SVABHĀVAPRATIBANDHA AGAIN

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Substantial improvement in our understanding of Dharmakirti’s thought depends on a considerable increase in research on various details of his theories and theorems, mainly on details of his linguistic and conceptual usage—not to speak, of course, of the philological toil still being owed to a respectable body of unedited and uninterpreted texts. A gratifying effort of this sort was recently made by Matsumoto Shirō with respect to the term svabhāvapratisaṁdhā. In a stimulating paper he examined the meaning of this term which is of significant importance in the context of Dharmakirti’s logical theory. Although his minute observations decidedly enlarged the scope for an interpretation of the term, his results are still not convincing and, moreover, methodologically problematic. I would, therefore, like to try once more to clarify the meaning of the term.

I.

To begin with, the following is a summary of the main points of Matsumoto’s article. In its first part (486f.) M. shows that Dharmottara’s interpretation of the compound svabhāvapratisaṁdhā as an instrumental-tatpurusha is not the only interpretation to be found within the commentators, but that we also find an interpretation as a locative-tatpurusha with Śākyamiti (M.: Śakya[buddhi]), the oldest commentator of the relevant text.

* I wish to thank Prof. Albrecht Wesler, Hamburg, who in a very helpful letter kindly explained to me the meaning of Durvekkamśa’s remarks in connection with sthānaṃ śriyastu (DrPr 110, 14–19).

* This paper was written in the spring of 1982 while I stayed in Kyoto as a guest of the University of Kyōto, invited by the Japanese Ministry of Education. I wish to thank the Japanese authorities, my colleagues, students and friends in Japan, and above all my host, Professor Kajiiyama Yūichi, for a most interesting, motivating and fruitful period of life.

Abbreviations used are the same as in Matsumoto’s article (cf. note 1) and in my edition and translation of the Pramāṇaviniścaya, 2nd chapter.


2 This is the interpretation on which I based my translation of the term in previous publications as referred to by M.
and the commentator generally considered as authoritative in the tradition of the school. M., however, considers both interpretations as "inadequate" in the light of his attempt to deduce the correct interpretation of the compound directly from Dharmakīrti's own contextual statements. The result of M.'s deductions in this second part (497-495) is a new interpretation: The term has two meanings "according to the two kinds of reason" (svabhāvaheu, kāryaheu). In case of a svabhāvaheu the compound must be taken as a locative-tatpuruṣa, in case of the kāryaheu as a genitive-tatpuruṣa. But, beyond that, the terms svabhāva and pratibandha which constitute the compound connote two different concepts respectively, too, as shown in M.'s conclusion by means of the formula "kāryaśya svabhāvasya pratibandhaḥ" and "bhāvaśya svabhāve pratibandhaḥ" to which he adds the translations "limitation of properties" and "counter-connection with its essence".

Before discussing M.'s derivations in detail, and re-examining the philological possibilities of a clear decision on the question, I would like to state in short the main systematical reasons for not being able to accept M.'s new proposals, so as not to obscure the basis for further discussions.

It seems to be generally accepted that Dharmakīrti offers a logical theory that is new in the Buddhist tradition of logic as founded by Dignāga. What exactly is new in this theory?

It is Dignāga's merit in the development of Indian logic to have clarified the formal possibilities of the nexus (vyāpti) between logical reason (hetu) and result (sadhya). And it is Dharmakīrti's merit to have answered the question for the reason of this logical nexus. The core of his answer consists in his explanation that—and how—this logical nexus is based on a relation in reality, and in which concepts such a basis in reality can be demonstrated. Thus, his answer is characterised mainly by two closely intertwined theorems: the theorem of a svabhāvapratibandha as the real basis of the logical nexus (avatattvā, niyama, vyāpti), and the theorem of the three kinds of logical reasons (trisiddhā hetu) for which such a real basis of their nexus with a result can be assumed.

The function of the term svabhāvapratibandha in Dharmakīrti's theory, therefore, is to indicate that relational character of reality which can be considered as the source and guarantee of logical necessity, too. Since the word pratibandha has only a formal meaning, the word svabhāva is responsible for connoting the reality needed. The conclu-

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4 Cf. my paper: Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti. WZKS 15, 1971, 179—211.
II.

Is it possible to deduce Dharmakirti's intentions with the term svabhāvapratibandha, i.e., the "correct" interpretation of the compound, directly from any of his statements? As far as I can see, Dharmakirti expresses himself nowhere in a way that such a deduction is possible. But before we try to find help elsewhere, we have to scrutinize Matsumoto's attempt to deduce the correct interpretation from the respective definitions of the two kinds of logical reasons, which is the major point of his article. M. thinks that "it can be assumed that the two modes of svabhāvapratibandha will no doubt be indicated" (my spacing) in these definitions "because the two kinds of reason do not deviate from the results only when there is svabhāvapratibandha" (497). This assumption would be appropriate, I admit, if Dharmakirti really gave a definition of his reasons. But, in fact, what Dharmakirti does in PV 1 2[=4] is only to give a list of the kinds of reasons: he states kārya and svabhāva in this verse, anupalabdhi follows. Dharmakirti only says that kārya is a logical reason, and specifies to what extent with regard to its properties. M., too, does not find the svabhāvapratibandha to be indicated in this "definition", for, to satisfy his quest for it, he quotes PVYSV 17, 61. And from this he concludes, that svabhāvapratibandha in the case of a kāryaketa must be "construed as 'svabhāvasya pratibandhaṁ' (limitation of svabhāva)", and he further interprets this as a "limitation of properties" (496).

