Syntactic gleanings from Bhårtåhari's Trikåññî* 

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1.1. Bhårtåhari's Trikåññî or Våkyapådiya¹ is chronologically the fourth major surviving text in the Påñinian tradition, coming after the works associated with Påñini, Kåtyåyana, and Patañjali. For a linguist interested in theories of language and grammar, it is a text of greater direct importance than its three surviving predecessors, for it is the first explicit and sustained statement of a theoretical kind on language and grammar that we have available in the Påñinian tradition. In its case, we do not generally have to speculate on an implicit view of language and grammar (as in the case of the Åśådhåyå or the Vårttika), nor do we have just a few tantalizing and colloquially worded theoretical statements interspersed in a mass of derivational detail (as in the Mahåbåhåśya). For syntax in particular, it is a mine of information and insights, as its name, Våkyapådiya, to some extent implies.²

Since the discussion of the Sanskrit grammarians usually proceeds as if Sanskrit is the only language to be analysed for theoretical gains, the Våkyapådiya does not contain a general consideration of syntax, i.e., a general syntactic theory or a theory of syntax in the abstract, with reference to languages other than Sanskrit or in explicit universalist terms. One is required to put such a theory together on the basis of some general statements by the author and on the basis of certain other statements of his which, although made in the context of Sanskrit, seem to have been intended as universally applicable.

Even as far as the syntax of Sanskrit is concerned, the work is not intended as an exhaustive or exclusive treatment of the topic. It rather concentrates on particular aspects and cases, but it does so in a remarkably rich and rewarding manner.

1.2. Two of the possible approaches that a paper exploring the Trikåññî from the syntactic point of view could take are already indicated by what I have said so far. The paper could either deal with what the Trikåññî has to say in the area of a general theory of syntax or it could concern itself with the Trikåññî's observations on the syntax of Sanskrit.

There is, however, a third possible approach: The first two books of the Trikåññî, the main text of which is written in verses (kårikås), traditionally include an explanatory and supplementary prose gloss known as Våtti (V).³ Anyone who has done sufficient reading in Sanskrit åśåstra (particularly philo-
Sophical) prose, is struck by this Vṛtti as a work having a distinctive style. The distinctiveness of its style, in turn, is due to its diction, certain embellishments, and some devices adopted to get the point across, as well as to its syntax. Therefore, a third approach to the Trikāṇḍi appropriate in a volume devoted to Sanskrit syntax would be one of studying the syntax of the Vṛtti. It is this approach that I intend to take.

1.3. My selection of syntactic features of the Vākyapādiya Vṛtti for inclusion in the following discussion is naturally determined by my impressions of what is commonly known about the syntax of Classical Sanskrit and about the syntax of Sanskrit philosophical commentarial prose in particular. I shall set aside, or mention only as background, those features which I believe are common knowledge. Given the limitations of space, I shall further confine myself to word order.

2.1. It is well known that the connectives ca 'and' and vā 'or' commonly occur at the end of the set of items they connect. Only rarely are they used after each single item. One can add a specification to this observation on the basis of works like the Vākyapādiya Vṛtti: If the second member of a pair joined by ca or vā contains a qualifier (usually an attributive adjective), then ca or vā is placed after that qualifier, not at the end of the whole second member. Illustrative examples are:

(1) ... śāstra-vyavahāram anupatati, śāstra-vyavahāra-sadāśaṁ ca lokaṁkaraṁ bheda-vyavahāram. (V.124-6)
'The abstracted word meaning' supports (i.e., serves as the basis of) the statements seen in the science of (grammar) and those analytical statements of the users (of the language) which are similar to statements seen in the science of (grammar).

(2) ... jñāne śāstra-pūrvaka vā prayoge ... (V.155)
'Merit consists in' knowing (the grammatical expressions) or in using them subsequently to (learning what) the science (of grammar has to say about such expressions).

The situation in these instances is the same as when ca, vā, hi, tu, etc. join clauses. There they generally appear after the first major word of the clause they connect to a preceding clause. The qualifier of the second member in the above instances enjoys a status similar to that of a word introducing a clause.

