

## Syntactic gleanings from Bhartṛhari's Trikāṇḍī\*

Ashok Aklujkar  
University of British Columbia (Canada)

1.1. Bhartṛhari's Trikāṇḍī or Vākyapadīya<sup>1</sup> is chronologically the fourth major surviving text in the Pāṇinian tradition, coming after the works associated with Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali. For a linguist interested in theories of language and grammar, it is a text of greater direct importance than its three surviving predecessors, for it is the first explicit and sustained statement of a theoretical kind on language and grammar that we have available in the Pāṇinian tradition. In its case, we do not generally have to speculate on an implicit view of language and grammar (as in the case of the Aṣṭādhyāyī or the Vārttika), nor do we have just a few tantalizing and colloquially worded theoretical statements interspersed in a mass of derivational detail (as in the Mahābhāṣya). For syntax in particular, it is a mine of information and insights, as its name, Vākyapadīya, to some extent implies.<sup>2</sup>

Since the discussion of the Sanskrit grammarians usually proceeds as if Sanskrit is the only language to be analysed for theoretical gains, the Vākyapadīya does not contain a general consideration of syntax, i.e., a general syntactic theory or a theory of syntax in the abstract, with reference to languages other than Sanskrit or in explicit universalist terms. One is required to put such a theory together on the basis of some general statements by the author and on the basis of certain other statements of his which, although made in the context of Sanskrit, seem to have been intended as universally applicable.

Even as far as the syntax of Sanskrit is concerned, the work is not intended as an exhaustive or exclusive treatment of the topic. It rather concentrates on particular aspects and cases, but it does so in a remarkably rich and rewarding manner.

1.2. Two of the possible approaches that a paper exploring the Trikāṇḍī from the syntactic point of view could take are already indicated by what I have said so far. The paper could either deal with what the Trikāṇḍī has to say in the area of a general theory of syntax or it could concern itself with the Trikāṇḍī's observations on the syntax of Sanskrit.

There is, however, a third possible approach: The first two books of the Trikāṇḍī, the main text of which is written in verses (kārikās), traditionally include an explanatory and supplementary prose gloss known as Vṛtti (V).<sup>3</sup> Anyone who has done sufficient reading in Sanskrit śāstra (particularly philo-

sophical) prose, is struck by this Vṛtti as a work having a distinctive style.<sup>4</sup> The distinctiveness of its style, in turn, is due to its diction,<sup>5</sup> certain embellishments,<sup>6</sup> and some devices adopted to get the point across,<sup>7</sup> as well as to its syntax. Therefore, a third approach to the Trikaṇḍī appropriate in a volume devoted to Sanskrit syntax would be one of studying the syntax of the Vṛtti. It is this approach that I intend to take.

1.3. My selection of syntactic features of the Vākyapadīya Vṛtti for inclusion in the following discussion is naturally determined by my impressions of what is commonly known about the syntax of Classical Sanskrit and about the syntax of Sanskrit philosophical commentarial prose in particular. I shall set aside, or mention only as background, those features which I believe are common knowledge.<sup>8</sup> Given the limitations of space, I shall further confine myself to word order.

2.1. It is well known that the connectives *ca* 'and' and *vā* 'or' commonly occur at the end of the set of items they connect. Only rarely are they used after each single item. One can add a specification to this observation on the basis of works like the Vākyapadīya Vṛtti: If the second member of a pair joined by *ca* or *vā* contains a qualifier (usually an attributive adjective), then *ca* or *vā* is placed after that qualifier, not at the end of the whole second member.<sup>9</sup> Illustrative examples<sup>10</sup> are:

- (1) ... śāstra-vyavahāram anupatati, śāstra-vyavahāra-śaḍrśam ca laukikam bheda-vyavahāram. (V 1.24-6)<sup>11</sup>  
'(The abstracted word meaning) supports (i.e., serves as the basis of) the statements seen in the science (of grammar) and those analytical statements of the users (of the language) which are similar to statements seen in the science (of grammar).'
- (2) ... jñāne śāstra-pūrvake vā prayoge ... (V 1.155)<sup>12</sup>  
'(Merit consists in) knowing (the grammatical expressions) or in using them subsequent to (learning what) the science (of grammar) has to say about such expressions).'