The crucial mistake in his derivation is that he thinks, it is clear "that the phrase 'svabhāvasya niyamayati' explains the meaning of the word svabhāvapratibandha" (496). In fact, the two statements are only very indirectly related. Dharmakirti, after showing that only because of a svabhāvapratibandha there is the absence of a reason that is an essential property (svabhāva), continues to show the same for the absence of a reason that is an effect (kārya): "...or a cause (causes the absence) of an effect, because (the latter) does not deviate (from the former). [That means:] The absent cause causes the absence of the effect. Otherwise that (which is assumed to be the effect) would not be just the effect of this (cause). An established relation of cause and effect, however, restricts the essence (of the effect). The absence (of the reason), therefore, is caused only by the svabhāvapratibandha in the two ways (as just explained above)."

Here the meaning of the word svabhāvapratibandha is not explained by the phrase svabhāvasya niyamayati, but by kāryaketaṁ abhāva as one of the kinds of a svabhāvapratibandha which are referred to by the word abhāyaṅketa. This relation of causality is the cause of the absence of an effect as logical reason, because it has restrictive force (niyamayati) on the essence of the effect. In other words, the restrictive determination (niyama) of the svabhāva is the consequence, the effect of an extant svabhāvapratibandha, not this relation itself.

M.'s derivation, that the term svabhāvapratibandha must be analysed as a genitive-attributa, i.e., svabhāvasya pratibandha ("limitation of properties") in case of the kāryaketa is, therefore, ungrounded. Moreover, his interpretation of the term pratibandha as "limitation" seems to have no other reason than the need for such a "limitational" connotation on account of his own assumption that this pratibandha was indicated in the kāryaketa-"definition" of PV 1 2. Yet, such a meaning is questionable at least, and would have to be established by a separate argument.

In order to show how the svabhāvapratibandha is indicated in the "definition" of the svabhāvahetu M. quotes PV 1 23 a-c and the explaining sentences of PVYSV 17, 1-3. In his interpretation he differentiates the relation (M.: connection) in question according to whether it is a "svabhāva-ābhāva connection", which he identifies as "anubandha" 8

8 abhāyaṅketa I understand as indicating the two modes of the svabhāvapratibandha that have been explained before the tī (PVYSV 16, 28—17, 7), since a modal translation of adverbs in -aṁ is to be preferred to a local one. M. translates it locally: "Therefore in both cases [i.e. svabhāvaṁ and kāryaketaṁ]...

9 kāryaṁ vā kāryaṁ anuvāhitaṁ (PV 1 23 c-d = [25 c-d]) kāryaṁ māvārthikaṁ kāryaṁ nirvāyayati, anyaṁ tathā kāryam eva na syah, svabhāvasya kāryaketaṁ svabhāvapratibandhaṁ eva māvārthiḥ. PVYSV 17, 4-7.

10 Cf. the famous verse PV 1 31 (=33): kāryaketaṁ abhāvaṁ svabhāvasya vā priyaketa vā svabhāvapratibandhaṁ eva māvārthiḥ. PVYSV 17, 4-7. // On the meaning of svabhāvasyaṁ cf. my paper "Wirklichkeit und Begriff" (note 4) 188f., and on the restriction of the properties of an effect by the properties of its cause cf. HB § 4. 21 and § b. 12214, and my notes in HB II, 125-129.
to by Matsumoto: *tsama* tannatrasambandha svabhavo bhavya eva va nivartayet (PV 1 23 a-c [25 a-c]) --- svam ca svabhavo parityajya kathaṃ bhavo bhavet, svabhavayaiva bhavatvata (PVSV 17, 1f.). --- "Therefore, either an essential property (svabhavo) which is connected only with the [existence of the other property] would cause the absence of this very property (bhavo), --- And how could the property (bhavo) exist without its essence (svabhavo), since that very essence (svabhavo) is the property (bhavo)?"

The terms involved may be exemplified in accordance with Śākyamati's explanations:

The designation or concept "tree" as property to be proven (sādhyo) is connected, being an essential property (svabhavo), only with the existence of the reason, the designation or concept "Śīmāpā." From its absence, therefore, follows the absence of the latter necessarily. Since it is inconceivable, that the property (bhavo) with the designation "Śīmāpā" should exist without its own essence which is designated as "tree," "for it is only a particular (reality) with branches etc. that is known (by) such (a name, i.e. Śīmāpā)." The reason for this impossibility, then, is that the very essence which is called "tree" is the property (bhavo) that is called "Śīmāpā." Or, in other words, that the two designations or concepts are essential properties (svabhavo) of the same reality or essence (svabhavo). The limiting eva, thus, serves to emphasize that the designation-property "Śīmāpā" is limited to the reality "tree": There is no "Śīmāpā" that is not a "tree."