2.2. Another peculiarity about the placing of ca and vā, regarding which I do not recall reading anything in the discussions of Sanskrit syntax, is that words which add emphasis, such as api and eva push ca and vā from the second position in the clause to the third place; cf. (3) and (4). And the same displacement is seen in the case of hi, as in (5).

(3) yō 'pi cābhīdhaṁ śrotā vā ... (V.1.24-6)
'And the speaker or hearer who ...'
pakṣāntare 'pi ca ... (V.137)
'And even under the other view (under which an already existing effect is simply manifested) ...'

(4) tasyāpi ca pratyāyasya ... (V.1.62)
'And even of that signatum ...'
teṣām api ca ... (V.1.73)
'And even of those (phonemes) ...'
smṛti-kāle 'pi ca ... (V.1.132)
'And even at the time of recollection ...'
saiva ca ... (V.1.5)
'And that (language) itself ...'
vāca eva vā ... (V.1.12)
'Or, of language itself ...'
sarve 'pi hi vādino ... (V.1.30)
'Indeed, all participants in philosophical discussion ...'
gopā[ā]vāpyā[ā]dayo 'pi hi (V.1.123)
'Indeed (or since such is the state of affairs), even persons like cowherds and shepherds ...'
vayaktā eva [hi] gaur, nākātriḥ (V.1.69-70)
'For it is an individual that is a cow, not a universal.'

2.3 I have sometimes wondered if there once was a difference of connotation between an expression of the type 'X ca Y ca' and an expression of the type 'X Y ca'. There are several passages in the Vākyapādiya Vṛtti, some of them quotations, which indicate that the first type of construction was favored, at least by the Vṛtti author and by some of his predecessors, when two items clearly belonging to different groups in the speaker's perception (especially items logically opposed to each other) were to be expressed together. See the examples in (6) - (8).

(6) praṇāma-rūpa-pākaś caśaṁ prākhyāśaṁ rūpa-pākaś ca cāpanā praṇog raśaḥ. sa khalv śāru ca cāpanā cēti. ... dvaitaṁ khalv aphy ahuḥ. nityaṁ cāpanā ca mātrā-yonayanāḥ. yāsu rūpa ca cāpanā ca, sūkṣmaṁ ca sūkṣmaṁ ca cēts ca eva bhuvanaṁ viṣaktam iti ... indriya-grāmas ca cēts cāpanā ca caṣṭrājaṁ cēti. (V.1.8)
'(Some say): 'Prāṇa, which has a maturation in the form of consciousness (or Knowledge) as well as a maturation in the form of matter (or nescience), is the essence of the Waters. It is verily one that returns (in the case of some) and one that does not return (in the case of others)." ... The Dualists too, indeed, say: "The sources of discrete entities are permanent as well as impermanent (i.e., some sources are permanent and some are not), (sources) in which this universe, the one having form as well as the one lacking form, the subtle as well as the gross (i.e., this universe in its amorphous as well as non-amorphous and subtle as well as gross aspects), is attached." ... the set of senses and the Internal Controller, the intellect (or mind) and the Knower of the Field (Self/soul)."
(7) śabdavatī cāśabdā ca śmṛtī nibadhyaete. (V 1.29)

'A Smṛti (social code), consisting of words as well as bereft of words (i.e., as something articulated as well as something preserved, without the benefit of verbal expression, in conduct only), is composed.'

(8) ... te saṁti-saṁbandha-mātreṇopalabdhās cāntupalabdhās ca ... (V 1.57)

'... they (the words), merely through the relation of existing (i.e., merely because they exist), when they are apprehended as well as when they are not apprehended, ...'

2.4. The next peculiarity of the word order of śāstric Sanskrit as evidenced in the Vṛtti appears more interesting to me than the features I have briefly presented so far. It lies in the placing of genitive modifiers. The normal position of a qualifier in the genitive is, as we know, the same as that of the attributive adjective, namely preceding the noun. In some instances, however, the position is deliberately changed and the word is placed after the noun. The advantage to the author apparently is that it is linked simultaneously to the preceding and the following noun, usually with a different shade of genitival meaning: a kind of slesa or play on meaning results. I will call this strategy the dehali-dīpa placing of the genitive: Just as a lamp placed on a threshold illumines the area in front as well as the room behind, so this sandwiched genitive throws light on the preceding as well as the following word; cf. (9) and (10).

