paramaṇus* and not bound by them.

It is to be noted that the *Nihnava*s discussed above were minor schisms and could not adversely affect the Jain monastic order. They

could not last long and either became obsolete or got merged in the original *saṃgha*. The veracity of the accounts of these schisms as given in the Jain texts is very difficult to ascertain. Much of the details is fanciful. But the fact that there have been minor schisms in the Jain order can hardly be denied.

The split of Jain Saṃgha into Śvetāmbara and Digambara Sects:

The organisation of the Jain *saṃgha* remained almost unaffected by the minor schisms mentioned above. Their impact was very short lived. But the split of Jain *saṃgha* into the *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbara* sects is a major event in the history of Jain religion. The Jain community was divided into two separate groups who, in course of time, developed their distinct organisation, literature and tradition of art. Even to-day they have maintained their distinct identities.

It is to be noted that both the sects do not have serious doctrinal differences. Their religio-philosophical beliefs and mythologies are identical. The only point of difference in mythological beliefs is that Malli Nātha, the nineteenth *Tīrthaṅkara*, was a woman according to the *Śvetāmbaras* where as, according to the *Digambaras*, he was a man. The ideological basis of this difference of contention lies in the fact that according to the *Digambaras* a woman is not entitled to the enlightenment where as the *Śvetāmbaras* believe that a woman can obtain it. The main differences between them are related with ethical practices.

When and how the split of Jain *saṃgha* into *Śvetāmbara-Digambara* sects took place is a problem which is still not convincingly solved and the historians are not unanimous on the point. Even the *Śvetāmbaras* and *Digambaras* give different account of this rift.

The *Digambara* version of the rift is recorded in the *Brihatkathā* composed by Hariṣeṇa in 931 AD. It is stated here that Bhadrabāhu had predicted a terrible famine in the country of Magadha for a period of

twelve years during the reign of Chandra Gupta Maurya. In order to save their lives from the famine a section of monks under the leadership of *Bhadrabāhu* migrated to the south India and the rest remained in the north India.

After sometimes the leaders of the order in north India met in Ujjayini. Still the calamity of famine was persisting and the leaders allowed the monks to wear a piece of cloth (*ardhapālka*) in order to avoid obscenity while touring for begging alms. These monks got accustomed to wearing *ardhapālaka* and they refused to get rid of this practice even when the famine was over. The conservative elements in the order and particularly those who had returned from the south Indian migration highly resented to this development. It is further stated that these *ardhapālaka* monks were once invited by Chandralekhā queen of king Lokapāla of Valabhipur. Seeing them neither clothed nor naked the king got annoyed where upon the queen asked the monks to wear full clothes. Thenceforth, the monks began wearing white clothes and came to be called *Śvetapatas* or *Śvetāmbaras*.

Thus, according to the *Digambaras* the Jain monks did not wear any clothes in the beginning but later on a section of them started wearing white clothes and got split from the original *saṃgha* (*mūla saṃgha*) and the split of *saṃgha* in the forms of *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbara* was effected.

However, the *Śvetāmbaras* give a different account of the split. According to them the *saṃgha* was divided six hundred nine years after Mahāvīra's death by Śivabhūti. It is stated in the *Āvaśyakabhāṣya*, a work of 5th century AD, that Śivabhūti, a resident of Rathavīrapur, was an employee of the local king. He had successfully fought many battles on behalf of the king and had won laurels. Consequently, he turned to be very proud and used to come home very late in the night. On the complaint of his wife, one night his mother did not open the door and asked him to

go elsewhere. Śivabhūti left the home and entered in a dwelling which was incidentally a Jain monastery (*upāsraya*). He requested the *āchārya* (priest) of the monastery to initiate him but his request was turned down. Śivabhūti, then, plucked out his hairs himself and started wandering as a monk with others. After some time, he came to his native place. When the king was informed of his arrival, he sent a precious shawl (*ratna kambala*) to him as a gift. Possession of such a precious article by a monk was protested by his senior but Śivabhūti did not pay any heed to his advice. His senior, then tore off the shawl and used it as mattress. At that time Śivabhūti did not say anything but out of reaction gave up all clothing which ultimately resulted in the schism of the order.

In an another version of Śivabhūti episode it is stated that Śivabhūti did not agree with his teacher Kriṣṇarṣi that the *jinakalpikas* (adherents of *jinakalpa*) are of two kinds. While some observe absolute nonpossession, others may have necessary requisites. Śivabhūti asserted that a follower of *jinakalpa* should strictly observe the principle of austerity including nudity. He gave up all clothing and created a schism. He was joined by Kaundinya and Kottavira as his disciples. His sister Uttarā is also said to have joined him, but was forbidden by him from observing nudity. The members of this group were initially called *bodiyas* but because of their practice of nudity they were later on known as *Digambaras*.

Thus, according to the *Śvetāmbara* tradition the *Digambara* sect originated 609 years after Mahāvīra's death, that is, in the first century AD.

The accounts of the *Śvetāmbara* and *Digambara* traditions are so discrepant that on the basis of them it is very difficult to reach a conclusion as to when and how the split occurred. Nonetheless, they give us certain clues which may help us in settling this issue.

Hoernle in his article on the *Ājivikas* in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* expressed the opinion that the *Digambaras* were

originally Ājivikas who, after their annoyance with Gośāla, joined the order of Mahāvīra as his disciple. Hoernle was led to derive this conclusion on the basis of the practice of *achelakatva* (nudity) of the Ājivikas and a statement of the commentator Śilāṅka in his commentary on the *Sūtrakritāṅga* that the revilers of the followers of Mahāvīra were the Ājivikas or *Digambaras*. Hoernle's contention is hardly convincing and A. K. Roy is quite correct when he states. "The bulk of the evidence however is against Hoernle's conjecture, and the theory that some Ājivikas formed the nucleus of the *Digambara* sect can not be built upon this one stray reference by Śilāṅka".⁴

A. K. Roy thinks that the process of split was gradual but it was completed at the end of 5th century A. D. when the Valabhi Council was held. He has cited some epigraphic and iconographic evidence in support of his contention.⁵ But his conclusion is based more on assumption than on evidence. Moreover, the assignment of such a late date for the split is not in consonance with what the facts of the traditions have to tell us.

It is quite evident from the early Jain texts that Mahāvīra lived strict austere life and observed *achelakatva* (nudity) and preached the same to his disciples. His followers earnestly observed the ethical regulations for some time even after his death. Parallel to Mahāvīra's order the *saṃgha* established by Pārśva Nātha was also functioning. The followers of Pārśva Nātha did not observe the practice of nudity and used to wear clothes. After the death of Mahāvīra, Indrabhūti Gautama was leading the *saṃgha* and Keśi Kumāra was the leader of the *saṃgha* of Pārśva Nātha. The twenty third chapter of the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* entitled '*Gautama-Keśi Saṃvāda*' in forms us that the two leaders incidentally met in Śrāvastī with their followers. It was generally realised by the monks that both the laws are pursuing the same end but why does the order of Pārśva Nātha allow an under and upper garment and that of Mahāvīra enjoin five vows and forbid wearing

clothes? When this question was raised by Keśi, Gautama gave a convincing reply so far as the discrepancy in the number of vows is concerned and Keśi was fully satisfied. On the matter of nudity or wearing of clothes the reply of Gautama was : "Deciding the matter by their superior knowledge, the *tīrthāṅkaras* have fixed what is necessary for carrying out the law. The various outward marks (of religious men) have been introduced in order that people might recognise them as such; the reason for the characteristic marks is their usefulness for religious life and their distinguishing character. Now the opinion (of the *tīrthāṅkaras*) is that knowledge, faith and right conduct are the true causes of final liberation."⁶ After being fully satisfied Keśi with his followers accepted the law of the five vows and both the *saṃghas* got united. It appears that the question of wearing clothes or not was left to the desires of monks. But the existence of two fold *kalpa*, namely, *jinakalpa* and *sthavira kalpa*, in an organisation could not last long. As a result, in course of time, the *saṃgha* got split into two sects *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbara*.

The lists of the names of the leaders of *saṃgha* after Mahāvīra found in the *Kalpa Sūtra*, *Nandi Sūtra*, *Āvaśyaka Sūtra* and *Paṛiśiṣṭaparvan* indicate that the unity of the *saṃgha* was maintained upto the time of Sthūlabhadra as both the traditions generally agree with the succession of pontificates upto Sthūlabhadra. He had two disciples Mahāgiri and Suhastin and the lists of the names of successors of these two are given in the *Nandi Sūtra* and *Kalpa Sūtra* which are quite different. On the basis of it, it may be construed that the split in the *saṃgha* was effected soon after Sthūlabhadra. The major events of the Jain monastic order are reckoned with reference to Mahāvīra era which is supposed to have started from 527 B.C., the traditional date of the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra. According to it the accession of Chandra Gupta Maurya to the throne and the death of Bhadrabāhu took place in 155 and 170 years respectively after the death of Mahāvīra. If these dates

are converted into the Christian era they will be 357 B. C. and 372 B. C. respectively. It is a point of general agreement among historians that Chandra Gupta's accession took place in and around 321 B. C. This date does not tally with the traditional calculations of the Jains. The possibility of miscalculation on the part of the Jains can not be ruled out. Since the reign of Chandra Gupta ended in 297-298 B. C. and the contemporaneity of Chandra Gupta and Bhadrabāhu is attested by the Jain sources, it may be safely assumed that in the beginning of the third century B. C., Sthūlabhadra took the charge of the leadership of the Jain *saṃgha*. Thus, there is a strong possibility that the schism occurred in the first half of the third century B. C.

