

# Svarupa Sambodhana

Right Instruction on the Nature of the Soul





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# **SVARUPA-SAMBODHANA**

Right Instruction on the Nature of the Soul

(SVARŪPASAMBODHANAM)

Translation, Notes, Introduction

by

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# Introduction

**Title of the work :** The title of this small work is *Svarūpasambodhanam*. The word *svaḥ* means the soul. The word *rūpam* means nature. So *svasya rūpam* means nature of the soul. The word *sam* means *samyak*, right. And the word *bodhanam* means instruction<sup>1</sup>. So the complete title *svarūpasambodhanam* means ‘Right instruction on the nature of the soul.’ Thus the title clearly points out the subject-matter of the work.

**Authorship :** Regarding the authorship of the work there are two traditions. According to one tradition its author is Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva while according to another tradition its author is Mahāsenā, a pupil of Nayasena. *Saptabhaṅgītarāṅgiṇī*<sup>2</sup> supports the first tradition as it quotes the third verse of *Svarūpasambodhanam* with the following preceding remark: *taduktam Akalaṅkadevaiḥ*. Again Dr. Vidyabhushan<sup>3</sup> and Nathuram Premi consider Akalaṅkadeva to be the author of the work. Padmaprabhamaladhārīdeva’s Sanskrit commentary on *Niyamasāra* supports the second tradition. Therein the 12th and the 4th verses of the work are quoted with the following remarks preceding those verses respectively: ‘*uktaṁ ca śaṇṇavatipāṣaṇḍivijayopārjitaviśālakīrtibhir Mahāsenapaṇḍitadevaiḥ*’ and ‘*tathā cuktam śrīMahāsenapaṇḍitadevaiḥ*.’ Of the two traditions the first one is widely upheld. So we too accept the first tradition which considers Akalaṅkadeva to be the author of the work.

1. One may consult *Apte’s Sanskrit-English Dictionary*.
2. p.79
3. *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, p.26

**Akalaṅkadeva’s Life and Works :** Akalaṅkadeva is a great Jaina logician. As is the case with other outstanding figures, the brilliant personality of Akalaṅka too is surrounded by legends. But it is almost certain that he flourished between 720 A.D. and 780 A.D.; that he belonged to Mānyakheṭa; that he was a son of Puruṣottama, a minister of Śubhatuṅga of Mānyakheṭa; that he stayed in the Buddhist *maṭha* to study Buddhist philosophy and that he had debates with a Buddhist teacher at the court of king Himaśītala of Kālīṅga. Akalaṅka composed several brilliant works on Jaina logic - *Laghīyastraya*, *Nyāyaviniścaya*, *Pramāṇasaṅgraha*, *Siddhiviniścaya*. These are his original works. On all these

he himself wrote short commentaries. Moreover he wrote commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra* of Vācaka Umāsvāti(mi) and *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Āc. Samantabhadra. They are respectively named as *Rājavārtika* and *Aṣṭasatī*.

**Laghīyastraya** : This is a good work on Jaina Logic. It has three main divisions called Praveśa. The first Praveśa deals with organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the second with philosophical standpoint (*naya*) and the third with scriptural knowledge or verbal testimony (*pravacana*). The first Praveśa is subdivided into four Paricchedas dealing with perception (*pratyakṣa*), object of organ of knowledge (*viśaya*), non-perceptual cognition (*parokṣa*) and scriptural knowledge or verbal testimony (*āgama*) respectively. The second Praveśa has only one Pariccheda which deals with philosophical standpoint (*naya*). The third Praveśa has two Paricchedas dealing with scriptural knowledge or verbal testimony (*pravacana*) and linguistic analysis of word-meaning (*nikṣepa*) respectively. *Laghīyastraya* contains in all 78 verses (*kārikās*), the first Pariccheda has 6<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> verses, the second 3 verses, the third 11<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> verses, the fourth 8 verses, the fifth 21 verses, the sixth 22 verses and the seventh 6 verses. On all these verses Akalaṅka has written an auto-commentary. Āc. Prabhācandra (late tenth century A.D.) has written an extensive and critical commentary on *Laghīyastraya*, called *Nyāyakumudacandra*. It is edited by M.K. Jain and published by Manik Chandra Digambara Jain Granthamālā, Bombay.

**Nyāyaviniścaya** : This is a very important work on Jaina Logic. It is not available in the original form. But it has been restored by M.K. Jain on the basis of Vādirāja's extensive commentary (*vivarāṇa*) on it. Vādirājasūri flourished in the late tenth century A.D. His commentary (*vivarāṇa*) on *Nyāyaviniścaya* is edited by M.K. Jain and published by Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, Kashi.

*Nyāyaviniścaya* has three divisions called Prastāva. The first Prastāva deals with perception, the second with inference and the third with scriptural knowledge or verbal testimony. The first Prastāva contains 168<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> verses, the second 217<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> verses and the third 95<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> verses. Thus the entire work contains 481<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> verses.

In the first Prastāva Akalaṅka states and explains the definition of perception. While discussing the definition, he deals with the object of perception. At this juncture he extensively expounds substance, mode, universal and particular. While proving that perception cognises the external object, Akalaṅka refutes the Buddhist theory of Vijñānavāda idealism, the Buddhist doctrine of knowledge

assuming the form of the object, the Buddhist theory of no-soul (*anātmavāda*) and the Buddhist atomism. While discussing substance and modes, he demonstrates the relation of identity-cum-difference obtaining between quality and mode and expounds the theory that reality (or a thing) is characterised by triple characteristic of origination, destruction and persistence. While discussing the problem of universal and particular, he criticises the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika views. After that he expounds four types of perception recognised by the Buddhists, viz. sense perception, mental perception, self-perception and yogic perception and refutes the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya definitions of perception. At the end he gives the definition of extrasensory perception.

The second Prastāva is devoted to the exposition of inference, probandum, probans, pseudo-probans, memory, recognition, hypothetical reasoning, sophism, legitimate public debate, etc. Incidentally it deals with how a word conventionally connected with a thing denotes that thing, denotative power of a word, nature of the soul, refutation of the views of the materialist Cārvāka and others regarding the soul, criticism of the Vaiśeṣika view that quality is not possessed of quality, examination of three types of probans, viz. *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* recognised by the Nyāya system as also of three types of probans, viz. *vīta*, *avīta* and *vītāvīta* recognised by the Sāṅkhya system.

The third Prastāva treats of scriptural knowledge (or verbal testimony), liberation and omniscience. While doing so, it scoffs at the compassionate and omniscient nature of Buddha and the four noble truths preached by him. Moreover, it criticises the Mīmāṃsā view of the authorlessness of the Vedas and the Sāṅkhya view of liberation. At the end it expounds the Jaina theory of sevenfold judgement and recapitulates the whole discussion on the organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

The auto-commentary (*svopajñavṛtti*) on the *Nyāyaviniścaya* is not available - it is lost - though it was present before Vādirāja, the author of *vivaraṇa* on the *Nyāyaviniścaya*.

