

## SVABHĀVAPRATIBANDHA AGAIN\*

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Substantial improvement in our understanding of Dharmakīrti's thought depends on a considerable increase in research on various details of his theories and theorems, mainly on details of his linguistic and conceptual usage—not to speak, of course, of the philological toil still being owed to a respectable body of unedited and uninterpreted texts. A gratifying effort of this sort was recently made by Matsumoto Shirō with respect to the term *svabhāvapratibandha*. In a stimulating paper he examined the meaning of this term which is of significant importance in the context of Dharmakīrti's logical theory. Although his minute observations decidedly enlarged the scope for an interpretation of the term, his results are still not convincing and, moreover, methodologically problematic. I would, therefore, like to try once more to clarify the meaning of the term.

### 1.

To begin with, the following is a summary of the main points of Matsumoto's article. In its first part (498f.) M. shows that Dharmottara's<sup>2</sup> interpretation of the compound *svabhāvapratibandha* as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa is not the only interpretation to be found within the commentators, but that we also find an interpretation as a locative-tatpuruṣa with Śākyamati (M.: Śākyabuddhi), the oldest commentator of the relevant text,

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Abbreviations used are the same as in Matsumoto's article (cf. note 1) and in my edition and translation of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, 2nd chapter.

1 *Svabhāvapratibandha*. *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 30, 1981, 498-494.

2 This is the interpretation on which I based my translation of the term in previous publications as referred to by M.

and the commentator generally considered as authoritative in the tradition of the school.<sup>3</sup> M., however, considers both interpretations as "inadequate" in the light of his attempt to deduce the correct interpretation of the compound directly from Dharmakīrti's own contextual statements. The result of M.'s deductions in this second part (497-495) is a new interpretation: The term has two meanings "according to the two kinds of reason" (*svabhāva* and *prati-bandha*). In case of a *svabhāva* the compound must be taken as a locative-tatpuruṣa, in case of the *kārya* as a genitive-tatpuruṣa. But, beyond that, the terms *svabhāva* and *prati-bandha* which constitute the compound connote two different concepts respectively, too, as shown in M.'s conclusion by means of the formula "*kāryasya svabhāvasya prati-bandhaḥ*" and "*bhāvasya svabhāve prati-bandhaḥ*" to which he adds the translations "limitation of properties" and "counter-connection with its essence".

Before discussing M.'s derivations in detail, and re-examining the philological possibilities of a clear decision on the question, I would like to state in short the main systematical reasons for not being able to accept M.'s new proposals, so as not to obscure the basis for further discussions.

It seems to be generally accepted that Dharmakīrti offers a logical theory that is new in the Buddhist tradition of logic as founded by Dignāga. What exactly is new in this theory?

It is Dignāga's merit in the development of Indian logic to have clarified the formal possibilities of the nexus (*vyāpti*) between logical reason (*hetu*) and result (*sādhya*). And it is Dharmakīrti's merit to have answered the question for the reason of this logical nexus. The core of his answer consists in his explanation that—and how—this logical nexus is based on a relation in reality, and in which concepts such a basis in reality can be demonstrated. Thus, his answer is characterised mainly by two closely interwoven theorems: the theorem of a *svabhāvapratibandha* as the real basis of the logical nexus (*avinābhāva*, *niyama*, *vyāpti*), and the theorem of the three kinds of logical reasons (*trividha hetu*) for which such a real basis of their nexus with a result can be assumed.

The function of the term *svabhāvapratibandha* in Dharmakīrti's theory, therefore, is to indicate that relational character of reality which can be considered as the source and guarantee of logical necessity, too. Since the word *prati-bandha* has only a formal meaning, the word *svabhāva* is responsible for connoting the reality needed. The conclu-

sion to be drawn is: The meaning of the word *svabhāva* in the compound *svabhāvapratibandha*—when used as a term to indicate the reason of the logical nexus—can only be "essence", Dharmakīrti's denotation for the real being as a totality of various causal possibilities.

An interpretation of the term like M.'s "limitation of properties" in case of the *kārya* seems therefore unacceptable. For the term understood in this way would lose its function within the theory. A "limitation of properties" is no indication of the real basis of the logical nexus, and we would have to continue asking for the reason of such limitation.

Secondly: Although Dharmakīrti uses the term *svabhāva* in texts of relevance here with two meanings according to a difference resulting from usage either in ontological or logical statements, it can have only one meaning in case of the term *svabhāvapratibandha*, and that is the ontological one. A differentiation of the meaning of the word *svabhāva* in the case of this term according to whether it is used to indicate the reason for the nexus of the *kārya* or the *svabhāva* would, in fact, render the term meaningless, since it could no longer serve to indicate the sufficient reason of logical necessity. Then, of course, a totally new interpretation of the term's function, and, beyond that, of the character of Dharmakīrti's logic as such, and particularly with respect to its historical originality, would be necessary. From his paper I cannot see whether M. intended to propose such a new interpretation, rather I have the impression that he was not aware of these consequences when he tried to solve the riddle of the meaning of the compound.

Finally: No doubt, the best way to interpret the meaning of a term is by means of observing its immediate context, i. e. by deduction from related statements by Dharmakīrti himself. If the result of such a deduction, however, differs from an interpretation extant in the exegetical tradition, the latter cannot be discredited simply with reference to one's own interpretation of the dharmakīrtian context. Rather one's own interpretation of Dharmakīrti's terms and statements can be secured and supported only when a reasonable explanation is given for (a.) the cause for the difference of an exegetical opinion in the commentators from the opinion supposed to be Dharmakīrti's by the investigating scholar, and (b.) for the development of different opinions in the commentaries—if there are such differences. To wit: The "wrong reading" has to be explained with regard to its causes, too.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. my paper: Philological remarks on Śākyamati's *Pramāṇavārttika*. In: *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf*, Wiesbaden 1980, 283f.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. my paper: Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti. *WZKS* 15, 1971, 179–211.

## II.

Is it possible to deduce Dharmakīrti's intentions with the term *svabhāvapratibandha*, i. e. the "correct" interpretation of the compound, directly from any of his statements? As far as I can see, Dharmakīrti expresses himself nowhere in a way that such a deduction is possible. But before we try to find help elsewhere, we have to scrutinize Matsumoto's attempt to deduce the correct interpretation from the respective definitions of the two kinds of logical reasons, which is the major point of his article.