This conjecture gets support from an account of the Jain texts. It is said that Sthūlabhadra convened a council at Pataliputra during the period of famine when Bhadrabāhu had gone to south India with a section of monks and he did not invite Bhadrabāhu to attend this council. It is quite strange that Bhadrabāhu who was the only person well-versed in all the *aṅgas* and *purvas* was not invited and in his absence, the form of canonical literature was fixed in this council. Does this not bespeak of some sort of dissension in the Jain Order?

It appears that after the amalgamation of the orders of Pārśva and Mahāvīra the discipline of nudity got loosened. The *Sthavirakalpa* became more popular among monks. However, more orthodox among them continued adhering to the *jina kalpa*. So long as the number of monks was small, there was no difficulty in maintaining the *jina kalpa*. We know that the monks depend on society for their subsistence. With the increase of number of monks the magnitude of their dependence on society might have increased. As such, movement of monks in big number in nude form for begging purposes might have caused a sense of shyness and hesitation. They will have been prompted to put on clothes without incurring any sacrilege particularly when sthavira kalpa was there. After

all, wearing clothes or nudity are simply outer marks of religion and they are insignificant so far as the realisation of *moksh* is concerned.

This, is not to say that *Jina Kalpa* was replaced by the *sthavira kalpa*. The monks with strong orthodoxical attitude continued the practice of nudity. In their eyes complete detachment from worldly possession was essential for the realisation of the highest goal and possession or putting on clothes constituted the transgression of the canon of *aparigraha*. The number of such monks was not very small and they formed a group in the general community of the monks. With the passage of time their attitude got more and more stiffened and they disagreed on more points with the rest others. They denied the womanhood of Malli Nātha, the nineteenth *Tīrthārka* of the Jain tradition, only on the ground that *Jinhood* can't be obtained without practising nudity and a woman cannot do it. They also deny the efficacy of womenfolk in obtaining salvation. Their orthodoxical attitude is reflected in their denial of Mahāvīra's marriage. In this context we can understand as to why they do not accept the authenticity of canonical texts compiled in the councils of Patalipūtra and Valabhi.

It is to be noted here that the split of the order did not occur all of a sudden. The process of division was gradual. It seems to have started in the first half of third cent. B. C., as has been pointed earlier, and was completed in the first coming A.D. If some minor details of the Śvetāmbar account are overlooked there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the account that the *Samgha* was split into the *Digambara* and *Śvetāmbar* sects 609 years after the death of Mahāvīra, that is first cent A. D. The tradition can not be rejected lock, stock and barrel.

Main Points of difference between *Śvetāmbara* and *Digambara* traditions :

1. While *Śvetāmbaras* used to wear white garments, the *Digambaras* practised nudity.

2. The *Śvetāmbaras* believed that Mahāvīra was married with Yasodā and had a daughter from her, the *Digambaras* altogether deny it.
3. According to the *Śvetāmbaras* 19th Tīrthaṅkara Malli Nātha was a woman, but the *Digambaras* believe that Malli Nātha was a man.
4. The *Śvetāmbaras* believe that a woman can obtain moksha but according to the *Digambaras* they are not entitled to it.
5. According to the *Śvetāmbaras* the embryo of Mahāvīra was transferred from the womb of *Kshatrāṇi* Triśalā to that of *Brāhmaṇi* Devānandā. The embryo transfer story is not accepted by the *Digambaras*.
6. The *Śvetāmbaras* believe in the authenticity of the existing twelve aṅgas. The *Digambaras* believe that the original twelve aṅgas are extinct.
7. The *Śvetāmbaras* adorn the images of *Tīrthaṅkaras* with clothes and ornaments. The *Digambaras* are opposed to such clothing or ornamentation.

In addition to these major differences, they developed differences on some minor points as well. They are trivial and have little historical significance. Infact, there were no significant doctrinal differences. Almost all the cardinal principles of Jainism are accepted by both of them.

1. *Kalpa Sūtra* (S.B.E. Vol. XXII) p. 286-87.
2. According to Digambara tradition Indrabhūti Gautam succeeded Mahāvīra. It is quite strange as to why the *Śvetāmbaras* tradition has ignored him as immediate successor of Mahāvīra.
3. *Kalpa Sūtra* (S.B.E. Vol. XXII) p. 287.
4. Roy, A. K. - '1 A History of the Jains' p. 90
5. Ibid. p. 93-95.
6. *Uttarādhyayan Sūtra* (SBE. Vol. XLV) p. 123.

6

The Doctrines of Jainism

As has already been pointed out, some basic concepts of Jain philosophy bear the stamp of primitive religious and metaphysical speculations. General agreement between Jainism, on the one hand, and Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Buddhism, on the other, on some basic principles, such as negation of a spiritual entity as primordial cause, transmigration, pessimism and liberation (*mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*), presuppose the existence of a substratum of philosophical speculation from which these schools sprang. But they devised their systems on different lines. For Instance, the Jain and Sāṃkhya both acknowledge the duality of spirit and matter, the plurality of spirits or souls, the efficacy of matter in influencing deeply and shaping the spirit or soul and, finally, that soul may be salvaged from the havoc of matter only by resorting to ascetic practices, but both of them have built up their respective philosophical systems on different lines owing mainly to the age old dichotomy of Brāhmaṇism and Śramaṇism. Buddhism, though having allegiance with Śramaṇism developed a philosophy which radically differed from Jainism though some of its features are common with the latter. The Buddha appears to have constructed his philosophical system synthesising some Upaniṣadic and Śramaṇic ideas.

But what about Jainism ? Is Mahāvīra the sole architect of the early Jain philosophical system ? To this question the reply of H. Jacobi is most pertinent and we would like to quote him : "Mahāvīra, however, unlike Buddha, was most probably not the founder of the sect which reveres him as their prophet, not the author of their religion. According to the unanimous Buddhist tradition, Buddha had, under the Bodhi tree, discovered by intuition the fundamental truths of his religion as it appears through out his personal work ; his first sermons are things ever to be remembered by his followers, as are the doctrines which he then preached. No such traditions are preserved in the canonical books of the Jains about Mahāvīra. His achievements of omniscience (*Kevala*) are of course celebrated events. But tradition is silent about his motives for renouncing the world and about the particular truths whose discovery led to his exalted position. At any rate, Mahāvīra is not described by tradition as having first become a disciple of teachers whose doctrines afterwards failed to satisfy him, as we are told of the Buddha, he seems to have had no misgivings, and to have where truth was to be had, and thus he became a Jain monk. And again when after many years of austerities such as are practised by other ascetics of the Jains, he reached omniscience, we are not given to understand that he found any new truth, or a new revelation as Buddha is said to have received ; nor is any particular doctrine or philosophical principle mentioned the knowledge and insight of which then occurred to him for the first time. But he is represented as gaining, at his *Kevala*, perfect knowledge of what he knew before only in part and imperfectly. Thus, Mahāvīra appears in the tradition of his own sect as one who, from the beginning, had followed a religion established long ago."¹

In fact, Mahāvīra should not be given the entire credit of constructing the Jain philosophical system. In all probability, he improved upon pre-existing Jain philosophical postulates. It is difficult to agree with B. M. Barua when he says that Pārśva was a man of practical

nature and organising genius. His rules were rules of conduct devoid of philosophical justification.² Misinterpreting Gautam-Keśi dialogue depicted in the *Uttarādhyayana Sūtra* he reaches the conclusion that "Pārśva's was a mere religious order, while Mahāvīra's was not only a religious order but also a distinct school of thought."³ He further states, "it is from Gośāla that Mahāvīra learnt to think philosophically as it was afterwards mainly in opposing this teacher's deterministic theory that he was led gradually to the discovery of nine categories (*navatattva*)."⁴

The view that before Mahāvīra Jainism was merely and ascetic discipline comprising only ethical rules and had no philosophical foundation can hardly be upheld. The validity of ethical rules lies in the belief that by practising them ultimate reality or goal may be realised. But the determination of ultimate reality and goal requires serious contemplation and thinking about life and world. In other words, philosophical thinking precedes formulation of ethical rules. A religion without philosophy is unthinkable.