***Pramāṇasaṅgraha*** : In this work Akalaṅka has collected all the possible arguments against each and every absolute view. The work is written in prose and verse style. Its language and meaning both are very difficult to grasp. It is divided into nine Prastāvas. The first Prastāva has 8<sup>1/2</sup> verses. It deals with perception and its divisions. The second Prastāva has nine verses. It treats of non-perceptual organ of knowledge. It expounds its divisions, viz. memory,

recognition and hypothetical reasoning, and establishes their pramāṇaship. In this Prastāva it is demonstrated that the relation of invariable concomitance between non-perceptual things can very well be established on the strength of scriptures. The third Prastāva has ten verses. It deals with inference and its members (*avayavas*). The fourth Prastāva has 12<sup>1/2</sup> verses. It refutes the Buddhist theory of triple characteristic of the probans and establishes the Jaina doctrine of only one characteristic of the probans, viz. the impossibility of the probans in the absence of the probandum (*anyathānupapatti*). Again, it treats of various types of the probans. The fifth Prastāva has 12 verses. It deals with various types of pseudo-probans like *viruddha* (contradictory) etc. It includes *viruddhāvyabhicārī* recognised by Dignāga in *viruddha*. Again it includes all pseudo-probans except *asiddha* (non-existent), *viruddha* (contradictory) and *anaikāntika* (inconclusive) in *akiñcitkara*. The sixth Prastāva has 12<sup>1/2</sup> verses. It expounds the nature of legitimate public debate (*vāda*). And it shows how the doctrine of Non-absolutism is free from the eight defects like *virodha* etc. with which the opponents try to vitiate it. The seventh Prastāva has 9<sup>1/2</sup> verses. It expounds scriptural knowledge or verbal testimony. The Jaina scriptures are free from all defects superimposed on them by opponents because they are authored or preached by the omniscient Tīrthāṅkara. At this juncture it proves the existence of an omniscient person as also the existence of extrasensory perception. At the end it demonstrates how the soul becomes free from the impurities of passions and consequently from all material karmic atoms and how it becomes omniscient. The eighth Prastāva has 13 verses. It is devoted to the exposition of sevenfold judgement. It enumerates seven philosophical standpoints (*nayas*). For the detailed exposition of the nature of *nayas* readers are advised to consult *Nayacakra*. The ninth Prastāva has two verses, It mentions *nikṣepas* and then winds up the entire treatise which contains in all 89 verses.

***Siddhiviniścaya*** : *Siddhiviniścaya* has 12 Prastāvas and each Prastāva has one Siddhi (Logical establishment). Thus in all there are 12 Siddhis. They are as follows : *Pratyakṣasiddhi*, *Savikalpakasiddhi*, *Pramāṇāntarasiddhi*, *Jīvasiddhi*, *Jalpasiddhi*, *Hetulaṅkāṣasiddhi*, *Śāstrasiddhi*, *Sarvajñasiddhi*, *Śabdāsiddhi*, *Arthanayasiddhi*, *Śabdanayasiddhi* and *Nikṣepasiddhi*. The original *Siddhiviniścaya* along with its auto-commentary (*svopajñavivṛti*) is not available. M.K. Jain has restored *Siddhiviniścaya* on the basis of Anantavīrya's elaborate and intensely logical commentary on it but it was impossible for him to restore the auto-

commentary. Anantavīrya's commentary with restored *Siddhiviniścaya* has been edited by M.K. Jain and published by Bhāratiya Jñānapīṭha, Kashi. Jinadāsa in his *Cūrpi* refers to *Siddhiviniścaya* by name and considers it to be a brilliant and prominent work of Jaina philosophy.

***Rājavārtika*** : This is a commentary on Vācaka Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*. It is very important as it deeply discusses the Āgamic and philosophical problems. It effectively employs the theory of Non-absolutism to resolve all philosophical controversies. It abounds in philosophical discussions. It expounds and criticises the Buddhist and the Vaiśeṣika theories of atoms and establishes the Jaina theory of atoms. It refutes the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist views on liberation. It examines and rejects the Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist and the Sāṅkhya views on *manas* (mind). As a matter of fact, it refutes all the important doctrines of the Non-Jaina philosophical systems,

***Aṣṭaśatī*** : *Aṣṭaśatī*, a commentary on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*, is very important as it presents clear-cut, closely reasoned and concentrated enunciation and defence of Anekāntavāda. Here Akalaṅka finds opportunity to discuss fundamental philosophical views centring around the admission or otherwise of two contradictory features, e.g. existence and non-existence, oneness and separateness, permanence and transience, 'identity between cause and effect, substance and property, parts and whole' and 'difference between cause and effect, substance and property, parts and whole'. He loses no opportunity to criticise various one-sided ontological positions and defend the corresponding Jaina positions. He critically examines rival positions as actually maintained in the contemporary works of various non-Jaina schools, particularly Buddhist. He is very bitter against the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and causeless destruction. He attacks the Buddhist Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda. Again, he strongly refutes the Buddhist logician's theory of perception. Moreover, we find in *Aṣṭaśatī* criticism of some basic theories of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā and Sāṅkhya systems. The style is compact, exact, terse and tough.

**Evaluation of Akalaṅka as a logician** : Akalaṅka is rightly called the Father of Jaina Logic. In his works on Jaina Logic which we have dealt with he is comprehensive and compact, authentic and terse, cogent and subtle. He gave final shape to Jaina Logic. He has deeply studied all the important works of other schools of Indian Logic. This becomes clear from his faithful presentation of



*prima facie* views. His study enabled him to examine theories and views upheld by rival logicians and to clearly establish Jaina position with regard to all the problems of Indian logic. He left no problem undiscussed. Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti was his prime adversary. He is very bitter in his attacks on Dharmakīrti. He formulates definitions of various logical concepts, clarifies the Jaina position on all the logical problems, establishes memory, recognition, hypothetical reasoning as *pramāṇas*. Thus he constructed fullfledged Jaina Logic. He explained the Jaina views in the context of non-Jaina schools of Indian logic. His refutation of the theories of rival logicians is thoughtprovoking. Thus his treatment is alround, profound, penetrating and comprehensive.

Akalaṅka's works were seriously studied by the non-Jaina scholars in those days and there is all possibility that his arguments were profitably utilised by them against the common rivals, I feel that well known Nyāya logician Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (ninth century A.D.) had consulted Akalaṅka's works. He refers to and refutes some Jaina views in the ninth chapter of his famous *Nyāyamañjarī*. His commentator Cakradhara, a Kashmiri pandit of 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> century A.D., while commenting on Jayanta's concerned sentences, reproduces five *kārikas* from Akalaṅka's *Siddhivinīścaya* and explains them extensively in his own words<sup>1</sup>. This is very important and noteworthy. One more Kashmiri pandit Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇakaṇṭha (10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> century A.D.) refers to Akalaṅka and his *Granthatraya* by name in his *Vṛtti* on *Mṛgendratāntra*. His actual words are : *sadasadvādinām arhatām ca mateṣu Akalaṅkatritaya-prabhṛtiṣu...*<sup>2</sup> This shows that Akalaṅka's works attracted the attention of non-Jaina scholars of even remote regions like Kashmir.

1. *Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhaṅga* by Cakradhara, edited by Nagin J. Shah, L.D. Series 35, 1972, pp.212-215.
2. *Mṛgendratāntra* with *Vṛtti*, Kashmir Series No. L, 1930 A.D.

**Subject-matter of the work :** This tiny treatise of twenty five verses treats of the nature of soul. In it Akalaṅka first emphasises its non-absolute nature. It has infinite attributes. Hence it possesses even opposite attributes. Though it has opposite attributes, there arises no contradiction because it has opposite attributes from different standpoints. If it has opposite attributes from one and the same standpoint, there will surely arise contradiction.

