

# THE SĀṆKHYA-YOGA AND THE JAIN THEORIES OF PARINĀMA

*by*

DR. INDUKALABEN H. JHAVERI



GUJARAT UNIVERSITY  
AHMEDABAD-380 009



### About the Book

This is a comprehensive study of the Sāṅkhya conception of Parināma (Change and evolution) and the Jain conception of reality. The treatment is critical, scientific and dispassionate. The work is based on extensive study and critical selection of relevant data. It presents a full and critical review of the entire subject-matter chosen for the study complete in all respects. The treatment of the evolution in Jain conception culminating in the adoption of the terminology and exposition sponsored by the advocates of Parināma furnishes the evidence of unbiased approach and evaluation.

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## FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure indeed in publishing, "The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and The Jain Theories of Parīṇāma" By Late Dr. Indukalaben Zaveri.

I am thankful to Prof. T. S. Nandi, Dept. Sanskrit, School of Languages of this University and Shri Naginbhai Shah, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad for reading the script and for giving their valuable opinion for publication.

I am also thankful to the late Shri Niranjan J. Mehta, Chairman Sadguru Indukalaben Jhaveri Charitable Trust for giving script and financial assistance.

The book includes the comparative study of sāmkhya and Jain theory.

I hope that the students and teachers of Sanskrit and Philosophy and learned Scholars interested in this subject will find this publication of great value and interest.

Ahmedabad-9

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## P R E F A C E

The title of my thesis is 'The Sāṃkhya and the Jain theories of Parīṇāma' based mainly on Sanskrit texts. 'In order to make the title more precise I have slightly changed it into 'The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Jain theories of Parīṇāma based mainly on Sanskrit texts.'

Modern scholars have studied both the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Jain systems in their various aspects. No one, however, so far as I know, has utilised the Sāṃkhya-Yoga sources and ideas contained in them to formulate a systematic Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory of Parīṇāma, and the Jain sources to formulate the Jain theory of Parīṇāma. What is more, the problem of relation between the Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Jain systems has been touched by scholars like Garbe, Jacobi, etc., but no one has, I think, attempted a comparative study of these systems and their bearing on the theory of Parīṇāma. Hence, this my attempt.

In preparing this thesis I have drawn upon important Sanskrit sources pertaining to Sāṃkhya-Yoga system and Sanskrit and Prakṛt sources pertaining to Jain system, which all are referred to in the bibliography. I have also utilised translation of the same in European and Indian languages wherever available and necessary. At certain places, we have thought it proper to give only the gist of the passages. For modern criticism of the two theories I have also consulted the relevant journals and such works as Garbe's Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Keith's Sāṃkhya System, Dr. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus etc., Jacobi's Studies in Jainism, Dr. Mookerji's Jain Philosophy of Non-absolutism etc. (cf. Bibliography)

I have divided my thesis in eleven chapters. In the first chapter, I have tried to show from Vedas - especially the R̥gveda



and Atharva-Veda – Brāhmaṇas and earlier Upanisads, how the philosophical tendencies of thought pertaining to the problems of One and Many and of the abiding and changing aspects of reality clearly foreshadow the theory of Parīṇāma. Then I have drawn upon Yāska's Nirukta (600 B.C.) which is contemporaneous with the earlier Upanisads and the rise of Jainism and Buddhism. Even though grammatical works are not usually drawn upon for philosophical ideas, yet for us, the Nirukta has a special significance in so far as it precisely enunciates the concept of Viparīṇāma or Parīṇāma for the first time, at so early an age. (विपरिणमते इत्य-  
प्रच्यवमानस्य तत्त्वादिकारम्). This shows that unless the concept was well known to and clearly grasped by the thinkers of the time in one form or the other, it could not have become a subject-matter for definition in a treatise like the Nirukta. It can be said without hesitation that this idea of Viparīṇāma or Parīṇāmā must have been favoured by what we may call Proto-Sāṃkhya and Proto-Jain thinkers. And we have already shown how the earlier Upanisads provide ground for the rise of such a concept. The reference to the term Vikāra in the sense of Parīṇāma in the Sūtras of Pāṇini is also noted. In the same chapter, I have referred to the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (which is generally placed in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C.), as it is convenient to treat grammatical works together. This work not only clearly states the idea of Parīṇāma but also makes a clear-cut distinction between Kūṭastha-nityatā and Parīṇāmi-nityatā for the first time, and hence the significance.

Then, in the second chapter I have considered in brief the specific Sāṃkhya ideas as found in the Mahābhārata, the Śmṛtis, the Purāṇas and the Caraka. I may point out here that all the passages of the Mahābhārata, the Śmṛtis and the Purāṇas referred to by me, do not necessarily precede Īśvarakṛṣṇa but there being not enough evidence to discriminate between the various strata, I have followed the old tradition of taking the Mahābhārata, the Śmṛtis and the Purāṇas together as constituting the Śmṛti tradition to be distinguished from the Śruti tradition of the Vedas and the

Upaniṣads. I have tried to show, in conclusion, that though in these passages explaining creation there is no explicit mention of Pariṇāma, the idea may have been taken for granted as implicit in the process, for as already noted, the concept was well-defined as early as the in Nirukta.

In the third and the fourth chapters I have attempted to study the theory of Pariṇāma, in its various aspects, as discussed in the important works of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga darśanas proper because there is no vital difference between the metaphysical theories of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga excepting that the latter accepts one puruṣa as Īśvara, not as the creator but as guiding the course of evolution. The fifth chapter is devoted to the critical exposition of the other topics related to Pariṇāma. At the end of this chapter, I have given a resume of all these five chapters.

In the sixth chapter I have given an account of the main Jain sources on which our discussion is going to be based.

In the seventh chapter I have discussed the Jain theory of Pariṇāma as found in the oldest extant Canonical literature of the Jainas, viz. the Āgamas.

In the treatment of the Āgamas I have consulted only those that contain discussion of philosophical doctrines - such as the Bhagavati-Sūtra, Sthanāṃga, Prajñāpana, Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Anuyogadvārasūtra, Jīvābhigama etc. In this seventh chapter which deals with Pariṇāma in the Āgamas, I have tried to show that despite the absence of any explicit and precise definition of the theory of Pariṇāma, there are in them, all the elements of it viz., Dravya, Paryāya and Pariṇāma.

In the eighth chapter, I have examined the relevant passages from the Tattvārtha-sūtra, and its Svopajña-bhāṣya by Umāsvāti and the important Prākṛta works of the Digambarācārya Kuda-kunda - such as the Pañcāstikāya, the Pravacanasāra, and the Sama-

yasāra. I have shown how, in the Tattvārtha the various concepts-viz., those of Dravya, Paryāya, Pariṇāma and Sat receive precise definition, though there is yet no elaboration of the same. In the works of Kundakunda I have attempted to show the development of the theory of Pariṇāma in its various aspects as well as its application to different Dravyas.

In the ninth chapter I have tried to give further exposition, application, analysis and justification of the doctrine of Paryāya-Pariṇāma as found in the works of tarka-period – such as the commentaries of the Tattvārtha Śūtra and other dialectical works. At the end a resume is attempted.

Having thus discussed the Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory and the Jain theory of Pariṇāma I have attempted in chapter X critical and comparative study of the theory of Pariṇāma, of these two systems, in its different aspects and discussed the problem of the historical relation between the two schools.

#### Some of the new points which I have attempted to work out in the thesis

(i) I have attempted a new study of the emergence of the idea of Pariṇāma in early Vedic literature.

(ii) As far as I know, no scholar has drawn attention to the precise definition of Vipariṇāma or Pariṇāma as given by Yāska.

(iii) I have attempted to throw new light on the problems of तत्त्वान्तरपरिणाम, the process of pariṇāma – ससृष्टविवेक and विशेष-विशेष – which all occur in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga works.

(iv) The problem of the relation between Pajjava or Paryāya and Pariṇāma, from the Āgama passages is discussed for the first time in this manner.



(v) A critical study of the Jain technical term 'agurulaghu' has been attempted for the first time here.

(vi) Similarly, further applications of Paryaya-Pariṇāma viz. Dravy paryāya and Guṇa-paryāya, Pariṇāma and Parispanda, prayoga-pariṇāma and Visrasā-pariṇāma, Artha-prayāya and Vyañjana-paryāya, as found in later Jain dialectical works have not been, so far as I know, critically examined in the way I have done.

(vii) In the discussion of the nature of Pre-Īśvaraśṛṣṇa Sāṃkhya and the historical relation between Sāṃkhya and Jain, I have tried a new approach in the study of the subject.

In this way, by putting forward in this thesis, a critical study of the views of India's ancient thinkers, of two important schools on Pariṇāma, I have attempted to make a contribution to the understanding of the concept of 'Permanence and Change,' a concept of great significance in the history of philosophy as well as in modern knowledge as a scientific principle.

In conclusion, I must express my thanks to Prof. R. C. Parikh for the guidance received from him during my studies. With his approval I have also consulted Pandit Sukhalalji Sangavi to whom I am grateful for his valuable help.

**Indukala H. Jhaveri**

## TRANSLITERATION

अ a,	आ a,	इ i,	ई i,	उ u,	ऊ ū,
ऋ r,	ॠ r,	ऌ l	ए e,	ऐ ai	ओ o,
औ au,	अं m	अः h,			
क k,	ख kh,	ग g,	घ gh.	ङ ṅ,	
च c,	छ ch,	ज j,	झ jh,	ञ ñ,	
ट t,	ठ ṭh,	ड ḍ,	ढ ḍh,	ण ṇ,	
त t,	थ th,	द d,	ध dh,	न n,	
प p,	फ ph,	ब b,	भ bh,	म m,	
य y,	र r,	ल l,	व v,		
श ś,	ष ṣ,	स s,	ह h.		

## ABBREVIATIONS

AMI.	Āpta-Mimāṃsā of Samantabhadra
Anu. Sū.	Anuyogadvāra-Sūtra.
AŚ.	Aṣṭaśatī
ASS.	Aṣṭasahasrī
AV.	Atharvaveda.
AYD.	Anyā-yogavyavaccheda-dvātrimśika
Bh. Sū.	Bhagavatī Sūtra.
Br. A.	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
Chā. Up	Chandogya Upaniṣad
DhS.	Dharma-Saṃgrahaṇī
HOS.	Harward Oriental Series.
PK.	Pañcastikāya.
PS.	Pravacanasāra
Rāj. V.	Rāja-vārttika on the Tsū.
RV.	Ṛgveda
SBE.	Sacred Books of the East.
Skā.	Sāṃkhya-kārikā
SPB.	Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya
SS.	Samayasāra
Ssū.	Sāṃkhya-sūtras.
STK.	Sāṃkhya-tattva-Kaumudī.
SVM.	Syādvāda-mañjarī.
SVS.	Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya.
Śl. V.	Śloka-vārttika
Tbh,	Tattvārtha-bhāṣya.
Thā. Sū.	Thāṇamga-sūtra
Tsū.	Tattvārtha-sūtra.
TVS.	Tattva-Vaiśāradi,
Ut. Sū.	Uttarādhyayana-sūtra
VB.	Vyāsa-bhāṣya
Ysū.	Yoga-sūtras.
YV.	Yoga-vārttika



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## CHAPTER I

### SEEDS OF PARIṆĀMA IN THE EARLIEST SANSKRIT LITERATURE (2500 B. C.- 200 B. C.)

#### Introductory :

The earliest source of religion and philosophy as they have taken shape in Indian culture is the Vedas, especially the Ṛgveda. The theory of Pariṇāma which I propose to study in the present thesis can be properly understood if we first attempt to discover from the earliest sources i.e. the Vedic sources, those tendencies of thought that helped in its emergence and development in the dārśanic form. I shall, therefore, first take notice of those speculations in the Vedas, particularly the Ṛgveda, which can throw light on this topic.

#### THE ṚGVEDA

(2000 or About 2500 B.C.)<sup>1</sup>

Speculations as to how this whole world came into being are to be found scattered throughout the whole of the Ṛgveda. "The earliest speculations on the question", as Prof. Belvalkar says, "are, as natural, mainly poetic with hardly any attempt at system-building. They name some god or gods—Indra, Varuṇa, Savitṛ or Dyāvapṛthivī – and credit him or them with the work of creating the world".<sup>2</sup> However, in the later portions of the Ṛgveda, espe-

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1 Winternitz, 'History of Indian Literature', Vol. I, p. 310.

Jacobi puts the Vedic hymns at 4500 B. C. Prof. Radhakrishnan assigns them to the 15th cent. B. C. Max Muller dates them about 1200 B.C.

2 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 22.

cially in the first and the tenth maṇḍala, we find these speculations resolving themselves into definite types which are in character, both mythical and metaphysical. Thus, in the Ṛgveda X.190 as Prof. Radhakrishnan puts it, 'water is said to develop into the world through the force of time, year, desire or tapas. Sometimes water itself is derived from night or chaos or air as in the Ṛgveda X.168.'<sup>3</sup> In the Ṛgveda. X.81,82 Viśvakarmā, a personal deity, is said to produce Heaven and Earth through the exercise of his arms and wings. In the Ṛgveda, X.72. Brahmanaspati becomes the creator. At certain places Prajāpati and Hiraṇyagarbha occur as the lord of creatures as in the Ṛgveda X.85,43 and X.121.

But such a conception of a personal supreme deity, as the source of all existence, could not for long satisfy the 'metaphysical craving' to use the term of Schopenhauer, of the more profound thinkers. For, as Max Muller aptly puts it, "every one of the gods called by a personal and proper name was limited *ipso facto* and therefore not fit to fill the place which was to be filled by an unlimited absolute power which they yearned for as the primary cause of all created things. No name that expressed ideas connected with the male or female sex, not even Prajāpati was considered as fit for such a being. And thus we see that as early as the Vedic hymns they arrived at the conception of 'That One' "<sup>4</sup> They applied to this central principle the neuter form 'ekam' and 'sat' to show that it is a comprehensive entity subsuming the duality of sex. 'That One' we come across in the Ṛgveda I. 164.6, wherein after asking who he was that established these six spaces of the world, the poet says, "Was it perhaps the One, in the shape of the unborn?" 'That One' is also referred to in X.82.6. Significant is the reference to this One at VIII.58.2 wherein the last quarter, 'It is the One that has severally become all this' clearly brings out the important ideas of One and Many, of Being and Becoming.

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<sup>3</sup> Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 99.

<sup>4</sup> Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 48



This concept of an abstract self-creative principle as the prius of the world is philosophically a definite advance over the previous one, of a personal creator, showing the operation of thought and abstraction.

We have so far left out two important cosmogonic hymns viz. the Nāsadiya Sūkta (X.129) and the Puruṣa Sūkta (X.90), since they deserve special notice. Prof. Macdonell sees in the former, the starting point of the natural philosophy which developed into the Sāṃkhya system.<sup>5</sup> According to Prof. Belvalkar, it contains the earliest germ of what later developed into the Parināmavāda or the doctrine of evolution.<sup>6</sup> But neither of these two views seems to be warranted by the actual wording of the hymn. The first two verses which run thus —

- I. "There was not non-existent nor existent :  
There was no realm of air, no sky beyond it.  
What covered in and where ? and what gave shelter ?  
Was water there, unfathomed depth of water ?
- II. Death was not then, nor was there aught immortal :  
No sign was there, the day's and night's divider.  
That One Thing, breathless, breathed by its own nature :  
Apart from it was nothing whatsoever."<sup>7</sup>

— bring out that the absolute reality which is at the back of the whole world cannot be characterised by us in any words. In the next three verses, the order of evolution is given :

- III. "Darkness there was : at first concealed in  
— darkness this All was indiscriminated chaos.  
All that existed then was void and formless :  
By the great power of warmth was born that Unit.

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5 Vedic Reader, p. 207.

6 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 24.

7 The Hymns of the R̥gveda, Griffith, Vol. II. p. 575. This hymn is translated by Muir, Max Muller, Macdonell, etc.

- IV. Thereafter rose Desire in the beginning, Desire,  
 The primal seed and germ of Spirit.  
 Sages who searched with their heart's  
 thought discovered the existent's kinship in the non-existent.
- V. Transversely was their severing line extended :  
 What was above it then, and what below it ?  
 There were begetters, there were mighty forces,  
 Free actions here and energy up younder."<sup>8</sup>

Immediately after this is brought out the mystery of the origin of the world in the last two verses :

- VI. "Who verily knows and who can here declare it,  
 whence it was born and whence comes this creation ?  
 The Gods are later than this world's production.  
 Who knows then whence it first came into being ?

- VII. He, the first origin of this creation, whether he  
 formed it all or did not form it,

Whose eye controls this world in highest heaven,  
 He verily knows it, or perhaps he knows not".<sup>9</sup>

Thus the hymn, although expressing the current ideas, regarding the first principle, has got a predominant note of agnosticism about it. It should, therefore, be looked upon as an agnostic poem as Prof. Ranade does.<sup>10</sup>

Puruṣa Sūkta :

Already in the hymn to Viśvakarmā, (R̥gveda X.81,82), there appears the desire to parallel the creation of the universe with a sacrifice. Similarly in the later portions of the R̥gveda, we come across as Prof. Belvalkar says,<sup>11</sup> the liturgical abstractions.

<sup>8</sup> The Hymns of the R̥gveda, Griffith., p. 575-576.

<sup>9</sup> Griffith -p. 576.

<sup>10</sup> 'A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy' p. 3.

<sup>11</sup> History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 24.

like Ṛta, Tapas or Śraddhā and even sacrifice which are conceived as cosmogenic principles – as in X. 190 where it is stated :

- I. “From Fervour kindled to its height, Eternal Law and Truth were born

Thence was the Night produced and thence the Billowy flood of sea arose.

- II. From that same billowy flood of sea, the year was afterwards produced,

Ordainer of the days and nights, Lord over all who close the eye.

- III. Dhātā, the great creator, then formed in due order Sun and Moon.

He formed in order Heaven and Earth, the regions of the air, and light”.<sup>12</sup>

This idea of sacrifice is carried to its fullest extent in the Puruṣa Sūkta of the R̥gveda, one of its latest hymns. In it we have the idea of a cosmic being from whom proceeds this whole universe, along with its social order. The act of creation is treated as a sacrifice in which Puruṣa is the victim. “Puruṣa is all this world, what has been and shall be. He not only pervades the whole universe but transcends it too”. Thus we have the idea of both immanence and transcendence expressed here for the first time in clear terms. Again, the struggle between the two notions of ‘permanence’ and ‘change’ seems to have already taken hold of the minds of the vedic thinkers. We see it reflected in— ‘पादोऽस्य विश्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि ।’ – ‘all existing things are a quarter of him and that which is immortal in the sky is three quarters of him’. Here is an attempt to put together as it were the experiences of ‘permanence’ and ‘change’ into one entity by saying

that one quarter of the *puruṣa* is all this changing world while his three quarters are immortal – i.e. permanent in the highest heaven.

However all these ideas, which are still in a rudimentary stage only and therefore vaguely stated, attain their gradual development in the Upaniṣads as we shall see below.

### THE ATHARVA - VEDA

The Atharva-Veda is a collection of hymns whose significance varies from the highest metaphysical and mystical ideas to the jugglery of magical charms. The ideas which we are investigating are to be found in X.7, XI.4, XIX.53-54, – where the very same supreme deity or All God and 'Tadekam' found in Ṛgveda occur under the new names of Skambha, Prāṇa and Kāla.

Special notice, however, should be taken of the two hymns of Kāla because it is the concept of Kāla or Time that is at the basis of all theories of change.

The following verses from the two hymns may be noted :

- I कालो अश्वो ब्रह्मति सप्तरश्मिः सहस्राक्षो अजरो भूरिरेताः ।  
तमा रोहन्ति कवयो विपश्चितस्तस्य चक्रा भुवनानि विश्वा ॥१॥
- II सप्त चक्रान्ब्रह्मति काल एष सप्तास्य नाभीरमृतं न्वक्षः ।  
स इमा विश्वा भुवनान्यञ्जत्कालः स ईयते प्रथमो नु देवः ॥२॥
- III पूर्णः कुम्भोऽपि काल आहितस्तं वै पश्यामो बहुधा नु सन्तः ।  
स इमा विश्वा भुवनानि प्रत्यङ्कालं तमाहुः परमे व्योमन् ॥३॥
- IV स एव सं भुवनान्यारभत्स एव सं भुवनानि पर्येत ।  
पिता सन्नभवत्पुत्र एषा तस्माद्देवान्यत्परमस्ति तेजः ॥४॥
- V कालोऽमू दिवमजनयत्काल इमाः पृथिवीरुत ।  
काले ह भूतं भव्यं चेष्टितं ह वि तिष्ठते ॥५॥

VI कालो भूतिमसृजत काले तपति सूर्यः ।

काले ह विश्वा भूतानि काले चक्षुर्वि पश्यति ॥६॥ AV. XIX. 53

VII इमं च लोकं परमं च लोकं पुण्यांश्च लोकान्विधृतीश्च पुण्याः ।

सर्वलोकानभिजिष्य ब्रह्मणा कालः स ईयते परमो नु देवः ॥५॥

AV. XIX. 54.5

- I Time carries (us) forward, a steed, with seven rays, a thousand eyes, full of fecundity. On him intelligent sages mount; his wheels are all the worlds.
- II This Time moves on seven wheels; he has seven naves; immortality is his axle. He is at present all these worlds. Time hastens onward, the first god.
- III A full jar is contained in Time. We behold him existing in many forms. He is all these worlds in the future. They call him Time in the highest heaven.
- IV It is he who drew forth the worlds, and encompassed them. Being the Father, he became their son. There is no other power superior to him.
- V Time generated the sky and these earths. Set in motion by Time, the past and the future subsist.
- VI Time created the earth; by Time the sun burns; through Time all beings (exist); through Time the eye sees.
- VII Having through divine knowledge conquered both this world and the highest world, and the holy worlds, and the holy ordinances, yea all worlds, Time moves onward as the supreme god.<sup>13</sup>

The rest of the verses, describe more or less mystically the different things of the universe such as mind, breath, name, waters, winds, regions, sky, R̥k verses, Yajus ...etc. which all are under the dominant influence of Kāla.



From our point of view, what is noteworthy in the hymns is the association of Kāla with dynamic ideas or ideas signifying movement. These are prominently brought out in the metaphors of a 'horse' and 'wheels'. Just as a horse carries forward a chariot, similarly the Time-horse carries forward all the worlds – i. e. all the things of the universe – which are imagined as the 'wheels' of Time. This is how the movement of the universe in time is visualised.

Of course, we have not here as yet any conscious or systematic philosophy of change. Its importance for us, however, lies in the fact that it represents an attempt of the ancient thinkers to visualise the cause of all changing world – phenomena.

From the above survey of the tendencies of thought that prevailed in the R̥gveda and the Atharvaveda, it can be seen that the spirit of philosophic enquiry had already seized the minds of the Vedic thinkers and that by setting up the queries concerning the first principle and by seeking to solve them, they had, no doubt, unknowingly broached the problems of the One and Many, of the 'abiding' and the 'changing' aspects of reality. These, passing through the Brāhmaṇa period, were to gather force and emerge into certain definite concepts in the Upaniṣadic period.

## THE BRĀHMAṆAS

(1200 B.C. to 1500 B.C.)<sup>14</sup>

When we come to the Brāhmaṇas we find the cult of sacrifice acquiring predominance to an amazing degree. There are, however, two aspects of the development of this idea of sacrifice. One is that of a complex and complicated sacrificial ritual, whereas the other is that of giving a mystical meaning to the entire act of sacrifice. This latter aspect, as seen above, was already foreshadowed in the later portions of the R̥gveda (X.90) wherein we have,

<sup>14</sup> Prof. Belvalkar, 'History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. II, p. 37.

as Prof. Belvalkar puts it, "the most thorough-going elevation of the Sacrifice into a world-principle. The only advance beyond this made by the Brāhmaṇas was the substitution of Prajāpati in place of the Virāṭ Puruṣa".<sup>15</sup> The life-activity of this Prajāpati is symbolised as a continuous process of sacrifice, which exhausts him and takes the juice out of him which loss is made up again and again through the sacrifice.<sup>16</sup> What is more Prajāpati himself is often identified with the sacrifice, and the latter again with the universe – thus – 'The soul of all beings, of all gods, is this the sacrifice'.<sup>17</sup> In this way by elevating the sacrifice into an omnipotent world-principle – the Creative Force, and by indentifying it with Prajāpati and the universe, a sort of mystical unity between the three was sought to be established. Such mystical interpretation of the sacrifice greatly tended to divert the minds of the thinking people from the actual performance of the sacrifices to the inner sacrifice in the form of meditations. Thus, in the Br. Ā. I.1 we find that instead of a horse-sacrifice, the visible universe is conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such.

This transformation of Yajña (यज्ञ), it is significant to note, is responsible for another important development. We know that the word 'brahman' (neuter) was used in the sense of a 'prayer' in the R̥gveda. As this simple prayer assumed the importance of a magical or mystical formula, in the AV, the word 'brahman' also came to have that sense. In the Brāhmaṇa age we find the word used for the sacrificial act and mystery. So when the identity of Prajāpati, yajña and the whole universe came to be mystically postulated, the word 'brahman' came to have this connotation also (i.e. signifying the identity of the three). This development, one might say, paved the way for the 'brahma' philosophy of the Upaniṣads, traces of which already begin to appear in the later part of the Brāhmaṇas – as for example in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa XI.2.3.1. where 'brahma' is mentioned as the prius of the world

15 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 25.

16 Tāṇḍya -Brāhmaṇa, IV. 10.1.

17 Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa, XIV, 3.2.1; III, 6.3.1.

and in the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa III. 12.9 and Śatapatha X. 6.3. where the 'brahman' and the omnipresent 'Ātman' are identified.

In this way from being merely a ritual act, yajña develops the significance of an act which symbolises world-creation and on the meditative side emerges into the mysticism of 'brahma' philosophy.

## THE UPANIṢADS

(700 B.C. - 600 B.C.)<sup>18</sup>

The number of Upaniṣads that have come down to us is very great indeed, nearly two-hundred, but all are not equally old. A great many of them belong to comparatively recent times and hence cannot be used as sources for the history of the earlier Indian philosophy. We shall therefore consider, here, only those Upaniṣads - viz. Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Īśa, Kena, Aitareya, Katha, Muṇḍaka, Śvetāśvatara, Praśna, - which are generally regarded as pre-buddhistic. Even amongst these, we shall for the most part, confine ourselves to their older portions only.<sup>19</sup>

### General remarks<sup>20</sup>

The subjective or the meditative way of thought already foreshadowed in the Brāhmaṇas in the conception of the 'inner

18 Das Gupta, 'A History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. I. p. 28. This is the generally accepted date of the earlier Upaniṣads.

19 The classification of old and new strata is given by Prof. Belvalkar, 'History of Indian Philosophy' p. 135. Cf also 'A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy' by Ranade, p. 16. According to Deussen and Winternitz, however, Īśa and Kena belong to a period later than that of Aitareya, Taittirīya and Kauṣītaki.

20 The earlier Upaniṣads, as is well-known, do not teach one single, uniform doctrine, as Indian commentators have all along held. There is yet a great latitude, freedom of thought and want of a connected system. This is quite natural since the Upaniṣads are not the works of a single hand or a single age but of a series of teachers existing

sacrifice', seems to have appealed very much to the Upaniṣadic thinkers and almost accepted as a method of discovering the truth about reality. With the ascendancy of this kind of outlook, it is but natural that the conception of an extraneous personal creator should pale into the background and that of an abstract absolute principle like 'Brahman' already foreshadowed in the 'Tadekam' of the Ṛgveda, should assume considerable prominence. Thus the very same 'Tadekam' comes to be variously expressed as 'Brahman', 'Ātman' or 'Sat' around which centres the whole of the Upaniṣadic philosophy. What is more, the important problem of 'One' and 'Many' – which was raised in the later part of the Ṛgveda but for which no satisfactory solution was found, assumes a more coherent and determinate form in so far as the nature of the 'One' and its relation to the 'Many' are more clearly brought out. Next, the terms like, brahman, śāśvata, dhruva, puruṣa, atman, which are a rarity in the Ṛgveda and the Brāhmaṇas find frequent mention here and express some of the fundamental concepts of the Upaniṣads. They have not yet assumed the character of technical concepts of the later philosophical systems but are nonetheless significant as furnishing the basis for the same.

With these general observations we may turn to the passages themselves which throw light on the nature of the 'One' and the 'Many', and their relation.

- I 'तद्धेदं तर्ह्यव्याकृतमासीत्तन्नामरूपाभ्यामेव व्याक्रियतासौ नामाऽयमिदं रूप इति... । स एष इह प्रविष्ट आनखाग्रेभ्यो यथा क्षुरः क्षुरधानेऽवहितः स्याद्विश्वंभरो वा विश्वंभरकुलये तं न पश्यन्ति ।' Br. Up. I. 4. 7.
- II 'यो देवोऽग्नौ योऽप्सु यो विश्वं भुवनमविवेश । य ओषधीषु यो वनस्पतिषु ..।' S'Ve. Up. II 17.

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at different periods of time. Hence it is that we find divergent currents of thought often contradictory in nature in one and the same Upaniṣad. In our above account of the Upaniṣads, however, we have not considered all these varied currents of thought that are reflected in them, but only those that bear upon our problem.

- III 'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरं यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्माऽन्तर्याम्यमृतः ।... अप्सु, अग्नौ, अन्तरिक्षे वायौ, दिवि, आदित्ये, दिक्षु, चन्द्रतारके, आकाशे, तमसि, तेजसि, सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्सर्वेभ्योऽन्तरो यं सर्वानि भूतानि न विदुर्यस्य सर्वाणि भूतानि शरीरं यः सर्वाणि भूतान्यन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्माऽन्तर्याम्यमृतः ।'

Br. Up. III. 7

- IV 'सोऽकामयत । बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । स तपोऽतप्यत । स तपस्तप्त्वेदं सर्वमसृजत । यदिदं किंच । तस्मद्भवा तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्राविश्य सच्च त्यच्चाभवत् । निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तं च । निलयनं चानिलयं च । विशानं चाविशानं च । सत्यं चानृतं च । सत्यमभवत् । यदिदं किंच तत्सत्यमित्याचक्षते ।'

Taittirīya Up. II. 6

- V 'स वा अयमात्मा सर्वेषां भूतानामभिपतिः सर्वेषां भूतानां राजा तद्यथा रथनाभौ च रथनेमौ चाराः सर्वे समर्पिता एवमेवास्मिन्नात्मनि सर्वाणि भूतानि सर्वे देवाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्व एत आत्मानः समर्पिताः ।'

Br. Up. II 5.15

- VI 'स यथोर्णनाभिस्तन्तुनोच्चरेद्यथाऽग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्त्येवमेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति तस्योपनिषत्सत्यस्य सत्यमिति प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम् ।'

Br. Up. II. 1.20

- VI तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाशः संभूतः । आकाशाद्वायु । वायोरग्निः । अग्नेरापः । अद्भ्यः पृथिवी । पृथिव्या औषधयः ।'

Taittirīya Up. II. 1

- VIII 'यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्यते च यथा पृथिव्यामौषधयः संभवन्ति । यथा सतः पुरुषात्केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्संभवतीह विश्वम् ॥' Muṇḍaka Up, I.1.7.

- IX '.....सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम् । तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तरोजोऽसृजत तत्तेज ऐक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तदपोऽसृजत ।

..... । ता आप ऐक्षन्त बहयः स्याम... ता अन्नमसृजन्त ।<sup>21</sup>

Cha. Up. VI. 2. 1 to 4

- I 'Verily, at that time the world was undifferentiated. It became differentiated just by name and form, as the saying is :

'He has such a name, such a form'.

He entered in here, from top to toe, as a razor is entirely closed up within the razor-box or again as a bird is pent up within its nest. Him they see not".<sup>22</sup> Br. Up. I.4.7.

- II 'The God who is in fire, who is in water, who has entered into the whole world, who is in plants, who is in trees'.

- III 'He who, dwelling in the earth, and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within - He is your soul, the inner controller, the Immortal. The inner controller is He who is immanent likewise in waters, fire, air, in the heavens, in the sun, in the quarters, in the moon, in the stars, in space - (in short) in all things and within all things, whom these things do not know, whose body these things are, who controls all these things from within'. Br. Up. III.7

- IV 'He desired : 'Would that I were many ! He performed austerity. Having performed austerity he created this whole

21 For similar creation-accounts - from 'Asat', 'Ātman', 'Brahman' cf. Tattiriya Up. II. 7, Aitareya Up. I. 1-2 and Br. Up. I. 4. 1-4, Br. Up. I. 4.11 respectively.

22 We have translated the passage 'विश्वंभरो वा विश्वंभरकुलाये' according to Prof. Ranade (Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy, p. 261). The other passages are translated according to Hume. Hume, following Śaṅkarācārya, translates it thus: 'as fire would be hidden in a fire-holder'. In the foot-note, he gives other references of this simile and interpretation of Whitney and Lanman. (Hume, Thirteen Upaniṣads, p. 28.)

world, whatever there is here. Having created it, he entered into it. Having entered it he became both the This and the That, the Defined and the Undefined, the Supported and Supportless, Knowledge and Not-knowledge, Reality and Unreality – yea, he became the Reality, it is for this reason that all this is, verily, called the Real'. Taitt. Up. II.6

V 'Verily this soul is the overlord of all things, the king of all things. As all the spokes are held together in the hub (navel) and felly of a wheel, just so in this all things, all gods, all worlds, all these selves are held together'.

VI 'As a spider might come out with his thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Soul come forth all prāṇas, all worlds, all gods, beings. The mystic meaning thereof is, 'the Real is of the real. Prāṇas verily are the real. He is their Real'. Br. Up. II.1.20.

VII 'From this Soul, verily, space arose, from space, wind; from wind, fire; from fire, water; from water, the earth; from the earth, herbs etc'. Taitt. II.1.

VIII 'As a spider emits and draws in (its thread),  
As herbs arise on the earth,  
As the hairs of the head and body from a living person,  
So from the Imperishable arises everything here.  
Muṇḍaka Up. I.1.7.

IX. '..... In the beginning this world was just Being, one only without a second. It bethought itself : "would that I were many ! Let me procreate myself". It created fire,..... Fire created water,..... Water created food'.  
Ch. Up. VI.2. 1-2.

The above passages point out that this universe is a real transformation of the first principle, Brahman, Ātman or Sat and that it (the first principle) is thoroughly immanent in every object

of this universe. According to Prof. Ranade, the Passages I, II & III (noted above), speak of the thorough immanence of the first principle.<sup>23</sup> The fourth one not only declares the immanence of God in all things, whatsoever but also tells us that what thus comes to exist is the Real.<sup>24</sup>

The different metaphors like the spinning of the web by the spider attempt to bring out the intimate relationship between the first principle and its derivatives. The external world is not something separate existing side by side with *the Ātman* but is permeated through and through by the latter. Referring to the passage I.1.7 of the Muṇḍaka Up., Deussen points out that 'the inner dependence of the universe on 'Brahman' and its essential identity with him was represented as a creation of the universe by and out of Brahman.'<sup>25</sup>

In short, Brahman is looked upon as the sole substratum of the universe, the principle that runs like a thread through the whole plurality, thereby binding it (i.e. the plurality) into a single unity. This plurality, having its basis in the highest reality Brahman, is real (and not illusory).<sup>26</sup>

The above may be regarded as describing the Upaniṣadic thought with regard to the derivation of the world-phenomena from one principle. There is a divergence of views amongst the ancient and modern writers regarding the reality of derivatives. Some Upaniṣadic thinkers speculate in a way which opens the

23 'Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy' p. 262.

24 'Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy' p. 212.

The reality of the universe is also shown in the Passage No. VI (above) also in the Br. Up. II 3. 1--6.

25 Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 164.

26 It may be noted that, just as the passages quoted above point to the immanence of the first principle in the universe, even so passages like V. 9. 10 in the Kāṭha, III. 9 and 14 in the Śvetāśvatara point to its transcendent character in the manner of the Puruṣa--Sūkta of the Rgveda.



door for the doctrine of Māyā or Avidyā in the sense of illusion. These passages<sup>27</sup> are seized by Śaṅkarācārya and his followers in ancient and modern times as purporting to give the essential doctrine of Upaniṣads. It may be conceded that the possibility of the above passages implying Māyā is not excluded, but that at any rate, does not justify the claim of Śaṅkara that all the Upaniṣads consistently uphold the doctrine of Māyā<sup>28</sup> (in the sense understood by him). For, we have seen above, that there are a number of passages which clearly imply the reality of the objective world.<sup>29</sup> This trend of thought which takes the world

- 27 I 'यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति तदितर इतरं पश्यति तदितर इतरं शृणोति.....यत्र वा अस्य सर्वमात्मैवाभूत्तत्केन कं जिघ्रेत्तत्केन कं पश्येत्तत्केन कं शृणुयात्... । Br. Up. II 4.14
- II 'यत्र वा अन्यदिव स्यात्तत्रान्योऽन्यत्पश्येदन्योऽन्यजिघ्रेदन्योऽन्यद्रस्येदन्योऽन्यद्वदेत्.....विज्ञानीयात् ।' Br. Up. IV. 3.31
- III 'मनसैवानुद्दृष्टव्यं' नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन ।  
मृत्योः स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ॥' Br. Up. IV. 4.19  
& Cf also Kāṭha Up. IV. 11.
- VI 'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृण्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचाऽऽरम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् ॥' Cha. Up. VI. 1.4
- V '...तदेतदृषिः पश्यन्नवोचत् । रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रति-  
चक्षणाय । इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते युक्ता ह्यस्य हरयः शता दशेति ।'  
Br. Up. II. 5.19
- VI 'मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् ।'

Śve. UP. IV. 10

28 What is more the word Māyā does not exclusively connote the illusory nature of phenomena. In some passages it is distinctly used to suggest the power of God, which is real and which is responsible for the existence of world-phenomena as in the Śve, Up. IV. 10. and Br. Up. II-5.19. One might say that the independent entity of Prakṛti in the Upaniṣads becomes the Māyā of Īśvara. It is a sort of Upaniṣadic appropriation of the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti.

29 'These passages are clearly repugnant to the doctrine of Māyā' Thibaut, Vedānta Sūtras, Part I, SBE, Vol. XXXIV, p. cxviii. 'The doctrine of

evolved out of Brahman as real, foreshadows the development of the theory of Parināma.

YĀSKA (about 600 B.C.)<sup>30</sup>,  
PĀṆINI (500 B.C.)<sup>31</sup>, PATAÑJALI<sup>32</sup>

It has been customary with historians of Indian Philosophy like Das Gupta, Radhakrishnan and others, to pass from the Upaniṣads to the epics, early Buddhism, Jainism, Sāṃkhya and other Vedic darśanas. This is quite a justifiable process in the ordinary course of things. But it should be noted that in our culture, as early as the Upaniṣadic period, the first thing upon which scientific reason was exercised was language, so much so that it was pursued as an independent discipline and various systematic treatises were also written on it. What is important for us to note is that scientific or philosophic outlook – for in the earlier stages it is difficult to distinguish clearly between science and philosophy – often got

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Māyā is not to be derived in any reasonable way from a system which was pantheistic or cosmogonic and in which, therefore, the assumption that the world was illusory would have been ridiculous. A pantheism and still more a cosmogonism are under the danger of falling to the level of materialism but not of evoking an illusionism'. 'Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and the Upaniṣads' by Keith, Vol. II, p.531. 'Is there anything in the early Upaniṣads to show that the author believed in the objective world being an illusion? Nothing at all.' Hopkins, J. A. O. S. xxii, p. 385.

'The opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upaniṣad teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of one soul only is manifestly wrong and I may even say is indicative of an uncritical judgement.' R. G. Bhandarkar – Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism. p. 2. foot-note.

- 30 According to Prof. Belvalkar, Yāska is not later than 700 B. C. 'History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. II, p. 37. Macdonell (History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 22) places him in the 5th cent. B.C.
- 31 Goldstucker, R.G. Bhandarkar, place him in the 7th cent. B. C. Macdonell assigns him to the 4th cent. B.C.
- 32 Middle of the 2nd cent. B. C. cf. Keith's Sāṃkhya System, p. 57. and Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212.

effectively expressed in thoughts and theories about language. So it would not be out of place if I draw upon for the theory of Pariṇāma what the Nirukta, the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali have to say about it.

Yāska mentions six modes in which bhāva or action (in general) is classified by Vārṣayaṇi.

Of these six bhāva-vikāras, we are concerned only with 'vipariṇamate'. It is defined as 'the modification of a being that does not fall away from its own self or essential nature'.<sup>33</sup>

The evidence of Nirukta is significant from two points of view. The age of its composition, as said above, is contemporaneous with that of earlier Upaniṣads and the rise of Jainism and Buddhism, if not earlier.

The second point which gives significance to this reference in the Nirukta is the character of the work. Even though it is a Vedāṅga and in that sense, sacred, yet it contains discussions pertaining to language which was a common property of the people, especially of men of learning. In fact, linguists had to give precision to words in order to clarify ideas which must have formed the subject-matter of discussion amongst thinkers.

Thus the Nirukta reflects current and older philosophical ideas. There can be no doubt that various types of change were analysed and put into precise terms of which Yāska has taken notice in the above passage. Of these, change in a thing without its original nature being lost, was indicated by the word vipariṇāma and this, as we shall see, is precisely the idea underlying the metaphysical concept of pariṇāma of the Sāṃkhya and the Jain system. In the Nirukta, of course, vipariṇāma is not meant to be a philosophical doctrine but one of the modes of bhāva and is thus more a category of grammar. Nevertheless, unless this

33 षड्भावविकारा भवन्तीति वार्ष्णिगिः ।.....

विपरिणमते इत्यप्रच्यवमानस्य तत्त्वाद्विकारम् ।

concept of vipariṇāma or pariṇāma was well-known to and clearly grasped by the thinkers of the time in one form or the other (whether as a metaphysical or a grammatical concept), it could not have become a subject-matter for definition in a treatise like the Nirukta. We can, therefore, without hesitation say that this idea of vipariṇāma or pariṇāma must have been favoured by what we may call proto-Sāṃkhya and proto-Jain thinkers. We have also seen how the earlier Upaniṣads provide ground for the rise of such a concept.

### PĀṆINI

Pāṇini in his Aṣṭādhyāyī mentions the word vikāra in the sūtras, तस्य विकारः । (4/3/134) and तदर्थं विकृतेः प्रकृतौ । (5/1/12). Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, does not say much on these sūtras by way of explanation, especially of the word vikāra. However, Kaṣikā, a late commentary on the sūtras of Pāṇini, written by Vāmanajayāditya, a Buddhist, (about the 9th cent. A.D.) explains these respectively, as follows : 'vikāra is the change of state of the original.' 'Prakṛti is the original cause while Vikṛti is its subsequent change of state'.<sup>34</sup>

It may be noted that the Jain grammarian Hemacandra (12 th cent. A. D.), too, explains 'vikāra' in a similar manner, thus : 'Vikāra is the change of state of the substance.'<sup>35</sup>

However, as Pāṇini himself has not explained the term, we cannot exactly say what he meant by 'vikāra'. Nevertheless, considering the fact that Vāmanajayāditya takes 'vikāra' to mean pariṇāma and that Hemacandra also follows the same traditional interpretation, we can reasonably presume that Pāṇini also must have implied pariṇāma by the word 'vikāra' which, otherwise, is a wider term. What is more, there has generally been

<sup>34</sup> 'प्रकृतेरवस्थान्तरं विकारः ।' and 'प्रकृतिरुपादानकारणं, तस्यैव उत्तरमवस्थान्तरं विकृतिः ।'

<sup>35</sup> द्रव्यस्यावस्थान्तरं विकारः । 6-2-30

an unanimity of view, amongst grammarians, in regard to the traditional interpretation of grammatical terms, whatever may be their other dogmatic differences.

### PATAÑJALI

Patañjali clearly explains the concept of parīṇāma at two places, one, while defining the concept of dravya in his bhāṣya on the Pāṇini Sūtra 5/1/119, and the other while distinguishing two types of nityata, viz., kūṭastha-nityata and parīṇāma-nityata.

Dravya is defined as that whose 'thatness' is not destroyed even on the manifestation of new qualities. And 'thatness' is the essential nature of a thing. Thus, for example, the qualities like redness, yellowness etc. appear in amalaka etc., but yet the latter is recognised to be the same (amalaka).<sup>36</sup>

Here it can be easily seen that the words 'तत्त्वं न विहन्यते' occurring in the passage under discussion are only a paraphrase of 'तत्त्वादप्रच्यवमानस्य' of the Nirukta,

Next, in the discussion of the 'nityānityatva' of śabda in the first Adhyāya (1/1/1), while trying to show that the meaning of the word 'siddha' in 'सिद्धे शब्दार्थसम्बन्धे' is synonymous with that of nitya, Patañjali points out incidentally that 'nitya' signifies that which is eternal, absolutely steady, immoveable, not subject to growth, decay or destruction, unchanging, beginningless and imperishable,<sup>37</sup> in other words, kūṭastha-nitya. But this, according to him, does not constitute the sole definition of nitya. That also is 'nitya' in which the 'thatness' of a thing is not destroyed.<sup>38</sup> This is made clearer by the illustration of 'ākṛti'. When an 'ākṛti'

36 'यस्य गुणान्तरेष्वपि प्रादुर्भवत्सु तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तद् द्रव्यम् । किं पुनस्तत्त्वम् । तद्भावस्तत्त्वम् । तद्यथा आमलकादीनां फलानां रक्तादयः पीतादयश्च गुणाः प्रादुर्भवन्ति आमलकं बदरमित्येव भवति ।'

37 ध्रुवं कूटस्थमविचात्यनपायोपजनाविकार्यनुत्पत्त्यवृद्धयव्यययोगि ।

38 तदपि निश्चयं यस्मिंस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते ।

or from disappears in the case of one dravya, it does not altogether cease to exist but is seen to subsist in another dravya.<sup>39</sup> What is meant is that inspite of undergoing change, ākṛti never totally abandons its essential nature (tattva) of 'ākṛtitva'.