As has been discussed earlier, there are certain basic concepts of Jainism which are of great antiquarian significance. For instance, animistic belief cannot be said to have originated in sixth century B. C. Likewise, it is quite unimaginable that a philosopher of the stature of Mahāvīra will have used the terms *dharma* and *adharma* denoting substances while he knew well that these terms had, by then, acquired definite meanings. This simply means that the use of these words to denote distinct categories of substance was nothing but continuance of an old tradition. As has already been discussed, the doctrine of *karma* and Rebirth was not formulated by the philosophers of the sixth century B. C. and there is a strong possibility that it originated in the Śramaṇa tradition, particularly, among Jains in earlier times. Hence, it is historically justified to hold that the Jains had a philosophical system, howsoever simple and unrefined it may be, in pre-Mahāvīra times.

There is no doubt that Mahāvīra added new tenets to the existing Jain doctrines and presented them in well organised and well knit form. Jacobi has convincingly shown that Mahāvīra formulated *Syādvāda*, a very important theory of Jain philosophy owing Sanjaya Belatthiputta. He writes, "that in opposition to the Agnosticism Mahāvīra has established the *Syādvāda*."⁵ He might have been inspired by the contemporary philosophical discussions to form new philosophical ideas. But the contention of B. M. Barua that Gośāla was the philosophic predecessor of Mahāvīra and the latter owed a lot to the former is erroneous, Jacobi is also of the view that Mahāvīra was highly influenced by Gośāla in the formulation of his doctrine. Disbelieving the Jain version of the relationship between Gośāla and Mahāvīra, he holds that Mahāvīra adopted some religious ideas and practices of the Ājīvikas as concessions made to them in order to win over Gośāla and his disciples.⁶ According to him he borrowed Gośāla's ideas of division of mankind into six classes and altered it in the doctrine of six *leśyās*. In his opinion, Mahāvīra adopted more rigid rules from Gośāla. He writes, "With regard to the rule of conduct the collective evidence obtainable is such as to amount nearly to prove that Mahāvīra borrowed the more rigid rules from Gośāla."⁷ He appears to point towards *achelakatva* (nudity) which formed a very important principle of ethics.

It is strange that too much importance has been attached to Gośāla's contributions to the development of Jain doctrines while there is no convincing evidence in support of it. But the truth appears to be otherwise. There is no reason to doubt the statement of the Jain texts that initiative was taken by Gośāla to meet with Mahāvīra. In all probability, being a man of spiritual leaning and in quest of truth he joined Mahāvīra as a novice. He received training in ascetic practices and philosophical thinking in the company of Mahāvīra. He, as is quite possible, must have been in continuous dialogue with Mahāvīra regarding philosophical ideas which Mahāvīra had acquired from the Jain tradition and the new ones.

which he might be postulating. In this process, after attaining some maturity, he might have developed some doctrinal differences and formulated his doctrines adopting many philosophical ideas and ethical practices of Mahāvīra.

Philosophy

The Jain philosophy consists of ontology, metaphysics, doctrine of *karma*, epistemology and ethics.

The Jains have an ontological perspective which is different from the Upaniṣadic and Buddhistic. They radically differ from the Upaniṣadic doctrine that the ultimate reality is permanent and unchanging. The visible changes are mere illusions of senses. On the other hand, the Buddhists deny that there is any thing permanent. According to them, reality is a mere flux. They treat the notion of the permanence of substance as mere fiction of ignorance. The Jains hold that permanence of substance and change both are real. According to them, substance is that which has its existence "*saddravya lakṣaṇam*". '*Sat*' consists of origination, decay and permanence - *utpād-vyaya-dhrauvya yuktaṁ sat*. In the process of change some qualities remain unchanged, some new qualities are generated and some old qualities are destroyed. It is to be noted that changes occur only in the accidental or acquired qualities. Substance consists of qualities and forms-*guṇa paryāyavad dravyaṁ*. *Guṇa* is some thing which can not be separated from *dravya*. It is permanent feature but form or *paryāya* changes. It is in this process of change in the form that the changes in the substance occur. For instance, when a piece of gold is turned into a ring, the qualities of gold remain the same though its form is changed. Thus, inspite of diverse changes the substance remains as a permanent entity.

The doctrine of *Anekāntavāda* is a logical corollary of this specific Jain conception of reality. *Anekāntavāda* is a doctrine which is based

on the conception that a thing possesses infinite number of qualities and forms - *ananta dharmātmakam vastu ananta paryāyātmakam cha*.

Based upon *Anekāntavāda* is the logical doctrine of *Syādvāda* of the Jains. The fundamental principle of *Syādvāda* is that both positive and negative predications may be done of the same thing. The affirmative predication about a thing is based upon four conditions - *Svadravya*, *Svakshetra*, *Svakāla* and *Svabhāva*. The assertion that 'this dish is made of silver' is affirmative predication from the point of view of *svadravya* and "not made of any other metal" is negative predication from the point of view *paradravya*. The Buddha died in Kushinagar is an affirmative predication from the point of view of *svakshetra* and "he did not die in Pātaliputra" is a negative predication from the point of view of *parakshetra*. Likewise, the predictions that "Mahatma Gandhi was killed in 1948" and "he was not killed in 1960" are positive and negative assertions from the points of view of *svakāla* and *parakāla* respectively. The same applies to *svabhava* and *parabhava*.

Thus, it is obvious that positive and negative predications are possible about the same thing from different points of views. The doctrine of *Syādvāda* is derived from this principle. According to this doctrine, there are seven forms of metaphysical propositions - *asti*, *nāsti*, *asti-nāsti*, *avaktavyam*, *asti-avakyavyam*, *nāsti-avaktavyam* and *asti-nāsti avaktavyam*. Before every proposition the word *syat* is added which is explained as *kathamchit* i.e. 'some how'. *Syat* indicates indefiniteness of being and presupposes that propositions are based on the points of view of *svadravya*, *svakshetra*, *svakāla*, *svabhāva* and *paradravya*, *parakshetra*, *parakāla* and *parabhāva* respectively. If both the aspects are to be expressed they should be placed one after the other - '*asti-nāsti*'. But if both affirmative and negative are to be expressed in the same predication it becomes inexpressible in language. Thus comes the fourth propositions *avaktavyam*. "By adding *avaktavyam* to first

three propositions the seven modes of expression- *Saptabhaṅga* of *Syādvāda* are made up. Thus, the Jains recognise only the relative proposition instead of absolute proposition which, in their view, is impossible because they hold that reality in itself is identity amidst diversity, unity amidst multiplicity and is permanent amidst change.

Complementary to *Syādvāda*, the Jains have formulated the doctrine of *Nayas* which is another approach to understanding the objects and events of the world. The *nayas* are seven in number. *Naigama naya* is co-ordinated view of an event or object. For instance, if a lady is mixing water with flour and is asked what she is doing and if her reply is that she is cooking food, her statement is correct from the point of view of *Naigama naya*. A generalised approach to objects and events is *Samgraha naya*. if some one is asked, 'who is he?' and if he replies that 'he is an Indian', his statement is true from the point of view of *Samgraha naya*. To this question if he replies that he is a '*Sikkha*' this statement is also true from the point of view of *Vyavahāra naya*. Thus these two *nayas* - *saṃgraha* and *vyavahāra* - are mutually relative and complementary to each other and not contradictory. *Rijusūtra naya* refers to specific form of an object in specific time-period. The rest three *nayas* - *Śabda*, *Samabhirudha* and *Evambhūta* - refer to linguistic usages. When things are approached and differentiated on linguistic and grammatical basis, it constitutes *Śabdanaya*. Acceptance of conventional meanings of words instead of etymological ones is *Samabhirudha naya*. When words are used in their original meanings to describe the existing form of a thing it is *Evambhūta naya*. Of these seven *nayas* the first three have been placed under the category of *Dravya naya* and rest four under the category of *Paryāya naya*.

Metaphysics

The visible world is constituted by two basic elements in their mutual relationship. These elements are - *Jīva* and *Ajīva*.

Jīva

Jīva is a *chetan* entity. It is endowed with consciousness, the essential characteristics of which are perception and knowledge. It is imperceptible and its existence is realised through its characteristic qualities in a material body. *Jīvas* are of two kinds : (i) mundane (*saṃsāri* or *baddha*) and. (ii) liberated (*mukta*). Mundane *jīvas* are always in association with bodies and are subjected to the cycle of death and birth. The liberated *jīvas* are free from embodiment. They live in the state of perfection in the highest quarter of the universe.

The *jīvas* are infinite in number and they retain their individual entity. The *jīvas* are active agents and cause their own actions and in turn enjoy their fruits. They are endowed with intelligence which may be obscured but never destroyed. Thus, a *jīva* is actor, enjoyer and knower.

The mundane *jīvas* are divided in several categories on the basis of their number of sense organs. They are :

1. Ekendriya Jīvas : The *ekendriya jīvas* are endowed with only touch sense organ. They are of five kinds according as their bodies are made up of earth, water, fire, air and vegetable substance. The first four, *Prithvikāya*, *Jalakāya*, *Agnikāya* and *Vāyukāya* are subtle forms of life while the fifth i.e. *Vanaspatikāya* is gross in form. They are elementary life forms.