It is both permanent and transitory, permanent from the standpoint of substance and transitory from the standpoint of modes. So it is characterised by

triple characteristic, viz. origination, destruction and persistence<sup>2</sup>. Modes are originated and destroyed while substance persists. It is both all-pervading and not-all-pervading, all-pervading from the standpoint of *kevalisamudghāta* and not-all-pervading from the standpoint of all other states except *kevalisamudghāta*. In all these states it is body-sized. It expands and contracts according to the size of the body in which it resides. It has both positive and negative natures, it has positive nature from the standpoint of its own attributes and negative nature from the standpoint of foreign attributes. It has forms as also it has no forms. It has forms when knowledge assumes forms of external objects and it has no forms when knowledge does not assume the forms of external objects but is absorbed in the self itself. It is both one (unitary) and many (manifold), one (unitary) from the standpoint of its unitary nature of sentience and many (manifold) from the standpoint of its manifold nature of many knowledge-types. It is both describable and indescribable, describable from the standpoint of its own substance, place, time and nature and indescribable from the standpoint of foreign substance, place, time and nature. From the standpoint of substance it is beginningless and endless but from the standpoint of modes it has beginning and end. It is both identical with and different from knowledge. Knowledge is a special quality of soul substance. And substance is identical with its quality from the standpoint of physical inseparability. At the same time substance is different from its quality from the standpoint of mental or conceptual differentiation on the basis of their different definitions, names etc. Soul is both deserving to be abandoned as well as deserving to be attained. From the standpoint of mundane or transmigratory state soiled with spiritual impurities or passions it deserves to be abandoned. And from the standpoint of the state of liberation in which it is free from all passions or spiritual impurities and as a result possessed of all the four infinities of knowledge, vision, bliss and energy fully manifested it deserves to be attained. It is both omniscient and non-omniscient, omniscient from the standpoint of the attainment of *kevalajñāna* and non-omniscient from the standpoint of all the states before the attainment of *kevalajñāna*.

Then the work deals with soul's transmigratory (mundane) state, its state of liberation, definition of liberation and the means of liberation.

In the transmigratory state the soul is caught in the cycle of births and deaths, it is soiled with passions and bound with karmic material atoms. It enjoys the fruits of its own karmas. It is stated that the doer of the karmas and the enjoyer of their fruits is one and the same soul. This is said against the

Buddhists, the upholders of momentarism in which this is impossible, one is the doer of karmas and another is the enjoyer of their fruits. The self itself gets bound with karmic material atoms, and it itself gets liberated. The one who is bound gets liberated. This is impossible in momentarism. The soul reaps the fruits of bondage and liberation. Bondage, liberation and their fruits have their respective causes.

In the state of liberation the soul, being free from passions and karmic material atoms, is established in its pure and pristine nature. As there are no material karmic coverings to blur the natural qualities of the soul, its four natural qualities, viz. knowledge, vision, bliss and energy are fully manifested to the infinite degree in the state of liberation.

It defines liberation as follows. The total and absolute dissociation of karmic material atoms from the soul (on the complete extinction of passions) is liberation.

Now it deals with the means to attain liberation. Right spiritual faith or inclination, right knowledge and right conduct all these three together constitute one means for the attainment of liberation. Firm unswerving faith in the group of nine spiritual truths (*navatattva*) as they are is called right faith. Right or valid knowledge is the definitive or determinate cognition of a thing as it is. It reveals both its own self and the external object. It is both *pramāṇa* (organ of knowledge) and *pramiti* (resultant cognition) from different standpoints. Right spiritual conduct is explained in three ways : (1) To remain firmly steady in the right spiritual faith or inclination as also in the right knowledge is called the right spiritual conduct. (2) Or to remain indifferent or equanimous in happiness and misery is called the right spiritual conduct. (3) Or 'I am alone, I am knower and seer, there is nobody with me in happiness and misery' - deep and strong reflection like this is called the right spiritual conduct.

Peaceful and auspicious time and place as also external austerities like fasting etc. which are conducive to deep reflection or meditation and equanimity, right faith and right knowledge are regarded as the assisting causes of right spiritual conduct. One should always, in favourable and adverse circumstances, meditate on the pure soul free from all passions to the best of one's ability. Soul soiled with passions can never grasp or realise the ultimate reality, viz. the pure supreme soul. So to be free from defilements like attachment, aversion etc. (passions) one should become completely free from delusion or infatuation, and taking recourse to indifference should get fully engrossed in deep meditation on

the pure supreme soul, the ultimate real. One should find out as to which things are favourable to the purity of the soul and as to which things are harmful to the purity of the soul. So, one should regard the former as deserving to be acquired and the latter as deserving to be abandoned. And consequently one should acquire the things deserving acquisition and abandon those deserving abandonment, if one wants to attain liberation.

One's own things and others' things should be looked upon as things only without distorting the former with the feeling of mineness or attachment and the latter with the feeling of not-mineness or aversion. When one reaches the highest point of the feeling of neutrality or indifference one will surely attain the final Beatitude.

One should be free from all desire. One should not desire even one's own soul. In other words, one should not get attached to one's own soul. So long as feeling of attachment arises in one, one will not attain liberation. One who is completely free from desire - one who has no desire even for liberation attains liberation. Desirelessness, which is nothing but non-attachment (*vītarāgatā*), is the nature of soul, in the ultimate analysis it is infinite bliss or happiness.

One should realise that his soul is different from all other things which are foreign to it. Soul is not identical with body, sense-organs, material karmic atoms, objects of worldly pleasure, etc. So one should destroy infatuation with them and get established in soul's pure and pristine nature which is equanimous, self-revelatory and self-luminous. One should withdraw oneself from all foreign things, turn inward and meditate on one's pure supreme soul. As a result of this meditation one attains the state of liberation fully permeated with the highest bliss.

This tiny treatise has covered all the important and essential aspects of the nature of soul. Brevity and clarity are the salient features of its style. So it will be of great value to the scholars and the students of Jainology. It will, no doubt, create interest in them for the further reading of great works on the spiritual wisdom of the Jainas.

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## भट्ट-अकलङ्कदेवविरचितं स्वरूपसंबोधनम्

मुक्तामुक्तैकरूपो यः कर्मभिः संविदादिना।  
अक्षयं परमात्मानं ज्ञानमूर्तिं नमामि तम्॥१॥

*muktāmuktaikarūpo yaḥ karmabhiḥ saṁvidādinaḥ ।  
akṣayaṁ paramātmānaṁ jñānamūrtiṁ namāmi tam ॥1॥*

I reverently bow down to the Supreme Soul<sup>1</sup> who is free from karmas and at the same time invariably associated with right knowledge etc.<sup>2</sup> It eternally has one uniform nature - spiritual nature. [Though it changes every moment it never changes into matter and assumes material nature.] [As a substance] it is imperishable. It is an embodiment of knowledge.

1. Generally by the term '*paramātman*' the common people or folk understand God who is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. For them He is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers '*paramātman*' stands for *Īśvara* or God. According to them God is the creator of the world and He is omniscient. Again, they believe that God is the dispenser of justice in accordance with the merits and demerits acquired by individuals. In other words, God grants the fruits of karmas of individuals. But the Jaina thinkers do not believe in such God. There is no God who creates the world because according to Jainism the world is never created, it is beginningless and endless. Moreover, there is no need to posit God as a dispenser of the fruits of karmas because karmas themselves are capable of producing the fruits (results) of good and bad moral acts at the fixed or ripe time. For the Jaina '*paramātman*' means that soul who has undergone spiritual discipline and thereby made itself absolutely free from attachment and aversion and as a result of it got completely dissociated from the material karmic particles. Thus it earns its final emancipation. Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika God, the Jaina *Paramātman* is not *nitya mukta* nor is it the only one.
2. 'Etc' here implies the other three, viz. vision (*darśana*), bliss (*sukha*) and energy (*vīrya*). In the Supreme Soul all these four are in infinite degree.