M's idea, further, that the "connection (sambandha) between bhavo and svabhavo has two directions" in agreement with which an anubandha and a pratisambandha have to be differentiated, cannot be supported by any statements from Dharmakirti or the commentaries. The word anubandha occurs in our context only in attributive positions

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11 The "definition" of PV 1 2 [c-d] (14 [c-d]) is repeated (cf. ... bhiṣer bhād panic te [PV T 66a2] = ... pārvatam anuvadasi [PVSVT 107, 24]) in PV 1 3 [b-c] (41ab), just before the discussion on apoha. In addition we have the description of the concomitance in difference (vyāsikā) of PV 1 23a-c (25c-c).

12 Cf. PVT 15a6: yad saṃkramaṇaḥ 'cintā na ca [121ab]: svam P) gita gani tākṣahi yad na tam dekh 'cintā na ca gya na bhavi gani tākṣahi te = PVSV 29, 13f.: bhūtvamātrānudrīhi hētuv yad bhūtvamātrānudrīhi bhavo hētuv. Cf. my "Wirklichkeit und Begriff" (note 4), 205 and note 97 for a translation of this definition's repetition in PV 1 23a-b (41a-b).

13 PVSV 4, 2: tadāhyam by ariṣṭasaṁśāntarūpānapadye eva ... ... 

14 PVSV 24, 11-15.
and indicates, as such, the concomitance of the property to be proven (sadhyadharma). The word pratibandha, however, is not a term for that same relation, only with another direction, but for that relation which is the real basis of any concomitance. The preposition prat-, here, has the meaning "towards, near to" and can be considered as being translated by "con" in M.'s rendering "connection". The use of prat- has the purpose only to emphasize the closeness of the connection, if it has any. pratibandha in this function, i.e., meaning the real basis of the logical nexus, is synonymous with sambandha.

Because of the originality and methodological importance of Matsumoto's attempt to deduce the correct meaning of the term from contextual evidence it was necessary to discuss his results in detail. Since his attempt was not successful, I think, and since I do not see another possibility to deduce Dharmakirti's intention with the term in a similar way, there is only one resort left: the old commentators.

21 Cf. e.g., HB 41, 8: anubandho 'nugamanam vyajitah.
22 If taken with the meaning "against, counter-", pratibandha has to be translated as "obstacle", since it connotes a binding, fixation, which is "against". Thus, M.'s "counter-connection" (496) cannot be the meaning of the word, because this translation translates these two concepts that can alternatively be meant by the one word "prat-" at the same time.
23 The Tibetans, e.g., translate pratibandha just by 'brel pa.
24 The Tibetan translation of the compound is of no help for a decision on the kind of tarpurṣa intended, because
a) it has been made in all probability by Subhūtisrī (Sānti) and dGe ba's blo gros, the team that also translated the Kūrikā and Devendrabuddhi's commentary on the other chapters in the 11th century. Thus, whatever their interpretation was, it would be in accordance with a late exegetical tradition.
   b) The majority of instances (PVS 10, 24= PVS; 411a11; 17, 2f=414b8; 17, 7=415a1; 17, 12=415a3; 53, 27=441a2) shows a literal translation by a compound (ran bsin 'brel pa) which I am tempted to call a "compound of embarrassment", i.e., not knowing—and not needing to know—how to analyse the compound exactly, it is taken—and certainly with good right—as too well known to need an exact translation with a particle determining the relation between the compound's members. Since 'brel pa is connected with the particle dan, naturally this particle would have to be supplemented in the first place.
   c) In fact, there are two instances (PVS 2, 1f= PVS; 408b4; 3, 3f=406b7) that show a translation with this locative particle dan: i.e., ran bsin dan 'brel pa. The translators, thus, have chosen the particle naturally ruled by the noun 'brel pa: this choice, however, does not necessarily indicate that the compound has been interpreted as an instrumental-tarpurṣa strictly speaking, a locative-tarpurṣa being possible as well. It only says that an interpretation as an instrumental-tarpurṣa cannot be ruled out for certain.

d) As to the genitive-particle to be found in PVS, 510b3f.(=PVS 147, 11), cf. below. p. 446.

III.

Dharmakirti's concept of the term svabhāvapratibandha has not changed, in my opinion, since he propounded a theory of the logical nexus and its basis in his first work. In this work the term occurs in the following places: PVS 2,19f.; 3,4; 10,24; 17,2f.; 17,7; 17,12; 53,27; 147,11. "Old" commentaries on these texts are the Pramāṇavārttika-tīkā (PVT) of Śākyamati (ca. 660–720 A.D.), the Pramāṇavārttika (sva) vṛttītiṣṭā (PVSVT) by Karṇapakgomin (around 800 A.D.), and—for the "parallel texts" of the Pramāṇavārttika-tīkā—the Pramāṇavārttika-carya (PVTn T) of Dharmottara (ca. 750–810 A.D.).

The following table gives the relevant passages in the commentaries. The sign of equation means that Karṇapakgomin copied his text from Śākyamati's; if negated (≠) it means that he did not copy from Śākyamati. In brackets I add the Sanskrit ending for the first part of the compound when either available from the grammatical analysis in the commentary, or to be assumed safely in the case of the Tibetan translations.