M. thinks that "it can be assumed that the two modes of *svabhāvapratibandha* will no doubt be indicated" (my spacing) in these definitions "because the two kinds of reason do not deviate from the results only when there is *svabhāvapratibandha*" (497). This assumption would be appropriate, I admit, if Dharmakīrti really gave a definition of his reasons. But, in fact, what Dharmakīrti does in PV I 2[=4] is only to give a list of the kinds of reasons: he states *kārya* and *svabhāva* in this verse, *anupalabdhi* follows. Dharmakīrti only says that *kārya* is a logical reason, and specifies to what extent with regard to its properties. M., too, does not find the *svabhāvapratibandha* to be indicated in this "definition", for, to satisfy his quest for it, he quotes PVSV 17, 6f. And from this he concludes, that *svabhāvapratibandha* in the case of a *kāryahetu* must be "construed as '*svabhāvasya pratibandhaḥ*' (limitation of *svabhāva*)", and he further interpretes this as a "limitation of properties" (496).

The crucial mistake in his derivation is that he thinks, it is clear "that the phrase '*svabhāvaṃ niyamayati*' explains the meaning of the word *svabhāvapratibandha*" (496). In fact, the two statements are only very indirectly related. Dharmakīrti, after showing that only because of a *svabhāvapratibandha* there is necessity in the absence of a reason that is an essential property (*svabhāva*), continues to show the same for the absence of a reason that is an effect (*kārya*): ".....or a cause (causes the absence) of an effect, because (the latter) does not deviate (from the former). [That means:] The absent cause causes the absence of the effect. Otherwise that (which is assumed to

5 loc. cit., 497—495.

6 It is difficult to follow M. when he speaks of "two modes of *svabhāvapratibandha*", because one, naturally, thinks of *tadatmya* and *tadutpatti* as the "two modes" of this relation. But this does not seem to be the meaning of M.'s expression. Rather "the two meanings of the term *svabhāvapratibandha*" is what he means by "the two modes," because these two meanings are the issue of his arguments.

7 *siddhas tu karyakāraṇabhāvaḥ svabhāvaṃ niyamayattī ubhayatha svabhāvapratibandhād eva nirvṛttiḥ*.

be the effect) would not be just the effect of this (cause). An established relation of cause and effect, however, restricts the essence (of the effect). The absence (of the reason), therefore, is caused only by the *svabhāvapratibandha* in the two ways (as just explained above)."

Here the meaning of the word *svabhāvapratibandha* is not explained by the phrase *svabhāvaṃ niyamayati*, but by *kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ* as one of the kinds of a *svabhāvapratibandha* which are related to by the word *ubhayatha*. This relation of causality is the cause of the absence of an effect as logical reason, because it has restrictive force (*niyamayati*) on the essence of the effect. In other words, the restrictive determination (*niyama*) of the *svabhāva* is the consequence, the effect of an extant *svabhāvapratibandha*, not this relation itself.

M.'s derivation, that the term *svabhāvapratibandha* must be analysed as a genitive-tatpuruṣa, i. e. *svabhāvasya pratibandhaḥ* ("limitation of properties") in case of the *kāryahetu* is, therefore, unfounded. Moreover, his interpretation of the term *pratibandha* as "limitation" seems to have no other reason than the need for such a "limitational" connotation on account of his own assumption that this *pratibandha* was indicated in the *kāryahetu*-definition of PV I 2. Yet, such a meaning is questionable at least, and would have to be established by a separate argument.

In order to show how the *svabhāvapratibandha* is indicated in the "definition" of the *svabhāvahetu* M. quotes PV I 23a—c | and the explaining sentences of PVSV 17, 1-3. In his interpretation he differentiates the relation (M.: connection) in question according to whether it is a "*svabhāva→bhāva* connection", which he identifies as "*anubandha*

8 *ubhayatha* I understand as indicating the two modes of the *svabhāvapratibandha* that have been explained before the *iti* (PVSV 16, 28—17, 7), since a modal translation of adverbs in *-tha* is to be preferred to a local one. M. translates it locally: "Therefore in both cases [i. e. *svabhāvahetu* and *kāryahetu*],....." (497). That it must be taken modally, and that it means the two ways "as just explained above" is also the opinion of Śākyamati who says: *de bas na bśad ma thag pa'i tshul gyis gñi gar tes bya ba ni* (PVT 47b2). The modal meaning is further corroborated by the following paraphrase: *de'i bdagñid dan / de las byuñ bu'i mshanñid kyis* (PVT 47b2) = *tadatmyena tadutpattiya va* (PVSVT 75, 23f.).

9 *kāraṇaṃ va kāryaṃ avyabhicarataḥ ||* (PV I 23|c—d [=25|c—d]) *kāraṇaṃ nivartamānaṃ kāryaṃ nivartayati. anyatha tat tasya kāryaṃ eva na syāt. siddhas tu karyakāraṇabhāvaḥ svabhāvaṃ niyamayattī ubhayatha svabhāvapratibandhād eva nirvṛttiḥ*. PVSV 17, 4-7.

10 Cf. the famous verse PV I 31(=33): *karyakāraṇabhāvad va svabhāvad va jñamakat / avina-bhāvanīyamo 'darśanān na na darsanāt ||* On the meaning of *svabhāvanīyama* cf. my paper "Wirklichkeit und Begriff" (note 4) 188f.; and on the restriction of the properties of an effect by the properties of its cause cf. HB § 4. 21 and § b. 12214, and my notes in HB II, 125—129.

(connection, following)", or a "*bhāva*→*svabhāva* connection" which he identifies as a "*pratibandha* (counter-connection, followedness)". His solution for the interpretation of *svabhāvapratibandha* is, that in case of a *svabhāva*hetu it must be understood "as *svabhāve prati bandhaḥ* (connection with *svabhāva*)" (496).

But what is the meaning of Dharmakīrti's "definition" of a *svabhāva*hetu?<sup>11</sup> The "definition" *svabhāve bhāvo 'pi bhāvamātrānurodhini* (PV I 2|c-d [=4|c-d]) means: "[And] also a property (*bhāva*) [is a logical reason] for (another) essential property (*svabhāva*) which follows only (the first property's) real existence (*bhāva*)."<sup>12</sup>

The *svabhāvapratibandha* indicated here and shortly mentioned in support of the definition is made more definite in the commentary on the repeated definition when Dharmakīrti says: *yo hi bhāvamātrānurodhi svabhāvas tatrāvinabhāvo bhāvasya iṣyate. — tadabhāve svayaṃ bhāvasyabhāvaḥ syād abhedataḥ* (PV I 39cd [=4|c] 171cd) *— yā eva bhāvo bhāvamātrānurodhi svabhāva ity ucyate, sa eva svayaṃ vastuto bhāvaḥ. sa cātmanam parityajya katham bhavet.*<sup>13</sup> "A property (*bhāva*) is assumed to have a necessary connection (*avinabhāva*) with that (other) essential property (*svabhāva*) which follows only (its) real existence (*bhāva*). — [For] if this (property) was absent, the (other) property (*bhāva*) itself would also be absent, since [the two are factually] the same (*abhedata*). — The very property (*bhāva*) which follows only the existence (*bhāvamātra*) [of the other property] and is called 'essential property (*svabhāva*)', just this is in reality (*vastutaḥ*) the [other] property. And how could this (other property) exist without itself [i. e. without that property which it—factually—is itself]?"

