TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP OF
THE NYĀYĀVATĀRA AND THE SAMMATI-TARKA-PRAKARĀṇA

1.

One of the conspicuous points that strikes the reader of legendary biographies of Siddhasena Divākara recorded in Jaina Prabandhas is that they generally speak of Sanskrit hymns composed by Siddhasena Divākara and of the ill fate Siddhasena Divākara brought upon himself by deciding to render the whole Jaina canon into Sanskrit, but they never – to my knowledge – happen to mention the title of the Nyāyāvatāra (NA.)¹ or of the Sammati-tarka-prakarana (STP).² Does this discrepancy in the tradition find any grounding in facts? Would we be right to assume that perhaps NA. was composed by someone other than Siddhasena Divākara?³ In any case Abhayadevasūri, the commentator on STP, explicitly mentions in the introductory part the title of the work as “Prabandha called Sammati” as well as its author Siddhasena Divākara.⁴ The true name of STP is now of secondary importance.

Not to assume at the outset that NA. and STP were written by the same author, I shall tentatively call the author of the Nyāyāvatāra Siddhasena Mahāmati after the specific identification of Haribhadrasūri,⁵ and provisionally reserve the name of Siddhasena Divākara for the author of the Sammati-tarka-prakarana.

2.

Apart from the different languages of NA. (written in Sanskrit) and of STP. (written in Prakrit), the reader cannot fail to notice an overall difference in style. One might be quick to object that, firstly, stylistic differentiation is merely a subjective matter that depends on the reader’s own taste and judgement, and, secondly, even if we are ready to assume that there indeed is such a difference in style, it may only be due to the different “linguistic environment” (Sanskrit in the case of NA., and Prakrit in the case of STP). By necessity even in the case of a person

bilingual by birth his or her style, say, in English will differ from the style of Hopi or Polish.

2.1.

Nevertheless, there are several other minor differences to notice. The first is the general outline and matters discussed in both works. The feature they have in common—perhaps the only one in common—is the epistemological concern. However, NA., in its 32 verses, deals with the question of epistemic validity (prāmāṇya) and the definition of the cognitive criterion (pramāṇa) as well as with its divisions and their definitions. Only two verses (NA.29–30) deal with the issue of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda) and with the theory of viewpoints (naya-vāda), but there is no mention of the method of the seven-fold predication (saptabhaṅgi) whatsoever.

The treatment of these issues is in a way non-Jaina, in so far as the choice of terminology and approach place the text within the tradition of such works as, e.g., Nyāya-pravēsa of Śaṅkarasvāmin or Nyāya-bindu of Dhrmakiśore (vide infra, p. 12 ff.). In fact, as I believe I have recently proved elsewhere,6 NA. depends heavily on Dhrmakiśore and—among his other works—on his NB. in several formulations.

2.2.

On the other hand, the scope of the three chapters of STP. is as follows: Chapter 1 contains a detailed exposition of the theory of multiplexity of reality (anekānta-vāda), including treatment of nayas (dravyāsākta and paryāśākta), as well as the set of seven viewpoints: jīva-sūtra, etc., especially STP.1.3–5, 7–18, 23, 31), nīkṣepas (STP.1.6, 40 ff.), saṃvāda (STP.1.36–40), and secondary issues such as the idea of upādā-sūtra-sūtra in the case of dravya (STP.1.12, STP.3.23), ethical issues (kaśyap, karman, bandha, saṁsāra, moksa; e.g. STP.1.18–20), the nature of atman/jīva (STP.1.51–52) that serves as exemplification of the doctrine of anekānta-vāda; Chapter 2 provides the discussion on the cognitive faculties (upāsāka, including their definition (STP.2.1–2), fivefold division of cognition (jñāna, STP.2.2–18) and fourfold division of insight, or conation (darsana, esp. STP.2.19–20), the claim that jñāna and darsanā become one in case of an omniscient person (kevala, STP.2 passim), which has become the most debated thesis of STP. among future generations of Jaina thinkers, the treatment of “the three jewels” (tīrṣa-ratna, samyag-jñāna-darśana-cārita, esp. STP.2.32–33), the state of omniscience (kevala); Chapter 3 is concerned with ontological issues, the relation of sāmānya-visēṣa (STP.3.1), the relation of dravya-poryaya (STP.3.2 ff., STP.3.30 ff.), guna-poryaya (STP.3.8–9), two nayas (dravyārthika-paryārthika; STP.3.10–14) and their relation (STP.3.15–18), atoms and matter (STP.3.39–41), miscellaneous ethical-and soteriological issues (STP.3.43 ff., 3.62 ff.), sub-categories of syād-vāda (STP.3.60).

The above list is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of the contents but should only serve as a provisional list of topics discussed in STP. This list, however, and a more in-depth reading could easily attest to it, should suffice to demonstrate that—despite the overall epistemological interest of the two works—the scope of NA. and STP. by no means overlap. This is also true not only of the general scope of both treatises but also for particular topics, ideas and notions that occur in both texts.

2.3.

Besides, characteristic of NA. is a standardised pattern of definitions and justifications for such definitions (in the form of hetus) pervading the whole structure of the text, viz. the term is first mentioned (uddeśa) and defined (laksana), whereas the definition serves as a thesis to be subsequently proved (pratijñā); this is followed by the mention of its divisions (bheda) and subsequent analysis (parikṣā), which is always followed by the justification and corroboration (hetu), e.g.:

NA.1: pratijñā = laksana (pramāṇaṁ sva-parinābhidian jñānaṁ, bādha-vivarjitaṁ)
+ division (pratikṣam ca paryokṣam ca dividyā)
+ hetu (maya-viniścayitī)

NA.4: pratijñā = laksana (aprayatnāvadehaṁ grāhaṁ jñānam idṛṣṭam / pratikṣam)
+ division (tataj jñeyam paryokṣam)
+ hetu (graṇthāvyādī).

Practically, every second verse reveals such a structure. Thus, the overall approach in NA. is highly structured and analytical; the picture of the logical system it lucidly presents is very clear. Furthermore, Siddhasena Mahāmati was certainly conscious of what the proper definition should consist in, in so far as he was apparently the first in the history of Jaina epistemological tradition to formulate the descriptive definition of pramāṇa.7

2.4.

On the other hand, we hardly find any true definition in STP. with the exception perhaps of STP.2.1 (a definition of cognitive faculties). But even then the author of STP. does not bother to provide justifications in a systematic form of hetus. STP. has the character of a plain exposition.
of some aspects of the Jaina doctrine; an occasional refutation of some contrary doctrines happens occasionally. Without a thorough-going, anterior knowledge of Jainism and its anekānta doctrine alongside its corollaries such as sapta-bhangi, nayaka-vādā, nīkṣepa-vādā, one could hardly make head or tail of the exposition. Nowhere do we find any en bloc enumeration of the five subdivisions of jñāna (mati, etc.) — and sporadic references to them are fragmentary6 — or a list of nayas (not even all are mentioned by name!); there is no explanation of how nīkṣepa work, what different kinds of karmān are (even though the knowledge of the subdivisions is essential to follow the text), etc. The reader is expected to have all this knowledge beforehand in order to understand the argument. One may seem to be justified in having the impression that either NA. and STP. derive from different intellectual backgrounds or that they serve some different purposes, or both.

2.5.