2. Dvindriya Jīvas : They have only two sense organs of touch and taste such as worms etc.

3. Trindriya Jīvas : They have three sense organs of touch, taste and smell such as ants etc.

4. Chaturendriya Jīvas : They have four sense organs of touch, taste, smell and seeing such as bees etc.

5. Panchendriya Jīvas : They have five sense organs of touch, taste, smell, seeing and hearing. The category of the *pañcendriya jīvas* is the highest form from the point of view of the development. Among them, higher animals, men, denizens of hell and gods possess an internal organ or mind (*manas*) and are, therefore, called rational (*saṅgyin*), while lower animals have no mind and hence are called *asaṅgyin*.

Among the *ekendriya jīvas*, the lowest class is called *nigoda*. The *nigoda jīvas* are of infinite number. They live in common body and have common respiration and nutrition. The entire *lokākāśa* is packed with innumerable clusters of such *nigodas*. Their life-span is very short. They are in a very slow process of evolution and substitute those *jīvas* in the mundane world who have obtained liberation. Their number is so great that the world will never be empty of the *jīvas*.

There are four walks (*gati*) of beings viz. men (*manuṣva gati*), animals (*tiṛṛyach gati*) denizen of hell (*naraka gati*) and gods (*deva gati*). Of these the first two i.e. men and animals are visible and the rest two live in hell and heaven according to their deeds. Those who observe restraint and rigorously maintain in difference to worldly objects reach the state of *Kaivalya* and transcending these four walks of life obtain liberation (*moksa*). There is difference in body-constructions of men and animals on the one hand and denizens of hell and gods on the other. While the body construction of the former is gross (*audārika*) and does not undergo change in one life span, those of the latter is subjected to change and hence is called '*vaikriyika*'. In addition to these two bodies the mundane beings possess two more bodies- *taijasa* and *kārmaṇa*. The *Taijasa* body maintains contact between being and the atoms while the *Kārmana* body is the lump of the *karma*-atoms which are attracted by the different acts of the being. These two are the permanent and subtle bodies of the mundane beings. Some spiritually advanced beings adopt a different kind of body according to their spiritual need, which is known as '*āhāraka*' body.

Ajīva

Ajīva dravya as the very term denotes, is lifeless substance. Its essential characteristic is that it is devoid of consciousness. *Ajīva dravya* has been divided into five categories - *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma*, *ākāśa* and *kāla*.

Pudgala

Pudgala is matter and hence its existence is realised by senses. It is called *mūrta dravya*. The smallest unit of *pudgala* is atom (*paramāṇu*). By combination and dissolution of atoms different forms of objects are formed. It is because of this characteristics of combination and disintegration that it is called *pudgala*. The physical universe is constituted by these *pudgalas*. Sound, heat, light, shade, darkness, gross and subtle forms are the by products of matter.

Dharma

Dharma dravya is the second category of *ajīva*. It pervades in the whole *lokākāśa*. It is because of this substance that the movement of objects from one place to the other is possible. As water provides the basis of the movement of fish so this *dharma* substance is the basis of mobility of the objects of the world.

Adharma

As the *dharma dravya* is the basis of mobility so the *adharma dravya* is the basis of immobility. The objects of the world are seen both in the states of mobility and rest. The Jains have tried to explain this condition by postulating the *dharma* and *adharma* substances. The *ajīva dravya* also pervades the whole *Lokākāśa*.

Both *dharma* and *adharma dravyas* are non-physical, still, they have been conceived as real substances.

Ākaśa

The fourth non-living substance is *ākāśa*. This too is non-material. It provides space for the existence of all others. It is infinite and is divided into *alokākāśa* and *lokākāśa*. The existence of other substances is possible in *lokākāśa*. *Alokākāśa* is total void. It is an abyss of nothing.

Kāla

The fifth non-living substance is *Kāla* (time). This also pervades the whole *lokākāśa*. Time is beginningless and endless. It is because of it that modifications in other substances become possible. For practical purposes the time is divided into limited periods such as minutes, hours, days, months, years and ages.

Āsrava and Karma-Bandha

The defilement of *jīva* in the mundane state is directly connected with its association with matter. It is usual that the *jīva* acts and these acts are performed at mental, verbal and physical levels. As soon as the activity begins a stirring is caused in the inner regions of the soul and the atoms surrounding the *jīva* are attracted. The atoms start pouring in the soul. The pouring or influx of the atoms is called *āsrava*. With it begins the bondage because these atoms cling with the soul, force the *Jīva* to act according to their strength. Every action causes further inflow and bondage and this process continues. All the experiences of mundane *jīva* are conditioned by this influx and bondage, the experiences of pleasure and pain, incarnation in different walks (*gatis*) physical condition, social status, age and all other conditions of *jīva* are results of its deeds. Though many other schools of thought in ancient India believe in the retribution of *karma* but the doctrine of *karma* in Jainism is peculiar in the sense that it is material in its nature and negates the existence of any arbiter of the fate of the *jīva*. In fact, the doctrine of *karma* is the key-stone of Jainism.

Āsrava is of two kinds : (i) *Īryāpathika*, (ii) *Sāmparāyika*, *Īryāpathika āsrava* is of little effect because it is caused by simple and ordinary acts and does not create any lasting bondage. It ordinarily takes place every moment in every mundane *jīva* and is easily washed away. But the *Sāmparāyika āsrava* is of lasting effect because it is caused by the acts done under the impulse of passion. It does not leave the soul unaffected and it requires rigorous efforts to get rid of it.

When the subtle matter (*karma-paramāṇu*) is amalgamated by the soul, *karma-bandha* comes into existence. The Jains have rigorously worked out a detailed doctrine of *Karma*. A study of the early Jain canonical texts indicates that its form was simple in the beginning but it was highly elaborated by later Jain thinkers. We shall keep ourselves confined only to its early form.

The *kārmaṇa* body created by *āsrava* binds the soul in eight ways according to the potency of the *karma-paramāṇus*. They are of eight kinds which create different types of bondage.

Gyānāvaraṇīya Karma : It obstructs the faculty of knowledge of *jīva*. It is because of this bondage that the difference in the degree of knowledge and ignorance is seen in mundane *jīvas*.

Darśanāvaraṇīya Karma : This type of *karma* obscures right intuition or insight.

Mohaṇīya : This *karma* causes dilution with regard to faith, conduct, passion and other emotions.

Vedanīya : This *karma* is responsible for producing the experiences of pleasure and pain and obscures the bliss nature of the soul.

Antarāya Karma : This *karma* creates obstruction in the application of virtues and powers of soul in good actions.

Āyu Karma : This *karma* determines the length of life of *jīva* in god, denizen, man and animal *gatis* (states)

Gotra Karma : This determines the social status of *jīva* at the time of birth.

Nāma Karma : The personality of *jīva* i.e. body, health, complexion and other attributes is determined by this *karma*.

Each kind of *karma-paramāṇus* get bound with the soul in fixed number. Even the time-limit of each kind of *karma-paramāṇu* is fixed during which it exercises effects on soul and then is purged off.

Thus, according to the Jain doctrine of *karma*, the driving force of life of a mundane being is *karma*. In its mundane state it is always under the shackles of *karma*. But being (*jīva*) is endowed with the capacity of minimising and even annihilating the effects of *karma*.

The *Jīva* can free itself from the bondage of *karma* by resorting to two steps. The first is stopping the influx of *karma*, that is, blocking the channels of the inflow of *karma* into the soul. It is technically called *Samvara*. The second is destroying or burning off the already accumulated *karmas* and hence, is called *nirjarā*. The complete annihilation of *karma* leads the *jīva* to the state of *kaivalya* or liberation (*moksha*). In the state of liberation, the soul is restored to its pristine purity freed forever, from the cycle of death and birth. It attains all perfections - infinite knowledge, infinite bliss and infinite power.

The essential condition for reaching the state of liberation (*moksha*), the *summum bonum* of life, is the possession of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct which have metaphorically been described as *triratna* (three jewels). The first step on the path of *moksha* is that one who is desirous of obtaining it, should have full faith in the teachings of preceptors which are enshrined in the canons. He should have firm faith that only by

abiding by the canonical prescriptions and proscriptions, the supreme goal of life can be achieved. Once right faith (*samyak darśana*) is generated, his attitude towards other co-existents becomes righteous. His right kind of inclination enables him to comprehend the nature of reality as enunciated in the canons.

The second necessary condition for reaching the state of consummation is that the *jīva* should be equipped with right kind of knowledge (*gyāna*).

Gyāna is conceived as self-luminous as it shows to the soul not only object but also itself. Knowledge is not an external possession of the soul but is only a mode of the soul or self. It is an intrinsic property of the soul. It reveals self as a knower or subject as well as the objects of the world. As such knowledge is indispensable means to serve the ultimate purpose of *jīva*. It enables the *jīva* to choose the good and avoid the evil. Hence possession of right knowledge is essential for the progress on the path of the realisation of the ultimate goal.