This obviously refers to the concept of pariṇāmi-nityatā.

Thus Patañjali not only explains and illustrates the concept of pariṇāma which was for the first time enunciated in the Nirukta, but also makes for the first time a precise and clear-cut distinction between two types of nityatā viz., kūṭastha-nityatā and pariṇāmi-nityatā.

- 39 '.....नित्याऽऽकृतिः । कथम् । न क्वचिदुपरतेति कृत्वा सर्वत्रोपरता भवति । द्रव्यान्तरस्या तूपलभ्यते ।'  
'.....किं पुनस्तत्त्वम् । तस्य भावस्तत्त्वम् ।  
आकृतावपि तत्त्वं न बिहन्यते ।' I. 1.1

It should be noted that ākṛti is here understood in the sense of ākṛti-sāmānya compared to which the different dravyas in which ākṛti comes to inhere become viśeṣas.

## CHAPTER II

### SĀMĀKHYA IDEAS IN PRE-ĪSVARAKṚṢṆA LITERATURE

#### SĀMĀKHYA IN THE UPANIṢADS<sup>1</sup>

Though we are in this thesis primarily concerned with the study of the theory of pariṇāma in the Sāṃkhya darśana, we cannot understand it without a knowledge of its other doctrines. We have seen, in the previous chapter, the early formulations of pariṇāma ideas. Now let us study the early occurrence of other Sāṃkhya ideas. So I propose to give a brief account of Sāṃkhya ideas as found in pre-Īsvarakṛṣṇa literature.

#### SĀMĀKHYA IDEAS IN THE UPANIṢADS

In one of the oldest Upaniṣads viz. the Chā. Up., the passage (VI. 4) which states that 'behind all things there are really three primary colours, the red, the white and the black which may really be said to exist, while all other things that are constituted out of them are merely a word, a modification and a name.' contains according to scholars like Prof. Ranade, the rudiments of the Sāṃkhya Guṇa Theory.<sup>2</sup> The names Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, however, it may be noted, get the earliest mention in the Maitrayaṇi, a late Upaniṣad.

According to Das Gupta, a comparison and combination of the two passages of the Chā. Up. viz. - one noted above (VI. 4) and the other (VI. 1.4) stating, 'as by one clod of clay, all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only in name, arising from speech, so it is only the clay that is true' - practically give the evolution - Pariṇāma theory of the Sāṃkhya school.<sup>3</sup>

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1 A detailed account of the same is given in 'Sāṃkhya System' by Keith, Ch. I. p. 1 to 19 and in 'Yoga Philosophy' by Das Gupta, p. 17 to 34.

2 'A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy' p. 182.

3 'Yoga Philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian Thought' p. 33-34.

In the Kaṭha Up. we are told that 'the objects are higher than the senses, mind than the objects, the Buddhi than mind, the great self than Buddhi, the Avyakta than the Great Self, the Puruṣa than the Āvyakta and that beyond and above the Puruṣa there is nothing else'.<sup>4</sup> In the same Up. a similar account is given. Here the mind stands above the senses, Sattva above the mind, over that the Great Self, over that the Avyakta, and over that the Spirit.<sup>5</sup> Here we find terms like 'व्यापक' and 'अलिङ्ग' used in the classical Sāṃkhya. Thus these passages give us important categories of the Sāṃkhya philosophy.

A much more developed form of Sāṃkhya is to be found in the Śve. Up. This Up. abounds in the Sāṃkhya categories. In this work the words Sāṃkhya and Kapīla are to be found for the first time.<sup>6</sup> It may be noted that the various categories of the classical Sāṃkhya viz., Vyakta, Avyakta, Jña, Pradhāna, Prakṛti, Pariṇāmayet also find mention in the same Upaniṣad.<sup>7</sup>

One should bear in mind that all these Sāṃkhya categories are related to one supreme God, Brahman or Rudra.

Again, therein the three-coloured she-goat is said to refer to the three Guṇas of the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti and the two he-goats, to the two kinds of souls, one still in the enjoyment of Prakṛti and the other, who, after having enjoyed her, has left her.<sup>8</sup>

The passage, V. 5. of this Upaniṣad deserves special notice as it uses the word 'pariṇāmayet' for the first time in the earlier Upaniṣads.

Śaṅkarācārya does not explain the word 'pariṇāmayet.'

4 I. 3. 10-11

5 II. 6. 7-8

6 'तत् कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यम् ।' (VI. 13) and 'अपि प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ।' (V. 2).

7 I. 8-10, IV. 10, I. 13, V. 7., VI. 4, V. 5, V. 8.

8 अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां स्रूपाः ।

अजो ह्यको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोऽन्यः ॥' (IV.5)



May not 'parīṇamayet' here be used in the sense of a process similar to the one which turns the digested food into blood. Thus, the sense here might be akin to that found in medical works. The general meaning of 'carrying a thing to another state', is of course implied but here it seems to have this specific sense.

In the Praśna Up.<sup>9</sup> we have an account of how all things are resolved into the Imperishable in the order of the five elements with the corresponding mātrās or subtle elements and this distinctly refers to the elements of the Sāṃkhya. Again as Prof. Ranade<sup>10</sup> points out, the conception of Līṅga-śarīra of the later Sāṃkhya philosophy is already adumbrated for us in the Praśna which reiterates from time to time the nature of the Puruṣa with sixteen parts. Thus, one passage, VI. 2. says that 'in this body verily is that Being who is made up of sixteen parts.' Another passage VI. 4 gives us the constituents of this Person – such as breath, space, air etc. which are more or less mythological but which nevertheless point to the similarity of idea.

The Maitrāyaṇi Up. is assigned a very late date and is often not included in the thirteen Upaniṣads. The mention of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of the five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements and reference to the Sāṃkhya categories, viz. Kṣetrajña, Sāṃkhya, adhyavasāya and līṅga all occur in this Upaniṣad.<sup>11</sup>

From the foregoing review, it would appear that general ideas underlying Sāṃkhya philosophy such as those of change and permanence, derivation of the world from one principle, three colours etc, occur in the earlier portions of the Śrauta

9 'पृथिवी च पृथिवीमात्रा चापश्चापोमात्रा च तेजश्च तेजोमात्रा च वायुश्च वायुमात्रा चाकाशश्चाकाशमात्रा च ..... एतत्सर्वं परेऽक्षरे आत्मनि संप्रतिष्ठते ।' IV.8

10 'Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy' p, 183.

11 A detailed account of Sāṃkhya ideas in this Upaniṣad is found in Keith's Sāṃkhya System, p. 13-14 and Das Gupta's Yoga Philosophy, p. 29 to 31.

literature; while specific Sāṃkhya terms find mention in the later portions : what bearing this fact has on the history of Sāṃkhya darśana, we shall study, later on.

### SĀMĀKHYA IN THE MAHĀBHĀRATA<sup>12</sup>

(400 B.C. to 400 A.D.)<sup>13</sup>

After the Upaniṣads, our next sources for studying the development of Sāṃkhya ideas are the works like the Mahābhārata, the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas. It should be pointed out here that by putting this discussion before Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya, I do not wish to imply that all these works preceded in time to the Sāṃkhyakārikā. While some portions of these works dealing with Sāṃkhya might have very well preceded Īśvarakṛṣṇa, there might be others which would be due to the influence of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. As, however, there is not enough evidence to discriminate between the various strata of these works, I have thought it proper to follow the old tradition of taking the Mbh., the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas together as constituting the Smṛti tradition to be distinguished from the Śrauta literature.

In the Mbh. at XII.318, three schools of Sāṃkhya are mentioned viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories, those who admitted twenty-five and those who admitted twenty-six categories. The school of twenty-four, according to Das Gupta, agrees with the views of Pañcaśikha found in the Mbh. XII.219 as also with those of Caraka, a work on medicine which will be noticed hereafter. The school of twenty-five categories, Das Gupta identifies with the well-known orthodox Sāṃkhya System of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.<sup>14</sup> This, however, is not exactly the case. The one that would identify the twenty-fifth category with that of the Puruṣas, regarding the latter

12 For a detailed account of Sāṃkhya in the Mbh., vide Sāṃkhya System by Keith, Ch. III, and Great Epic of India by Hopkins p. 97 onwards.

13 'The Great Epic of India', p. 398

Hopkins gives different stages of additions to the epic. According to him, the didactic matter was included about 200 B.C.

14 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 216-217.

as 'nirguṇa' would be representing the view of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This kind of doctrine is to be found at XII. 194, XII. 306, XII. 314-315, XIV. 50.8. The other that takes the twenty-fifth principle to be one Ātman who is sometimes called Viṣṇu, Vāsudeva, Nārāyaṇa etc. and derives Prakṛti from him or regards him as an Adhiṣṭhātā should be regarded as different. This view is mentioned in XII. 303, XII. 302.38, XII.339. In the school of twenty-six categories, the twenty-fifth category is that of Puruṣas and the twenty-sixth is Brahman, Viṣṇu or Nārāyaṇa as in XII.350, 25-26 and XII. 351, XII. 217, XII. 308. It may be noted that the Gītā throughout upholds the last view and takes Kṛṣṇa as the twenty-sixth principle. What is more, the Mbh. (XII.318) recommends this view and explicitly denounces the view of twenty-four and twenty-five categories as unsatisfactory.<sup>15</sup>

Just as there is no uniformity in the Mbh. in regard to the number of fundamental categories, so also there prevails a variety of views on the different evolutes of the series. Thus in XII.298, 7 the following eight categories are given – viz. the five senses, mind, Buddhi and Kṣetrajñā.<sup>16</sup> At another place XII. 275, 16-18, for the Spirit, Citta is substituted and the Spirit is reckoned as the ninth element. In XII.313, the following are derived from Nature the five organs of perception, the five organs of action, mind, Individuation and Buddhi. This, it can be seen, in its substance, corresponds with the products of the classical Sāṃkhya.<sup>17</sup> In XII. 306, the eight Prakṛtis are mentioned in the manner of the classical Sāṃkhya with this difference that instead of the five Tanmātras, five Bhūtas are substituted. The order of development is thus stated. From the Avyakta Prakṛti is produced the Mahat, from

15 'न चतुर्विंशको ग्राह्यो मनुजैर्ज्ञानदर्शिभिः ।' Mbh. XII 318.74

'तेनैतान्नाभिनन्दन्ति पञ्चविंशकमच्युतम् ।

जन्ममृत्युभयाद्धीता योगाः सांख्याश्च काश्यप ।

षड्विंशमनुपश्यन्तः शुचयस्तत्परायणाः ॥' Mbh. XII 318.79

16 'इन्द्रियाणि नरे पञ्च षष्ठं तु मन उच्यते ।

सप्तमी बुद्धिमेवाहुः क्षेत्रज्ञं पुनरष्टमम् ॥' Mbh. XII 248. 17

17 Vide Chapter III.

it Individuation, from it the five Elements. The Vikāras are said to be sixteen but after that only five viśeṣas and five senses, i. e. in all ten vikāras are mentioned. In XII. 310.10-17, five organs of perception – eye, ear, etc., their five objects, five organs of action, speech, hands etc. and mind are mentioned as the sixteen vikāras. The evolutionary series given in the Anugītā (XIV, 40-42) agrees in many respects with that of the classical Sāṃkhya. It is stated that from the Avyakta is produced the Mahat, from it Individuation, from it the five Elements, from them on the one hand the qualities of sound etc. and on the other the five vital airs, while from Individuation arise the eleven organs of sense – five of perception, five of action and mind.

It may be noted that nowhere in the Mbh. do we get a reference to the five Tanmatrās (which in the classical Sāṃkhya are derived from Individuation) and to the division of Individuation into Vaikārika, Taijasa and Tāmasa found in the Sāṃkhya-kārika.

With the exception of these two, the Mbh. records the categories of the classical Sāṃkhya in a variety of ways. Nevertheless the important concepts of the classical Sāṃkhya, like those of the three Guṇas, the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the plurality of passive Puruṣās etc. are clearly mentioned.

From the above, it is clear that the Mbh.-Sāṃkhya provides a cosmology with a God. Though the terms like 'vikurvāṇāḥ' and 'Vikurte', 'Vikriyā' do occur in the Mbh. (XII.313.15, 302.21.42, 308.2)<sup>18</sup> yet we do not find any explicit mention of pariṇāma as explaining creation. It may be that the idea of pariṇāma was taken for granted as implicit in the process.

### SĀMKHYA IDEAS IN THE SMṚTIS AND PURĀṆAS

The Smṛtis and the Purāṇas adopt the Mbh. tradition of theistic Sāṃkhya in one form or another. In the Manu-Smṛti which is contemporaneous with the main body of the didactic

18 Cf. also 307, 13.

epic,<sup>19</sup> references to the Sāṃkhya terms, viz. Mahat, Ahaṃkāra, and the three Guṇas are to be found.<sup>20</sup>

The Yājñavalkya Smṛti, however, alludes to the categories of the Sāṃkhya in greater detail.<sup>21</sup>

It gives a more systematic account of the Sāṃkhya categories than the one found in the Manu-Smṛti. It gives twenty-four categories viz., Avyakta – Ātmā, Buddhi, Individuation, eleven senses (five of preception, five of action, and mind), five Arthas (objects) and five Elements, pṛthivi etc. – which agree in almost all the details with those of the classical Sāṃkhya, except the substitution of the Arthas in place of the Tanmātrās of the classical Sāṃkhya and the absence of the recognition of Prakṛti, the 24th principle, as distinct from the Puruṣa, the twenty fifth principle. It is noteworthy that the whole series is said to evolve from the Avyakta ātmā who thus ceases to be a mere passive spectator as in the classical Sāṃkhya. The Ātmā is said to have got entangled in the three Guṇas. The same Atmā freed from the bondage of the three Guṇas is called परः पुरुषः, the highest self (st. 174), wherein takes place the dissolution of all the principles. This account, it may be noted, closely resembles the Mbh. view of twenty-four categories as well as the one given in the Caraka.

The cosmogonic accounts of the Purāṇas mention all the categories of the classical Sāṃkhya, by including the Tanmātrās

19 'Sāṃkhya System' Keith, p. 44.

20 'उद्धवर्हात्मनश्चैव मनः सदसदात्मकम् ।

मनसश्चाप्यहंकारमभिमन्तारमीश्वरम् ॥१४॥ Manu-Smṛti I.14

महान्तमेव चात्मानं सर्वाणि त्रिगुणानि च ।

विषयाणां ग्रहीतृणि शनैः पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि च ॥१५॥

तेषां त्ववयवान्सूक्ष्मान् षण्णामप्यमितौजसाम् ।

सन्निवेश्यात्ममात्रासु सर्वभूतानि निर्ममे ॥१६॥'

The three Guṇas are elaborately described in XII. 24-52.

and the three kinds of Individuation – viz. Vaikārika, Taijasa and Tāmāsa – that were so far omitted in the accounts of the Sāṃkhya categories. However these Sāṃkhya ideas are given a mould which would be consistent with the view of the sectarian schools, like the Bhāgavata, Pāśupata etc. That is why in all the accounts we find a God postulated as the Creator and ten Devas as the presiding deities of the ten senses<sup>22</sup>. The personification of the three Guṇas as Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva in the Matsya Purāṇa also points to the same thing<sup>23</sup>. This way of looking at trinity, it may be noted, became a popular dogma as can be seen from the maṅgala verse of Kādambarī.<sup>24</sup>

### CARAKA (78 A.D.)<sup>25</sup>

Just as we drew upon grammatical works for understanding the history of Sāṃkhya doctrine, similarly we may draw upon the medical work viz. the Caraka<sup>26</sup>. This work, gives an elaborate account of the twenty-four categories of the Sāṃkhya<sup>27</sup>. It enumerates not only the twenty-four categories of the Sāṃkhya but also states the order of evolution, which is the same as the one found in the classical Sāṃkhya (st. 63, 64, 66). The twenty-four categories are, Avyakta, Buddhi, Individuation, five gross Elements, (these eight are 'bhūtaprakṛti') the five organs of

22 Viṣṇupurāṇa, I.2. 19-57. All the other Puraṇas give more or less similar account of creation.

23 गुणेभ्यः क्षोभमाणेभ्यस्त्रयो देवा विजज्ञिरे ।

एका मूर्तिस्त्रयो देवा ब्रह्मविष्णुमहेश्वराः ॥

(एका मूर्तिस्त्रयो भागा) Matsya P.I.3.16

24 रजोजुषं जन्मनि सत्त्ववृत्तये स्थितौ प्रजानां प्रलये तमः स्पृशे ।

अजाय सर्गस्थितिनाशहेतवे त्रयीमयाय त्रिगुणात्मने नमः ॥२॥

25 'History of Indian Philosophy, Das Gupta, Vol. I, p. 212.

26 This work is generally not dealt with in the study of the Sāṃkhya. Attention to it was drawn by Prof. Das Gupta in his 'History of Indian Philosophy', Vol. I, p. 213.

27 Katidhapūruṣīya Prakaraṇa, Carakasamhitā, p. 287. ff.

perception, the five of action, mind and the five Arthas (these sixteen being called vikaras as in the classical Sāṃkhya). The place of Tanmatrās of the classical Sāṃkhya is here taken by the five Arthas (as in the Mbh. and Yājñavalkya Smṛti).

By a conglomeration of the Avyakta with its later evolutes, Rāśi-puruṣa or Jīvātma comes into existence (st. 35). All karma, good or evil, pleasure, pain, cognition, birth, death, bondage, liberation etc. (st. 39,40,41) belong to this Rāśi-puruṣa, i.e. to say, he, on account of his delusion, desire, aversion and karma, is the cause of all these things (st. 53). When, however, the Sattva Guṇa predominates (st. 36) and the true knowledge dawns, the conglomeration ceases to exist and the Puruṣa comes to have the pure state. This free Puruṣa is called Bhūtātmā or Paramātmā (st. 84, 57,53). It must be noted here that this pure Puruṣa, Bhūtātmā, is not given a separate existence from the Avakta-prakṛti but is only regarded as a state of Prakṛti i.e. Avyakta and Ātmā or Kṣetrajña are identified and the very same Ātmā when in union with its later products is called Rāśipuruṣa or Jīvātmā. The ultimate state of liberation is characterless absolute existence and is spoken of as the Brahma-state (ब्रह्मभूत) (St. 154-155).<sup>28</sup>

In the above account what is important for us to note is that the plurality of passive puruṣas, reckoned as the twenty-fifth principle in the Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is assimilated here in the Avyakta, the twenty-fourth principle. Consequently, the Puruṣa no longer remains a passive spectator but an active agent responsible for his bondage and liberation which in the classical Sāṃkhya are effected by the non-sentient Prakṛti. On the other hand, the non-sentient Prakṛti, the twenty-fourth principle, the prius of the world phenomena, in the classical Sāṃkhya becomes a sentient principle having the same functions (as those vested in the Prakṛti of the classical Sāṃkhya).

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28 For a detailed account of Caraka cf. 'History of Indian Philosophy' Vol. I, Das Gupta, p. 213 onwards.

## REVIEW

The numerous references to the Sāṃkhya ideas noted above both in the religious and secular literature make it abundantly clear that the Sāṃkhya ideas must have been widely prevalent then. That they must have been greatly authoritative and must have powerfully influenced the contemporary thought is borne out by the explicit statement in the Mbh. to that effect. 'In the Mbh.', as Hopkins puts it 'Kapila is authoritative in all philosophical matters and that his name covers every sort of doctrine. He is in fact the only founder of a philosophical system known to the epic'.<sup>29</sup> 'The best evidence', in the words of Hopkins, 'of the authority of Kapila is given not by express statement but by implication in the praise of other systems which, an important point, are by the same implication looked upon as distinct from that of Kapila, although his name is used to uphold them. Thus Kapila's own system is called generally the Sāṃkhya-Yoga or specifically the Kapilam. The Sāṃkhya-Yogins are said to be the models even in teaching of other tendency as in XII. 347.22. and nothing better can be said of the Bhāgavatas, here extolled, than that their system is 'equal to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga', not, be it observed, the same but as good as the system of Kapila. In the Gītā, too (I, 75) the Sāṃkhya is cited alone as the one system of Salvation'.<sup>30</sup> It is also significant to note that Kapila's treatise is repeatedly regarded to be the oldest.<sup>31</sup>

All this leaves no doubt as to the antiquity and supremacy of the Sāṃkhya thought in ancient India.

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29 Great Epic of India, p. 97, 99, 100.

30 Great Epic of India, p 100

31 Great Epic of India, p. 98, (Mbh. XII. 350, 6)



### CHAPTER III

## PARIṆĀMA IN THE SĀMĀKHYA-KĀRIKĀ AND ITS COMMENTARIES

### Introductory :

Our discussion of the theory of Pariṇāma in Sāṃkhya-Yoga is based mainly on the Skā. of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the Sāṃkhya-sūtras, and the Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali with their important commentaries and sub-commentaries

The Sāṃkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is the earliest available work of the Sāṃkhya system. Scholars have held divergent views as regards the date of this work.<sup>1</sup> It may be assigned to the 2nd or 3rd cent. A. D. Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes himself as being in the succession of disciples from Kapila, through Āsuri and Pāṇḍasikha. Thus Kapila becomes the original 'seer' of this system. Various mythical accounts are to be found in regard to Kapila<sup>2</sup> but according to Prof. Radhakrishnan it may be accepted that a historical individual of the name of Kapila was responsible for the Sāṃkhya tendency of thought. It will not be wrong, in his opinion, to place him in the century preceding Buddha.<sup>3</sup>

According to Max Muller,<sup>4</sup> however, the oldest text-book of the Sāṃkhya is the Tattvasamāsa, but this view has now been

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1 Prof. A. B. Dhruva (cf. his paper in the proceedings of the First Oriental Conference) and Gopinath Kaviraj (cf. his introduction to Jayamaṅgala, p. 8) place it in the 1st cent. B. C. Dr. Belvalkar in the 1st cent. A.D. or the 1st half of the 2nd cent. A. D. (Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 175-178). According to Prof. Das Gupta (History of Indian philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212) and Radhakrishnan (Indian philosophy, Vol. II, p. 255) it is a work of the 3rd cent. A.D. Keith places it in the 4th cent. A.D. (Sāṃkhya System, p. 69).

2 Mbh. XII. 340. 67, Rāmāyaṇa, I. 40-41, Bhāgavata, III, 24. 36. Śve. Up. v. 2,

3 Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 254.

4 Six Systems of Indian Philosophy', p. 318-319.

rejected by scholars like Garbe<sup>5</sup>, Keith<sup>6</sup>, Das Gupta etc., who place it after 1400 A.D.

Commentaries on the Skā. : Prof. R.C. Parikh,<sup>7</sup> after having examined the arguments of Prof. Belvalkar, Keith and Takkasu in regard to the date of Mātharavṛtti, as also the internal evidence of the same, concludes that it can be placed in the beginning of the 4th cent. A. D. or the latter half of the 3rd cent. A. D. Thus Mātharavṛtti can be said to be the earliest commentary of the Skā.

Next Gauḍapāda and Rājā wrote commentaries on the Skā. There is, however, dispute about Gauḍapāda's date and personality. He is generally placed before Vācaspati (9 th cent. A.D.). According to Das Gupta, Rājā's commentary on the Skā. was the same as Rājavārttika quoted by Vācaspati and is probably now lost.<sup>8</sup>

The Buddhist monk Paramārtha translated the Skā. into Chinese and also wrote a commentary on it in the 6th cent. A.D. We have consulted its English translation by S.S. Suryanarayanan.

Next, attention may be drawn to an anonymous commentary on the Skā. viz. the Yuktidīpikā<sup>9</sup> which is recently discovered and is assigned to the 6th Cent. A.D. by Dr. Mookerji.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, we may mention the most important commentary viz. Tattva-kaumudī of Vacaspati on the Skā. which is placed, without dispute, in the 9th cent. A.D. Jayamaṅgala, in the opinion of Dr. Gopinātha Kaviraj, is wrongly attributed to Śaṅkarācārya. Kaviraj

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5 *Sāṃkhya Philosophy*, pp. 68-70.

6 *Sāṃkhya System*, p. 68, 89.

7 'Purātattva' (Gujarati quarterly), Year I (1923), Vol. 2, pp. 152-160.

8 *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 212.

9 This work has been edited by Pulinbihari Cakravarti and published in 1938.

10 'Sāṃkhya-Yoga System', *History of Philosophy-Eastern and Western*, Vol. I. p. 292

presumes Śaṃkarārya to be the author and places him about 1400 A.D.<sup>11</sup>

### **Pariṇāma in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā**

As our main concern is with the theory of Pariṇāma, we shall here consider those Kārikās which have a direct or indirect bearing upon it. Pariṇāma, however, being a metaphysical concept can only be understood in relation to other metaphysical concepts of the Sāṃkhya. Hence we shall have to take notice of these also.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa analyses the whole universe into twenty-five principles, of which twenty-four, from the Avayakta-Prakṛti down to the gross Elements represent the mental and material creation, while the twenty-fifth, the Puruṣas, is distinct from these. The order of evolution of the twenty-four Principles is as follows : From the Prakṛti proceeds the Mahat, thence Individuation; from the Vaikṛta Individuation proceeds the group of eleven senses (five of knowledge, five of action and mind) characterised by Sattva; from the Bhūtādi Individuation proceed the subtle elements which are characterised by Tamas; from the Taijasa Individuation proceed both. Thus out of Individuation a group of sixteen is produced. Lastly from the five subtle elements arise the five gross elements.<sup>12</sup>

Of these twenty-four principles the primal Prakṛti is not an evolute but an evolvent only as it becomes the cause of later principles and is itself not caused by anything. The group of seven, viz. Mahat, Individuation and the five subtle elements, being the cause of some and the effect of others is called both the evolvent and the evolute, while the eleven organs and the five gross elements, being only the effects and not the causes of further

11 Introduction to Jayamaṅgaḷā, p. 9.

cf. also Literary Gleanings in Q. J. of the Āndhra Hist. R. S., Oct, 1927.

12 प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततोऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद् गणश्च षोडशकः ।

तस्मादपि षोडशकात् पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ Skā. 22.

principles, are designated as vikāras or evolutes only. The Puruṣa—the Subject, the twenty-fifth principle, is neither an evolute nor an evolvent as it is not caused by anything, nor does it become the cause of anything <sup>13</sup>

The twenty-five principles are also classified as Vyakta (Manifest), Avyakta (Unmanifest) and Jñā (the Subject). It is the knowledge of these three that liberates man from wordly misery.<sup>14</sup> Of these three, the Vyakta<sup>15</sup> is stated to be caused, non-eternal, non-pervading, mobile (i.e. capable of movement in space),<sup>16</sup> manifold, dependent, mergent,<sup>17</sup> conjunct and subordinate. The Avyakta is the reverse of this.<sup>18</sup> The Vyakta and Avyakta are similar<sup>19</sup> in so far as both are possessed of the three Guṇas, are indistinguish-

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।

भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसस्तैजसादुभयम् ॥ Skā 25.

13 मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।

षोडशकस्तु विकारो न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ Skā. 3

14 तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान् व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् । Skā. 2

15 हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।

सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ Skā. 10

16 'सक्रियम्' — परिस्पन्दवत् । यथा हि बुद्ध्यादयः उपात्तमुपात्तं देहं त्यजन्ति देहान्तरं चोपाददत, इति तेषां परिस्पन्दः । शरीरपृथिव्यादीनां च परिस्पन्दः प्रसिद्ध एव ।' STK on Skā 10

17 'लिङ्ग' however is differently explained by Vācaspati as : यथा चैते बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानस्य लिङ्गं तथोपरिष्ठाद्वक्ष्यति । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् अनुमितिकारणम् । ....' i.e. STK on Skā. 10. Yuktidīpikā gives the same meaning, Jayamaṅgalā notes both the senses, viz. 'mergent' and 'the mark leading to the inference of Pradhāna'.

18 Note that the reverse of 'सक्रियत्व' in the Avyakta is to be understood in the sense of the absence of 'parispanda' only for 'सदृशपरिणाम' is there cf. STK on Skā 10. निष्क्रियम् ... यद्यप्यव्यक्तस्यास्ति परिणाम-लक्षणा क्रिया तथापि परिस्पन्दो नास्ति ।

19 त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।

व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ Skā 11.

able,<sup>20</sup> objective, common, insentient and productive. The Jñā is the reverse of these two and yet also similar to them in some respects. Thus like the Avyakta, the Jñā is uncaused, eternal, all-pervading, independent, non-mergent, non-conjunct and like the Vyakta, multiple. As distinguished from the two, He is devoid of the three Guṇas, distinguishable (Viveki), non-objective, non-general, sentient, non-productive and absolutely passive (i.e. devoid of both parispanda and parīṇāma).

Thus, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, in the ultimate analysis, recognises two-fundamental principles, one of unchanging consciousness which is multiple and the other, an entity which is the source of the remaining phenomena of the world. In short, all changes, mental<sup>21</sup> and physical are relegated to Prakṛti and the unchanging aspect of our experience is called the Puruṣa – the Subject.

The Prakṛti is made of the three Guṇas, i.e. the three constituents, viz. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas which on the material side are responsible for shining (prakāśa), energy (pravṛtti), obstruction or mass (niyama) respectively, and on the mental side for pleasure, sorrow and dullness.<sup>22</sup> These three, though not causally related, are yet absolutely dependent upon one another. They are found to co-operate in spite of their natural opposition in every object physical or mental. Just as the wick, fire and oil combine to produce illumination, so these also always co-operate throughout

20 Vācaspati gives an additional meaning of 'aviveki' as follows :

‘अथवा सम्भूयकारिताऽत्राविवेकिता । न हि किञ्चिदेकं पर्याप्तं स्वकार्ये,  
अपि तु सम्भूय ...।’ i.e. ‘non-separativeness’. One thing is not adequate by itself to produce its effect but can do so only when in co-operation with other things.

21 It is this characteristic of Prakṛti viz. that it is an evolvent of both the mental and material phenomena and particularly the fact that the first evolute is Mahat or Buddhi and everything else, mental and physical, is derived from it – which has induced Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar to look upon the Sāṃkhya as an idealism which he compares with that of Fichte. ‘Indian philosophical Review’, Vol: II, pp, 201-209, (1918-1919),

22 प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।

अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ Skā 12

the course of evolution.<sup>23</sup> The preponderance of one and the subordination of the others in different manner and proportion give rise to the plurality of phenomena in their infinite complexity.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa describes the functioning of Prakṛti through the Pariṇāma of the three Guṇas. He uses the word pariṇāma in the Ska. 16 and 27. In the sixteenth, he says that the Avyakta operates through the three Guṇas by blending and modification, like water, on account of the difference arising from the predominance of one or the other of the Guṇas.<sup>24</sup> In the second half of the Ka. 27, he points out that the diversity of the organs arises from the specific modifications of the Guṇas, and from the diversity of their objects.<sup>25</sup>

The evolutes of Prakṛti which arise from the pariṇāma of the Guṇas and which constitute the Vyakta are considered as karyas (effects) of Prakṛti. Īśvarakṛṣṇa tries to prove the existence of the Avyakta, the prius, through the Vyakta-karyas by the principle of causation.<sup>26</sup> His principle of causation, however, is not of the same type as that of the Vaiśeṣikas in which one thing causes another thing which is non-existent (asat), to come into being. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's

23 ... .. प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ Skā 13

24 कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च ।

परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ॥ Skā. 16

25 गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं ग्राह्यभेदाच्च ।

I have adopted the reading of Māthara viz. ग्राह्यभेदाच्च i. e. विषय-भेदाच्च as it suits better in the context. Gauḍapāda, Vācaspati, and the Chinese version of Parmāratha read 'ग्राह्यभेदाच्च' i.e. the external diversities. Vācaspati explains the second half thus: 'the diversity of organs is due to specific modification of the Guṇas like the external diversity'. The reading of Yuktidipikā is altogether different. It is अन्तस्त्रिकालविषयं तस्मादुभयप्रचारं तत् ।' This reading is also adopted by Bhaṭṭotpala in his commentary on the Bṛhat Sāṃhitā, p. 7.

26 भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद् वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ Skā. 15

causation is a manifestation of what already pre-exists. This theory is called the Satkaryavāda, while that of the Vaiśeṣikas is called the Asatkaryavāda. He establishes it in the following manner.

‘The effect is existent (in its cause), since non-existent cannot be produced; since there is a definite relation of the cause (with the effect); since all is not possible; since the efficient can do only that for which it is efficient and lastly since the effect is of the same essence as the cause.’<sup>27</sup>

Such a theory of causation can be understood only on the basis of Pariṇāmavāda according to which everything evolves out of a primary substratum and, therefore, in a sense existing in it i.e. in the primary substratum and only becoming manifest through the process of pariṇāma.

Thus, on one hand, we see that the Avyakta becomes Vyakta through pariṇāma and on the other, the existence of Avyakta is inferentially proved through the principle of Satkāryavāda. Now remains the problem of relating the Avyakta-Prakṛti to the Puruṣa (Jīva). Īśvarakṛṣṇa explains it as follows :

From the union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti the insentient ‘Evolute’ appears as if ‘sentient’ and similarly, from the activity really belonging to the Guṇas, the Spirit (Puruṣa) which is neutral, appears as if it were active. For the perception of Nature (Prakṛti) by the Spirit and for the isolation of the Spirit, there is the union of both, like that of the halt and the blind; and from this union proceeds evolution. This evolution from the Mahat down to the specific elements is brought about by the Prakṛti. This work is done for the emancipation of each Spirit and thus is for another’s sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself. As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf so does Nature act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.<sup>28</sup>

27 असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसम्भवाभावात् ।

शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात् कारणभावाच्च सत्कार्यम् ॥

28 Skā, 20, 21, 56, 57.

This, however, must be understood as follows. In the Sāṃkhya theory, Prakṛti evolves by itself. No sentient agent is thought necessary. Nevertheless, a philosopher cannot rest content without discovering the purpose of Prakṛti. This he does in the 'bhoga' and 'mokṣa' of Puruṣas. Here we must bear in mind that neither the Puruṣas can, by definition, have any purpose, nor the Prakṛti, being non-sentient, can have one. So we cannot say that the evolution of Prakṛti is teleological in the ordinary sense of the word. We should, therefore, regard it as achieving a purpose without meaning it and look upon the teleological expressions as only a way of explaining the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa.

### **Development of the Theory of Pariṇāma in the Commentaries of the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā**

I, here, deliberately leave out the Sāṃkhya-sūtras with the Pravacana-bhāṣya of Vijñānabhikṣu and the Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali with their commentaries since these works present certain differences of interpretation on some of the important topics of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. They will be treated in detail hereafter.

The commentaries on the Skā. will be examined in their chronological order.

We first take up the commentaries on the Skā. 9. It may be here pointed out, at the outset, that Māṭhara, Gauḍapāda and Paramārtha's Chinese version, while commenting on the Skā. 9, simply paraphrase what is stated in that Kārikā itself, adding illustrations for the sake of clarity. Thus they do not contribute much to the understanding of Pariṇāma.

In the Yuktidīpikā, we find the problem of Pariṇāma in relation to the Satkāryavāda receiving further elucidation. While refuting the Asatkāryavāda of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the author of the Yuktidīpikā defines and explains Pariṇāma.

'Pariṇāma is the manifestation or appearance of another aspect and the disappearance of the previous one, in a substrate, which



is being favoured by other requisite concomitant conditions. These appearance and disappearance are not production and destruction. This answers the objection that the terms 'birth' (जन्म) and 'existence' (सत्) will be synonymous on the assumption of the Satkāryavāda. For when the different kāraṇas by their activity cause to manifest the cloth which is nothing but the threads themselves arranged in a particular way, it is said by the people in vyavahāra that the cloth is made, produced or is born. When, on the other hand, these kāraṇas cause to disappear the existing state by a different form owing to the manifestation of other potentialities, the previous form is said to be destroyed. Really speaking, however, there is no production of anything nor destruction of anything'.<sup>29</sup>

Vācaspati Miśra in his STK says almost the same thing, adding only the different proofs (प्रमाण) establishing the non-difference between cause and effect.

This shows that according to the Sāṃkhya the so-called production is only the manifestation of what already exists and is not a new creation. 'The so-called beginning of an object', as Prof. Hiriyanna puts it, 'is only an event in its history; the object itself is not and cannot be made. Similarly the destruction means only change of form for there can be nothing like absolute annihilation'.<sup>30</sup> Thus, as Keith correctly observes, 'causality in Sāṃkhya, in its ultimate essence, is reduced to change of appearance in an abiding entity'.<sup>31</sup> The causality of the Satkāryavāda, as is

29 साधनानुगृहीतस्य धर्मिणो धर्मान्तरस्याविर्भावः पूर्वस्य च तिरोभावः परिणामः । न चाविर्भावतिरोभावावुत्पत्तिनिरोधौ । .. ... एतेनारम्भोपरमोत्पन्नविशेषप्रसङ्गो जन्म-सच्छब्दः प्रत्युक्तः । कथम् ? आत्मभूतं हि तन्तूनां पटाख्यं व्यूहस्थानीयं सन्निवेशविशेषं यदा कारकाणि स्वेन व्यापारेणाविष्कुर्वन्ति तदा क्रियते उत्पद्यते जायते इत्येवमादिलोकस्य व्यवहारः प्रवर्तते । यदा तु कारकाणि शक्त्यन्तराविर्भावात् संस्थानान्तरेनौत्सुक्यवर्तितामवस्थामुपसंहरन्ति तदा प्रागुपलब्धं संस्थानं विनाशशब्दवाच्यतां प्रतिपद्यते । परमार्थतस्तु न कस्यचिदुत्पादोऽस्ति न विनाशः ।

30 'Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 273.

31 Sāṃkhya System, p. 73.

apparent from the above, is only a natural and logical deduction from the postulate of Parināmavāda, just as that of Asatkāryavāda, is from that of the Ārambhavāda.

Māṭhara's explanation of the word 'परिणामतः' occurring in the Skā. 16 points out that there are two kinds of causation. One is the production of effect by automatic transformation, as for instance the transformation of milk into curd. In the other case the effect does not come out by automatic transformation of the material, but it is made out of the material with the help of extraneous agency, as for example the manufacture of pot from clay with the help of rod, thread, water etc. Of these two kinds of causation, Māṭhara says that, the first kind operates in Pradhāna since it is transformed into the Vyakta, viz. Mahadādi, of its own accord.<sup>32</sup>

This kind of distinction is not to be found in the Gaudapada-bhāṣya, Yuktidīpikā, STK and Jayamaṅgalā. The Yuktidīpikā, however, tries to elucidate parināma in a different way by raising the objection that the Prakṛti being immobile (निष्क्रिय) will not be able to put forth the different effects. This is met by pointing to two kinds of kriyā viz. प्रस्यन्दलक्षणा activity involving flow i.e. movement and परिणामलक्षणा activity of the nature of simple transformation in a thing. Of these two, the first is denied in the Pradhāna, as it is too subtle (सौक्ष्म्यात्). It is the second kind of

- 32 अत्राह-इह लोके द्विविधं कारणं परिणामकत्वादपरिणामकत्वाच्च । तत्रा-  
परिणामकत्वाद् मृत्पिण्डसूत्रोदकविदलान्पश्यामः । परिणामतश्च क्षीरं दधीति ।  
तत्र प्रधानं कथं कारणमित्यत्रोच्यते-परिणामतः । यथा क्षीरं दधिभावेन  
परिणमति, यदेव क्षीरं तदेव दधि, एवं प्रधानं व्यक्तभावेन परिणमति दधिवद्  
व्यक्तं क्षीरवत् प्रधानमित्यर्थः । यदेवाव्यक्तं तदेव व्यक्तमिति । तस्मादुच्यते  
प्रधानं कारणमिति ।

This passage distinguishes two types of causality, one, that of parināma, i. e. natural causation and the other involving extraneous agency. Note that Paramārtha's version gives this passage verbatim but cites the example of 'parents giving birth to a child' while explaining the second kind of causation.

kriya – viz. Pariṇāma-lakṣaṇā, that produces the various effects. This pariṇāma is then defined thus : When the substrate without leaving its essential nature, puts on another aspect, giving up the previous one, it (i.e. this whole process) is called Pariṇāma. Just as a leaf without abandoning its essential nature assumes yellowness, on the disappearance of its previous dark green colour, on account of such causes as heat etc. similarly is this to be understood.<sup>33</sup>

Jayamaṅgalā explains pariṇāma as the change of state. Just as a big tree manifests itself from a subtle seed through the growth of roots, branches, sub-branches etc., similarly the Avyakta transforms itself into the Vyakta.<sup>34</sup>

The last quarter of the Kā. 16 viz. ‘सल्लिवत्प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्’ which deals with the question as to how one Prakṛti can bring about diverse manifestations, is explained by all the commentators in more or less the same manner with variation in the illustrations. We give below Vācaspati’s explanation since it is somewhat elaborate.

Just as the water falling from the clouds though naturally of itself having one taste, becomes sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent etc according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth and becomes transformed into the juice of fruits such as cocoanut, plam, wood-apples and so forth; in the same manner, the Guṇas of the Pradhāna come to be predominant one

33 जहद्वर्मान्तरं पूर्वमुपादत्ते यदाप्सरम् । तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो धर्मी परिणामः स उच्यते ॥ यदा शक्त्यन्तरानुग्रहात् पूर्वधर्मं तिरोभाव्य स्वरूपादप्रच्युतो धर्मी धर्मान्तरेणाविर्भवति तदवस्थानं अस्माकं परिणाम इत्युच्यते । यथा पालाशं पलाशादप्रच्युतं निमित्तान्तरस्यातपादेरनुग्रहाच्छ्यामतां तिरोभाव्य पीततां व्रजति, तथेदं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

34 पूर्वस्यामवस्थायामवस्थान्तरं परिणामः... । यथा कणिकायाः सूक्ष्माया मूलकः(?) शाखाप्रशाखादिप्रवृद्धो महान्वनस्पतिर्व्यक्तो भवति एवमव्यक्ताद्व्यक्तं परिणमति ।

by one and thereby bring about various modifications in the form of various products.<sup>35</sup>

The commentaries on Kā. 27 'गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं' do not throw any more light than the passages noted above. They simply seek to show that the diversity of the organs and the external diversity are not caused by God, Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Pradhana or Svabhāva but by the specific modifications of the Guṇas.<sup>36</sup>

Thus we see that Māṭhara distinguishes parināma as an automatic change by assuming two types of causation and contrasting parināma-kāraṇa with aparināma-kāraṇa. The Yuktidīpikā and STK. explain parināma in relation to Satkāryavāda. The Yuktidīpikā alone, however, defines parināma.<sup>37</sup>

35 यथा हि वारिदविमुक्तमुदकमेकरसमपि तत्तद्भूविकारानासाद्य नारिकेलताल-  
तालीबिल्व.....कपित्थफलरसतया परिणमन्मधुराम्ललवणतिक्तकषायकटु-  
तया विकल्पे एवमेकैकगुणसमुद्भवात्प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति ।  
तदिदमुक्तम्... 'प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात् ।' एकैकगुणाश्रयेण यो विशेषस्त-  
स्मादित्यर्थः ।

36 cf. Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda, on the Skā. 27.

37 Yuktidīpikā on Skā. 16

## CHAPTER IV

# DEVELOPMENT OF PARINĀMA IN THE YOGA-SŪTRAS AND THEIR IMPORTANT COMMENTARIES AND THE SĀMKNHYA-SŪTRAS AND THEIR COMMENTARIES

### Sources

The yoga-works : Indian tradition<sup>1</sup> identifies Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya with Patañjali, the author of the Yoga-sūtras. If this tradition can be relied upon, then the date of the Yoga-sūtras, will be the middle of the 2nd cent. B. C. which is the generally accepted date of the Mahābhāṣya. But Scholars like Keith<sup>2</sup> and Woods<sup>3</sup> do not subscribe to this traditional view and regard the two Patañjalis as different. Prof. Wood places the Yoga-sūtras in the 4th or 5th cent. A. D. However, they are not later than the 3rd cent. A. D.<sup>4</sup> The earliest commentary on the Yoga-sūtra is the Vyāsa-bhāṣya (4th cent. A.D.)<sup>5</sup> Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu wrote commentaries on the Vyāsa-bhāṣya, called Tattva-Vaiśaradī and Yoga-vārttika respectively. Bhikṣu has also written Yogasārasaṁgrah and Vijñānāmṛta-bhāṣya, a commentary on the Brahmasūtra. The commentaries of Bhoja (10th cent. A.D.)<sup>6</sup> and Nāgeśa (17th cent. A.D.)<sup>7</sup> on the Yoga-sūtras, are respectively called Bhojavṛtti and Chāyavyākhyā.

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1 cf. The commentary of Bhoja on the Yoga-sūtra. Introduction st. 5.

2 Sāmkhya System, p. 59-57.

3 The Yoga System of Patañjali, Harward Oriental Series, Introduction p. xv.

4 cf. Prof. R. C. Parikh's article in 'Purātattva' Year I. Vol. 2, p. 158.