The same description of the *svabhāvapratibandha* is given when Dharmakīrti supports the necessity of the concomitance in difference (*vyatireka*), the text that is referred

to by Matsumoto: *tasmāt tanmātrasambandhaḥ svabhāvo bhāvaṃ eva va nivaṛtayed* (PV I 23 a-c [=25 a-c]) ..... *svaṃ ca svabhāvaṃ parityajya katham bhāvo bhavet, svabhāvasyaiva bhāvatvāt* (PVSV 17, 1f.). = "Therefore, either an essential property (*svabhāva*) which is connected only with the [existence of the other property] would cause the absence of this very property (*bhāva*), — ..... And how could the property (*bhāva*) exist without its essence (*svabhāva*), since that very essence (*svabhāva*) is the property (*bhāva*)?"<sup>15</sup>

The terms involved may be exemplified in accordance with Śākyamati's explanations:<sup>16</sup> The designation or concept "tree" as property to be proven (*sādhyā*) is connected, being an essential property (*svabhāva*), only with the existence of the reason, the designation or concept "Śiṃśapā". From its absence, therefore, follows the absence of the latter necessarily. Since it is inconceivable, that the property (*bhāva*) with the designation "Śiṃśapā" should exist without its own essence which is designated as "tree", "for it is only a particular (reality) with branches etc. that is known (by) such (a name, i. e. 'Śiṃśapā')."<sup>17</sup> The reason for this impossibility, then, is that the very essence which is called "tree" is the property (*bhāva*) that is called "Śiṃśapā". Or, in other words, that the two designations or concepts are essential properties (*svabhāva*) of the same reality or essence (*svabhāva*). The limiting *eva*, thus, serves to emphasize that the designation-property "Śiṃśapā" is limited to the reality "tree": There is no "Śiṃśapā" that is not a "tree".<sup>18</sup>

M.'s idea, further, that "the connection (*sambandha*) between *bhāva* and *svabhāva* has two directions" in agreement with which an *anubandha* and a *pratibandha* have to be differentiated, cannot be supported by any statements from Dharmakīrti or the commentaries. The word *anubandha*<sup>20</sup> occurs in our context only in attributive positions

11 The "definition" of PV I 2|c-d (=4|c-d) is repeated (cf. .... *bśhor bśad pa bzlas te* [PV T 66a3] = ..... *pārvoktam anuvadati* [PVSVT 107, 24]) in PV I 39ab (=41ab), just before the digression on *apoha*. In addition we have the description of the concomitance in difference (*vyatireka*) of PV I 23a-c [=25a-c].

Since M. does not translate the crucial terms *bhāva* and *svabhāva*, both of which are used in their capacity to denote different concepts, I do not really know, however, how to understand his translation.

12 Cf. PVT 15a8: *yod tsam dan 'brel pa can* (D12b4: *tsam P*) *gyi gtan tshigs yod pa tsam dan 'brel pa can gyi no bo ni gtan tshigs te* = PVSVT 29, 13f.: *bhāvamātrānurodhini hetu sabbhāvamātrānurodhini bhāvo hetuḥ*. Cf. my "Wirklichkeit und Begriff" (note 4), 205 and note 97 for a translation of this definition's repetition in PV I 39a-b (=41a-b).

13 PVSV 4, 2: *tadātmayā hy arthasya tanmātrānurodhiny eva* .....

14 PVSV 24, 11-15.

15 The example was introduced PVSV 16, 30f.

16 Cf. PVT 47a2-5(= PVSVT 74, 27-78, 14; cf. also PVInt 343a6-b5).

17 PVSV 16, 30f.: *śakhadimadviśeṣasyaiva kasyacit tathāprasiddheḥ*.

18 Cf. Matsumoto 495. 19 loc. cit. 496f., as explained above (cf. p. 464).

20 And its synonyms which are either substantives in second position of a bahuvrīhi, or possessive adjectives, as is clear from the following examples: *bhāvamātrānurodhin* (PV I 2d [=4d], PV I 39b [=41b], PVSV 24, 11, 14), *tanmātrānurodhin* (PVSV 4, 2) *tanmātrānubandhin* (PVSV 6, 26), *tanmātrasambandha* (PV I 23a [=25a]), *\*tadbhāvamātrānurodhin* (PVInt II 53ab), *svasattamātrābhāvin* (NB II 15), *sādhunadharmabhāvamātrānubandha* (HB 4, 4), *sādhunadharmabhāvamātrānvayin* (HB 5, 10), *sādhunadharmamātrānvaya* (VN 9, 5f.).

Matsumoto's reference to PVSV 6, 26f. (note 11) is, in addition, useless for his purpose, because *svabhāvo bhāvasya* there means the essence of the causal complex (*bhāva* = *hetusamagrit*); cf. "Wirklichkeit und Begriff" 185.

and indicates, as such, the concomitance of the property to be proven (*sādhya-dharma*).<sup>21</sup> The word *pratibandha*, however, is not a term for that same relation, only with another direction, but for that relation which is the real basis of any concomitance. The preposition *prati-*, here, has the meaning "towards, near to" and can be considered as being translated by "con-" in M.'s rendering "connection".<sup>22</sup> The use of *prati-* has the purpose only to emphasize the closeness of the connection, if it has any. *pratibandha* in this function, i. e. meaning the real basis of the logical nexus, is synonymous with *sambandha*.<sup>23</sup>

Because of the originality and methodological importance of Matsumoto's attempt to deduce the correct meaning of the term from contextual evidence it was necessary to discuss his results in detail. Since his attempt was not successful, I think, and since I do not see another possibility to deduce Dharmakīrti's intention with the term in a similar way, there is only one resort left: the old commentators.<sup>24</sup>

21 Cf., e. g., HB 41, 8: *anubandho 'nugamanam vyāptih.*

22 If taken with the meaning "against, counter-", *pratibandha* has to be translated as "obstacle", since it connotes a binding, fixation, which is "against". Thus, M.'s "counter-connection" (496) cannot be the meaning of the word, because this translation translates these two concepts that can alternatively be meant by the one word "*prati*" at the same time.