In the Jain epistemology, knowledge is divided into mediate (*parokṣa*) and immediate (*pratyakṣa*). Mediate knowledge is derived through an intervening medium where as immediate knowledge is derived through direct perception without any intervening medium. Knowledge is of five different kinds viz. *mati*, *śruta*, *awadhi*, *manah-paryaya* and *kewala*. *Mati gyāna* arises out of the contact between the object and the senses. *Śruta gyāna* is the knowledge revealed by the scriptures. It involves inference as well as verbal testimony. *Awadhi gyāna* is a kind of extra-sensory perception. It is latent in every soul though not available to all. It has space-time limitation. *Manah Paryaya gyāna* refers to the thoughts in the minds of others. Those who are endowed with this knowledge can know the mental activities of others. It is higher kind of knowledge and can be had only by those who are spiritually advanced. *Kewal gyāna* is infinite knowledge. It is omniscience. It is conjoined with the attainment of liberation.

Jain Ethics

Right conduct is essential for the attainment of *moksha*. For the right conduct of the adherents of Jainism a specific code of conduct has been laid down. In this ethical code separate provisions have been made for householders and monks.

Ethical code for the Householders or Laity

1. Five *aṇuvratas*

The householder has to observe five vows viz. *ahiṃsā*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmacharya* and *aparigraha*. It has been enjoined on lay people that they will observe these vows as far as is possible. Since, living a worldly life it is not possible for a householder to strictly observe these vows so some concessions have been granted to him. This is why they are called *aṇuvratas*.

Ahiṃsā : Any act at physical, verbal or mental levels intended to inflict injury, pain or harm is violence. Killing and beating any being or inflicting physical pain in any mode to it is physical violence. The very thought of doing any harm amounts mental violence. Uttering harsh words to offend the feelings of any being is verbal violence. Total abstinence of these types of violence can not be expected from a householder. But he will have to take care of the fact the minimum injury is committed while discharging his duties.

Satya : A householder should observe truth fullness in his day-to-day life. He should not only abstain from speaking false, but also abstain from inducing others to do so. He is ordained to guard himself from approving other's falsehood, spreading false ideas, revealing other's secret, forgery of documents and breach of trust. Though sometimes the householder is emotionally forced to resort to falsehood he has to be cautious that such incidents are minimised.

Asteya : Taking away any thing secretly or by application of force over which one does not have proprietary right is theft. Making theft committed by others for himself, possessing things of stealth, export-import beyond the limits fixed by the state, use of false measures and weights and adulteration are other forms of theft and householder is instructed to abstain himself from these acts. However, he is permitted to take away things like clay, water etc. which are under no body's possession though the monks are restrained to take anything not given to them (*adattādāna se viramaṇa*).

Brahmacharya : Abstinence from sex and infatuation with opposite sex is *brahmacharya*. The householder should keep himself or herself satisfied with his or her wife or husband and treat all others as mothers, sisters, daughters or fathers, brothers or sons. Making others marry, intercourse with prostitute, unnatural sex, intensity of sexual passion, and talking of obscenity amount to violation of the vow of celibacy.

Aparigraha : The householder is permitted to have things essential for his livelihood, and he should fix the limit of his possessions. However, if his resources exceed his requirement he should spend them up in the works of public welfare.

The practice of these *aṇuvratas* is intended to cultivate a spiritual culture of self control, self denial and detachment. In order to keep the householder steadfast on the path of spiritual progress provision of *guṇavratas* has been made. They are three in number, namely *dig-vrata*, *deśa-vrata* and *anartha-danda-vrata*. In pursuance of *dig-vrata* the householder should fix the limit of distance upto which he will move in this or that direction. Fixing an ocean, river, mountain or village as the limit of the area in which he has to move for a certain period of time is *deśa-vrata*. Through the *anarthadanadavrata* the householder is abstained from contemplating and possessing things which are not of his concern.

In order to further his spiritual advancement provision of four *śikṣāvratas* is made. They are -

1. ***Sāmāyika*** : This vow is observed by the householder to create in himself an attitude of equanimity and to get rid of sinful acts. In it he is required to retire to a peaceful place for sometime in order to contemplate and meditate on holy things.
2. ***Posadhopavāsa*** : In the observance of this vow the householder is required to keep fast on the 8th and 14th day of every fortnight and pass these days studying scriptures and keeping himself busy with religious activities.
3. ***Bhogopabhogaparimāṇa*** : In this vow the lay man is required to set a measure of food, drink and other comforts both in quantity and quality.
4. ***Atithi-Saṁbibhāga*** : In it he is required to serve monks and holy men who turn up at his residence with food, medicines and other things according to their wants.

In all, these are the twelve vows which a householder is required to observe. The whole course of right conduct is arranged in eleven stages which are called eleven *pratimas*. In this arrangement limitations of individuals and successive development have been kept in mind. In the last stage of this course, the layman is fully prepared to take up the career of a monk.

Discipline of Monk

A monk at time of initiation takes the five vows as stated above. He has to observe those vows in right earnest with all strictness. Since no concessions are granted in their observance they are called *mahāvratas*. *Moksha* is not possible without *saṁvara* and *nirjarā*. For it, not only the process of *karma*-bondage is to be stopped but the

annihilation of accumulated *karmas* is also essential. In order to enable the monk to emancipate himself from the bondage of *karma* and obtain liberation some specific ethical regulations have been made in addition to the great vows.

After initiation a monk is required to completely abandon all worldly possessions. At most, he can keep with him a jug, peacock feather and some religious books. He may wear clothes or remain naked. The salient features of monastic discipline are brought forth in the following lines.

Samitis :

While observing the great vows a monk is required to be very careful lest sinful acts would be committed. In order to avoid such sins he must observe five *samitis*.

1. ***Īryāsamiti :*** He has to be cautious in walking. He has to walk in day and to take care that no being is killed out of carelessness.
2. ***Bhāṣā samiti :*** He should observe restraint in his speech. He should abstain from flattery, condemnation, use of bitter words etc.
3. ***Aiṣaṇā samiti :*** He should take pure food offered to him greedlessly.
4. ***Ādānanikshepa samiti :*** While placing or taking up his articles he should be careful that no being is injured.
5. ***Pratisthāpanā samiti :*** While attending to the calls of nature and disposing of the refuse he should be careful that no being is injured or killed.

Pariṣaha :

In order to keep himself steadfast on the path to perfection a monk is required to bear the troubles without being disturbed. These troubles

are twenty two in number which a monk has to endure such as hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquito-bite, disgust, sexfeeling, illness and ill-treatment etc.

Ten Dharmas : A monk is required to conquer vices, namely, anger, pride, illusion and greed, and inculcate following ten virtues: forbearance (*kṣamā*), indulgence (*mārdava*), straightforwardness (*ārjava*), purity (*śauch*), truthfulness (*satya*), restraint (*saṁnyama*), austerity (*tapa*), sacrifice (*tyāga*), detachment (*akiñchan*) and celibacy (*brahmacharya*).

In addition to these *dharmas* or laws a monk is required to create certain feelings by reflecting upon some fundamental truths such as transitoriness of worldly objects, helplessness of man, worldly experiences are miserable etc. They have been called *anuprekshā* or *bhāvanā* and are enumerated to be twelve. Through their regular exercise monk's steadfastness on the path of salvation is strengthened.

Since bondage begins with the activities of body, mind and speech, and liberation is not possible without getting rid of this bondage, a monk is required to keep his body, mind and speech in strict control so that further *āsrava* and *karma-bādhā* would not take place.

A monk is required to practise austerities (*tapas*) for the stoppage of the inflow of new *karmas* and purgation of accumulated *karmas*. Austerity (*tapa*) has been assigned great significance in Jain ethics. Austerity is of two types-external and internal. External *tapa* comprises fasting, reduction in intake of food, selection of pure food from the beggings, abstinence from delicious food, residing in secluded places and exercise mortificatory postures under adverse conditions. The internal austerity (*tapa*) consists of spiritual exercises such as meditation, confessions and repentance, respectfulness and servitude to teachers and other learnedmen, study of scriptures and contemplation on their

teachings and control over vices like greed, anger etc. But contemplation is most important of all these internal austerities. Contemplation is concentration of mind on a certain object. The object of contemplation should be religious (*dharma*) and pure (*śukla*). Through religious contemplation which consists of concentration of mind to the truths revealed in the scriptures, perception is purified and steadfastness in the observance of the rules of conduct is strengthened. The pure meditation leads to final emancipation through different stages of spiritual advancement.