As far as vocabulary and particular terms or ideas are concerned, here is a list of selected terms and topics that are crucial in one text but are altogether absent from the other work, not only as being stated expressis verbis but even under a different formulation:

(1) Significant terms and ideas in NA. that are neither mentioned nor implied in STP.: the distinction into śvātra-anumāna / pārthāra-anumāna and śvātra-pratyakṣa / pārthāra-pratyakṣa (NA.10, 11, 13), pratyakṣa-vādā (NA.10); non-erroreousness of cognitive criteria (avibhārama / abhāram) (NA.5, 6, 7); the idea of self-revealing nature of cognition (svānya-niti/tvay / svā-pārābhāsā jñāna); (NA.1, 7, 13, 31) and self-cognition (svāva-vibhāsāsā; NA.31); the defining characteristic of the logical reason, e.g. the inseparable connection (avind-bhāva; NA.5, 13), “inexplicability otherwise” (anayatvānapattā / anayatvānapāpamā; NA.17, 22, 23) or similar, including the term ananāpattā;5 the use of vādyāy (NA.18) or annat-vādyāy (NA.20); the use of aṣṭaka only in the sense of “theses” as a logical terminus technicus (NA.13, 14, 21);5 cognitive criterion (pramāṇa; NA.1, 2, 3, 5, 67, 28, 32) probandum (sākhyā; NA.5, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 29, 24, 25) probans (sāhanā; NA.18, 19, 25, 26); the idea of a valid method of reasoning (pragya; NA.14, 17),11 the use of the term anumāna (NA.5, 11, 13); mental representation (pratibhāṣa; 7, 12, 27); indirect cognition (parokṣa; NA.1, 4); fallacy (abhāṣa; NA.21, 22, 26); criticism (dūsraṇa; NA.26); testimony based on the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (syād-vāda-traya; NA.30); the cognizable (prameya / maya; NA.1); method / logic and methodologist / logician (nyāya and nyāya-vid; NA.20, 24, 25); doubt (sandha; NA.22).

(2) Significant terms and ideas in STP. that are not mentioned in NA.: treatment of the viewpoints (nayaka with its two main types: dravyāśita, paryayāśita, and subdivisions such as ruttā-sthūla, etc.; STP. 1.3–5, 7–18, 31, 3.10, 14, 57);12 standpoints (nīkṣepa; STP.1.6, 40 ff.); the theory or origination, continued existence and annihilation that define substance (upādāna-sthāiti-bhāga / dravya; STP.1.12, 3.23, 38–34); kathāya, karmān and bandha (STP.1.19, 46, 2.2, 3.53); samājra and mokṣa (STP.1.20, 3.43–45); explicit reference to the Canon and Jaina tradition (STP.1.49) and numerous use of “āgama”; the concept of two cognitive faculties (apaya: jñāna and dārtana; STP.2.1, 20, 29, 3.3, 43; the concept of the five kinds of knowledge (jñāna: mati, śruta, avadhi, manah-parāyaṇa, kṣeva; STP.2.3.5, 6, 8, 16, 23, 27); sapta-bhangi (STP.1.36–40); the terms śāṁbhāsya and viṣeṣa (STP.2.1, 3.1, 57); the use of Jaina particle “no” (“quasi” e.g. in STP.50); the term sanyaśic (STP.2.33, 3.44; the idea of righteousness and misapprehension (samaṇa - miṁśhāpa; STP.3.53); the idea of “the three jewels” (samyag-jñāna-dārtana-caturtha; STP.3.44, 67); qualities and modes (guna - paryāya; STP.3.2 ff., 3.24); ethical questions and the impossibility of liberation (bhāvabhāvaṇa beings; STP.3.43 ff.); the notion of neutral non-existence (anyonyabhāva; STP.3.31); STP.1.36–40: treatment of sapta-bhangi; rāga-dveśa-moha (STP.2.43); six negative and positive false statements (miṁśa-saṁścāra; STP.3.54); treatment of eight subtopics of syād-vāda and ways of predicating (dravya-kṣeta-kalā-bhāva-paryāya-deśa-sambandha, ekānta-asadbhūta and sadbhūta-anicca; STP.3.59–60).

The above juxtaposition of the two lists reveals that the vocabulary of both texts also does not match.

2.6.

After even a brief analysis and comparison of both lists, it is clear that NA. shares its vocabulary with the general Indian pramāṇa tradition and is very much akin to that of the pramāṇa tradition or the Buddhist Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school. We do not find in NA. technical terms derived directly from the Jaina tradition (with the sole exception of “kevāla” in NA.27), thus the text can be easily understood even by those who are not acquainted with the Jaina doctrine and religion. Besides, the scheme and topics discussed in NA. are not restricted to matters that are of interest merely to the Jainas (e.g. the issue of omniscience and its detailed stages, divisions of karmic bondage, etc., that could hardly evoke any interest in a person not directly involved in Jainism). On the other hand, STP. rests on ideas, locations and terminology that had to large extent been coined as early as in the Canonical literature and presupposes a closer acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine and peculiarities of expression. The choice of topics demonstrates that, at least to a certain degree, the text is directed specifically to a Jaina reader.

2.7.

Does the above situation mean that there are no similarities to be observed between the two works? The followings list summarises the very few similarities I have been able to spot:

(3) (a) the description of the absolute knowledge: sukha-kavā-akṣarama kevala (NA.27) and savākavā-ekṣāramam aksimaham kevala (STP.2.17);11 (b) none of the texts uses the terms vikalpa, kalpa etc. in their epistemological sense of
acquainted with specifically Jaina vocabulary and notions. That could explain away the fact that the argumentation of STP.1 is logically less rigid and less technical. In addition, one might claim that the same Siddhasena deliberately dealt with different topics in both texts in order not to repeat the same ideas.

One might even refer to the famous TS.1.5: “The comprehension of these categories representing reality is accomplished through cognitive criteria and viewpoints” (pramāṇa-nayair tad-ādhyatamā), and conclude that NA.2.1 is devoted to “the comprehension of reality through cognitive criteria” (pramāṇair tad-ādhyatamā), whereas STP.1 focuses on “the comprehension of reality through viewpoints” (nayair tad-ādhyatamā); hence both works are complementary.

But I believe such an argument would be too artificial with no justification in the textual layer of both treatises. Such an argument would be nothing more than a hermeneutical interpretative attempt to understand the actual role of both works, after one has already accepted that they are written by the same person. In my opinion, as I shall try to demonstrate in the subsequent paragraphs, there is hardly anything in both texts that could justify such a claim. There are, however, some strong points to be found in NA.2 and STP.1 that prove the contrary thesis.

3.

Having considered the differences mentioned above, one might hastily come to conclusion that indeed these texts have different authors. However the vice, viz. differences, could theoretically be turned into virtue. One might claim that it was indeed the strategy of Siddhasena to write a manual on logic (NA.) that, on the one hand, systematises Jaina logic and epistemology and, on the other, discloses it in a systematised form to the non-Jaina philosophic audience. That would nicely explain why the author did not employ Jaina doctrinal terminology and took recourse to general standards of discussing philosophy. It would also explain why he decided to use Sanskrit. Mutatis mutandis, STP.1 was composed in Prakrit in order to reach a more general and wider Jaina readership, inclined less epistemologically or philosophically but well

...
could become sweet of two kinds (flavours) and black of infinite kinds (shades),
nevertheless the man does not become small or big because of the relation [e.g. as
a son, etc.] [2.20] [The proposer of absolute identity between substance and
quality (dravya-parinyaṣayor abhedākānta-vāda)] says: "If you accept the existence
of the relatum (sambandhitva, viz. that x is related to y) on account of the relation,
why do you not accept as proved this particular relatum, when this particular
relation is there?" [3.21] [The Siddhānta-vādin] [To accept] this particular relatum
on the basis of this particular relation is logically correct. However, transformation
(sc. sense datum) of a particular colour etc. does not enter a particular [sense organ
such as] the eye etc. [3.22] It is said [by an opponent] "How could possibly a
complex transformation (sc. sense datum) occur in one [substance]"? [To answer
this, the Siddhānta-vādin] says by way of application: "It is either occasioned by
something else, or not" – such is the one-sided [view].