सोऽस्त्यात्मा सोपयोगोऽयं क्रमाद्धेतुफलावहः।  
यो ग्राह्योऽग्राह्यनाद्यन्तः स्थित्युत्पत्तिव्ययात्मकः॥२॥

*so'sty ātmā sopayogo'yaṁ kramād dhetuphalāvahaḥ ।  
yo grāhyo'grāhyānādyantaḥ sthityutpattivyayātmakaḥ ॥2॥*

This soul does exist<sup>1</sup>. It is endowed with cognitive activity. It, [being variable constant, *paripāminitya*], assumes the states or modes of cause and effect in succession. [This can be explained in two ways : (1) As it changes every moment, its preceding state or mode acts as a cause to generate the immediately succeeding state or mode. (2) It assumes spiritual practices of austerities, vows, meditation etc. as a means to achieve the end of spiritual perfection or pure spiritual state called liberation. Thus soul itself is both the end and the means. Means here culminates in the end. In this manner causality is intrinsic to soul.] Soul [soiled with spiritual impurities or passions - pervert thinking, feeling and willing - and as a result with karmic matter] deserves to be abandoned and soul [established in its pure and pristine state] deserves to be attained. [As a substance] soul is beginningless and endless, [though its modes have a beginning and an end.] It is of the nature of permanence, origination and destruction<sup>2</sup>.

1. This refutes the Cārvāka materialist's view that there does not exist any independent ultimate substance called soul. He maintains that the quality called *jñāna* or consciousness does not require the independent ultimate substance soul to reside in. It is because *jñāna* or consciousness is not a fundamental primary non-emergent quality. It is an emergent quality. When the four material elements, viz. earth, water, fire and air combine and get integrated in a particular structure to form a compound called body, in this body there emerges consciousness which is not found in any material element. Hydrogen and oxygen are two fundamental elements. When they combine and form the compound H<sub>2</sub>O (water), there emerges qualities in H<sub>2</sub>O which are not present in either hydrogen or oxygen. In short, the Cārvāka holds that consciousness is the product of material elements. The Jaina thinkers point out that we never perceive anywhere the generation of consciousness from the unconscious material elements. The Cārvāka believes that perception is the only valid source of knowledge. How can he then believe in what perception fails to demonstrate?
2. The Jaina definition of reality (*sat*) as given by Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* is : *utpādayaya-dhrauivyayuktaṁ sat*, that is, that which is characterised by origination, destruction

and permanence is real. Soul, being a real entity or substance, is no exception to this definition. So according to the Jaina thinkers soul is neither absolutely momentary nor absolutely permanent but it is permanent-cum-changing, that is, variable constant (*paripāminītya*). Soul assumes different modes constantly at every moment, but it never abandons its essence. It undergoes change no doubt but it retains its essential nature; it is in this sense that it can be said to be permanent - not in the sense of being absolutely changeless. The process of change or transformation involves origination, destruction and persistence. So soul is said to have this triple character. Its pervious mode is destroyed, the immediately succeeding mode is originated and the essential nature persists. And all these three phenomena occur simultaneously at every moment.

**प्रमेयत्वादिभिर्धर्मैरचिदात्मा चिदात्मकः।  
ज्ञानदर्शनतस्तस्माच्चेतनाचेतनात्मकः॥३॥**

*prameyatvādibhir dharmair acidātmā cidātmakaḥ ।  
jñānadarśanatas tasmāc cetanācetanātmakaḥ ॥3॥*

From the standpoint of its attributes like being-an-object-of-knowledge etc. soul is insentient. And from the standpoint of its attributes of knowledge and vision<sup>1</sup> it is sentient. Therefore, it is both sentient and insentient.

- 1 *Jñāna* (knowledge or knowing) and *darśana* (vision or seeing) : These are the two cognitive faculties. What is the difference between the two ? The answers given by the Jaina thinkers differ. (1) Some say that *jñāna* is a determinate (*sākāra*) cognition while *darśana* is an indeterminate (*nirākāra*) cognition. Therefore it is said by some that *jñāna* cognises particulars (*viśeṣagrāhī*) while *darśana* cognises universal or generality (*sāmānyagrāhī*). In other words, it is said by others that *jñāna* is a thought-involving (*savikalpa* or *savīcāra*) cognition while *darśana* is a thought-free cognition. (2) The view of Ācārya Virasena is very important. He observes in his commentary *Dhavalā* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta that *jñāna* is a cognition that cognises an external object of the nature of both universal and particular while *darśana* is a cognition that cognises the self of the nature of both universal and particular. *sāmānyaviśeṣātmakabāhyārthagrahaṇam jñānam, tadātmakasvarūpagrahaṇam darśanam, iti siddham* / *Dhavalā* on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* 1.1.4.

ज्ञानाद् भिन्नो न चाभिन्नो भिन्नाभिन्नः कथञ्चन।

ज्ञानं पूर्वापरीभूतं सोऽयमात्मेति कीर्तितः॥४॥

*jñānād bhinno na cābhinno bhinnābhinnah kathañcana ।*

*jñānam pūrvāparībhūtaṁ so'yam ātmeti kīrtitaḥ ॥४॥*

Soul is not absolutely different from [its quality] knowledge. Nor is it absolutely identical with knowledge. But from a certain point of view it is different from knowledge and from a certain point of view it is identical with knowledge<sup>1</sup>. Knowledge is [a quality] having preceding and succeeding modes or states. In this manner the soul is described.

1. Soul is a substance and knowledge is its special quality. The Vaiśeṣika thinkers maintain that substance and its quality are absolutely different. Against this Vaiśeṣika view the Jaina thinkers put forward their non-absolute view. They say that a substance and its quality are identical in so far as they are physically inseparable. It is impossible to physically separate and put them in different places. But it is possible to mentally differentiate a substance from its quality on the basis of their different names, definitions, etc. Thus from the point of view of mental or conceptual distinction, a substance and its quality are different from one another.

स्वदेहप्रमितश्चायं ज्ञानमात्रोऽपि नैव  
ततः सर्वगतश्चायं विश्वव्यापी न सर्वथा।

*svadehapramitaś cāyaṁ jñānamātro'pi naiva  
tataḥ sarvagataś cāyaṁ viśvavyāpī na sarvathā ॥५॥*

Soul is body-sized<sup>1</sup>. It is not of the nature of knowledge alone<sup>2</sup>. As it is of the nature of knowledge, it is all-knower<sup>3</sup>(omniscient) [by its pure knowledge, *kevalajñāna*.] It is not absolutely all-pervading [implying thereby that it is all-pervading only when it performs *kevalisamudghāta*<sup>4</sup> in its last birth and pervades the entire universe (*loka*)]

1. The dimension of the soul is equal to that of the body in which it lives. Even in the state of liberation it has practically the size equal to that of the last body it had in the last birth. On this point the Jaina thinkers differ from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya thinkers who consider the soul to be absolutely all-pervading.

नानाज्ञानस्वभावत्वादेकोऽनेकोऽपि नैव सः।  
चेतनैकस्वभावत्वादेकानेकात्मको भवेत्॥६॥

*nānājñānasvabhāvatvād eko'neko'pi naiva saḥ ।  
cetanaikasvabhāvatvād ekānekātmako bhavet ॥6॥*

Soul is neither absolutely one (unitary), nor absolutely many (manifold). As it is of the nature of many knowledge-types<sup>1</sup> or many knowledge-modes<sup>2</sup>, it is many or manifold. Though thus it is manifold or many, it is one or unitary too because it has one nature of sentience. In this manner from two different standpoints it is both unitary (one) and manifold (many).

1. Jaina thinkers recognise five types of knowledge, viz. *matijñāna* empirical knowledge, *śrutajñāna* scriptural knowledge or knowledge gained through words or signs, *avadhijñāna* clairvoyance, *manaḥparyāyajñāna* telepathy and *kevalajñāna* omniscience. *Matijñāna* empirical knowledge includes sensory perception *matī*, memory *smṛti*, recognition *sañjñā*, cogitation or hypothetical reasoning *cintā* and inference *abhinibodha*.
2. Knowledge changes every moment and assumes different modes. Knowledge-of-pot (*ghaṭajñāna*), knowledge-of-cloth (*paṭajñāna*) etc. are the modes of knowledge.