All these ethical regulations lead the monk to final liberation through different stages of advancement. This has been enunciated in the doctrine of *Guṇa-sthāna*. There are fourteen *guṇasthānas* i.e. fourteen stages of advancement which begin from the stage of *mithyātva* and ends with stage of *ayogakevalin*. Through these stages the seeker advances by degrees in true knowledge, in firmness of belief, in control of passion and in *saṁvara* and *nirjarā* and becomes pure and purer in successive stages. Finally, he obtains liberation after reaching the fourteenth stage i.e. *ayogakevalin* when he is liberated from the bondage of *karma*. Liberation is a stage of perfection-perfect knowledge, perfect bliss, perfect power and disincarnate.

1. Jacobi, H. - Lord Mahāvira in the Eyes of Foreigners, p. 16.
2. Barua, B. M. - A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy 1981, p. 380-381.
3. Ibid p. 381.
4. Ibid - p. 383.
5. Jacobi, H. S.B.E. XLV p. 27
6. Ibid - p. 32
7. Ibid - p. 30

The Āstika-Nāstika Dichotomy-A Review

The *āstika-nāstika* dichotomy of ancient Indian religious-philosophical tradition deserves serious consideration. It seems to have epitomised the earliest ontological dissension. With the development of philosophical speculations in course of time, the connotations of the terms *āstika* and *nāstika* also grew. It is imperative to study the semantic changes through the ages for understanding the history of philosophy. To ignore it is to invite confusion.

Pāṇini refers to *asti*, *nāsti* and *dista* as three distinct philosophical traditions existing prior to his times¹. It is highly rewarding to study the original meaning of these terms. Patañjali commenting on Pāṇini, states - '*asti iti asyamatlḥ āstikaḥ, nāsti iti asyamatlḥ nāstikah. Kāśikā*² explains these terms by saying that the *āstikas* are those who believed in *paraloka* (otherworld). Those opposed to it are *nāstikas*. The term *nāstika* is mentioned in at least two places in the *Manusmṛiti*. At one place *nāstika* has been said to be a denouncer of the *Vedas* (*Vedanindakaḥ*)³. But at another place the '*nāstikya*', '*Veda-nindā*' and '*devatānām kutsanam*' terms have been placed side by side and one has been instructed not to get indulged in such activities⁴, indicating thereby that *nāstikya* is some thing more than mere denouncement of the *Vedas* and the gods. In the dialogues of the Buddha and some later Buddhist works the *nāstiksa* are said to be persons not believing in the doctrine of *Karma* and transmigration⁵. The *lokāyatikas* have been condemned by the Buddha for not believing in the retribution of *karma* and consequent

future birth. Significantly, the word *paraloka* has been used in this context denoting abode of life after death.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa⁶ has used the terms *ātmastitā* and *nāstikya* as denoting two opposite views meaning thereby that the *nāstika* did not believe in the existence of soul whereas the *āstika* believed in it. In another verse he has placed *nāstika* in the category of those who perish owing to their non-belief in the fruitfulness of the rites prescribed by the *śrutis* and the *smṛtis*⁷. According to Śaṅkarācārya *āstika* is one who believes that the meanings enshrined in the *āgamas* are the ultimate truths⁸. In a number of contexts the *āstika* is said to be believer in the existence of God and *paraloka* and also a staunch adherent of his religious faith⁹. On the contrary, *nāstika* does not believe in God and *paraloka*. In this context, it is interesting to note that the traditional classification of Indian philosophical schools place the six systems of philosophy, namely, *Sāṃkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya*, *Mimāṃsā*, *Vaiśeṣika* and *Vedānta* in the category of the *āstika* philosophies whereas the Buddhist, Jain and Lokāyata schools in the *nāstika* category. These so called *nāstika* schools have been condemned for defiling the *Vedas* and their non-belief in the existence of God.

The references mentioned above present a very confusing picture of the *āstika* and *nāstika* traditions. In order to conceptualise the contradictions in meanings of these terms in proper historical perspective, it is necessary to analyse the development and interaction of the philosophical ideas in ancient India.

The oft-quoted references of the Buddhist and Jain literature about the thinkers of sixth century B. C. clearly show that a number of schools of thought were current which opposed the Vedic *Weltanschauung* and presented their alternative systems. The leaders of these schools have been called *gāṇācāryas* and *tīrthāṅkars*. As they were dissenters and non-believers who rejected the Vedic view of life, it may be surmised

that they were the first to be dubbed as *nāstikas*. Pāṇini's two categories of *āstika* and *nāstika* may, thus, be interpreted as the former being the category of those people who believed in and endorsed the Vedic view of life while the latter as the category of those who dissented and rejected it. The adherents of the Vedic tradition believed in the authority of the *Vedas*, the existence of God and the efficacy of rituals. Since the *nāstikas* did not endorse the Vedic view of life and the world and opposed it they were so branded and declared the denouncers of the *Vedas* and the Vedic gods, a refrain to be found right from the *Manusmṛiti* to the works mediaeval period.

The point of the *āstika-nāstika* dichotomy is rendered complicated by the evidence furnished by the commentaries of Patañjali and Kāśikā, the dialogues of the Buddha (*Majjhima Nikāya*) and some later works where that *āstika* is connected with the belief in the *paraloka* and the *nāstika* with the non-belief in it. As such, the Jain, Buddhist and *Ājīvikas*, then, can not be called as *nāstikas* because they believed in *paraloka*. This runs counter to the established tradition. But this contradiction is resolved once we go into the changes and development of the meaning of the term *paraloka*. There are two stages of the development of the connotation of the term *paraloka*. Originally, it connoted heaven and hell as is evident from its references in the *Rigveda* and *Atharvaveda*¹⁰. The concept of hell is absent in the *Rigveda* but it is found in the *Atharvaveda*¹¹. The references in these early texts indicate that the terms heaven and hell denoted the abodes of life after death where one had to experience pleasure and pain according to his deeds. The end of these experiences and return from these abodes is nowhere mentioned in early texts since the idea of rebirth was then non-existent. The meaning of the term *paraloka*, however, acquired a different shade in the later-Vedic period when the idea of *saṃsāra* and the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth had received wide acceptance. It, now, came to denote the life after death, the form of which was determined by the deeds done in

previous life, though its association with heaven and hell still remained in vogue. It is to be noted here that the heretical schools took quite a good number of words having cultural connotations from the existing tradition and used them in specific sense suited to their ontological perspectives. The terms *paraloka*, *swarga* and *naraka* have been used by the Buddhists and Jains, but their connotations in the Buddhist and Jain contexts are a little different from what we see in the Vedic tradition. While during the early Vedic period the stay in *paraloka* i.e. heaven or hell is interminable, the stay in heaven or hell is terminable according to the Buddhists and Jains and the doer is said to enter into new life after meting out the fruits of his deeds. Infact, in the Buddhist and Jain terminology, the term *paraloka* denoted life after death in general and not necessarily heaven or hell. Even the terms *swarga* and *naraka* acquired different meanings.

The Jain tradition recognises the four states of living beings viz. the *devagati*, *narakagati*, *tiryanchagati* and *manuṣyagati*. These are the four categories in which the beings in the cycle of death and birth are placed according to their deeds. The *devagati* and *narakagati* beings are those who live in *swarga* and *naraka* respectively according to their deeds. The being of any category may pass into any other category according to his deeds after the expiry of his residue *Karmic* effects. This obviates the idea of *swarga* and *naraka* in the Jain tradition which is quite different from the Vedic concept. Likewise, the Buddha also believed in the idea of *saṁsāra* and transmigration, hence outlook about *swarga* and *naraka* differed from the Vedic one. It is pertinent to mention here that though the Buddha was brought up in the Śramanic hot-house his temporal location made him prone to accommodating some ideas which were non-Śramanic in origin and were prevalent in his time. So, when the Buddha called someone as *nāstika* if he did not believe in *paraloka*, he, infact, unconsciously stepped into the shoes of the Vedic theologian who calls the dissenter as *nāstika* who did not believe in

the existence of *paraloka*. The point to be noted here is that the dissenter, who did not endorse the pivotal tenet of the tradition of a particular school, is called a *nāstika*. Contrary to it, one who had steadfast belief in the tradition is *āstika*.

Following this line of argument, we can convincingly explain as to why the designation *nāstika* has been used to those who did not believe in the existence of soul. In the beginning centuries after the Charistian era, the theory of soul had received wide acceptance in India. The believers in this theory, as such, were called *āstikas* and the non-believers as *nāstikas*. In this light, the use of the terms *ātmastitā* and *nāstikya* by Kumarila Bhatta is rendered comprehensible. In the same strain we can understand as to why the God-believers were called *āstikas* and the non-believers as *nāstikas*.

Thus, we can infer from the facts discussed above that the terms *āstika* and *nāstika* primarily meant believer and non-believer or dissenter respectively. With the change in the articles of belief and non-belief in course of religio-philosophic development, the connotation of the terms *āstika* and *nāstika* also changed.