This passage is followed by the exposition of the Jaina view of
substance as permanence, origination and annihilation (STP.3.23).23

4.1.

I do not wish to discuss ontological issues here, and the reason why I
have quoted these verses is to draw attention to the verse STP.3.20, which
speaks of accepting a relatum by force of a relation. In fact, the verse
goes back to STP.3.8.24 "Since [sense data such as] colour, taste, smell
and touch are characterized by dissimilar (sc. individual) grasping,
therefore the qualities abide in substance – such is [the standpoint]
accepted by some [thinkers]." The idea expressed in the verse boils
down to the following: since we perceive various qualities (guna),
incompatible in their nature, we must assume one common substratum
for them, and this substratum, or locus, is substance (dravya). No doubt,
this is a reference to the position to the Vaiśeṣika school, which is also
confirmed by the commentary of TBV.25 The circumstances under
which the above is asserted are further characterised in VS.4.1.9-11,26
where the conditions for perceptibility of visual, gustatory, olfactory and
tactile stimuli, which correspond to a number of respective properties
located in one and the same substratum, are described.

In the context thus delimited by STP.3.8, STP.3.20 states the condition
for accepting such a single substratum common to several qualities:
we accept it because it is related to the qualities. The principle lets us
infer one thing related to another by a relation (sambandha). Thus, the
gunas as relata serve as an inferential mark, whereas the dravya is the
inferred relatum. This is precisely one of possible kinds of inference
mentioned in VS.9.18 (and VSU, ad loc.): asyēdāṃ kāryaṃ kāraṇaṃ
sambandhi ekārtha-samavāyī virodhi cēti latiṣyakam. – "The discipline
[based on] the inferential sign (sc. inference) has the form: [a] this is
its effect, [b] this is its cause, [c] this is its connected [attribute],
[d] this is its inherent [property] and [e] this stands in contradiction
with [that]." The sambandhin (the connected attribute, relatum), also
called samyogin27 related by a particular relatum is adduced as one
of reasons in VS.3.1.8: samyogī, samavāyī, ekārtha-samavāyī, virodhi
cā. kāryam kāryāntarasya, kāraṇam kāraṇāntarasya, virodhy-ahūtaṃ
bhūtasya, bhūtam abhūtasya, abhūta, abhūtasya, bhūtam bhūtasya.
Such a relation is adduced as a proof, e.g. for the existence of the soul
(ātman) in VS.3.1.13 and for the existence of the mind (manas) in
VS.3.2.1.

What is conspicuous in Siddhasena Divākara’s reply (STP.3.21)
is that he generally accepts this kind of reasoning: "[To accept] this
particular relatum on the basis of this particular relation is logically
correct" (jujai sambandhā-vastai sambandhī-visesānām). There is not
the slightest trace of hesitation to accept the principle (sambandhitva)
of inferring the relatum x as connected with its related attribute y on
account of a relation (sambandha) throughout STP. and Siddhasena
Divākara seem to apply this principle uncritically.

4.2.

On the other hand, NA. formulates – following Pātravāmin, alias
Pātrakṣarin or Pātrakṣarisvāmin, in this regard – an entirely
new definition of the logical reason “inexplicability otherwise”
(ānyathāparipattī, ānyathā大国naṭvatā) as the basis of all inher-
ence, and thereby rejects older forms of inference. NA.22 refers to an
earlier source of this idea, which is independently reported and criti-
cised by Ṣantarakṣita in TSa.1364 ff. (p. 405 f.)28 and the crucial verse
is TSa.1369.29 It is Ṣantaraksita TSa.1364, p. 405.1 (ānyathā-kānā
pātravāmi-mata ca āśānke...), who explicitly mentions Pātravāmin30
as the first who took the notion of the “inexplicability otherwise”
(ānyathāparipattī) to be the proper definition of a logical reason.
Whatever has the historical priority, whether it was indeed Pātravāmin
or someone else who was followed by Siddhasena Mahāmāti, is irrele-
vant for the present issue. In any case, the author of NA. finds the
principle of ānyathāparipattī so important that, in such a short text
as NA., he does not fail to mention it explicitly twice,31 reminding
the reader of it (NA.22), and uses it additionally for the third time in
NA.23.

It would have been a highly surprising and incongruous attitude on
the part of the author to vehemently advocate the novel relation of
ānyathāparipattī in one text, and to completely ignore it in another
work, even when the occasion avails. If Siddhasena Divākara had indeed
known of the notion of \textit{anyathānapapatti} as the defining characteristic of the logical reason, his statements in STP.3.21 would have been expressed quite differently.

5.

5.1.

Furthermore, again in STP.3.22, we find the statement \textit{expressed by way of application}: “It is either occasioned by something else, or not”. The term \textit{uvaṃtya = upanīta}, or “expressed by way of application”, is directly related to the technical term \textit{upanaya} (“application”).

The word \textit{uvaṃtya = upanīta} occurs once again in STP.3.51\textsuperscript{32} by way of introducing an application: “These two, however, [viz. \textit{dravyārthika-}
and \textit{paryāyarthika-nayās},] when applied in the \textit{anekānta} exposition,\textsuperscript{33} become pre-eminent correct conation, because [they are the means of] the elimination of the existential pain; [when] these two [are taken] separately (sc. independently of each other) they do not satisfy [the needs].” Furthermore, STP.3.52 explicates this idea by applying it to a particular case, which is the case of the application proper: “Since ‘the pot’ is not separated\textsuperscript{34} from earth, therefore their non-difference is logically correct. On the other hand, since ‘the pot’ was not there before, [hence] it is different from earth.” The verse does not state any general rule; on the contrary, it applies a general principle of the \textit{anekānta} description to a particular case. Abhayadevästrī introduces the verse with: \textit{amum eva artham upasamhāra-daśāraṇa upadarśayann āha} (TBV.3.52, p. 710.8).

Both words \textit{upanaya} and \textit{upasānāhāra}\textsuperscript{35} are technical terms to denote the fourth stage of the classical five-membered proof formula (\textit{pañcāvaya-vāya}). The two verses follow the thesis, expressed in STP.3.46, which states that “the doctrine of viewpoints (nāya-vāda), [which (or: when it)] is completely pure, becomes a proof of the purport of the Canon only.” STP.3.47 adduces the reason (\textit{hetu}), in other words it states the principle of the invariable concomitance (\textit{vyāpti}); “To such an extent [opinions] are a method (vahā = panthan = mārga) of exposition (vacana), in the same measure they become doctrines of viewpoints (nāya-vāda), and vice versa (caiva . . . caiva): to such an extent [opinions] are doctrines of viewpoints, in the same measure they become the highest teachings (samaya = siddhānta = Āgama).”

As the next step, we have the example (\textit{dṛṣṭānta}) expounded in three subsequent verses. STP.3.48 refers to the doctrine of Sāṅkhya (as \textit{dravyārthika-nāya} / \textit{dravyārthika-nāya}) and to the doctrine of the Buddha (as \textit{payāya-vikalpa = paryāyāstika-nāya / paryāyārthika-nāya}). STP.3.49 criticises the doctrine of Vaiśeṣika: even though the system combines two viewpoints: \textit{dravyāstika} and \textit{paryāyāstika}, nevertheless, it is the case of falsehood (\textit{mithyādha}) because the two \textit{nayas} are treated independently: \textit{anyonya-nirāpekṣa}. STP.3.50 mentions the followers of Sākya and Ulūka as well as the system of Sāṅkhya again as an example.