नावक्तव्यः स्वरूपाद्यैः निर्वाच्यः परभावतः।  
तस्मान्नैकान्ततो वाच्यो नापि वाचामगोचरः॥७॥

*nāvaktavyaḥ svarūpādyaiḥ nirvācyaḥ parabhāvataḥ ।  
tasmān naikāntato vācya nāpi vācām agocaraḥ ॥7॥*

From the standpoint of its own nature etc<sup>1</sup>. it is describable. And from the standpoint of foreign nature etc. it is indescribable<sup>2</sup>. So it is neither absolutely describable nor absolutely indescribable.

1. Here the word 'etc'. wants us to add substance *dravya*, place *kṣetra*, time *kāla* and quality or state *bhāva*.
2. From the standpoint of its own nature etc. soul exists. And hence it is possible to describe it positively. But it does not exist from the standpoint of the foreign nature etc. How can it be possible to describe that which does not exist ?



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स स्याद्विधिनिषेधात्मा स्वधर्म-परधर्मयोः।  
समूर्तिर्बोधमूर्तित्वादमूर्तिश्च विपर्ययात्॥८॥

*sa syād vidhiniṣedhātmā svadharma-paradharmayoḥ ।  
samūrtir bodhamūrtitvād amūrtiś ca viparyayāt ॥8॥*

Soul has both positive and negative natures. From the point of view of its own attributes it has positive nature. And from the point of view of the foreign attributes it has negative nature. On account of knowledge assuming forms [of external objects] the soul is possessed of forms. And on account of knowledge not assuming forms [of external objects - this being the case when knowledge is completely engrossed and absorbed in the self] the soul is not possessed of forms<sup>1</sup>.

1. That the soul is both *samūrti* [possessed of *mūrti*] and *amūrti* [not possessed of *mūrti*] can be explained in a different way as follows: 'Possessed of *mūrti*' means *mūrta* and 'not possessed of *mūrti*' means *amūrta*. And that which is possessed of physical qualities, viz. touch, taste, smell and colour is called *mūrta*. *mūrtatvaṁ rūpādimattvaṁ / Ālāpapaddhati, sūtra 103*. *Pudgala* (Matter) is the only substance which possesses physical qualities. This is the reason why Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* (5.23) defines *pudgala* as follows: *sparsā-rasa-gandha-varṇavantaḥ pudgalāḥ /* Therefore *pudgala* substance alone is *mūrta*. The remaining five substances, viz., *jīva* (soul), *dharma* (medium of motion), *adharma* (medium of rest), *ākāśa* (sky) and *kāla* (time) are devoid of physical qualities and hence they are *amūrta*. *amūrtatvaṁ rūpādirahitatvaṁ / Ālāpapaddhati, sūtra 104*. Thus from the standpoint of the absence of physical qualities in the soul substance, the soul is *amūrta*. But from the standpoint of its state of bondage in which material karmic atoms interpenetrate the soul, the soul in the state of bondage is regarded as *mūrta*. Āc. Pūjyapāda in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* (2.7) observes as follows: *nāyam ekāntaḥ amūrtir evātmā / karmabandhaparyāyāpekṣayā tadāveśāt syān mūrtaḥ / śuddhasvarūpāpekṣayā syād amūrtaḥ/*

इत्याद्यनेकधर्मत्वं बन्धमोक्षौ तयोः फलम्।  
आत्मा स्वीकुरुते तत्तत्कारणैः स्वयमेव तु ॥९॥

*ityādy anekadharmatvaṁ bandha-mokṣau tayor phalam ।  
ātmā svikurute tattatkāraṇaiḥ svayam eva tu ॥9॥*

Thus soul possesses many attributes. It itself gets bound and it itself gets

liberated. It itself accepts the fruits of bondage and liberation. Bondage, liberation and their fruits have their respective causes.

## Bondage and its causes and fruits :

The material karmic atoms are attracted towards the soul through its mental, vocal and bodily activities; then they get stuck to it due to the unctuousness of passions as the dust particles get stuck to the wet leather when brought there by air. There takes place interpenetration of the karmic material atoms and the units of soul like the interpenetration of milk and water in a mixture of the two. This is called bondage.

That the karmic material atoms received by the soul undergo transformation of karma means that at that time four characteristics are produced in them, the four characteristics being nature, duration, intensity and quantity. It is these characteristics that constitute the types of bondage. Thus the types of bondage are four, viz. bondage in respect of nature (*prakṛtibandha*), bondage in respect of duration (*sthītibandha*), bondage in respect of intensity (*anubhāvabandha* or *rasabandha*) and bondage in respect of quantity (*pradeśabandha*). The nature of the material karmic atoms - the nature to cover knowledge, the nature to cover vision, the nature to cause the experience of pleasure or pain, etc. - is generated in them in accordance with the nature of the activity undertaken by the soul. For instance, an act of destroying books, despising the learned, etc., generates the knowledge-covering nature in the karmic atoms bound on account of this act. Thus, the nature of activity determines the nature of karmic atoms inflowed into and bound with the soul as a result of this activity. As already stated, along with the generation of nature-characteristic in the material karmic atoms, the duration-characteristic is also generated in those very karmic atoms as soon as they are bound with the soul. That is, a limitation as to time-period up to which the karmic atoms in question obstruct the concerned quality of the soul is produced in those atoms as soon as they are bound. Again, along with a nature-characteristic there is produced in the karmic atoms the effect-intensity characteristic. In other words, as soon as the karmic atoms are bound, there is generated in them certain speciality on account of which their effect experienced by the concerned soul will have specific intensity - strong, moderate or mild, Moreover, all the material karmic atoms that are being received by the soul get transformed into diverse natures and hence naturally undergo corresponding

quantitative distribution under each nature. This is what we mean by quantity-characteristic.

As already stated, the nature-characteristic is governed by the nature of activity. The quantity of karmic atoms depends on the degree or intensity of activity. This is so because even passion-free soul binds karmic atoms to itself due to its activities. On the other hand, duration of karmas and the intensity of their fruits depend on passions. The stronger the passions, the longer is the duration of karmas and the greater is the intensity of their fruits. In other words, the bondage in respect of nature and the bondage in respect of quantity depend on the activity concerned. But the bondage in respect of duration and the bondage in respect of effect-intensity are due to passions. Thus, activity and passion are the two causes of bondage.

Going into the details, one finds five causes of bondage, viz. *mithyātva*, *avirati*, *pramāda*, *kaṣāya* and *yoga*. *Mithyātva* means lack of faith in the existence of soul or absence of spiritual inclination. *Avirati* means not to desist from vices, violence, etc. and to indulge in the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. *Pramāda* means self-forgetfulness, spiritual lethargy and lack of feeling of regard for virtuous acts. It also means not to remain awake to the memory of what has to be done and what has not to be done. *Kaṣāya* means passions like anger, greed etc. *Yoga* means activity of mind, speech and body.

Now we mention fruits of bondage. Bondage causes wandering in the worldly existence, it keeps the soul caught up in the cycle of birth and death. Again, bondage causes obscuration of soul's natural qualities of infinite knowledge, infinite vision, infinite bliss and infinite energy through material karmic coverings or veils.

## Liberation and its causes and effects or fruits :

The total and absolute dissociation of all the material karmic atoms from the soul is called liberation.