1. *Aṣṭādhyāyī* - Pāṇini - 4.460.
2. *Paraloka astiti yasyamatiḥ saḥ āstikaḥ tadvipari to nāstikaḥ-Kāśikā*
3. *Manusmṛiti* - 2.11.
4. *Manusmṛiti* - 4.163.
5. *Majjhima - nikāya* 2.2.10 - *Majjhim - nikāya* Trans. Rahul Sāṅkṛityāyan 2nd edition p. 142
6. *Ślokavārtika - Ātmavāda* - 148; See *Dharmaśāstra Kā Itihāsa* Vol. V. P. 120 fn.
7. *Ślokavārtika* 3.65.
8. *Āstikyaṃ śraddhānata paramarthesvagamarthesu* - Śaṅkara
9. *Āstikaḥ śraddhāsch* - *Yāgyavalkya Smṛiti* 1.268.
10. *Atharva-veda* II 14.3; V.30.11
11. *Atharvaveda* XII 4.36.

General Bibliography

Texts and Translations

- Aitareya Brāhmaṇa : Ed. K. S. Agashe, Poona, 1896.
Trans. by A. B. Keith,
Hos, Vol. XXV, Cambridge, Mass., 1920
- Atharvaveda : Ed. with Sayana's Comm. by S. P. Pandit, Bombay, 1895-8.
Trans. in part, M. Bloomfield, SBE, Vol. XLII, Oxford, 1897.
- Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad : Ed. with trans. by O. Bohtlingk, Leipzig, 1889.
- Chhāndogya Upaniṣad : Ed. with trans. by O. Bohtlingk, Leipzig, 1889.
- Gopatha Brāhmaṇa : Ed. by Rajendra Mitra and H. Vidyabhushan, Calcutta, 1892.
- Kāthaka Saṁhitā : Ed. by Von Schroeder, Leipzig, 1900-11.
- Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa : Ed. by E. B. Cowell, Calcutta, 1891. Trans. by A. B. Keith, HOS, XXV, Cambridge, Mass, 1920.
- Pañchaviṁsa Brāhmaṇa : Ed. by A. VEDANTAVAGISA, Calcutta, 1869-74.
- Rigveda : Saṁhitā and Pāda text with Sāyana's Comm. Ed. by F. Max Muller (Second Edn.) 1890-2. Saṁhitā and Pāda text with Sayana's Comm. Critically edited by Vaidika Saṁsodhana Mandala, Poona, Four Vols. 1933, etc.
- Satapatha Brāhmaṇa : Ed. by A. Weber, London, 1885. Trans. by J. Eggeling, SBE, XII, XXVI. XLI, XLIII, XLIV,

Oxford, 1882-2000.

- Taittirīya Saṁhitā : Ed. by A. Weber, Berlin, 1871-72; with the comm. of Mādhava, Calcutta, 1854-99.
- Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini : Tr. by S. C. Vasu, Varanasi, 1891-1898.
- Bhāgavata Purāṇa : Ed. by V. L. Pansikar, Bombay, 1920, Eng. trans. by J. M. Sanyal, Calcutta, 1930-34.
- Mahābhārata : Eng. trans. by M. N. Dutt, Calcutta, 1885-1905.
- Rāmāyaṇa : Trans. into English prose by M. N. Dutt, Calcutta, 1892-94.
- Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha : Trans. by Cowell and Gough.

JAIN

(a) Canonical

- Āchārāṅga : Niryukti, Bhadrabāhu.
: Chūrṇi, Jinadāsagaṇi, Ratlam, 1941.
: Com. Śilāṅka, Surat, 1935.
: Trans. H. Jacobi, SE, XXII.
- Antagaddasāo : Com. Abhayadeva, Ed. by M. C. Modi, Ahmedabad, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Poona, 1932. Trans. L. D. Barnett, London, 1907.
- Anuttarovavaiyadasāo : Com, Abhayadeva, Ed. by M. C. Modi, Ahmedabad, 1932.
: Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Poona, 1932.
- Anuyogadvāra : Chūrṇi, Jinadāsagaṇi, Ratlam, 1928..
: Com. Haribhadra, Ratlam, 1928.
: Com. Maladhāri Hemchandra, Bhavanagar, 1939.
- Aupapātika : Ed. by N. G. Suru, Poona, 1936.
- Āvaśyaka : Niryukti, Bhadrabāhu
: Bhāṣya
: Chūrṇi, Jinadasagaṇi, Ratlam, 1928.

- : Com. Haribhadra, Āgamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1916.
- : Com. Malayagiri, Āgamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1928.
- : Niryukti Dīpika, Māṇikyāśekhara, Surat, 1939.
- Bhagavati** : Com. Abhayadeva, Āgamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1921, Ratlam, 1937.
- : Ed. by Jozef Deleu with introduction, critical analysis, commentary and indexes 'De Tempel' Tempelhof 37, Brugge (Belgie).
- Dasaveyāliya** : Niryukti, Bhadrabāhu.
- : Chūrṇi, Jinadāsagani, Ratlam, 1933.
- : Com. Haribhadra, Bombay, 1918.
- : Introduction and notes W. Schubring, Ahmedabad, 1932.
- Kalpāsūtra** : Trans. H. Jacobi, SBE, XXII, 2nd Reprint, Delhi, 1968.
- Nāyādhammakahā** : Ed. N. V. Vaidya, Poona, 1940.
- : Com. Abhayadeva, Āgamodaya, Bombay 1919.
- Niryavāliya** : Com Chandrasūri, Ahmedabad, 1938. Ed. Gopani and Chokshi, Ahmedabad, 1934, Ed. P. L. Vaidya, Poona 1932.
- Nisītha** : Bhāṣya
- Chūrṇi Jinadāsagani, Ed. Vijaya Prema Surisvara, V. S. 1995.
- Eka Adhyayana by D. S. Malavania.
- Samavāyāṅga** : Com. Abhayadeva, Ahmedabad, 1938.
- Sūtrakritāṅga** : Niryukti, Bhadrabāhu.
- : Chūrṇi, Jinadāsagani, Ratlam, 1941.
- : Bom. Śilāṅka Āgamodaya Samiti, Bombay, 1917.
- : Eng. Trans. by H. Jacobi, SBE, XLV, Delhi, Reprint 1964.

- Thānāṅga : Com. Abhayadeva, Ahmedabad, 1937.
- Uttarādhyayana : Niryukti Bhadrabāhu.
: Chūrṇi, Jinadāsagaṇi, Ratlam, 1933.
: Eng. Trans. by H. Jacobi, SBE, XLV, Delhi, Reprint 1964.
: Ed. J. Charpentier, Upsala, 1922.
- Uvāsagadasāo : Eng. Trans. by A. F. R. Hoernle, Calcutta, 1888, Ed. P; L; Vaidya, Poona, 1930.

JAIN

(b) Noncanonical

- Darśanasāra of Devasena, Ed. by N. R. Premi, Bombay, V. S. 1974.
- Daśabhaktyādi-saṃgraha of Pūjyapāda, MS
- Harivaṃśapurāṇa of Jinasena Sūri, Bombay, 1930, with Hindi Trans. Bhāratīya Gyānapītha, Kashi, 1962.
- Mahāpurāṇa (Ādipurāṇa and Uttarapurāṇa) of Jinasena and Guṇabhadra, Indore, V. E. 1973-75, with Hindi Trans. Bhāratīya Gyānapītha, Kashi, 1951-54.
- Mahāvīrachariya of Guṇachandra, Bombay, 1929, with Gujarāṭi Trans. Bhāvanagar, V. S. 1994.
- Mahāvīracharita of Nemichandra Devendragani, Jaina Atmānanda Sabhā, Bhāvanagar, 1933.
- Paṇiṣṭa-Parvan of Hemachandra, Ed. by H. Jacobi, Calcutta, 2nd edition, 1932.
- Paum-chariū (Rāmāyaṇa) of Vimalasūri, Ed. H. Jacobi, Bhavanagar, 1914.
- Tiloyapaṇṇati of Yativṛṣabha Ed. A. N. Upadhye & H. L. Jain, Solapur, 1951.
- Trilokasāra of Nemichandra, Bombay.
- Triśaṣṭiśālākāpuruṣacharita, trans. by H. M., Johnson, Baroda, 1930.
- Vardhamāna-charita of Asaga, Solapur, 1931.
- Vividha-tīrtha-kalpa of Jinaprabha, Ed. by Jinavijaya, Bombay.