(9) sa eva hi kalau śakti-vaikalyanī nīrān pravibhaktāngō drśyate. (V 1.5)

'In the age of kali, due to the deficient capacities of men, the same (Āyurveda) appears to men with its branches divided.'

(10) jñānātmakatvād v pariṣaysaiva saṁskāra-hetavaḥ. (V 1.10)

'Or, (the different lores) bring about the refinement of man alone (not of both man and knowledge, as in the preceding alternative), since man consists of knowledge.'

In all such instances we clearly have a stylistic consideration, or a consideration that had become a convention of śāstric writing for some authors, overriding the processes of natural or ordinary Sanskrit syntax. For a specific gain the usual word order is reversed, a move quite consistent with the Sanskrit culture's extraordinary sensitivity to the possibilities of multiple meaning, word economy, and, in general, language play.

2.5 It seems that in works like the Vākyapadiya Vṛtti there is an additional, essentially rhetorical, principle operating behind word order. The author is interested optimally in producing conviction in his reader about the truth of what he states, and minimally in ensuring that the reader understands what he states. Toward these ends, he adopts devices similar to those of a good teacher. He moves from the general to the specific, or from the gross to the subtle, or from the least arguable to a characterization specific to a particular line of thinking, or in a way that shows awareness of possible objections. One may not always be able to determine which of these possible ways of looking at his order is the right way or whether there is in fact only one right way, but one can be certain that a specific movement conducive to the author's goal of effective communication is there. In fact, if one does not assume such a movement or something similar to it, one may not have any explanation for the order seen in words appearing in the same case and performing a common or identical syntactical role.

Note, for example, the following:

(11) abhinātā saṁhṛta-kramāntantah saṁnieśvināḥ śabda-tattvād ... (V 1.12)

'From the undifferentiated, sequenceless, internal language principle ...'

Here, the first adjective sets up a contrast between the ordinarily experienced language marked by diversity and the language-principle characterized by oneness.

The second adjective explains why there is a lack of diversity in the language-principle: because sequence, which marks language in communication, is withdrawn in it. Finally, the third adjective indicates why sequence is not there or the fact that at the particular stage of his thinking the author is concerned not with the outgoing language in operation, but with the source of language in operation.

(12) tais tu krama-jamabhātś ayugapat-kālār ayuyapadeśyā-rūpār

avayavaiḥ ... śabdāntaram arādbhūn na śakyate. (V 1.23)

'With those sequentially produced, non-simultaneously existing, unidentifiable parts ... (which one has in an individual utterance of a word) it is not possible to bring into existence another entity (or an entity of a different kind, a collectivity having a stable nature, called) word ...'

In this instance, each subsequent adjective takes us nearer to the final assertion and seems to assume a possible question in between. In the utterance of a word, sound particles are produced in a sequence, hence they cannot physically form a unity called word. Well, someone might query, 'Is it not possible that they could all exist together subsequent to their coming into being?' The reply is: 'No, they do not remain in existence at the same time' and further, 'Even if they were assumed to coexist, because each is atomic in nature, they do not have expressible forms or known identities; we would not know that they have given rise to a particular word.'

Similarly, in (13), each succeeding adjective makes the statement more plausible. This can be seen through an imagined dialogue of the type (14).

(13) yātā śūkṣmaṁ nityān añṭāriyān vācaṁ rṣayaṁ sūkṣmat-kṛta-dharmāṇga

mantra-ṛṣaṭ paśyantī tam ... (V 1.5)

'That language, subtle, permanent, and sense-transcending, which

the seers who have realized dharma and who see mantras perceive...'
(14) 'If word or language is subtle, does it really exist?' 
'It is permanently there.'
'If it is permanently there, why do we not perceive it?'
'You need persons with special qualities to perceive it.'