The situation in these instances is the same as when *ca*, *vā*, *hi*, *tu*, etc. join clauses. There they generally appear after the first major word of the clause they connect to a preceding clause. The qualifier of the second member in the above instances enjoys a status similar to that of a word introducing a clause.<sup>13</sup>

2.2. Another peculiarity about the placing of *ca* and *vā*, regarding which I do not recall reading anything in the discussions of Sanskrit syntax, is that words which add emphasis, such as *api* and *eva* push *ca* and *vā* from the second position in the clause to the third place;<sup>14</sup> cf. (3) and (4). And the same displacement is seen in the case of *hi*, as in (5).

- (3) yo 'pi cābhidhātā śrotā vā ... (V 1.24-6)  
'And the speaker or hearer who ...'  
pakṣāntare 'pi ca ... (V 1.37)  
'And even under the other view (under which an already existing effect is simply manifested) ...'

tasyāpi ca pratyāyyasya ... (V 1.62)

'And even of that signatum ...'

teṣām api ca ... (V 1.73)

'And even of those (phonemes) ...'

smṛti-kāle 'pi ca ... (V 1.132)

'And even at the time of recollection ...'

- (4) saiva ca ... (V 1.5)

'And that (language) itself ...'

vāca eva vā ... (V 1.12)

'Or, of language itself ...'

- (5) sarve 'pi hi vādino ... (V 1.30)

'Indeed, all participants in philosophical discussion ...'

gopā[lāvipā]lādayo 'pi hi (V 1.123)

'Indeed (or since such is the state of affairs), even persons like cowherds and shepherds ...'

vyaktir eva [hi] gaur, nākṛtiḥ (V 1.69-70)<sup>15</sup>

'For it is an individual that is a cow, not a universal.'

2.3 I have sometimes wondered if there once was a difference of connotation between an expression of the type 'X *ca* Y *ca*' and an expression of the type 'X Y *ca*'. There are several passages in the Vākyapadīya Vṛtti, some of them quotations, which indicate that the first type of construction was favored, at least by the Vṛtti author and by some of his predecessors, when two items clearly belonging to two different groups in the speaker's perception (especially items logically opposed to each other)<sup>16</sup> were to be expressed together. See the examples in (6) - (8).<sup>17</sup>

- (6) prajñāna-rūpa-pākaś<sup>18</sup> cāsamprakhyāna-rūpa-pākaś cāpām prāṇo rasaḥ. sa khalv āvartī cānāvartī ceti. ... dvaitinaḥ khalv apy āhuḥ. nityāś cānityāś ca mātrā-yonayaḥ, yāsu rūpi cārūpi ca, sūkṣmaṁ ca sthūlaṁ cedam bhuvaṇaṁ viśaktam iti ... indriya-grāmaś cāntaryāmī ca, buddhiś ca kṣetrajñāś ceti. (V 1.8)  
'(Some say:) "Prāṇa, which has a maturation in the form of consciousness (or Knowledge) as well as a maturation in the form of matter (or nescience), is the essence of the Waters. It is verily one that returns (in the case of some) and one that does not return (in the case of others)." ... The Dualists too, indeed, say: "The sources of discrete entities are permanent as well as impermanent (i.e., some sources are permanent and some are not), (sources) in which this universe, the one having form as well as the one lacking form, the subtle as well as the gross (i.e., this universe in its amorphous as well as non-amorphous and subtle as well as gross aspects), is attached." ... the set of senses and the Internal Controller, the intellect (or mind) and the Knower of the Field (Self/soul).'

- (7) śabdavati cāśabdā ca smṛtir nibadhyate. (V 1.29)  
'A smṛti (social code), consisting of words as well as bereft of words (i.e., as something articulated as well as something preserved, without the benefit of verbal expression, in conduct only), is composed.'
- (8) ... te sattā-saṁbandha-mātreṇopalabdhāś cānupalabdhāś ca ...  
(V 1.57)<sup>19</sup>  
'... they (the words), merely through the relation of existing (i.e., merely because they exist), when they are apprehended as well as when they are not apprehended, ...'