5 Radhakrishnan, Indian philosophy, Vol. II, p. 341-342

cf. Prof. R. C. Parikh's article in 'Purātattva', Year I, Vol. 2, p. 159.

6 Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212.

7 Dās Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 212.

The Sāṃkhya-sūtras are traditionally attributed to Kapila. But they are assigned to the 14th cent. A.D. by modern scholars chiefly on the ground that Mādhava's Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha does not refer to it but bases his account of the Sāṃkhya on the Kārikā.<sup>8</sup> Aniruddha was the first to write a commentary on the Sāṃkhya-sūtra in the latter half of the 15th cent. A.D. The important commentary on the Sāṃkhya-sūtras is, however, that of Vijñānabhikṣu, called the Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya ( 16th cent. A. D. ) Bhikṣu also wrote an independent work called Sāṃkhyasāra. There are two other works on Sāṃkhya, viz. Śimānanda's (or Kṣemendra's) Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana and Bhāvāgaṇeśa's Sāṃkhyatattvayāthārthyadīpana, both of which are later than Vijñānabhikṣu.

### **Pariṇāma in the Sūtras of Patañjali and the V.B.**

The sūtras of Patañjali do not define or explain pariṇām as such. They seem to take for granted the idea of pariṇāma. They explain the different pariṇāmas of the Citta and only incidentally refer to those of the Elements (bhūtas) and Senses (indriyas). The word pariṇāma, however, is used in ten sūtras viz. III. 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, IV. 2, 14, 32, 33, of which only the relevant ones are considered here. Sūtras III. 9, 11, and 12 explain the nirodh-pariṇāma, the samādhi-pariṇāma and the ekagrata-pariṇāma of the Citta. The suppressive modification (nirodh-pariṇāma) is the conjunction of the mind with the moment of suppression (nirodh), when the outgoing and suppressive potencies disappear and appear respectively.<sup>9</sup> The trance modification of the mind (samādhi-pariṇāma) is the destruction and rise of all-pointedness and one-pointedness, respectively.<sup>10</sup> It is the mental modification of one-pointedness when the subsiding and rising cognitive acts are similar.<sup>11</sup> It is clear that these indicate the different stages of development of the mind.

8 'Indian Philosophy', Radhakrishnan, Vol. II, p. 255.

9 व्युत्थाननिरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ निरोधक्षणचित्तान्वयो निरोधपरिणामः ।

10 सर्वार्थतैकाग्रतायोः क्षयोदयो चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः ।

11 ततः पुनः शान्तोद्भूतौ तुल्यप्रत्ययौ चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः ।

III. 13 just refers to dharma-pariṇāma (change of characteristic), lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma (a technical term denoting pariṇāmas dependent on time-variation) and avasthā-pariṇāma (change of state or condition) of the Elements (bhūtas) and the Senses.<sup>12</sup> III. 15. points out that the distinctness of succession is the reason for the distinctness of modifications.<sup>13</sup>

Let us now consider what Vyāsa, Vācaspati, Bhoja, Vijñāna-bhikṣu and Nāgeśa have to say on pariṇāma, while commenting on the Ysū.

Vyāsa developes the theory of Pariṇāma while explaining the relevant sūtras. He gives a comprehensive view of the three aspects of pariṇāma, viz. dharma-lakṣaṇa-avasthāpariṇāma in his bhāṣya on the Ysū. III. 13 thus : Dharma-Pariṇāma is the change of characteristic in the characterised or the substance, as for instance, the disappearance and appearance of the characteristic of the Vyutthāna (outgoing activity) and Nirodha (suppression) respectively in the characterised (i.e. the Citta here). Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma refers to the three time-variations, viz. past, present and future of the same characteristic. Thus the characteristic of Nirodha, having given up the first time-form (adhvā) which consists of the time-variation (Lakṣaṇa) not yet manifested (anāgata), attains the present time-variation, without overstepping its essential nature of 'Dharmatva.' It is in this time-variation which manifests in the present that the true nature of Nirodha is manifested. This is its (Nirodha's) second time-form (adhvā). It is not severed from the past and the future time-variations (Lakṣaṇa).

Likewise Vyutthāna-characteristic has three time-variations and is connected with three time-forms. Having given up the present time-variation, it (Vyutthāna) passes over into the past time-variation, without, however being apart from its nature of 'Dharmatva'. This is its third time-form (adhvā) and it is not severed from the future and the present time-variation (Lakṣaṇa).

12 एतेन भूतेन्द्रियषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः ।

13 क्रमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुः ।

Similarly, inclining again to *Vyutthāna* it gives up the future time-variation without leaving its essential characteristic and attains the present time-variation (*Lakṣaṇa*). This is its second time-form and it is not severed from the past and the future time-variations. Similarly *Nirodha* again and *Vyutthāna* again.<sup>14</sup>

Thus the *Lakṣaṇa Pariṇāma* considers the three stages of a characteristic, the unmanifested when it exists in the future, the manifested moment of the present and the past when it has been manifested, now lost to view but conserved and kept in all the onward stages of the evolution. As Prof. Das Gupta puts it, 'it records the history of the thing in future, present and past which are only the three different moments of the same thing according to its different characters, as unmanifested, manifested and manifested past but conserved.'<sup>15</sup>

In the *Avasthā-Pariṇāma*, during the moment of *Nirodha*, the suppressive potencies become powerful and the *Vyutthāna* potencies become weak. It, thus, refers to the change of state or condition.

These three aspects of *Pariṇāma* are also illustrated in the *bhūtas* by the example of clay. When the substance clay undergoes a change of characteristic from the form of lump to that of pot, it is its *Dharma-Pariṇāma*. This characteristic viz. the *ghaṭa*-form may be thought to have itself undergone a change in as much as it has now come into being from a state of relative non-being or latency. This is called the *Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma* of the *Dharma* or characteristics as constituting *ghaṭa*. This *ghaṭa* is again suffering another change as new or old as it is just produced or is gradually

14 तत्र व्युत्थाननिरोधधर्मयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ धर्मिणि धर्मपरिणामो लक्षण-  
परिणामश्च । निरोधस्त्रिलक्षणस्त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तः । स खल्वनागतलक्षणमध्वानं  
प्रथमं हित्वा धर्मत्वमनतिक्रान्तो वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपन्नः । यत्रास्य स्वरूपे-  
णाभिव्यक्तिरेषोऽस्य द्वितीयोऽध्वा । न चमतीतानागताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां वियुक्तः ।  
तथा व्युत्थानं त्रिलक्षणं त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तं...एवं पुनर्व्युत्थानमिति ।

15 Study of Patañjali, p. 73.



running towards its decay. This is its Avasthā-Parīṇāma or change of condition.<sup>16</sup>

Having explained these three aspects of Parīṇāma, Vyāsa clarifies that it is from the view-point of distinction (bheda) between the characteristic (Dharma) and the characterised (Dharmi), that this three-fold change is to be understood. Again, it is from this point of view that it is said that the substance has neither past nor future but that it is the characteristics only that are manifested in time by virtue of which the substance is spoken of as varying and changing temporally just as a line remains unchanged itself but acquires different significances as one or two zeroes are placed on its right side.<sup>17</sup>

In reality, however, (i. e. from the standpoint of non-distinction between Dharma and Dharmi) there is but one change because the characteristic is the very being itself of the characterised; and it is the change of the characterised alone that is detailed by means of the characteristic. Thus it is that the three-fold change, Dharma, Lakṣaṇa and Avasthā, does not overstep the being of the characterised substratum and it is for this reason that there is but one change which runs through all these specialisation thereof. This change, Vyāsa defines as the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of a substance which remains constant.<sup>18</sup>

16 तथाऽवस्थापरिणामः । तत्र निरोधक्षणेषु निरोधसंस्कारा बलवन्तो भवन्ति दुर्बला व्युत्थानसंस्कारा इति । एष धर्माणामवस्थापरिणामः । परमार्थतत्त्वेक एव परिणामः । धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रो हि धर्मो धर्मविक्रियैवैषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्चयत इति । तत्र धर्मस्य धर्मिणि वर्तमानस्यैवाध्वस्वतीतानागतवर्तमानेषु भावान्यथात्वं भवति न तु द्रव्यान्यथात्वम् । यथा सुवर्णभाजनस्य भित्त्वा-  
ज्यथाक्रियमाणस्य भावान्यथात्वं भवति न सुवर्णान्यथात्वमिति ।

17 धर्मिणोऽपि धर्मान्तरमवस्था धर्मस्यापि लक्षणान्तरमवस्थेत्येक एव द्रव्यपरिणामो भेदेनोपदर्शित इति । ...न धर्मी त्र्यध्वा धर्मास्तु त्र्यध्वानस्ते लक्षिता अलक्षितास्तत्र लक्षितास्तां तामवस्थां प्राप्नुवन्तोऽन्यत्वेन प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्तेऽवस्थान्तरतो न द्रव्यान्तरतः । यथैका रेखा शतस्थाने शतं दशस्थाने दश ।.....

18 परमार्थतस्तु एक एव परिणामः । धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रो हि धर्मो धर्मविक्रियैव एषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्चयत इति । ...त एते धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा धर्मिस्वरूप-

Thus Vyāsa explains the three aspects of Parināma and shows how these are to be comprehended from standpoints of distinction between Dharma and Dharmā and non-distinction between the two. The latter seems to be the real, proper philosophical view according to Vyāsa.

Next, while commenting on the Ysū. IV. 33, Vyāsa makes more explicit the Sāṃkhya concept of Parināma, more properly of Parināmīnityatā by distinguishing it from the other type of nityatā, viz. the Kūṭasthanityatā.

Permanence is two-fold, the absolutely unchanging permanence and permanence amidst change. Of these the first belongs to the Puruṣa and the second to the three Guṇas. The Permanent or Eternal is that in which the substance or the essence is not destroyed by changing appearances. Both are permanent because their substance or essence is never destroyed. Now with regard to the characteristics of the Guṇas viz. Buddhi, etc., succession has an end which is cognised by the cessation of the changes. In the eternal Guṇas, however, it has no end. In the case of the absolutely permanent ones, the existence of the released Puruṣas who are established in their own natures is also known by succession. In their case too, therefore, it has no end. The succession here is abstracted from the act of existence and is based upon words only.<sup>19</sup>

मनस्त्रिधास्ता इत्येक एव परिणामः सर्वानमून्विशेषानभिप्लवते ।...अथ कोऽयं परिणामः । अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणाम इति ।

- 19 द्वयी चेयं नित्यता कूटस्थनित्यता परिणामिनित्यता च । तत्र कूटस्थ-नित्यता पुरुषस्य । परिणामिनित्यता गुणानाम् । यस्मिन्परिणाम्यमाने तत्त्वं न विहन्यते तन्नित्यम् । उभयस्य तत्त्वानभिघातान्नित्यत्वम् । तत्र गुणधर्मेषु बुद्ध्यादिषु परिणामापरान्तनिर्ग्राह्यः क्रमो लब्धपर्यवसानो नित्येषु धर्मिषु गुणेष्वलब्धपर्यवसानः । कूटस्थनित्येषु स्वरूपमात्रप्रतिष्ठेषु मुक्तपुरुषेषु स्वरूपा-स्तित्ता क्रमेणैवानुभूयत इति तत्राप्यलब्धपर्यवसानः शब्दपृष्ठेनास्तिक्रियामुपादाय कल्पित इति ।

Another important development, to be noticed for the first time in Vyāsa, pertains to the elucidation of the nature of the process of Parīṇāma of twenty-three principles from Prakṛti. Ahaṅkāra and five tanmātras are the six unspecialised modifications of Pure Be-ness, the Great Principle, the Mahā Ātmā. That which is prior to the unspecialised forms is the undifferentiated Mahat Principle. Remaining in the Mahat of pure Be-ness, these (six aviśeṣas) grow up to their highest capacity. On involution, they pass back into the state of Pure Be-ness, the great principle; and thence they pass into the state which neither is nor yet is not, that in which it exists and yet does not; that which is Real, the Unmanifested, the background of all. This is their undifferentiated phenomenal modification; and that which neither is nor yet is not, is the noumenal modification.

The undifferentiated phenomenal (Linga) is the next after the Noumenal (Alinga). Existing therein, it becomes distinguished from it (Alinga), because the law of the order of appearance is inviolable. Similarly the six unspecialised modifications have their being in the undifferentiated phenomenal and are distinguished from that by the order being inviolable. Likewise, are the elements and organs having their being in these unspecialised modifications, distinguished from them, as has been already described. There is no other tattva appearing in succession after the specialised modifications. So there is no evolution into any other principle beyond the viśeṣas. But their Dharma-Lakṣaṇa-Avasthā-Parīṇāma will be explained later on.<sup>20</sup>

- 20 एते सत्तामात्रस्याऽऽत्मनो महतः षडविशेषपरिणामाः । यत्तत्परमविशेषेभ्यो लिङ्गमात्रं महत्तत्त्वं तस्मिन्नेते सत्तामात्रे महत्यात्मन्यवस्थाय विवृद्धिकाण्डामनुभवन्ति । प्रतिसंसृज्यमानाश्च तस्मिन्नेव सत्तामात्रे महत्यात्मन्यवस्थाय यत्तन्निःसत्तासत्तं निःसदसन्निरसदव्यक्तमलिङ्गं प्रधानं तत्प्रतियन्ति । एष तेषां लिङ्गमात्रः परिणामो निःसत्तासत्तं चालिङ्गपरिणाम इति । .....लिङ्गमात्रमलिङ्गस्य प्रत्यासत्तं तत्र तत्संसृष्टं विविच्यते क्रमानतिवृत्तेः । तथा षडविशेषा लिङ्गमात्रे संसृष्टा विविच्यन्ते परिणामक्रमनियमात् । तथा तेष्वविशेषेषु भूतेन्द्रि-

Thus in the Vyāsa-bhāṣya we not only get a precise definition of the theory of Parīṇāma but also a systematic and elaborate exposition of the various aspects of Parīṇāma and of the process of Parīṇāma which is not to be found in earlier Sāṃkhya-Yoga literature.

Vācaspati, Bhoja, Vijñānabhikṣu and Nāgeśa add nothing new in the explanation of the passages pertaining to dharma-lakṣaṇa-avasthā parīṇāma and twofold permanence. Vācaspati and Bhikṣu, however, attempt to throw further light on the passage dealing with the Tattvāntara-parīṇāma and Saṃsṛṣṭa-viveka, by giving their own interpretations which deserve special notice. So we consider them independently.

### The Tattvāntara-Parīṇāma

Vācaspati attempts to explain Tattvāntara Parīṇāma in his commentary on the Ska. 3, though he does not elucidate the point while commenting on the Vyāsa-bhāṣya. There he arrives at the conclusion that the absence of equal degree of grossness and perceptibility is the criterion of tattvāntaratva. Let us see how he arrives at this conclusion.

‘...The five gross elements and the eleven sense-organs are mere products or modifications, not productive. Though the cow, the jar, the trees and the rest are the products of the earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, which latter are the products of the cow and the tree, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees etc., do not differ from earth, in their essence, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term Root, ‘Prakṛti’ stands; and that the cow, the tree etc. do not differ from each other in their

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दाणि संसृष्टानि विविच्यन्ते । तथा चोक्तं पुरस्तात् । न विशेषेभ्यः परं  
तत्त्वान्तरमस्तीति विशेषाणां नास्ति तत्त्वान्तरपरिणामः । तेषां तु धर्मलक्ष-  
णावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्यायिष्यन्ते ।

essence, is proved by the fact that they have the same degree of grossness and perceptibility'.<sup>21</sup>

Vijñānabhikṣu's explanation of the same is as follows :

‘तत्त्वत्वं च द्रव्यत्वं तत्त्वान्तरत्वं च  
स्वावृत्तिद्रव्यत्वसाक्षाद्व्याप्यजातिमत्त्वम् ।’

‘Tattvatva consists in the possession of substantiality (dravyatva) and tattvāntaratva i.e. distinctness of tattva consists or lies in the possession of the generality (jātimatva, as e.g. ‘puruṣatva’) which is directly pervaded by the generality (‘dravyatva’ i.e. substantiality which characterises the twenty-five tattvas) and which does not reside or inhere (स्वावृत्ति) in the other tattvas (as e.g. other twenty-four, than the Puruṣa).’

Thus according to Bhikṣu, the twenty-five principles of the Sāṃkhya are distinct tattvas because each one possesses a distinct ‘Jāti’. But this is only explaining away in the terminology of Vaiśeṣika, what is accepted as a dogma. Vacaspati, however, may be said to have attempted a sort of rational explanation of ‘tattvāntaratva’.<sup>22</sup>

21 पञ्चमहाभूतानि एकादश इन्द्रियाणीति षोडशको गणो विकार एव, न प्रकृतिरिति । यद्यपि पृथिव्यादीनां गोघटवृक्षादयो विकाराः एवन्तद्विकारभेदानां पयोबीजादीनां दध्यङ्कुरादयः, तथाऽपि गवादयो बीजादयो वा न पृथिव्यादिभ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरम् । तत्त्वान्तरोपादानत्वं च प्रकृतित्वमिहाभिप्रेतम्, इति न दोषः । सर्वेषां गोघटादीनां स्थूलतेन्द्रियग्राह्यता च समेति न तत्त्वान्तरम् ।

22 Das Gupta's interpretation of the same is as follows : ‘The production of these Viśeṣas and A viśeṣas is called tattvāntaraparināma, as distinguished from the changes that take place among the viśeṣas themselves. Thus for example when the tanmātras are produced from ahaṃkāra, the state of being, involved in the tanmātrās, is altogether different from the state of being of ahaṃkāra. It is not merely a mere change of quality, but a change of existence or state of being. Thus though the tanmātrās are derived from mahat through ahaṃkāra, the traces of ahaṃkāra cannot be easily found in them. This derivation is not such that the ahaṃkāra remains principally unchanged and there is only a change of quality of the ahaṃkāra, but it is a different exis-

The above discussion regarding the twenty-four principles being distinct tattvas, points to one fact, viz., that the Sāṃkhyaas either reduced all the world-phenomena to these twenty-four distinct elements or regarded all the world-phenomena as resulting from the association and dissociation of these elements. The hypothesis that the Sāṃkhyaas were so called because they accepted a particular saṃkhyā of elements, receives support if we regard that the Sāṃkhyaas regarded this particular saṃkhyā as indicating so many distinct elements. In this matter, the 'tattvāntaras' can be compared with the Astikāyas of the Jain, the difference, however, being that the Jainas do not attempt to derive them from any one principle. One may regard the evolution of these twenty-three elements from Prakṛti as so many Distinctions which Prakṛti put forth through the process of Parināma and which, later on, by mutual association and dissociation, gave rise to the multifarious world-phenomena.

We may now turn to the next problem, which attempts to describe the process of Parināma, Saṃsṛṣṭa-viveka.

### **The Process of Parināma - saṃsṛṣṭa-viveka**

Before, however, we proceed to understand the process of Parināma (संसृष्ट-विवेक), it is necessary to take notice of Vijñāna-bhikṣu's view regarding the nature of the three Guṇas because his interpretation of Saṃsṛṣṭa-viveka can only be understood in the light of his conception of the three Guṇas.

According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the Guṇas are super-subtle

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tence altogether, and has properties which differ widely from that of ahaṃkāra. So it is tattvāntaraparināma, i.e. evolution of the different categories of existence. The evolution of the senses and the five gross elements cannot be of this nature, for they are the viśeṣas which have been too much specialised to allow the evolution of any other substance of a grade of existence different from themselves. With them there is an end of all emanations and the changes or modifications that they suffer are brought under the dharma, lakṣaṇa and avasthā-parināma.

substances,<sup>23</sup> infinite in number according to the diversity of individuals.

Prakṛti according to Bhikṣu is a conglomerate (samūha) of an infinite number of subtle Guṇa-reals. It is not correct, according to this view, to say that the universal Guṇas produce a diversity of effects on account of their varying combinations since such a view cannot account for the appearance of minor differences, increase, decrease etc. and for the initial disturbance in the Prakṛti.<sup>24</sup>

It is, however, not possible to find endorsement of this view of Bhikṣu in any of the earlier Sāṃkhya works.<sup>25</sup> On the contrary, the express statement of the Skā. 10.<sup>26</sup> that the Avyakta is not sāvaśava (having parts) seems to go against Bhikṣu's view. Moreover, it is not clearly stated in any earlier work as to whether the Guṇas are to be regarded as subtle substances infinite in number. On the other hand, in consonance with the nature of Prakṛti, as one homogeneous and integrated whole, the

23 सत्त्वादीनि द्रव्याणि न वैशेषिका गुणाः संयोगविभागवत्त्वात् । SPB I.61

24 'सत्त्वादित्यमपि व्यक्तिभेदादनन्तम् । अन्यथा हि विभुमात्रत्वे गुणविमर्दवैचित्र्यात् कार्यवैचित्र्यमिति सिद्धान्तो नोपपद्येत । विमर्दोऽवान्तरभेदासंभवात् । ..... गुणानां सत्त्वादीनामेकैकव्यक्तिमात्रत्वे वृद्धिह्रासादिकं नोपपद्यते । तथा परिच्छिन्नत्वे च तत्समूह रूपस्य प्रधानस्य परिच्छिन्नत्वापत्त्या श्रुतिस्मृति-सिद्धमेकदाऽसंख्येयब्रह्माण्डादिकं नोपपद्येत । SPB I.127

25 Prof. Das Gupta opines that "there is nothing, however, in the interpretation of Gauḍapāda and Vācaspati which would militate against the interpretation of Bhikṣu, but yet while they were silent as to any definite explanations regarding the nature of the Guṇas, Bhikṣu definitely came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation of their nature..... Bhikṣu's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known of the manifestations and workings of the Guṇas in all early documents". *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I., p. 224. We cannot, however, agree with this view, for reasons stated above.

26 Cf. STK on SKā. 10.

three Guṇas seem to indicate the three universal powers or potentialities of Prakṛti which bring about various manifestations in this universe.

Now, let us understand Bhikṣu's interpretation of the process of Parīṇāma – saṁśṛṣṭa-viveka, in the light of his theory of the Guṇas, as given by him in his YV. (II. 19).

According to Bhikṣu, when the process of creation starts, there occurs only a partial, not a total disturbance in the equilibrium of Prakṛti, the equilibrium being maintained for ever in a certain part of Prakṛti. Otherwise, i.e. on the assumption of a total disturbance of the equilibrium, the different stages (viśeṣa, aviśeṣa, līṅga) in the order of cosmic evolution, will not be possible. The transformation of the subsequent categories (tattvas) takes place successively from only a part of the preceding categories, like that of foam taking place in part of the ocean and not like that of milk into curd which is a total parīṇāma of the previous state. The existence of the preceding tattvas, the causes, as pervading the subsequent ones, their effects, after the production of the latter, comes to be established by the fact that the deficiency of the reals in the cause, consequent upon the production of the effect, has to be made good by the preceding tattvas successively by a process of refilling.<sup>27</sup>

27 ..... अथवा सर्वदा सत्त्वरूपं नित्यत्वमेवात्राप्यर्थोऽस्तु सर्गेऽपि गुणासाम्य-  
स्यात्यन्ततोऽनुच्छेदात्, अंशत एव वैषम्येणावरणरूपस्य गुणसाग्यस्य सर्वदा  
सत्त्वात्, अन्यथा साम्यावस्थाया अन्यन्तोच्छेदे पर्वत्वानुपपत्तेश्च । ..... तस्य  
च वंशतुल्यस्य गुणवृक्षस्यावरणप्रज्ञा पूर्वपूर्वतत्त्वानामंशत एवोत्तरतत्त्वरूपेण  
परिणामो भवति समुद्रस्यांशतः फेनादिरूपतावद् न तु दधना दुग्धस्येव पूर्वपूर्व-  
तत्त्वस्य सर्वांशेन परिणाम, उत्पन्नकार्यस्य कारणेन पुनरापूरणार्थं तु कारणानां  
स्वकार्यावरकतयाऽवस्थानं सिध्यति, तस्मात् सर्गकालेऽपि बहिरलिङ्गावस्थाव-  
स्थानात्तस्या नित्यत्वमिति.....।'

Dr. Seal and Das Gupta, accepting the above interpretation of Bhikṣu regarding the nature of the Guṇas and the process of Parīṇāma give an exposition of the same in modern terms as follows : "This evolution in its



From the above, it is obvious that the problem of the nature of the process of parīṇāma, depends upon the view that we take

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formal aspect is defined as differentiation in the integrated. In other words, the process of Evolution consists in the development of the differentiated within the undifferentiated, of the determinate within the indeterminate, of the coherent within the incoherent. The evolutionary series is subject to a definite law which it cannot overstep. The order of succession is not from the whole to parts, nor from parts to the whole, but ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole. That the process of differentiation evolves out of homogeneity as separate or unrelated parts, which are then integrated into a whole, and that this whole again breaks up by fresh differentiation into isolated factors for a subsequent reintegration, and so on ad infinitum, is a fundamental misconception of the course of material evolution. That the antithesis stands over against the thesis, and that the synthesis supervenes and imposes unity ab extra on these two independent and mutually hostile moments, is the same radical misconception as regards the dialectical form of cosmic development. On the Sāṃkhya view, increasing differentiation proceeds *pari passu* with increasing integration within the evolving whole, so that by this two-fold process what was an incoherent indeterminate homogeneous whole evolves into a coherent determinate heterogeneous whole." *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, p. 7-8.

Das Gupta, after quoting the above passage from Dr. Seal, adds, "The meaning of such an evolution is this, that all the changes and modifications in the shape of the evolving collocations of *guṇa* reals take place within the body of the *Prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* consisting of the infinite reals is infinite, and that it has been disturbed does not mean that the whole of it has been disturbed and upset, or that the totality of the *guṇas* in the *Prakṛti* has been unhinged from a state of equilibrium. It means rather that a very vast number of *guṇas* constituting the worlds of thought and matter has been upset. These *guṇas*, once thrown out of balance begin to group themselves together first in one form, then in another, then in another, and so on. But such a change in the formation of aggregates should not be thought to take place in such a way that the latter aggregates appear in supersession of the formere ones, so that when the former comes into being the latter ceases to exist. For the truth is that one stage is produced after another; this second stage is the result of a new aggregation of some of the reals of the first stage. This deficiency of the reals of the first stage which had gone forth to form the new aggregate as the second stage is made good by a refilling from the *Prakṛti*. So also, as the third stage of aggregation takes place from out of the reals of the second

of the nature of the constitution of *Prakṛti*. If we imagine *Prakṛti* to be a homogeneous, integrated whole, as the *Skā.* seems to understand in our opinion, then the disturbance at one point should disturb the whole, i.e. when the *parināma*-process starts, the whole of the *Prakṛti* must become active. This seems to be the view of the *Skā.* as well as of *Vyāsa* (who, it must be noted, simply refers to it as 'a process of differentiation in the integrated' without touching the question of the total or partial *Parināma*) though neither the *Skā.* nor *Vyāsa* has stated the position in clear terms as regards the process of *Parināma*, (total or partial).

The interpretation, given by *Bhikṣu*, becomes intelligible in the light of his view of the constitution of *Prakṛti* which, as we have already noted, is a conglomerate of an infinite number of the *Guṇa*-reals. It seems to me that this view of *Bhikṣu*, if not contradictory of the view of the orthodox *Sāṃkhya*, is distinctly different from it<sup>28</sup>.

Consistently with the concept of *Prakṛti* as held by the old *Sāṃkhya* writers, it does not stand to reason to assume that the disturbance in the equilibrium of the *Guṇas* affects only a certain part of *Prakṛti* and not the whole of it. The view of *Bhikṣu* can, however, be reconciled with the *Sāṃkhya* view proper, if we interpret his 'अंशतः परिणाम' as 'अंशतः परिणामाभिव्यक्ति' or 'कार्याभिव्यक्ति' i.e.

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stage, the deficiency of the reals of the second stage is made good by a refilling from the first stage and that of the first stage from the *Prakṛti*. Thus by a succession of refilling the process of evolution proceeds, till we come to its last limit, where there is no real evolution of new substance, but mere chemical and physical changes of qualities in things which had already evolved." *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I., pp. 246-247. 'Evolution in *Sāṃkhya* (तत्त्वान्तरपरिणाम) means the development of categories of existence and not mere changes of qualities of substances (physical, chemical, biological or mental). Thus each of the stages of evolution remains as a permanent category of being and offers scope to the more and more differentiated and coherent groupings of the succeeding stages. Thus it is said that the evolutionary process is regarded as a differentiation of new stages as integrated in previous stage.

28 *Radhakrishnan* too, calls the view of *Bhikṣu* regarding the nature of the *Guṇas* 'different view.' *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. p. 265.

to say the disturbance taking place in the whole of Prakṛti but the manifestation of effects occurring partially or rather gradually. For even on the view of homogeneous, integrated Prakṛti in which the slightest disturbance is a disturbance of the whole, the 'abhivyakti' or actual manifestation or what we might call its assuming of particular stages such as Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra etc., is gradual.

### **Study of Parīṇāma from another point of view**

Let us now study parīṇāma from the point of view of its operation in regulating the creation or manifestation of different things.

Amongst modern writers Dr. Seal and Dr. Das Gupta have tried to give a sort of exposition of the above problems in an able and lucid way. It will be better, therefore, to study this problem in the words of these scholars.

\*Considering the cosmic changes as a whole, the guṇas remain for ever as their permanent substrata. The changes come and go, the combinations break and form but the reals remain ever the same, though they may seem to appear in diverse characters. The characters and qualities are the results of the diversity of their combination. Thus the totality of the mass and energy also remains constant if we take account of both the manifested and the unmanifested, the actual and the potential. Such is the bond of teleological relation between the guṇas and the puruṣas, that the course of evolution follows an unalterable definite law, not only as regards the order of succession but also about the appearance and mutual relations of the separate units of like and unlike energies. Had there not been such a definite order, the world would have been a chaos instead of cosmos, in spite of all the three guṇas. All things being composed ultimately of the three guṇas, there are no intrinsic differences amongst them (sarvam sarvātmakam). The only difference is the difference in the constitution of the collocation of the guṇas, or as expressed in the phenomenal world of matter as the collocations of the atoms. It is theoretically therefore possible to change anything in the world to any

other provided the necessary collocations of the atoms could be arranged. The changes or modifications only give expression to the latent varieties of the substance. As the atoms change their position by their innate rajas or energy, the substance changes its form and manifests diverse new qualities which could not be perceived before. But still such a change is not possible to an unlimited degree, for in the constitution of the relations of the *guṇas* there are limitations and obstacles which cannot be overstepped. These limitations may generally be counted in the phenomenal world of change, as being of the nature of time, space, form and disposing cause. Thus Kashmere being the country of saffron, it does not grow in the Pāñcāla country, even though the other causes of its growth may be present there. Similarly there are no rains in the summer season, therefore the growth of rice is not possible in that season; so also the form of a man cannot take its rise from that of a deer. Thus, though all things are intrinsically the same yet the obstacles to change, of the constitution of the *guṇas* in the formation of different substances in certain directions, are such that these cannot be removed, and so those modifications though theoretically possible will ever remain a practical impossibility.

This brings us to the relation of cause and effect and the part which is played by concomitant conditions in transforming the cause into the effect. We know that there is no other difference between cause and effect than this that the former is only the potential state of which the latter is the actual. The sum of material causes is only the vehicle of the power which is efficient in the production. The concomitant conditions are said to help the effectuation of this transformation from the potential to the actual state. Thus the work of the sculptor may be regarded as the concomitant condition which transforms a piece of marble into a statue. The oilman has helped the oil which was already in existence in the mustard to manifest itself as such. Thus, looked at from this point of view, all concomitant causes may be regarded as helping the passage of the effect from its potentiality as the cause, into the effect as an actuality'.<sup>29</sup>

29 *Yoga Philosophy*, Das Gupta, pp. 209-211.

This exposition is based on VB. III. 14, TVS III. 14, YV IV. 12 and

'These mechanical examples of the Kapila-Sāṃkhya have the merit of simplicity, but the Patañjali-Sāṃkhya brushes them aside, and explains causation on the basis of the conservation and transformation of Energy advancing it as the liberation of potential Energy existing stored up in a Guṇa collocation (the sum of material causes), the liberation following on the action of the proximate efficient cause, or concomitant condition.

The causal operation of concomitant conditions (efficient causes) lies only in this, that they supply a physical stimulus which liberates the potential Energy stored up in a given collocation. Everything in the phenomenal world is but a special collocation of the ultimate Reals (Energy, Mass and Essence). The sum of (material) causes potentially contains the Energy manifested in the sum of effects; and in the passage from potency to actualisation, the effectuating condition (the concomitant cause), when it is itself accom-

SPB I. 20.

- (1) सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति । यत्रोक्तम्-जलभूम्योः पारिणामिकं रसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावरेषु दृष्टम् । तथा स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेष्वित्येवं जात्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति । देशकालाकारनिमित्तापबन्धान्न खलु समानकालमात्मना-भिव्यक्तिरिति । VB. on III. 14.
- (2) यद्यपि कारणं सर्वं सर्वात्मकं तथाऽपि यो यस्य कार्यस्य देशो यथा कुङ्कुमस्य काश्मीरः । तेषां सत्त्वेऽपि पाञ्चालादिषु न समुदाचार इति न कुङ्कुमस्य पाञ्चालादिष्वभिव्यक्तिः । एवं निदाघे न प्रावृषः समुदाचार इति न तदा शालीनाम् । एवं न मृगी मनुष्यं प्रसूते न तस्यां मनुष्याकारसमुदाचार इति । एवं नापुण्यवान्सुखरूपं भुङ्क्ते न तस्मिन्पुण्यनिमित्तस्य समुदाचार इति । TVS. on III. 14
- (3) दृष्टं च कारणव्यापारेण सदेवाभिव्यज्यत इति यथा पाषाणेषु सतामेव प्रति-मापद्मादीनां लौकिकव्यापारेणाभिव्यक्तिमात्रमिति...। YV on IV. 12.
- (4) .....अभिव्यक्तिर्वर्तमानावस्था । कारणव्यापारोऽपि कार्यस्य वर्तमानलक्षणपरिणाममेव जनयति । यथा शिलामध्यस्थप्रतिमाया लैङ्गिकव्यापारेणाभिव्यक्तिमात्रं तिलस्थतैलस्य च निष्पीडनेन, धानस्थतण्डुलस्य चावघातेनेति ।

SPB on I. 120

plished, is only a step in the evolutionary series, which adds a specific stimulus, and renders determinate that which was previously indeterminate. When the effectuating condition is added to the sum of material conditions in a given collocation, all that happens is that a stimulus is imparted which removes the arrest, disturbs the relatively stable equilibrium, and brings on a liberation of Energy together with a fresh collocation.

Describing the production of bodies ('organic vehicles') for individual souls out of matter of Prakṛti, under the influence of their merit and demerit, as concomitant conditions, Patañjali points out that non-material concomitant like merit and demerit do not supply any moving force or Energy to the sum of material conditions, but only remove the arrest (the state of relatively stable equilibrium) in a given collocation, even as the owner of a field removes the barrier in flooding his field from a reservoir of water. This description is intended to represent the super-physical influence of non-material concomitants (or causes) like volition, merit and demerit, etc., but the causal operation of a material concomitant condition is essentially the same; there is the same reservoir of stored-up Energy in a given collocation, the same condition of arrest or relatively stable equilibrium, the same liberation of the stored-up potential Energy which flows along the line of least resistance, the only difference being that in the case of material concomitants the stimulus which removes the arrest is physical, instead of being transcendental as in the case of non-material causes like will, merit and demerit, etc.

The Vyāsa-Bhāṣya helps us to a clear mental representation of the details of this process : As the owner of many fields can irrigate, from a field which is already flooded, others of the same or a lower level, without forcing the waters thereto with his hands, and merely by making an opening in the barrier or dyke, on which waters rush in by their own force; or, further, as the same person cannot force these waters, or the earthly matters held in solution therein, into the roots of the rice plants, but only removes the obstructive grasses and weeds, on which the fluids of their

own power enter the roots - such is the action of effectuating condition added to a sum of material causes or conditions'.<sup>30</sup>

Thus we see that the energy conserved in one form naturally passes into another by manifesting consequent changes or transformations designated by the name of evolution. As natural flow is obstructed in various ways by the resistance offered by space, time, form and causality, it has naturally to take the course in which there are no impediments and obstacles; at each stage new impediments may come in and interfere with the evolving process and compel the flow to change the direction of its course at every stage; so it is that we find that the evolutionary process has naturally to take a curvilinear line rather than the straight one. It is this resistance against the evolutionary flow which compels it to reject thousands of courses open to it and select a particular one in which there is no resistance. It is this, therefore, that gives *niyama* or a regulation (*parīṇāmakramaniyama*)<sup>31</sup>.

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30 Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, B. N. Seal, pp. 14-16.

31 Yoga Philosophy, pp. 212-213.

## CHAPTER V

### OTHER TOPICS RELATED TO PARINĀMA

#### Introductory

In this Chapter I propose to treat other topics of Sāṃkhya philosophy which are directly or indirectly conditioned by the concept of Parināma or which in some way throw light on the character of Parināma. These pertain to the concept of Ākāśa and Kāla, the derivation of the different categories from Prakṛti, their character, the nature of the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, the purpose guiding parināma and the function given to Īśvara by Yoga in it.

#### Concept of Ākāśa and Kāla in Sāṃkhya-Yoga

The foregoing discussion of the different aspects of parināma especially the last one viz., its relation to causality brings us to the consideration of the problem of Time (Kāla) and Space (Ākāśa) in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system. The Skā. does not say anything on the concept of Kāla. Amongst its commentaries only the STK, incidentally touches it. The VB., the TVS., and YV. deal with it at some length. Vyāsa explains it as follows:

As an atom is a substance in which minuteness reaches its limit, so a moment is a division of time in which minuteness reaches its limit. Or a moment is that much of time which an atom takes in leaving the position in space it occupies and reaching the next point. The succession of moments is the non-cessation of the flow thereof. The moments and their collection do not fall into a collection of actual things. The Muhūrta, the day and night are all aggregates of mental conceptions. This time which is not a substantive reality in itself, but is only a mental concept, and which comes into the mind as a piece of verble knowledge only, appears to people whose minds are given to out-



going activities, as if it were an objective reality. The moment falls under the head of reality and is maintained by succession. This succession consists in the sequence of moments. The Yogis who know time call this by the name of time.

Further two moments cannot co-exist. There can be no succession of two co-existent moments. It is impossible. The uninterrupted sequence of the first moment and of the one which follows, is what is called succession. For this there is but one moment existing in the present; the antecedent and postcedent moments do not exist; therefore, there cannot be any collection of them.

Further, the moments that have passed and those [that have yet to come, should be described as existing in consequence of universal change in evolution. For this reason the whole world undergoes change every moment and all these characteristics are relatively established in that one moment of time.<sup>1</sup>

Vācaspati, while commenting on the concerned passage, adds no new idea. His remarks on the Skā. may be noted.

Therein he points out that according to the Vaiśeṣikas, Time being one (indivisible) it cannot admit of such divisions as 'present' and 'future' and hence they attribute these divisions to certain 'accidents' (adventitious conditions): but according to the Sāṃkhyācāryas, says Vācaspati, these same 'accidents' themselves may be regarded as the basis of the notions of 'future', 'present' and 'past', and there is no need for the postulating of an intervening entity as 'Time'; this is the reason why time is not accepted as a distinct entity.

Vijñānabhikṣu in his YV. points out that though Time is defined as *buddhi-nirmāṇa*, yet it may be taken as real. For it only means that Time has no real (objective) existence apart from the 'moment'. The latter is real being identical with the unit of change of the Guṇas in phenomena.<sup>2</sup> But, as Dr. Seal points out,

1 VB III. 51

2 .....तदस्मिन् शास्त्रे क्षण एव काल इति सिद्धान्तः; कालोऽत्र नाभ्युपगम्यत

‘even this is real only for our empirical (relative) consciousness (व्युत्थितदर्शन), which intuitively the relation of antecedence and sequence into the evolving Reals (Guṇas), in the stage of ‘empirical intuition’ (सविचारा निर्विकल्पज्ञा). The ‘intellectual intuition’ (निर्विचारा निर्विकल्पज्ञा), on the other hand, apprehends the Reals as they are, without the imported empirical relations of Space, Time, and Causality’.<sup>3</sup>

From the above it is clear that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga accepts *kāla*, not as a distinct eternal entity, like the Vaiśeṣikas, but only as the one present moment which is identical with the unit of change of the Guṇas.

### Ākāśa

In Sāṃkhya-Yoga works earlier than Bhikṣu’s, we are given to understand Ākāśa as a gross evolute produced from the Śabda-tanmātrā (sound-potential). This means that the evolution of the categories upto Ākāśa takes place without the latter. Bhikṣu seems to have experienced this difficulty and hence his clever innovations in the SPB & YV.

We elucidate his innovations as follows. At one place he states that Eternal Space (Dik) and Time (Kāla) are of the form of Prakṛti or the root cause of the (produced) Ākāśa, and are only the specific qualities of Prakṛti. Hence the universality of Space and Time is established. But these, space and time, which are limited, are produced from Ākāśa through the conjunction of this or that limiting object.<sup>4</sup>

At other place he writes that the notion of eternal Dik should be understood to be unreal, for generally there is no Dik-Vyava-

इति कस्यचित् प्रलापस्तु भाष्यार्थाविवेकमूल इति, यत्तु पूर्वदेशासंयोगाद्यवच्छिन्नः परमाणुक्रियाऽऽदिरेव क्षणः कालस्तु तदतिरिक्तो नित्य इति वैशेषिकाः आहुः, तन्न.....अस्माभिस्तादृशस्यैव गुणपरिणामस्य क्षणत्ववचनात्.....’ YV on III 51.

3 Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 21.

4 SPB. II. 12.

hāra.<sup>5</sup> The notion of pūrva-dīk etc. is due to the limiting adjuncts of Dik which is accepted (as an entity) by others (e.g. the Vaiśeṣikas). So, even though ordinarily there is the vyavahāra of Kāla and Dik, yet the two are to be explained through Ākāśa only. There is however a difference between Time and Dik in as much as the latter is absolutely illusory (having no real existence at all), whereas, the former is admitted to exist as moments.<sup>6</sup>

At the third place he anticipates an objection that if Ākāśa is allpervading, it can neither be an effect of something nor can it be described as atomic as is done by the Bhāṣyakāra. His reply to the objection is as follows : Ākāśa is of two kinds, one original and the other, derivative like the earth-element of the Vaiśeṣikas. The original or Kāraṇākāśa is "the undifferentiated formless Tamas (mass in Prakṛti, matter-rudiment, Bhūtādi), which is devoid of all potentials and is merely the all-pervasive seat<sup>7</sup> or vehicle of the ubiquitous original Energy (Rajas)". This Kāraṇākāśa, on the association of the other Guṇas first modifies itself partially as the sound-potential, and then the gross Ākāśa is produced by a conglomeration of the Ākāśa-atoms like the gross earth (of the Vaiśeṣika). This gross Ākāśa is limited from the point of view of Ahaṃkāra (the preceding evolute) and serves as the medium for air (वायोरावरणम्).<sup>8</sup>

Thus, we see that, Bhikṣu, having before him the full-fledged discussions of Space and Time of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, has felt the difficulty of thinking anything without postulating Ākāśa and Kāla. With the help of Vaiśeṣika ideas, he imagines two types of Ākāśa and Kāla, primary or original and derivative or empirical. He looks upon the primary or Kāraṇākāśa as being identical with Tamoguṇa in Prakṛti and regards, the eternal Dik and Kāla as the specific qualities of Prakṛti. Empirical dik-kāla, he explains, through the association of Ākāśa with limiting adjuncts.

5 i.e. simply 'dik' without any qualifications like, 'pūrva' etc.

6 YV. III. 51

7 Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 27.

8 YV. III 40.

It is clear that this has no textual justification for it (and even philosophically its value is doubtful because the Sāṃkhya concept of Prakṛti is beyond Time and Space). We may, however, say that this Prakṛti, in as much as it brings forth the empirical Time and Space, has the potentiality of that Time and Space. And if we consent to call this potentiality of Time and Space as Kāla and Kāraṇākāśa respectively, we may have reason to agree with Bhikṣu.<sup>9</sup>

### On the Derivation of the different Categories from 'Prakṛti

The Skā, and its commentaries, as already noted, describe the order of evolution of the different categories from Prakṛti as follows : From Prakṛti is derived the Mahat, from Mahat Ahaṃkāra, from the three-fold Ahaṃkāra—eleven senses and five Tanmātrās and from the five Tanmātrās the five Bhūtas. The SSū. too gives the same order. However, a different order is given by VB and TVS. Here two parallel lines of evolution start from the Mahat which, on one side, develops into the Ahaṃkāra and eleven

9 It may be noted that Śimānanda in his Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana, points out that the Vaiśeṣika view which regards Kāla as an independent eternal entity and, the Sāṃkhya view which regards the notion of the Mahā-Kāla (i.e. the eternal Time) and the moment as being due to the conjunction of the Ākāśa with the limiting adjuncts—are not endorsed by the Yoga. According to the latter, the moment alone is the real Kāla and that Pradhāna (i.e. its pariṇāma) is the cause of the Kāla-vyavahāra and not the Ākāśa. Thus, Śimānanda makes a distinction between the Sāṃkhya view and the Yoga-view. He, however, does not say anything regarding the Concept of Ākāśa, in Sāṃkhya-Yoga (i.e. as to whether it is to be identified with the Tamas in Prakṛti or regarded as produced from the Śabdatanmātrā only).