BUDDHIST

- Aṅguttara-Nikāya** : Ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy, PTS, London, 1885-1900.
Tr. F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hare. *The Book of the Gradual Sayings*, 5 Vols. P.T.S. London, 1932-36; I & II Vols. 1951.
- Buddhacharyā** : (Being a Hindi translation of selected portions from the Tripitaka and Atthakahā Tr. by Rahula Sankrityayana, 2nd Ed. Sarnath, 1952.
- Dhammapada** : Text. Ed. by Rahula Sankrityayana, Rangoon, 1937.
: Eng. Trans. by F. Max Muller, SBE, oxford, 1898.
Ed. and trans. by Mrs. Rhys Davids, SBE, London, 1931.
- Dīgha Nikāya** : Ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, 3 Vols. PTS, London, 1890, 1903, 1911. Eng. trans. (*Dialogues of the Buddha*) by T. W. Rhys Davids. 3 Vols. SBB. London, 1899-1910, 1921. Tr. Rahula Sankrityayana in Hindi *Dighanikaya*, Mahabodhi Sabha, Sarnath, 1936.
- Jātaka** : Ed. V. Fausboll. 7 Vols. London, 1877-97. Eng. trans. under the Editorship of E. B. Cowell, 7 Vols. Cambridge, 1895-1913.
- Mahāvagga** : Ed. by N. K. Bhagat, 2 Vols, Bombay 1944-1952.
- Majjhima Nikāya** : Ed. by V. Trenckner and R. Chalmers, PTS, London, 1888-1902.
Eng. Trans. (*Further Dialogues of the Buddha* by Ford Chalmers, 2 Vols. SBE, London, 1926-27.
Tr. Rahula Sankrityayana in Hindi, Mahabodhi Sabha, Sarnath, 1933.
- Petavatthu** : Ed. by J. Minayeff, PTS, London. 1888.
- Samyutta Nikāya** : Ed. by Leon Freer, PTS, London. 1884-98. Indexes by Mrs. Rhys Davids, London, 1904. Eng. trans. (*Book of the kindred saying or Grouped Suttas*)

- by Mrs. Rhys Davids and F. L. Woodward, PTS, London, 1917-30.
- Sutta Nipāta : Ed. by D. Andersen and H. Smith, PTS, London, 1913.
Eng. trans. by V. Fausboll, SBE, Oxford, 1898. Ed. by Rahula Sankrityayana, Rangoon, 1937.
- Theri-gāthā : Ed. by H. Oldenberg, PTS, London, 1883. Eng. trans. (Psalms of the Brethren) by Mr. Rhys Davids, PTS, London, 1913.
- Thera-gāthā : Ed. by R. Pischel, PTS, London, 1883. Eng. trans. (Psalms of the Sisters) by Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS, London, 1885. Eng. Trans. by D. M. Strong, London, 1902.
- Udāna : Ed. by P. Steithal, PTS, London, 1885. Eng. Trnas. by D. M. Strong, London, 1902.
- Vinaya Pitaka : Eng. trans. (Vinaya Texts) by T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenderg, SBE, Oxford, 1881-85. Tr. by Rahula Sankrityayana in Hindi, mahabodhi Sabha, Sarnath, 1935.

MODERN WORKS

- Agrawala, V. S. : India as known to Pāṇini, Lucknow, 1953. Indian Art, Varanasi, 1965.
- Bandopadhyaya, N. C. : Economic Life and Progress in Ancient India, Calcutta, 1956.
- Banerjee S. C. : Dharma Sūtras, A Study in their Origin and Development, Calcutta, 1962.
- Banerjee A. C. : Studies in the Brāhmanas.
- Barua, B. M. : A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, Reprint 1970. Delhi. Gaya and Bodha-Gaya, Calcutta, 1934.
- Basham, A. L. : History & Doctrine of the Ājivikas, London, 1951.
- Bhandarkar, D. R. : Lectures on the Ancient History of India

(Carmichael Lectures, 1918), Calcutta, 1919.

- Chatterjee, A. K. : A comprehensive History of Jainism, Calcutta, 1978.
- Deo, S. B. : History of Jaina Monachism, Poona, 1956.
- Deva Krishana and Mishra,
Vijayakanta : Vaiśāli Excavations, Vaiśāli, 1961.
- Diwakar, R. R. : (General Editor) : Bihar through the Ages, Calcutta, 1959.
- Dutta, S. K. : Early Buddhist Monachism, London, 1924.
- Fick, R. : Social Organisation in North-East India in Buddha's Time, Tr. S. K. Maitra, Calcutta, 1920.
- Glassenapp, H. : Doctrine of Karma in Jain Philosophy Bombay, 1942.
- Jain, B. C. : Lord Mahāvira (A study in Historical Perspective), Benares, 1948.
- Jain, C. L. : Jaina Bibliography, Calcutta, 1945.
- Jaini, J. L. : Outlines of Jainism (Cambridge, 1916)
- Jain, Mnuī Uttam Kamal : Jain Seats and Schools Delhi, 1975.
- Jain, A. K. (Ed.) : Lord Mahāvira in the Eyes of Foreigners.
- Jacobi, Herman- "Jainism" : Encyclo paedia of Religion and Philosophy Vol. VII p.464-475.
- Jain, J. C. : Life in Ancient India as depicted in the Jain Canons, Bombay, 1947.
- Jain, J. P. : The Jaina Sources of the History of Ancient India, Delhi, 1964.
- Jain, K. C. : Jainism in Rajasthan, Sholapur, 1963. Malwa Through the Ages, Delhi, 1972.
- Jha, D. N. : Ancient India - An Introductory Outline.
- Kane, P. V. : History of Dharmasastra, 3 Vols., Poona, 1941.
- Law, B. C. : India as described in Early Texts of Buddhism and Jainism, London, 1941.
- History of Pāli Literature, 2 Vols, London, 1933.

- : Mahāvira, His Life and Teachings, London, 1937.
: Some Jaina Canonical Sūtras, Bombay, 1949.
: Indological Studies, I & II, Calcutta, 1962.
- Majumdar, R. C. and
Pusalker, A. D. : Ed. The Vedic Age, 2nd Impression, London, 1962.
- Malālśekhar, G. D. : Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names, London
- Macdonell, A. A. & Keith A. B. : Vedic Index of Names and Subjects, Oxford.
- Mishra, Yogendra : Ed. Homage to Vaiśāli, Vaiśāli, 1948.
- Mishra S. N. : Prāchin Bhārata meīn Grāma evaṁ Grāmya Saṁskṛitiyaṁ
- Mehta, Ratilal N. : Pre-Buddhist India, Bombay, 1939.
- Mishra, Yogendra : An Early History of Vaiśāli, Delhi, 1962.
- Pandey, G. C. : Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, Allahabad, 1957.
Śramaṇa Tradition-Its History and contribution to Indian culture.
- Pargiter, F. E. : Ancient Indian Historical Tradition, London, 1922.
- Rapson, E. J. Ed. : Cambridge History of India, Vol. I : Ancient India, Cambridge, 1922, Reprint 1935.
- Rhys Davids, T. W. : Buddhist India, ninth edition, Delhi, 1970.
- Schubring, W. : The Doctrine of the Jains, Delhi 1962.
: The religion of the Jains, Calcutta, 1966.
- Sen Amulyachandra : Schools and Sects in Jaina Literature, Calcutta 1931.
- Shah, C. J. L. : Jainism in North India, London, 1932.
- Sharma, R. S. : Material Culture and Social Formation.
- Singh, J. P. : Aspects of Early Jainism, Varanasi, 1972.
- Sirear, D. C. : A, Grammar of Prākṛit Language, Calcutta, 1942.
- Stevenson, Mrs. Sinclair : The Heart of Jainism, first Indian Edition 1970.

- Tatia, N. : Studies in Jain Philosophy, Varanasi.
- Thaper, Romila : Ancient Indian Social History.
- Tulsi : Pre-Vedic Existence of Śramaṇa Tradition.
- Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty : Karma and Rebirth in classical Indian Traditions 1983.
- Winternitz, M. : A History of Indian Literature, Calcutta, 1933.
- H. Zimmer : Philosophies of India.
- Hastimal : Jaina Dharma Kā Maulika Itihāsa, I, Jaipur, 1971.
- Jain, H. L. : Bhāratīya Sanskrit me Jaina Dharma Kā Yogadāna, Jabalpur, 1962.
- : Jaina Tīrtha Sarvasaṁgraha, Ahmedabad, 1953.
- Kalyān Vijaya : Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvira, Jalor, V. S. 1998.
- : Vira Nirvāṇa Saṁvata aura Jaina Kāla Gaṇanā, Jalor, 1930.
- Mukhtar, Jugal Kishore : Jaina Sāhitya aura Itihāsa para Viśada : Prakāśa, Delhi, 1956.
- Premi, N. R. : Jaina Sāhitya aura Itihāsa, Bombay, 1956.
- Shastri, K. C. : Jaina Sahitya kā Itihāsa, Varanasi, V.N.S. 2489.
- Vijayendra : Tīrthaṅkara Mahāvīra, Bombay, V. S. 2017

JOURNALS

- Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona Annual Reports of the Archaeological Survey of India.
- Epigraphia Carnatica.
- Epigraphia Indica, Otacamund.
- Indian Antiquary, Bombay.
- Indian Archaeology - A Review, Delhi.
- Indian Culture.
- Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.
- Jaina Siddhānta Bhāṣkara (Hindi-English)

Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta.

Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University, Calcutta.

Journal of Indian History, Tirvandrum.

Journal of the Numismatic Society of India, banaras.

Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda.

Nāgari Prachārīṇi Patrikā, Banaras.

Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference.