2.4. The next peculiarity of the word order of śāstric Sanskrit as evidenced in the Vṛtti appears more interesting to me than the features I have briefly presented so far. It lies in the placing of genitive modifiers. The normal position of a qualifier in the genitive is, as we know, the same as that of the attributive adjective, namely preceding the noun. In some instances, however, the position is deliberately changed and the word is placed after the noun. The advantage to the author apparently is that it is linked simultaneously to the preceding and the following noun, usually with a different shade of genitival meaning; a kind of *sleṣa* or play on meaning results. I will call this strategy the *dehalī-dīpa* placing of the genitive: Just as a lamp placed on a threshold illumines the area in front as well as the room behind, so this sandwiched genitive throws light on the preceding as well as the following word; cf. (9) and (10).

- (9) sa eva hi kalau śakti-vaikalyān nṛṇāṁ pravibhaktāṅgo dṛśyate.  
(V 1.5)  
'In the age of kali, due to the deficient capacities of men, the same (Āyurveda) appears to men with its branches divided.'
- (10) jñānātmakatvād vā puruṣasyaiva saṁskāra-hetavaḥ. (V 1.10)<sup>20</sup>  
'Or, (the different lores) bring about the refinement of man alone (not of both man and knowledge, as in the preceding alternative), since man consists of knowledge.'

In all such instances we clearly have a stylistic consideration, or a consideration that had become a convention of śāstric writing for some authors, overriding the processes of natural or ordinary Sanskrit syntax. For a specific gain the usual word order is reversed, a move quite consistent with the Sanskrit culture's extraordinary sensitivity to the possibilities of multiple meaning, word economy, and, in general, language play.<sup>21</sup>

2.5 It seems that in works like the Vākyapadīya Vṛtti there is an additional, essentially rhetorical, principle operating behind word order. The author is interested optimally in producing conviction in his reader about the truth of what he states, and minimally in ensuring that the reader understands what he states. Toward these ends, he adopts devices similar to those of a good teacher. He moves from the general to the specific, or from the gross to the subtle, or from

the least arguable to a characterization specific to a particular line of thinking, or in a way that shows awareness of possible objections. One may not always be able to determine which of these possible ways of looking at his order is the right way or whether there is in fact only one right way, but one can be certain that a specific movement conducive to the author's goal of effective communication is there.<sup>22</sup> In fact, if one does not assume such a movement or something similar to it, one may not have any explanation for the order seen in words appearing in the same case and performing a common or identical syntactical role.<sup>23</sup> Note, for example, the following:

- (11) abhinnāt saṁhṛta-kramād antaḥ-saṁniveśinaḥ śabda-tattvād ...  
(V 1.12)  
'From the undifferentiated, sequenceless, internal language principle ...'

Here, the first adjective sets up a contrast between the ordinarily experienced language marked by diversity and the language-principle characterized by oneness. The second adjective explains why there is a lack of diversity in the language-principle: because sequence, which marks language in communication, is withdrawn in it. Finally, the third adjective indicates why sequence is not there or the fact that at the particular stage of his thinking the author is concerned not with the outgoing language in operation, but with the source of language in operation.

- (12) tais tu krama-janmabhir ayugapat-kālair avyapadeśya-rūpair  
avayavaiḥ ... śabdāntaram ārabdhūn na śakyate. (V 1.23)  
'With those sequentially produced, non-simultaneously existent, unidentifiable parts ... (which one has in an individual utterance of a word) it is not possible to bring into existence another entity (or an entity of a different kind, a collectivity having a stable nature, called) word ...'

In this instance, each subsequent adjective takes us nearer to the final assertion and seems to assume a possible question in between. In the utterance of a word, sound particles are produced in a sequence, hence they cannot physically form a unity called word. Well, someone might query, 'Is it not possible that they could all exist together subsequent to their coming into being?' The reply is: 'No, they do not remain in existence at the same time' and further, 'Even if they were assumed to coexist, because each is atomic in nature, they do not have expressible forms or known identities; we would not know that they have given rise to a particular word.'

Similarly, in (13), each succeeding adjective makes the statement more plausible. This can be seen through an imagined dialogue of the type (14).

- (13) yām sūkṣmāṁ nityām atīndriyāṁ vācam ṛṣayaḥ sāksāt-kṛta-dharmāṇo  
mantra-dṛṣaḥ paśyanti tām ... (V 1.5)  
'That language, subtle, permanent, and sense-transcending, which the seers who have realized dharma and who see mantras perceive...'