2.6. Finally, I would like to draw attention to the Vṛtti's use of parenthetical clauses. These interrupt, if not disturb, the normal word order of the sentences containing them. It is my impression that such, truly parenthetical, clauses are rare in Sanskrit expository prose. Particles and short phrases that indicate hesitation, emotion, etc., on the part of the speaker are occasionally employed in Classical Sanskrit poetry for the appropriate aesthetic effect. There may also be parenthetical particles, phrases, and clauses in the Vedic corpus (Thieme 1944), some of them genuine and some due to factors such as metrical constraints, textual corruption, etc. However, as far as I can recall and ascertain without rereading a large mass of Classical śāstric prose, there are very few, if any, truly parenthetical clauses in that body of literature. The Vṛtti, along with Manḍanaśīra's Brahmāśīla, seems to be a definite, if not a large-scale, exception to this practice. Cf. passages such as (15).

(15) yathā hi jñānār jñeya-paramantrāh jñeya-rūpa-pratyavabhāsatvād anindṛṣyā-svā-rūpam api jñānāntarasyeva bhinnār śvasva-vātmanāḥ sva-rūpa-mārān darṣayati — tathā hi ayantam anupalabdham api anyena jñānena śūṇtī-viṣayatvān pratipadayate — tadvad ayam ...
(V 1.51)

'Just as a cognition, which is dependent upon the object on account of the (invariable) reflection (in it) of the form of the object and which is unspecifiable in terms of its own form, displays the own-form component of itself, (a component) separated as if it were (a form) of another cognition — to clarify: although it is not at all apprehended by another cognition, it becomes an object of recollection — in the same way this (word) ...'

Here, within the relative clause that begins with yathā and gives an analogy, we have a parenthetical clause, set off by the two dashes. To illustrate his point that in the process of signification a signifier reveals the signatum as well as its own form, Bhartrhari employs the analogy of a cognition. A cognition is dependent on the object apprehended in it, in the sense that without that object it would not have any specifiable form. However, it must also be admitted that it reveals its own form as it apprehends or reveals the object — that it reveals its own form as it would of another cognition. How can we infer this? From the fact that the contents of even unnoticed cognitions become objects of memory. If I saw a pitcher, I can have a recollection of the form 'I saw a pitcher' even if after seeing the pitcher I did not have a reflective or introspective (anuṣṭubhyāsavyāt) type of cognition like 'I saw a pitcher.' Now, since what is not experienced is not recollected, it must be concluded that the seeing of the pitcher was experienced (was recorded in consciousness) in some way — that when I saw the pitcher my consciousness recorded the pitcher as well as my seeing of it, that is, the object

of cognition as well as the form of the cognition. This argument is what the clause flanked by dashes states in a syntactically self-sufficient way. Its occurrence in the body of a larger sentence and the absence of a relationship of syntactic dependence on the words of the larger sentence which its words exhibit make it a true parenthetical clause.34

3. In the above discussion I have pointed out certain peculiarities of word order which may hold good only in the case of a specific body of literature written in a particular period, and which may have their origin in what the Vṛtti author inherited and what his objectives were. In a sequel to the present article, I shall offer a few theoretical observations on word order in Sanskrit.

Notes

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2 Hans Henrich Hock suggested some changes in an earlier draft of this paper that went beyond the usual editorial suggestions for consistency. I wish to thank him for his informed friendly advice.

3 The paper is based on the following primary sources:

(a) Vākyapādīya of Bhartrhari with the Vṛtti and the Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva. Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1966. (Deccan College Monograph Series, 32.)

(b) The Vākyapādīya of Bhartrhari, Kāḍa II with the commentary of Puyya-rāja and the ancient Vṛtti, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1983.

I have followed the enumeration of kārikās in Wilhelm Rau (1977), Bhartrhari's Vākyapādīya: Die Mūla-kārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 42-4.) Wiesbaden: Steiner. Hence the numbers in my edition and those in the editions by Subramania Iyer do not always match. However, they are not far removed from each other.

(c) Paratāṭalī's Vṛṣṭikrama-mahā-bhāṣya, ed. by F. Kielhorn, revised ed. by K. V. Abhyankar, Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.