Note that Vijnānabhikṣu, while commenting on the Ssū. II. 12, (दिव्कालौ आकाशादिभ्यः ।) says that the notion of 'खण्डकाल' is the result of the association of the Ākāśa with the limiting adjuncts. But, in his Yoga-Vārttika, as we have seen, he identifies Kāla (i.e. the moment) with the unit of change of the Guṇas in accordance with Vvāsa-bhāṣya.

senses and on the other into the five Tanmātrās and the five Bhūtas.<sup>10</sup>

10 VB. and TVS. on Ysū. II. 19.

Dr. Seal remarks that the first order given by the Skā. and others, is literally correct but misses the significance of the doctrine of Saṃ-  
sṛṣṭa-viveka or 'differentiation in the integrated', according to which the Tanmātrās are all evolved through the medium of Ahaṃkāra, in the cosmic matter of Experience (Mahat). Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus, p. 12.

It may be noted that Bhikṣu who comments on the VB. and the SSū, points out that, truly speaking, the genesis of the Tanmātrās from Mahat takes place through the Ahaṃkāra and in association with it for it has been so described in the VB. on the Ysū. I. 45 (YV. on Ysū. II. 19). Thus both Bhikṣu and Seal purport to convey the same thing from Vyāsa's statement though in different way.

Incidentally we may note here other differences of view between the earlier and later works as regards the derivation of other categories.

It may be noted that nothing is stated about the manner of the order of evolution of the Tanmātrās from Ahaṃkāra, in any of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga works excepting those of Vijñānabhikṣu. In his YV. (on II. 19) and SPB. (I. 62), he points out that the same order of evolution is to be followed in the case of the Tanmātrās as is followed in the case of evolution of the Bhūtas from the Tanmātrās. Thus Ahaṃkāra gives rise to Śabda-tanmātrā, the Śabdatanmātrā in association with Ahaṃkāra, to Sparśa-tanmātrā, and so on. (For a detailed discussion of the different views of the derivation of Tanmātrās as found in the Smṛtis and Purāṇas, cf. Dr. Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus p. 28 onwards).

As regards the manner of the derivation of the Bhūtas from the Tanmātrās, the Skā. says nothing. The Mātharavṛtti, STK, Jayamaṅgalā (Skā. 22), VB. and TVS. hold that one i.e. the first Tanmātrā combines with one, two, three or four to produce the more complex Bhūtas with the corresponding number of qualities. According to Gauḍapāda and the author of Yuktidīpikā, however, the Tanmātrās can singly produce the Bhūtas. According to Bhikṣu Ākāśa-atom is generated from the Śabda-tanmātrā with an accretion from bhūtādi, (YV. on Ysū. I. 43). According to Nāgeśa, to produce the gross atoms from the Tanmātrās, an accretion of bhūtādi as an accompanying agent is necessary at every step. Thus

The more important problem, however, is not the order of evolutes but the character of differentiation. This is the problem of *Viśeṣāviśeṣa*. In the *Skā.* 38, the term *Aviśeṣa* is applied to the five *Tanmātrās* and *Viśeṣa* to the *Bhūtas*. The *VB.* applies the term *Aviśeṣa* both to the *Ahaṁkāra* and *Tanmātrās* and *Viśeṣa* to the eleven senses and five *Bhūtas*. But what is meant by these two terms is not made clear either in the *Skā.* or in the *VB.* However, the commentaries on the *Skā.* and on the *VB.* attempt to explain these terms as under.

According to *Māṭhara* and *Gauḍapād* the *Tanmātrās* are *Aviśeṣa* because they all give pleasure to gods owing to the predominance of *Sattva*, even though the *Rajas* and *Tamas* are there. The *Rajas* and *Tamas* do not produce their painful and deadening effects respectively. The five *Bhūtas* are *Viśeṣas* because they become objects of enjoyment for men and produce pleasure, pain and delusion in them.<sup>11</sup>

Let us see how *Vācaspati* in his *STK.* explains them. The *Tanmātrās*, says he, are *Aviśeṣa* because they are subtle and therefore their 'specific character' consisting of the 'calmness, turbulence and delusiveness' is not patent enough to be enjoyed. On the other hand, he points out that the *Bhūtas* are called *Viśeṣa* because

Vāyu-atom is produced from these three-*Śabda* + *Sparśa* + accretion from *bhūtādi*. Similarly *Tej*, *Āp* and *Pṛthivī* atoms are produced.

It may be noted that the introduction of 'atom' as an additional stage between *Tanmātrā* and *Bhūta* occurs only later on, in the *VB*, *TVS* and *YV.* probably due to the influence of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school.

There is a difference of view in regard to the derivation of the eleven senses. According to the *Skā* (25) all the senses emerge from the *Sāttvika-Ahaṁkāra* with the help of *Rajas*. The same view is endorsed in its commentaries. According to The *TVS* and *Nāgeśa-vṛtti* (*Ysū.* II. 19), the five organs of perception arise from the *Sāttvika-Ahaṁkāra*, the five of action from the *Rājasa-Ahaṁkāra* and the mind from both. *Bhikṣu* in his *SPB.* (II. 18), holds that the ten senses, five of perception and five of action, are produced from the *Rājasa-Ahaṁkāra* and the mind alone is produced from the *Sāttvika-Ahaṁkāra*.

<sup>11</sup> *Māṭhara* and *Gauḍapāda* on *Skā.* 38.

they are calm, turbulent and deluding; they are thus perceived to be distinguished from one another while the Tanmātrās cannot be similarly distinguished by us and hence they are *Aviśeṣa* and subtle.<sup>12</sup>

The same explanation is given by Vācaspati and Viṇṇanabhikṣu while commenting on the VB. (Ysū. II, 19) with this difference that the explanation of *Aviśeṣa* is made applicable to *Ahaṃkāra* also since *Ahaṃkāra* along with the Tanmātrās, is called *Aviśeṣa* in the VB.<sup>13</sup>

It must be noted that the expression 'शान्तादिविशेषशून्य' occurring in the concerned passage in YV. does not mean that the Tanmātrās are all absolutely devoid of 'शान्तत्वादि' 'but only that they are so subtle that these can neither be felt nor perceived in any way by the senses. The expression 'श्रवणस्पर्शनदर्शनादिविशेषरहित', also occurring in the same passage, with reference to *Ahaṃkāra* should be similarly understood.

From the above interpretations of Vācaspati and Bhikṣu, the criterion of *Viśeṣa*/*aviśeṣa* comes out to be, the capability or otherwise, respectively of becoming the objects of 'upabhoga' which,

12 See STK. 30. Yuktidīpikā gives quite a different explanation of the term *Aviśeṣa*. It is as follows : The five Tanmātrās viz., śabda, rūpa, rasa, gandha and sparśa are called *Aviśeṣa* because each of them is not differentiated into its particulars such as Śabda into udātta/ānudaṭta etc., rūpa into white, black etc. and so on. This explanation, it can be seen, is on the Vaiśeṣika line of Sāmānya and Viśeṣa.

Jayamaṅgalā explains these terms in a still different way. The Tanmātrās are called *Aviśeṣa* because they are not capable of being particularly qualifying anything on account of their subtleness. The Bhūtas are called *Viśeṣa* because through them the Tanmātrās get differentiated.

13 TVS II.19; YV II, 19.

अविशेषाणां शान्तघोरमूढलक्षणरहितानां ये विशेषा...। TVS II 19

आकाशादीनि भूतानि-शब्दादितन्मात्राणां शान्तादिविशेषशून्यशब्दादिधर्मकसूक्ष्म-द्रव्याणामत एवाविशेषसंज्ञकानां-विशेषा अभिव्यक्तशान्तादिविशेषकाः परिणामाः... यथाक्रममिति शेषः तथेति । ...अभिमानमात्रधर्मकस्य श्रवणस्पर्शनदर्शनादिरूप-विशेषरहितस्याहंकारस्येति शेषः ।' YV II. 19

Nāgasa too gives a similar explanation.

in *Sāṃkhya*, denotes both cognition and conation. Here, it may be noted that the commentators are silent on the question as to whether the *Mahat* and the *Ahaṁkāra* (in the first order of evolution which is given in the *Skā.*) are *Aviśeṣa* or not. *Bhikṣu* touches this point by saying that though '*Aviśeṣatva*' does belong to *Mahat* and *Prakṛti*, yet the term *Aviśeṣa* is conventionally fixed for the six categories (*Ahaṁkāra* and five *Tanmātrās*) only, like the word '*pañkaja*'. This is just explaining away the thing and the question therefore still remains as to whether *Mahat* and *Ahaṁkāra* are *Aviśeṣa* or not.<sup>14</sup>

*Vacaspati*, however, approaches this problem of '*Viśeṣaviśeṣa*' from another point of view, viz. that of causality. Thus he says: The five *Tanmātrās* have the *Buddhi* as their cause because they are the unspecialised modifications, just like the principle of Individuation. *Aviśeṣatva* (non-specialisation) consists in being the cause of further *vikāras* or modifications; this characteristic is common to both the *Tanmātrās* and *Asmitā*. *Viśeṣas*, on the other hand, are the final modifications which do not become the cause of further *tattvas*.<sup>15</sup>

Thus, according to this interpretation of *Vācaspati* '*विकारहेतुत्व*' (wherein, '*vikāra*' signifies '*vikāramātra*') is the criterion of

14 Probably they must have been regarded as having the character of the 'subject' of '*upabhoga*' rather than the object. Though, in *Sāṃkhya* philosophy the subject is the *Puruṣa*, yet the *Buddhi* must do the activity of being the subject for *Puruṣa* and, therefore, in this sense we can say that the *Mahat* and *Ahaṁkāra* are equal to what in ordinary psychology would be called consciousness which cognises and feels and which, therefore, cannot be an object. If this explanation is correct, we can say that '*Viśeṣaviśeṣa*' cannot be applied to *Buddhi* (and *Ahaṁkāra*) in the sense in which the terms are applied to the *Tanmātrās* and *Bhūtas*.

15 ...अत्र च पञ्चतन्मात्राणि बुद्धिकारणकानि अविशेषत्वाद् अस्मितावद् इति । विकारहेतुत्वं चाविशेषत्वं तन्मात्रेषु चास्मितायां चाविशिष्टम् । ...विशेषा... विकारा एव न तु तत्त्वान्तरप्रकृतयः । TVS on II. 19.



Aviśeṣa. The Ahaṃkāra and five Tanmātrās being the cause of further modifications or the tattvas (i.e. of the last sixteen vikāras) are termed 'Aviśeṣa', while the eleven senses and five Bhūtas are called 'Viśeṣa' because they do not possess this characteristic viz. 'विकारहेतुत्व', i.e. they do not become the cause of further tattvas. (These sixteen represent the final stage of evolution of the tattvas). This interpretation, it can be seen, is free from the difficulties which faced us in the first interpretation. It is precise and avoids the fallacy of being too narrow (avyāypti).

### **The Nature of the Relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa**

Divergent explanations are given by later commentators in regard to the nature of the relation between the changing Prakṛti and unchanging Puruṣa. In the Skā. (20), it is simply stated that the non-sentient Liṅga becomes as if sentient on account of its contact with the Puruṣa.<sup>16</sup> But nothing is said as to the nature of this contact. Neither Māthara nor Gauḍapāda enlightens us much on this point. Nevertheless, this problem is indeed a crucial one for the Sāṃkhya and hence could not be evaded especially when the opponents made it the target of their attack and demanded its clarification. Hence the attempts of the later commentators to elucidate the same. Let us see how far they succeed in the solution of this problem.

According to Vācaspati there is no saṃyoga or contact of the Buddhi with the Puruṣa but a reflection of the Puruṣa is caught in the states of Buddhi by virtue of which these become intelligised and transformed into consciousness. But this view is said to be open to the objection that it does not explain how the Puruṣa can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the Buddhi, for its reflection in the Buddhi is merely the image and there cannot be any experience (bhoga) on the basis of that image merely, as actually there is no connection of the Puruṣa with the Buddhi. The answer of Vācaspati is that there is no contact

<sup>16</sup> तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।

between them in Space or Time but the 'sannidhi' or proximity, here means 'yogyatā' or passive capacity of being treated and by virtue of it the Puruṣa, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified with the Buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the Buddhi appear ascribed to a person.<sup>17</sup>

Bhoja maintains that just as the proximity of a magnet manifests the power of movement in a piece of iron, so by the mere proximity of the Puruṣa, the cit which exists in a potential manner as it were in the sattva, becomes manifest and this manifestation of cit which illumines the whole vṛtti or state becomes the object of Puruṣa's experience partly because of the closest proximity of the Puruṣa and partly because the whole process of Prakṛti's transformations is for the experiences and the liberation of the Puruṣa. Prakṛti is not conscious that it will serve the purpose of the Puruṣa but its forward and backward transformations are called its tendencies for the services of the Puruṣas. As both the Prakṛti and the Puruṣa are omnipresent, there cannot be any actual contact or saṃyoga.<sup>18</sup>

Vijñānabhikṣu points out that yogyatā or capacity, which Vācaspati speaks of, on the part of the Puruṣa by virtue of which even though it may not be in touch with the Buddhi, yet the states of Buddhi can continue to be expressed in terms of an experience, will continue even in the state of emancipation; for it is the nature of the Puruṣa and so the experience will continue even in the emancipated state. Second, if the beginningless experience of states be said to be serving the purpose of saṃyoga or contact, then the assertion of the VB that this seeming union is due to avidyā potency breaks down. Thirdly, the objection of Vācaspati that saṃyoga of the Buddhi and the Puruṣa will necessarily mean that the Puruṣa is exposed to change is groundless, for saṃyoga and change are not synonymous. The Ākāśa has also saṃyoga, but it is not by virtue of that called pariṇāmin or changing. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the

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17 TVS. II. 17 and I.4.

18 Bhojavṛtti IV. 22 and II. 23.

Buddhi which knows or forms its states and when this is reflected in the Puruṣa, there is the notion of the person or the experiencer in the Puruṣa and when the cit is reflected in the Buddhi, there is the knowledge as conscious state in the Buddhi. The notion of the knower as 'I', the experiencer cannot be generated in the Buddhi by the reflection of the cit; for the mere reflection cannot be said to be of any purpose. It is when by the reflection of the cit, the states of Buddhi become intelligised, that the Puruṣa shines forth through their reflections as the coniser of those states.<sup>19</sup>

In all these explanations, it can be seen, attempts are made to remove the defects of the earlier ones and keep the kṛtasthānityatva of the Puruṣa in tact. But while one explanation removes one drawback, it creates a number of other difficulties which have to be explained away somehow.

In fact, the real source of the difficulty is in regarding the Puruṣa and the Prakṛti as absolutely distinct in character and then finding out some way of bringing them together because in empirical experience this is a felt fact.

### **The Purpose guiding Parīṇāma and the function given to Īśvara by Yoga in it**

All the Yoga-works hold Īśvara responsible for the removal of all barriers in the way of Prakṛti's development.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, 'the Yoga philosophy differs from the Sāṃkhya in this that the Puruṣārtha or serviceability to the Puruṣa is only the aim or end of the evolution of Prakṛti and not actually the agent which

19 YV, on II. 17, SPB. I. 19.

These views summarised from 'Yoga Philosophy' by Das Gupta.

20. ईश्वरस्यापि धर्माधिष्ठानार्थं प्रतिबन्धापनय एव व्यापारः । TVS IV. 3.

Cf. also 'ईश्वरस्तु साम्यपरिणामादिरूपाखिलावरणभङ्गे नोद्बोधकः ।'

YV. and Nāgeśa vṛitti, IV. 3

removes the obstacles of the *Prakṛti* in such a way as to determine its course as this cosmical process of evolution. *Puruṣārtha* is, indeed, the aim for which the process of evolution exists; for this manifold evolution in all its entirety affects the interests of the *Puruṣa* alone; but that does not prove that this its teleology can really guide the evolution in particular lines so as to ensure the best possible mode of serving all the interests of the *Puruṣa*, for this teleology being immanent in the *Prakṛti* is essentially non-intelligent.<sup>21</sup>

The *Sāṃkhya*, however, hopes that this immanent teleology in *Prakṛti* acts like a blind instinct and is able to guide the course of its evolution in all its manifold lines in accordance with the best possible service of the *Puruṣa*. The *Pātañjala* view, as we have seen, maintains that *Īśvara* removed all obstacles of *Prakṛti* in such a way that this teleology may find scope for its realisation.<sup>22</sup>

It may, however, be noted in passing that even the theism of *Yoga* is a halting sort of theism because according to it the only thing that God does is to remove the obstacles from the movement of *Prakṛti*. Then *Prakṛti* moves according to its inherent directive energy. In this view, God cannot really be said to direct *Prakṛti* as such.

### Recapitulation

In this section I propose to consider the various stages of the development of the idea of *Parināma* and its application to the different categories.

In some of the later hymns of the *R̥gveda*, we find the Vedic seers visualising certain general principles about the world, its

<sup>21</sup> न च पुरुषार्थोऽपि प्रवर्तकः किन्तु तदुद्देशेन ईश्वरः ।

उद्देश्यतामात्रेण पुरुषार्थो प्रवर्तकः । TVS. IV. 3.

<sup>22</sup> Study of *Pātañjali*, Das Gupta, pp. 89-92.

nature and its relation to man. The world in its manifold aspects seems to be a created thing. They, therefore, searched the creator and the substance out of which it must have been created, on the analogy, say, of a carpenter or a potter creating his artifacts. In the earlier stages such gods, as Indra, Agni, Varuṇa etc. are regarded as creating the world. Later, Hiranyagarbha, Viśvakarmā and Prajāpati perform this function. As to the original substance water seems to have a preference over others. Sometimes, however, Tamas, Tapas and Śraddhā are regarded as the original entities. Some of the Vedic thinkers alight upon such distinctions as one (एक) and Many (बहु) Sat and Asat i. e. Being and Non-being and get perplexed as to what must have been the first principle from which the manifold might have come forth. Some of the thinkers appear to have grappled with the difficulty of relating One and Many, Being and Non-being, Permanence and Change. Those who could not resolve the contradiction assumed one of these as the ultimate principle according to their predilections. Sometimes Sat was posited as the original principle, sometimes Asat and sometimes That One, Tadekam.

We are interested in understanding these later principles viz. Sat, Asat and Tadekam. These terms suggest an approach different from that of the creationist thinkers. They suggest what we might call a metaphysical tendency seeking for a general principle in the multifarious phenomena of the world.

In the terms Sat and Asat, the Vedic thinkers seem to have embodied their ideas of Permanence and Change. In their attempt to find something which would comprehend the 'dvandvas' (opposites) or to discover a principle from which these could be derived, they alight upon the idea of Puruṣa who can give birth to the phenomenal world and yet remain permanent or immortal. This idea is expressed by saying that a part of the Puruṣa becomes the world while its three parts are immortal in heaven. Thus the problem of the existence of the world is solved by regarding it as merely worked out from a part of Puruṣa. Anyway, here is an

attempt to combine in one entity the divergent ideas of One and Many, Permanence and Change.

We find a new development in the search of the first principle in the Atharva-Veda in the conception of *Kāla*. This *Kāla* which is viewed as movement on the analogy of a horse is the creative principle of the universe. This is a distinct advance in the philosophy of change.

In the *Brāhmaṇas* *Prajāpati* is firmly established as the creator of the world. In the identification of *Yajña*, universe and *Prajāpati*, we see the assumption of a world-ground which not only provides the material for world phenomena but also the energy and agency which bring forth and preside over the world-phenomena. In some portions of the earlier *Upaniṣad*,<sup>23</sup> we find the thinkers still struggling with the 'dvandvas' (opposites) of earlier thinkers.

The result of this diverse thinking seems to be reflected in the *Vedāṅga*, viz. the *Nirukta*. In its discussion of the six *bhava-vikāras*, we find *bhāva* or *kriyā* as such, analysed and given precise nomenclature as *jāyate*, *asti*, *vipariṇamate*, *vardhate*, *apakṣīyate* and *vinaśyati*. Of these 'vipariṇamate' deserves special notice because it is a clear enunciation of the principle of Permanence-in-change which, as we see, governs all later *Pariṇāma*-thinking.

The *Upaniṣads*, as a whole, show a clear tendency towards 'Sentient Monism' which seems to take two forms. One regards multiplicity and change as real—a precursor of the philosophy of the *Śvetāśvatara Up.*, of the different schools of *Sāṃkhya* mentioned in the *Mahābhārata*, of the creationist theories of the *Smṛtis* and *Purāṇas*, of *Sāṃkhya* in the *Caraka* and of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of *Rāmānuja* which all unanimously uphold the theory of *Pariṇāma*, whatever may be the other divergences regarding the nature of the first principle. The other form is that of *Yājñavalkya* who seems to regard all change and diversity (*विकारबहुत्व*) as chimerical—a precursor of *Gauḍapāda* and *Śaṅkarācārya*.

All the thinkers of the time, however, were not monists. There were dualists both amongst Vedic and non-Vedic thinkers. They regarded the distinction between the 'sentient' and the 'non-sentient' as fundamental and so, in their opinion, one could not be derived from the other. The Sāṃkhyas, the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsakas were such amongst Vedic thinkers and the Jains and the Buddhists, amongst Non-Vedic thinkers. They all tried to explain the genesis of the world by various theories. The Vaiśeṣika view was the creationist one, God creating the material world out of atoms and dispensing the goods of the world to the different souls according to their actions. They adopted the principle of causation as explaining the regulated creation of things. The Sāṃkhyas adopted the principle of Pariṇāma to explain the material creation or change in the world.

Both the Vaiśeṣikas and Sāṃkhyas regard the Puruṣas as kūṭastha-nitya with the difference that the former would allow changes in their guṇas or qualities which are absolutely distinct from their permanent substrates whereas the latter would not allow the slightest change in them.

The Jains adopt as we shall see the principle of Pariṇāma as governing both the Jīvas and the material world. The Buddhists accept the principle of flux without accepting any abiding entity.

It is, however, the grammarians who supply us with references which enable us to study the development of the concept of Pariṇāma. Pāṇini refers to vikāra in all probability in the sense of 'परिणाम'. Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya reflects the development of Pariṇāma in a proper philosophical manner. He follows, in essence, Yāska's definition of 'vipariṇāma' while defining 'dravya', and posits two types of nityatā—viz. pariṇāmi-nityatā and kūṭastha-nityatā,

All these ideas had assumed more or less definite conceptual forms before Īśvarakṛṣṇa summarised the tenets of the Sāṃkhya in his work.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa refers to *Pariṇāma* only twice, in the Kā. 16 and 27. Kā. 16 brings out the idea of *Pariṇāma* by stating that the functioning of *Prakṛti* is *Pariṇāma* and this *Pariṇāma* is characterised by the predominance of the one or the other of the *Guṇas*. The same is applied in Kā. 27 to explain the mutual distinction between the eleven senses.

This lack of further elaboration of *Pariṇāma* can be explained on two grounds viz. that Īśvarakṛṣṇa might have felt that the idea was too well-known to require any elaborate explanation and secondly we see the same idea worked out in the theory of *Satkāryavāda*.

If it were possible to identify the author of the *Yoga-sūtras* with that of the *Mahābhāṣya*, we could have said that *Patañjali* had before Īśvarakṛṣṇa clearly visualised and defined *Pariṇāma* in philosophical terms. The *Yoga-sūtras* define the different *Pariṇāmas* of the *Citta* such as the *Vyutthāna*, *Nirodha* and *Samādhi* *Pariṇāmas* and only incidentally refer to the *Dharma-Lakṣaṇa-Avasthā* *Pariṇāmas* of the *bhūtas* and senses.

*Māthara* elucidates *Pariṇāma* by distinguishing two types in transformation. One is of the nature of creation or manufacture like that of a pot. This he calls 'अपरिणामतः कारण'. The other is natural transformation like that of milk into curd. This he calls 'परिणामतः कारण'. He identifies the process of *Prakṛti*'s *Pariṇāma* with the latter. This makes clear the idea that *Pariṇāma* is a sort of material evolution and not of the nature of anything created or made on the analogy of human work.

*Vyāsa* not only defines but also explains in detail the three aspects of *Pariṇāma*, viz. *Dharma-Lakṣaṇa-Avasthā* *Pariṇāma*, the process of *Pariṇāma* (संश्लेषविवेक) of the twenty-three categories, called the *Tattvāntara-Pariṇāma*, show how the course of evolution is regulated in a certain fixed manner owing to the limitations of space (देश), time (काल), form (आकार) and other extraneous causes (निमित्त) and distinguishes between *kūṭastha-nityatā* and *pariṇāmi-*



nityatā. He elucidates for the first time the concept of *kāla* as it is conceived in Sāṃkhya-Yoga.

Yuktidīpikā also attempts a definition of *Pariṇāma* which is essentially the same as that given by Vyāsa. Both the *Yuktidīpikā* and *STK.* explain *pariṇāma* in terms of *Satkāryavāda*.

Vijñānabhikṣu has attempted a different interpretation of the nature of *Guṇas* and of the process of *Pariṇāma* संसृष्टिविवेक which has created a new problem in the understanding of the nature of the constitution of *Prakṛti* and its *Pariṇāma*-process. The older view seems to regard *Prakṛti* as one homogeneous whole, as undergoing *Pariṇāma* but manifesting itself in the form of effects gradually. Bhikṣu would regard *Prakṛti* as consisting of an infinite number of the 'Guṇa-reals' undergoing *Pariṇāma* only in part and maintaining at the same time the state of equilibrium in the other part, on the analogy of the *Pariṇāma* of foam in the ocean. The deficiency caused by the production of different effects is said to be supplied by the process of re-filling from the remaining infinite reals.<sup>24</sup>

Thus the world-process according to the Sāṃkhya is the continuous mutual interaction of the three *Guṇas* to which has been applied the concept of *Pariṇāma* as defined by Yāska. The Yoga-school attempts to understand primarily the mental processes in the light of *Pariṇāma* and so refers incidentally to the *Pariṇāmas* of the *bhūtas* and the senses. They, however, bring in God to remove the obstacles in the way of the evolution of *Prakṛti*.

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24 This reminds us of the *Puruṣa-sūkta* of the *R̥gveda*, wherein the one part of the *Puruṣa* constitutes this world while its three parts remain immortal in heaven, and of the first principle of the *Upaniṣads* which is both immanent and transcendent. This may also be compared to the Jain concept of *Lokākāśa* and *Alokākāśa*. Changes, both similar and dissimilar, take place in the former whereas the latter which extends infinitely beyond the *Lokākāśa*, undergoes homogeneous *pariṇāmas* only (Viz., *agurulaghu-pariṇāma*).

## CHAPTER VI

# JAIN SOURCES

### History of the Jain Church

According to Jain tradition, Jain religion is eternal and it has been revealed again and again in every one the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable groups of twenty-four Tīrthaṃkaras. In the present Avasarpiṇī<sup>1</sup> period, the first Tīrthaṃkara was Ṛṣabha and the last, the twenty-fourth was Vardhamāna Mahāvīra. According to Jacobi, "all the Tīrthaṃkaras except the two last, viz., Pārśva and Mahāvīra, belong to mythology rather than to history".<sup>2</sup> The Śvetāmbara tradition places the death of Mahāvīra in 527 B. C. Jacobi, however, gives 477 B. C. as the date of Mahāvīra's death.<sup>3</sup> The death of Pārśva is placed at the reasonable interval of 250 years before that of Mahāvīra. This fact, viz. that the Jain Church existed before Mahāvīra and that the latter was only a reformer and propagator of the old religion

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1. Time, in Jain philosophy, is infinite; but there are cycles in it, each cycle having two eras of equal duration described as the Avasarpiṇī and the Utsarpiṇī – a metaphor drawn from the revolving wheel. The former is the descending era in which virtue gradually decreases; and the latter, the ascending in which the reverse takes place. The present era is stated to be the former.
  2. Studies in Jainism, p. 9.
  3. The Gujarātī translation of his article in German – published in the Journal 'Bhārtiya Vidyā', 1945, (Singhi Smāraka Grantha), p. 182. This is his last article discussing the probable dates of the death of Mahāvīra and Buddha (1930). In a previous article which is published in ERE, Vol. VII. pp. 465-474 as well as in 'Studies in Jainism', he held a different view, about the dates of the Nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra and Buddha – according to which Mahāvīra died before Buddha's death. Now, he is of the opinion, that Mahāvīra lived seven years after the death of Buddha which is assigned to 484 B.C.

is attested not only by the Jain Āgamas<sup>4</sup> but also by the oldest Buddhist texts.<sup>5</sup> Thus, the antiquity of the root-ideas of Jain philosophy may be said to date back, at least to the time of Pārśva, i. e. 800 B. C.

The Jain church, as it is well-known, is divided into two sects the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara. According to Jacobi<sup>6</sup> this schism originated in the second or the third century after Mahāvira's death, although as Charpentier<sup>7</sup> says, the final division did not take place till a later date in either 79 or 82 A. D., according to varying traditions. There are however no essential dogmatic differences between the two sects though, as we shall see, there prevails a divergence of view about the existence of the original Jain canon.

### **Jain Sources**

Before proceeding to study the concept of Parīṇāma, as discussed in Jain works, it would be necessary to give first a brief

4. References to the followers of Pārśva are to be met with in the Jain canonical works, such as the Bh.Sū. V.9.1.9., Ut. Sū. XXIII. Next Mahāvira's parents are said to have been followers of the tenets of Pārśva in Ācārāṅga-Sūtra 11-15. That Mahāvira was only a reformer of old religion is further testified by Ut. Sū. xxiii st. 12-13 wherein we are told that Pārśva enjoined on his followers four great vows, viz., not to injure life, to be truthful, not to steal, and to possess no property, while Mahāvira added a fifth requisition, viz. that of chastity. Next, Pārśva allowed his disciples to wear an upper and an under garment. Mahāvira, on his part, followed the more rigid rule which forbade totally the use of clothes for an ascetic.
5. After a detailed examination of the Buddhist texts, Jacobi concludes that "as it is now here said or even merely implied that the Niganthas were a newly-founded sect, we may conclude that they had already existed a considerable time before the advent of the Buddha". SBE, Vol. XLV, p. xii. For details of the Buddhist evidence cf. SBE. Vol. XLV, pp. xxi, xxii. xxiii.
6. Jain Sūtras, Part I, SBE, Vol. XXII.
7. The Uttarādhyaṇasūtra, Introduction, p. 15. Archives D'Etudes Orientals, Vol. 18.

account of the main sources on which our discussion is going to be based.

Our material is drawn from both the Śvetāmbara and Digambara works. The source-books are spread over three periods viz., (A) the oldest or the Āgama period, (B) the period of Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, i.e. the period of transition from the Āgama to Tarka period, and lastly (C) the Tarka period from Siddhasena and Samantabhadra to Yaśovijayaji.

## A

### The Āgama Period

(About 4th cen. B. C. to 4th cent. A. D.)<sup>8</sup>

As mentioned above, there is a difference of opinion about the authenticity of the extant Jain canon between the Śvetāmbara and the Digambara sects. According to the former the extant bulk of the canon, consisting of the forty-five texts<sup>9</sup> is authentic in character and is really based on the older one that had been compiled at the Council of Pātaliputra (300 B.C.) and it can be

8. We have taken into account only those Āgamas that precede Umāsvāti.

9. The usual list is as follows :

A. The twelve Aṅgas – 1. Āyāra (Ācāra); 2. Sūyagaḍa (Sūtrakṛta); 3. Ṭhāṇa (Sthāna); 4. Samavāya; 5. Viyāhapannatti (Vyākhyāprajñapti—mostly called Bhagavati); 6. Nāyādhammakahāo (Jñātādhammakathāh); 7. Uvāsagadasāo (Upāsakadasāh); 8. Antagaḍadasāo (Antakṛddasāh); 9. Anuttarovavāiyadasāo (Anuttraupapātikadasāh); 10. Paṇhāvāgarāṇaim (Praśna-vyākaraṇāni); 11. Vivāgasūya (Vipākāṣṛta); 12. Dīṭṭhivāya (Drṣṭivāda).

B. The twelve Uvaṅgas (Upāṅgas) – 1. Uvavāiya (Aupapātika); 2. Rāya-pasenaijja (Rājaprasāṇiya); 3. Jivābhigama; 4. Pannavaṇā (Prajñāpanā); 5. Sūriyapannatti (Sūryaprajñapti); 6. Jambuddivapannatti (Jambudvīpa-Prajñapati); 7. Candapannatti (Chandraprajñapti); 8. Nirayāvali; 9. Kappāvadaṁsiāo (Kalpāvatamsikāh); 10. Pupphīāo (Puṣṭikāh); 11. Pupphacūliāo (Puṣpacūlikāh); 12. Vāṇhidasāo (Vṛṣṇidasāh).

C. The ten Pāṇṇas (Prakīrṇas) : 1. Causāraṇa (Catuhśaraṇa); 2. Āurapaccakkhāṇa (Āturapratyākhyāṇa); 3. Bhattapariānnā (Bhaktaparijñā); 4. Saṁthāra (Saṁstāra); 5. Taṇḍulaveyāliya (Tandulavai-

traced back to Mahāvīra and his disciples.<sup>10</sup> The Digambara, however, repudiate the existing canon as spurious, merely a late

tālika); 6. Candāvijjhaya (Bühler gives Candāvija); 7. Devindatthava (Devendrastava); 8. Gaṇivijjā (Gaṇividyā); 9. Mahāpaccakkhāṇa (Mahā-Pratyākhyāṇa); 10. Viratthava (Virastava).

D. The six Cheya-Suttas (Cheda-sūtras) :- 1. Nisiha (Niśītha); 2. Mahānisiha (Māhā-niśītha); 3. Vavahāra (Vyavahāra); 4. Āyāradasāo (Ācāradasāḥ) or Dasāsuyakkhandha (Daśāsrutaskandha); 5. Kappa (Bṛhat-kalpa); 6. Paṃcakappa (Pañca-kalpa.)

E. Individual texts :- 1. Nandisutta (Nandī-sūtra); 2. Āṇogaddāra (Anuyogadvāra).

F. The four Mūla-suttas (Mūlasūtras) : 1. Uttarājjhayāna (Uttarā-dhyayana); 2. Āvassaya (Āvaśyaka); 3. Dasaveyāliya (Daśavaikālika); 4. Piṇḍa-nijjutti (Piṇḍa-Niryukti).

10. According to the Śvetāmbaras, there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen 'Pūrvas' and the eleven 'Aṅgas', the fourteen Pūrvās were, however, reckoned, to make up a twelfth Aṅga under the name of Dīṭṭhivāya. The knowledge of the fourteen Pūrvas continued only down to Sthūlabhadra, the eighth patriarch after Mahāvīra; the next seven patriarchs down to Vajra knew only ten Pūrvas, and after that time the remaining Pūrvas were gradually lost, until, at the time when the final redaction of the canon took place - 980 years after the death of Mahāvīra - all the Pūrvas had disappeared, and consequently the 12th Aṅga too. (cf. 'Studies in Jainism', p. 11-12).

About the Aṅgas : (For details cf. 'Paṇiṣṭaparvan' edited by Jacobi p. lxxxii-lxxxiii and 'Vira Nirvāṇa Saṃvat and Jain kāla gaṇanā' by Muni Kalyānavijayaji).

In the second century after Mahāvīra's death there was a terrible famine in the land of Magadha which lasted for 12 years. At that time the Maurya Candragupta was the king of Magadha and Thera Bhadrabāhu was the head of the Jain community. Owing to famine Bhadrabāhu migrated to Nepal. During these unsettled times, the monks neglected their regular studies so that the sacred lore was on the point of falling into oblivion. The Saṅgha therefore [reassembling in Pāṭaliputra when the famine was over, collected the fragments of the canon which the monks happened to recollect, and in this way brought together the eleven Aṅgas. In order to recover the Dīṭṭhivāya, the Saṅgha sent 500 monks, with Sthūlabhadra as their leader, to Bhadrabāhu in Nepal, who had then undertaken the 'mahaprāṇa' vow, lasting for twelve years, but all of them except Sthūlabhadra, becoming tired by the slowness of their progress, soon fell off; Sthūlabhadra alone stayed out the whole term of his master's

and unauthoritative collection of works brought together by Jincandra in Valabhī at a far later date.<sup>11</sup>

vow and learned the fourteen Pūrvas; but he was forbidden to teach more than the first ten of them to others as a penalty for misusing them. Thus the first compilation of the canon took place in Pāṭaliputra during the time of Candragupta Maurya who is assigned 299 B.C.-i.e. the beginning of the 4th cent. B. C. or the end of the 3rd cent. B. C.

Now owing to another famine in the year 827 after the death of Mahāvira (i. e. about 4th cent. A.D.) when all the sacred lore was again in danger of becoming obsolete, another council of monks was convened at Mathurā under the guidance of Ācārya Skandila in order to collect the scriptures and arrange them in an orderly way. Synchronous with this, Ācārya Nāgārjuna did the same work of collecting the sacred texts by convoking a council of monks at Valabhī, but unfortunately as these two Ācāryas, Skandila and Nāgārjuna could not meet, there remained certain differences in some of the readings, allusions to which can still be found in the commentaries.

The well-known final council presided over by Devardhigaṇi was held at Valabhī, 150 years after the councils presided over by Skandila and Nāgārjuna at Mathurā and Valabhī respectively. (i.e. in the beginning of the 6th cent. A.D. or 980 years after the death of Mahāvira). Devardhi prepared his final version of the Jain canon with the aid of the written texts as well as the memory of the monks who had assembled at the council. The twelfth Aṅga containing the Pūrvas, as said above, was already missing by this time and that is why we find only eleven Aṅgas in the recension that has come down to us. It may be noted that Devardhi followed mainly the version of Skandila. The latter's readings were accepted in toto and where the readings of Skandila and Nāgārjuna differed, Devardhi tried to reconcile them as far as possible. Most important differences were, however, retained by giving them, in the Mūla-sūtra, i.e. the text as also in the 'Tikā and Cūṇis' (For details Cf "Vira Nirvāṇa Samvat and Jain kāla-gaṇanā" by Muni Kalyāṇavijaya-p. 688 onwards). Thus the redaction by Devardhi represents the canon in the present form which forms the earliest source of information about Jain religion and philosophy. This is the Śvatāmbara tradition regarding the present Jain canon.

11. Cambridge History of India, Vol. I.

"Even the Digambaras admit that the first disciples of Mahāvira knew

There being thus two opposite traditions regarding the Jain canon, we have to take note of the views of modern scholars who have critically examined the whole question as to the authenticity and antiquity of the Jain canon.

It is noteworthy that the result of recent researches of Jacobi inclines more towards the tradition of the Svetāmbaras. In his opinion which is also endorsed by Dr. Charpentier,<sup>12</sup> the Svetāmbara tradition regarding the Jain canon cannot be regarded as wholly without any historical foundation. Of course all the works comprising the present canon do not belong to the same period but are of different origin and age. Of the 45 texts mentioned above, the eleven Aṅgas which are said to have been compiled by Mahāvīra's pupils are undoubtedly the oldest part of the canon - which is assigned to the end of the 4th cent. B.C. or the beginning of the 3rd cent. B. C., by Jacobi and others on a consideration of language and metre on the one hand and comparison with the oldest Buddhist Pāli works on the other.<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that when the Aṅgas are said to be the oldest, that should not be taken to mean that the form in which they have come down to us is the same as it was at the time of their origin. Not only the passing of time but the traditional reliance upon memory rather than upon written documents made some additions, omissions and alterations inevitable. What is however contended is that they adequately preserve the oldest portions too.

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the fourteen Pūrvas and eleven Aṅgas. They relate however that not only was the knowledge of the fourteen Pūrvas lost at an early period but that as early as 436 years after Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa, the last who knew the eleven Aṅgas died and the teachers who succeeded him knew less and less Aṅgas as time went on until the knowledge of these works was completely lost 683 years after Mahāvīra's death."

"History of Indian Literature" by M. Winternitz, Vol. II. p. 432-433.

12. The Uttarādhyayanāsūtra Introduction p. 31.

13. SBE, Vol. XXII, p. xliii (Introduction).

Of the eleven Āngas, Viyāhapannatti usually called the Bhagavati-sūtra, which is the fifth Āṅga and the biggest of all, shall be our main source of material for the discussion of Pariṇāma in the Āgamas, as it, besides being antique in character, presents an exhaustive and lucid description of the varied questions metaphysical and ethical, which were being discussed since the time of Mahāvīra and even before that during the period of Pārśva. Thus both from the point of view of its subject-matter and its antique character the Bhagavati occupies a prominent place in the Āgama literature. Other relevant old works such as Tīrthaṅga, Pannavaṇa, Ut. Sū., Aṇugaddara, Jivābhigama containing references to metaphysical problems will also be consulted whenever necessary.

## B

### The Darśana Period

The Period of Umāsvāti and Kundakundācārya :

(4th and 5th cent. A. D.)

As we shall see, the account of the Jain doctrines as found in the Āgamas is descriptive in its treatment. The doctrines are simple, stated without any attempt at elaborate explanation or establishing anything on the basis of reasoning. Hence many terms and phrases are left unexplained. This development is to be found in the Darśana and the Tarka period. In the earliest dārśanic texts viz., the Tattvārtha-sūtra of Umāsvāti and the works of Kundakunda (which shall be presently noticed), we find the material of the Āgamas systematised in such a way as to give a comprehensive view of all the doctrines of Jain philosophy. Though these texts do not show any essential difference from the doctrines of the Āgamas, yet advance over the latter is discernible in so far as a certain clearness and accuracy of idea and expression, as will be seen, characterise them. However, for the subtle dialectical exposition and discussions, we shall have to go to the still later works of the Tarka period.



The Tattvārtha-sūtra with the svopajña-bhāṣya of Umāsvāti is a work which is regarded as authentic both by the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras, while the important works of the Digambara-cārya Kundakunda viz., Pravacanasāra, Pañcāstikāya, Samayasāra and Niyamasāra, which we are to consider are the prime authority of the Digambaras. The dates of these two Ācāryas cannot be fixed with certainty. According to Digambara tradition and scholars like Dr. Upādhye<sup>14</sup> and Winternitz<sup>15</sup>, Kundakunda lived in the first cent. A.D. and was anterior to Umāsvāti whose date is stated to be about the 3rd or 4th cent. A.D.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand certain scholars<sup>17</sup> assign a later date to Kundakunda viz., beginning of the 5th cent. A.D. i.e. after Umāsvāti. It is not necessary for us to enter into this controversial issue. We shall, however, take up first the Tattvārtha in as much as it does not show such a detailed and elaborate treatment of metaphysical problems, especially of the concept of Parīṇāma, as is seen in the works of Kundakunda.

The unique feature of the Tattvārtha is that it is the first of its kind in the whole of Jain philosophical literature, attempting to systematise all the tenets of the Jain system on the basis of the Āgamas. Further, as we know, the dārśanic-sūtra period of Indian Philosophy had come to a close by the time of Umāsvāti and the age of commentaries on these sūtras had already set in. But there was not a single Jain Sanskrit (or Prakṛta) philosophical work so far written in the sūtra style. This need was fulfilled by the work of Umāsvāti which therefore comes to occupy the position of the first philosophical work written in Sanskrit and in the sūtra style in the whole of Jain literature. The works of Kundakunda too, are the first to be written systematically in Prakṛta verses. They treat the very same philosophical problems that are dealt with in the Āgamas and the Tattvārtha, though they cannot be said to be based on the Āgamas as their authority is denied by the Digambaras.

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14 Pravacanasāra Introduction p. xxii.

15 History of Indian Literature Vol. II, p.476.

16 History of Indian Literature, Winternitz. Vol.II,p.578.

Pt. Sukhalalji's Introduction to the Tattvārtha (Gujarati) p 11.

17 Muni Kalyāṇavijaya's Śramaṇa Bhagavān Mahāvira (Hindi) p.392.

## C

## The Tarka Period

(5th Cent. A.D. to 17th cent A.D.)

The Tarka period is prolific in dialectical works. I have drawn upon the most prominent and authoritative texts which throw light on the problem of *Parīṇāma* and the subject-matter related to it. I mention below, in chronological order, these works with the names of their authors.

1. *Sanmati-Tarka* by Siddhasena Divākara. Later part of the 4th cent. A.D. or the beginning of the 5th cent. A.D.<sup>18</sup> Śvetāmbara.
2. *Sarvārtha-Siddhi* by Pūjyapāda. About 5th cent. A.D. (latter half).<sup>19</sup> Digambara.
3. *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* by Samantabhadra. About 6th cent. A.D.<sup>20</sup> Digambara.
4. *Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya* by Jinabhadra. About 1st half of the 7th cent. A.D.<sup>21</sup> Śvetāmbara.
5. *Tattvārtha-Rājavarttika*, *Aṣṭaśatī*, *Laghyastraya* etc. by Akalaṅka. About 7th cent. A.D.<sup>22</sup> Digambara.
6. *Tattvārthasūtrabhāṣyavṛtti* by Siddhasena Gandhahastī. Later half of the 8th cent. A.D.<sup>23</sup> Śvetāmbara.
7. *Dharma-saṁgrahaṇī*, *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*, etc., by Haribhadra. 8th cent. A.D.<sup>24</sup> (latter part). Śvetāmbara.

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18 Pandit Sukhalalji's Introduction to *Sanmati-Prakarāṇa* (Gujarati Translation) p.69.

19 'Jainendravākarāṇa and Ācārya Devanandī' an article in *Sāhitya Saṁśodhaka* p. 79.