23 The Tibetans, e. g., translate *pratibandha* just by '*brel pa*'.

24 The Tibetan translation of the compound is of no help for a decision on the kind of *tatpuruṣa* intended, because

a) it has been made in all probability by Subhūtiśrī(śānti) and dGe ba'i blo gros, the team that also translated the *Kārikā* and Devendrabuddhi's commentary on the other chapters in the 11th century. Thus, whatever their interpretation was, it would be in accordance with a late exegetical tradition.

b) The majority of instances (PVS 10, 24 = PVS<sub>1</sub> 411a1f.; 17, 2f. = 414b8; 17, 7 = 415a1; 17, 12 = 415a3; 53, 27 = 441a2) shows a literal translation by a compound (*rañ bzin 'brel pa*) which I am tempted to call a "compound of embarrassment", i. e., not knowing—and not needing to know—how to analyse the compound exactly, it is taken—and certainly with good right—as too well known to need an exact translation with a particle determining the relation between the compound's members. Since '*brel pa*' is constructed with the particle *dañ*, naturally this particle would have to be supplemented in the first place.

c) In fact, there are two instances (PVS 2, 19f. = PVS<sub>1</sub> 405b4; 3, 3f. = 405b7) that show a translation with this sociative particle *dañ*, i. e. *rañ bzin dañ 'brel pa*. The translators, thus, have chosen the particle naturally ruled by the noun '*brel pa*'; this choice, however, does not necessarily indicate that the compound has been interpreted as an instrumental-*tatpuruṣa* strictly speaking, a locative-*tatpuruṣa* being possible as well. It only says that an interpretation as an instrumental-*tatpuruṣa* cannot be ruled out for certain.

d) As to the genitive-particle to be found in PVS<sub>1</sub> 510b3f. (= PVS 147, 11), cf. below. p. 468f. H 468f.

## III.

Dharmakīrti's concept of the term *svabhāvapratibandha* has not changed, in my opinion, since he propounded a theory of the logical nexus and its basis in his first work.<sup>25</sup> In this work the term occurs in the following places: PVS 2, 19f.; 3, 4; 10, 24; 17, 2f.; 17, 7; 17, 12; 53, 27; 147, 11.<sup>26</sup> "Old" commentaries on these texts are the *Pramāṇavārttika-ṭīkā* (PVT) of Śākyamati (ca. 660–720 A. D.), the *Pramāṇavārttika* (sva) *vṛttiṭīkā* (PVS<sub>1</sub>) by Karpakagomin (around 800 A. D.), and—for the "parallel texts" of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*—the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (PVin T) of Dharmottara (ca. 750–810 A. D.).

The following table gives the relevant passages in the commentaries. The sign of equation means that Karpakagomin copied his text from Śākyamati's; if negated (≠) it means that he did not copy from Śākyamati. In brackets I add the Sanskrit ending for the first part of the compound when either available from the grammatical analysis in the commentary, or to be assumed safely in the case of the Tibetan translations.

PVS	PVT	PVS <sub>1</sub>	PVinT	PVin II
1: 2, 19f.	12a8	=23, 18	235b3(°ena)	10, 14
	12a8f.(°e)	≠23, 18f.(°ena)		
3, 4	—(13a6)	=—(24, 25)	237b8	11, 6
2: 10, 34	33a8f.	=57, 17f.(+°ena)	324b5	40, 10
3: 17, 2f.	47a6f.(°e)	=75, 14f.(°e)	343b5(°e)	45, 32f.
17, 7	47b2	=75, 24	344a2	46, 6
4: 17, 12	47b5f.(°e)	=76, 9(°e)	344a7(°sya)	46, 17
5: 53, 27	142a1	=218, 26(°sya)		
6: 147, 10f.	400a4f.(°sya)	=528, 17f.		

25 This is the original form of the present *Pramāṇavārttika*, first chapter, together with its "commentary"; cf. E. Frauwallner: *Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's. Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller*. Leipzig 1954, 142ff.

26 Although the Tibetan translation of *pratibandha* chosen here, viz. *rag lus pa*, shows that the interpreters emphasised the meaning of "dependance", which is definitely the meaning of the word in PVS 147, 3 where this *pudgala*-related digression begins, the meaning of the compound is the same as in the other places where '*brel pa*' is the usual translation.

27 On his date and the relationship of his commentary to that of Śākyamati cf. my paper: *Miszellen zur erkenntnistheoretisch-logischen Schule des Buddhismus I: Zur Datierung Karpakagomin's*. WZKS 23, 1979, 141–150. Cf. also A. Akamatsu: *Karpakagomin and Śāntarakṣita*. *Indological Review* 3, 1981, 53–58.

From among these texts the explanations given on PVS<sup>28</sup> 2, 19f. are most suitable for an attempt to understand the variations extant in the analysis of the compound. The wavy line in the following texts indicates the words from PVS<sup>28</sup>, and a straight line indicates the explanatory analytical phrasing of the first part of the compound (*svabhāva-*) as far as of relevance to our problem.

1: PVS<sup>28</sup> 2, 19f.: *svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham na vyabhicarati.*

1a: PVT 12a8f.: *yañ ci ste [D: cis te P] dños po bsgrub pa gñis kho na yin ze na / rañ bzin dañ 'brel pa kes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / rañ bzin bsgrub par bya ba'i dños po dañ 'brel pa ni de la rag las pa ñid de de yod na'o //*

1b: PVS<sup>28</sup> 23, 18f.: *kim punar dvau eva vastusādhānau ity aha (svabhāvapratibandha iti). svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ, sādhanam kṛteti samāsaḥ. svabhāvena pratibaddhatvam, pratibaddhasvabhāvam iti yāvat. tasmin saty .....*

1c: PVinT 235b3: *rañ bzin 'brel pa ni rañ bzin gyis 'brel pa ste / 'brel pa'i rañ bzin kes bya ba'i don to // de yod na .....*

1d: NBT 110, 1f.: *svabhāvapratibandha iti. svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ, sādhanam kṛteti samāsaḥ. svabhāvapratibaddhatvam pratibaddhasvabhāvatvam ity arth-ah.*

1e: NBT, 62a2f.: *... rañ bzin 'brel pa kes smos te / rañ bzin gyis 'brel pa yin te / rañ bzin 'brel pa ñid ni 'brel pa'i rañ bzin ñid ces bya ba'i don te /*

While Śākyamati (text 1a) interprets the compound clearly as a locative-tatpuruṣa,<sup>32</sup> Karṇakagomin (text 1b) does not follow this interpretation. Instead he interprets it as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa. There is no doubt that Karṇakagomin has copied Śākyamati's explanation in the context; thus the way the text of the PVT was used by Karṇakagomin for this particular piece of explanation is quite telling: While the context and the introduction are faithfully copied from PVT, the analysis of the compound itself is taken

from another source whose interpretation was evidently favoured by Karṇakagomin. This interpretation is Dharmottara's analysis as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa. The rest of Karṇakagomin's explanation has been taken, in fact, from Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭkā (Text 1d).<sup>33</sup> Dharmottara's commentary (Text 1c) on the parallel-text in PVin II is not likely to be the source for two reasons: Although Dharmottara analyses the compound as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa in the PVinT, too, the remaining paraphrase is still limited, less redundant, and — above all — it is only in NBT 110, 2ff. that Dharmottara gives a well-formulated reason for his analysis as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa, i. e. that it has the advantage of expressing the connection in both kinds of logical reasons by means of a single compound.<sup>34</sup>

To summarize: Śākyamati explains the compound as a locative-tatpuruṣa, *svabhāva* to be the *sādhyavastu*, and "connection with ....." to mean "dependance upon ....." . Karṇakagomin substitutes for this Dharmottara's interpretation as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa, which Dharmottara stated first — possibly — in his PVinT, and then repeated with the addition of a clear argument for the value of this new interpretation in the NBT. The decisive difference between the two kinds of explanation seems to be indicated by the fact that only Śākyamati identifies *svabhāva* as *sādhyā*.