3 Although the title Vākyapādīya is now used to refer to all of the three books, the older tradition is to confuse it to the first two books; see Aklujkar 1969:347-54.

4 Vākyapadīya (kārikā) gauravatāḥ vākyapadīyam Vākyapādīya is a book that deals with sentence and word (the latter mainly as a sentence constituent, not as a lexical item), Bhartrhari's chosen subject, then, naturally involves consideration of the relation between word
and sentence, particularly of the transition from the level of the sentence (vākyasa) to that of the word, and vice versa. It is with such transitions that syntax is primarily concerned.

In addition to its general meaning explained just now, the title Vākyapāda seems to have the particular connotation of 'a work interested in determining whether the sentence or word is the primary unit of language'; cf. Prabhākara quoted in Akujkar 1969:552.

3 On the authorship of the Vākyapāda-vṛtti, see Akujkar 1972.

The only other work with which a comparison of the Vṛtti has been suggested is the bhaiṣaja, attributed to Vyāsa or Vindhyavāsa, on the Yogabhāṣya. However, the impression that the Vṛtti's style is similar to that of the Yogabhāṣya is more likely to be due to a few passages and expressions that are common to the two texts. (These common elements are pointed out in an unpublished paper which I read before the 1970 annual meeting of the American Oriental Society.) There may not be any intrinsic similarity of style between the two works.

4 A detailed study of the diction of the Vṛtti will be made after its word index, on which I am working, is finalized. As a sample, note the expressions niripāta 'known', samāceta 'proper conduct', pradāśa 'part', abhikhyāta 'well known', apavyāntana 'manifest', prabandha 'continuum, stretch', pariśṭa see, commonly found (7), upagraha 'taking on, assuming', and pratitulabha 'acquired, received (cf. Pāli pāṇipātha).

5 E.g. alliteration of p as in (a) or of v in (b).

(a) ... pratiprada paripāta paripāta paricchittam sābādman pāna parīcchittam... (V.1.54)
... coming to the effort (of articulation), (the speaker) in the case of each expression, applies his mind as if he is contacting expression-units that are cut off all around (i.e., the speaker seeks distinct phonetic shapes as he proceeds toward making an utterance)...

(b) ... vṛttasya vaśān eva sphoṭo vicārāṇāṃ vṛttasya anvartata... (V.1.50)
... in the (fast, medium, and slow) modes of utterance, a linguistic unit imitates diverse modes (i.e., gives the impression of variation in its manner of being) without (really) changing its (own) extent/metre.

6 As the author deals with subtle semantic concepts, he uses paraphrase or restatement much more than is common in Sanskrit expository prose. Note e.g. the characterization of kriyā or action as expressed by a verb and of sattvā or reified signa in (a), or the statement in (b) on the beginninglessness, as it obtains in a linguistic community, of the 'word: meaning' relation.

(a) teṣāṁ pravṛttit sakṣātyādyat tavānā sādhyatvam, sādhanaṃ[bhāṣātāṃ] (sābhāṣātāṃ) ["sābhāṣātāṃ"] krama-rūpopagrahā, kālābhāvayakti-hetuvam. aparā parāvāha sattvam-mātraṇa, trīṣṇa api kāleṣu sva bhāvābhāvedham, abhāvāvayena pratyāstamitam krama-rūpasr, nāma-pada-nibandham. (V.1.13)
'Of that action, which is designated pravṛtti, the nature is to have a "to-be-accomplished" character, to have an expectancy for means (that will bring it about), to assume the form of sequence, to become the cause of the manifestation of time. The other entity, artha, is all that which is existent (or reified), which is "accomplished" (or stable) by nature with respect to all the three times (past, present, and future), which, as meaning, has no sequential form, which is the basis of nominal expressions.'