20 Pt. Sukhalalji's *Prākkathana*, *Nyāyakumudacandra*, Part II, p.17.

21 Muni Jinavijayaji, 'Bhāratiya-Vidyā', *Singhī Smāraka Grantha*.

22 Pt. Sukhalalji's *Prākkathana*, *Nyāyakumudacandra*. Part II. p.16-17.

23 Pt. Sukhalalji, Introduction to the *Tsū*. (Gujarati), p.59.

24 Muni Jinavijayaji, 'Jain Sāhitya Saṁśodhaka', year I, Vol.I.

8. Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika, Aṣṭasahasrī, by Vidyānanda. First half of the 9th cent. A.D.<sup>25</sup> Digambara.
9. Commentaries on the three important works of Kundakunda viz. Pravacanasāra, Pañcāstikāya, Samayasāra by Amṛtacandra. First half of the 10th cent. A.D.<sup>26</sup> Digambara.
10. Commentary on the Sanmati of Siddhasena Divākara by Abhayadeva. (Śvetāmbara). Later half of the 10th cent. A.D.<sup>27</sup>
11. Syādvādaratnākara by Vāḍideva, Early part of the 12th cent. A.D.<sup>28</sup> Śvetāmbara.
12. Dvātriṃśikā, Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā by Hemcandra. 12th cent. A.D.<sup>29</sup> Śvetāmbara.
13. Syādavāda-mañjarī, by Malliṣeṇa, (13th cent. A.D.)<sup>30</sup> Śvetāmbara.
14. Pañcādhyāyī by Rājamalla (15th cent. A.D.)<sup>31</sup> Digambara.
15. Dravya-Guṇa Paryāya Rāsa, Naya-Pradīpa, commentary on the SVS. of Haribhadra, etc., by Yaśovijayaji, (17th cent. A.D.)<sup>32</sup> Śvetāmbara.

In all these works, as we shall have occasion to see, two or three things stand out prominently. Firstly, in all of them we find an attempt at establishing and justifying the Jain position on the strength of dialectical reasoning. This had to be done in answer to the various objections raised by the rival schools of thought that had developed then. The objections are generally answered by controverting the objector's position and by pointing out the fallacy and inconsistency therein, and then Jain standpoint is

25 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, p.lxxxi.

26 Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vol.II.584.

27 Pt. Sukhalalji, Introduction to Sanmati-prakarana Guj. Translation, p.144

28 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, p. lxxxi.

29 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, Introduction to SVM, p.lxxxii.

30 Introduction, Nyāyakumudacandra, Part II, p.42.

31 Introduction to Pañcādhyāyī, by Phulacandra Siddhāntaśāstri, p. 16.

32 Winternitz, History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, p.593.

sought to be established by showing it to be free from the alleged inconsistencies and fallacies. This method of argumentation, no doubt, went a long way in the development of thought. For, all the questions so far left untouched and for whose explanation no need had so far arisen had, of necessity, to be taken up and treated at full length with a view to make the Jain system of thought strong and cogent. In this way, this later development of thought helped to fill in the gaps found in the pre-darśanic stage and to bring about a full-fledged development of all the main concepts of the Jain philosophy. —

## CHAPTER VII

# PARINĀMAVĀDA IN THE ĀGAMAS

### Introductory

The Āgamas, as already said above, do not contain any systematic exposition of the Jain doctrines but a detailed descriptive account of them in a desultory manner. So, it shall be our task, here, to gather from the Āgamas such references as have a bearing on Parināma and related matter. But, as Parināma being a concept of reality is closely related to other metaphysical ideas, it is necessary to study it in relation to general Jain metaphysics. We shall have to keep close to this approach throughout the discussion of Parināma, even in later works. Otherwise we would miss the different bearings of Parināma on different aspects of reality. So, first I give below a general scheme of metaphysics as is found in the Āgamas.

### Jain Metaphysics

#### The Davvas (Dravyas)

The universe (Loga) is said to be constituted of the five Atthikāyas, viz., Dhammatthikāe (Principle of Motion), Ahammatthikāe (Principle of Rest), Āgāsatthikāe (Space), Jīvātthikāe (Soul), Poggalatthikāe<sup>1</sup> (Matter). These are classed under two kinds of substances viz. Jīvadavvas and Ajīvadavvas. Of the four Ajīvadavvas, Poggalatthikāe is rūvī (i.e. possessed of colour, taste,

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1 'किमयं भंते लोएत्ति पवुच्चइ ?'

'गोयसा ! पंचत्थिकाया, एस णं एवत्ति लोएत्ति पवुच्चइ, तं जहा-धम्मत्थिकाए अहमत्थिकाए जाव पोग्गलत्थिकाए ।' Bh. Sū. 13.4.481  
cf. also 2.10.117, 7.10-Pannavaṇā and Thā Sū. I.251.

smell and touch) while the rest are arūvi (i.e. not possessed of colour, taste etc.)<sup>2</sup>

Āgāsatthikāe is again comprised of Loyāgāse and Aloyāgāse. The space containing substances Jīva and others is called Loyāgāse while the one extending infinitely beyond it, is called Aloyāgāse. It is a void devoid of substances.<sup>3</sup> Thus if we want to picture to ourselves Jain cosmography we shall have to regard Āgāsa (Space) as the primary entity, a part of which is peopled with Jīva, Poggala, Dhamma, Ahamma.

It may be noted that at certain places in the Āgamas, Kāla too is admitted as a separate sixth substance (dravya).<sup>4</sup> At Ut. Sū. 28.73<sup>5</sup> the six substances viz., Dhamma, Ahamma, Āgāsa, Kāla, Poggala and Jīva are said to make up this universe (Loga). When, however, Kāla is not recognised as a separate substance it is identified with Jīva and Ajīva.<sup>6</sup> These two views about Kāla persist throughout the later period.

Of the six substances, Āgāsa, Dhamma and Ahamma are each one substance only while Kāla, Poggala and Jīva are an infinite number of substances. (Ut. Sū. 28.8)

- 2 'कतिविहा णं भंते ! दव्वा पन्नत्ता ?' 'गोयमा ! दुविहा दव्वा प. तं जहा जीवदव्वा य अजीवदव्वा य ।' 'अजीवदव्वा णं भंते ! कतिविहा पन्नत्ता ?' 'गोयमा ! दुविहा प. तं जहा — रूविअजीवदव्वा य अरूविअजीवदव्वा य ।'

Bh. Sū. 25.2.720 (2.10.120), Anu. Sū. 14.

- 3 Bh. Sū. 2.10. 120-121.

- 4 कतिविहा णं भंते ! सव्वदव्वा पन्नत्ता ?' 'गोयमा । छव्विहा सव्वदव्वा पन्नत्ता — तं जहा — धम्मत्थिकाए अहम्मत्थिकाए जाव अद्वासमए ।'

Bh. Sū. 25.4

cf. Also Bh. Sū. 2.10.120, 11.11.424, 13.4.482-483; Pannnvenā. 1.

- 5 धम्मो अहम्मो आगासं कालो पुग्गलजन्तवो । एस लोणो त्ति पन्नत्तो जिणेहि वरदंसिहि ॥७॥

- 6 (Jivābhigam)

'किमयं भते ! कालो त्ति पवुच्चइ ?'

'गोयमा ! जीवा चेव अजीवा चेव त्ति ।'

With these general remarks we may proceed to consider the nature and functions of each of these substances.

### Jīva :

The main characteristic of Jīva is stated to be uvaoga, the capacity to attend and to know.<sup>7</sup> The other characteristics are knowledge (nāṇa), faith (damsaṇa), conduct (cāritta), austerities (tava), energy (vīriya) and the experience of happiness and misery<sup>8</sup>. From the standpoint of substance (dravya), Jīva is described to be infinite (in number), from that of khetta (kṣetra), pervading the Logāgāsa, from that of Time, eternal, and from that of bhāva, devoid of colour, taste, smell and touch.<sup>9</sup> Each Jīva has innumerable (asaṃkhyāta) space-points, i.e. equivalent to those of Logāgāsa.<sup>10</sup> Though Jīva is arūpī, it acquires the size and form of the body which it comes to inhabit as a result of karmas. Its space-points

#### 7 उवओगलक्खणे णं जीवे ।

Bh. Sū. 13.4.481, 2.10.117

जीवो उवओगलक्खणो ।

Ut. Sū. 28.10

#### 8 ... ..

नाणेणं दंसणेणं च सुहेण य दुहेण य ॥१०॥

नाणं च दंसणं चेव चरितं च तवो तहा ।

वीरियं उवओगो य एयं जीवस्स लक्खणं ॥११॥

Ut. Sū. 28.10.11. Cf Also Bh. Sū. 13.4.481

#### 9 दव्वओ णं जीवत्थिकाए अणंताइं जीवदव्वाइं, खेत्तओ लोगप्पमाणमेत्ते, कालओ न कयाइ न आसि जाव निच्चे, भावओ पुण अवण्णे अगंघे अरसे अफासे, गुणओ उवओगगुणे ।

Bh. Sū. 2.10.117.

#### 10 केवतिया णं भंते ! लोयागासपएसा पन्नत्ता ?

‘गोयमा ! असंखेज्जा लोयागासपएसा पन्नत्ता ॥’

‘एगमेगस्स णं भंते । जीवस्स केवइया जीवपएसा पन्नत्ता ?’

‘गोयमा ! जावतिया लोगागासपएसा एगमेगस्स

णं जीवस्स एवतिया जीवपएसा पणत्ता ॥’

Bh. Sū. 7.8.283.

The terms Sāṃkhyāta (संख्यात) Asaṃkhyāta (असंख्यात) and Ananta

(paesā) are capable of expansion and contraction according to the dimension of the physical body. In this respect it resembles a lamp which though remaining the same illumines the whole of the space enclosed in a small or big room in which it happens to be placed.<sup>11</sup>

Jiva is both an experiencer and an agent.<sup>12</sup> It is eternal from the standpoint of substance and non-eternal from the standpoint of modes.<sup>13</sup> Its different states depending upon Karmas are as

(अनन्त), it must be noted, do not possess their ordinary sense in Jain philosophy. They are technical and are explained by means of the simile of 'Palya' (a particular kind of vessel with specific measurements). The minimal (जघन्य) limit of Saṃkhyāta is two, while its highest limit (उत्कृष्ट) is beyond our calculation. It is explained by means of 'palya'. All the numbers between जघन्यसंख्यात and उत्कृष्टसंख्यात are called मध्यमसंख्यात. When one more is added to the highest (उत्कृष्ट) Saṃkhyāta it becomes the minimal limit of Asaṃkhyāta which extends over a very wide range of numbers and cannot be calculated by us. Ananta begins when one is added to the highest (उत्कृष्ट) Asaṃkhyāta. Ananta, too, has the highest limit. Each of these, Saṃkhyāta, Asaṃkhyāta and Anant, has various subdivisions. For details cf. Karma-grantha, Hindi, by Pandit Sukhalalji, Part IV, pp. 208 onwards.

11. 'से णूणं भंते ! हत्थिस्स य कुंथुस्स समे चेव ?' 'हंता गोयमा । हत्थिस्स कुंथुस्स य, एवं जहा रायप्पसेणइज्ज जाव खुड्डियं वा महालियं वा से तेणट्ठेणं गोयमा ! जाव समे चेव जीवे ।'

Bh. Sū. 7.8.293

12. 'जीवे णं भंते ! सयंकडं दुक्खं वेदेइ ?' 'गोयमा ! अत्थेगइयं वेएइ, अत्थेगइयं नो वेएइ ।' 'से केणट्ठेणं भंते ! एवं ... .. ।' 'गोयमा ! उदिन्नं वेएइ, अणुदिन्नं नो वेएइ, से तेणट्ठेणं एवं वुच्चइ-अत्थेगइयं वेएइ ... .. ।'

Bh. Sū. 1.2, 21

13. 'जीवा णं भंते ! किं सासया असासया ?'

'गोयमा ! सासया सिअ असासया ।'

गोयमा । दव्वट्ठयाए सासया भावट्ठयाए असासया ।'

Bh. Sū. 7.2.272



follows : (1) Udie (औदयिका) Operative, or that which rises from the operation or fruition of karmas. (2) Uvasamie (औपशमिक) Subsidential, arising from the subsidence of karmas. (3) Khaie (क्षायिका), arising from the destruction of karmas. Khaovasamie (क्षायोपशमिक) i.e. arising from the partial destruction, subsidence and operation of karmas. (5) Parīṇāmie (परिणामिक), Natural, the soul's own natural thought-activity, independent of karmas. (6) Sannivaie<sup>14</sup> (सन्निपातिक) i.e. resulting from the association of two or more states. In the Pannavaṇā (Ch. 13) and the Bh. Sū. 14.4.514, we find the different kinds of Parīṇāmas of the soul given as follows : gati-parīṇāma, indiya-parīṇāma, kaśāya-parīṇāma, leśā-parīṇāma, joga-parīṇāma, uvaoga-parīṇāma, nāṇa-parīṇāma, daṃsaṇa-parīṇāma, caritta-parīṇāma and veda-parīṇāma. These are explained in detail hereafter.

#### Poggala :

Poggala is distinguished from all the other substances owing to its possessing rūpitva i.e. colour, taste, and touch.<sup>15</sup> Its chief characteristic is said to be that of 'grahaṇa' since it forms the basis of the bodies, senses, yoga,<sup>16</sup> and respiration of souls,<sup>17</sup> (i.e. by the vibratory activity of the soul, poggale - matter - transforms itself in the form of body, senses etc.). From the standpoint

14. छव्विहे भावे पण्णत्ते, तं जहा--उदइए उवसमिए खइए खओवसमिए पारिणामिए सन्निवाइए ।

Tthā. Sū. 6.537

Cf. Also Anuyogadvāra Saṭbhāvādhikāra and Bh. Sū. 17.1.593.

15. ... पोग्गलात्थिकाय रूविकायं अजीवकायं पन्नेवेति ।

Bh. Sū. 7.10.30

16. This term is explained in the next chapter.

17. 'पोग्गलात्थिकाए णं पुच्छा' 'गोयमा ! पोग्गलात्थिकाएणं जीवाणं ओरा-  
लियवेउव्वियआहारए तेयाकम्मए सोइंदियचक्खिंदियघाणिंदियजिन्मिंदिय-  
फासिंदियमणजोगवयजोगकायजोगआणापाणूणं च गहणं पवत्तति, गहण-  
लक्खणे णं पोग्गलात्थिकाए ।'

Bh. Sū. 13.4.481

of substance, it is infinite in number, from that of 'khetta' (kṣetra) it is co-terminous with the Logāgāsa, from that of time it is eternal and from that of 'bhāva' it is possessed of taste, smell etc. It has five colours, five tastes, four kinds of odour and eight kinds of touch.<sup>18</sup> A paramāṇupoggala, however, possesses only one colour, one taste, one smell, and two kinds of touch.<sup>19</sup> The different kinds of transformation of poggala are stated to be - sound, darkness, lustre (of jewels), light, shade, sunshine, colour, taste, smell, and touch.<sup>20</sup> To these may be added its other Parināmas such as bandhaṇaparināma, gatiparināma, bheda-parināma and agurulahuya-parināma<sup>21</sup> which are classed under the general heading of 'ajivaparināmas' in the Pannavaṇā (ch. 13) and the Bh.Sū. 14.4.<sup>22</sup> Like the Jīva, Poggala also is eternal from the standpoint

18. 'पोगलत्थिकाए णं भंते ! कतिवण्णे कतिगंधे० रसे फासे ?' 'गोयमा ! पंचवण्णे पंचरसे दुग्ंधे अट्ठफासे रूवी अजीवे सासए अवट्ठिए लोगदब्बे, से समासओ पंचविहे पण्णत्ते, तं जहा - दब्बओ खेत्तओ कालओ भावओ गुणओ, दब्बओ णं पोगलत्थिकाए अणंताइं दब्बाइं, खेत्तओ लोयप्पमाणमेत्ते, कालओ न कयाइ न आसि जाव निच्चे, भावओ वण्णमंते गंध० रस० फासमंते, गुणओ गहणगुणे ।' Bh. Sū. 2.10.117

19. 'परमाणुपोगले णं भंते ! कतिवन्ने जाव कतिफासे पन्नत्ते ?  
'गोयमा ! एगवन्ने एगगंधे एगरसे दुफासे पन्नत्ते ।'  
Bh. Sū. 18.6.631

20. 'सद्धन्धयार उज्जोओ पहा छाया तवे इ वा ।  
वण्णरसगन्धफासा पुग्गलाणं तु लक्खणम् ॥' Ut Sū. 28.12

21. cf. Appendix II

22. 'अजीवपरिणामे णं भंते ! कतिविधे पन्नत्ते ?' 'गोयमा ! दसविधे पन्नत्ते, तंजहा -- बंधणपरिणामे १, गतिपरिणामे २, संठाणपरिणामे ३, भेदपरिणामे ४, वण्णपरिणामे ५, गंधपरिणामे ६, रसपरिणामे ७, फासपरिणामे ८, अगुरुलहुयपरिणामे ९, सद्धपरिणामे १० ।' Pannavaṇā 13 (परिणामपद)

of substance and non-eternal from the standpoint of modes.<sup>23</sup>

Now a little about the classification of Poggala. In Thā. Sū.82,<sup>24</sup> it is stated that Poggala is of two kinds – Parmāṇu-poggala and No-paramāṇu-poggala (i.e. the khandhā or molecular aggregate) while a four-fold classification is also met with in the Viśeṣa-pada of Pannavaṇā (ek. 5) thus : (1) Khandhā, (2) Khandha-desā, (3) Khandapaesā, (4) Paramāṇu poggalā – i.e. (1) molecular aggregate, (2) a part of a molecular aggregate, (3) The smallest part of a molecular aggregate and (4) an atom. Then in the Bh. Sū.8.1.309, we find a three-fold classification of Poggala based on two kinds of change or transformation – one, natural change (वीससा) and the other involving conscious effort (पओग)<sup>25</sup>.

The terms 'पओग' and 'वीससा' are not explained but subdivisions of each are given in detail in subsequent passages.

These two kinds of change, as we shall have occasion to see, are elaborately treated in later works.

It should be noted that the number of Poggala and atoms is infinite (ananta) but they occupy only the innumerable (asaṃkhyāta) space-points of Logāgāsa. This is possible because of the peculiar power of penetration or occupation possessed by an atom as well as a molecular aggregate. Thus one space-point can be occupied

23. 'परमाणुपोगले णं भंते किं सासए असासए ?'

'गोयमा ! सिय सासए सिय असासए ।'

'से केणट्ठेणं ?'

'गोयमा ! दव्वट्ठयाए सासए वन्नपज्जवेहि जाव फासपज्जवेहि असासए ।'

Bh. Sū. 14.4.512

24. 'दुविहा पोगला पं. तं. -- परमाणुपोगला चेव नोपरमाणुपोगला चेव ।'

25. 'कइविहा णं भंते । पोगला पन्नत्ता ?' 'गोयमा ! तिबिहा पोगला पन्नत्ता, तं जहा -- पओगपरिणया मीससापरिणया वीससापरिणया ।'

by an infinite number of atoms and molecular aggregates.<sup>26</sup>

### Dhammatthikāe and Ahammatthikāe

Both these substances are, from the standpoint of substance, one, from that of 'khetta', co-extensive with the Logāgāsa, from that of time, eternal and from that of bhāva, devoid of colour, taste, smell and touch.<sup>27</sup> The function of Dhammatthikāe is to be the efficient cause in soul's all dynamic bhavas, such as gamanā-gamāna (going and coming), speech, unmeṣa (act of opening the eyes), vibratory activity through mind, speech and body (जोग) and similar others signifying motion<sup>28</sup> as also in Poggala's motion. That is why Dhammatthikāe is called 'gamaṇa-guṇe'. Adhammatthikāe on the other hand is 'ṭhāṇa-guṇe' in as much as it is the efficient cause of all the static bhavas of Jīva, like sitting, standing, sleeping, steadying the mind etc. as well as of Poggala.<sup>29</sup> It may be noted here in passing that nowhere do we find, in the Āgamas, specific mention of the Pariṇāmas of these as in the case of Jīva and Poggala. Of the different Ajīva-pariṇāmas mentioned in the Pariṇāma-pāda (ch. 13) of Pannavaṇā noted above only one, viz., 'agurulahuya' is applicable to these two.

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26. 'परमाणुपोगला णं भंते ! किं संखेज्जा असंखेज्जा अणंता ?' 'गोयमा !  
नो संखेज्जा नो असंखेज्जा अणंता, एवं जाव अणंतपएसिया खंधा ।'  
'एगपएसोगाढा णं भंते ! पोगला किं संखेज्जा असंखेज्जा अणंता ?'  
'एवं चेव ..... एवं जाव असंखेज्जपएसोगाढा ।' Bh. Sū. 25.4.740
27. Ut. Sū. 2.10.116
28. 'धम्मत्थिकाए णं भंते ! जीवाणं किं पवत्तति ?' 'गोयमा ! धम्मत्थिकाएणं  
जीवाणं आगमणगमण भासुम्मेसमणजोगा वइजोगा कायजोगा जे यावन्ने  
तहप्पगारा चला भावा सव्वे ते धम्मत्थिकाएणं पवत्तंति, गइलक्खणे णं  
धम्मत्थिकाए ।' Bh. Sū. 13.4.481
29. 'अहम्मत्थिकाएणं जीवाणं किं पवत्तति ?' 'गोयमा ! अहम्मत्थिकाएणं  
जीवाणं ठाणनिसीयणतुयट्ठण मणस्स य एगत्तीभावकरणता जे यावन्ने • थिरा  
भावा सव्वे ते अहम्मत्थिकाए पवत्तंति, ठाणलक्खणे णं अहम्मत्थिकाए ।'  
Bh. Sū. 13.4.481

## Āgāsattthikāe

Āgāsattthikāe is composed of Logāgāsa and Alogāgāsa. The former contains Jīva, Poggala, Dhamma and Ahamma and Kāla whereas the latter is devoid of these, an empty space, extending infinitely beyond the Logāgāsa.<sup>30</sup> Its function is to give place to or serve as a substratum for other substances.<sup>31</sup> From the stand-point of substance, it is one, from that of 'khetta', co-extensive with loka and aloka, from that of time eternal, from that of bhāva devoid of colour, taste, smell and touch.<sup>32</sup> It has infinite number of space-points. Of the different Ajīva-parīṇāmas, noted above, only 'agurulahuya' is applicable to it like Dhamma and Ahamma.

Kāla : It may be noted that nothing beyond a bare mention of Kāla as a sixth substance is to be found in the Āgamas. At one place, however, (Ut.Sū.28-10), the characteristic or function of Kāla is stated to be 'Vattaṇā - वत्तणालक्खणे कालो' i.e. 'to help substances in their continuing to exist'. We do, often, get references to 'vyavahāra-kāla' or conventional time viz., 'āvalikā' 'muhutta' etc. as in the Bh.Sū.25-5, but these do not throw any light on

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- 30 'कतिविहे णं भंते ! आगासे पणत्ते ?' 'गोयमा दुविहे आगासे प० तं जहा-लोयागासे च अलोयागासे ।' 'लोयागासे णं भंते ! किं जीवा जीवदेसा जीवपदेशा अजीवा अजीवदेसा अजीवपेसा ?' 'गोयमा । जीवा-वि जीवदेसावि...अजीवावि अजीवदेसावि...।'   
 Bh. Sū. 2.10.121

'अलोयागासे णं भंते । किं जीवा' ? पुच्छा तह चेव ।

'गोयमा ! नो जीवा जाव नो अजीवप्पेसा ।'

Bh. Sū, 2.10. 121

'लोगालोगे य आगासो ।' Ut. Sū. 36.7

- 31 'आगासत्थिकाए णं भंते । जीवाण अजीवाण य किं पवत्तति ?' 'गोयमा आगासत्थिकाएण जीवदव्वाण य अजीवदव्वाण य भायणभूए...अवगाह-णालक्खणे णं आगासत्थिकाए ।'

Bh. Sū. 13.4.481

- 32 Bh. Sū. 2.10.116

Kāla as a metaphysical principle and its relation to the Parīṇāmas of things.

The above account of the six dravyas culled from the Āgama passages, presents the Jain view of metaphysics. This view in its outline is throughout maintained by the later writers, supplying of course logical framework and consistency.

We may now turn to the theory of Parīṇāma which can be formulated from the Āgamas.

### **Elements of Parīṇāma as found in the Āgamas**

At the outset, it may be pointed out that nowhere in the Āgamas, have I succeeded in finding a passage which directly defines the concept of Parīṇāma as such. We shall, therefore, endeavour to understand the Āgama idea of Parīṇāma by studying the passages relevant to the subject. Such passages by the very nature of the subject-matter get classified under three heads. viz., (A) Those bearing on the Pajjavas of Jīva and Ajīva, (B) Those bearing on the Parīṇāmas of Jīva and Ajīva, (C) Those concerning the eternal and non-eternal aspects of Jīva and Poggala.

#### **A**

#### **The Pajjavas of Jīva and Ajīva**

The Pajjavas of Jīva and Ajīva are enumerated in the fifth chapter viz., the Viśeṣa-pada of Pannavaṇā and in the Bh.Sū. 25.5.746. Therein at one place Jīva-pajjavas are stated to be infinite in number because the total number of individual Jīvas (Jīva-vyakti) is infinite. Thus it considers the pajjavas of the Jīva category viewed in a general way. At another place the innumerable Neraiyas are said to have infinite pajjavas because the shades (degrees of transformation) of a certain quality like blackness are infinite (in their variation). Thus, here a different point of view is

indicated in the explanation of the infinity of pajjavas, viz. the possibility of infinite variety in the individual shades (degrees of transformation) of a single quality.

### **Ajīva-Pajjavas**

Bhagavatīśūtra and Pannavaṇā first divide the Ajīva-pajjavas into rūvi and arūvi and each is then classified into four and ten kinds respectively. Of these rūviajīvapajjavas are stated to be infinite in number because the total number of atoms as well as molecular aggregates of different kinds is infinite. The infinite pajjavas of an atom, as also those of the different molecular aggregates, are explained by showing the possibility of an infinite degree of variation in a single quality of an atom or a molecular aggregate (as was shown in the case of Neraiya—infernal being). No such calculus is, however, used in regard to the ten kinds of arūviajīvapajjavas.

The above-noted different pajjavas of Ajīva, show the different forms which the Ajīva-substances viz., Dhamma, Ahamma, Poggala, Āgāsa and Kāla assume, as also the different limited aspects such as 'desa' and 'paesa' in which they present themselves. There is this difference, however, between Poggala on one side and Dhamma, Ahamma and Āgāsa, on the other, viz., that the former in its atomic as well as molecular form is infinite in number while the latter are each one (indivisible) in number. This difference, as seen above, characterises their pajjavas also.

It is clear that, here too, the word pajjava indicates the various formations of Poggala as well as the different aspects under which Dhamma, Ahamma and Āgāsa present themselves. If we put together the passages concerning both Jīva and Ajīva, we can see that the Āgama-writers used the word 'pajjava' to indicate the various aspects or phenomena in which things present themselves.

B

**The Pariṇāmas of Jīva and Ajīva**

The Pariṇāmas of Jīva and Ajīva are enumerated in the Pariṇāma-pada (ch. 13) of Pannavaṇā and the Bh.Sū.14.4.

The Pariṇāmas of Jīva as stated there are :

- 1 गतिपरिणाम, 2 इन्द्रियपरिणाम, 3 कषायपरिणाम, 4 लेश्यापरिणाम,
- 5 योगपरिणाम, 6 उपयोगपरिणाम, 7 ज्ञानपरिणाम, 8 दर्शनपरिणाम
- 9 चारित्र्यपरिणाम, 10 वेदपरिणाम.

Various sub-divisions of each of these ten kinds of Pariṇāmas are detailed in the subsequent passages of the same chapter of Pannavaṇā. For us, however, it is necessary to note only these ten fundamental ones.

The above enumeration of the pariṇāmas of Jīva presents some difficulties as to how all the pariṇāmas attributed to Jīva can belong to it. We can understand ṇāṇa, daṁsaṇa, caritta and uvaoga Pariṇāmas, as representing the proper functioning or Pariṇamana-activity of Jīva but, how are we to understand indiya, joga, kasāya, leśā, veda and gati as the Pariṇāmas of Jīva ? The explanation of this lies in the peculiar Jain theory of bhāvakarma i.e. psychic transformation and activity. The soul's original nature is supposed to be pure consciousness possessing the full powers of cognition but in its mundane existence, this pure faculty of cognition being clouded by karmic matter, functions only partially and piece-meal. Hence it is, that the soul has restricted or limited perception of the sensations received through different senses. In reality, however, all the sensations such as those of seeing, hearing etc., that we attribute to different senses belong to the cognitive faculty of the soul. So, when one speaks of Jīva's indiya-Pariṇāma, it is the bhāva-indiyas, the limited psychic transformations, supplying in-reality the cognitive aspect of the sensations received



through material senses, that are to be taken. When, however, on the disappearance of corresponding karmas, the obstruction disappears, the soul cognises all the sensations, otherwise supplied by material senses, without the latter's aid. The Jain psychologist, thus, assumes the bhāva-psycho aspects corresponding to material aspects with which alone, ordinary people are familiar.

What applies to the cognitive aspect or Parīṇāma of the soul, applies also to other aspects, viz., daṁsaṇa, caritta and uvaoga. In the pure state these are all concentrated on the self but in the mundane state, they are directed in various degrees to other things. This direction of the soul to other things, or to itself is regarded as the function of the soul. It is this direction of the soul to objects other than itself, that is responsible for the material collocation or dravya-karma that attaches to itself. Thus the 'Yoga' (Yoga), which in Jain terminology means the vibratory activity of the soul through the association of body, mind and speech, is essentially the Parīṇāma of the soul.

The kaṣāyas which literally mean stains on a pure object, mean in the case of soul, so many stains on the pure consciousness. They are the different attitudes of the soul, towards the various objects of the world. They are four in number viz., anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed.

Lesas (Sans.-leśyās) are the peculiar colour-shadows of the soul due to the influence of karmic matter and are determined by the soul's bhāva-karma or psycho activity.

Veda-Parīṇāma is the sex transformation in the consciousness of Jīva due to the sex of the body which it pervades.

Gati is the movement of the soul through the different worlds, such as Nāraka, Deva, Tiryāṇca and Maṇuṣya on account of its karmas.

In short, the functioning of the soul either self-directed and therefore pure or influenced by extraneous things and therefore

directed towards them is all the *Pariṇāmas* of the soul. As is made clear by later writers, 'Cetanā' or 'Upayoga' being the main characteristic of the soul, all its *Pariṇāmas* are really the *Pariṇāmas* of 'Cetanā' and/or 'Upayoga' due to extraneous influence or independent of it (i.e. in the pure state).

### **The *Pariṇāmas* of Ajīva**

The *Pariṇāmas* of Ajīva are :

- 1 बन्धनपरिणाम, 2 गतिपरिणाम, 3 सस्थानपरिणाम, 4 भेदपरिणाम,
- 5 वर्णपरिणाम, 6 गन्धपरिणाम, 7 रसपरिणाम, 8 स्पर्शपरिणाम, 9 अगुरु-  
लघुपरिणाम, 10 शब्दपरिणाम.

All these *Pariṇāmas* of Ajīva, excepting 'agurulahuya' are applicable, as already said, only to Poggala and not to any other Ajīva-dravya. And even amongst the Poggala-*pariṇāmas*, a paramāṇu can possess only gati, agurulahuya, vaṇṇa, gandha, rasa and phāsa - *Pariṇāmas*, and not others, as the latter presuppose the existence or presence of, at least, more than one Paramāṇu.

The Poggala-*Pariṇāmas* enumerated above, do not require any explanation which was necessary in the case of the *Pariṇāmas* of the soul. They all, in short, represent the activity of Poggala and its results in different relations.

If we take into consideration the *Pariṇāmas* of Jīva and Ajīva, we find that they all represent the functioning or *Pariṇamana* of Jīva as well as Ajīva, particularly Poggala, which the Āgama-writers could visualise.

### **The problem of eternity and non-eternity with reference to Jīva and Poggala**

In his dialogue with Gotama & Jamālī Lord Mahāvīra discusses this problem.

**Jīva :****I. 'Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?'**

'O Goyamā ! The souls are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect. They are eternal from the standpoint of substance and non-eternal from the stand-point of 'bhāva' i.e. modes'.<sup>33(a)</sup>

**II. 'The soul, O Jamālī ! is eternal because at no time was it not-existent, is non-existent, and will be non-existent. It existed, exists (now) and will continue to exist (in future). It is persistent, is fixed, eternal, imperishable, undecaying, steady and nitya'.**

'The Soul, O Jamālī ! is non-eternal because after having been in an infernal state of existence, it comes to be in animal state, after that in a human state and after that in a celestial state of existence'.<sup>33(b)</sup>

**III. 'Are the Neraiyas, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?'**

'Goyamā ! They are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.'

'With what end in view, O Lord, it is so said?'

'Goyamā ! They are eternal from the view-point of non-extinction (avvocchittinaya) and non-eternal from the viewpoint of extinction (vocchittinaya).<sup>34</sup>

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33(a) Bh. nū. 7.2.273.

33(b) Bh. Sū. 9.6.387, 14.42.

34 7.3.279,

'Avvocchittinaya' corresponds to the 'dhrauvya' and 'Vocchittinaya' to the 'utapāda-vyaya' aspect of the later Jain philosophers. Here one particular state, of certain duration of Jīva, viz. Neraiya is taken and its eternal and non-eternal aspects are shown. The commentator takes by 'Avvocchittinaya' the 'dravya-aspect' of the Neraiya and by 'Vocchittinaya' the changing Paryāya-aspect - viz., the Nārakatva.

IV. 'Is it, O Lord, that an unsteady or a transient thing changes, breaks (i. e. perishes), that a steady, persistent thing does not break (perish) ? Is it that the child is eternal<sup>35</sup> and childhood non-eternal, that the pandit is eternal and 'panditatva' non-eternal ?'

'O Goyamā ! it is like that.....' ?<sup>36</sup>

All these passages, as can be seen, aim at showing the eternal aspect of the soul, from the standpoint of substance, by postulating its existence or persistence in all the three times and its non-eternal aspect from the standpoint of 'bhāva' i.e. modes, such as 'nārakatva', 'manuṣyatva', 'devatva', childhood, 'panditatva' etc., which all are subject to change. It may be noted here in passing that 'bhāva' in 'bhāvattahāyae' has the sense of 'pajjava' (i.e. pariṇāma),

#### **Poggala :**

1. 'Are the atoms, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal ?'

'Goyamā ! The atoms are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect.'

'With what end in view, is it so said ?'

'Goyamā ! they are eternal from the view-point of substance and non-eternal from the view-point of modes such as those of colour, taste, smell and touch<sup>37</sup>.

II. 'Can it be said, O Lord, that the Pudgala existed in the endless, eternal past ?'

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35 Here by child, its soul—as a substance is to be considered and by 'childhood'—its quality that is liable to change.

36 Bh. Sū. 1.9.80.

37 Bh. Sū. 14.4.512

'Yes, Goyamā ! it can be so said'.

'Can it be said, O Lord, that the Pudgala exists in the eternal present ?'

'Yes Goyamā ! it can be so said'.

'Can it be said, O Lord !' that the Pudgala will exist in the endless, eternal future ?'

'Yes, Goyamā ! it can be so said'.<sup>38</sup>

III. 'Is it possible, O Lord, that a Pudgala, which may be arid (at one moment) in the endless, eternal past, may become cohesive (at another moment) ? – or both arid and cohesive at one and the same moment with reference to its different parts (deśas) ? Again, is it possible, that it may undergo manifold varṇa(colour) – parināmas, either naturally or by some extraneous agency (cf. commentary of Abhayabheda – on करणेण), or (undergo) only one varṇa-parināma on the destruction of the previous (manifold) parināmas ?'

'Yes, Goyamā ! it is possible like that'.<sup>39</sup>

As in the case of the Soul, the above passages point to the eternal and non-eternal aspects of pudgala, from the standpoints of substance and modes respectively.

There is a passage in the Bh.Sū. 9.6.387 – which deals with these two aspects, eternal and non-eternal, with reference to loka or the universe as a whole. It is as follows :

'The world, O Jāmālī, is eternal for at no time was it non-existent, is non-existent, will be non-existent. It existed (in the past), exists (now), and will continue to exist (in future). It is persistent, fixed, eternal, imperishable, undecaying, steady and nitya. It is

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38 Bh. Sū. 1.4.42.

39 Bh. Sū. 14.4.570.

non-eternal, O Jamāli, in as much as after Osappiṇī<sup>40</sup> there is Ussappiṇī and after Ussappiṇī, there is Osappiṇī.<sup>41</sup>

In the above passage the words *davvaṭṭhayāe* and *bhāvaṭṭhayāe* are not used as in the case of *Jīva* and *Poggala*. The *dravyārthika* standpoint is obvious in the first part of the passage concerning the eternal aspect of the universe; but the non-eternal aspect that is sought to be established through *Osappiṇī* and *Ussappiṇī* is not quite clear. For the effect of these two eras, according to Jain philosophy, is limited to a part of the human world (*Manuṣya-loka*) only, and not to the whole of the *loka*, which comprehends much more than the human world and wherein the changes do take place but they are not adversely or favourably affected by *Osappiṇī* and *Ussappiṇī* respectively. The statement, therefore, seems to have been made from a general point of view, to convey that though the universe as a whole never perishes and is thus eternal, yet as changes, due to time, constantly take place in them, it is non-eternal to that extent. Thus, the two aspects of 'permanence' and 'change' with reference to the *loka*, seem to be broadly aimed at.

In all the above passages, what is meant is that things are eternal from the standpoint of what persists in them and non-eternal from the standpoint of what is evanescent in them. What is permanent or persistent is technically the 'dravya' of a thing while what is evanescent or passing the 'paryaya' or 'bhāva' of that thing.

Now, in order to have a clearer understanding of the doctrine of change and permanence, as it might have been held by the earlier Jain writers, it will be necessary to study comparatively *Pajjavas* and *Pariṇāmas* of *Jīva* and *Ajīva*, noticed above.

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40 These two terms we have already explained.

41 Bh. Sū. 9.6.387

The different Parīṇāmas of Jīva and Ajīva, as we saw, represent various kinds of Parīṇāmana-activity or functioning of Jīva and Ajīva respectively, as a result of which they assume particular formations – states, at particular moments of time. All these Parīṇāmas can co-exist in a substance at a time, but none of them, taken singly, permanently abides in it (Jīva or Ajīva). Thus, for instance, take a particular gati-parīṇāma viz., the human state. This Parīṇāma of Jīva is not everlasting but will be replaced after a time by another gati-parīṇāma say, the Nāraka-state, the Tiryāṅca-state or the Deva-state. Similar is the case with each Parīṇāma of Jīva and Ajīva. These particular states-formations which a substance assumes in succession as a result of the process of change (parīṇāmana-activity), are also designated as ‘pajjavas’ as is evident from the use of such terms in the Āgama as nāṇapajjava, daṃsaṇapajjava, vaṇṇapajjava, rasapajjava, phāsapajjava etc. with reference to these parīṇāmas.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless the fact that the word does not exclusively signify the result of the Parīṇāmana activity, but something in addition, is borne out by a careful study of the first set of passages, bearing upon the pajjavas of Jīva and Ajīva. The title ‘viśeṣa-pada’ given to the fifth chapter of Pannavaṇā (containing the pajjavas of Jīva and Ajīva), and the treatment of the pajjavas and parīṇāmas in two different chapters are further indicative of a wider connotation of the term Pajjava. Let us see how this is.

When in the first instance, the Jīva-pajjavas are stated to be infinite, it can be seen that the pajjavas there represent the different kinds of bhedas – viśeṣa avasthās of the Jīva category viewed as one, from the standpoint of Saṃgraha-Naya (which takes a collective view of things). Here, we must carefully note that we cannot regard from the Jain standpoint, the different pajjavas of the Jīva-category as due to the Parīṇāma of one Jīva because the Jains do not believe in one Jīva from which the various Jīvas have come out, as certain schools of Vedānta like those of Rāmaṇuja or Vallabha seem to think. Similarly another kind of

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42 Bh, Sū. 14.4.512. Pannavaṇā, ch. V.

bheda or Viśeṣa is denoted by the term pajjava when the infinite (ananta) pajjavas of innumerable (asaṁkhyāta) Nārakas, and other groups of beings as well as those of atoms and different kinds of molecular aggregates are explained. One quality like blackness is supposed to have infinite degrees of variation i.e. infinite kinds (ananta-bheda or Viśeṣa), on account of which the dravya possessing that quality is said to have infinite pajjavas. In the case of arūpajjavas, the word pajjava is used to signify such bhedas as deśa, and pradeśa which are only subjective, for as already noted, Dhamma, Ahamma, Āgāsa being each, one indivisible whole, cannot admit of any real division as such. It, however, is possible in the case of Poggala as its pajjavas viz., khandhas – molecular aggregates and atoms, can actually unite and become separate.

It becomes clear, therefore, that the word pajjava is used in a wide sense, comprehending all the possible kinds of aspects (द्रव्यभेद, गुणभेद, कालकृतभेद, देशकृतभेद etc.) under which Jīva and Ajīva substances could be conceived. The word Parīṇāma, on the other hand, is limited to signify only one of such manifold aspects i.e. those pajjavas which are the results of the Parīṇāmāna-activity. Thus the word Pajjava includes the pajjavas of Parīṇāmāna as well as of others. This is clearly seen in the passages discussing the question of eternality and non-eternality with reference to Jīva, Poggala and loka, wherein the standpoint of bhava-modes clearly refers to the results of the Parīṇāmāna-activity.

The above discussion on Pajjava, Parīṇāma, Sāsayaśāsayatta (शाश्वताशाश्वतत्व) helps us to formulate the concept of change as it must have been explicitly or implicitly understood by the ancient Jain thinkers. As said in the beginning of this chapter, even though there is no explicit definition<sup>43</sup> of Parīṇāma to be found in the

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43 It may be noted that the Ut. Sū. 28.6, attempts to define for the first time, Dravya. Guṇa and Paryāya thus :



older Āgamas, yet in the passages given above we see all the different elements of the theory of Parīṇāma, viz., Dravya, Paryāya

‘गुणानमासओ दव्वं एगदव्वसिया गुणा ।

लक्खणं पज्जवाणं तु उभओ अस्सिय भवे ॥’

‘Substance is the substrate of qualities, the qualities are those that inhere in one substance; but the characteristic of modes (pajjavas) is that they inhere in at least two substances’.

Further on in st. 13 of the same chapter, the characteristic of pajjavas are given thus :

‘एगत्तं च पुहुत्तं च, संखा संठाणमेव य ।

संजोगा य विभागा य, पज्जवाणं तु लक्खणं ॥’

‘The characteristic of pajjava i. e. mode is singleness, separateness, number, form, conjunction and disjunction.’

There is however a difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of ‘उभओ’ in उभओ अस्सिया भवे । The commentator Śāntayācārya, takes by ‘उभओ’ to imply both Dravya and Guṇa - ‘उभयोः द्वयोः प्राकृतत्वाद् द्रव्यगुणयोरश्रिताः । But this interpretation is not possible in the light of st. 13 which describes Pajjava. Singleness separateness etc. are not possible between Dravya and Guṇa but only between two or more Dravyas. What is more, the word ‘तु’ seems to suggest contrast to ‘एगदव्वसिया.’ Hence scholars like Pt. D. Malvania (‘Nyāyāvatāra-vārttikavṛtti’ Introduction p. 106-107.) whom I have followed, would interpret ‘उभओ’ as meaning ‘two or more Dravyas’.

Apart from the divergence of interpretation, the definition and characteristic of pajjava given above, do not throw any greater light on the concept of Parīṇāma than that thrown by the passages which we have already noted and discussed. They only point to the distinction of Pajjava from Guṇa, viz., that which inheres in two substances is not to be called a Guṇa, but, Pajjava. That is why we have not included and considered the above definition of Pajjava in our discussion of Parīṇāma in the Āgamas.

Another reason why the above passages from the Ut.Sū. are not considered is that the use of the word Guṇa is of a distinctly late age.

and Pariṇāmāna. Similarly the discussion of the permanent and the changing aspects of reality from the Dravyārthika and Paryāyārthika standpoints respectively, clearly visualises the theory of Pariṇāma. We might say here that the later definition of reality in terms of 'utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya' is derived from these earlier discussions.

We may, now, consider an interesting problem, important both historically and philosophically, arising from the above discussion, in connection with the usage of the terms Pajjava (Paryāya) and Pariṇāma.

### **Paryāya – Pariṇāma**

Both the words Paryāya and Pariṇāma, grammatically mean one and the same thing and, therefore, can be used as synonyms. In fact, they are actually used as synonyms in the earlier and later Jain philosophical literature.

The problem, now, arises, whether we are to regard both terms of equal status historically in Jain literature or, whether there are any considerations, which would make us think, that the term Pariṇāma might have been taken from common usage to elucidate the doctrine of Change and Permanence.