What STP.3.53 says – “Time, intrinsic nature, fate, former deed, man are partial causes, [hence] they are [a case of] falsehood (\textit{mithyāvāna}); however, in a compound they become truth (\textit{samyakvāna})” – can easily be taken as a reformulation of the initial thesis expressed in STP.3.46. Since this new formulation of the initial thesis links the verses STP.46–52 with a short excursus on causality and liberation, it is not surprising to see that STP.3.53 in its turn emphasizes the idea of causes and causality. This is also quite evident if we consider that the section of STP.3.46–53 immediately follows a digression about the doctrine of causality (\textit{hetu-vāda}) and the doctrine of “non-causality” (\textit{ahetu-vāda}) in STP.3.43–45 with regard to soteriological issues, such as the question of beings capable of attaining liberation (\textit{bhāvya}) and beings incapable of it (\textit{abhāvya}) as well as causal predicaments and prerequisites for the attainment of liberation. The idea stated in STP.3.46 and STP.3.53 is explicitly replicated also in the phrase that “Jina’s words are made of an amassment of false views,” found in the final verse of STP.3.69: “Prosperity to Jina’s words that are made of an amassment of false views, that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the salvific happiness.”\textsuperscript{36} Since STP.3.53 seems to be kind of rephrasing of the thesis of STP.3.46 that immediately follows the application (\textit{upanaya}) in STP.3.51–52, it is clearly the fifth member of the proof formula, viz. the conclusion (\textit{nigamana}).

Accordingly, whereas STP.3.22 is at least an allusion to, if not a direct instantiation of, the five-membered proof formula (\textit{pañcāvaya-vāya}), the verses STP.3.46–53 are an instance of such a proof formula. They therefore demonstrate that Divākara not only approved of the five-membered proof formula (\textit{pañcāvaya-vāya}), but he also employed it himself.

5.2.

In contradistinction to this, we can read in NA.20\textsuperscript{37} that \textit{dṛṣṭānta} is not an essential part of the formal reasoning (\textit{sādhanāvāya}), inasmuch as the relation of the internal invariable concomitance (\textit{vyāpti}) suffices to prove the thesis. Thereby, the author of NA. not only subscribes to
the ideas expressed in Vāda-vidhāna and Vāda-vidhi of Vasubandhu
to limit the number of necessary "syllogistic" members to three, but
he furthermore continues this "economical" trend in Indian logic
and ventures to simplify the reasoning procedures in order to make them
universally binding, without any need for further empirical justification
other than the premises themselves. Besides, he emphasizes the sole
validity of the principle of anyathānapapatti (inexplicability otherwise).
It would be incongruous, if Siddhasena Mahāmati, being such an ardent
proponent of the new definition of the valid hetu in NA., had subscribed
himself to the notion of sambhādhin as a binding logical principle in a
text other than NA.

My interpretation of the genuine standpoint of NA. as regards the
validity of the inferences that have recourse to the idea of sambhādhin, as
expressed in VS.9.18, is further strengthened by what Siddhārṣigaṇi says
in NAV.5.2, while commenting on the Vaiśeśika definition of inference:
[2] tathāyey: "syēdām kāryam kāraṇam saṁyogī samavāyī virodhī cēti
lainṅkam" it. Referring to the saṁyogī part of the Vaiśeśika definition,
Siddhārṣigaṇi plainly says: "By the same [argument the thesis that]
a also a connected attribute leads to the comprehension [of the inferendum]
is censured because it is open to similar criticism." (NAV.5.3: etena
saṁyogāno 'pi gamakata pratyakta, saṁmā-diśayanavāt).

Siddhārṣigaṇi’s clarification confirms Siddhasena Mahāmati’s opinion
and stands in contradiction with the inference in STP. based on
sambhādhin i saṁyogī. Thus, we encounter in STP. and NA. two
conflicting attitudes towards the question of reasoning and the proof
formula. It would be highly surprising if one and the same author
outspokenly rejected the idea of the five-membered proof formula in
one text (NA.) and used the same five-membered proof formula in
another text (STP.).

6.1.

As mentioned already (§ 2.1, p. 2), NA. presupposes the notions,
ideas and terminology developed by Dīnṇāga and Dharmakīrti
and the text gives the impression that its author tries to keep pace with
the development of Indian logic. There are a large number of other
Buddhist notions and quotations, or semi-quotations in NA. (see n.
6), that are consistently and deeply interwoven in the structure of the
text, revealing that the author was, on the one hand, aware of possible
criticism from the Buddhist side who might disapprove of his own
ideas or, on the other hand, he himself was expressly critical of certain
Buddhist concepts.

On the other hand, I do not find even a single notion in STP. that might
presuppose its author’s acquaintance with Dīnṇāga’s, Śaṅkaravāma’s
or Dharmakīrti’s ideas; no criticism is raised against the viṇṇā-sāda,
Yogācāra, Yogācāra-Sautrāntika etc. The main antagonists in STP. are
the Vaiśeśika, whereas the references to other schools are sporadic.40
Apart from the notions and terms mentioned above in § 2.5 (e.g. svārtha-
l parārtha-anumāna) or the issue of sāmāyā - viśesa (vide infra, § 6.2,
p. 13 ff.) that occur in NA. and are absent from STP, there is not the
slightest hint in STP. to support the supposition that its author knew
of such ideas as: the doctrine of apoha; conceptualisation (kalponā);
the non-verbal perception (nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa); non-erroneousness
of perception (āvibhāma l abhrānti) coupled with erroneouness of
inference (vibhāma l bhṛnti); the concept of trairūpya and general
discussion on conditions of validity of inference; the question of causation
(also in the epistemological sense), including the arising of cognition as
a reflection (pratibhāsa) of an object as well as the actual relation
between cause and effect (grāhīya-grāhaka-bhāva-sambandha) in
the form of relation of causality (sād-uptati) and relation of essential
identity (tādāmya). These are only some of the topics one would expect
Siddhasena Divākara to deal with in respective sections of STP. devoted
to the linguistic approach towards reality (e.g. by applying syādā-sāda
or nāya-sāda) and the meaning of words, or to the exposition of causality
(e.g. in the sections of STP.3.32–35 and STP.3.43–45), for instance,
applied to origination of material things (dravya) endowed with quali-
ties (guna) and modes (paryāya), or to the working of karmān (when
the author discusses an antiquated doctrine of determinism (niyati)
in STP.3.53).

Certainly, these notions are likewise absent from NA., and I have
dared these ideas as an argument ex silento. Their absence from
NA. necessitates no further justification: there is no context in the
discussion within NA. for them to be mentioned, whereas generally
concepts and ideas that are expected to be relevant for the discussion
are indeed reported there. This is not the case with STP. This is of
course a negative evidence, i.e. it only proves that the author of STP.
does not use these notions and terms we would expect to find in STP.,
but it does not disprove the claim that the author was not aware of
them. The argument rests on the supposition that if the author of STP.
had been acquainted with these ideas, he would probably not have
missed the opportunity to defend his views against possible criticism
in respective sections of his STP. But, as one could argue, he might simply have considered them irrelevant or thought it to unnecessary to refute them for some reason. Whatever the case might have been, it does not seem very plausible that one and the same person could exhibit such divergent attitudes in both works (STP. and NA.) and be so inconsistent (either in terms of conceptual framework or in terms of approach).

6.2.

6.2.1.