(b) aśayānābhāva satā sābādharābhāvāḥ so 'yām iti yāh sarībindhyāḥ so 'yāhādānasya kartuma śāktyāvādānajātācārya, sva bhāvāvādānajāta, na kenaśāntī karitān karipati oripatān praty ajñātā-pārvas tat-prabhānaṃ karika iti... (V.1.23)
'The identity relationship of word and meaning, which (relationship) comes about when there is a relationship of the form "this X is (the meaning) of this (word) X", is simultaneous with the coming into being (of the word), since meanings cannot be taught; (it) is there by its very nature; (it) is not something previously unknown that some agent fashions for the first time for a recipient of information.'

8 For instance, use of the ablative (usually of an abstract noun) to specify the reason behind an assertion and use of the instrumental to specify the indirect reason if the direct reason is expressed through an ablative.

9 Awareness of this subtlety allows us to infer that in a phrase like pārṇam agṛhītyavakrtaṃ grihīta vā previously not grasped or indistinctly grasped (V.1.23) the original reading is more likely to be pārṇam agṛhītyavakrtaṃ vā grihīta, with vā after the adverb qualifying the second member. Similarly, we can conclude that if we must introduce a ca, not found in the manuscripts, into the phrase artha-vādān artha-vādā-prakṛtiṃ śrutī-vādānī (V.1.8) 'explanatory passages [and] those sentences of the śruti which are like the explanatory passages', we should introduce it not at the end, but after the adjective of the second member in the pair artha-vādā and śrutī-vādā — as artha-vādā artha-vādā-prakṛtiṃ ca śrutī-vādānī.

10 Note that throughout this paper, I do not attempt to present a comprehensive collection of examples, counterexamples, or apparent counterexamples.

Words or letters not found in the manuscripts of the Vṛtti are put in brackets. Their acceptance into the text of the Vṛtti is frequently based on the testimony of the ancient commentator Vyāsabha who, on the whole, had access to much better manuscripts of the Vṛtti than we have today.

11 Similar examples are the following:

(a) ... śrūṇām, prthva anyānāṃ ca tirtha-pravīḍesu prasiddhiṃ arthān ... (V.1.38)
... the (subtle transmigratory) body and the various other entities well known in tirtha-pravīḍa (foundational philosophical views? philosophies intended for salvation?).

(b) bhīmāsāntānām [tu] padāśābhāvā vābhāvā arthān ca vāsāntānām ... (V.1.71)
'On the other side, ... of words having different meanings and of phonemes found in different words.'

(c) ... śrutī-vīdhānāṃ karmāṇi śrūṇāṃ śrūṇādhyānaṃ ca bhāksyabhāksyādyāt-niyāṇam ... (V.1.149)
... the actions/procedures enjoined by the śruti and the restrictions, based on the śrūṇā, regarding such matters as what should be eaten and what should not be eaten,'

12 Similarly, in ... vadhaidārgaṇa sādhatva-jñāna-labhāya vā sādha-pārvaṇa yogena ... (V.1.159-70), which I shall leave untranslated because a literal translation will not make much sense and a full explanation will take us too far afield.

13 This is confirmed by a phrase like the following which approaches the length and function of a clause.

svaṃ hi (or: svapne 'pi) bādheradānāṃ sābād-pratipādanaṃ, ghanā-sannivitvāvyanāṃ ca kūryādānāṃ avayava-vibhāgam antareṣṭāṃ vishyādānāṃ sthikāmyanāṃ arthānāṃ darśāṇānāṃ ... (V.1.36).
'Making known words, etc., even in a dream, to deaf persons and others who are similar to the deaf, and seeing subtle things inside residences without separating the constituents of touched walls, etc., which (walls) have densely placed constituents ...'

Here the talk is of certain spirits and their extraordinary capacities, such as the capacity to make the deaf hear sounds in dreams and the capacity to see through thick walls. sābād-pratipādanaṃ and darśāṇāṃ form the pair connected by ca, but ca does not appear after either. It is placed after a qualifier (ghanā-sannivitvāvyanāvye 'of those touched walls, etc., whose constituents are densely placed'), if not an adjectival, of darśana, that is, after the first significant word of the second unit as in the case of clauses joined by ca or vā.

It might be thought that iti in phrases such as so 'yam iti ca (V.1.68) has a similar effect. However, so 'yam iti means 'identification, superimposition' in such instances and has the value of a single, compound word.