This account for the material situation can be corroborated by the limited evidence coming from the explanations of PVS<sup>28</sup> 10, 17f.:<sup>35</sup>

2: PVS<sup>28</sup> 10, 17f.: *... tayoh kaścit svabhāvapratibandho 'py eṣṭavyaḥ.*

2a: PVT 33a8f.: *... bsgrub par bya ba dañ sgrub pa de gñis de'i bdag ñid dañ / de las byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid kyis 'brel pa 'ga' tig kyañ 'dod par bya dgos te /*

2b: PVS<sup>28</sup> 57, 17f.: *... tayoh sādhyasāadhanayoh kaścit svabhāvena pratibandhas tadātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇo 'py eṣṭavyaḥ.*

2c: PVinT 324b5f.: *... de gñis rañ bzin 'brel pa'i 'brel pa ñid 'dod par bya dgos te /*

While Śākyamati (text 2a) gives no analysis of the compound, not repeating the first member at all, but instead inserting the terms for the two kinds of the connection, Karṇaka-

28 The introduction of Karṇakagomin's explanation was copied from Śākyamati, for the texts immediately preceding and following have also been copied (PVS<sup>28</sup> 22, 10-22; 23f.=PVT 11b7-12a8; 12b1); but the pratika was lost.

29 Kātyāyana's Vārttika 2 on Pāṇ 2. 1. 33; it also occurs as a sūtra in Śākāyāna 2. 1. 37 (ed. Bombay 1907, 121).

30 The following *svabhāvapratibandhaḥ* of the extant editions must be deleted (as in Ms. C of Malvania's edition).

31 This explanation of the compound with reference to Kātyāyana's Vārttika has no correspondence in the Tibetan translation (NBT) but must be considered as being supported by the parallel in PVS<sup>28</sup>.

32 As indicated first by Matsumoto, loc. cit. 498.

33 Explaining NB II 19: *svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham gamayet.*

34 NBT 110, 2-4: *karāṇe svabhāve ca sādhye svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ kāryasvabhāvayor avīṣṭa ity ekena samāseṇa dvayor api saṃgrahaḥ.* Cf. also DhPr 110, 23f. where in continuation of DhPr 110, 17ff. the originality of this explanation is distinctly accentuated. Cf. also below, p. 471f.

35 For Karṇakagomin's using Dharmottara's PVinT cf. my paper of note 27, MESB I, note 23. Karṇakagomin's dependance on the NBT in case of the text under examination is, to my knowledge, the only instance noted so far to establish the relation between these two texts.

36 Cf. below, p. 464.

gomin (text 2b) —who copies the PVT here— adds *svabhāvena*. He, thus, emphasizes again his preference for the interpretation as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa; and it is probably his own addition, since PVinT (text 2c) on the parallel text of PVin II gives no analysis of the compound at all. It must be underlined that *svabhāvena* of text 2b explains the connection between the two, *sādhyā* and *sādhana*, and cannot mean one of these properties themselves. And this calls our attention to an important implication of this formulation of Dharmakīrti: Since it is logically impossible to say that “between two items there is a connection of/with one of these two”, *svabhāva* must be taken as an attributive explanation of *pratibandha*. In the light of this, Śākyamati's substitution of *svabhāva* by the term for the two kinds of the connection in an instrumental (\**tadātmayatadutpattilakṣaṇena*) must be considered as being motivated by the same reasons.

A look at the explanations of PVSV 17, 2f. brings further clarity:

3: PVSV 17, 2f.: ... *iti tasya svabhāvapratibandhād avyabhicarah.*

3a: PVT 47a6f.: *gtan tshigs de'i phyir sgrub pa śiñ śa pa la sogs pa bdag ŋid du gyur pa de ni rañ bzin 'brel pa kho na'i phyir te/ rañ bzin bsg grub par bya bar 'dod pa śiñ la sogs pa dañ ji skad bśad pa'i rnam pas 'brel pa kho nas 'khrul pa med do||*

3b: PVSVT 75, 14f.: *iti hetos tasyātmabhūtasya sādhanasya śiṃśapādeḥ svabhāve sādhyābhimate vṛkṣādaṁ yathoktena prakāreṇa pratibandhād evāvyabhicarah.*

3c: PVinT 343b5: *des na śiñ śa pa ŋid kyi ŋo bo ldog par byed pa (?) bsg grub par bya ba'i ŋo bo la 'brel pa yin la/ 'brel pa'i phyir na 'khrul ba med do||*

These texts analyse the compound as a locative-tatpuruṣa, and they all explain the first member, *svabhāva*, to mean the *sādhyā*. This, evidently, is the reason why Dharmottara and Karṇakagomin, too, do not deviate from Śākyamati here: the first member of the compound does not explain the *pratibandha*.

4: PVSV 17, 12: *tasmāt svabhāvapratibandhād eva hetuḥ sādhyam gamayati.*

4a: PVT 47b5f.: *gañ gi phyir de lta yin pa de'i phyir rañ bzin 'brel pa kho nas bsg grub par bya bar 'dod pa'i dños po dañ 'brel pa kho nas ...*

4b: PVSVT 76, 9: *yata evan tasmāt svabhāvapratibandhād eva sādhyābhimate vastuṇi pratibaddhatvād eva ...*

4c: PVinT 344a7: *de'i phyir ran bzin 'brel pa kho nas zes bya ba ni rañ bzin gyi 'brel pa yin pa'i phyir.*

The explanation of the compound as a locative-tatpuruṣa is coupled again with that of *svabhāva* as meaning *sādhyā* in Śākyamati's (text 4a) and Karṇakagomin's paraphrase (text 4b) which is copied from the former. The analysis as a genitive-tatpuruṣa by

Dharmottara (text 4c) —if it is not a corruption (*gyi* for *gyis*)— could mean nothing other than Dharmottara takes *svabhāva* to mean the *sādhana* instead of the *sādhyā*.

This analysis as a genitive-tatpuruṣa is also to be found in the explanations of PVSV 53, 26f. and 147, 10f. (cf. texts 5b, 6a).