One consideration, which immediately comes to our view is, the word Pariṇāma is of common usage in the Jain and other darśanas while, the term Paryāya in this particular sense, is a Jain

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For Dravya and Paryāya, as we know, were already too familiar to the older Āgamas, but the word Guṇa in the sense of a 'quality' seems to be unknown to them. Guṇa, in the Āgamas (as we have already seen) is generally used in the sense of so many 'fold' or 'times'. The above passage of the Ut. Sū., however, introduces the category of Guṇa for the first time in the Āgamas in the specific sense of 'quality', probably due to the Vaiśeṣika influence.

technical word. Another consideration which weighs with us is, that the word Paryāya, as seen above, has a wider connotation, including all the possible aspects due to Parīṇāma and others, independent of it. I am, therefore, inclined to suggest that the earlier Jain thinkers viewed the problem of reality from the Paryāya point of view. They saw that the different phenomena of the world (paryāyas) show certain persistent elements. They classified these persistent elements into five or six categories which are their five or six Dravyas. They, thus, viewed reality as consisting of Dravya and Paryāya and when they developed their dialectic for discussing metaphysical problems, they did it, accordingly in the form of Dravyarthika-Naya and Paryāyarthika-Naya. It may be noted that we do not meet with such a usage as Parīṇāmārtthika-Naya, which clearly proves that Paryāya was traditional with them.

However, in the general philosophical discussions of their contemporaries, there was another word almost a synonym of Paryaya, viz., Parīṇāma. This word, however, had an important connotation. It referred to an activity which brings forth various states. Philosophically it was necessary for the Jain to have a concept which would explain why the Dravyas took on different Paryāyas. Parīṇāma could explain it, and so the term which could be a synonym of Paryāya and which at the same time, had the further advantage of explaining how the Paryāyas form themselves, was brought into service and made a current coin by the Jain thinkers. Nevertheless, they stuck to their original word Paryāya, and allowed it to have a wider connotation of aspects, which could not be brought under the Parīṇāma-activity. That shows the strength of the traditional usage.

That the word Parīṇāma was more or less used to suggest activity or functioning, in addition to being a synonym of Paryāya, is not only brought out from the passages referred to above but also by the use of such verbal forms of pari + nam (परि + नम्)<sup>44</sup> wherever

44 Bh.Sū. 14. 4. 510-511. 12. 5. 452.

activity is to be indicated. It is only rarely that the verbal forms of pari + i (परि + इ) are used for that purpose.

These considerations lead me to think that the earlier Jain thinkers, even before the nucleus of the Jain Āgamas was formed, in which both the terms Paryāya and Parināma are found, might have brought into service the term Parināma, of common usage, to elucidate their doctrine of Dravya and Paryāya. I, however, do not suggest that there was any conscious borrowing from one school by another. It only suggests the historical process of philosophical development of the Paryāya doctrine, with the help or impact of the current ideas of Parināma-activity.

## CHAPTER IX

# PARINĀMA IN THE WORKS OF UMĀSVĀTI AND KUNDAKUNDA

**The Tattvārtha-Sūtra with its svopajña Bhāṣya**  
(About the 3rd or 4th cent A. D.)

Coming to the post-Āgama period, we take up, first, the TSū. of Umāsvāti. As already said, this work occupies a unique position in Jain literary history, because it is a work which is accepted as authentic both by the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras, which is not the case with the Āgamas.

Let us, first, study the relevant passages from this work, bearing on our problem, and then consider what development we can detect in them.

We saw, in our discussion on the Āgama-material, that the Paryāya-Pariṇāma theory is intimately connected with the concept of Dravya. So here also, we must, first, try to understand what Dravya means. We saw that older Āgamas, nowhere, clearly define Dravya. It is only, later, in the Ut. Sū., that we get the definition of Dravya, Guṇa, and Paryāya. In the Tattvārtha, Dravya is defined, as an entity possessing Guṇa and Paryāya.<sup>1</sup> This definition, by bringing in the aspect of Paryāya, makes the concept of Dravya, more consistent with the Jain tradition than that of Dravya given in the Ut. Sū. The latter defines substance as the substratum of qualities.<sup>2</sup> The analysis of reality into Dravya and Paryāya is a Jain concept, while the analysis of reality into

1 गुणपर्यायवद् द्रव्यम् । V. 37

2 गुणाणमासञ्चो द्रव्यं ।

Dravya and Guṇa is a Vaiśeṣika concept. Philosophically considered, these two approaches are distinct. One takes reality as it assumes different forms, or views reality, through its transformations; while the other statically analyses it into substance and qualities. When, however for whatever reason, the analysis of Dravya and Guṇa was accepted by the Jains, (following the Vaiśeṣikas), they had to find a place for it, along with their Dravya-Paryāya analysis. And Umāsvāti defines guṇas as residing in the substance and having no quality(guṇa) in themselves.<sup>3</sup>

Here, however, we are primarily concerned with the explanation of Paryāya that is given in the bhāṣya on. V. 37.<sup>4</sup> Paryāya is another bhāva(state) and another name, i.e. the Paryāya of a Dravya is a distinct transformation, bearing a distinct name. In this definition, the idea of another name seems to be due to a desire to incorporate the common meaning of Paryāya viz. a synonym. Philosophically, one might say, that a Dravya may have a distinct Paryāya yet it may not always have been possible to name it differently, though one may concede that for the purpose of discourse, one has to have a distinct name, to indicate a distinct state. This is because, we can speak of a Paryāya when it is recognised as such by our thought and to pin it down our thought would require a word. However that may be, the concept of Paryāya is made clearer by Umāsvāti, by defining it as a distinct state (formation) to be recognised by a distinct name.

Now, let us take the definition of Pariṇāma. The Bhāṣya states that Pariṇāma is the nature, the 'thatness' of each substance (dravya) and its qualities (guṇas).<sup>5</sup> in other words, if we regard reality as the sum-total of the five or six substances

3 द्रव्याश्रया निर्गुणा गुणाः । V. 40

4 भावान्तरं संज्ञान्तरं च पर्यायः ।

5 तद्भावः परिणामः । (V.41) भाष्यम्-धर्मादीनां द्रव्याणां यथोक्तानां च गुणानां स्वभावः स्वतत्त्वं परिणामः ।

(dravyas) and their qualities (guṇas), Parīṇāma is the nature of all these. In short, it is the nature of dravyas-cum-guṇas to transform.

Umasvāti has taken a further step in the development of Jain philosophy by defining reality as such under the term Sat (which was not so far used in the earlier Jain literature).

He defines sat (reality) as characterised by origination, decay and permanence<sup>6</sup>. This definition and its explanation give us two important ideas – one, viewing all the Dravyas under the term Sat, and the other – the nature of this Sat, which is stated to be Parīṇāma in the sūtra V.41, is analysed into the three aspects of utapāda-origination, vyaya-decay, and dhrauvya-permanence. In short, it gives us an analysis of Parīṇāma, and its identification with reality as such. This analysis of Parīṇāma, it may be noted, comes to be the same in substance as the definition of Viparīṇāma, given by Yāska in his Nirukta.

Not to be deprived of this triple nature of origination, decay and persistence is the definition of eternity (nityata)<sup>7</sup>. This definition points out that, that is to be called eternal which does not become apart from the state of being Sat or real. Now, the nature of Sat, as already noted, is to originate, to decay and to persist. Thus to be eternal is to originate, decay and persist. This is the source of the doctrine of 'parīṇaminityatva.'

There are three sūtras (V. 42-44) in the Tattvārtha, at the end of the fifth Adhyāya which present a new kind of classification of Parīṇāmas into 'ādimān' i. e. having a beginning and 'anadi' i. e. beginningless.<sup>8</sup> They further state that the anādi-

6 उत्पादन्यमधोव्ययुक्तं सत् । V.29

7 तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम् । V.30 भाष्यम् – यत् सतो भावान्न व्येति न व्येद्यति तन्नित्यम् ।

8 अनादिरादिमांश्र । V.42

pariṇāmas take place only in the arūpi dravyas, such as Dharma, Adharma, Ākāśa and Jīva,<sup>9</sup> while, the rūpi dravyas undergo ādimān-pariṇāmas, like those of colour, taste, smell and touch.<sup>10</sup> One exception to this is however pointed out, viz. that though Jīva is arūpi, and therefore, liable to anādi-pariṇāmas only, as stated before, yet there are certain ādimān-pariṇāmas like those of Yoga and Upayoga taking place in it, along with anadi-pariṇāmas.<sup>11</sup>

With reference to the above three sūtras, it should be noted that they are omitted by the Digambara commentators of the Tattvārtha, viz. Pūjyapāda and Akalaṃka. They, however, do refer to this classification in the commentary on the Sūtra, 'तद्भावः परिणामः १', but, do not follow Umāsvatī in the explanation of the same. According to them, all the Dravyas – rūpi and arūpi – have anādi-pariṇāmas from the Samānya or Dravyārthika standpoint, and ādimān-pariṇāmas from The Viśesa-Paryāyārthika standpoint.<sup>12</sup> It is important to note that even the Śvetāmbara commentator Siddhasena too, does not seem to follow rigidly Umāsvatī's explanation. He maintains that everywhere – i. e. in all the dravyas there are certain anadi-pariṇāmas and certain

9 भाष्यम् – तत्रानादिरूपिषु धर्माधर्माकाशजीवेष्विति । V.42

10 रूपिष्वादिमान् । V.43

भाष्यम् – रूपिषु तु द्रव्येषु आदिमान् परिणामोऽनेकविधः  
स्पर्शपरिणामादिरिति ।

योगोपयोगी जीवेषु । V.44

11 The two terms yoga and upayoga are explained later on.

12 स द्विविधोऽनादिरादिमांश्च । तत्रानादिधर्मादीनां गत्युपग्रहादिः सामान्यापेक्षया ।  
स एवादिमांश्च भवति विशेषापेक्षया । Sarvārtthasiddhi V.41.  
द्रव्याधिकपर्यायाधिकनयद्वयविवक्षावशात् सर्वेषु धर्मादिद्रव्येषु स उभयः परि-  
णामोऽवसेयः । Raj-vārttika V. 41.



ādimān-parīṇāmas.<sup>13</sup>

Thus these sūtras make an attempt to understand Parīṇāma in some detail.

The foregoing discussion based on the sūtras of the Tattvartha along with the bhāṣya shows a distinct philosophical advance over the Āgamas, both in a wider generalisation, clarification and method. The concept of Sat as comprehending the whole reality, has been reached under the term Sat, and clearly defined. Similarly Dravya, Guṇa, Paryāya and Parīṇāma receive precise definitions.

#### Kundakundācārya (About the 5th cent. A. D)

Kundakundācārya occupies a prominent place in the Digambara hierarchy of scholar-saints. From our point of view, his importance lies in the fact that he is a philosopher of Parīṇāma, par excellence. We can study and understand Parīṇāma theory nowhere better than in the works of this great acārya. He tries to explain and elucidate the theory of Parīṇāma in its various aspects, by means of its analysis and application to the different Dravyas.

In the TSū., as we saw, Umāsvāti took a step in the development of Jain philosophy, by postulating Sat, and identifying it with utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya. Kundakunda carries forward that step and describes Sat or Satta in greater detail,<sup>14</sup> identify-

13 ये तु मन्यन्ते रूपिष्वेवादिमान् परिणामो भवति, नामूर्तेषु, तेषामरूपिद्वय-  
पर्यायाश्रयव्यवहारलोपादुत्पादादिलक्षणायोगात् परिणामाभावः..... तस्मात्  
सर्वत्र केचिदनाद्याः केचिदादिमन्तः परिणामा इति न्यायः । V. 43. P. 440

14 सत्ता सव्वपयत्था सविस्सह्वा अणुतपज्जाया ।

भंगुप्पादधुवत्ता सप्पडिवक्खा हवदि एक्का ॥ PK. 8

ing it with Dravya,<sup>15</sup> and pointing to it as 'living' in every-thing.<sup>16</sup>

Thus Kundakunda imagines Satta almost in the terms of *ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*. He qualifies it a *sappaḍivakkhā*. This clearly indicates the Jain Anekānta or relative position. Nevertheless, if the aim of philosophy is to reach wider and wider generalisations, then this is the statement of the widest imaginable generalisation.

Another point, that may be noted, is the derivation of the word Dravya, as one that flows and reaches out to all its Paryāyas, which beautifully explains the operation of *Pariṇāma* (Pk.9).<sup>17</sup>

Next, in the TSū., we noticed that *Pariṇāma* was, by implication, analysed into *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*. Kundakunda explicitly states this position, in PS II. 7. He says that the *Pariṇāma* characterised by permanence, origination and decay of Dravya with reference to qualities and modes, is its (Dravya's) nature. Kundakunda, further, elucidates this point, by explaining the relation of invariable concomitance between the three aspects of *Pariṇāma*, viz. *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauvya*, in PS II. 8. where he states that there is no origination without decay, nor is there decay without origination; origination and decay are not possible without the aspect of permanence.

Kundakunda further describes a thing (अर्थ<sup>18</sup> i. e. anything about which we can predicate is), as lying in substance (द्रव्य),

15 द्रवियं तं भण्णंते अण्णण्णभूदं तु सत्तादो ॥ PK. 9

16 इह विविहलक्खणाणं लक्खणमेगं सदिति सव्वगयं । PS II. 5

17 द्रवियदि गच्छदि ताइं ताइं सव्वभावपज्जयाइं जं । द्रवियं तं भण्णंते.....

PK 9

18 'Artha' employed in the gāthā signifies substance, quality, and mode but here it is taken to mean quality and mode with reference to substance. Ps II 14

quality (गुण), and mode (पर्याय), and shows the inseparable connection between Artha and Pariṇāma.<sup>19</sup>

This means that there is in this world not a single object which does not undergo modification, and no modification without an object as its substratum, implying thereby that the two, 'the Real' and the 'Pariṇāma' are so inseparably connected with each other, that the very concept of one is impossible without that of the other. This stanza, it can be seen, identifies, on one side, Artha with Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya and on the other with Pariṇāma. The TSū., as already seen, mentions Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya but does not identify them with Artha. Similarly, Pariṇāma was said to be the nature of the reals (Dravyas), but the metaphysical identity of Pariṇāma with reality was not so explicitly stated as here.

The definition of Dravya in the TSū. makes clear that there cannot be any Dravya apart from Guṇa and Paryāya. It is also stated in the bhāṣya on I. 5<sup>20</sup> that such a Dravya, severed from Guṇa and Paryāya, can only be imagined, through abstraction in thought; but this does not clarify, whether Guṇa and Paryāya can exist apart from Dravya. Kundakunda clarifies this point, and explains the mutual relationship between Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya in the following manner :

- I 'There is nothing as quality nor as modification in the absence of a substance.'
- II. 'There is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance. The one cannot be without the other, so say the 'Śramaṇas'.

19 णत्थि विणा परिणामं अत्थो अत्थं विणेह परिणामो । दव्वगुणपज्जयत्थो अत्थो अत्थित्तणिवत्तो ॥

20 द्रव्यजीव इति गुणपर्यायवियुक्तः प्रज्ञास्थापितोऽनादिपरिणामिकभावयुक्तो जीव उच्यते ।

- III. 'There is neither quality without substance, nor substance without quality, hence these two are not incompatible in their nature'.
- IV. 'The substance which is not different from Sat, modifies itself through change of quality; therefore, modifications in qualities are further called the substance only'.
- V. 'A substance is said to be identical with that (bhāva or state) in which it is transformed for that much time (i. e. as long as that state remains).'
- VI. 'If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from its qualities, then it may change into infinite other substances or again if the qualities can exist apart from their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at all'.<sup>21</sup>

In the above passages, we see that Kundakunda is at pains to establish the material (or objective) identity between Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya as well as Pariṇāma. However, in philosophical analysis, all these concepts of Dravya, Guṇa, Paryāya and Pariṇāma are to be grasped as distinct and separate from one another. This raises the problem of identity and difference. Kundakunda renders a definite service to Indian philosophy by clearly enunciating the two types of differences – one which is made by thought and the other which is objective. For the former he uses the term 'anyatva' and for the latter, 'pṛthaktva'. He defines and explains them as follows :

- I. 'It is the dictum of Mahāvīra, that separateness (pṛthaktva) consists in having separated space-points; non-identity (anyatva) is the absence of identity.'
- II. 'Really speaking, what is substance is not quality, nor what

is quality is substance; this is a case of non-identity and not of absolute negation; so it is pointed out.'

III. 'The difference between *Dravya* and *Guṇa* may be determined by appellation, form, number, or locality. These determinants are various. They hold good among things and their qualities, whether these are considered different or identical'.

IV-V. 'Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of the primary atom. They are not said to be really distinct from their material substratum, though they are undoubtedly distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc. In the same way, perception and knowledge are really inseparable from the self and are not distinct from it, though from the viewpoint of name, form, etc. they may be spoken of as distinct from the substratum. In short, though distinguishable in thought, they are not really distinct.'<sup>22</sup>

Thus with the help of the distinction between 'anyatva' and 'prthaktva' Kundakunda avoids the confusion, which is likely to occur in the discussion of 'bhedābheda'.

After having made this distinction, Kundakunda further analyses the concept of *Parināma* into its two components, viz., 'change' involving *utpāda* and *vyaya*, and 'permanence' involving *dhrauvya*, by relegating *utpāda* and *vyaya* to *Paryāya* and *dhrauvya* to *Dravya*.<sup>23</sup>

The above discussion makes clear the contribution of Kundakunda to the clarification of the concepts of reality and *Parināma*.

<sup>22</sup> PS II. 14 & 16; PK 52; PK 57-58

<sup>23</sup> PK. 15, PK 11, PS II. 11

**Application of Pariṇāma to Kāla, Pudgala and Jīva  
as found in the works of Kundakunda.**

At the outset, it must be pointed out that, of the six Dravyas, Kundakunda, like his predecessors, omits Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa and applies the doctrine of Pariṇāma to Kāla, Pudgala and Jīva only.<sup>24</sup>

**Kāla :**

In the Āgamas, we saw, that Kāla was mentioned as a sixth Dravya, but its paryāyas were not given.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, the Tsū. devotes only two sūtras to Kāla, stating that it is accepted by some as a separate Dravya and that it has infinite samayas.<sup>26</sup> Kundakunda, however, clearly explains the nature and functions of Kāla and shows the application of the doctrine of pariṇāma to it as follows. That on account of which the five Substances undergo changes is called Real Time or Kāla-dravya. It is devoid of physical qualities like colour etc. Samaya, Nimiṣa, Kāṣṭha, Kalā, Nālī, day and night, month, season, Ayana (half-year) and Saṁvatsara (year) are all Vyavahāra or conventional time. These are determined by other objects. Duration of time, either long or short, is impossible apart from a standard of measurement. The standard of measurement also has no meaning apart from material objects. Hence, conventional or relative time is brought about by extraneous conditions. Relative time is determined by changes or motion in things. These changes themselves are the effect of time

24 There is only one stanza in the PK. (91) which seems to refer to the Pariṇāma of the Dharma Dravya. It is as follows—

अगुरुलघुगेहिं सया तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणयं निच्चम् ।

गदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं करणभूयं सयमकज्जम् ॥

The Dharma Dravya which is eternal constantly undergoes infinite modification of the quality 'agurulaghu'. It is unaffected by movement, but it conditions the motion of those that can move.

25 In the Bh. Sū. 25.5.747, the notion of conventional time, viz., āvalikā, muhūrta etc. is there but it is not clear whether these 'अणंता समया' are to be understood as referring to the paryāyas of Dravya-Kāla.

26 'कालश्चेत्येके' V.38. 'सोऽनन्तसमयः' V.39.

absolute. The former is momentary, i.e. having beginning and end. The latter is eternal. The duration that an atom requires to move from one spatial point to the next one is called samaya (moment). This samaya is liable to origination and destruction. No two samayas are co-existent.<sup>27</sup>

### **Application of Parināma to Pudgala**

Matter exists in four main modes; skandhas, skandhadeśas, skandhapradeśas and primary atoms. The complete molecule of matter is skandha; a half of it is skandhadeśa; a half of that half is skandhapradeśa; and what cannot be divided is the primary atom. Skandhas are of two kinds—those that can be perceived by the senses and the minute ones beyond sense-perception. These also are called matter conventionally. These manifest themselves in six different modes by which the three worlds are completely filled. An atom has physical qualities and it itself is unable to produce any sound whatsoever. All the atoms are homogeneous and capable of being the cause of any of the four physical elements—earth, water, fire and air. Skandhas, when strike one another, produce sound. An atom has a single taste, colour and smell and two contacts. Whatever is perceived by the senses, the sense-organs, the various kinds of bodies, the physical manas, the karmas (subtle material forces affecting soul) etc. are material (i.e. the modes of matter). Colour, taste, touch, smell and sound are the qualities of matter while structure, conglomeration (composites) and sound are the modes of matter. The primary atom has no space-points; it is an unit of space-point. When conjoined with other atoms due to its being arid or cohesive, it comes to have two or more space-points. The degrees of aridness or cohesiveness of an atom increase from one to infinity gradually one by one. Two atoms form an aggregate only when there is the difference of two degrees (points) in the cohesiveness or aridness that they possess, the minimum degree being excepted. The aggregates having two or more space-points and the subtle and gross elements of earth, water, fire and air come into existence

when different numbers of atoms combine themselves with one another on account of the different degrees of their cohesiveness and aridness. The molecules, capable of becoming karmas, coming into contact with the (passional) conditions of the Soul, are transformed into Karmas. The soul (as a direct agent) does not transform the molecules into the Karmas in the same manner as a potter moulds clay into a pot.<sup>23</sup>

**Jīva :**

Compared to the somewhat sketchy treatment of *Pariṇāma* with reference to *Kala* and *Pudgala*, the treatment with reference to *Jīva* is elaborate and comprehensive. This is but natural. The Jain darśana, being a *Mokṣa-darśana*, should be more concerned with those topics which have a direct bearing on the problem of liberation of the soul. *Pariṇāma*, being a guiding principle, it is quite in the fitness of things that Kundakunda should give a detailed application of it, with reference to *Jīva*. The Āgamas and the Tsū. give a good account of bondage (*bandha*), its cause (*āsrava*), the means to liberation (*saṃvara* and *nirjarā*) and liberation (*Mokṣa*), which constitute important problems of Jain spiritual philosophy. Kundakunda also, discusses these topics, but does it, in the light of the theory of *Pariṇāma*, i. e. by viewing them as results of the operation of *Pariṇāma*.

Before we come to the application of *Pariṇāma* to *Jīva*, we should note the consistency of the *Pariṇāma* theory, with the principle of *Dravya*. The five or six *Dravyas* are by their very definition, absolutely distinct from one another. This distinctness, as we shall see, is consistently maintained in their *Pariṇāmas*. Kundakunda, however, refers only to *Jīva* and *Pudgala*, because it is the *Pariṇāmas* of these, that are primarily his concern. Here, naturally, the question arises, as to how *Jīva* and *Pudgala* ever come together and form this phenomenal world, if they are abso-



lutely distinct from each other. The answer to this will be found in the Jain theory of karma, which is discussed by Kundakunda in his application of Parīṇāma to Jīva.

The nature of Jīva is said to be constituted of sentiency (cetanā) and manifestation of consciousness (upayoga).<sup>29</sup> The Parīṇāmana-activity of this Cetanā is said to present itself in three aspects, with reference to knowledge, karma and the fruit of Karma.<sup>30</sup> Knowledge is the comprehension of objects, whatever is initiated by the soul is Karma, the fruit of Karma is either happiness or misery.<sup>31</sup> Kundakunda, further, identifies in the next stanza, parīṇāmi with Parīṇāma and speaks of Ātman itself as Parīṇāma and of knowledge, Karma and the fruit, as Ātman, of course in the sense of having aprthaktva.<sup>32</sup>

What is meant is that it is the evolving Cetanā which has always these three aspects and that we name it as knowledge (jñāna), Karma (karma) and fruit (phala), only on account of the predominance of one over the others. It also follows from the above that these three aspects of Cetanā are to be found in any state of the soul, either mundane or liberated. Of course, the nature of these three differs in the two states. In order to understand this difference, it is necessary to know first the nature of bondage, its cause, the means to freedom, and the nature of freedom, according to Jain philosophy.

29 ... जीवः पुनश्चेतनोपयोगमयः PS. II. 35.

30 परिणमदि चेदणाए आदा पुण चेदणा तिव्राभिमदा । सा पुण णाणे कम्मे फलम्मि वा कम्मणो भणिदा ॥ PS II. 31

31 णाणं अट्ठवियप्पो कम्मं जीवेण जं समारद्धं ।  
तमणेगविधं भणिदं फलं ति सोक्खं व दुक्खं वा ॥ PS. II. 32

32 अप्पा परिणामप्पा परिणामो णाणकम्मफलभावो ।  
तम्हा णाणं कम्मं फलं च आदा मुणेद्व्वो ॥ PS. II. 33

Kundakunda explains the nature of bondage and its cause thus. He says that when the soul functions in an 'otherward' attitude as 'I am this', 'this is mine', identifying itself with things other than itself, through its *Pariṇāmas* of *rāga* (attachment), *dveṣa* (aversion), *moha* (delusion), it comes to have the state of bondage.<sup>33</sup> This is the same thing as to say that it is through *rāga-dveṣa-moha* *Pariṇāmas*, that the soul becomes 'otherward' in its attitude, which is responsible for the influx of karmic matter which clings to it.

Another important thing, that is pointed out is that the soul is the direct agent of its own modifications only, and not of those of matter, but matter being transformed into karmas by reason of the soul's thought-activity, the soul is called an auxiliary cause of the modifications of matter into karma. Similarly, matter is the direct cause of its own modifications only, but being responsible in producing thought-activity (*rāgādi*) in *Jīva*, it is regarded as the auxiliary cause of the latter's modifications.<sup>34</sup> Thus, the Jain provides a causal nexus or rather a nexus of action and reaction between *Jīva* and *Pudgala*.

The means to liberation and the nature of the state of liberation, are described by Kundakunda.<sup>35</sup> There he aims at showing that when the soul, by its properly directed process of *Pariṇāma*, through *Samvara*-blocking and *nirjarā*-shedding of Karmas, totally destroys its passions, viz. *rāga-dveṣa-moha*, and the consequent influx of karmic matter, its attitude becomes 'self-ward' i. e. it realises its own true self which is the state of liberation. In this state, the soul does not cease to function altogether, but continues to modify itself into pure infinite *jñāna*, *darśana*,

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33 PS I. 84, see also PS II. 85, PS II. 96, PK 135-137

34 PS II. 92, SS-87

35 PK 149; PS I. 80; PK 152, 157, 159; PS I. 19 & 60.

cāritra,<sup>36</sup> virya (energy) and sukha (bliss).

We can now understand the difference in the nature of the three aspects of Cetanā, viz., jñāna, karma and phala in the state of bondage and liberation. Kundakunda explains this from an ethical point of view. He refers to three kinds of upayoga, viz., auspicious (śubha), inauspicious (aśubha), and pure (śuddha).<sup>37</sup> This term, upayoga, is peculiar to Jain philosophy. Along with Cetanā, it is regarded as the differentia of a soul. It is not easy to distinguish between Cetanā and Upayoga unless we regard former as a static abstraction and the latter, the concrete Cetanā, or Cetanā as it functions. Kundakunda defines Upayoga which is identified with Jīva, as jñāna-cum-darśana.<sup>38</sup> It is the different Parīṇāmas or transformations of

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36 'Cāritra' in the worldly state is translated as 'conduct' which may be right (samyak) or wrong (mithyā). In the state of liberation, however, there being no body, 'cāritra' signifies 'sama' i. e. manifestation of pure consciousness or self-realisation.

स्वरूपे चरणं चारित्र्यं स्वसमयप्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः । तदेव वस्तुस्वभावत्वाद् धर्मः ।  
शुद्धचैतन्यप्रकाशनमित्यर्थः । Amṛtacandra on PS. 1. 7.

The terms 'jñāna' and 'darśana' are explained hereafter

37 PS. II. 63—66, PS. I. 70, 11, 12, 14, 15

38 उवओगो णाणदंसणं भणिदो... PS II. 63 Jñāna and darśana are also called sākāra Upapoga and anakāra Upayoga respectively. (cf. Tsū. II. 9 and the bhāṣya). Of these the first is the specific or differentiated knowledge while the second (darśana) represents the primary grasping of a thing, i. e. the undifferentiated knowledge.

It may be noted that the term darśana has, in Jain philosophy, another sense also, viz., faith in truth or right belief (cf. Tsū. I. 2. 'तत्त्वार्थश्रद्धानं सम्यग्दर्शनम् ।').

For want of precise English equivalents, the Sanskrit terms, 'jñāna' and 'darśana' have been retained.

this Upayoga which are responsible for the varied states of bondage and the final state of liberation.

It must be noted that 'Upayoga' primarily denotes jñāna and darśana i.e. refers to the aspect of knowledge only, but, when viewed from the ethical standpoint, it comes to be classified as śubha, aśubha and śuddha. Of these first, as seen above, refers to the śubha-pariṇāma of the soul, which causes the meritorious influx of karmas and happiness, as its fruit. Aśubha pertains to aśubha-pariṇāma (thought-activity), leading to the sinful influx of karmas in the soul, and the fruit of which is the experience of misery. Both these Pariṇāmas occur in the worldly state of bondage. On the other hand, that Upayoga which is free from the worldly dualism of good and evil, happiness and misery, in other words, from rāga, dveṣa and moha is called śuddha or pure. This ultimately leads the soul to mokṣa or self-realisation. In this state, jñāna, karma and phala cannot evidently be understood, as in the state of bondage. The soul in this state is steady in its own self, and non-attached to anything alien to itself. So, we have to understand that its jñāna, karma and phala are all 'self-ward' (directed to the self). It is only from this point of view, that the Jain can consistently hold the view that the soul in śuddho-payoga realises its nature of infinite jñāna, darśana, cāritra, sukha etc.

Thus, Kundakunda, through the principle of Pariṇāma, explains the different transformations of the soul from the various mundane states to the pure state of liberation, the cause of the mundane states and the means of achieving liberation. Through his theory of karma-pariṇāma, he makes an attempt to explain how the two absolutely distinct entities come to influence each other, and make this world as it is. In short, the principle of Pariṇāma has been useful in explaining metaphysics and ethics, as well as the mundane phenomena of the world, in which, a man, or for the matter of that, every living being, finds himself.

The foregoing discussion on the different aspects of Parināma and its application to the Dravyas, particularly the Jiva Dravya, enables us to gauge Kundakunda's philosophical acumen which has gone a long way in contributing to the development of Jain philosophic thought.

## CHAPTER X

### PARIṆĀMA IN TARKA-PERIOD<sup>1</sup>

**Exposition of Pariṇāma as found in the commentaries on the relevant sūtras of the Tattvārtha**

In the history of Indian philosophy, we find that the development of ideas in later periods, has taken place not so much through original works as through commentaries on the sūtras, bhāṣyas etc. of the different darśanas. This holds good for the Jain darśana also. So, to study the further exposition of the doctrine of Pariṇāma, we shall have to take recourse to the important commentaries on the relevant sūtras of the Tattvārtha, which we discussed before.

The Digambara Ācāryas seem to have particularly applied themselves to the exposition of the Tsū, in a number of commentaries. The Śvetāmbaras seem to have satisfied themselves with the bhāṣya and it is only at a comparatively late period that an able commentary viz. that of Siddhasena, both on the Tsū. and its bhāṣya, was written. We shall first take the Digambara commentators, Pūjyapāda, Akalaṅka and Vidyānanda and then the Śvetāmbara commentator Siddhasena even though Vidyānanda is later than Siddhasena. Pūjyapāda's comment on the sūtra, तद्भावाच्चयं नित्यम् deserves study.

The Tattvārtha bhāṣya explained 'Tadbhāva' as simply 'Satobhāva' wherein Sat referred to ūtpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya; Pūjyapāda explains it as 'pratyabhijñānahetutā,' i.e. the cause of the recognition 'this is that.' We see here a distinct progress in philosophical thought. In the bhāṣya, the principle of identity

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<sup>1</sup> 5th cent. A. D. to 17th cent. A. D.

is merely grammatically and objectively explained as the 'state of being that', while Pūjyapāda explains it subjectively or rather epistemologically on the basis of knowledge of recognition, thus : 'Identity is that in a thing, which is responsible for the recognition of a thing, as identical with something that we had formerly known. This would be impossible, if there were a total destruction of the thing formerly experienced or if it were merely a new phenomenon. Thus, that which retains this trait, i.e. literally, does not become apart from this trait, is nitya or eternal.'<sup>2</sup>

Akalamka, in his Rāj. V. (p. 239-240), and Vidyānanda, in his Śl. V. (p. 434), essentially, follow Pūjyapāda in the explanation of 'Tadbhāva', but make more explicit and clear what was suggested in तत् कथंचिद् वेदितव्यम् । (Pūjyapāda). Thus, Akalamka attempts to explain away the contradiction that may be alleged against the three aspects of reality viz., utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya, by bringing into service the doctrine of relative stand-points, i.e. of Dravyārthikanaya and Paryāyarthikanaya, which will be noted fully later on when we consider the defence of Pariṇāma by later writers. Vidyānanda, by raising the question as to what is that nitya-aspect of reality, which is possessed of 'dhrauvya' and what, the anitya-aspect, which is possessed of 'utpāda and vyaya' — seeks to, respectively, explain them in the two sūtras, viz. तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम् and अतद्भावेन सव्ययमनित्यम् the latter sūtra being derived from the former. He explains 'Tadbhāva' in the same way as Pūjyapāda does, while 'Atadbhava' is explained

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- 2 "कस्तद्भावः ? प्रत्यभिज्ञानहेतुता । तदेवेदमिति स्मरणं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् । तदकस्मान्न भवतीति योऽस्य हेतुः स तद्भावः । तस्य भावस्तद्भावः । येनात्मना प्राग्दृष्टं वस्तु तेनैवात्मना पुनरपि भावात्तदेवेदमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । यद्यत्यन्तनिरोधोऽभिनवप्रादुर्भावमात्रमेव वा स्यात्ततः स्मरणानुपपत्तिः । तदधीनो लोकसंव्यवहारो विरुध्यते । ततस्तद्भावेनाव्ययं नित्यमिति निश्चीयते । तत् कथंचिद्वेदितव्यम् । सर्वथा नित्यत्वेऽन्यथाभावाभावात्संसारतन्निवृत्तिकारण-प्रक्रियाविरोधः स्यात् ।

as that which is the cause of knowledge of 'otherness' or 'this is not that.'<sup>3</sup>

Siddhasena's commentary is, somewhat, more elaborate and contains other discussions also, in addition to the elucidation of the sense of the sūtra.

We explain the comment as follows : The sattva which is the common characteristic of all the five astikāyās indicates those qualities of each, which persist; for example, consciousness, incorporeality etc. of the soul. He explains 'nityatva' as signifying the 'dhrauvya aspect' of reality. But having done that he finds it difficult to find room for utpāda and vyaya, which as a process are also essential to reality. He solves this difficulty by stating that utpāda and vyaya have one substratum viz. dravya or dhrauvya and that the word 'bhāva' in the sūtra indicates the utpāda-vyaya aspect implying at the same time the rejection of kūṣasthanityatā or absolute non-change, which can never be the nature of a real. Had it not been so, the sūtra would have been 'Tadavyayam nityam'.<sup>4</sup> It can be seen from the above that in substance there is not much difference between Siddhasena and his predecessors.

3 अतद्भावोज्यत्वं पूर्वस्मादन्यदिदमिति अन्वयाप्रत्ययादवसेयम् ।

4 '...तस्य सतो भवनं भावस्तद्भावः, तदेव हि सत् तथा तथा भवति जीवादि देवादिरूपेण, न जातुचित् सत्त्वत्यागेनान्यथा भवति, तद्भावादव्ययं अविनाशि नित्यं; नित्यग्रहणाद् ध्रौव्यांशपरिग्रहः, सह्यन्वयी द्रव्यास्तिकांशः सर्वदासर्वं न विच्छिद्यते, सदाकारेणानुत्पत्तेरविनाशाच्च, भावशब्दोपादानात् परिणामनित्यता गृह्यते, कूटस्थनित्यता त्यज्यते, अन्यथा 'तदव्ययं नित्य'मिति सूत्रं स्यात् । यत् तु न केनचिदाकारेण विक्रियते, तदनुपाख्यमेव भवेत् । सत्त्वं च सर्वेषामन्वयिनां धर्माणां सूचकम्, षष्ठास्तिकायव्यापित्वात् तु सत्त्वपरिग्रहः, साक्षाज्जीवस्तावत् सत्त्वं चैतन्यममूर्तत्वमसंख्येयप्रदेशत्वं चाजहत् तथा तथा परिणामान्न व्यगात् न व्येति न व्येप्यत्यविनाश्यव्ययो नित्य उच्यते, न पुनर्देवादियपर्यायेणाप्यनन्वयिना नित्यता ध्रौव्यमस्य विद्यते, तथा पुदगलः ... .. ।'



While explaining the sūtra 'tadbhāvaḥ parīṇāmaḥ' Pūjyapāda states that the nature by which substances transform themselves is Parīṇāma.<sup>5</sup>

Akalanika does not add anything to the above explanation.

Vidyānanda elaborates the statement of Pūjyapāda by saying that 'Tadbhāva' is the way in which substances like the soul etc. exist in their particular states. This is Parīṇāma, their nature, which is experienced by us as existing in the present.<sup>6</sup>

Siddhasena attempts a further explanation of the same by pointing out that Parīṇāma is to be understood as 'सामान्यरूप' because it involves the persistent aspect also ( ध्रुवांश ) and not mere change exclusively, and by illustrating Parīṇāmanīyatā through its application to the different Dravyas.<sup>7</sup> This question of application will be treated in the next section.

Pūjyapāda in his comment on the sūtra 'उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत्' explains the three terms utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya, according to Jain philosophy, in the following way.

‘एवमन्वय्यंशो नित्यत्वेन लक्षितो द्रव्यनयस्वभावः । पर्यायनयस्वभावो ..... स्थित्यंशप्रतिबद्धौ । स्थितिरपि पर्यायप्रतिबद्धा, सर्वदा संसर्गरूपत्वाद् वस्तुनः, एकमेकाधिकरणावुत्पादविनाशौ जैन एव शासने साङ्गत्यमनुभवतोऽन्यत्र तु व्यधिकरणावेवोत्पादविनाशौ नियतो वेति ।’ p. 391, 392 (V, 30)

5 धर्मादीनि द्रव्याणि येनात्मना भवन्ति तद्भावः तत्त्वं परिणाम इति व्याख्यायते ।

6 जीवादीनां द्रव्याणां तेन प्रतिनियतेन रूपेण भवनं तद्भावः तेषां द्रव्याणां स्वभावो वर्तमानकालतयानुभूयमानस्तद्भावः परिणामः प्रतिपत्तव्यः ।

7 ...तस्येति द्रव्यषट्कस्याभिसम्बन्धः, तदेव हि धर्मादिद्रव्यं तेन तेनाकारेण भवति, गतिस्थित्यवगाहरूपत्वात्, अनुवर्तते हि सर्वत्र गत्यादिषु धर्मादिद्रव्यं स्वरूपमजहत् ..... धर्मो हि गन्तुं त्युपग्रहाकारेण परिणमते स्वरूपापरित्यागेन, स्थित्युपग्रहाकारेण स्थातुरधर्मः, व्योमाऽप्यवगाहुरवगाहदायित्वेनोपजायते, पुद्गलाः शरीरशब्दादिरूपेण, आत्मा ज्ञानदर्शनोपयोगवृत्त्या नारकादिभावेन च, कालोऽपि वर्तनादिप्रपञ्चेन परिणमते ।

Utpāda or origination is the attainment of another state, due to internal and external causes by a sentient or a non-sentient substance, without abandoning its essential nature. As for example, the attainment of another state, viz. that of a jar, by clay, is the latter's Utpāda.<sup>8</sup>

Vyaya or decay is the abandonment of the previous state, as, for example, the abandonment of the form of piṇḍa, on the origination of another form, viz. that of a jar.<sup>9</sup>

On account of the beginningless Pariṇāma-nature of reality, there is an element in it which persists because it is neither produced, nor does it become extinct. This is the persistent or dhrauvya aspect of reality as, for instance, the persistence of clay, in its different states such as those of piṇḍa, jar etc.<sup>10</sup>

Akalamka and Vidyānanda have nothing more to add, by way of explanation of these terms. They discuss another question, namely, that of the identity or difference between Dravya on one hand, and utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya on the other, which will be considered at its proper place.

Siddhasena, in the proper anekānta style, says that from the standpoint of substance (Dravyārthikanaya), utpāda and vyaya are merely appearance and disappearance. In reality, nothing is produced or destroyed. This is in short the Kūṭasthanityata. But, he takes care to add that from the standpoint of modes (Paryāyārthikanaya) utpāda and vyaya are real. The question of the conflict between these two points of view is sought to be

8 चेतनस्याचेतनस्य वा द्रव्यस्य स्वां जातिमजहत उभयनिमित्तवशाद्भावान्तरावा-  
प्तिरुत्पादनमुत्पादः । मृत्पिण्डस्य घटपर्यायवत् ।

9 पूर्वभावविगमनं व्ययः । यथा घटोत्पत्तौ पिण्डाकृतेः ।

10 अनादिपारिणामिकस्वभावेन व्ययोदयाभावात् ध्रुवति स्थिरीभवतीति ध्रुवः ।  
यथा मृत्पिण्डघटाद्यवस्थामु मृदाद्यन्वयः ।

solved by saying that the two standpoints are not independent but are controlled by each other.<sup>11</sup>

The above three sūtras of the Tattvartha and their exposition given by the Svopajña-bhāṣya and the different commentaries, attempt to analyse and bring out the nature of Parīṇāma. The eternal nature of reality is to persist in such a way, that it continuously assumes new forms, giving up the old ones. In other words, the five or six Dravyas which constitute reality change in such a way that in every change, one can recognise the element of selfidentity.<sup>12</sup>

One question, however, arises from the above, as to whether 'nitya' is to be taken as suggesting that the Parīṇāma nature of things consisting of utpāda-vyaya-dhrauṇvya is nitya (eternal) or merely as referring to their permanent aspect (dhrauṇvya). The Svopajña-bhāṣya of the Tattvartha seems to take the former view, whereas the later commentators seem to incline towards the latter

- 11 '.....तत्र द्रव्यनयाभिप्रायेणाकारान्तराविर्भावमात्रमुत्पाद औपचारिकः, परमार्थतो न किञ्चिदुत्पद्यते सततमवस्थितद्रव्यांशमात्रत्वात्, तथा व्ययः तिरोभाव-लक्षणः, पूर्वावस्थायास्तिरोधानं विनाशः, यतो द्रव्यमेव तथा तथा विवर्तमान-मुत्पादविनाशव्यवस्थया व्यपदिश्यते ..... ।'

'.....ननु च द्रव्यपर्यायिनयोः स्वतन्त्रत्वात् द्वावपि विजिगीषु(षू)स्वविजयोपमदं परस्परं न सहेते, ..... । उच्यते-पर्यायिनयस्य तावदुत्पादव्ययलक्षणस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं नास्ति द्रव्यास्तिकेनाङ्कुशितत्वात् । न ह्युत्पादो नाम किञ्चिद् धर्मोऽस्त्यभूतभवनात्मकः..... ।'

p. 383 (on Tsū. V. 29)

- 12 'The three elements, of origination, cessation and persistence, as constituting a reality, are a natural deduction from the reality of change. The Jain believes in the dynamic nature of reals and, in deference to the demands of reason and experience alike, he sums up the three elements as the component factors of the constitution of reality. One can avoid this triple characteristic only by the declaration of change as appearance which is the position of Vedānta'. Dr. Mookerji, 'Jain Philosophy of Non-absolutism'

view. Nevertheless by adding 'कथंचित्' to 'nitya', they seem to make their explanation practically identical with that of the bhāṣya.

### **Application of the doctrine of Parīṇāma to Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa.**

We have noticed, in the treatment of Kundakunda, the application of Parīṇāma to Jīva, Pudgala and Kāla. The later writers attempt to apply the doctrine of Parīṇāma, to Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa that were so far left out. Let us see how this is done.

It is objected that if the Dharmādi substances are devoid of kriyā (kriyā here signifies movement), then their utpāda-origination will not be possible. For utpāda of pot, etc. is always seen to be preceded by kriyā or activity. In the absence of utpāda, there will be no vyaya or decay. Consequently, the doctrine of the utpāda-vyaya-dhauvyā holding good about all the substances (Dravyas), will be contradicted. This is met by saying that it is possible in a different way. Despite the absence of utpāda, due to kriyā, in these Dharmādi substances, it is imagined or thought of in a different manner. Utpāda is of two kinds, one due to one's own agency (of the thing itself) and the other due to extraneous agency. The varying degrees of increase and decrease in the 'agurulaghu' qualities (of these dravyas), which are infinite and which are accepted on the authority of the Āgamas, represent their utpāda and vyaya which are due to their own agency (svanimitta). The utpāda and vināśa due to their being passive instruments in the motion, staticity and occupation respectively of horse, etc. are generally regarded (व्यवहियते) as their 'parapratyaya' utpāda and vināśa (i.e. due to extraneous agency). Owing to the distinctness, at every moment, of motion, staticity and occupation of horse, etc. there follows the distinctness of their cause also (i. e. Dharmādi).<sup>12</sup>

Akalamka in his Rāj. V., gives the above explanation verbatim.