15 Cf. te 'pi hi (Patañjali 3.1.26.15) cited in V.1.23.

In some cases, hi seems to take the third position, not as a result of the use of api or eva but as a result of its strong association with the subject word; cf. e.g. the examples in (a) and (b).
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(a) praviviktaḥ sa hi tasya vastuno vyavaharikāmin rūpaṃ. (V 1.24-26)
"That separated (word meaning) is such a form of that entity which (form) does not figure in
communication (i.e., which has reality only as a product or tool of linguistic anal-
ysis)."

(b) prabhāpa sarvāh śvayyān śvaśāyān vidyāyaṁ vīśkarāpan amangacchati. (V 1.14-22)
"Usually everyone follows grammar in his respective branch of learning."

The observation made in this section makes tair eva [ca] a probable reading in V 1.118, words 13-4.

16Cf. vedāni ca vedānīna ca (Yāsā 1.20) 'the Veda and the ancillaries of the Veda',
sandhānam ihamāndāni ca cādiḥyāndāni ca (Patañjali 1.31) 'of persons interested in and studying
one and the same thing'.

17The sources of the quotations in example (6) are not known.

18Unless prajñāna and asamprakhyāna are opposite in meaning (which is possible), the original
context here could have been prajñāna-rūpa-pākaś [cādiḥprajñāna-rūpa-pākaś ca asamprakhyāna-
rūpa-pākaś] cāsamprakhyāna-rūpa-pākaś cādiḥ, and the part set off in brackets could have been
lost through haplography.

19Sentences like the following may be exceptions to the observation made in this section or,
what is more likely, they may reflect the fact that the concepts connected by ca belonged to antithetical
or distinct categories in the author's way of thinking:

(a) pradēṣaḥ 'i brahmaḥ sāvarṣayam anaktānāṃ ca āvikalpaḥ ca. (V 1.9; a citation)
"The domain of brahma is coterminous with all forms (and hence with all vikalpas
"conceptual constructs"), but it is also devoid of or beyond any vikalpa."

(b) vedo hi loke prakṛtiṇām ca prakṛtiṇām ca rūpaḥ ca (V 1.10)
"The Veda fashions the worlds as material cause and also as an instructor or guide in
processes of diversification as well as in creations of order or arrangement."

The double employment of ca in some of the verses (kākākā) of the Tīkāya, as in te līgāṁ
canvāsām ca sva-sādānāṁ ca (1.26) and satyās ca pratibhāyati ca (1.87), could be due to constraints of the
metre. When ca or vā joins three clauses, it may occasionally not figure in the first clause as can be seen
from the following:

(c) yadi niśśāmin ca sādānāṁ abhiyavakti, jānākāni-viśkṛtyāpattīr vā saṁtān, asatānā vā
sappākhyā-yuṣprāyaṁ vā pariṣṭhitoṇa... (V 1.28)
"Whether it is (merely) a manifestation of permanent (basically unchanging) linguistic
units, or transformations such as coming into existence in the case of (linguistic units)
existing in (some other form), or states of being specifiable and being unspecifiable in the
case of (previously) inexist (linguistic units),..."

(d) yāv yāvā jīva-vedā, yāś ca [...] punāya aṣṭāraṇ prakāś, yāś ca [...] prakāśa-prakāśa
yāḥ prakāśāyaś sādākṛtyaḥ prakāśaḥ, taitat sarvaṃ upānindaham yāvā uṣṇī avastu,
ūyāh sthitā ca sarvaṃ ārthaḥ cet. (V 1.12)
"This all, whether it is material or non-material [and whether it is stationary or] moving,
is fixed in that which is this fire, and which is the internal light in men, and which
is [...] the illuminator of the luminous and the non-luminous, the light called śādā
(language)."

Contrast the use of ca in every clause in examples like (e).