5: PVSV 53, 26f.: *tadutpattidharma bhāvaḥ svabhāvapratibandhād apekṣate nāma ...*

5a: PVT 142a1: ... *rañ bzin 'brel ciñ rag las pa'i phyir phan par byed pa bltos pa zes bya ste/*

5b: PVSVT 218, 26: *svabhāvasya pratibandhād ayattatvād apekṣate nāma upakāriṇam.*

6: PVSV 147, 10f.: *na ca tajjanmalakṣaṇāt svabhāvapratibandhād anyāḥ pratibandho nāma.*

6a: PVT 400a4f.: *skye ba'i mtshan ŋid can te/ skye ba'i dbaṅ po can gyi rañ bzin gyi rag las pa las rag lus pa zes bya ba gzan yod pa ma yin no||*

6b: PVSVT 528, 17f.: ... *na hi janmalakṣaṇaj janmasvabhāvāt svabhāvapratibandhād anyāḥ pratibandho nāma.*

Both passages differ from those discussed so far, in that they do not talk about *svabhāvapratibandha* in the context of logic, as the basis for the necessary nexus between two concepts. Rather, more generally, they refer to the *svabhāvapratibandha*-idea as the only reason for dependance. In the first statement, which serves a discussion of the *sāmānya* (text 5), dependance (*apekṣa*) is said to be based on the *svabhāvapratibandha*; and the second statement (text 6), serving a discussion of the *pudgala*, rules out all connections except for the *svabhāvapratibandha*. In both cases only the causal connection is intended. Here, the first member of the compound, *svabhāva*, does not mean the *sādhyā*, of course, but the actual essence of something. Since the term, as used here, means the whole entity, without any abstract properties being taken into consideration in the context, the analysis as a tatpuruṣa with an objective genitive “connection of the essence” is a natural explanation. But this genitive-tatpuruṣa is not the same as that of text 4c because of the different connotation of the term *svabhāva*. Thus, strictly speaking—because the intention of the term *svabhāvapratibandha* is limited here to causality only—the analysis as a genitive-tatpuruṣa as in the case of these two occurrences does not contribute directly to an understanding of the term's meaning as the real basis of the necessary logical relation.

The conclusion to be drawn from this material is evident: The different analyses of the compound as instrumental-, genitive-, and locative-tatpuruṣa result from the respective interpretation of the meaning of the compound's first member. If *svabhāva* was

understood to mean *sādhyā*, the property to be proven, the compound is analysed as a locative-tatpuruṣa; this is the case in texts 1a, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b. And if taken to mean *sādhana*, the proving property (possibly in text 4c), it would be analysed as a genitive-tatpuruṣa. In texts 1b, 1c, 1d and 2b, however, *svabhāva* does not mean one of the properties, but the essence, nature, thing itself. In these cases the compound is analysed as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa. Here it is particularly instructive to note that Śākyamati's interpretation as a locative-tatpuruṣa (text 1a) which is combined with an interpretation of *svabhāva* as *sādhyā* has been substituted by Karṇakagomin with Dharmottara's interpretation as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa while at the same time dropping the interpretation of *svabhāva* as *sādhyā* from the copied text.

Since the material used in this investigation was strictly limited to the few occurrences of the term *svabhāvapratibandha* in the PVSV and the early exegetical tradition, the proposal of the following working-hypothesis may be useful to enlarge the meaning of our conclusions with a few to further research: Before a decision is made on the analysis of the compound, the meaning of *svabhāva* must be determined. It either means one of the logical properties (*dharma*) or the essence, the real thing (*svarūpa*, *ātman*). In the first case mainly the *sādhya**dharma* will be meant, but — generally speaking — there is an analytical alternative. The compound can be explained, then, either as a genitive-, or as a locative-tatpuruṣa with reference to the fact that the two cases represent the linguistic way to express the two different ends of the relation in question: The connection (*pratibandha*) is one of that which is connected — in our case usually the logical reason (*hetu*) — with that with which it is connected. In other words, we may assume that an analysis of the compound as a genitive-tatpuruṣa is given with the meaning "connection of the *svabhāva*, i. e. the *hetu*", and an analysis as a locative-tatpuruṣa with the meaning "connection with the *svabhāva*, i. e. the *sādhyā*". Naturally, we can find statements where both ends of the connection are indicated as, e. g. in PVSV 17, 2f. (cf. texts 3 and 3a, 3b). If *svabhāva* means the essence, an analysis as instrumental-tatpuruṣa is the correct one. That it is taken with this meaning in the compound already by Dharmakīrti is clear because of the implications of his words PVSV 10, 24 (text 2).<sup>37</sup> It seems to be Dharmottara, however, who takes this interpretation to be the correct one also in at least one other crucial instance of the term (cf. texts 1c, 1d) where it was not applied previously (cf. text 1a).

One question remains to be answered with regard to this analysis as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa: What kind of instrumental? In our case it can only be taken as causal or as

modal. Modern interpreters show some fluctuation between these two possibilities.<sup>38</sup> I have found no statement of Dharmakīrti so far which allows a safe exclusion of one of them. Considering the "logic" of the expression, however, it is difficult to find a clear line of separation between the two connotations. After all, if something is connected "by its essence", it is connected "essentially" because this kind of "cause" is contemporaneous. Since even from a text looking as modally as Durvekamiśra's *yah svarūpeṇa kvacid ayattas tasya svabhāvas tatra pratibaddha ayatta iti* (DhPr 110, 21f.) we cannot deduce a definite exclusion of a causal translation, I think that both translations are acceptable, while the modal one, e. g. with an adverb, is usually more practicable.

#### IV.

It has been assumed above that Dharmottara found it better to interpret the term *svabhāvapratibandha* as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa (texts 1c, 1d) at its occurrence most consequential for an understanding of the theory of the logical nexus, i. e. PVin II 10, 14 and NB II 19. In NBT 110, 2-4 Dharmottara adds a sentence to his analysis of the compound with a view to showing the value of this interpretation: *karaṇe svabhāve ca sādhye svabhāvena pratibandhaḥ kāryasvabhāvayor aviśiṣṭa ity ekena samāśena dvayor api saṁgrahaḥ*. This sentence is important for two reasons: It gives a clear survey of Dharmottara's interpretation of the case-relations involved, and it allows the consideration of possible historical implications when he concludes "Thus [the connections of] both of these (reasons) are summarily stated by one and the same compound."<sup>40</sup>

For, if we follow Durvekamiśra's comments (DhPr 110, 17-19 and 23f.), the phrasing *ekena samāśena* means some emphasis on this interpretation as bringing an advantage (*atiśaya*) over another, older one which explained the compound as a genitive-tatpuruṣa in case of the *kāryahetu*, and as a locative-tatpuruṣa in case of the *svabhāvahetu*,

38 E.g., Th. Stcherbatsky in his *Buddhist Logic* II, 69, gives a modal translation: "dependent in its own existence", and 69, note 7, a causal one: "being tied up by one's own existence". Mookerjee—Nagasaki in their translation of 1964 translate by various attributes (15: "real and natural relation", 16: "natural relation", 44, 67: "necessary concomitance", 66: "natural concomitance") which is based on a modal interpretation. I myself used to translate causally "Verknüpfung durch das Wesen", but now prefer the modal translations "Wesentliche Verknüpfung, essential connection".