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25 This is the original form of the present Pramāṇavārttika, first chapter, together with its "commentary"; cf. E. Frauwallner: Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakirtis. Anasata, Festschrift Friedrich Weller. Leipzig 1954, 142ff.
26 Although the Tibetan translation of pratibandha chosen here, viz. rgya la po, shows that the interpreters emphasized the meaning of "dependence", which is definitely the meaning of the word in PVS 147, 3 where this pudgalal-relation derivation begins, the meaning of the compound is the same as in the other places where 'brel pa is the usual translation.
From among these texts the explanations given on PVSV 2,19f. are most suitable for an attempt to understand the variations extant in the analysis of the compound. The wavy line in the following texts indicates the words from PVSV, and a straight line indicates the explanatory analytical phrasing of the first part of the compound (svabhāvâ-), as far as of relevance to our problem.

1: PVSV 2,19f.: svabhâvapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham na svabhācarati.
1a: PVT 128f.: yān ci te [D: cis te P] dīnas po bhgrub pa gnis kho na yin kie na / rahi bīn dañ 'brel po kes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / rahi bīn bhgrub par bya bīn dīnas po dañ 'brel pa ni de la rag las pa nid de de yod na'o //
1b: PVST 23,19f.: kim punar drat eva vasteśadhanav iti dha (svabhâvapratibandha iti), svabhâvâna pratibandhâh, sadhanam kyàti samâsâh, svabhâvâna pratibaddhatvan, pratibaddhavabhâvatvan iti yāvat. tasmin saty yato.
1c: PVVin 235b3: rahi bīn 'brel pa ni rahi bīn gnis 'brel pa st / 'brel pa'ī rahi bīn kes bya bai don to / de yod na ......
1d: NBT 110,1f.: svabhâvânapratibandha iti, svabhâvâna pratibandhah, sadhanam kyàti samâsâh, svabhâvânapratibaddhatvan pratibaddhavabhâvatvan iti artha.
1e: NBT, 62a2f.: ... rahi bīn 'brel pa kes smos te / rahi bīn gnis 'brel pa yin te / rahi bīn 'brel pa ni bīr bai ni rahi bīn nid ces bya bai don te /

While Śākyamati (text 1a) interprets the compound clearly as a locative-tatpurūṣa, Kārṇakagomin (text 1b) does not follow this interpretation. Instead he interprets it as an instrumental-tatpurūṣa. There is no doubt that Kārṇakagomin has copied Śākyamati's explanation in the context; thus the way the text of the PVT was used by Kārṇakagomin for this particular piece of explanation is quite telling: While the context and the introduction are faithfully copied from PVT, the analysis of the compound itself is taken from another source whose interpretation was evidently favoured by Kārṇakagomin. This interpretation is Dharmottara's analysis as an instrumental-tatpurūṣa. The rest of Kārṇakagomin's explanation has been taken, in fact, from Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭṭika (Text 1d). Dharmottara's commentary (Text 1c) on the parallel-text in PVVin II is not likely to be the source for two reasons: Although Dharmottara analyses the compound as an instrumental-tatpurūṣa in the PVVin II, too, the remaining paraphrase is still limited, less redundant, and — above all — it is only in NBT 110,2ff. that Dharmottara gives a well-formulated reason for his analysis as an instrumental-tatpurūṣa, i.e. that it has the advantage of expressing the connection in both kinds of logical reasons by means of a single compound.

To summarize: Śākyamati explains the compound as a locative-tatpurūṣa, svabhāvâ to be the sadhyavastu, and "connection with ....." to mean "dependence upon .....". Kārṇakagomin substitutes for this Dharmottara's interpretation as an instrumental-tatpurūṣa, which Dharmottara stated first — possibly — in his PVVin II, and then repeated with the addition of a clear argument for the value of this new interpretation in the NBT. The decisive difference between the two kinds of explanation seems to be indicated by the fact that only Śākyamati identifies svabhāvâ as sadhyâ.

This account for the material situation can be corroborated by the limited evidence coming from the explanations of PVSV 10,1f.

2: PVSV 10,1f.: ... tayoh kacit svabhâvapratibandho 'py esāvajah.
2a: PVT 33a8f.: ... bigrub par bya ba dañ sgrub pa de gnis de'i bdag nid dañ / de las byun bai mithan nid kyis 'brel pa 'ga' / sig kyân 'dod par bya dgos te /
2b: PVST 57,17f.: ... tayoh sadhyasādhanayoh kacit svabhâvâna pratibandhah sadāmyadadutaspatīsukṣmo 'py esāvajah.
2c: PVVin 324b5f.: ... de gnis rahi 'brel pa'i 'brel pa ni 'dod par bya dgos

While Śākyamati (text 2a) gives no analysis of the compound, not repeating the first member at all, but instead inserting the terms for the two kinds of the connection, Karnaka-