- (14) 'If *vāc* or language is subtle, does it really exist?'  
 'It is permanently there.'  
 'If it is permanently there, why do we not perceive it?'  
 'You need persons with special qualities to perceive it.'

2.6. Finally, I would like to draw attention to the Vṛtti's use of parenthetical clauses. These interrupt, if not disturb, the normal word order of the sentences containing them. It is my impression that such, truly parenthetical, clauses are rare in Sanskrit expository prose. Particles and short phrases that indicate hesitation, emotion, etc. on the part of the speaker are occasionally employed in Classical Sanskrit poetry for the appropriate aesthetic effect. There may also be parenthetical particles, phrases, and clauses in the Vedic corpus (Thieme 1944), some of them genuine and some due to factors such as metrical constraints, textual corruption, etc. However, as far as I can recall and ascertain without rereading a large mass of Classical śāstric prose, there are very few, if any, truly parenthetical clauses in that body of literature. The Vṛtti, along with Maṇḍanamīśra's Brahmasiddhi, seems to be a definite, if not a large-scale, exception to this practice. Cf. passages such as (15).

- (15) *yathā hi jñānam jñeya-para-tantram jñeya-rūpa-pratyavabhāsatvād anirdeśya-sva-rūpam api jñānāntarasyeva bhinnām svasyaivātmanah sva-rūpa-mātrām darśayati — tathā hy atyantam anupalabdham apy anyena jñānena smṛti-viśayatvaṁ pratipadyate — tadvad ayam ...* (V 1.51)

'Just as a cognition, which is dependent upon the object on account of the (invariable) reflection (in it) of the form of the object and which is unspecifiable in terms of its own form, displays the own-form component of itself, (a component) separated as if it were (a form) of another cognition — to clarify: although it is not at all apprehended by another cognition, it becomes an object of recollection — in the same way this (word) ...'

Here, within the relative clause that begins with *yathā* and gives an analogy, we have a parenthetical clause, set off by the two dashes. To illustrate his point that in the process of signification a signifier reveals the signatum as well as its own form, Bhartṛhari employs the analogy of a cognition. A cognition is dependent on the object apprehended in it, in the sense that without that object it would not have any specifiable form. However, it must also be admitted that it reveals its own form as it apprehends or reveals the object — that it reveals its own form as it would of another cognition. How can we infer this? From the fact that the contents of even unnoticed cognitions become objects of memory. If I saw a pitcher, I can have a recollection of the form 'I saw a pitcher' even if after seeing the pitcher I did not have a reflective or introspective (*anuvyavasāya*) type of cognition like 'I saw a pitcher.' Now, since what is not experienced is not recollected, it must be concluded that the seeing of the pitcher was experienced (was recorded in consciousness) in some way — that when I saw the pitcher my consciousness recorded the pitcher as well as my seeing of it, that is, the object

of cognition as well as the form of the cognition. This argument is what the clause flanked by dashes states in a syntactically self-sufficient way. Its occurrence in the body of a larger sentence and the absence of a relationship of syntactic dependence on the words of the larger sentence which its words exhibit make it a true parenthetical clause.<sup>24</sup>

3. In the above discussion I have pointed out certain peculiarities of word order which may hold good only in the case of a specific body of literature written in a particular period, and which may have their origin in what the Vṛtti author inherited and what his objectives were. In a sequel to the present article, I shall offer a few theoretical observations on word order in Sanskrit.

### Notes

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The paper is based on the following primary sources:

(1) Bhartṛhari's *Trikāṇḍī* or *Vākya-pāṇīya*. I have reproduced the text of the Vṛtti from my critical edition of the *Trikāṇḍī* (under preparation). Those wishing to verify my references to the Vṛtti prior to the publication of my edition should consult the editions by K. A. Subramania Iyer:

(a) *Vākya-pāṇīya* of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti and the Paddhati of Vṛṣabha-deva. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1966. (Deccan College Monograph Series, 32.)

(b) The *Vākya-pāṇīya* of Bhartṛhari, *Kāṇḍa II* with the commentary of Puṇya-rāja and the ancient Vṛtti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

I have followed the enumeration of *kārikās* in Wilhelm Rau (1977), Bhartṛhari's *Vākya-pāṇīya*: Die Mūla-kārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 42:4.) Wiesbaden: Steiner. Hence the numbers in my edition and those in the editions by Subramania Iyer do not always match. However, they are not far removed from each other.