39 Cf. p. 44.

40 I.e. a connection by essence/essentially (*svabhāvena*) of a proving essential property (*svabhāvaya*) with an essential property to be proven (*svabhāve sādhye*).

37 Cf. above. p. 44.



thus referring actually to two different compounds. Moreover Durvekamiśra's phrasing (especially in DhPr 110, 23f.) clearly reveals that he considered this new interpretation to be Dharmottara's achievement. It must be noted, however, that Durvekamiśra is the only one known so far to know of this interpretation which relates the compound to the two kinds of reasons respectively. Dharmottara's statement as such does not need to be taken other than as an explanation that the *svabhāvaprati-bandha* is the same for both kinds of reasons. Beyond that, since the various explanations of the compound discussed above all agree on the fact that this would be the same in each case for both kinds of reasons, and since I tried to explain why Matsumoto's proposal for a solution similar to the one possibly indicated here cannot be accepted, I have to admit that I still do not know<sup>41</sup> whose interpretation could be considered as having been improved by Dharmottara. We, also, cannot exclude the possibility that Durvekamiśra offers a piece of over-interpretation here.

## V.

That the terms *tādātmya* (PVSV 4, 2) or *tādātmata* (PVSV 2, 21) are synonyms of *tadbhāvata* — and not terms for M.'s "two directions" of the connection in logical context (495), is evident from PVSV 17, 13: *sa ca tadbhāvalakṣaṇas tadūpattilakṣaṇo vā*. The term denotes that real connection, connection in reality, which provides the basis of the logical nexus between an essential property as reason (*svabhāvahetu*) and the respective essential property to be proven (*sādhyā*).

The best support for the translation of *tādātmya* etc. by "real identity" or, short, "identity" are those sentences where Dharmakīrti lays the foundation for the need to deal with the *apoha*-theory. The beginning of the first passage (PVSV 2, 2<sup>42</sup>—3, 3) is sufficient for our purpose here. When Dharmakīrti says: *sa ca tādātmatvāt* ("And this

41 It does not seem to be Vintadeva's, whose paraphrase on the beginning of NB II 19 I do not really understand, however: *rañ bēin dan 'brel pa dan / rañ bēin gyi ño bos 'brel pa ni rañ bēin gyi 'brel pa ste* / (NBTi 64, 6f.). The instrumental *ño bos* (if it is not a corruption for *ño bo'i*) could indicate that the interpretation as a modal instrumental-tatpuruṣa was already thought of before Dharmottara, perhaps without a particular argument for it such as the one given by Dharmottara.

42 The second passage introduces the *apoha*-digression: *ya eva tarhi kṛtakāḥ sa evānityo bheda-bhāvāt. pratijñārthakadeśo hetuḥ syāt. naiṣa doṣaḥ, yasmāt*..... (PVSV 24, 16f.). And the third concludes this digression: *tena svabhāvasyaiva sādhyasādhana-bhāve 'pi na sādhyasādhanasāṃsargah. tan na pratijñārthakadeśo hetur iti* (PVSV 93, 3-5).

[connection] follows from the fact, that [the reason] is the self/essence of the [result]"), he introduces the objection: *tādātmatve sādhyasādhana-bhedābhāva iti cet* (PVSV 2, 21) ("If [the reason] is the self/essence of the [result], there is no difference<sup>43</sup> between reason [*sādhana*] and result [*sādhyā*]."), and he answers: *na, dharmabhedaparikalpanād iti vakṣyāmaḥ* ("[This] is not [the consequence], because of the assumption of different properties, as we shall explain.")

We have to conclude, then, that beyond the explanation of the difference between the reason and the result as properties, Dharmakīrti's expression *tādātmatvāt* must be taken to mean that the reason is in reality the same as the result. And this is what I translate as "real identity".

## VI.

In note 12 of his paper Matsumoto, finally, does not accept my interpretation of the word *tādātman-* as a tatpuruṣa, "but rather Dharmottara's interpretation that the word is a bahuvrīhi-compound" (494). My interpretation is not based on NBT 106, 6f. and HB 57, 6f. as proposed by M., since these passages are, indeed, useless in this connection. Lacking any passage where a decision could be derived from Dharmakīrti himself, I had to base such an interpretation on the commentaries on passages like the three mentioned above, where the compound *tādātman-* or its synonym *tadbhāva-* occurs.<sup>44</sup> The questions remaining, then, are: What are the explanations of the commentators? Why do we find two different explanations? And why did Dharmakīrti not give a clarification of the exact meaning of the compound?

Explaining *tādātmatvāt* of PVSV 2, 2<sup>45</sup> the Tibetan translation of Śākyamati's PVT takes it as a genitive-tatpuruṣa. The same is the case when *tādātmatve* of this line is explained, and to this second explanation Śākyamati adds: *bsgrub par bya ba gañ*

43 For Dharmakīrti's concept of *bheda* cf. PVSV 20, 21f.

44 I have to admit that in writing note 2 of my paper: On the Interpretation of the *svabhāvahetu*. WZKS 13, 1974, 117—129, I should have referred to Dharmottara's explanation. As far as I can remember, I did not think of it, then. Rather I thought only of the "usual way" of translating it, not making myself sufficiently aware of the fact that this translation must be traced to Stcherbatsky's knowledge of Dharmottara's interpretation.

45 PVT 12b2-3: *de ni tes bya ba ni rañ bēin dan 'brel pa'o // de'i bdag nid yin pa'i phyir tes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba'i rañ bēin yin pa'i phyir* // = PVSVT 23, 21f.: *sa ca svabhāvaprati-bandhaḥ.....tādātmatvād iti sādhyasvabhāvāt*.

46 PVT 12b3-4: *de'i bdag nid yin na tes bya ba ni gal te sgrub pa bsgrub par bya ba'i bdag nid yin na* = PVSVT 32, 22f.: *tādātmatve sādhyasvabhāvātmatve sādhanasya*.

yin pa de ñid sgrub pa yin pas (PVT 12b3f.) = *yad eva sādhyā tad eva sādhanam* iti (PVSVT 23, 22f.). In the case of the commentaries on *tadbhāvalakṣaṇa* from PVSV 17, 13 it is again only the Tibetan translation of Śākyamati's PVT which supports the interpretation as a genitive-tatpuruṣa.