28 The introduction of Kārṇakagomin's explanation was copied from Śākyamati, for the texts immediately preceding and following have also been copied (PVSVT 22, 10-22; 23 = PVT 11b7-12a8; 12b1); but the pratiṣṭha was lost.
29 Kāśyapa's Vārttika 2 on Pāṇini 2.1.33; it also occurs as a sūtra in Śākyāntimata's 2.1.37 (ed. Bombay 1907, 121).
30 The following svabhâvapratibandha of the extant editions must be deleted (as in Ms. C of Mulavāni's edition).
31 This explanation of the compound with reference to Kāśyapa's Vārttika has no correspondence in the Tibetan translation (NBT) but must be considered as being supported by the parallel in PVSVT.
32 As indicated first by Matsumoto, loc. cit. 498.
33 Explaining NB 2.19: svabhâvapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham gosmayet.
34 NBT 110,2.4: kārṇa svabhāv ca sadhyā svabhāvāna pratibandhāh kārṇavābhāvānyor avitiṣita ity ekena samatena dvayor ep samgrahah. Cf. also Dārśin 110, 2ff. where in continuation of Dārśin 110, 17ff. the originality of this explanation is distinctly accented. Cf. also below p.79f.
35 For Kārṇakagomin's using Dharmottara's PVVin cf. my paper of note 27. MESS I, note 23.
36 Kārṇakagomin's dependence on the NBT in case of the text under examination is, to my knowledge, the only instance noted so far to establish the relation between these two texts.
gomin (text 2b) — who copies the PVT here — adds svabhāvā. He, thus, emphasizes again his preference for the interpretation as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa; and it is probably his own addition, since PVin T (text 2c) on the parallel text of PVin II gives no analysis of the compound at all. It must be underlined that svabhāvā of text 2b explains the connection between the two, sādhya and sādhana, and cannot mean one of these properties themselves. And this calls our attention to an important implication of this formulation of Dharmakīrti: Since it is logically impossible to say that “between two items there is a connection of/with one of these two”, svabhāvā—must be taken as an attributive explanation of pratibandha. In the light of this, Śākyamati’s substitution of svabhāvā for the term for the two kinds of the connection in an instrumental (tattvamāyatadutpaditakṣayena) must be considered as being motivated by the same reasons.

A look at the explanations of PVSV 17, 2f. brings further clarity:

3: PVSV 17, 2f.: ... iti tasya svabhāvapratibandhād atvabhācitraḥ.

3a: PVT 47a6f.: gata tathas deśi ṣhīr sgrub pa śiṅ la pa la sogs pa dbod niid du gyur pa de ni raḥ bhin ‘brel pa kha na’i phyir te raḥ bhin bigrub par bya bar ‘dod pa śiṅ la sogs pa dahn ji skad blad pa rnam pa ‘brel pa kha nas ‘khrul pa med do ||

3b: PVSV 75, 14f.: iti hetos tasyātmaḥataḥ sādhanasya sādhyaḥkārā prakāraṇa pratibandhāt svabhācitraḥ.

3c: PVIN T 34b5: des na śiṅ la pa śiṅ kyi no bo dbod par byed pa (?) bigrub par bya ba’i no bo la ‘brel pa yin la ‘brel pa shiṅ phyir na ‘khrul ba med do ||

These texts analyse the compound as a locative-tatpuruṣa, and they all explain the first member, svabhāvā, to mean the sādhya. This, evidently, is the reason why Dharmottara and Karṇākagomin, too, do not deviate from Śākyamati here: the first member of the compound does not explain the pratibandha.

4: PVSV 17, 12: tasmāt svabhāvapratibandhād eva hetub sādhyaṃ gamayati.

4a: PVT 47b5f.: gan gi phyir de lta yin pa deśi phyir raḥ bhin ‘brel pa kha nas bigrub par bya bar ‘dod pa dahn pa ‘doh pa dahn ‘brel pa kha nas ... ||

4b: PVSV 76, 9: yata eva tasmāt svabhāvapratibandhāt eva sādhyaḥkārān eva pratibandhākharotad eva ... ||

4c: PVIN T 34a7: deśi phyir raḥ bhin ‘brel pa kha nas ‘zes bya ba ni raḥ bhin gyi ‘brel pa yin pa ‘hyi phyir.

The explanation of the compound as a locative-tatpuruṣa is coupled again with that of svabhāvā as meaning sādhya in Śākyamati’s (text 4a) and Karṇākagomin’s paraphrase (text 4b) which is copied from the former. The analysis as a genitive-tatpuruṣa by Dharmottara (text 4c) — if it is not a corruption (gys for gyis) — could mean nothing other than Dharmottara takes svabhāvā to mean the sādhana instead of the sādhya.

This analysis as a genitive-tatpuruṣa is also to be found in the explanations of PVSV 53, 26f. and 147, 10f. (cf. texts 5b, 6a).

5: PVSV 53, 26f.: tattvapratidharmā bhavah svabhāvapratibandhād apekṣate nāma ... ||

5a: PVT 142a1: ... raḥ bhin ‘brel ciṅ raṅ la pa’s phyir phan par byed pa blitos pa les bya ste ||

5b: PVSV 218, 26: svabhāvasya pratibandhāt ayattavād apekṣate nāma upakāryam.

6: PVSV 147, 10f.: na ca tajjanmalakṣanāt svabhāvapratibandhād anyāḥ pratibandho nāma.

6a: PVT 400a6f.: skye ba’i mithan niid can te | skye ba’i dbok po can gyi raḥ bhin gyi raṅ la pa la raṅ lus pa les bya ba gian yod po ma yin no ||

6b: PVSV 528, 17f.: ... na hi janmalakṣanājanmanvabhāvāt svabhāvapratibandhād anyāḥ pratibandho nāma.