(c) Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-mahā-bhāṣya*, ed. by F. Kielhorn, revised ed. by K. V. Abhyankar. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

(3) Yāska's *The Nighaṇṭu* and the *Nirukta*, ed. by Lakshman Sarup. 1920-7. Reprinted 1967, 1984. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

<sup>1</sup>Although the title *Vākya-pāṇīya* is now used to refer to all of the three books, the older tradition is to confine it to the first two books; see Aklujkar 1969:547-54.

<sup>2</sup>*vākya-pāde adhiṣṭhita kṛtāḥ granthāḥ vākya-pāṇīyam* 'Vākya-pāṇīya is a book that deals with sentence and word (the latter mainly as a sentence constituent, not as a lexical item).<sup>1</sup> Bhartṛhari's chosen subject, then, naturally involves consideration of the relation between word

and sentence, particularly of the transition from the level of the sentence (vākya) to that of the word, and vice versa. It is with such transitions that syntax is primarily concerned.

In addition to its general meaning explained just now, the title Vākyapadīya seems to have the particular connotation of 'a work interested in determining whether the sentence or word is the primary unit of language'; cf. Prabhākara quoted in Aklujkar 1969:552.

<sup>3</sup>On the authorship of the Vākyapadīya-vṛtti, see Aklujkar 1972.

<sup>4</sup>The only other work with which a comparison of the Vṛtti has been suggested is the bhāṣya, attributed to Vyāsa or Vindhyavāsa, on the Yogasūtras. However, the impression that the Vṛtti's style is similar to that of the Yogabhāṣya is more likely to be due to a few passages and expressions that are common to the two texts. (These common elements are pointed out in an unpublished paper which I read before the 1970 annual meeting of the American Oriental Society.) There may not be any intrinsic similarity of style between the two works.

<sup>5</sup>A detailed study of the diction of the Vṛtti will be made after its word index, on which I am working, is finalized. As a sample, note the expressions *nirjñāta* 'known', *samācāra* 'proper conduct', *pradeśa* 'part', *abhikhyāta* 'well known', *upavyaṇjana* 'manifestor', *prabandha* 'continuum, stretch', *paridṛṣṭa* 'seen, commonly found (?)', *upagraha* 'taking on, assuming', and *pratilabdha* 'acquired, received' (cp. Pāli *paṭilābha*).

<sup>6</sup>E.g. alliteration of *p* as in (a) or of *v* in (b).

(a) ... prayatnam abhipadyamāṇaḥ prati-śabdaṁ paritaḥ paricchinnāḥ śabdātmanah samspr̥ṣāṇi iva manah prañidhatte (V 1.54)

'... coming to the effort (of articulation), (the speaker) in the case of each expression, applies his mind as if he is contacting expression-units that are cut off all around (i.e., the speaker seeks distinct phonetic shapes as he proceeds toward making an utterance) ...'

(b) ... vṛttiṣu tāvān eva sphoṭa vicitrāṁ vṛttim anuvīdhatte (V 1.50).

'... in the (fast, medium, and slow) modes of utterance, a linguistic unit imitates diverse modes (i.e., gives the impression of variation in its manner of being) without (really) changing its (own) extent/measure.'

<sup>7</sup>As the author deals with subtle semantic concepts, he uses paraphrase or restatement much more than is common in Sanskrit expository prose. Note e.g. the characterizations of *kriyā* or action as expressed by a verb and of *sattva* or reified signata in (a), or the statement in (b) on the beginninglessness, as it obtains in a linguistic community, of the 'word : meaning' relationship.

(a) tasyāḥ pravṛttir iti samākhyāṭyās tattvaṁ sādhyatvaṁ, sādhanākāṅkṣatā (\*ñikṣatvaṁ?), krama-rūpopagrahaḥ, kālābhivyakti-hetutvaṁ. aparas tv arthaḥ sattva-mātraṁ, triṣv api kāleṣu sva-bhāva-siddham, abhidheyatvena pratyastamita-krama-rūpaṁ, nāma-pada-nibandhanam. (V 1.13)

'Of that action, which is designated pravṛtti, the nature is to have a "to-be-accomplished" character, to have an expectancy for means (that will bring it about), to assume the form of sequence, to become the cause of the manifestation of time. The other entity, artha, is all that which is existent (or reified), which is "accomplished" (or stable) by nature with respect to all of the three times (past, present, and future), which, as meaning, has no sequential form, which is the basis of nominal expressions.'