It is in the context of the cognitive faculties (upayogas) that Siddhasena Divākara uses the terms sāmānyya and viśesa in STP.2.1: “Such insight (conation) which grasps the general [becomes] cognition [when] characterised by the specific.41 This comprehension of an object is [within the scope of both viewpoints42 alike.”43 What concerns me here is the first hemistich that characterises the nature of darsana (insight / conation) and jñāna (cognition), which grasp the general (sāmānyya) and the specific (viśesa) respectively. Here the differentiation into the sāmānyya and the viśesa is not along the lines of the typical distinction of the universal (as related to the class notion, jāti, language and concepts, kalpanā) and the particular (vyakti, svalaksana, etc.). Crucial for the distinction is the opposition between “general, indistinct, unclear” (for sāmānyya) and “distinct, specific, particular” (for viśesa). What emerges is the picture of the darsana grasping the sāmānyya, and the jñāna grasping the viśesa.

At first glance, one might have an impression that what is at stake is the often-debated division into perception (pratyaksā, which is often – even in Jaina sources – called darsana; see below § 6.2.2 for the similar case) and its opposite, non-perceptual cognition, e.g. inference (anumāna). What would surprise him or her would be the untypical correlation of perception (pratyaksā) to sāmānyya and non-perceptual kinds of cognition (such as anumāna) to viśesa. Such a position would immediately be liable to censure not only from the Buddhist side, in so far as it would express precisely the opposite of what e.g. Dharmakīrti claimed, namely that the viśesa (svalaksana) is the proper object (viṣaya) for perception (pratyaksā), whereas the sāmānyya (sāmānyya-lakṣaṇa) is the proper object (viṣaya) for inference (anumāna).

Naturally, a reader well acquainted with Jaina tradition would immediately recognise that the text deals with the two upayogas, not with the division into pratyaksā – anumāna, or something similar.

6.2.2.

However, the author of STP. was in fact occasionally wary of a possible misunderstanding of his position. An instance is facilitated by the discussion of STP.2.21–24:

[The prima facie position to be refuted:] [21] “Insight is nothing but sensation, because it designates [this is a pot]’ hence it becomes [the sensuous]’ cognition. Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute [cognition and insight] is this much only: [22] [the absolute] cognition is preceded by [the absolute] insight, but [the absolute] insight is not conditioned by [the absolute] cognition; hence we rightly conclude that there is difference between both [the absolute] cognition and [the absolute] insight”.45

[Rejoinder:] [23–24] “If you maintain that insight is nothing but [ocular]’ sensation, or a qualified cognition, [then], if it were so, it [would] follow that insight is nothing but the sensuous cognition, and such would necessarily be [the case] with the insight derived through the remaining sense organs. But this is not correct”.46

[The opponent argues:] “If in [the case of] these [remaining senses] only cognition is understood,”47 in the very same way in [the case of] eyes [only cognition should be understood].48

From the above passage it follows that the opponent may have considered insight / conation (darsana) to be merely perception (pratyaksā), both because of the misleading terminology (see above § 6.2.1 for a similar case) and because of the specific character of insight / conation (darsana), viz. its “operating strategy” that merely brings the constatation: “this is such a thing.” Precisely such a constatation is often said to be a characteristic mark of – at least conceptual (sāvikalpaka) – perception.50 In other words, the opponent may have had the impression that the description of the mechanism of darsana matches that of avagraha,51 for “it designates [this is] a pot” (“ghado” tī niyavannā),52 hence he may have been inclined to equate the two. Especially the contents of STP.2.21 and 2.23 are very suggestive in this regard.

Significantly Siddhasena Divākara disavows any supposition that darsana might be equated with avagraha and tries to prove that the affinity between Jaina avagraha and darsana is illusory. He does so, despite the fact that naturally anyone sufficiently acquainted with Jaina tradition would immediately recognise that darsana and avagraha can by no means be identified.

This only demonstrates that Siddhasena Divākara anticipated possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations on the part of his opponent, that he was aware of such a possibility.

Accordingly, if the author of STP. had been acquainted with Dīnāga’s or Dharmakīrti’s ideas, he would not have failed to expound on the controversial question of the proper relation between darsana – sāmānyya
and jñāna – viśeṣa stated in STP.2.1 (vide supra § 6.2.1), for he would have been aware that his statements are not only liable to some misreading but may easily trigger pertinent criticism. This further strengthens the supposition, expressed above in § 6.1, that STP. was written before Diṇḍāga.

7.  

Another case of disagreement between NA. and STP. concerns different typologies of cognitive faculties (upayoga) and cognitive criteria (pramāṇa). In NA. we find two subdivisions of pramāṇa: (1) perception (pratyaksā), divided into sensory (anuprāṇa) and supra-sensory (kevala), and (2) indirect cognition (parokṣa) that comprises inference (anumāṇa) and verbal testimony (śābda). With the exception of the kevala-pratyakṣa mentioned in NA.27, Siddhasena Mahāmati’s understanding of pratyakṣa conforms to the general Indian epistemic tradition that took it to be the cognition directly derived through and with the help of sense organs in the first place. His pratyakṣa (perception) departs from the Jaina tradition that regarded pratyakṣa to be direct and of exclusively supra-sensory character. There is no reference to the idea of upayoga in NA.; instead the main concern of Siddhasena Mahāmati is the enquiry into the character of pramāṇa. His examination culminates in formulating the first descriptive definition of pramāṇa in the history of Jaina epistemology and one of the first in India.

In sharp contrast to NA. is the classification outlined in STP. Surprisingly the idea of cognitive validity (pramāṇa) and of cognitive criterion (pramāṇa) is absent there, and so are such terms as pramāṇa, pramāti, māṇa, pramā, or their equivalents. Instead, what predominates in the epistemological scheme of STP. are the two upayogas (investigated esp. STP.2.1–5, 18 ff., 30), divided traditionally into five kinds of jñāna and four kinds of darsana.

The idea of the fivefold division of jñāna into mātya, śrutatva, avadhi, manah-paryāya, kevala is present e.g. in STP.2.5–6, 2.16, 2.23 and 2.27. There can be no doubt that Diṇḍākarā recognised the four divisions of caksu-darsana, acaksu-darsana, avadhi-darsana, kevala-darsana (see STP.2.20), with the proviso of STP.2.30–31 (vide infra, p. 16). Surprisingly, the division into pratyakṣa-parokṣa is nowhere mentioned explicitly in STP. And – with the exception of STP.2.28–29 – the terms pratyakṣa, samaksaka, saksāti etc. as well as their opposites never occur in the text. The same goes for parokṣa. Nonetheless we can easily – in the verses that outspokenly speak of pratyakṣa – find hints that the author did conceive of the upayoga scheme as bifurcating into the complements of direct and indirect cognition: “[27] In [case of] a conditioned person (i.e. in the state of bondage) the comprehension of objects is occasioned by the sentient cognition and testimony; there is no insight in any one of them; what from [should there be] insight [in them]? [28] Since objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly, therefore the word ‘insight’ does not apply to the cognition through testimony at all. [29] Since entities not [directly] touched [by senses] (asprśa) become directly cognisable for the cognition through telaeesthesia, therefore the word ‘insight’ is [correctly] employed with regard to the cognition through telaeesthesia.” The next two verses of STP.2.30–31 state that at the level of an omniscient person (kevalin) both the cognitive faculties, viz. kevala-darsana and kevala-jñāna are identical (aviśeṣa), since they arise at the same time.