Both passages differ from those discussed so far, in that they do not talk about svabhāvapratibandha in the context of logic, as the basis for the necessary nexus between two concepts. Rather, more generally, they refer to the svabhāvapratibandha-idea as the only reason for dependance. In the first statement, which serves a discussion of the sādanyā (text 5), dependance (apekṣa) is said to be based on the svabhāvapratibandha; and the second statement (text 6), serving a discussion of the pūdgalā, rules out all connections except for the svabhāvapratibandha. In both cases only the causal connection is intended. Here, the first member of the compound, svabhāvā, does not mean the sādhya, of course, but the actual essence of something. Since the term, as used here, means the whole entity, without any abstract properties being taken into consideration in the context, the analysis as a tatpuruṣa with an objective genitive “connection of the essence” is a natural explanation. But this genitive-tatpuruṣa is not the same as that of text 4c because of the different connection of the term svabhāvā. Thus, strictly speaking—because the intention of the term svabhāvapratibandha is limited here to causality only—the analysis as a genitive-tatpuruṣa as in the case of these two occurrences does not contribute directly to an understanding of the term’s meaning as the real basis of the necessary logical relation.

The conclusion to be drawn from this material is evident: The different analyses of the compound as instrumental-, genitive-, and locative-tatpuruṣa result from the respective interpretation of the meaning of the compound’s first member. If svabhāvā was
understood to mean *sādhya*, the property to be proven, the compound is analysed as a locative-tatpurṣa; this is the case in texts 1a, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b. And if taken to mean *sādhanā*, the proving property (possibly in text 4c), it would be analysed as a genitive-tatpurṣa. In texts 1b, 1c, 1d and 2b, however, *svabhāva* does not mean one of the properties, but the essence, nature, thing itself. In these cases the compound is analysed as an instrumental-tatpurṣa. Here it is particularly instructive to note that Śākyamati’s interpretation as a locative-tatpurṣa (text 1a) which is combined with an interpretation of *svabhāva as sādha* has been substituted by Karṇapakagomī with Dhammadharita’s interpretation as an instrumental-tatpurṣa while at the same time dropping the interpretation of *svabhāva as sādha* from the copied text.

Since the material used in this investigation was strictly limited to the few occurrences of the term *svabhāva-pratibandha* in the PVś and the early exegetical tradition, the proposal of the following working-hypothesis may be useful to enlarge the meaning of our conclusions with a few to further research: Before a decision is made on the analysis of the compound, the meaning of *svabhāva* must be determined. It either means one of the logical properties (*dharma*) or the essence, the real thing (*svārāpa, atman*).

In the first case mainly the *sādhyadharma* will be meant, but — generally speaking — there is an analytical alternative. The compound can be explained, then, either as a genitive-, or as a locative-tatpurṣa with reference to the fact that the two cases represent the linguistic way to express the two different ends of the relation in question: The connection (*pratibandha*) is one of that which is connected — in our case usually the logical reason (*hetu*) — with that with which it is connected. In other words, we may assume that an analysis of the compound as a genitive-tatpurṣa is given with the meaning “connection of the *svabhāva*, i.e. the *hetu*”, and an analysis as a locative-tatpurṣa with the meaning “connection with the *svabhāva*, i.e. the *sādhyā*”. Naturally, we can find statements where both ends of the connection are indicated as, e.g. in PVś 17, 21 (cf. texts 3 and 2a, 3b). If *svabhāva* means the essence, an analysis as instrumental-tatpurṣa is the correct one. That it is taken with this meaning in the compound already by Dhamakṛiti is clear because of the implications of his words PVś 10, 24 (text 2). It seems to be Dharmottara, however, who takes this interpretation to be the correct one also in at least one other crucial instance of the term (cf. texts 1c, 1d) where it was not applied previously (cf. text 1a).

One question remains to be answered with regard to this analysis as an instrumental-tatpurṣa: What kind of instrumental? In our case it can only be taken as causal or as modal. Modern interpreters show some fluctuation between these two possibilities. I have found no statement of Dhamakṛiti so far which allows a safe exclusion of one of them. Considering the “logic” of the expression, however, it is difficult to find a clear line of separation between the two connotations. After all, if something is connected “by its essence”, it is connected “essentially” because this kind of “cause” is contemporaneous. Since even from a text looking as modally as Durvēkamśīra’s *aḥ svārāpya kvaścid ayattas tayo svabhāvas tatra pratibandha ayatta iti* (DhPr 110, 21f) we cannot deduce a definite exclusion of a causal translation, I think that both translations are acceptable, while the modal one, e.g. with an adverb, is usually more practicable.

IV.

It has been assumed above that Dharmottara found it better to interpret the term *svabhāva-pratibandha* as an instrumental-tatpurṣa (texts 1c, 1d) at its occurrence most consequential for an understanding of the theory of the logical nexus, e.g. PVś II 10, 14 and NB II 19. In NBT 110, 2-4 Dharmottara adds a sentence to his analysis of the compound with a view to showing the value of this interpretation: *kāraṇe svabhāve ca sādhya svabhāvena pratibandhah kāryasyavabhāvavasarvyo avaitī tasya ekena samāsena dvaya api saṁghrahaḥ*. This sentence is important for two reasons: It gives a clear survey of Dharmottara’s interpretation of the case-relations involved, and it allows the consideration of possible historical implications when he concludes “Thus [the connections] of both of these (reasons) are summarily stated by one and the same compound.”