(b) asyedaṁ-bhāve sati śabdārthayoḥ so 'yam iti yaḥ sambandhaḥ so 'thādeśanasya kartum asakyatvād autpātikah, sva-bhāva-siddho, na kenacit kartrā karñcit pratipautāraṁ praty ajñāta-pūrvas tat-prathamam kṛta iti. (V 1.23)

'The identity relationship of word and meaning, which (relationship) comes about when there is a relationship of the form "this X<sub>1</sub> is (the meaning) of this (word) X<sub>2</sub>," is simultaneous with the coming into being (of the word), since meanings cannot be taught; (it) is there by its very nature; (it is) not something previously unknown that some agent fashions for the first time for a recipient of information.'

<sup>8</sup>For instance, use of the ablative (usually of an abstract noun) to specify the reason behind an assertion and use of the instrumental to specify the indirect reason if the direct reason is expressed through an ablative.

<sup>9</sup>Awareness of this subtlety allows us to infer that in a phrase like *pūrvam agbhūdyaktam ghrīḍā vā* 'previously not grasped or indistinctly grasped' (V 1.23) the original reading is more likely to be *pūrvam agbhūdyaktam vā ghrīḍā*, with *vā* after the adverb qualifying the second member. Similarly, we can conclude that if we must introduce a *ca*, not found in the manuscripts, into the phrase *artha-vādān artha-vāda-prakāraṇi śruti-vākyaṇi* (V 1.8) 'explanatory passages [and] those sentences of the śruti which are like the explanatory passages', we should introduce it not at the end, but after the adjective of the second member in the pair *artha-vāda* and *śruti-vākya* — as *artha-vādān artha-vāda-prakāraṇi ca śruti-vākyaṇi*.

<sup>10</sup>Note that throughout this paper, I do not attempt to present a comprehensive collection of examples, counterexamples, or apparent counterexamples.

Words or letters not found in the manuscripts of the Vṛtti are put in brackets. Their acceptance into the text of the Vṛtti is frequently based on the testimony of the ancient commentator Vṛṣabha who, on the whole, had access to much better manuscripts of the Vṛtti than we have today.

<sup>11</sup>Similar examples are the following:

(a) ... śarīraṁ, prthag anyāṁś ca tūrtha-pravādeṣu prasiddhān arthān ... (V 1.38)

'... the (subtle transmigratory) body and the various other entities well known in tūrtha-pravādas (foundational philosophical views? philosophies intended for salvation?)'

(b) bhinnārthānām (tu) padānām bhinna-padaṣṭhānām ca varṇānām ... (V 1.71)

'On the other side, ... of words having different meanings and of phonemes found in different words.'

(c) ... śruti-vihitāni karmāṇi smṛti-nibandhanāṁś ca bhakṣyābhakṣyādi-niyamān ... (V 1.149)

'... the actions/procedures enjoined by the śruti and the restrictions, based on the smṛti, regarding such matters as what should be eaten and what should not be eaten.'

<sup>12</sup>Similarly, in ... *vyākāraṇa ... avadhāraṇena sādhuṭva-jñāna-labhyena vā śabda-pūrveṇa yogena* ... (V 1.159-70), which I shall leave untranslated because a literal translation will not make much sense and a full explanation will take us too far afield.

<sup>13</sup>This is confirmed by a phrase like the following which approaches the length and function of a clause.

svapne hi (or: svapne 'pi) badhirādīnām śabdādi-pratipādanam, ghana-samniṣṭāva-yavānām ca kuḍyādīnām avayava-vibhāgam antareṇāntar veśmādiṣu sūksmāṇām arthānām darśanam ... (V 1.36).

'Making known words, etc., even in a dream, to deaf persons and others who are similar to the deaf, and seeing subtle things inside residences without separating the constituents of thatched walls, etc., which (walls) have densely placed constituents ...'