Vidyananda in his Ś. VI. points out that though Dharma and Adharma, are devoid of Parispanda Kriyā (of the nature of movement) owing to their pervasive character, yet they are possessed of Parīṇāma kriyā, (i.e. internal transformation of qualities). Otherwise, i.e. if this is not accepted, the concept of reality will be stultified.<sup>13</sup>

Siddhasena, in his comment on the Tsū. and its bhāṣya (V. 30) more elaborately explains the application of Parīṇāma to Dharma, Adharma, and Ākāśa thus : 'The substance Dharma abides (i.e. is eternal) from the standpoint of its essential characteristics, viz., sattva (existence), amūrtatva (incorporeality), asaṃkhyeyapradeśavattva (possessing innumerable space-points), lokavyāpī (pervading the universe) etc., but is not eternal from the standpoint of its helping the motion of the movers like atoms, Devadatta etc. The function of helping the movement becomes distinct, because of the distinctness of the ganṭh (goer). Thus the subsequent Parīṇāma becomes different from the previous one. The 'gatyupakāritva-parīṇāma' that is first produced, does not last for ever, because it is produced by the association of things different from itself like pot etc. Similarly, 'Parīṇāmitva' should be understood in the Adharma substance. The notion of 'anityatva' (non-eternality) therein, is to be understood, from the standpoint of its helping the staticity of things. Ākāśa, however, is eternal from the point of view of its essential characteristics, viz., sattva (existence), incorporeality (amūrtatva), anantapradeśavattva (possessing infinite space-points) etc., and non-eternal, from the standpoint of its giving room to things. Even where, there are no substances viz. Jīva and Pudgala, i.e. in the Alokākāśa, 'anityatā' should be necessarily understood through the modes (paryāyas) of the qualities like 'agurulaghu' etc. These modes become different (every moment). Otherwise, (i.e. if this kind of 'anityatva' is not acce-

13 धर्माधर्मो' परिस्पन्दलक्षणया क्रियया निष्क्रियो सकलजगद्व्यापित्वादाकामवत् ।  
परिणामलक्षणया तु क्रियया सक्रियावेव, अन्यथा वस्तुत्वविरोधात् । P. 398

pted,) there will not be (in the Alokākāśa) either independent utpāda-vyaya (i.e. due to its inherent agency), or even dependent (or relative) utpāda-vyaya (i.e. due to the agency of extraneous things). Consequently, the definition of Sat will become narrow (in so far as it will exclude Alokākāśa from its pale).

Thus, Siddhasena completes the application of Parināma, by extending it to Alokākāśa too.

It may be noted that in the SVM of Malliṣeṇa, the application of Parināma i.e. utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya, to Ākāśa is explained, in two ways, as follows :

When souls and material objects, which occupy space, travel from one point of space, to another, they become separated from one portion of Ākāśa, and get united with another portion of Ākāśa. These separation and union, being contradictory dharmas, must belong to two different dharmins, according to the rule, “अयमेव हि भेदो भेदेहेतुर्वा यद्विरुद्धधर्माभ्यासः कारणभेदश्चेति ।” i.e. those things must be regarded as distinct, which possess contradictory predicates, or spring from different causes. Ākāśa comes under the first part of the rule, and is thus shown to be two – one that is destroyed, and the other that is produced, the former being the one from which the previous saṃyoga is destroyed, and the latter being the one with which a new saṃyoga is produced; and yet, in another way, both the Ākāśas are one. Thus Ākāśa may be shown to be both nitya and anitya.

When ‘ghaṭa’ is gone and ‘paṭa’ takes its place, ‘ghaṭākāśa’ is replaced by ‘paṭākāśa’; thus one Ākāśa is destroyed and another is produced. It may be objected, that this is mere ‘upacāra’ i.e. Ākāśa is not really produced or destroyed, but by a transference of predicates, it is said to be produced or destroyed according to the production or destruction of ghaṭa, paṭa, etc., which condition it. To this objection, it is replied : the transference of predicates takes place in an ‘upacāra’ owing to something being

common to the primary and the secondary subject. Thus, 'upacāra' does not take place without some connection of the predicate, with the primary object. For example, Ākāśa is primarily all-pervading, but, in accordance with the ghaṭa, paṭa, etc., which reside in it, it has different supposed parts' with reference to which it may be said to possess a 'parimāṇa' which covers a particular space or spot, and the Ākāśa is thereby known as 'ghaṭākāśa', 'paṭākāśa' etc. This change of states means change of that to which the states belong. Thus, the production and destruction of 'ghaṭa', 'paṭa' etc., and through them, of 'ghaṭākāśa', 'paṭākāśa' etc., amount to the production and destruction of Ākāśa itself. Thus Ākāśa is shown to be 'parīṇāmi-nitya' in another way.<sup>14</sup>

From the above elucidation, it is clear that when the later Jain writers were confronted with objections regarding the application of parīṇāma to Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa, they had to answer them and explain the application, in order to maintain consistency with their fundamental dogma that parīṇāma characterises every existent real. But these entities, being abstract in character, their parīṇāmas cannot be explained in so smooth a manner, as those of Jīva and pudgala and hence have to be explained through those of Jīva and pudgala which exist in Space and move or remain steady by Dharma and Adharma respectively. The use of such expressions as 'कल्प्यते' and 'व्यवहियते' in Pūjyapāda is evidence of the difficulty of smoothly explaining the parīṇāmas of these three substances and of the far-fetched character of the explanation.<sup>15</sup>

### Further Application and Analysis of Paryāya-Parīṇāma

#### (1) Dravya-Paryāya and Guṇa-Paryāya

The distinction between Dravya and Guṇa is important for us as giving a further elaboration of Parīṇāma and Paryāya in-

14 Prof. A. B. Dhruva, SVM. p. 15, 16 and Notes, p. 42, 43, 45

15 With reference to Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa Dr. Jacobi remarks

to Dravya paryāya and Guṇa-Paryāya. We saw that the older Āgamas did not make this distinction but a late passage in the Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, have recognised Dravya and Guṇa as two distinct categories. The recognition of Guṇa as a distinct category over and above Dravya category led to the discussion as to whether this Guṇa should be considered as different from paryāya or identical with it. The distinction between Guṇa and Paryāya has not been unanimously accepted by later writers. I give below the views of those writers who accept it as well as of those who do not, in order to study their arguments and see if they reflect any development of philosophic thought.

Siddhasena Divākara<sup>16</sup> regards them to be non-different on the following grounds. In the Āgamas only two view-points are mentioned, viz., Dravyāstika and Paryāyāstika. They should have mentioned the third view-point viz., Guṇāstika if they really wanted to give guṇa, the status of an independent category. Secondly, Guṇa is identical with Paryāya and not something independent of Paryāya as the former is synonymous with the latter. Guṇa differentiates one (universal) into many (individuals); Paryāya differentiates one (individual) into many (states). Of course, the shades of meaning of these two words are different. Yet, in the

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that 'the function of space, as we conceive it, is by the Jains, distributed among three different substances; this seems highly speculative, and rather hyperlogical' (Studies in Jainism. p. 18).

Dr. Jacobi, further, compares Dharma and Adharma with Rajas and Tamas of the Sāṃkhya. He says, 'Rajas is necessary for motion and immobility is caused by Tamas. Immobility or rest is, however, but one aspect of Tamas; another is 'iniquity' adharma. This character of Tamas, consisting in Adharma, proves the near relation between Sāṃkhya Tamas and Jain Adharma and, explains at the same time, why the substratum of immobility has been named by the Jains, by the strange name Adharma'. (Studies in Jainism, p. 85).

- 16 This Siddhasena is different from Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsu and its Bhāṣya



Āgamas at all places the employment of the term *Guṇa* is avoided. Thirdly, the meaning of the word *Guṇa* used in the Āgamas is not quality but number. For example, the term *Guṇa* in the phrase- 'eka-guṇa,' 'dasa-guṇa' means number (of states or degree) and not quality. All this conclusively proves that Āgamas do not accept *Guṇa* as an independent category over and above *Paryāya*.<sup>17</sup>

Thus Siddhasena, on the basis of the authority of the Āgamas, establishes the position that *Guṇa* is not a distinct category apart from *Paryāya* but is identical with the latter.

*Pūjyapāda* recognises *Guṇa* as different from *Paryāya*. The *Guṇas*, according to him, are those that always accompany the *Dravya* while the *Paryāyas* are those that do not accompany the *Dravya* (throughout its career of *parīṇāma*). Thus, for example, knowledge etc., are the *Guṇas* of *Jīva* which always accompany the latter. Similarly colour, etc., are of *Pudgala*. The specific transformations of these *Guṇas*, such as the knowledge of *ghaṭa*, *paṭa* etc., anger, pride etc., in the case of *Jīva*, strong and mild odour, dark and faint colour etc., in the case of *Pudgala* are the *Paryāyas* of *Jīva* and *Pudgala* respectively.<sup>18</sup>

*Akalamkā* in his *Rāj. V.* maintains both the views viz., the non-distinction between *Guṇa* and *Paryāya* as well as the distinction between the two.<sup>19</sup> The first view is similar to that of Siddhasena Divākara while the second to that of *Pūjyapāda*.

*Vidyānanda*, following *Pūjyapāda*, explains *Guṇa* and *Paryāya* thus. The *Guṇas* co-exist in *Dravya*, while the *Paryāyas* are different from them in so far as they take place in succession.<sup>20</sup>

17 *Sanmati*—Tarka III. 9—14

18 *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tsu V.* 38.

19 p. 243—244

20 *Śloka-vārtika* on *V.* 42 (p. 440)

Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsū. and its bhāṣya, clearly endorses the view of Akalaṅka. According to Siddhasena, from the empirical standpoint, Guṇas are distinguished from Paryāyas. The Guṇas have simultaneous existence in a Dravya, whereas the Paryāyas have not. In reality, however, the Paryāyas themselves are the Guṇas i. e. are identical with the Guṇas<sup>21</sup>

Vālideva, in his Syādvāda-ratnakara, accepts the distinction between Guṇa and Paryāya but defends it more cleverly by regarding Guṇa and Paryāya as two types of Viśeṣas. Viśeṣa or particular, he says, is of two kinds, Guṇa and Paryāya. Guṇa is a co-existent characteristic, as for instance, the potentiality of the manifestation of consciousness etc. in the Ātman; and the Paryāya, on the other hand, occurs in succession one after another—as for example, happiness, unhappiness etc. in the Ātman.<sup>22</sup>

Haribhadra, in his SVS, seems to follow Siddhasena Divākara, by accepting only two categories, viz. Dravya and Paryāya. He assimilates the Guṇas in the category of Dravya.<sup>23</sup>

Yaśovijayji, in his commentary on the SVS, not only follows Siddhasena Divākara's view but also discusses it, in detail, giving the same arguments as were given by Divākara.<sup>24</sup>

The same view is put forward by Yaśovijayaji in his Gujarati work, 'Dravya-Guṇa-Paryāya Rāsa', wherein he states that the view of some who uphold that Guṇa, as potentiality, is a distinct category and that it is the cause of Guṇa-paryāya just as Dravya is the cause of Dravya-paryāya is not correct.<sup>25</sup>

The above discussion gives us some idea as to how the Jain Ācāryas extended the principle of Paryāya to Guṇa. Once when

21 Siddhasena's Commentary on V. 37 (p. 428)

22 Syādvādaratnākara, Ch. V., p. 735

23 SVS VII. 31

24 Commentary of Yaśovijaya on SVS p. 261

25 'Dravya-Guṇa-Paryāya Rāsa' II. p. 10.

they accepted the analysis of reality into Dravya and Guṇa, they must have felt the difficulty of showing the relation between Guṇa and Paryāya. This they solved by having two types of Paryāyas viz., Dravya-paryāya and Guṇa-paryāya. But, while doing this, they defined Guṇas as 'anvayinah' i. e. the persistent elements of a thing. After such a definition of Guṇa, it is difficult to see what would be left of Dravya, for a Parīṇāmavādin. However, with the ever helpful Anekānta dialectic, the Jain Ācāryas will justify it, by having recourse to 'bhedābheda'. It appears, however, that Siddhasena Divākara, Haribhadra and Yaśovijaya are not only more consistent with the teaching of the Āgamas, but philosophically more sensible also.<sup>26</sup>

## (2) *Parīṇāma and Parispanda*

The later works analyse Parīṇāma into Parispandātmaka parīṇāma and Aparispandātmaka parīṇāma. The first being change due to movement in space and the second internal change of qualities in a thing. Sometimes these two are also viewed under the concept of kriyā. This distinction, it must be noted, is not to be found in Jain philosophical literature before Pūjyapāda. Let us see how Pūjyapāda and the later Jain philosophers distinguish them.

According to Pūjyapāda, the change in a thing, of the nature of origination of a new characteristic and disappearance of the old one, is to be called Aparispandātmaka-parīṇāma. For example, anger etc. in Jīva, changes of colour etc. in Pudgala, the change

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26 Jacobi, correctly, observes that 'the mention of Guṇas seems to be a later innovation, due to the influence which the philosophy and terminology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, gradually, gained over the scientific thoughts of the Hindus. For, at the side of Paryāya, there seems to be no room for an independent category 'quality', since Paryāya is the state in which a thing, Dravya, is at any moment of its existence and this must therefore include qualities, as seems to be actually the view, embodied in the oldest text'. (SBE. Vol.XLV. pp xxxiv)

in the 'agurulaghu' quality of Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa—all these represent Aparispandātmaka-pariṇāma. Kriyā, however, is distinguished from this kind of Pariṇāma and is called Parispandātmikā though Parispanda is not defined.<sup>27</sup>

Akalamka refutes the view that like 'sthiti' (staticity), kriyā too gets included under Pariṇāma. He points out that a substance (dravya) possesses two bhāvas (states)—Parispandātmaka and Aparispandātmaka; to indicate the former, the term kriyā is employed and to indicate the latter the term pariṇāma is employed.<sup>28</sup>

Vidyānanda points out that only that paryāya or pariṇāma of a Dravya which is the cause of the attainment of another place is to be called Kriyā and not all.<sup>29</sup> At another place he includes both Parispanda and Pariṇāma under kriyā.<sup>30</sup>

Siddhasena, the commentator of the 'Tsū. and its bhāṣya, at one place, states that the change in a substance (dravya) without abandoning its essential nature is pariṇāma; and hence pariṇāma does not include in its fold parispanada, i. e., kriyā,<sup>31</sup> while at another place he states that kriyā is a particular kind of pariṇāma.<sup>32</sup> This suggests that he is not opposed to the view that includes kriyā under the head of pariṇāma.

Thus, Pūjyapāda and Akalamka distinguish between Kriyā and Pariṇāma by defining the former as Parispandātmikā (i. e. movement in space) and the latter as internal change of qualities

27 Sarvārtha-siddhi on V. 22

28 RājV p. 227

29 द्रव्यस्य हि देशान्तरप्राप्तिहेतुः पर्यायः क्रिया, न सर्वः ।

Sl. V. p. 357-398

30 परिस्पन्दलक्षणया क्रियया..... परिणामलक्षणया तु क्रियया... ।

Sl. V. p. 398, See also AŚS p. 178

31 द्रव्यस्य स्वजात्यपरित्यागेन परिस्पन्देतरप्रयोगजपर्यायस्वभावः परिणामः..... ।

commentary, p. 350

32 परिणतिविशेषा एव वर्तनाक्रियाभेदा इति । Ibid, p. 353

in a thing. Akalaṃka uses the word 'bhāva' to include both *kriyā* and *Parīṇāma*. Vidyānanda uses the word *kriyā* in the same sense (i. e. *Parispanda*), but, while applying *Parīṇāma* to *Dharma* and *Adharma*, he uses the word *kriyā*, in a wider sense, to include both *Parispanda* and *Parīṇāma*, i. e. in the sense in which Akalaṃka uses the word 'bhāva'. Siddhasena also follows the distinction made by Pūjyapāda and others in the passage quoted in fn. 31. However, what is to be noted is that Vidyānanda calls *kriyā* a *Paryāyaviśeṣa* of *Dravya*, and Siddhasena too calls it a *Parīṇataviśeṣa*. This is likely to cause some confusion. For, if we follow the distinction between *Parīṇāma* and *kriyā* (*gatikarma* or *Parispanda*), it would not be quite proper to include either, *Parīṇāma* and *kriyā* or *Parispanda*, as two varieties of *Kriyā* as Vidyānanda and Siddhasena do or to call *kriyā* a *paryāyaviśeṣa* as Vidyānanda and Siddhasena do. If we confine the word *Paryāya* to denote a state due to *Parīṇāma*, then it cannot be used to denote *Kriyā*, which is distinct from *parīṇāma*. But the Jain Ācāryas seem to have allowed this looseness to remain on purpose because *Parīṇāma*-*Paryāya* express the nature of reality as such. Hence every kind of change, either internal (of qualities of a thing) or due to movement in space, has to be regarded as a case of *Parīṇāma*-*Paryāya*. Akalaṃka tries to avoid the difficulty, by using the word *bhāva* to include both *Parīṇāma* and *Kriyā* but if he be asked to define 'bhāva', he would have to include *Parīṇāma* as a part of his definition. The narrower meaning that is sometimes given by the commentators is scientifically more useful in as much as it clearly distinguishes between the change which we call transformation or evolution, and the change due to movement in space, which may not affect the internal qualities of a thing. But philosophically, it delimits the principle of *Parīṇāma*, which was supposed to characterise the whole of reality, and therefore, *kriyā* also. So, the Jain Ācāryas could not help being loose and indefinite in the usage of these terms.

(3) *Prayoga-Parīṇāma and Visrasā-Parīṇāma*

The analysis of Parīṇāma into Prayoga, Visrasā and Miśra is, as we have seen, mentioned in the Bh. Sū., with reference to Pudgala. The Tattvārtha-bhāṣya refers to the same, as subdivisions of gati or kriyā. But these are not explained either in the Bh. Sū. or in the Tbh.

There is, however, no uniformity in the treatment of this topic in later works. Sometimes these are mentioned in relation to Parīṇāma, sometimes in relation to utpāda-vināśa, and sometimes in relation to kriyā or gati. What is more, while certain works mention further subdivisions of Prayoga and Visrasā, such as 'Samudāyakṛta', 'Aikatvika' etc. (which we shall presently see), others simply explain these, in a general way, without referring to the subdivisions. Lastly, it may be noted that Miśra-Parīṇāma is more often than not, omitted. All this will be clear from what follows.

Siddhasena Divākara, in his Sanmati-tarka, mentions prayoga and visrasā in relation to utpāda and vināśa and gives the subdivisions thereof. According to him, utpāda (origination) and vināśa (destruction) are of two kinds—one brought about by sentient agency (prayoga) and the other natural (visrasā). Origination or destruction brought about by sentient agency is also called samudāyavāda or aparīṣuddha. And natural origination or destruction is also of two kinds—samudāyakṛt and aikatvika. Aikatvika origination (one-sided) is seen in Ākāśa, Dharma and Adharma. It is due to external causes and is not seen invariably. Regarding samudāyakṛt destruction, it is said that it could be brought about in two ways, viz. by the separation of aggregates and by the transformation into another mode.<sup>33</sup>

The only extant commentary on Sanmati is by Abhayadeva (11th cent. A. D). It explains the meaning of the concerned Sanmati gathās in detail, the gist of which may be stated as follows :

“Both origination and destruction are of two kinds, viz., ‘prayogajanita’ i. e. brought about by human efforts and ‘vaisrasika’, i. e. natural. Now, both the artificial origination and destruction and natural origination and destruction are Samudāyā-kṛta i. e. aggregational. When the disjoined members unite to make up a thing, it is an instance of aggregational origination. It is also termed ‘impure origination’ (aparīśuddha), as it does not depend on one particular substance (but more than one). Aggregational destruction (both artificial and natural) is of two kinds, one, arising from a disjunction or division of the component parts of an aggregate and the other resulting from the transformation of a thing from one state to another. The example of the former is the destruction of cloth, on the disjunction of its component parts viz., the threads, while the transformation of clay into a pot is the second kind of destruction.

Natural origination and destruction, has besides the above, one additional division, viz., Aikatvika, which is not found in the artificial utpāda and vināśa. This Aikatvika Utpāda and Vināśa are confined only to those single entities viz., Ākāśa, Dharma and Adharma which are indivisible wholes. Again, they are simply natural. For Ākāśa, Dharma and Adharma cannot give scope to effort as they are, unlike atom, devoid of the motion, though they undergo a modificatory change. The utpāda and vināśa of these three, is or can be simply this that they disinterestedly become a receptacle and passive instruments in effecting motion or stability from the viewpoints of Time and Space for the atom or the Soul which has the dynamic power. But such utpāda and vināśa, being dependent on others are ‘aniyata’ or ‘irregular.’ (or not invariable).<sup>34</sup>

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34 द्विभेद उत्पादः— पुरुषेतरकारकव्यापारजन्यतया अध्यक्षानुमानाभ्यां तथा तस्य

Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tsū. and its bhāṣya,<sup>35</sup> and Yaśovijayaji<sup>36</sup> also discuss in detail the above subdivisions of Prayoga and Visrasā. The gist of their discussion is essentially the same, and so we do not repeat it here.

Pūjyapāda, Akalamka and Vidyānanda do not allude to the above mentioned divisions of Prayoga and Visrasā, but explain them in general. Pūjyapāda mentions Prayoga and Visrasā, as two kinds of Parispandātmikā kriyā. The movement of cart, etc. and that of clouds etc. are given as illustrations of the two kinds of kriyā<sup>37</sup> respectively. He does not explain Prayoga and Visrasā

प्रतीतेः । ..... तत्र प्रयोगेण यो जनित उत्पादः मूर्तिमद्द्रव्यारब्धावयवकृतत्वात्  
स समुदायवादः, तथाभूताऽऽरब्धस्य समुदायात्मकत्वात् । तत एवासावपरि-  
शुद्धः, सावयवात्मकस्य तच्छब्दवाच्यत्वेन अभिप्रेतत्वात् ॥

English translation by A. S. Gopani, p. 143-146

स्वाभाविकश्च द्विविध उत्पादः — एकः समुदायकृतः प्राक्प्रतिपादितावयवारब्धो  
घटादिवत् । अपरश्चै कत्विकोऽनुत्पादिताऽमूर्तिमद्द्रव्यावयवारब्ध आकाशादिवत् ।  
आकाशादीनां च त्रयाणां द्रव्याणामवगाहकादिघटादिपरद्रव्यनिमित्तोऽवगाहना-  
दिक्रियोत्पादोऽनियमाद् अनेकान्ताद् भवेत् अवगाहक-गन्तृ-स्थातृद्रव्यसन्निधा-  
नतोऽम्बर-धर्मा-धर्मेष्ववगाहन-गति-स्थितिक्रियोत्पत्तिनिमित्तभावोत्पत्तिरित्य-  
मिप्रायः ।

विगमस्यापि एष द्विरूपो भेदः — स्वाभाविकः प्रयोगजनितश्चेति..... ।  
तत्र समुदायजनिते यो विनाशः स उभयगामि द्विविधः — एकः समुदय-  
विभागमात्रप्रकारो विनाशः यथा पटादेः कार्यस्य तत्कारणपृथक्करणे तन्तु-  
विभागमात्रम्, द्वितियप्रकारस्त्वर्थान्तरभागगमनं विनाशः यथा मृत्पिण्डस्य  
घटार्थान्तरभावेनोत्पादो विनाशः ।

Sanmati, Vol. V. p. 641, 643

35 p. 383, 384; 385

36 Śyādayāḍakalpalatā a Commentary on SVS. VII 7 by Yaśovijaya, p. 219, 220, 221. cf. also 'Dravya-Guṇa-Paryāya Rāsa', p. 97, 98, 99

37 'क्रिया परिसंदात्मिका । साद्विविधा प्रायोगिकवैज्ञानिकभेदात् । तत्र प्रायो-  
गिकी शकटादीनां वैज्ञानिकी भेदादीनाम् ।



as such. But Akalāmka explains them as such in the following manner.

The modification, of the ~~nature~~ of Prayoga and Visrasā, of a Dravya without giving up its essential nature, is Pariṇāma. The 'aupaśamikādi states' (i. e. those states in which passions are being subdued) of the soul, being dependent upon the suppression of Karmas and not upon the efforts of a sentient agent, represent the natural Pariṇāma of the soul, while the states (bhāva) of knowledge (jñāna), conduct (śīla), and thought-activity (bhāvanā), being dependent upon the efforts of Ācāryas etc, constitute the Prayogaja or artificial Pariṇāmas of the soul. In the case of non-sentient substances, like clay etc., the Pariṇāma of the form of 'ghaṭa' etc. being the result of the efforts of sentient agents like potter, etc. is the artificial one, while that of rainbow etc., is the natural Pariṇāma. Similarly, the Pariṇāma of Dharma etc. should be understood.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, Akalāmka understands Prayoga and Visrasā as two types of Pariṇāma and applies them particularly to Jīva and Pudgala.

Vidyānanda applies Prayoga-Visrasā to Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa, besides Jīva and Pudgala.

The natural Pariṇāma of Dharma and others, he states, is the state of their possessing innumerable space-points, of their being the cause etc. of particular movements of things, while their being the cause etc. of movement of machines, etc. is their

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38 द्रव्यस्य स्वजात्यपरित्यागेन प्रयोगविक्षसा लक्षणो विकारः परिणामः । ..... तत्र चेतनस्य द्रव्यस्य औपशमिकादिर्भावः कर्मोपशमाद्यपेक्षोऽपौरुषेयत्वात् वैज्ञानिक इत्युच्यते । ज्ञानशीलभावनादिलक्षणः आचार्यादिपुरुषप्रयोगनिमित्तत्वात् प्रयोगजः । अचेतनस्य च मृदादेः घटसंस्थानादिपरिणामः कुलालादिपुरुषप्रयोगनिमित्तत्वात् प्रयोगजः । इंद्रधनुरादिनानापरिणामो वैज्ञानिकः । तथा धर्मादेरपि परिणामो योज्यः । Rāj. V. p. 22

artificial *Pariṇāma* because it depends upon human effort.<sup>39</sup>

Siddhasena, the commentator of the *Tsū* and its *bhāṣya*, while commenting on the *Tsū*. V. 22 gives *Prayoga*, *Visrasā* and *Miśra* as the varieties of 'gati' or 'kriyā'.<sup>40</sup> It must be noted that he does not refer to those varieties viz., *Samudāyakṛta*, *Aikatvika* etc., which he discusses in his *ṭīkā* on the *Tsū*. V. 29.

From the above, it can be seen that while Siddhasena *Divākara*, *Abhayadeva*, and Siddhasena the commentator of the *Tsū* and its *bhāṣya*, apply the two types of *Pariṇāma*, *Prayoga* and *Visrasā*, chiefly to changes of *Pudgala*, *Dharma*, *Adharma*, and *Ākāśa* i. e. to *Ajīva* substances only, *Akalamka* and *Vidyānanda* extend them to *Jīva* also.

The above analysis of *Pariṇāma* into *Prayoga* and *Visrasā* is an attempt to explain two types of causation, one natural and the other involving human agency. This obviates, for the Jain, the necessity of postulating a Creator, because he is able to explain all the happenings in the universe by these two types of *Pariṇāmas*.

#### (4) *Artha-Paryāya and Vyañjana-Paryāya*

The distinction or analysis of *Paryāya* into *Artha-Paryāya* and *Vyañjana-Paryāya* is to be found for the first time in the *Sanmati-Tarka* of Siddhasena *Divākara*.

39 धर्मास्तिकायादिद्रव्यस्य तु वैस्रसिकोऽसंख्येयप्रदेशित्वादिरनादिः परिणामः  
प्रतिनियतगत्युपग्रहेतुत्वादिः । आदिमान् प्रयोगजो यन्त्रादित्युपग्रहेतुत्वादिः  
पुरुषप्रयोगापेक्षत्वात् । *Sl. V. on V. 22*

40 तत्र प्रयोगगतिः जीवपरिणामसंप्रयुक्ता शरीराहारवर्णगन्धरसस्पर्शसंस्थानविषया, विस्रसागतिः प्रयोगमन्तरेण केवलाजीवद्रव्यस्वपरिणामरूपा, परमाण्वभेन्द्रधनुः परिवेषादिरूपा विचित्रसंस्थाना ..... । P. 353

Siddhasena Divākara uses the term *vyañjana-Paryāya* to signify a series of changes which has such similarity as to allow it to be called by one name, and the term *Artha-Paryāya*, to indicate those minute or subtle divisions in the change-series, which are or appear to be further indivisible and which, therefore, cannot be given any name.<sup>41</sup>

This distinction is referred to at various places in the works of the Tarka-period like those of Akalaṃka, Vidyānanda, Yaśovijaya etc. and is explained in a similar manner.<sup>42</sup> Yaśovijaya, it may be noted, gives in detail various subdivisions of *Artha-Paryāya* and *Vyañjana-Paryāya* such as '*Dravya-vyañjana-paryāya*', '*Guṇa-vyañjana-paryāya*', '*Dravya-arthah-paryāya*', '*Guṇa-arthaparyāya*', '*Vibhāva-dravya-vyañjana-paryāya*', '*Svabhava-dravya-vyañjana-paryāya*',<sup>43</sup> etc. which are generally not to be seen in other works.

It is noteworthy that a late work (15th cent. A. D.), *Pancādhyāyī*, by Rājamalla alludes to *Artha-Paryāya* and *Vyañjana-Paryāya* in an altogether different sense. According to him, *Guṇa-Paryāya* is *Artha-paryāya* and *Dravya-Paryāya* is *Vyañjana-Paryāya*; what is more, *Dravya-Paryāya* is, specifically, taken to mean minute spatial parts of indivisible wholes, like *Dharma*, *Adh-*

41 Sanmati-tarka, I. 31, 32, 34

42 दृश्याः स्थूला व्यञ्जनपर्यायाः अदृश्याः सूक्ष्माः केवलागमगम्या अर्थपर्यायाः । स्थूलो व्यञ्जन पर्यायो वाग्मगम्यो नञ्चरः स्थिरः । सूक्ष्मः प्रतिक्षणध्वंसी पर्याय-श्चार्थसंज्ञकः । ASS on kā. 11 Tippana p. 112 Cf also Śl. V. pp. 129-130 धर्माधर्मनभःकाला अर्थपर्यायगोचराः । व्यञ्जनेन तु संबद्धौ द्वावन्यौ जीव-पुद्गलौ । आलापपद्धति of Devasena st. 2.

स्थूलाः कालान्तरस्थायिनः शब्दानां संकेतविषयाः व्यञ्जनपर्याया इति । प्रावचनिकप्रसिद्धेः । नयप्रदीप p. 64

43 '*Dravya-Guṇa-Paryāya Rāsa*', p. 149, 151

Naya-pradipa, p. 47

arma,<sup>44</sup> etc. which can only be imagined, and which are, therefore, not real but subjective.<sup>45</sup> This sense of Dravya-Paryāya reminds us, of such Paryāyas of Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa, as deśa, pradeśa, which we noticed in the Āgama section. Anyway, it is clear that Pancādhyāyī does not follow Siddhasena Divākara and others, in the interpretation of the terms Artha-Paryāya and Vyañjana-Paryāya. It is also not clear as to whom the words, 'Keciṭ Budhāḥ.' (I 63) refer. For, in no other work, do we find this kind of meaning given to Artha-Paryāya and Vyañjana-Paryāya.

### Defence of Pariṇāma

So far we have considered the elucidation of Pariṇāma and its progressive application to the Dravyas from various points of view. Now we have to consider the various arguments advanced by the later dialectical writers, in defence of Pariṇāmavāda. This is done by showing the logical impossibility in the realm of metaphysics as well as ethics of holding absolute changelessness of reality, (Kūṭastha-nityatā), or absolute change-fulness without any persistent element (Kṣaṇikavāda).

In this section, as the arguments of the different Śvetāmbara and Digambara writers on this topic show a substantial unifor-

- 44 गुणपर्यायाणामिह केचिन्नामान्तरं वदन्ति बुधाः ।  
 अर्थो गुण इति वा स्यादेकार्थादर्थपर्याया इति च ॥  
 अपि चोद्दिष्टानामिह देशांशैर्द्रव्यपर्यायाणां हि ।  
 व्यञ्जनपर्याया इति केचिन्नामान्तरं वदन्ति बुधाः ॥  
 I, 62-63.

- 45 अंशविभागः स्यादित्यखण्डदेशे महत्यपि द्रव्ये ।  
 विष्कम्भस्य क्रमतो व्योम्नीवाङ्गुलिवितस्तिहस्तादिः ॥  
 प्रथमो द्वितीय इत्याद्यसंख्यदेशस्ततोऽप्यनन्ताश्च ।  
 अंशा निरंशरूपास्तावन्तो द्रव्यपर्यायाख्यास्ते ॥ I. 24-25

mity, I have drawn upon those authors whose exposition is detailed and clear. Other references are quoted in foot-notes.

### *(1) Defence of Parīṇāma on Metaphysical grounds*

The metaphysical problems concern the operation of causality (kāryakāraṇabhāva), arthakriyākāritva, recognition (pratyabhijñā), and memory. The Jain writers mainly show that all these three would not be possible if their Parīṇāmavāda is not accepted.

#### *(a) Kāryakāraṇabhāva :*

If a thing is regarded as unchanging in an absolute sense, there would be no causation, as causation is possible in time and is therefore possible in that which is temporal. An unchanging eternal has no temporal character and so cannot be a cause. On the other hand, if a thing is supposed to be momentary, in an absolute sense, the question arises, as to whether the two momentary reals that are supposed to cause one the other are simultaneous or successive. If the former, one of them cannot produce the other, any more than the left horn can produce the right horn. If the latter, there can be no causal relation between them, in as much as one (i. e. the cause) has already passed away when the other (i. e. effect) springs into existence. And if the latter can come into existence even in the absence of the cause at the moment of its origin, there is no reason why it should not come into being at the other moments (even before the production of the effect) when the cause is absent likewise.<sup>46</sup>

The Jain, however, maintains that causation can easily fit in with his view of reality, as it fulfils the necessary condition of

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46 AMi 37, 43; DhS 237-244; AYD 16, SVM on AYD 16

It must be noted that many more arguments on the basis of dialectical reasoning are set forth in the works noted above, to show the impossibility of causation on the assumption of absolute non-change or absolute changefulness, but we have noticed only the important ones. I have followed the same method in the following discussion also.

causation viz. change through persistence (the cause being both permanent and fluxional).

(b) Arthakriyākāritva

The most important criterion of Sat or reality is given as 'arthakriyākāritva', i. e. the the quality of serving a purpose. The theories of kūṭastha-nityatā and kṣaṇikatva are criticised from this point of view.

The impossibility of 'arthakriyākāritva,' in an unchanging eternal is shown by the following dilemma : 'Does the thing that is supposed to be unchangingly eternal exercise *arthakriyā* step by step or all at once ? It cannot do so step by step for that involves the loss of nityatva – the thing having already changed i. e. ceased to be nitya, the moment the first step has been taken. If the thing continues to be the same even after the first step is taken, there will be no cessation of the activity suited to the first step, and thus there will be no possibility of a second step ever being taken. If, on the other hand, the thing is supposed to change by the first step, it loses its nityatva by so doing. For, to be no longer in the former state, means to be anitya. If it be said by way of defence that the thing remains the same all along the steps but awaits the arrival of an auxiliary – sahakārin – cause in going from step to step and thus the changes are rung out, not on the original thing which retains its sameness and therefore nityatva, but only on the series of sahakārins, that does not really obviate the difficulty but only pushes it a little further on. Thus if the thing remains the same in spite of the arrival of the sahakārin, it means the latter has exercised no influence upon the original cause, and if for influencing, another sahakārin is needed, then the fallacy of regressus infinitum (anavasthā doṣa) will occur.

The other alternative of 'yauṅapadya' too is impossible. Nothing can put forth activity in all directions, and accomplish its effects all at once, in a single moment of time. Supposing it can,

all its work will be finished in the first instant of time, leaving the thing without *kriyā* and, therefore, different from what it was before, which amounts to a confession that the thing is *anitya*.

In the same way, if all things be momentary, the cause and effect will fall on two different moments of time, and so, at the moment when one is, the other is not. Now how can that which is, act upon that which is not? And if a thing cannot act, it cannot be, for to be is to act or accomplish. Thus the things, can never be momentary in the absolute sense. This is, further, shown by the following dilemma: Is the momentary thing *sat*, while it acts, or is it *asat*? Not the former. For, in that case, it would be operating upon its contemporaneous effect which is impossible; for if that were possible, all things being contemporaneous with one another, would be causes of one another, which is absurd. The latter alternative also will not do, for how can a thing, that is *asat*, possess causal power any more than the hare's horn? And no third alternative is possible. Therefore the original hypothesis of momentariness breaks down<sup>47</sup>

For the Jain, however, there is no difficulty as the things, under *syādvāda* hypothesis, can act, while they possess the three-fold characteristic of abandonment of previous form, acceptance of a new form, and retention of its own identity.

#### (c) *Pratyabhijñā Smaraṇa*

In an absolutely unchanging thing, there being no antecedence and sequence, recognition of the sameness in change, is not possible; similarly recollection is impossible, on the assumption of momentariness of things. For, knowledge, that is, experience has passed away and there is nothing to connect it with the knowledge that is memory. If the author of experience and that of memory were not required to be identical, A would experience a

thing and B would remember it. In other words, any man would remember any thing, irrespective of the need of previous experience. And if recollection is impossible, recognition becomes impossible too, as it involves recollection in addition to experience.<sup>48</sup>

## *(2) Defence of Pariṇāma on ethical grounds*

All the darāśanas, excepting Cārvāka, believe in liberation as the final goal of life and consequently the possibility of achieving it through human behaviour. Now, the Jains try to prove that on the assumption of either absolute non-change or absolute change, all human behaviour becomes meaningless.

If Ātman be regarded as absolutely nitya, the experience of happiness and unhappiness, which is a felt fact, will be rendered impossible. For, to be nitya means to be unchangeable and there cannot be experience of happiness and unhappiness one after another unless Ātman could pass from one state to another. It will be possessed of either happiness or unhappiness for all time, if it be absolutely nitya. If it be urged that the Ātman does not change, only its states change, it is asked, 'do the states remain separate from the Ātman or are they one with the Ātman?' In the former case, how could they be associated with Ātman? In the latter case, they are as good as not, and the difficulty of accounting for change, consistently with the absolute nityatva of Ātman, remains the same.

Furthermore, puṇya and pāpa too are impossible on the hypothesis of absolute nityatva. For, the experience of happiness and unhappiness are brought about by puṇya and pāpa, which means that they should exercise a certain activity and this is impossible, if Ātman is unchangingly eternal.

Next, bondage and liberation will be similarly inexplicable on the hypothesis of exclusive nityatva. Bondage is a kind of sam-



yoga between Ātman and karma, and saṃyoga is 'अप्राप्तानां प्राप्तिः' i.e. obtaining what has not been obtained already. Thus, there are two distinct states involved in the notion of saṃyoga, the previous absence and the later presence—which are inconsistent with the hypothesis of absolute nityatva. Moreover, it will be asked, 'How does a changeless and uniformly enduring Ātman suddenly happen to incur bondage? Again, was it not free before the chains of bondage came to be put on it? Then, does the bondage make any change in the Ātman or not? If it does, it is anitya, like any other mortal thing such as a piece of hide. If it does not, so as to keep it nirvikāra, the presence or absence of the bondage matter nothing to it who remains as unaffected as Ākāśa by change.'<sup>49</sup>

The opposite absolute view of anityatva of Ātman is shown to be untenable thus. If the Ātman is so absolutely anitya, as to undergo change every moment, the law of Retribution which requires personal identity of the doer and the enjoyer, would not hold good, i.e. the doer of the act will be one while the enjoyer of the fruits thereof will be quite a different person.

Similarly such Ātman cannot be the author of puṇya and papa. For, the single instant is the length of time just sufficient for it to come into existence and there is nothing to spare for doing of puṇya and pāpa. If it be urged by way of defence that the Ātman of the first moment produced the Ātman of the next moment, and so on, so that there is a continuity, not the identity, of being, this defence will be of no avail. The law of homogeneity of cause and effect would require that a happy Ātman should beget only a happy Ātman, and so the vicissitudes of happiness and unhappiness in the Ātman would become impossible<sup>50</sup>

49 SVM pp. 155-156

50 SVM. by Prof A. B. Dhruva, Notes, pp. 272, 273, 274

Cf. Similar arguments in DhS 194, 195 etc.. 218, 220-222, 228-231 etc. Sanmati-tarka I. 17-20 Āmī 40-41 and AS and ASS on them. SVS. III. 32, 33, 35, 36. IV. 7-10

The bondage and liberation will have no meaning also, as they cannot be predicated of one and the same Ātman.

If the Buddhist were to explain all the aforementioned problems by substituting *saṁtāna* for Ātman, i.e. continuity for identity and thus making not the identical Ātman, but the continuous stream of consciousness, which we call Ātman, both the doer and the enjoyer, – karma being transmitted from one life to another in the shape of *karma-vāsanās* i.e. as impressions left on the Ātman by karmas on the analogy of a colour which transmits itself from one piece of cloth to another – the Jain declares this explanation to be without substance and cogency; according to him, *saṁtāna* and *vāsanā* have no reality. This is shown by this dilemma :

Is the *saṁtāna* the same as the *saṁtānin* or different ? In the former case, the position remains the same (as in the view of momentariness). In the latter case, a question may be put whether the distinction of the *saṁtāna* and the *saṁtānin* is real or unreal. If it is unreal, the position remains status in quo ante. If it is real, it may be asked whether the *saṁtāna* which is supposed to be really distinct from the *saṁtānin*, is itself momentary or otherwise (i.e. *nitya*). If the former, all the fallacies, shown in the doctrine of momentariness, stand as they are. If the latter, the *saṁtāna* will be only another word for a permanent Ātman, and this would be contradicting the assumption of momentariness.

The unreality of *vāsanā* is thus shown. The two, viz., *vāsanā* and the stream of different moments (*kṣaṇasaṁtati*) cannot fit in with each other as identical interest. For if they be identical, they are either *vāsanā* or *kṣaṇasaṁtati*; one must be merged in the other. If there is *vāsanā* alone and no *vāsyā* on which *vāsanā* is to operate, the *vāsanā* would be no *vāsanā*. If, on the other hand, *kṣaṇasaṁtati* be regarded as the sole reality, the old difficulties stand as before. If the two, *vāsanā* and *saṁtati*, are different,

then the question is, whether the vāsanā is momentary or otherwise. If the former, there is no reason for its recognition. The only reason for its recognition is to supply the principle of permanence, which is lacking in the kṣaṇasamṛtati. If, it is nitya, it violates the doctrine of universal momentariness.

The third alternative of anubhayapakṣa too is impossible. There must be either bheda or abheda between vāsanā and kṣaṇasamṛtati; because bheda and abheda are mutually exclusive, and if one is not, the other must be there. Besides if the relation is neither bheda nor abheda, it means it is unreal. According to all those who do not endorse the anekāntavāda of the Jains, a thing must be either bhinna or abhinna, a third alternative is not possible. It is, therefore, concluded by the Jain that the opponent must endorse the Jain doctrine of both bheda and abheda.<sup>51</sup>

Thus the aforementioned metaphysical and ethical problems, as also uncontradicted verdict of experience necessitate, maintains the Jain, the recognition of the doctrine of Parīṇāma, which represents the synthesis of the two extremes of absolute nityatva and absolute anityatva. It is the doctrine of identity-in-change, of unity-in-difference.

After having justified the doctrine of Parīṇāma on metaphysical and ethical grounds, the Jain sets himself to the task of answering the arguments advanced against the doctrine of Parīṇāma.

### (3) *Jainas answer the objections raised by others*

It has been contended, by the opponent, that there is inconsistency in the doctrine of Parīṇāma, as it involves the attribution of opposite properties of 'permanence' and 'change' to one and the same entity. For, utpāda is the birth or origination of some-

thing, that did not exist before, and vināśa is the opposite of it i.e. the abhāva or destruction of that which existed, 'Dhrauṇvya', on the other hand, is devoid of both these traits viz. utpāda and vināśa. How can these be in an entity at a time.<sup>52</sup>

The objection is answered by the Jain by an appeal to experience, as also by having recourse to the *anekanta* dialectic thus :

The experience favours the view that things are multiform in character, and so, the only doctrine which tallies with experience and, therefore, with truth is that things are neither exclusively *nitya*, nor *anitya*, but are, in reality, both.

It is also averred that the statement of *utpāda*, *vyaya*, and *dhrauṇvya* is made from two different standpoints viz., the *Paryāya* standpoint and the *Dravya* standpoint respectively. It, thus, refers to the two aspects of reality, the *Dravya* referring to the *dhrauṇvya* aspect, and *Paryāya* to the *utpāda-vyaya* aspect; so, there remains no scope for the alleged inconsistency which would be justifiable, if the two opposite properties were predicated, in one and the same breath, of one and the same aspect.<sup>53</sup>

Another objection concerns the relation of the triad of *utpāda*, *vyaya* and *dhrauṇvya*, to the thing (reality) of which they are predicated.<sup>54</sup> This objection is stated and answered by *Vidyānanda* in this ASS.<sup>55</sup> As this portion of ASS has been very lucidly explained by Dr. S.Mookerjee in his 'Jain philosophy of non-Absolutism' (p. 74-76) we quote his words below.

52 अत्राप्यभिदधत्यन्ये विरुद्धं हि मिथस्त्रग्रम् ।  
एकत्रैवैकदा नैतद्वदां प्राञ्चति जातुचित् ॥  
उत्पादोऽभूतभवनं विनाशस्तद्विपर्ययः ।  
द्रौव्यं चोभयशून्यं यदेकदैकत्र तत्कथम् ? ॥

53 SVS VII 10-14; RājV on V. 30 (p. 239)

54 cf. Rāj V. on TSū V. 29. P. 239. Śl. V. p. 434. SVM, p. 133-136.