Furthermore, Siddhasena Divākara accepted the sentient cognition (mati-jñāna, abhinibodhika-jñāna) himself alongside its four traditional stages, viz. sensation (avagraha), speculation (īhā), perceptual judgement (apāya) and retention (dhāranā), and classified it as the parokṣa type cognition (jñāna).

Thus, the structure of the cognitive faculties propounded in STP. corresponds basically to what I call Model 1: upayoga: (I) jñāna: (1) abhinibodhika-jñāna with its four stages: (a) avagraha, (b) īhā, (c) apāya, (d) dhāranā, (2) śruta-jñāna, (3) avadhi-jñāna, (4) manah-paryāya-jñāna, (5) kevala-jñāna, (II) darsana: (1) caksu-darsana, (2) acaksu-darsana, (4) avadhi-darsana, (5) kevala-darsana.

Significantly as it were, not only is this structure incompatible with NA., but also the notion of the sentient cognition (mati-jñāna, abhinibodhika-jñāna) does not fit into the framework of NA.

8.  

In NA. Siddhasena Mahāmati develops the idea of svārtha-vākyā and parārtha-vākyā (NA.10) and svārtha-pratyakṣa and parārtha-pratyakṣa (NA.11), elaborating upon the well-known division of svārtha-darsana and parārtha-darsana developed by Diṇḍāgā and Dharmakīrti. It is precisely in the context of his attempt to prove that the epistemic idea of efficacy for others (parārthya) and efficacy for oneself (svārthya) is applicable to both perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (parokṣa) that one should read his statement of NA.12: “And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external factor for the representation.”
His thesis of parārtha-pratyakṣa boils down to saying that things can also be directly cognized through verbal means, and verbal utterances can be classified as cases of perception under special conditions, viz. if they contribute to the generating of knowledge in the hearer that corresponds to the speaker’s cognitive states derived perceptually.

In contradistinction to the above statement of NA., STP.2.28 explicitly declares that “objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping [them] directly” (paccakkha-ggañhāna na inti suya-nāna-sammiyā athā). In other words, for Siddhasena Dīvākara verbal communication is incompatible with the notion of direct cognition (pratyakṣa), hence must by definition be indirect (parokṣa).65 Here we have a clear case of two contradictory concepts when one and the same sphere of verbal communication is either attributed (NA.) or denied of (STP.) the efficacy of direct cognition. Apparently Siddhasena Dīvākara could not have been aware of the concept of parārtha-pratyakṣa.66

9. As I have tried to demonstrate on the preceding pages, there is a number of points that make the common authorship of STP. and NA. highly debatable, namely (1) the general outline, vocabulary and matters discussed (vide supra §§ 2.1–2, 2.5–6); (2) presence (in NA.) or absence (in STP.) of the structured pattern of definitions and justifications (vide supra §§ 2.3–4); (3) various principles on which inference is based, viz. inference of the relatum (sambandha) by means of a relation (sambandha) – i.e. the application of sambandha as hetu – accepted in STP. and rejected in NA., and the “inexplicability otherwise” (anyathānupapatti) – i.e. the proper hetu – as the basis of all inference propounded in NA. (vide supra § 4); (4) acceptance (in STP.) or rejection (in NA.) of application (upanaya) as a member of the proof formula (nyāyāvayaṇa, sādhanā), and therefore the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the classical five-membered proof formula (pañcāvayaṇa-vākyya) (vide supra §§ 5.1–2); (5) presence (in NA.) or absence (in STP.) of notions that presuppose the authors’ acquaintance with Dīnāgā or Dhammakīrti (vide supra §§ (§ 2.1, 6.1), especially the case of the proper relation between darsana – sāmīyā and jñāna – viśeṣa (vide supra §§ 6.2.1–6.2.2); (6) different typological schemes of cognitive faculties (upayoga) or cognitive criteria (pramāṇa), the question of the feasibility of assigning room to the sensuous cognition (mati-jñāṇa, abhinibodhika-jñāṇa) in such a classification, as well as different interpretations of the true character of pratyakṣa (vide supra § 7); (7) the controversy of the direct, i.e. perceptual character (pratyakṣa) of verbal utterances and the question whether things communicated verbally can be grasped directly (vide supra § 8).

To this list I could add some more points of divergence, discussed already in Balcerekowicz (forthcoming), namely: (8) the assignment of either sensory (NA.) or suprasensory (STP.) character to pratyakṣa, taken either as perception (NA.) or as blanket term “direct cognition” (STP.);67 (9) the importance of the essential unity of jñāna and darsana at the kevala stage for the author of STP. and complete indifference to the question in NA. as well as a different treatment of kevala in both works;68 (10) different attitudes to the authority of the Āgamas, either faithfulness to the Āgamic tradition (STP.) or search for novel solutions (NA.).69

I believe these points of divergence clearly demonstrate that not only were the Sammati-tarka-prakarana and the Nyāyāvatāra conceived by two different persons, but also at two different historical periods.

As regards the Sammati-tarka-prakarana, it is rather dubious whether the name of its author was indeed Siddhasena Dīvākara, but since I see no better alternative, I would suggest keeping the name, especially in view of Abhayadevasūrya’s identification (vide supra n. 4). Since there is no indication that Siddhasena Dīvākara as the author of the Sammati-tarka-prakarana might have been familiar with the terminology of Dīnāgā’s school, I would maintain that he must have flourished before ca. 500 C.E.

Since the Nyāyāvatāra was definitely composed after 620/660 C.E. (Dhammakīrti) and Pārśāvāmin and before c. 800 C.E. (Haribhadraśūri),70 its author cannot be the same Siddhasena. To distinguish the two Siddhasenas, I follow the identification by Haribhadraśūri and refer to the author of the Nyāyāvatāra as Siddhasena Mahāmati.71

NOTES

1 The Prabhāvakacaritā of Prabhācandra – dated from 1277 C.E. (see Granoff (1989–1990: 1, 329)) – seems to be the only exception, see Granoff (1989–1990: II, 292): “The Prabhāvakacaritā is the only text to name in addition Siddhasena’s manual of logic, his Nyāyāvatāra,...”

2 See Granoff (1989–1990: 1, 336): “The work that modern scholars consider to be Siddhasena’s main philosophical work, his Sammati-tarka, is nowhere mentioned in the biographies of the prabhāvakas and in related sources.”

3 See Upādiye (1971: xxiii), “Its [ = Nyāyāvatāra – P.B.] constitution (whether it had 32 verses), its authorship by Siddhasena (the author of the Sammati) and consequently its date to have remained open questions for a number of reasons.”

4 TBV.1 (introducductory port), p. 1.17–18: ... Siddhasena-Dīvākaraḥ tad-upāya-bhūna-Saṁmati-dikṣā-prakarana-karaye...
Haribhadraśtri quotes the verse NA.2 in his Asṭaka and refers to its author as Mahāmatī, cf. Pt. Dulsukhbhaśa Malvanā (1979: 287–288), Puḍāhye (1971: xxiv) and Dhaky (1995: 44). The following observation of Puḍāhye (1971: xxiv) further strengthens the claim that NA. and STP. had two different authors: “Haribhadra, in his Asṭaka, quotes the Nyāyavairāca 2, by referring to its author as Mahāmatī. Elsewhere, however, Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the Saṃvatī as Divākara and Śrūtakalita.”


8 E.g. only the avagriha stage of maśa-jitā is mentioned in STP., while the author is silent on the three remaining subdivisions, viz. ṛṭa, apyāja and ādranā. Nevertheless the reader is expected to know them to be able to follow the argumentation.