According to Jainism there are two causes of liberation. They are *saṁvara* and *sakāma nirjarā*. *Saṁvara* means the stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter. And *sakāma nirjarā* means voluntary partial dissociation of the karmic matter accumulated and clung to the soul. The soul should initiate both these processes simultaneously. It should see to it that they go on continuously without any break till the soul becomes completely free from all karmic matter. The following

practices the soul should undertake to stop the inflow of karmic matter : *gupti* spiritually beneficial control of the activities of mind, speech and body, *samiti* careful activities inspired by a sense of discrimination to avoid violence, *dharma* cultivation of meritorious qualities, viz. forbearance, softness of heart, straightforwardness, contentedness, truthfulness, restraint, austerity, renunciation, non-attachment and continence, *anuprekṣā* spiritually beneficial deep-reflections, *pariṣahajaya* to endure with equanimity all afflictions and hardships, and *cāritra* the endeavour to remain steady and firm in the state of equanimity by giving up all impure and pervert activities. And the voluntary dissociation of the bound karmic matter is achieved by six external and six internal austerities. The six external austerities are : fasting, reduced diet, voluntarily limiting the variety of food and drink, giving up delicacies or a stimulating diet, lonely habitation and mortification of the body. The six internal austerities are : *prāyaścitta* atonement with a view to making clean sweep of defects, *vinaya* veneration, *vaiyāvṛttya* rendering service, *svādhyāya* self-study or scriptural study, *vyutsarga* renouncement of attachment and other passions, and *dhyāna* spiritually beneficial mental concentration.

There is also another method of the Jaina treatment of the causes or means of liberation. Jaina thinkers say that *samyak darśana*, *samyak jñāna* and *samyak cāritra* - these three together constitute the path of liberation. Here the term 'samyak' - 'right' has the sense of 'spiritual' or 'conducive to spiritual development'. *Samyak darśana* means spiritual inclination or predilection. It also means faith in the existence of soul and spiritual truths. *Samyak jñāna* means knowledge conducive to spiritual development. The soul does always possess some knowledge or other and the same is turned into *samyak jñāna* as soon as *samyak darśana* makes its appearance. Before the attainment of spiritual inclination or attitude, one's knowledge was conducive to increment in worldly entanglement or spiritual degradation but after its attainment the very knowledge turns conducive to spiritual upgrading or development. *Samyak cāritra* means conduct conducive to spiritual progress and at last resulting in liberation. So it means conduct effecting reduction and at last extinction of passions. So spiritually good conduct is mainly identical with the observance of five vows (*vrata*). The five vows consist in five forms of abstention (*virati*), viz. from violence, lying, stealing, sex-indulgence and worldly attachment.

As stated earlier, liberation is nothing but total and absolute dissociation



of karmic matter from the soul. As a result of this, the soul gets established in its pure and pristine state. Again, on account of absolute absence of karmic veils or coverings the natural qualities or faculties of the soul, viz. knowledge, vision, bliss and energy get fully manifested in their infinite degree.

कर्ता यः कर्मणां भोक्ता तत्फलानां स एव तु।  
बहिर्न्तरूपायाभ्यां तेषां मुक्तत्वमेव हि ॥१०॥

*kartā yaḥ karmaṇām bhoktā tatphalānām sa eva tu ।  
bahir antar upāyābhyām teṣām muktatvam eva hi ॥10॥*

Only that [mundane] soul who is the doer of karmas<sup>1</sup> is the enjoyer of their fruits<sup>2</sup>. The total and absolute dissociation of karmas (= material karmic atoms) [from the soul] is itself liberation; it is attained by the soul through external and internal means<sup>3</sup>.

1. Soul is regarded as the doer of karmic material atoms only in the sense that it attracts towards itself karmic material atoms by its mental, vocal and bodily activities inspired by passions and causes them to penetrate itself. It is not the doer of these material karmic atoms in the sense of generating or creating them. Neither soul can generate matter nor can matter generate soul.
2. Jaina thinkers criticise the Buddhist theory of momentariness. They say that their theory of momentariness does not go well with their belief in karma theory. In the theory of momentarism the doer of a particular karma is never the enjoyer of the fruit of that very karma. The doer and enjoyer are different. This makes the karma theory redundant and meaningless.
3. External means are the six external austerities. And internal means are the six internal austerities. See the explanation of ninth verse under the head of 'Liberation and its causes and fruits.'

सद्दृष्टिज्ञानचारित्रमुपायः स्वात्मलब्धये।  
तत्त्वे याथात्म्यसंस्थित्यमात्मनो दर्शनं मतम्॥११॥

*saddṛṣṭi-jñāna-cāritram upāyaḥ svātmalabdhaye ।  
tattve yāthātmayasamsthityam ātmano darśanam matam ॥11॥*

Right spiritual inclination or faith, right knowledge and right conduct<sup>1</sup> all

these three together constitute one means<sup>2</sup> for the attainment of pure state of one's own soul. Firm unswerving faith in the group of [nine] spiritual truths<sup>3</sup> as they are is called right faith in the soul.

1. For right spiritual inclination or faith, right knowledge and right conduct one may refer to the explanation of the ninth verse under the head 'Liberation and its causes and fruits.'
2. When all the three means are available in a perfect form the complete liberation is possible, never otherwise. The attainment of *samyak darśana* automatically makes all the existing knowledge *samyak*. Therefore *samyak darśana* and *samyak jñāna* necessarily go together, one without the other is an impossibility. But on the appearance of *samyak darśana* and *samyak jñāna cāritra* may not become perfectly *samyak*. To make it perfectly *samyak* the soul requires to make special spiritual efforts. And as soon as it becomes perfectly *samyak* the result is complete liberation. Thus even in the absence of *samyak cāritra*, *samyak darśana* and *samyak jñāna* can be present for a while. On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary that perfect *samyak caritra* must necessarily be preceded by *samyak darśana* and *samyak jñāna*. And when *cāritra* becomes completely *samyak*, the other two being already present there, the three together immediately lead to complete liberation.
3. Nine spiritual truths (*navatattva*) in which one is required to have firm faith are as follows: *jīva* soul, *ajīva* non-sentient real, *punya* auspicious material karmic particles, *pāpa* inauspicious material karmic particles, *āsrava* inflow of material karmic particles to soul, *bandha* bondage of material karmic particles with soul, *saṁvara* stoppage of the inflow of material karmic particles to soul, *nirjarā* partial dissociation of material karmic particles (voluntary and involuntary) from soul and *mokṣa* total and absolute dissociation of material karmic particles from soul.

यथावद् वस्तुनिर्णीतिः सम्यग्ज्ञानं प्रदीपवत्।

तत् स्वार्थव्यवसायात्मा कथञ्चित् प्रमितेः पृथक्॥१२॥

*yathāvad vastunirṇītiḥ samyag jñānaṁ pradīpavat ।*

*tat svārthavyavasāyātmā kathañcit pramiteḥ pṛthak ॥12॥*

Valid or right knowledge is the definitive cognition of the thing as it is<sup>1</sup>. Like a lamp it is of the nature of determination of both its own self and the object<sup>2</sup>. From a certain standpoint it [as an organ of knowledge or *pramāṇa*] is different from the resultant cognition (*pramiti*)<sup>3</sup>.