55 ASS p. 112-113 (on Āmī 11.)

'If persistence, cessation and birth were, each of them, identical with substance of which they are predicated, then being identical with the same substance, all of them would be identical with one another. Thus, persistence would be the same thing as cessation and birth, cessation would be identical with persistence and birth, and birth would be identical with cessation and persistence. So the triple character is reduced to an identical single mode. And if, each of these modes were regarded as numerically different from the substance and also from one another, and if each of them were believed to be real, then again each of these modes would have triple character. An infinite vicious series would be inevitable, as each of the triple modes, would have another triple character and so on to infinity, unless the triple mode were severally and jointly asserted to be unreal characterization. Either a single mode, in the place of the triple character, or an infinite series, or its unreality, is to be asserted. But, the Jain answers the critic, by asserting the non-absolutistic position. So far as persistence etc are regarded as identical with the substance, it is legitimate that persistence and cessation and birth should be regarded as identical. And if attention is concentrated on the aspect of difference of those modes, from the substance, and from one another, then each of them would have a triple character. There is no reason for the infinite series, as difference is not absolute. The modes are identical with the substance only so far as the substance is focussed in the modes. The modes are not absolutely different from substance, as, in that case, the modes would not belong to the substance. The mode is a mode of the substance, because the identity of substance is focussed in it and is not annulled. So a mode is identical with substance in that respect. To take an example, clay is transformed into a jar, and so the former is regarded as the cause of the latter. The jar is different from clay, no doubt, but the jar could not be a jar unless it were the same substance as clay. So difference and identity, both being inseparable moments in the relation, a mode as identical with the substance may have the same predicates with the substance, and as different from the substance may each of them

behave as an independent reality and such may have the triple characteristic. The reduction of the triple character to a unitary character is also a matter of point of view. The mode and the substance may be viewed as identical and also as different, as they are both in one. Thus the consequences, alleged to be inevitable by the opponent, are not inevitable, as they are based upon exclusive identity and exclusive difference. But the identity is not exclusive of difference and vice versa as both are the attested traits of reality. A mode and a substance are different because they are two, and they are identical because one is not independent of the other. If identity is to be asserted on the evidence of experience, difference also should equally be asserted on the strength of the same evidence. The compartmental way of looking at things leads to the affirmation of one and to the negation of the other, since it concentrates on one and ignores the other. The besetting sin of philosophers has been the habit to put the telescope upon the blind eye and then to deduce that the other aspect is not real. The Jain philosopher voices the necessity of using both the eyes and of seeing the obverse of the coin of reality.'

### Recapitulation

Āgamas frequently refer to Paryāya and Parīṇāma. As in the Sāṃkhya-kārikā, here also the terms are not clearly defined and probably for the same reason viz. that the terms were too well-known to require explanation. The elements of Parīṇāma are, however, clearly mentioned, viz. Dravya – the permanent or abiding element, Parīṇāma – the process of transformation, and Paryāya, the state of Dravya. Only these are not put together to form a definition.

The term Paryāya, however, has a wider connotation signifying both a state due to Parīṇāma or any other aspect due to division in space such as deśa and pradeśa of Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa.

This consideration as well as the greater frequency of the term Paryāya leads one to believe that Paryāyavāda must have been the original doctrine of the Jains, particularly so when we bear in mind that the term Paryāya does not occur in the sense in other darśanas. On the other hand, the concept of Parīṇāma was a common property and so must have been used by the Jain thinkers to explain their doctrine of Paryāya.

The Tattvartha-Sūtra shows a more philosophical development, reflecting the influence of other darśanas. In the fashion of the Vaiśeṣikas, Dravya is defined as consisting of Guṇa (quality) in addition to the orthodox Paryāya (mode). The word sat is used to denote reality and is defined as consisting of origination, decay and permanence. This nature of reality is called Parīṇāma in 'तद्भावः परिणामः ।' This approach leads to the application of Utpada, Vyaya and Dhrauvya to anything about which existence can be predicated.

Amongst the Jains, Kundakunda may be called the philosopher of Parīṇāma, par excellence. He describes reality – Sattā as 'सर्वपदस्था, एका, अनन्तपर्याया, भङ्गोत्पादध्रौव्यात्मिका etc.' and in that way puts together all the elements of reality which were left loose by Umāsvāti. The nature of reality is clearly stated to be Parīṇāma which becomes analytically defined as utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Again, by showing invariable concomitance between utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya, he clarifies the concept of Parīṇāma as a unitarily related process. This unitary character is also brought out by pointing to two types of bhedas भेदs – viz. Pṛthaktva i.e. distinction due to separate space-points and Anyatva, i.e. distinction based upon subjective analysis – and stating that Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya are not 'pṛthak' but only 'anya'. He compares and shows the relation between the two triplets of utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya on one side, and Dravya-Guṇa-Paryāya on the other, by declaring that utpāda and vyaya belong to Paryāya while Dravya is what is dhruva or permanent in a thing.

Kundakunda has applied the theory of *Pariṇāma* to his metaphysics of *Jīva*, *Pudgala*, and *Kāla*. His remarkable contribution, however, lies in his philosophy of the *Pariṇāma* of *Jīva*.

The introduction of category of *Guṇa*, in addition to *Dravya* and *Paryāya*, as constituting reality made the later Jain writers assume two types of *Paryāyas* viz. *Dravya-Paryāyas* and *Guṇa-Paryāyas*.

The later works of the *Tarka*-period attempt to apply the doctrine of *Pariṇāma* further to *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa*, and in that way make it a universal principle. In this attempt, however, they have not shown the *Pariṇāmas* of these *Dravyas* as such but through the *Pariṇāmas* of *Jīva* and *Pudgala*. This difficulty is due to the peculiar view of the nature of *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* which are all-prevading and indivisible wholes.

The application of *Pariṇāma* to *Dharma*, *Adharma* and *Ākāśa* compelled the Jain thinkers to relate properly the concepts of *Kriyā* and *Pariṇāma*. Sometimes they would take *kriyā* as a wider concept and understand, movement of a thing in space (*Parispanda*) and material change in time as two types of *kriyā*. Sometimes they would bring these two, viz. *Parispanda* and *Pariṇāma* under *Pariṇāma*, calling the former a *Paryāya-viśeṣa* (पर्यायविशेष) and thus understand *Pariṇāma* as a wider concept.

From a different point of view, they would analyse *Pariṇāma* into two types, viz. *Prayoga* and *Viśrasā*, the first brought about by sentient agency and the second by natural transformation (i.e. without the aid of any sentient agency).

The experience of the fact of human personality which is a *Paryāya* and yet abides from birth to death, made the Jain thinkers classify *Paryāyas* into *Vyañjana-Paryāya* and *Artha-Paryāya*. As long as we can roughly indicate a *Paryāya* by one



word, so long it appears as having a sort of abiding quality. This type of Paryāya is Vyañjana-Paryāya. The actual transformation which goes on continuously every moment is the Artha-Paryāya which is not cognisable to ordinary intelligence and therefore not capable of being named.

The theory of Parīṇāma is explained in greater detail, in the commentaries on the relevant sūtras of the Tattvārtha. What we have to note is that the word 'तद्भाव' in the definition of nitya ('तद्भावाव्ययं नित्यम्' १) which was explained objectively in the Tattvārtha-bhāṣya as 'सतोभाव' comes to be explained by Pūjyapāda, Akalaṃka and Vidyānanda as 'प्रत्यभिज्ञानहेतुता' on the basis of our experience which vouches for the knowledge of recognition of the identity in a thing. In the same way, Vidyānanda adds that utpāda and vyaya refer to that which is the cause of the knowledge of difference, – 'This is different from that, i.e. the previous one'.

Siddhasena, the commentator of the Tbh., explains utpāda and vyaya in terms of manifestation (आविर्भाव) and non-manifestation (तिरोभव) like the author of Yuktīdīpikā and Vācaspati.

Lastly, the Jain thinkers of this period, defend the doctrine of Parīṇāma on various grounds and try to answer the objections of the rival schools of thought. This is done by showing how the principle of causality, the facts of memory and recognition and dogmas of kartṛtva, bhoktṛtva, sukhaduḥkhānubhava, bandha, mokṣa etc. – which are the accepted postulates of almost all the darśanas – will not hold good on the assumption of absolute permanence or absolute change without anything abiding. All these postulates, avers the Jain, can be properly explained only on the acceptance of the doctrine of Parīṇāma, i.e. utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya.

To conclude, the Jain analysed reality, first into Dravya and Paryāya and then into Dravya, Guṇa and Paryāya. The relation between Dravya and Paryāya (i.e. the state of Dravya) is explained

by the process of *Pariṇāma*. Here too, *Pariṇāma* has the same meaning as given by *Yāska*.

The Jain assumes five or six ultimate entities – *Dravyas*. All these have their *Paryāyas* through *Pariṇāma*. Thus, in Jain philosophy, *Pariṇāma* is a universal principle, applying to the whole of reality.

## CHAPTER X

# SĀMĀHYA-YOGA AND JAIN-A COMPARISON

### Philosophical

Both the Sāmkhya-Yoga and Jain seem to have followed Yāska's definition of Vipariṇāma in their doctrine of Pariṇāma, i.e. they have viewed the world-process as change in an abiding entity or entities (विपरिणमते इत्यप्रच्यवमानस्य तत्त्वादिकारम् ।)

Umasvāti analyses the Pariṇāma nature of reality into utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Vyāsa defines Pariṇāma as अवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्वधर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः । These two views are, in substance, identical.<sup>1</sup>

Vyāsa has analysed Pariṇāma into Dharma-Pariṇāma, Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma and Avasthā-Pariṇāma. The Jaina has not analysed Pariṇāma in this way. Nevertheless, these become expressed in his Dravya-Paryāya and Guṇa-Paryāya. Every Dravya-Pariṇāma (such as a pot in the case of Pudgala and manhood मनुष्यत्व in the case of Jīva) and Guṇa-Paryāya (such as darkness or yellowness in Pudgala and Jñāna-paryāya in Jīva) of the Jain represent Dharma-Pariṇāma or change of aspect. When the same is viewed from the standpoint of its time-variations of past, present and future, it is Lakṣaṇa-Pariṇāma. The oldness and newness or 'tīvratā-mandata' (तीव्रता-मंदता in the case of Jīva) which a Dravya-

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1 Cf Yuktidipikā :

जहद्वर्मान्तरं पूर्वमुपादत्ते यदापरत् । तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो धर्मो परिणामः स उच्यते ॥ on Skā. 16

and Śloka Vārttika : पूर्वस्वभावपरित्यागाजहद्वृत्तोत्पादो द्रव्यस्योत्तराकारः परिणामः स एव पर्यायः ।

Pāryāya or a Guṇa-Pāryāya suffers as a result of time-process is its Avasthā-Pariṇāma. This Avasthā-Pariṇāma, it must be noted, is possible only in the Vyañjana-Pāryāya of the Jain which abides for a certain length of time. There cannot be such Avasthā-Pariṇāma in the Artha-Pāryāya as the latter is momentary.

Both the Sāṃkhya and the Jain understand Pariṇāma as a wide concept including the material change in time (Aparispanda-tamaka-pariṇāma) as well as physical movement in space technically called Parispanda. Both of them, sometimes, bring these two kinds of changes under two types of Kriyā, viz. परिणामात्मिका क्रिया and परिस्पन्दात्मिका क्रिया. In the Jain view, the Parispanda is possible only in Jīva and Pudgala, as each Jīva and Pudgala i.e. atom is limited and therefore capable of movement. In Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa which are indivisible wholes and pervade this loka (i.e. the universe), there is evidently no scope for Parispanda. In the Sāṃkhya, Parispanda has to be negated in Prakṛti which is one homogeneous whole and all-pervading. It becomes possible in the different products of Prakṛti, from Buddhi onwards, which are limited compared to their cause, the Prakṛti.

There is, however, one difficulty in understanding Parispanda in the Sāṃkhya, viz. that it has to be visualised without Ākāśa.

Vijñānabhikṣu felt this difficulty and hence he clarified that Prakṛti subsumes Ākāśa. But this interpretation, as already seen, is not vouchsafed by the older Sāṃkhya texts which derive Ākāśa from the Śabda-Tan-mātrā. So we must understand Parispanda in Sāṃkhya before the production of Ākāśa as something which is possible without Space. For the Jain, however, there is not such difficulty as Ākāśa is accepted as an underived entity,

The Sāṃkhya and Jain show certain affinity in regard to the concept of Kāla. The Sāṃkhya does not recognise Kāla as an independent entity. It is only an aspect of Prakṛti, i.e. identical with the pariṇāmas of Prakṛti. A moment is identified with the

unit of change of the Guṇas. In the Jain system, there are two divergent views on Kāla since the Āgama period. One regards it as an independent entity, a sixth Dravya while the other identifies it with the changes of Jīva and Ajīva. The second view is similar to that of the Sāṃkhya.

Next, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view of the regulation of Parināma from the point of view of देश (place), काल (time), आकार (form) and निमित्त (extraneous cause) finds a certain parallel in the Jain view according to which the Parināma of every object is conditioned by द्रव्य (substance), क्षेत्र (place), काल (time) and भाव (the essential characteristics which constitute a thing). This is illustrated by means of an illustration of a pot, in the Rāj. V., thus :- यथा घटो द्रव्यतः पार्थिवत्वेन उत्पद्यते न जलत्वेन । देशत इहत्यत्वेन न पाटलिपुत्रकत्वेन । कालतो वर्तमानकालतया नातीतानागताभ्याम् । भावतो महत्त्वेन नाल्पत्वेन (or भावतो रक्तत्वादिना) । pp. 180-182 'From the standpoint of substance, a pot is produced from the earth and not from the water. From the standpoint of place, it is produced here (i.e. at the particular place where it is produced) and not elsewhere, in Pāṭaliputra etc. From the standpoint of time, it is produced in the present (and not in the past or future). From the standpoint of bhāva, it comes to have the qualities of mahat-parimāṇa and not the alpa-parimāṇa (or it comes to have the qualities of redness etc.)' We have already explained the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view in this respect and so, here, we do not give it again.

The causal theory of the Sāṃkhya is the Satkāryavāda which is deducible from the doctrine of Parināma. It means that the effect pre-exists in the cause and is only manifested by causal operation. There is no new creation or production of the effect as such. The Jain, even though, accepting the doctrine of Parināma, calls his causal theory Sadasatkāryavāda, i.e. the effect is both pre-existent and pre-non-existent. It is existent in so far as it

potentially pre-exists in the cause and non-existent in so far as its actual manifestation is a novel emergence. Thus the Jain too in the way of the Sāṃkhya regards effect as manifestation of the abiding entity but the phrase Satkāryavāda being suggestive of 'Ekāntism', the Jain as an 'Anekāntist' brings in Asat along with Sat. He also seems to be influenced by the Vaiśeṣika logic which emphasises the newness of the effect, though he would not regard manifestation as new creation in the Vaiśeṣika sense. For the Sāṃkhya too, it must be noted, the manifestation is (अभिव्यक्ति) non-existent (असत्) and is brought about by the operation of the Karakas but he does not use the term Asat, Vidyānanda in his *Aṣṭasahasrī* draws attention to this by stating that the Jain view is really meant by the Sāṃkhya even though he does not profess it and that the Sāṃkhya cannot maintain his Satkāryavāda in an absolute sense without stultifying his whole scheme of metaphysics.<sup>2</sup>

The differences in the application of the theory of Parināma between the Sāṃkhya and the Jain are due to their differences of view regarding the nature, number and derivation of the original entities. The Sāṃkhya analyses reality in two ways. One, on the

- 2 ... तदाविर्भावस्य कादाचित्कत्वादपेक्षितपरव्यापारत्वं, न तु घटादेरिति चेत् कोयमाविर्भावो नाम ? प्रागनुपलब्धस्य व्यञ्जकव्यापारादुपलम्भ इति चेत् तर्हि प्रागसन् कारणैः क्रियते न पुनर्घटादिरिति स्वरुचिवचनमात्रम् । अथ तस्यापि प्राक्तीरोहितस्य सत एव कारणैराविर्भावान्तरमिष्यते तर्हि तस्याप्यन्यत्तस्याप्यन्यदाविर्भावान्तरमित्यनवस्थानान्न कदाचिद् घटादेराविर्भावः स्यात् । अथाविर्भावस्योपलम्भरूपस्य तद्रूपाविर्भावान्तरानपेक्षत्वात् प्रकाशस्य प्रकाशान्तरानपेक्षत्ववन्तानवस्थेति चेत् तर्हि तस्य कारणादात्मलाभोभ्युपगन्तव्यः, ततः कार्यमाविर्भाव इति । तद्वद्वटादिकमपि, अपेक्षितपरव्यापारत्वाविशेषादात्मलाभे । न ह्यलब्धात्मलाभस्योपलम्भः शक्यः कतुं, सर्वथातिप्रसङ्गात् । तदेवं प्रधानपरिणामतया-पीष्टं घटादिकं कार्यद्रव्यमापाद्यते । तस्य च प्रागभावापत्तवेऽनादित्वप्रसङ्गात्कारणव्यापारानर्थक्यं स्यादिति सूक्तं दूषणम् । प्राक्तीरोभावस्योपगमे वा स एव प्रागभावः सिद्धः, तस्य तीरोभाव इति नामान्तरकरणे दोषाभावादुत्पादस्याविर्भाव इति नामान्तरकरणवत् । ASS. p. 104

principle of 'Sentience' (चेतन) and 'Non-sentience' (जड) and the second way is to view reality as Parīṇāmi and Aparīṇāmi or Kūṭastha. He identifies the sentient with the Kūṭastha and all change physical and mental is relegated to the Non-sentient i.e. the Prakṛti. The Jain dualism accepts the first principle of division only, viz. Sentience (Jīva) and Non-sentience (Ajīva) and rejects the second. This is the fundamental difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Jain. The latter regards the soul also as undergoing Parīṇāma. For him, all reality – Sat has the characteristic of utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya and so both the Jīva and Ajīva must possess this characteristic.

Next, the Sāṃkhya regards the transforming Prakṛti as responsible for all changing phenomena. To make his cosmology systematic, he first derives in a fixed order the twenty-three tattvas from Prakṛti and then regards all phenomena as the result of the qualitative and the quantitative combination and separation of the twenty-three tattvas. The primary derivation is, in Sāṃkhya phraseology, called Tattvāntara-Parīṇāma; while the subsequent parīṇāma is called Dharma-Lakṣaṇa-Avasthā Parīṇāma. For the Jain it was not necessary to have Tattvāntara-Parīṇāma because he starts with the five or six Tattvāntaras as fundamental and underived entities. The Jain is really a pluralist because in addition to the category of Jīvas, he assumes four underived Ajīva categories viz. Pudgala, Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa. He explains all psychic phenomena as resulting from the parīṇāmas of Jīvas, all material phenomena, from the pāriṇāmas of Pudgala, consisting of infinite atoms, while Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa make possible the movement ( गति ), staticity (स्थिति) and occupation (अवगाह) respectively of Jīva and Pudgala.

As just said, the essential difference between the Sāṃkhya and the Jain lies in the fact that the principle of Parīṇāma is not applied to Puruṣas by the Sāṃkhya while the Jain would apply it to both Jīvas and Ajīvas. From this difference ensue various differences of view between the Sāṃkhya and the Jain.

The denial of *Parīṇāma* in the *Puruṣas* has made it highly difficult for the *Sāṃk'hya* to relate them to the changing *Prakṛti* and has prevented them to play any substantial role in the world-phenomena. In fact, *Prakṛti*, having the inherent power to change, could very well function in the absence of such *Puruṣas* whose existence, however, makes the natural movement of *Prakṛti* teleological. This is difficult to grasp because we are accustomed to associate purposive activity with sentient beings.

Another consequence of this assumption is that *jñāna*, *bhoga*, *bandha*, *mokṣa* etc. which appear as of *Puruṣa* become really so many transformations of *Prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* is never bound and therefore has never to be free. He merely witnesses all the transformations of *Prakṛti*. Thus, in *Sāṃk'hya*, truly speaking, *bandha* and *mokṣa* are the transformations of *Prakṛti*.

The above difficulties do not confront the Jain. The application of *Parīṇāma* to *Jīvas* enables him to smoothly relate the two, viz., *Jīva* and *Pudgala*, and explain their mutual influence and inter-action. The Jain theory of *Parīṇāma* which in the case of *Jīva* takes the form of *bhāva-karma* and in the case of *Pudgala*, *dravya-karma*, makes it possible to attribute *jñāna*, *bhoga*, *bandha*, *mokṣa* etc. to *Jīvas* directly. Thus the infinite variety of phenomena and their significance to *Jīves* as objects of knowledge, enjoyment and as objects from which *Jīvas* have to be free are consistently explained by the Jain theory of *Parīṇāma*.

The only difficulty that the Jain will have to face is that, if by definition, *Jīva* and *Pudgala* are fundamentally different from each other, how the transformations (*parīṇāmas*) of the one can ever be related to those of the other. In the case of the *Sāṃk'hya* there is no such difficulty because the *Puruṣas* and *Prakṛti* are always distinct from each other and never come in real contact. The *bhoga* and *mokṣa* in the *Puruṣa* are always *aupacārika* (i. e. only a way of speaking).

The *Sāṃk'hya* is thus metaphysically in a stronger position while the Jain's position is empirically more comprehensible.



### Historical

Many divergent views are held by scholars on the question of the nature of pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṃkhya.

According to Garbe, the Sāṃkhya was thought out by one seer as a complete and well-knit system, such as we have in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā, in non-Brāhmanic circles, in pre-Buddhist period.<sup>3</sup> This original Sāṃkhya came to be perverted in the Upaniṣads and the epic, the Gitā, and later still in the theistic Yoga and the several sectarian Purāṇas; but, in spite of such deliberate attempts outside, the doctrine in its own school was maintained singularly unalloyed, all through its long career extending over more than a dozen centuries.

Jacobi<sup>4</sup> assigns the origin of the Sāṃkhya to 800 B. C. approximately and before 500 B. C. it became fixed up in a systematised form which agreed with the classical form in being dualistic and atheistic but differed from the classical in other details such as the following :- (1) The 'pre-classical' Sāṃkhya, as differing from the later system which has only a metaphysical interest, had a didactic and practical purpose, being addressed to the masses rather than to trained dialecticians. (2) Its original dogma of Satkāryavāda or the continual reality of the products sub specie aeternitatis was more allied to the contemporary Jain doctrine of the indesructibility but qualitative indefiniteness of matter, rather than to the Vedāntic 'satkāraṇavāda', with which it later came to be identified. (3) It did not fully develop the doctrine of the three-fold pramāṇas right from the very start. (4) The similarity between the Sāṃkhya and the Jain view as regards the nature of matter, the size of the individual souls, belief in Karman and

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3 'Die Sāṃkhya Philosophie' first edition, 1894, second edition 1917. (As Prof. Belvalkar has noted in History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 414).

4 cf. His two reviews of the two editions of Garbe's book in 'Gottingen-sche Gelehrte Anzeigen', 1895, pp. 202-211 and 1919, pp. 1-30. cf. also ZDMG, Vol. I ii, pp. 1-15, other smaller papers contributed to 'Kuhn Festschrift, Lichtdes Ostens,' etc. (Prof. Belvalkar, p. 416).

transmigration, the doctrine of *Ahimsā* etc. suggests an origin of both these systems, by degrees, from out of a common cultural and philosophical heritage. (5) The pre-classical *Sāṃkhya*, so far from making a tirade against the *Śrutis*, endeavoured to interpret them to support its own views, as seems clear from the data in the *Brahma-sūtras*.

Oldenberg's view differs from those of Garbe and Jacobi.<sup>5</sup> He sees the beginnings of the *Sāṃkhya* in the *Kaṭha* and especially the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣads*. His pre-classical *Sāṃkhya* is a triune-unity as set forth in the first chapter of the *Śvetāśvatara*. Lastly, seeing that the *Sāṃkhya* of the *Kaṭha* and the *Śve. Upaniṣads* affords a close similarity to the *Sāṃkhya* of the *Gītā* and the *Epic* generally, Oldenberg is not ready to regard the 'Epic *Sāṃkhya*' as belonging yet to the formative, pre-classical stage, because the *Epic* invariably speaks of the *Sāṃkhya* as well as the *Yoga* as two systems of long standing (सनातन). He would go so far as to regard the *Epic* form of the system as one self-consistent line of development taken by the 'original' *Sāṃkhya*, just as its classical form with its pronounced dualism and its negation of the Absolute may very well have been another independent line of development.

Dr. Belvalker,<sup>6</sup> after criticising these different views, endorses in the end the view of Oldenberg.

Dr. Keith<sup>7</sup> also seems to incline more to the views of Oldenberg. According to him the classical *Sāṃkhya* is a natural

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5 cf. his 'Die Lehre der Upanishaden and die Anfänge des Buddhismus.' 1915.

Also 'Zur Geschichte der *Sāṃkhya*-philosophie' in NGGW, 1917, pp. 218-253. (Belvalkar, p. 418).

6 History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 426.

7 *Sāṃkhya System*, p. 52-53.

growth from the philosophy of the Upaniṣads which show traces of the Sāṃkhya doctrine.

At the outset I may say that owing to lack of sufficient evidence, one cannot come to a definite conclusion on any one of the above views.

I shall, however, try to put forth my hypothesis which, though not agreeing entirely with any of the views stated above, finds support piece-meal in them.

The Sāṃkhya that is known to the dārśanic tradition of India is the Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. It is dualistic, 'parināmistic' and atheistic in its philosophical outlook. The Indian dārśanic tradition takes no notice of those Sāṃkhya ideas of the Upaniṣads and the Mahābhārata which differ from the Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.\*

Let us consider first the evidence supplied by the Kārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. According to Kā. 69, 70, 71, 72, the tradition which Īśvarakṛṣṇa has followed and the works which he has summarised are as follows. 'This abstruse knowledge for the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, wherein the origin, duration and dissolution of beings are considered, has been expounded by the Great Sage (Paramarṣi). The Sage imparted this supreme purifying doctrine to Āsuri, who taught it to Pañcaśikha who elaborated the doctrine. Handed down through a long tradition of pupils, it has been briefly written up in Āryā metre by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The subjects that are treated of in the 'Saptati' are those of the complete 'Saptitantra' excluding illustrative tales and omitting the doctrines of other schools.\*.

8 Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Mādhavācārya and Śaḍdarśanasamuccaya of Haribhadra.

9 पूर्वार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यं परमविद्या समाख्यातम् ।  
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाभिनत्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥

From this one may reasonably conclude that the tradition and the works referred to by Īśvarakṛṣṇa must have held the views which are reflected in the *Kārikās*. We have no reason to doubt this tradition which would carry the *Sāṃkhya* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa to earlier centuries. Whatever else we may say, we cannot deny that there was an earlier *Sāṃkhya* school which held the views embodied in the *Kārikās*.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not mention the name of the Seer of his system, whom he refers to merely by the word 'Paramarṣi'. This 'Paramarṣi' is identified with Kapila by the commentators.<sup>10</sup> This Kapila, as already said, may be regarded as historical and placed in the century preceding Buddha.<sup>11</sup>

एतत्पवित्रमश्नं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।  
 आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम् ॥  
 शिष्यपरंपरयाऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ।  
 संक्षिप्तमार्गमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥  
 सप्तत्यां किल येऽर्थास्तेऽर्थाः कुत्सनस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।  
 आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥

10 It may be noted that Śaṅkarācārya distinguishes the Kapila of *Sāṃkhya* from the Kapila mentioned in the *Śve. Up.*

11 'There seems to be no reason to doubt that Kapila was a real (human) philosopher, and not a mere shadow of a divinity'. Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*, p. 98.

As regards the antiquity and authority of the *Sāṃkhya* thought, cf. p. 50-51

'Besides the tradition recorded in the *Buddhacarita* that the Buddha had his schooling under Ālāra Kālāma lends additional support to the theory of its pre-Buddhist origin. The antiquity of *Sāṃkhya* philosophy is further attested by the fact that the fundamental doctrines of *Sāṃkhya* School have been elaborately criticised in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* and the *Brahma-Sūtra*,... In *Aśvaghōṣa's Buddhacarita* also, similar *Sāṃkhya* doctrines have been expounded. In the *Ahīrbudhnyā-Saṃhitā* also we find a representation of *Sāṃkhya* doctrines with necessary adaptations and variations.' 'The *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*' by Dr.

Another important point to be noted is that Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts on a par the Śrauta (ānuśravika) remedy with that of the empirical (dṛṣṭavat) so far as the achievement of the final goal is concerned. This attitude towards the Śruti could not have been an innovation on the part of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. We must regard it as the attitude of the original Sāṃkhya thinkers. This would go to show that the early Sāṃkhya tradition was not completely bound down to śrauta tradition and was independent enough to differ from the Śrauta tradition, at least from its karma-mīmāṃsā.<sup>12</sup>

If this were the only evidence, the question would have been easy to settle, but we find the Sāṃkhya ideas referred to in the Upaniṣads and the Mahābhārata. The Mbh. mentions three types of Sāṃkhya, two of which derive Prakṛti from Brahman, Viṣṇu or Nārayaṇa. These are decidedly theistic in their outlook. One of the schools of twenty five categories, agrees with Kapil-Sāṃkhya.

This complication has given rise to the controversies noted

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Mookerji, a chapter in History of philosophy, Eastern and Western, p. 243.

- 12 Again in Mbh. XII. 268. 6-10 'Kapila appears as a teacher of unorthodox non-injury and maintains to the end (so that his view is presented as really correct) that not the Sacrifice of animals but the "Sacrifice (worship) of knowledge" is the best.' Great Epic of India, Hopkins, p. 99.

Also cf. Gītā II. 42, 43, 44 wherein the Jāṇā-less ritualists are condemned by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga. यामिमां पुष्पितां वाचं प्रवदन्त्यविपश्चितः । वेदवादरताः पार्थ नान्यदस्तीति वादिनः ॥४२॥ कामात्मानः स्वर्गपरा जन्मकर्मफलप्रदाम् । क्रियाविशेषबहुलां भोगैश्वर्यगतिं प्रति ॥ ४३ ॥

With reference to the Sāṃkhya and Yoga in the Mbh S. K. De says that 'the Yoga was perhaps more orthodox, but the Sāṃkhya is the philosophy of knowledge par excellence which did not adhere strictly to traditional views'.

History of philosophy, Eastern and Western, (p. 87).

above, about the original Sāṃkhya being theistic or atheistic, monistic or dualistic.

Under the circumstances, the only proper way seems to be to rely upon the tradition of Īśvarakṛṣṇa for the history of his darśana and explain the occurrence of Sāṃkhya ideas in the Upaniṣads and the Mbh. on that basis. It is possible to do so in the following way.

Even though all the darśanas claim to be complete systems, yet each one of them is known to the Indian tradition for its particular contribution. Thus, Pūrvaṃīmāṃsā's contribution lies in its rules of interpretation and the doctrine of Karma, while Vedānta is known for its Adhyātma-vidyā. One goes to the Vaiṣeṣika darśana for the theory of atomism and the theory of causation involving agency of God. Nyāya darśana's main object is to teach the means of valid knowledge. The Yoga-school teaches ethical psychology.

Viewed thus, the Sāṃkhya darśana is more or less synonymous with its doctrine of the Guṇas, and its doctrine of Utpatti, Sthiti and Laya of the world i.e. its cosmology. These ideas of the Sāṃkhya school appealed most to the thinkers of India and so whenever cosmological ideas are alluded to in the Upaniṣads, the Mbh., the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas, they bear the impress of this Sāṃkhya thought. They are sometimes specifically called Sāṃkhya and sometimes merely incorporated as common property.

As noted above the Upaniṣadic monism explained the world-phenomena in two ways; the one adopted by Yajña-vaalkya which regarded the world-phenomena as chimerical and the other which regarded them as real and explained it in such Upaniṣads as the Śve. by having recourse to Sāṃkhya ideas expressed in such words as Ajā, Māyā, Prakṛti, Pradhāna etc. However, the Upaniṣadic thought being monistic, this Pradhāna, Prakṛti, etc., would be looked upon as the creative aspect of the first principle. Thus, the Upaniṣadic thought which is developed

in the Mahābhārata, remained true to its original inspiration of monism and to support its (i.e. Upaniṣadic) cosmology adapted the cosmological ideas of Sāṃkhya, with which the latter must have been identified amongst thinkers. We would not, therefore, agree with the opinion of those<sup>13</sup> who regard the Sāṃkhya in the Upaniṣads, the Mbh., the Smṛtis and Purāṇas as mere perversion of the classical Sāṃkhya or with the opinion of those<sup>14</sup> who regard the Kapila Sāṃkhya as derived from the Upaniṣad-Mbh. view. We would rather regard these Sāṃkhya ideas as adaptations of the classical Sāṃkhya. The Sāṃkhya proper remained true to its position of dualism, 'Parīṇamism' and atheism<sup>15</sup> just as the Vedānta remained true to its Upaniṣadic monism.

Whether Kapila-Sāṃkhya had some affiliation with any of the numerous early Vedic schools or whether it was like the Śramaṇa sects, a school of non-vedic Parivrajakas, we cannot definitely say, though Īśvarakṛṣṇa's contemptuous reference to 'ānuśravika' in the Skā. and other such references in the Mbh. and the Gītā (noted above) leave room for the possibility that in the beginning, it might have been non-Vedic.

As we have seen, these two schools (viz. Sāṃkhya and Jaina) have many points of agreement between them such as (i) the dualism of sentience (cetana) and non-sentience (jaḍa); (ii) the infinite number of puruṣas; (iii) the explanation of world-phenomena through Parīṇama and achievement of salvation through

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13 Garbe and Jacobi.

14 Keith.

15 The fact that the Mbh. mentions a school of Sāṃkhya agreeing with that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the express statement of the Mbh. that the Sāṃkhya unlike the Yoga, does not believe in a supreme personal God, point out that the dualistic and atheistic Sāṃkhya had its existence then. The statement in the Mbh. of the denial of Īvara by the Sāṃkhya (Mbh. XII. 300) seems to indicate that it might have been atheistic from the beginning.

discriminative knowledge (*viveka-jñāna*, *bheda-jñāna*). Their outlook of life that it is nothing but suffering in the last analysis, is also common.

The fundamental difference, however, lies in the concept of the nature of *Puruṣa* and *Jīva*. The *Sāṃkhya* *puruṣas* are, as seen above, *kūṭastha-nitya* i.e. not undergoing any change, whereas the *Jīvas*, in Jain philosophy, undergo *Pariṇāma*.

From these similarities and differences, we cannot say whether one was derived from the other. Historically, if we place the rise of *Sāṃkhya* in 800 B.C., as some scholars<sup>15</sup> do, we have also to take into consideration the historicity of *Pārśva* (800 B.C.) which is now generally accepted. Thus the question of derivation of one from the other must remain unsolved till some new evidence comes forth.

However, one consideration may be put forward. Jainism might represent the more primitive outlook, which regarded the *Jīvas* also as changing like other material things. The *Sāṃkhya* view of relegating all change to one entity, viz. *Prakṛti* and regarding the *Puruṣas* as absolutely unchanging is philosophically more advanced and, therefore, might have been a later view.

However that may be, it appears that earlier than *Yaska*, there must have been a school of *Pariṇāmists*, whose concept has been explained in the *Nirukṭa*. This school of *Pariṇāma*-thinkers might have been the original inspirers both of the *Proto-Sāṃkhya* and *Proto-Jain* thinkers—*Jaina* thinkers who were in the habit of looking at things as the *Paryāyas* of some original entities, especially of one and the same *Jīva* becoming *manuṣya*, *tiryāṇca*, *nāraka* etc.

The attempt to find out whether these *Proto-Sāṃkhya* and *Proto-Jain* *Pariṇāma*-thinkers were *Śramaṇas* or *Vedic Brahmanas* is again bound to be futile for the simple reason that there is no evidence whatsoever to decide this issue.

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15 Jacobi, *Studies in Jainism*, p. 80.



## APPENDIX

### AGURULAGHU

The term 'agurulaghu' is technical in Jain philosophy. It seems to have been used in more senses than one.<sup>1</sup>

Firstly, it is used in the karma-śāstra in two ways—one, one of the varieties of Nāma-karma (अगुरुलघुनामकर्म) which itself is one of the kinds of eight basic Karmas viz. Jñānāvaraṇīya etc. and the other, as an attribute of the soul, obscured by the Gotra-karma. On account of the 'agurulaghu-karma' the soul comes to possess a body which is neither too heavy nor too light to do anything, i.e. a normal body, capable of carrying on the requisite functions in life.

Next, the attribute 'agurulaghu' is regarded as one of the eight attributes of the soul viz., jñāna, darśana, cāritra, etc. which are supposed to be obscured or veiled by the respective karmas viz., Jñānāvaraṇīya etc. This particular attribute is said to be obscured by the gotra-karma as a result of which the soul comes to be looked upon as high (गुरु) or low (लघु) as regards its birth, family etc. In reality, however, all the souls are alike, neither high nor low. When the gotra-karma is annihilated, this attribute 'agurulaghu' of the soul manifests itself.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the 'agurulaghu' here indicates the inherent similarity of all the souls.<sup>3</sup>

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1 cf. Tsū. VIII. 12. Gujarati edition by Pt. Sukhalalji. p. 335.

2 The eight attributes, on the annihilation of the eight kinds of karmas, fully manifest themselves in a soul. These are then called the eight attributes of a siddha.

3 Cf. Tattvārtha Sūtra - Gujarati Edition, p. 400. It may be noted that the term 'agurulaghu' is also used in a purely spiritual sense with reference to Jiva. That soul who is engrossed in sinful activities, viz. violence, falsehood, stealing etc., is called 'guru-karma', while

The third usage pertains to our ordinary notion of heavy weight and light weight. That which is heavy and has a tendency to go down is 'guru', e.g. stone etc. Laghu is light, like smoke etc. whose nature is to go up. Vāyu is called 'gurulaghu', as it tends to move across. That which is neither light nor heavy is 'agurulaghu' as for instance, Ākāśa. Thus, 'agurulaghu', here, signifies the negation of the different degree of lightness and heaviness of weight. From this point of view, all the arūpi incorporeal Dravyas viz., Jīva, Dharma, Adharma and Ākāśa are called 'agurulaghu'. In the rūpi Pudgala, atoms and those subtle molecular aggregates (skandhas) which possess four kinds of touch are called agurulaghu, and the rest of the rūpi substances, viz., the gross molecular aggregates, possessed of the eight kinds of touch, etc. are 'gurulaghu'. Thus, the molecular aggregates which constitute the Aūdārika, Vaikriya, Āhāraka and Taijasa bodies are called 'gurulaghu', while those which form the Kārmaṇa body, mind and speech are 'agurulaghu'.<sup>4</sup>

Now, of the three usages given above, the first two, as can be seen, refer specially to Jīva and karma. Though the term itself is negative (अगुरुलघु) its import is positive in these two cases. The third meaning of the term, as applied to all the fundamental Dravyas, seems to indicate the negative character of the attribute.

The question, now, is, whether the 'agurulaghu-paryāyas or pariṇāmas', which are frequently referred to in the Jaina philosophical literature, are to be understood as the Paryāyas of this attribute (as applied to all the ultimate Dravyas). The negative character of the attribute, however, makes it difficult to understand them (the paryāyas) that way. So, what could be the meaning of 'agurulaghu', as an attribute – undergoing Pariṇāma – of all the

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the one who refrains from them and leads a pious life is called 'laghu-karmā'. The liberated soul is beyond these two. Thus, 'gurulaghu' and 'agurulaghu', here signify the different degrees of spirituality. cf. Bh. Sū. 1. 9. 73.

4 cf. Bh. Sū. 1. 9. 74. and its commentary by Abhayadeva.

fundamental Dravyas ? We are here primarily concerned with this 'agurulaghu'.

Pandit Sukhalalji and Baraiya have attempted to explain it as follows : 'Each Dravya is Parināmi in Jaina philosophy. In fact, Parināma is regarded as the very nature of reality. It is quite likely, therefore, that each Dravya, being possessed of the inherent power to change, may in the absence of a controlling factor, transgress its limit of Parināma and change in such a way as to give up its essential nature स्वभाव, जाति altogether and become a totally different Dravya. Hence, in order to avoid this contingency, this attribute agurulaghu seems to have been recognised, as controlling and regulating the Parināma of each Dravya and thereby keeping it within its specific limits.'<sup>5</sup>

The above explanation was formulated, as Sukhalalji says, without any textual authority in support of it. However, I have been able to discover its corroboration, in Amṛtacandra's commentary on the Pañcāstikāya (st. 84—Nirṇaya Sāgar edition and 91 in the Eng. edition) of Kundakunda. It is as follows : अपि च धर्मः अगुरुलघुभिर्गुणैरगुरुलघुत्वाभिधानस्य स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठत्विबन्धनस्य स्वभावस्याविभाष-परिच्छेदः प्रतिसमयसंभवत् षट्स्थानपतितवृद्धिहानिभिरनन्तैः सदा परिणतत्वात्.....!'

Thus, 'agurulaghu' is that element in the five or six ultimate Dravyas, which keeps them in their own nature in spite of continuous transformation. To put it in modern terms, it is what constitutes the 'thatness' of an ultimate entity.

<sup>5</sup> cf. Tsū. Gujarati Edition, p. 401, 402.

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### About the Author

Late Dr. Indukala H. Jhaveri (1928-1983), a scholar, had conceived this work as her research project, which later earned her Ph.D. from Gujarat University. Apart from this thesis entitled, '*Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Jain Parināmavāda*' her other publications include the edited Prakrit work '*Yogaśataka*' of Haribhadra enriched by Gujarati translation, exposition and comprehensive introduction; the English translation of Pt. Sukhlalji's introduction (Hindi) to *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* and Gujarati translation of the second part of *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* by Prof. M. Hiriyanna. Dr. Ms. Jhaveri's sundry research papers were published in journals like *Aryanpath*, *The Journal of Oriental Research Institute* and *Vidya*.

Dr. Jhaveri began her teaching career at B. J. Institute of Learning and Research and later taught at Shri H. K. Arts College, Ahmedabad.



## ગુજરાત યુનિવર્સિટી દ્વારા પ્રકાશિત થયેલ પુસ્તકો

ખા. નં.	પુસ્તકનું નામ	લેખકનું નામ	કિંમત
૧.	ઋગ્વેદ તૃતીય મંડળ	ડૉ. જયદેવ શુક્લ	૧૦-૦૦
૨	પુરુષોત્તમદેવની લઘુપરિભાષા વૃત્તિનું વિવેચનાત્મક અધ્યયન	ડૉ. વી. એમ. ભટ્ટ	૩૨-૦૦
૩.	સાંખ્ય સપ્તતિવૃત્તિ વિ. ૧	ઈ. એ. સોલોમન	૬-૦૦
૪	સાંખ્ય સપ્તતિવૃત્તિ વિ. ૨	ઈ. એ. સોલોમન	૫-૦૦
૫,	ધ્વન્યાલોક લેખન	ડૉ. તપસ્વી નાન્દી	૧૮-૦૦
૬.	ધ્વન્યાલોક	ડોલરરાય માંકડ	૧૦-૦૦
૭.	અરપય દ્વિક્ષીત-કવિ અને અલિંકારિક	ડૉ. ભગવતી પ્રસાદ ડી પંડ્યા	૩૦-૦૦
૮.	અલંકાર વિચાર	પી. જી. શાસ્ત્રી	૫-૦૦
૯.	ભરતનું નાટ્યશાસ્ત્ર	ડૉ. ટી. એસ. નાન્દી	૧૬-૦૦
૧૦.	A Critical Study of the Partyaksha Particcheda of Bhasarvajna's Nyayabhusana	ડૉ. એલ. વી જોષી	૩૦-૦૦
૧૧.	The Origin & Devp. of the Theory of Rasa and Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics	ડૉ. ટી. એસ. નાન્દી	૨૦-૦૦
૧૨.	કાદમ્બરી પૂર્વાર્ધ	જે. એચ. દેસાઈ	૧૭-૦૦
૧૩.	શ્રી હર્ષકૃત ખંડન ખંડખાદ્ય પરની શૈલ્ય હિતૈષણી ટીકા	પ્રો. એસ્તર સોલોમન	૬૦-૦૦

યુનિવર્સિટીનાં પ્રકાશનો કેવી રીતે મેળવશો ?

યુનિવર્સિટીનાં પુસ્તક-પુસ્તકોની કિંમત તથા જરૂરી ટપાલ ખર્ચ અગાઉથી યુનિવર્સિટી કાર્યાલયના “ નાણાં સ્વીકાર કેન્દ્ર ” ઉપર કાર્યાલયના કામકાજના દિવસોએ ૧૧-૧૫ થી ૨-૦૦ ના સમય દરમિયાન ભરી અથવા રજિસ્ટ્રારશ્રી, ગુજરાત યુનિ. (હિસાબ વિભાગ), અમદાવાદ-૩૮૦૦૦૯ને ડિમાન્ડ ડ્રાફ્ટથી નાણાં મોકલી પ્રકાશનો મેળવી લેવાનાં રહેશે. ડિમાન્ડ ડ્રાફ્ટ સાથે પૂરેપૂરું નામ, સરનામું, પ્રકાશન વગેરેની પૂરી વિગતો જણાવવા વિનંતી છે.

યુનિવર્સિટી દ્વારા પ્રકાશનો વી.પી. થી મોકલવામાં આવતાં નથી.