For, if we follow Durvēkamśīra’s comments (DhPr 110, 17-19 and 23f.), the phrasing *ekena samāsena* means some emphasis on this interpretation as bringing an advantage (*atilaya*) over another, older one which explained the compound as a genitive-tatpurṣa in case of the *kārya-hetu*, and as a locative-tatpurṣa in case of the *svabhāwahetu*,

37 Cf. above, p. 434.


39 Cf. p. 434.

40 I.e. a connection by essence/essentially (*svabhāvamāna*) of a proving essential property (*svabhāva*) with an essential property to be proven (*svabhāva sādhyā*).
thus referring actually to two different compounds. Moreover Durvekamitra's phrasing (especially in DhPr 110, 23f.) clearly reveals that he considered this new interpretation to be Dharmottara's achievement. It must be noted, however, that Durvekamitra is the only one known so far to know of this interpretation which relates the compound to the two kinds of reasons respectively. Dharmottara's statement as such does not need to be taken other than as an explanation that the svabhavapratibandha is the same for both kinds of reasons. Beyond that, since the various explanations of the compound discussed above all agree on the fact that this would be the same in each case for both kinds of reasons, and since I tried to explain why Matsumoto's proposal for a solution similar to the one possibly indicated here cannot be accepted, I have to admit that I still do not know whose interpretation could be considered as having been improved by Dharmottara. We, also, cannot exclude the possibility that Durvekamitra offers a piece of over-interpretation here.

V.

That the terms tādātmya (PVS V 4, 2) or tādātma (PVS V 2, 21) are synonyms of tadbhāvāta — and not terms for M.'s "two directions" of the connection in logical context (495), is evident from PVS V 17, 13: sa ca tadbhāvakāyas tadbhāpattiyakalakṣaṇaḥ vā. The term denotes that real connection, connection in reality, which provides the basis of the logical nexus between an essential property as reason (svabhāvatetum) and the respective essential property to be proven (sadbhyam).

The best support for the translation of tādātmya etc. by "real identity" or, short, "identity" are those sentences where Dharmakīrti lays the foundation for the need to deal with the apoha-theory. The beginning of the first passage (PVS V 2, 2f—3, 3) is sufficient for our purpose here. When Dharmakīrti says: sa ca tadbhāpattīvat ("And this

41 It does not seem to be Vinitadeva's, whose paraphrase on the beginning of NB II 19 I do not really understand, however: rājan bīṇa dār bīre pa dār rājan bīṇ a gī ṣo bīre pa ni rān bīṇ  gī sī bīre pa se i :) (NB T 64, 6f.). The instrumental no bō (if it is not a corrupta for no bō) could indicate that the interpretation as a modal instrumental-tapārūṣa was already thought of before Dharmottara, perhaps without a particular argument for such as the one given by Dharmottara.

42 The second passage introduces the apoha-digression: ya eva tari krtakā sa evantyam bhedabhāvat pratiṣṭhārakudhriya hetvayam. maṇi dūṣayin, yamant---(PVS V 24, 16f.). And the third, concludes this digression: tāna svabhāvakṣaśa tadbhāvaśah bhavisyate' pānāni tadbhāvakṣaśaśadharmajñānavyākatan man na pratiṣṭhārakudhriya hetu iti (PVS V 93, 35).

43 For Dharmakīrti's concept of bheda cf. PVS V 20, 21f.

44 I have to admit that in writing note 2 of my paper: On the Interpretation of the svabhāvatetum. WZKS 13, 1974, 117—129, I should have referred to Dharmottara's explanation. As far as I can remember, I did not think of it, then. Rather I thought only of the "usual way" of translating it, not making myself sufficiently aware of the fact that this translation must be traced to Stecherbatsky's knowledge of Dharmottara's interpretation.

45 PVS V 12b3: de ni sē bha ni rāan bīṇ dār bīre pa'ū/ de di bāggo nīd yin pāi phir yin ni bhāg guh par bya ho'it bāg pī mā bhāg pū sā bha ni bāg guh par bya ho'it bāg yin ni = PVS V 23, 11f.: sa ca svabhāvapratibandhaḥ...tadbhāpattīvat iti sadbhāvabhāvatvat.

46 PVS V 12b5: de'it bāg guh nīd yin na sē bha ni gāl te sābhāg guh par bya ho'it bāg nīd yin ni = PVS V 33, 21f.: tadbhāpattīvat sadbhāvabhāvatvat sadbhāva.
The explanation of the compounds from the previous page is too short (cf. PV 18b1f., PVST 29, 15).