1. Here is given the definition of valid knowledge. The term 'definitive cognition (*nirṇītiḥ*)' in the definition stands for that cognition which is devoid of the characteristic of doubt, indecision and indeterminate cognition. And the term 'as it is (*yathāvad*)' excludes illusory cognition (*bhrāntiḥ* or *viparyayaḥ*) which cognises the object as it is not, as for example cognition of silver in shell.
2. In the systems of Indian philosophy the question as to how the cognition itself is cognised is discussed. The Jaina and the Buddhist thinkers maintain that cognition is self-cognised or self-revelatory. Cognition cognises both the object and its own self. Like a lamp it reveals both the object and its own self. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers maintain that cognition is cognised by another cognition which is perceptual (called *anuvyavasāya* or after-cognition). According to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga thinkers cognition (*jñāna*) which is an attribute of *citta* is seen (*darśana*) by *puruṣa*. Kumārila maintains that cognition is cognised by means of an inference where cognizedness (*jñātatā*) produced in the object by the concerned cognition acts as probans, that is, by means of an inference of the type where the existence of a cause is inferred from that of the effect (*kārya-hetuka kārāṇa-viśayaka anumāna*).  
The Jaina thinkers refute those who do not hold cognition as self-cognised. They point out that it is quite impossible for a cognition to cognise an object if it itself is not cognised. It cannot be maintained that the cognition is cognised by the second cognition, since the latter, too, being equally uncognised cannot cognise the first cognition in question. If a third cognition is requisitioned for the purpose, it will lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*, the third being in the same situation with the second *quā* uncognised will require a fourth and the fourth a fifth and so on if no cognition is supposed to be self-cognised or self-revelatory.
3. Activity of the form of knowledge or cognitive activity viewed from the standpoint of subject or knower is an organ of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the same activity viewed from the standpoint of object is a resultant cognition (*pramitiḥ*). In another manner, the same knowledge activity can be viewed as an organ and a resultant from the different angles. When viewed as an illumination of an object it is considered to be an organ and when viewed as the removal of ignorance about the object concerned it is considered to be a resultant.

दर्शन-ज्ञानपर्यायेषूत्तरोत्तरभाविषु।  
स्थिरमालम्बनं यद् वा माध्यस्थ्यं सुख-दुःखयोः॥१३॥

ज्ञाता-द्रष्टाऽहमेकोऽहं सुखे दुःखे न चापरः।  
इतीदं भावनादाढ्यं चारित्रमथवा मतम्॥१४॥

*darśana-jñānaparyāyeṣūttarottarabhāviṣu ।*  
*sthiram ālambanam yad vā mādhyaस्थ्यं sukha-duḥkhaḥ ॥13॥*  
*jñātā-draṣṭā 'ham eko 'ham sukhe duḥkhe na cāparaḥ ।*  
*itīdam bhāvanādāḍhyam cāritram athavā matam ॥14॥*

To remain firmly steady in [the stream of] succeeding states of right spiritual inclination or faith as also of right spiritual knowledge, [attaining higher and higher purity] is the right spiritual conduct. Or to remain indifferent or equanimous in happiness and misery is the right spiritual conduct<sup>1</sup>. Or 'I am alone<sup>2</sup>, I am knower and seer<sup>3</sup>, there is nobody with me in happiness and misery<sup>4</sup>' - deep and strong reflection<sup>5</sup> like this is the right spiritual conduct. This is what the wise say.

1. *Cāritra* or right spiritual conduct means the constant development of the feeling of equanimity resulting from an absence of the mental perturbances or agitations like attachment, aversion etc. In short, equanimity is the essence of right spiritual conduct.
2. This is called *ekatvabhāvanā*. In order to attain liberation feeling of aloofness has to be constantly evoked on the occasion of attachment and aversion. For that, the attachment developed in relation to things considered to be one's own and the aversion developed in relation to those considered to be alien to oneself have to be discarded and so one must reflect : "I am born alone, I die alone, and alone do I reap the fruits of the form of pleasure, pain, etc. yielded by the karmic seeds sown by myself." This is called reflection on aloneness.
3. This is *svarūpabhāvanā*.
4. This is *aśarāpabhāvanā*, reflection on helplessness. Nobody can save one from the inescapable claws of death. The sons are no protection, neither father, nor relatives, nor friends. Man alone has to suffer from the pains of acute diseases, none can share them, even the dearest person cannot mitigate them. There is no escape from the evil consequences of our evil acts. Such is the grim reality of helplessness. He who is disgusted with the thought of his complete helplessness takes shelter under the religion preached by the omniscient Lord.

5. The Jaina authors treat of twelve soteriological deep reflections (*dvādaśa anupreksā* or *bhāvanā*). These reflections increase man's detachment from the world, protect him from harmful tendencies and spur his efforts towards final emancipation.

यदेतन्मूलहेतोः स्यात् कारणं सहकारकम्।  
तद् बाह्यं देशकालादिः तपश्च बहिरङ्गकम्॥१५॥

*yad etan mūlahetoh syāt kāraṇam sahakārakam ।*  
*tad bāhyam deśakālādīḥ tapaś ca bahiraṅgakam ॥15॥*

Those that are the assisting causes assisting this main fundamental cause [viz. the right spiritual conduct] in the generation of liberation are the external space and time etc. as also the external austerities.<sup>1</sup>

1. By assisting cultivation and development of equanimity which is the essence of right spiritual conduct, the external space, time and austerities etc. assist right spiritual conduct in the generation of liberation. Right spiritual conduct is the constant development of equanimity. And in order to develop equanimity to its fullness external austerities and rules and regulation of conduct pertaining to the observance of vows of nonviolence, truthfulness etc. are adopted. In the gradual development of equanimity, the consideration of time, space and the level of a spiritual aspirant becomes necessary and the practice of external austerities is to be accorded its due place in the spiritual discipline. The six external austerities are enumerated in the explanation of the ninth verse under the head 'Liberation and its causes and fruits.' The purpose behind the observance of external austerities is to gain control over senses and the self. Again, their practice cultivates the power of endurance so that in adverse times one can endure bodily hardships and maintain mental peace and equanimity.

इतीदं सर्वमालोच्य सौस्थ्ये दौःस्थ्ये च शक्तितः।  
आत्मानं भावयेन्नित्यं रागद्वेषविवर्जितम्॥१६॥

*itīdam sarvam ālocya sausthye dauḥsthye ca śaktitaḥ ।*  
*ātmānam bhāvayen nityam rāga-dveṣavivarjitam ॥16॥*

Thus having examined thoughtfully all this [whatever is said in the foregoing verses] one should always, in favourable and unfavourable circumstances or conditions, deeply meditate on the pure soul free from attachment and aversion to the best of one's ability.



कषायैः रञ्जितं चेतः तत्त्वं नैवावगाहते।  
नीलीरक्तेऽम्बरे रागो दुराधेयो हि कौङ्कुमः॥१७॥

*kaṣāyaiḥ rañjitaṁ cetāḥ tattvaṁ naivāvagāhate ।*  
*nīlirakte 'mbare rāgo durādheyo hi kauṅkumaḥ ॥17॥*

Soul soiled with passions<sup>1</sup> can never grasp or realise the ultimate reality, viz. the pure nature of the soul, just as the cloth dyed with dark black colour accepts saffron-red colour with great difficulty.

1. Jaina thinkers recognise four passions *kaṣāyas*, viz. anger *krodha*, pride *māna*, deceitfulness *māyā* and greed *lobha*. These four are covered by the two, viz attachment *rāga* and aversion *dveṣa*. Passions are the root-cause of bondage or transmigratory state *saṁsāra*. Therefore it is said : *kaṣāyamuktiḥ kila muktir eva*. Freedom from passions is the real liberation.

ततस्त्वं दोषनिर्मुक्त्यै निर्मोहो भव सर्वतः।  
उदासीनत्वमाश्रित्य तत्त्वचिन्तापरो भव॥१८॥

*tatas tvam doṣanirmuktyai nirmoho bhava sarvataḥ ।*  
*udāśinatvam āśritya tattvacintāparo bhava ॥18॥*

So to be free from all the defilements [like attachment, aversion, anger etc.] you become completely free from delusion or infatuation,<sup>1</sup> and taking recourse to indifference you get fully engrossed in the deep reflection on the pure soul which is the ultimate real.