9 An exception is the related term upapanna occurring in STP.2.33: samamānābā naiyasam dāsnasam dāsamase u bhavyaṁjīvam / samamānān ca imam ti athaḥ hoi uvasanam । – “Right insight [exists] in right knowledge, and right knowledge should be necessarily admitted [to exist] in right insight – this is explicable (upapanna) from the meaning (arthā = sāmānyāḥ).”

10 Truly, the term pakṣa occurs in STP., but in the more general sense of “opinion, viewpoint,” e.g. STP.1.23: avanyona-pakṣa-nirpekkhā navah, and STP.2.39: atha puna puna-pakṣa-bhavyā bhakti / tāsa vi udayanam imam tī hiṃ-patijñānam voccham । – “Even though a fact has been previously adduced to refute a one-sided view, nevertheless, we will formulate a solution (remedy) [in the form of] the reason: ‘this is an example’.” The context for it is STP.2.37–38 and the question: “What is the relation between liberoted jiva and its kevala cognition? They should be different form each other.”

11 The term prayoga occurs in STP.3.32 but not in the logical sense.

12 NA.29–30 only mentions the term nava as an element of the anetkāta theory.

13 There is, however, a conspicuous similarity as regards the character of kevala (similarities are underlined):

NA.27: sakādvarana-mukātmana kevalam yat prakāśata / pratyayaṃ sakādvarana-mukātmana pratiḥpratigam na / – “That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as [something] absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects.”

STP.2.17: tamāḥ caiva-viśeṣa.l justi na u niño-dānsana-lāśānam / sva-yam anandavanam akhyānam kevalaṃ jambu । – “Therefore it would follow that [cognition would be] four-fold [not five-fold], but there [would be] no [separate] cognition and insight [in case of] Jinas, if the absolute cognition is without veils, eternal, imperishable.” This verse is a rejoinder of Divākara’s opponent who draws the conclusion from Divākara’s thesis about the identity of cognition and insight. But this similarity is apparent and not conclusive, since it may be simply due to a general way of describing the absolute cognition.

14 E.g. niśkriyā-bheda-svārūpa, bheda na pratipadyante.

15 One would expect NA. to use the term (niś-las-vaśika) or kalpa while discussing the nature of perception, e.g. to take recourse to the idea of non-conceptual perception expressed by Divākara or Dharmakīrti in NB.1.4: tatra pratyayaṃ kalpanapaddham abhṛtām. Strangely enough, NA. does nowhere refute the idea of kalpanapaddhāna.

16 sakādvarana-mukātmana kevalam yat prakāśata – i.e. it is the only cognition after all veils have been destroyed.

17 kevala-nādvarana-ekkha-jāyam kevalan jāh nānām । – after veils have been destroyed, other kinds of cognition such as the sensuous cognition, etc., are not cognition.

18 STP.3.16: evantu-pakkha-vādya iha u sāda-guna-jātī-bhavam i / aha puna-pakṣa-bhavyāṇam eka-pratigam na / – “Thus, even a common cognition is an absolute cognition.”

19 STP.3.17: pita-pata-natu bhavaya-bhāvanāna eka-pratigam na / – “Thus, even a common cognition is an absolute cognition.”

20 STP.3.18: jāha sambandha-vaitivita so purusro purisa-bhāva-nirāśaḥ / taha dāsamana indraya-gayaṃ rādī-vistasanam tāhā । – “If a cognition is the feeling of the self in the cognition and that is the absolute cognition.”

21 STP.3.19: hajahī jāha-guna-nakhaṇam anamā-guna-kāla-yam u rādī-vistasanam tāhā । na u dāthā naḥ mālaloḥ / – “If a cognition is the feeling of the self in the cognition and that is the absolute cognition.”

22 STP.3.20: bhava-mahābhāva-vātā jī jī sambandhitānam anumānam / naṃ sambandhitānaṃ visesato sambandhitānaṃ sāvāyam । – “Thus, if the self in the cognition and that is the absolute cognition.”

23 STP.3.21: jāha sambandha-vaitivita so purusro purisa-bhāva-nirāśaḥ / taha dāsamana indraya-gayaṃ rādī-vistasanam tāhā । – “Thus, if the self in the cognition and that is the absolute cognition.”

24 STP.3.22: bhava-mahābhāva-vātā jī jī sambandhitānam anumānam / naṃ sambandhitānaṃ visesato sambandhitānaṃ sāvāyam । – “Thus, if the self in the cognition and that is the absolute cognition.”

25 The above verse refers to the refutation of the thesis of absolute difference between substance and quality (dravya-paryaya-bhedaśānta-vāda) in the preceding section. Cf. Abhayadevasūri’s TBV. ad loc. p. 36.6–17, 19, evam-saṁśārikahṛtyupagamavāda yoh pūrṇa dravya-guna-kriyābheda sa yady api pūrṇam eva pratyakṣ ṣekha bhedaśānta-gaṇaka-paramāntābhāvād abheda-gaṇaka-pracaśita-vādaya ca “sarvaṃ ekam sad aviseṣaṃ viśeṣaṃ vā viśeṣaṃ kusumāvad asatra-prataṣṭaḥ” iti pradarsanitavyāḥ. tatprāvṛṣe tāñ Natavarāṇa-dhvijapandaranāthā uddharaṇa-mātraṃ abhiḥkhyātāyā. – “However, even though this [Vaiśesika] doctrine accepting absolute difference of (lit. as absolutely different substance) to the divisions of substance, quality and movement has just in the preceding been rejected – because [firstly] there is no cognitive criterion proving (lit. making one grasp) absolute difference and [secondly] because a counter-proof for (lit. a cognitive criterion proving) non-difference of [substance, quality and action] has been demonstrated [in the form]: ‘Everything is the one existent, because there is no distinction [among entities as regards their existence], or if there were [any] distinction, that would lead to the undesired consequence of non-existence of [some entities that should be taken to differ from other entities considered to exist], like a sky-flower’ – nevertheless merely an example is [explicitly stated in order to provide] additional substantiation for the gist of this [doctrine of the absolute difference].”

26 Thus the dialectical structure of the whole passage is as follows: the bheda-vāda of 3.16 as the paurava-pakṣa 1 (it is referred to by the abheda-vādins), to which it opposed its corroborative instantiation in 3.17, is subsequently followed by a rejoinder in 3.19 (inexplicability of the occurrence of two different kinds of situations) and its refutation from the position of the abheda-vāda of 3.20. Further, the Jaina position is established in 3.21, only to be followed by the quardy voiced by the opponent in 3.22 ab which is solved in 3.22 cd. The idea is clear enough: if a man, as the substratum of various interpersonal and family relations, were identical with the relationships qualifying him, then a particular relation, say, of his-being-a-father to a particular individual (this son) would have to be necessarily bear on all other relations, insofar as they would be likewise identical with the substratum, for the relation of identity (abheda) is a transitive relation. Thus, the logical justification for the bheda-vāda would, in the eyes of Sādhuśeṣa Divākara, be to prevent a range of undesired consequences ensuing from the transitive character of the identity relation that underlies the abheda-vāda.