The crucial statement in the Hetubindu is HB 4, 31: to sādhyadharmasya vastas tadāhāvataya sādhanādharmahābhavamātānubhandhahābhavādīdhiḥ (= "... is the proof that the property to be proven follows only the presence of the proving property because in reality [the property to be proven] is the essence [bhāvā] of that [proving property].""). The compound sādhetvā, here, is explained as a tatpurusa by Araśa. 47

47 The explanation of sādhetvā from PV 4, 2 is too short (cf. PV 18b1f., PVST 29, 15).

48 PV 47b1f.: deśi bo māśa māṇī nād eva bha la gos pa'i bhrug par bya bo' r la bha' e gi yo bo' māśa māṇī nād...=PVST 76, 11ff.: sādhetvāpithaka iti sādhyadharmahābhavādīdhiḥ.

Additional support is given by the short paraphrases of sādhetvā from PV I 27a (=29a) and a number of passages in the Viṣṇu on vv. 27-29 (=29-30).

49 Cf. PVST 29b12, 12 (sādhetvā) and 10, 15 (sādhetvā) 7, 25; 46, 18ff. and 33 (sādhetvā).

50 Cf. PVST 235b6: guh gi phyar bhrug par byed par de bhrug par bya bo' r la bha' e gi yo bo' māṇī nād yin pa de nābhāvās.

51 Cf. PVST 224a6f., 340e7f., 345a7f.

52 Cf. PVST 228b12f.: bhrug par bya bo' r la bha' e gi yo bo' māṇī nād yin pa de nābhāvās.

53 NBT 63a2: bhrug par bya bo' r la bha' e gi yo bo' māṇī nād yin pa de nābhāvās.

Cf. also the formulation of NBT 162, 12 which corroborates an interpretation as a bahuvrihi: ye ki sādhyadharmahābhavamātānubhandhahābhavādīdhiḥ, sa eva sādhanādharmahābhavādīdhiḥ nābhāvā.

And of NBT 162, 15f.: tattvata eva sādhyahābhavādīdhiḥ (sic 1) yah sādhanāyasya sādhanāvātasya.

54 NBT 65, 1f.: tattvata 'yād bhrug par bya bo' r la bha' e gi yo bo' māṇī nābhāvās.

55 HBT 41, 15-17: sādhanādharma bhāvābhavādīdhiḥ sādhanādharma bhāvābhavādīdhiḥ sādhanādharma bhāvābhavādīdhiḥ sādhanādharma bhāvābhavādīdhiḥ sādhanādharma bhāvābhavādīdhiḥ sādhanādharma bhāvābhavādīdhiḥ sa kathāṃ tathāgatānubhandhaya (= 'This, [i.e.] the proving property; the existence [bhāvā] [i.e.] the essence [bhāvā] of which, because it is the existence-essence [bhāvā] of that. How could the proving property, being the essence [bhāvā] of the property to be proven, not follow this [property to be proven]?')

But on another comparable occasion Arcaṭa prefers to interpretate tādātman- of HB 8, 13 as a bahuvrihi.

Thus we find two interpretations of the compounds tādātman-, tādāhāvā-: as a tatpurusa by Śākyamati, Karṣūkṣāgomin, Arcaṭa and Dharmottara (PVST), and as a bahuvrihi by Arcaṭa and Dharmottara (NBT and PVST). I have to admit that I could not find a statement in these commentaries that would provide some information as to a distinct reason for such a twofold explanation of the compound, nor can I think of one.

We have to keep in mind, however, that the meaning of the compound within the context of Dharmakīrti's theorem of the svabhāvatpratibandha remains the same, whether it is taken as a tatpurusa or as a bahuvrihi.

For, interpreted as a tatpurusa, it means that the concept of the proving property (sādhanādharma, hetu) is, in reality, the essence (atman, bhāvā) of the property to be proven (sādhyadharmā). And taken as a bahuvrihi, it means that the concept of the proving property has the property to be proven, in reality, as its essence (atman, bhāvā).

The difference between the two solutions is, that in the case of the tatpurusa-solution the concept of the hetu is introduced as being reduced to its reality, thus serving as the real essence of the concept of the sādhyā; and in the case of the bahuvrihi-solution these positions are reversed. Since the function of the compound within the contextual theorem remains unchanged, it is possible that there was no awareness in the commentators, e. g. Arcaṭa and Dharmottara, that it needed to be dissolved in one particular way only. It seems that this is one of those cases where the modern scholar has a problem that was none to the tradition under examination, and where, therefore, he looks for an answer that was never given.

With regard to the term tādātmya we can observe that the earlier explanations of the compound tādātman- take it as a tatpurusa, while—possibly starting with Arcaṭa—it is then also understood as a bahuvrihi. In both cases of explanation, however, the term tādātmya indicates the fact, that one property is in reality the same as the other property. 56

56 Cf. HBT 83, 5: tādātmano yo yasya svabhāvatā tattvabhāvatāyasya......
petty, and the rendering of the term as "real identity" or just "identity" is appropriate.

Methodically speaking, it is a legitimate and desirable procedure to try to understand a theorem by basing oneself on Dharmakirti's work alone. It is sometimes—e.g., where we suspect a development of a theory in Dharmakirti's works—the only approach possible, as I shall show on another occasion. But when the commentators differ from the results deduced out of Dharmakirti's statements alone, we have to give, in addition, a convincing explanation for that difference. If we do not, or cannot account for this difference of interpretation in a historically reasonable way, our interpretation of Dharmakirti's statements may only be a mis-interpretation and certainly needs to be re-examined.