1. Blinded by delusion (*moha*) the soul loses its sense of discrimination, it cannot differentiate the good from the evil, the auspicious acts from the inauspicious acts. It is like a man who is under the influence of liquor. The drunken man loses all his power of understanding the situation and as a result becomes infatuated and goes astray and does such despising and disgusting acts as he would not have done if he were not infatuated by liquor. Similarly, a living being greatly infected with delusion is unable to understand the reality as it is and under the sway of nescience and wrong notions gropes in the dark and in vain.

हेयोपादेयतत्त्वस्य स्थितिं विज्ञाय हेयतः।  
निरालम्बो भवान्यस्मादुपेये सावलम्बनः॥१९॥

*heyopādeyatattvasya sthitim vijñāya heyataḥ ।  
nirālambo bhavānyasmād upeye sāvalambanaḥ ॥19॥*

Having properly known the nature of the things that deserve to be abandoned as also of the things that deserve to be acquired, abandon all the foreign things - foreign to or harmful to the pure soul - which deserve to be abandoned and acquire those things which deserve to be acquired.<sup>1</sup>

1. Jaina thinkers recognise seven reals (*tattva*). They are : *jīva* soul, *ajīva* insentient element, *āsrava* inflow of material karmic particles in soul, *bandha* bondage of material karmic particles with soul, *saṁvara* stoppage of the inflow of material karmic particles in soul, *nirjarā* partial dissociation of material karmic particles from soul, and *mokṣa* absolute and total dissociation of material karmic particles from soul. One desirous of liberation should know all the seven reals, and should have faith in the existence of all of them. But he should regard *ajīva*, *āsrava* and *bandha* as *heya*; they deserve to be abandoned. On the other hand, he should consider the remaining four to be *upādeya*; they deserve to be acquired.

स्वं परं चेति वस्तु त्वं वस्तुरुपेण भावय।  
उपेक्षाभावनोत्कर्षपर्यन्ते शिवमाप्नुहि॥२०॥

*svaṁ paraṁ ceti vastu tvaṁ vasturūpeṇa bhāvaya ।  
upekṣābhāvanotkarṣaparyante śivam āpnuhi ॥20॥*

You reflect over your own things and other's things as mere things only [without distorting the former with the feeling of mineness, attachment or love and the latter with the feeling of not-mineness, aversion or hatred.]<sup>1</sup> When you reach the highest point of the feeling of neutrality or indifference, [that is, when you are not swayed even slightly by attachment or aversion,] you will attain the final Beatitude.

1. The fact nobody can deny is that whenever an ordinary person cognises an external object his cognition is always associated with the rise of the feeling of like or dislike, attachment or aversion, love or hatred, attraction or repulsion towards the object. So

his cognition is never pure but always tainted with the feeling of attachment and aversion. But in the case of a *tīrthanikara* or a *jīvanmukta* or a highly spiritual person, whenever cognition of an external object takes place it is never associated with the rise of the feeling of attachment and aversion. His knowledge is never tainted with attachment and aversion. It is always pure (*kevala*). Therefore one who is desirous of liberation should stop the rise of the feeling of attachment and aversion towards the object of his cognition, he should keep his cognition free from the taint of the feeling of attachment and aversion.

तथाप्यतितृष्णावान् हन्त! मा भूस्त्वमात्मनि।  
यावत् तृष्णाप्रभूतिस्ते तावन्मोक्षं न यास्यसि॥२१॥

*tathāpy atitrṣṇāvān hanta mā bhūs tvam ātmani ।  
yāvat trṣṇāprabhūtiś te tāvan mokṣam na yāsyasi* ॥21॥

Even then, O you, do not desire even your soul excessively, that is, do not get strongly attached to your soul, because so long as desire or feeling of attachment arises in you, you will not attain liberation.

यस्य मोक्षेऽपि नाकाङ्क्षा स मोक्षमधिगच्छति।  
इत्युक्तत्वाद्धितान्वेषी काङ्क्षां न क्वापि योजयेत्॥२२॥

*yasya mokṣe 'pi nākāṅkṣā sa mokṣam adhigacchati ।  
ity uktatvād dhītānveṣī kāṅkṣām na kvāpi yojayet* ॥22॥

The wise say that one who does not have desire even for liberation attains liberation. Therefore one who is in search of spiritual welfare should have no desire whatsoever for anything.

सापि च स्वात्मनिष्ठत्वात् सुलभा यदि चिन्त्यसे।  
आत्माधीने सुखे तात यत्नं किं न करिष्यसि॥२३॥

*sāpi ca svātmaniṣṭhatvāt sulabhā yadi cintyase ।  
ātmādhīne sukṣe tāta yatnam kiṁ na kariṣyasi* ॥23॥

And even this desirelessness or non-attachment, being ingrained in one's soul, is easily attainable - if you think so, then, O child, why do you not put

forth your effort to attain this bliss<sup>1</sup> which is *solely* dependent on soul?

1. Here desirelessness or non-attachment (*vītarāgatā*) is equated with the permanent infinite bliss which is the nature of soul.

स्वं परं विद्धि तत्रापि व्यामोहं छिन्धि किन्त्विमम्।  
अनाकुलस्वसंवेद्ये स्वरूपे तिष्ठ केवले॥२४॥

*svaṁ paraṁ viddhi tatrāpi vyāmoḥaṁ chindhi kintv imam |*  
*anākula-svasaṁvedye svarūpe tiṣṭha kevale ||24||*

Know rightly your own soul and all other foreign things [like body, sense organs, material karmic particles, objects of worldly pleasure, etc.] But cut off or destroy this infatuation with them. Be established in soul's pure nature which is unagitated and equanimous, self-revelatory and self-luminous.

स्वः स्वं स्वेन स्थितं स्वस्मै स्वस्मात् स्वस्याविनश्वरम्।  
स्वस्मिन् ध्यात्वा लभेत स्वोत्थमानन्दामृतं पदम्॥२५॥

*svaḥ svaṁ svena sthitam svasmai svasmāt svasyāvinaśvaram |*  
*svasmin dhyātvā labheta svottham ānandāmṛtaṁ padam ||25||*

For the attainment of its own [pure] self (*svasmaṁ*), the soul (*svaḥ*), having dissociated all foreign substances or things from itself (*svasmāt*) and having turned inward in its own self (*svasmin*) and then having meditated (*dhyātvā*) on itself (*svaṁ*) which is established in its own pure nature by itself (*svena sthitam*), may attain (*labheta*) its own (*svasya*) imperishable or eternal (*avinaśvaram*) state (*padam*) permeated with the nectar of bliss (*ānandāmṛtam*) ensuing from its own self (*svottham*).

इति स्वतत्त्वं परिभाव्य<sup>२॥२५॥</sup> वाङ्मयं  
य एतदाख्याति शृणोति चादरात्।  
करोति तस्मै परमात्मसंपदं  
स्वरूपसंबोधनपञ्चविंशतिः॥२६॥

*iti svatattvaṁ paribhāvya vāṅmayam  
ya etad ākhyāti śṛṇoti cādarāt ।  
karoti tasmai paramātmāsampadam  
svarūpasambodhanapañcaviṁśatiḥ ॥26॥*

[This treatise entitled] ‘Svarūpasambodhana (=Right Instruction on the Nature of the Soul)’ consisting of twenty five verses bestows wealth of Supreme Soul on him who, having thoroughly and deeply reflected, in the manner shown in the treatise, on the nature of soul, embodied in the words of the treatise, [again and again] respectfully listens to it and expounds it to others.

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