Here the talk is of certain spirits and their extraordinary capacities, such as the capacity to make the deaf hear sounds in dreams and the capacity to see through thick walls. *śabdādi-pratipādanam* and *darśanam* form the pair connected by *ca*, but *ca* does not appear after either. It is placed after a qualifier (*ghana-samniṣṭāva-yava* 'of those thatched walls, etc. whose constituents are densely placed'), if not an adjective, of *darśana*, that is, after the first significant word of the second unit as in the case of clauses joined by *ca* or *vā*.

<sup>14</sup>It might be thought that *iti* in phrases such as *so 'yam iti ca* (V 1.68) has a similar effect. However, *so 'yam iti* means 'identification, superimposition' in such instances and has the value of a single, compound, word.

<sup>15</sup>Cf. *te 'pi hi* (Patañjali 3.1.26.15) cited in V 1.23.

In some cases, *hi* seems to take the third position, not as a result of the use of *api* or *eva* but as a result of its strong association with the subject word; cf. e.g. the examples in (a) and (b).

- (a) praviviktaḥ sa hi tasya vastuno vyavahārātūtaṁ rūpam. (V 1.24-26)  
'That separated (word meaning) is such a form of that entity which (form) does not figure in communication (i.e., which has reality only as a product or tool of linguistic analysis).'
- (b) prāyeṇa sarvo hi svasyāṁ svasyāṁ vidyāyāṁ vyākaraṇam anugacchati. (V 1.14-22)  
'Usually everyone follows grammar in his respective branch of learning.'
- The observation made in this section makes *tair eva [ca]* a probable reading in V 1.118, words 13-4.

<sup>16</sup>Cf. *vedam ca vedāṅgāni ca* (Yāska 1.20) 'the Veda and the ancillaries of the Veda', *saṁānam ihamānānām cādhyānānām ca* (Patañjali 1.31) 'of persons interested in and studying one and the same thing'.

<sup>17</sup>The sources of the quotations in example (6) are not known.

<sup>18</sup>Unless *prajñāna* and *asamprakhyaṇa* are opposite in meaning (which is possible), the original text here could have been *prajñāna-rūpa-pākaś [cāprajñāna-rūpa-pākaś ca samprakhyaṇa-rūpa-pākaś] cāsamprakhyaṇa-rūpa-pākaś cāpām*, and the part set off in brackets could have been lost through haplography.

<sup>19</sup>Sentences like the following may be exceptions to the observation made in this section or, what is more likely, they may reflect the fact that the concepts connected by *ca* belonged to antithetical or distinct categories in the author's way of thinking:

- (a) pradeśo 'pi brahmaṇaḥ sārvarūpyam anatikrāntaś cāvikalpaś ca. (V 1.9; a citation)  
'The domain of brahmaṇ is coterminous with all forms (and hence with all vikalpas "conceptual constructs"), but it is also devoid of or beyond any vikalpa.'

- (b) vedo hi lokānām prakṛitvena copadeṣṭu-rūpatvena ca vivarteṣu vyavasthāsu 'ca vīdhātū (V 1.10)

The Veda fashions the worlds as material cause and also as an instructor or guide in processes of diversification as well as in creations of order or arrangement.'

The double employment of *ca* in some of the verses (kārikās) of the Trikāṇḍī, as in *te lingais ca sva-sabdais ca* (1.26) and *śaṣṭhyāś ca prathamāyās ca* (1.67), could be due to constraints of the metre.

When *ca* or *vā* joins three clauses, it may occasionally not figure in the first clause as can be seen from the following:

- (c) yadi nityānām śabdānām abhivyaktir, janmādi-vikriyāpatir vā satām, asatām vā sopākhyā-nirupākhyatvaṁ ... (V 1.28)  
'Whether it is (merely) a manifestation of permanent (basically unchanging) linguistic units, or transformations such as coming into existence in the case of (linguistic units) existing (in some other form), or states of being specifiable and being unspecifiable in the case of (previously) inexistent (linguistic units), ...'

- (d) yo 'yam jñāta-vedā, yaś ca [...] puruṣeṣv āntaraḥ prakāśo, yaś ca [...] prakāśāprakāśa yoh prakāśayitā śabdākhyāḥ prakāśaḥ, tatraitat sarvam upanibaddham yāvad vastv avastu, yāvat sthānu carīṣṇu ceti. (V 1.12)

'All this, whether it is material or non-material [and] whether it is stationary [or] moving, is fixed in that which is this fire, and which is the internal light in men, and which is [...] the illuminator of the luminous and the non-luminous, the light called śabda (language).'