(e) ye caśvārā-kāla-praśnā-vidyāyāt āsantaḥ śūh, ye caśvārām aṣṭāraṇāh aṣṭāraṇāh
āsantaḥ śūh, ye caśvārām aṣṭāraṇāh aṣṭāraṇāh eva manyeṣe, ye caśvārām aṣṭāraṇāh
śrāvānaḥ-arthaḥ-saṁścāraṇaḥ-saṁścāraṇaḥ śrāvānaḥ-pratipadāṇaḥ aṣṭāraṇāh
vidyāyāsāṁ lākṣaṇām aṣṭākaṣām tāṣṭam... (V 1.28)
"Of those who propound distinct (primary causes like) God, Time, Self, Knowledge, and
the Knower of the Field, and (of those) who entertain only nescience devoid of God,

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Time, Self, Knowledge, (or) the Knower of the Field, and (of those) who proclaim as
cause an all-encompassing entity in which there are, without any loss of exness,
manifestations of infinite, mutually opposed, and unsegregated capacities and of which
there is neither a predecessor nor a successor..."

20PROBABLY, the following sentences also contain a dehatī-diipa use of the genitive:
(a) sanyāś-viprajasidhi līgā-vakñāpānām vīśkarāpanaṁ nībhandanām (V 1.11)
"In changing properly the gender, grammatical number, etc., the analysis of gender,
grammatical number, etc. is the basis."

(b) na by āntatvā śādānāṁ śaśātāmabhī kimścīd api prayojanang asī. (V 2.23)
"Under the alternative of impermanence of words, etc., there would be no purpose in
beginning the science of words, etc."

21As an example of the sensitivity mentioned here, note the following.

taḥ tāraśāy api śāda-vyakti-samavāyē, śādākṣētra vānavaadvāgraha-prāptā
śaṁskṛtarśābhī śāmopanānaḥ buddhiḥpuṣṭiḥ pāravaṁ aṣṭāvīyaṁ va gṛhīta
sāṁskṛte 'nnaḥ-karaṇa cāraṇa-vijñāṇaḥścāḥ purīcaṁ pārīce (V 1.23)
"In the same manner, here too, although there is no aggregation of sound individuals, the
form of the word-universal, previously unapprehended or indistinctly apprehended
through cognitions which are impressed with the intake of phoneme-parts (i.e., parts
in the form of phonemes) and which have arisen in a sequence, is determined with the
final cognition. It is determined in the inner organ (or mind) which is modified through
cognitions which are impressed with the intake of phoneme-parts and which have arisen
in a sequence."

Here, the instrumental forms (vānavaadvāgraha-prāptā-śaṁskṛtārśābhī śāmopanānaḥ buddhiḥpuṣṭiḥ)
are connected with the adjectival phrase pāravaṁ aṣṭāvīyaṁ va gṛhīta as sāṁskṛte 'nnaḥ-karaṇa.
To avoid having to repeat the instrumental forms, the author places sāṁskṛte 'nnaḥ-karaṇa immediately after the adjectival phrase and, against the usual practice,
allows to the substantive (ākūṭa) to be removed from the adjectival phrase qualifying it.

223 would concede that if it were not for the order of expressions we would not be able to
know in individual instances what the stages in the progression of thought were. These stages
are, after all, not open to observation by others; there is no widespread agreement in their case.
However, my point is that there is evidence suggesting that a presumed dialogue with the reader
is responsible for the presence of certain expressions at certain points: A kind of bouncing
board seems to exist in front of the author and his later words seem to be determined by the
effect he thinks the earlier words will produce on the board.

23The condition 'performing a common or identical syntactic role' is not essential to the
point I make. It is more of a methodological condition that serves to ensure that evidence of a
clear sort is adduced. If different positions assigned to grammatically similar words are
explored, the possibility that the difference in positions could be due to the difference in
grammatical function is eliminated.

24The long sentence yāhaṁ aṣṭaṁśa-ṣaṁsāraṇaḥ-saṁsāraṇaḥ yāhāḥ aṣṭaṁśa-ṣaṁsāraṇaḥ
... vīśkarāpanaṁ vīśkarāpanaṁ vīśkarāpanaṁ vīśkarāpanaṁ vīśkarāpanaṁ vīśkarāpanaṁ... (V
1.23) may likewise be viewed by some as containing a series of parenthetical clauses.