27 The above verse of 3.18 projects the structural pattern of the complex whole: the man and his relational modes with respect various family relations, onto the substance-qualities structure. The qualities of the substance Sādhuśeṣa Divākara
has in mind are colour and other sensations (vījaya) related to the five senses. If a substance as the substratum for its qualities were in the relation of identity to its qualities, then e.g. the relation "substance – visible-form", which further relates the substance to a particular sense (here: sense of vision), would be passed onto other relational complexes substance – sensation – sense organ: in consequence, the distinction between the character of sensory data would be blurred and disappear, the distinction between them being merely nominal. Cf. Abhayadevari's in asoc. to loc. p. 636.19.27, vathā pradhārā-sambandha-viśītaḥ pitr-ādi-vyapadevam śrīvīrya tattva-rūpivai savara-nirātiveigated asit: api san tathā advayam api ghranā-rasa-nirākara-avasthānām avajah rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-talabāvyapadevam-màtram labhate drava-svara-viśītevajah api nahi sākṣērā-tābdha-bhudai ghranā-nirākara-avajah rūpa-vāda-bhūdai vastu-bheda yuktas tata dravyāvaiśaitkJā-sāke trunośch bhūdha-vāda dravya-gaṇavatār miśā-sāka iti. – "Just as [a man] qualified by a specific relation, who is determined [in his relational status] by the designation 'father', etc. still [remains] unaltered (sc. unmodified) – viz. existent – in his human form, in the same manner also the substance – having entered a [specific] relation with the faculties of smell, taste, vision, touch and hearing – receives the designation alone [that refers to] its colour, taste, smell, touch and sound, even though [the substance remains] the same in its intrinsic nature of [being] a substance. For it is not sound (to assume) that an entity [referred to] is different on account of the difference of [referring] terms [such as] 'colour', etc., analogous [to the [non-difference] of [one and the same] male deity despite the difference of [referring] terms [such as] 'Sakra', 'Indra', etc. Hence, since the doctrine of the absolute unity of substance is proved, the doctrine [proposing] conditional difference – cum – non-difference between substance and its qualities is a false doctrine." 22 Abhayadevari introduces the refutation with the words asya nīttrakṣaṇaśvāda, and further explicates (TVB. asoc. to loc. p. 636.29-637.5, yadi nāma ātrāhā-dvajam eva rasana-sambandhā "rasa" iti vyapadevam āśādayat dhvaj-guna-mudhram rasatah katu bhavet tathā nayana-sambandhā yadi nāma "kṣayam" iti bhavet ananya-guna-kṣayam tat katu śyāt vāsatuḥsah-bhavaguter naivānā-sambandha- madhūlām asambhāvātaḥ, tathā, prayādā-sambandha-dvārenā puruśa bhavet na tv alop mahānā vā yakshā, vītā-prapitaṁ upacarināte mithyātvaḥ stī rāmysvā- prapitaṁ api tathā prakṛteḥ iii bhāvah. – Suppose that a singular substance such as mango fruit, etc., could acquire the designation alone 'taste' due to [its] relation with the [faculty of] smell, how could it become sweet of two kinds (sc. possess two sweet flavours, if the determining relation substance-sense is singular) with respect to taste? Similarly, suppose that – due to the relation with the [faculty of] vision – something could be called 'black', how could it be black of infinite kinds (sc. how could it be characterised by innumerable shades of black, if there is only one substance-sense relation)? [This should not occur], because the recognition of difference in the complex [consisting of various flavours / shades] would not be possible due to the mere (sc. singular) relation with the [faculty of] vision, etc. Similarly, it is sound [to maintain] that a man who is precisely the father, etc., by way of [his] relation to [his] son, could become neither small nor big, because such should be the [expected] unwelcome consequence if on account of the apprehension of the particular there [could also] arise the apprehension of the general, either metaphorically or falsely. Such is the idea.

What is implied here, I believe, is that in the first case, a singular substance (mango fruit, a black object) is the bearer of a number of indistinct and particular cognitive qualities (distinct sweet flavours, a range of particular shades of black), even though there is only one general relation (connection) between the substance and the respective sense organ (faculties of taste, of vision) that is accountable for the respective general blanket-terms such as 'sweet' or 'black', whereas in the second case the substance (the man) retains its (his) singular character, even though one should by analogy expect him to appear diversified, since it (he) enters a number of relations.

For the specific meaning of vāsatuḥsah = "particularised complexity / individualised character" see NAV.29.23: <tt>ṁaṁśaḥ tād eva samvadanaḥ upasārjani-ṛṣi-vāsatuḥsah pradhānā-kramākāram sāmānyam grhyātāt ucyate</tt>... "(Therefore, it is taught that the very same sensation [in which] the particularised complexity is made subordinate [and in which] one [common] form is made the main [import] grasps the universal...)" and NAV.29 of NAV.29.23: upasārjani-ṛṣi, upasārjani-ṛṣi gauri-grhātā vāsatuḥsah viśīte-vārāṇaḥ yena tat-tathā.


26 VS.9:18 sambandha-labdhena samyogino grahaham dhūmadeḥ, avyakhyātaṁ samyogadviśāte. See the reading of the sūtra in NAV.5: avyakhyātaṁ kāryam kāryaṁ samvṛtvāviśeṣaṁ virodha cātā laṅkajñam. 27 The relevant section is edited and translated in KUNST (1939: I:5–13). 28 arvāhyānupanānāvatā yatra tratā trayena kim nāravāḥ-arpanānāvatā yatra tratā trayena kim. The verses are also found in TŚV, p. 203, TVB. vol. II, p. 569.28–29 and in PM.2.1.9 § 33: p. 45.17–18. In the reading of TŚA. the pādus ab are interchanged with the pādus cd. on the authenticity of this verse, see BALCEROWICZ (1999: xxx. n. ix) and BALCEROWICZ (2000: 45. n. 72). 29 Pātrāvīṃśa's treatise in question is his lost Tri-lakṣana-kārdaṭhāra. See DHARKY (1995: 43).

30 NA.17ab: hetu tathāpattayāḥ yātā pravṛgyo 'nyathāpi vā I, NA.22ab: avyakhyānaṁ arpanānāvatāḥ hetā lokanānaṁ trayo I. 31 I quote the whole passage of STP.3:46–53, which is relevant for further discussion:

STP.3:46, 1 parśudādhy nava-yāvyā dvāgūnametra-sāhō kiho I so eva dhūmigtaṁ daṇī tann api pakkhe viśāndaṁ I

STP.3:47, 1 jāvāvā yāvata-vātā vātavā yena homī yava-yāvyā I jāvāvā yava-yāvyā tāvata vāva yena-parca-sūrya I

STP.3:48, 1 jain kāvīlōn darjanam evam darjāvāvāya vatāvāya I sudhohina-tanahasa u parśudādhyo pājāva-yāvyā I

STP.3:49, 1 dohi vi naṅkhi nāṁ sānithām uārāna tahā vi mīcchātum I jain sarvāśa-prāṇatūhemanaṁ antākārayā antākārayā I

STP.3:50, 1 je saniya-yāvyā-dose sākkheyaḥ bhāvanītāh sankhāsaṁ I sankhāya u vasanāva tattve tvāc te sāc te jain I

STP.3:51, 1 te i bhavāvinyā tiṣyitāh samyukhānāvānānānaṁ sānithāṁ I jain bhuvābhūkha-vimokhām dvi vi paṇīreti pātikānaṁ I

STP.3:52, 1 nāttī pāHAVā-viśeṣītvā grahdhā tri jain tetā jyujī annam I

STP.3:53, 1 kala sankhāya nava-puva-yāvyā parama kārṇāyogām I mīcchātum te cēuvātī) samaiśāh hiṃci samānanām I

32 Here: bhuvana = bhujana = vivaśca = anekānta.


NAT, Devabhadrā: Nyāyavātāra-tīppana, See: NA.

NAV, Siddhārṣīganī: Nyāyavātāra-viṃti, See: NA.


Nībbhāsyāna Pāksaśārinī, Nyāya-būdha, See: NS.


PALLV. Ananta Virya. Parīkṣāmukhi-laghu-vritti. See: PA.


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Anuśāsa. See: Nandi.