The same result can be gained from a survey of the relevant passages of the Pramāṇa-viniścaya. It is particularly interesting to note that Dharmottara in his explanation of these passages analyses *tadātmatva* (PVin II 10, 15) as a tatpuruṣa, as well as *tadbhāva* (PVin II 7, 25; 46, 18f., 33), while he seems to analyse *tadātmya* (PVin II 24, 12) as a bahuvrīhi. In NBT on NB II 22 he also explains it as a bahuvrīhi: *sa sādhyo 'rtha atma svabhāvo yasya tat tadātma. tasya bhāvas tadātmyam* (NBT 113, 3f.), as pointed out by Matsumoto (note 12). Vinītadeva explains it as a tatpuruṣa.

The crucial statement in the Hetubindu is HB 4, 3f.: ..... *sādhyadharmasya vastutāḥ tadbhāvataya sādhanadharmabhāvamātrānubandhasiddhiḥ* (= "..... is the proof that the property to be proven follows only the presence of the proving property because in reality [the property to be proven] is the essence [bhāva] of that [proving property]"). The compound *tadbhāva*-, here, is explained as a tatpuruṣa by Arcaṭa.

47 The explanation of *tadātmya* from PVSV 4, 2 is too short (cf. PVT 15b1f., PVSVT 29, 15).

48 PVT 47b6f.: *de'i ño bo'i mtshan ñid ces bya ba la sog pa'i bsgrub par bya ba'i rañ bzin gyi ño bo'i mtshan ñid*.....=PVSVT 76, 11f.: *tadbhāvalakṣaṇa iti sādhyasvabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ*.....

Additional support is given by the short paraphrases of *tadbhāva* from PV I 27a (=29a) and a number of passages in the Vṛtti on vv. 27-28 (=29-30).

49 Cf. PVin II 24, 12 (*tadātmya*) and 10, 15 (*tadātmatva*) 7, 25; 46, 18f. and 33 (*tadbhāva*).

50 Cf. PVinT 235b6: *gañ gi phyir sgrub par byed pa de bsgrub par bya ba'i rañ bzin ñid yin pa des na*.....

51 Cf. PVinT 224b6f., 344a7f., 345a7.

52 Cf. PVinT 282b4: *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos de'i bdag ñid gañ yin pa'i sgrub par byed pa'i chos de'i'o*||

53 NBT, 63a2: *bsgrub par bya ba'i don de'i bdag ñid gañ yin pa de'i dños po ni de ñid de* | Cf. also the formulation of NBT 162, 12 which corroborates an interpretation as bahuvrīhi: *yo hi sādhyadharmāḥ sādhanadharmamātrānubandhān, sa eva tasya sādhanadharmasya svabhāvo nanyah*. And of NBT 162, 15f.: *tasmāt sa eva sādhyāḥ kartavyāḥ* (sic!) *yāḥ sādhanasya svabhāvaḥ syāt*.

54 NBTi 65, 1f.: *rtaḥ 'ga' tig bsgrub par bya ba'i don gyi rañ bzin yin pa de'i phyir*.....

55 HBT 41, 15-17: *tadbhāvataya: sa sādhanadharmo bhāvaḥ svabhāvo yasya tasya bhāvataya tadbhāvataya. yo hi sādhanadharmāḥ sādhyadharmasya svabhāvaḥ sa katham tam nānubadhyat*. (= "This, [i. e.] the proving property; the existence [bhāva,] [i. e.] the essence [svabhāva] of which, because it is the existence-essence [bhāva] of that. For how could the proving property, being the essence [svabhāva] of the property to be proven, not follow this [property to be proven] ?")

But on another comparable occasion<sup>56</sup> Arcaṭa prefers to interpret *tadātman*- of HB 8, 13 as a bahuvrīhi.

Thus we find two interpretations of the compounds *tadātman*-, *tadbhāva* -: as a tatpuruṣa by Śākyamati, Karpakagomin, Arcaṭa and Dharmottara (PVinT), and as a bahuvrīhi by Arcaṭa and Dharmottara (NBT and PVinT). I have to admit that I could not find a statement in these commentaries that would provide some information as to a distinct reason for such a twofold explanation of the compound, nor can I think of one. We have to keep in mind, however, that the meaning of the compound within the context of Dharmakīrti's theorem of the *svabhāvapratibandha* remains the same, whether it is taken as a tatpuruṣa or as a bahuvrīhi.

For, interpreted as a tatpuruṣa, it means that the concept of the proving property (*sādhanadharmā*, *hetu*) is, in reality, the essence (*atman*, *bhāva*) of the property to be proven (*sādhyadharmā*). And taken as a bahuvrīhi, it means that the concept of the proving property has the property to be proven, in reality, as its essence (*atman*, *bhāva*). The difference between the two solutions is, that in the case of the tatpuruṣa-solution the concept of the *hetu* is introduced as being reduced to its reality, thus serving as the real essence of the concept of the *sādhyā*; and in the case of the bahuvrīhi-solution these positions are reversed. Since the function of the compound within the contextual theorem remains unchanged, it is possible that there was no awareness in the commentators, e. g. Arcaṭa and Dharmottara, that it needed to be dissolved in one particular way only. It seems that this is one of those cases where the modern scholar has a problem that was none to the tradition under examination, and where, therefore, he looks for an answer that was never given.

With regard to the term *tadātmya* we can observe that the earlier explanations of the compound *tadātman*- take it as a tatpuruṣa, while—possibly starting with Arcaṭa—it is then also understood as a bahuvrīhi. In both cases of explanation, however, the term *tadātmya* indicates the fact, that one property is in reality the same as the other pro-

56 Cf. HBT 83, 5: *tadātmano yo yasya svabhāvaḥ tatsvabhāvasya*.....

57 HB 5, 12 does not support, I think, either interpretation. I do not accept, however, Matsumoto's argument against my construction of the expression *lingisvabhāva*. Arcaṭa (HBT 57, 11ff.) does not express himself regarding the nature of the compound *lingisvabhāva*; from HB 5, 11f. we can only understand, that Dharmakīrti wants to emphasise that the reason is *vastuto lingisvabhāva*, where *svabhāva* definitely has the meaning "essence" (cf. HBT 57, 13f.). *svabhāva* of this sentence also cannot be connected with HB 5, 14f., because there Dharmakīrti turns against the assumption that even a property that is conditioned by something else, and non-concomitant can be considered as an essential property (*svabhāva*) (cf. HB II 102f., note 7).

perty, and the rendering of the term as "real identity" or just "identity" is appropriate.

Methodically speaking, it is a legitimate and desirable procedure to try to understand a theorem by basing oneself on Dharmakīrti's work alone. It is sometimes— e. g. where we suspect a development of a theory in Dharmakīrti's works—the only approach possible, as I shall show on another occasion. But when the commentators differ from the results deduced out of Dharmakīrti's statements alone, we have to give, in addition, a convincing explanation for that difference/ If we do not, or cannot account for this difference of interpretation in a historically reasonable way, our interpretation of Dharmakīrti's statements may only be a mis-interpretation and certainly needs to be re-examined.