Contrast the use of *ca* in every clause in examples like (e).

- (e) ye ceśvara-kāla-puruṣa-vidyā-kṣetrajñān vibhakta-tattvān ānuḥ, ye cānūsvaram akālam apuruṣam avidyam akṣetrajñam avidyā-mātram eva manyante, ye caikatvānatikrameṇa saṁmūrccita-viruddhāparimāṇa-śakti-rūpa-nirbhāsa-parigraham apūrvāparāṁ viśvāmānām kāraṇam ācakṣate, teṣām ... (V 1.28)  
'Of those who propound distinct (primary causes like) God, Time, Self, Knowledge, and the Knower of the Field, and (of those) who entertain only nescience devoid of God,

Time, Self, Knowledge, (or) the Knower of the Field, and (of those) who proclaim as cause an all-encompassing entity in which there are, without any loss of oneness, manifestations of infinite, mutually opposed, and unsegregated capacities and of which there is neither a predecessor nor a successor ...'

<sup>20</sup>Probably, the following sentences also contain a *dehali-dīpa* use of the genitive:

- (a) samyag-viparīṇatai līṅga-vacanādīnām vyākaraṇam nibandhanam (V 1.11)  
'In changing properly the gender, grammatical number, etc., the analysis of gender, grammatical number, etc. is the basis.'
- (b) na hy anityatve śabdādīnām śāstrāmbhe kimcid api prayojanam asti. (V 1.23)  
'Under the alternative of impermanency of words, etc., there would be no purpose in beginning the science of words, etc.'

<sup>21</sup>As an example of the sensitivity mentioned here, note the following.

tathāśrīṣaty api śabda-vyakti-samavāye, śabdākṣter varṇāvayavāvagraha-prāpta-saṁskārābhiḥ kramotpānnābhir buddhibhiḥ pūrvam agrhīṭavyaktam vā gṛhīṭa saṁskṛte 'ntah-karaṇe carama-vijñānenākṛtiḥ paricchidyate. (V 1.23))

'In the same manner, here too, although there is no aggregation of sound individuals, the form of the word-universal, previously unapprehended or indistinctly apprehended through cognitions which are impressed with the intake of phoneme-parts (i.e., parts in the form of phonemes) and which have arisen in a sequence, is determined with the final cognition. It is determined in the inner organ (or mind) which is modified through cognitions which are impressed with the intake of phoneme-parts and which have arisen in a sequence.'

Here, the instrumental forms (*varṇāvayavāvagraha-prāpta-saṁskārābhiḥ kramotpānnābhir buddhibhiḥ*) are connected with the adjectival phrase *pūrvam agrhīṭavyaktam vā gṛhīṭa* as well as *saṁskṛte 'ntah-karaṇe*. To avoid having to repeat the instrumental forms, the author places *saṁskṛte 'ntah-karaṇe* immediately after the adjectival phrase and, against the usual practice, allows the substantive (*ākṛtiḥ*) to be removed from (is) the adjectival phrase qualifying it.

<sup>22</sup>I would concede that if it were not for the order of expressions we would not be able to know in individual instances what the stages in the progression of thought were. These stages are, after all, not open to observation by others; there is no widespread agreement in their case. However, my point is that there is evidence suggesting that a presumed dialogue with the reader is responsible for the presence of certain expressions at certain points: A kind of bouncing board seems to exist in front of the author and his later words seem to be determined by the effect he thinks the earlier words will produce on the board.

<sup>23</sup>The condition 'performing a common or identical syntactic role' is not essential to the point I make. It is more of a methodological condition that serves to ensure that evidence of a clear sort is adduced. If different positions assigned to grammatically similar words are explored, the possibility that the difference in positions could be due to the difference in grammatical function is eliminated.

<sup>24</sup>The long sentence *yathaivoṭkṣepaṇa-bhramaṇa-recanādīnām ... vyavahārā avatiṣṭhante* in V 1.23 may likewise be viewed by some as containing a series of parenthetical clauses.