

# THE VĀDAVIDHI AND THE VĀDAVIDHĀNA OF VASUBANDHU

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UDYOTAKARA mentions in his Vārtika titles of three works without the author's name: a "Vāda-vidhi," while examining the definitions of Pratijñā,<sup>1</sup> a "Vāda-vidhāna" in connection with the refutation of the definition of Vāda,<sup>2</sup> and a "Vāda-vidhānatikā," while discussing the definitions of Pakṣa.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Satischandra Vidyābhūṣana assumed "Vāda-vidhāna" to be a different title of "Vāda-vidhi" and ascribed it to Dharmakīrti, taking it to be identical with the "Vādanyāya." He, further, assumed "Vāda-vidhānatikā" to be identical with the "Vādanyāyatika" of Vinīta-dēva<sup>4</sup>. In my article "Vāda-vidhi", contributed to JBORS<sup>5</sup>, I contradicted his view and set forth evidences to support my view that "Vāda-vidhi" was a work of Ācārya Vasubandhu, quite different from the "Vādanyāya" of Dharmakīrti. Prof. H. Jacobi, to whom I had sent an off-print of my article, wrote to me that he "perfectly agreed with me that Udyotakara was much earlier than Dharmakīrti."

<sup>1</sup> NV. p. 117, on NSI. i. 33.

<sup>2</sup> NV. p. 154-55 on NSI. ii. 1.

<sup>3</sup> NV. p. 117 on NSI. i. 33.

<sup>4</sup> HIL. p. 320; JRAS 1914. p. 601-606. Introduction to the Bilingual Index to the Nyāyabindu, pp. ix-x.

<sup>5</sup> "Vāda-vidhi"—JBORS Dec. 1926. pp. 587-591.

But Dr. Keith, who also read my article, wrote to me as follows: "I have now had time to investigate the question and there are certain difficulties in your view which have occurred to me, though, in itself, it is attractive. I think that it is satisfactory that the matter should be re-examined, though I have been unable to arrive at decisive results." He wrote an article, under the caption, "Vasubandhu and the Vāda-vidhi" to IHQ<sup>1</sup>. Therein he examined the question in detail and arrived at the conclusion that "evidences were inadequate to overthrow the view of Vidyābhūṣana, though, unquestionably on chronological grounds, there is reason to doubt the use by Udyotakara of Vinīta-dēva. But, if the matter has to be established in any other sense new evidence must be adduced." Prof. G. Tucci contributed an article under the title, "Vāda-vidhi," to IHQ and defended my view by adducing further evidences from the Chinese sources. I, too, wrote an article,<sup>2</sup> "Vasubandhu and the Vāda-vidhi," as a rejoinder to Dr. Keith, and explained why "Vāda-vidhi" should be regarded as a work of Vasubandhu, and "Vāda-vidhānatikā" could not be considered as identical with "Vādanyāyatikā" of Vinīta-dēva. This conclusion has, no doubt, been drawn on the strength of the evidences available from the Tibetan sources, particularly the statements of Dinnāga.<sup>3</sup> It is quite strange that Udyotakara, who has cited several fragments of the "Vāda-vidhi" should refer to the work only once. It is still more so that Vācaspati, in his tikā, should ascribe only the definition of Pratyakṣa to Vasubandhu and remark in the case of other fragments either 'Pareṣām lakṣaṇam' or 'lakṣaṇātaram', without referring either to the text or its author. He does not, further, make any comment either on the definition of Pratijñā ascribed by

<sup>1</sup> Vasubandhu and the Vāda-vidhi—IHQ Vol. IV. 221.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, V. 81-86.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 82.

Udyotakara to "Vādāvidhi," on the "Vādauidhāna," or on the "Vādauidhānatikā" mentioned by Udyotakara. Thus the evidences from the Sanskrit sources are apparently not sufficient to ascribe "Vādavidhi" to Vasubandhu.

But, fortunately, new works, Buddhist and Jaina, which have been discovered and published, throw considerable light on the problem. They contain statements which prove beyond doubt Vasubandhu's authorship of the Vādavidhi and suggest the possibility of regarding "Vādauidhāna" as a different work by Vasubandhu. This article is written to bring together these statements and explain how they help to solve the problem.

Udyotakara examines the definition of Pratijñā of the "Vādavidhi" and rejects it as being defective. His comments run as follows:—यद्यपि वादविधौ साध्याभिधानं प्रतिज्ञेति प्रतिज्ञालक्षण-मुक्तम् । तदुभयथादोषान्न युक्तम् । कथमिति । यदि तावत् पूर्वप्रकृतमपेक्ष्य-माणेनेदमुच्यते साध्याभिधानं प्रतिज्ञेति तदा साध्यप्रहणानर्थक्यम् । प्रकृतः पक्षः तच्छब्देनाभिसम्भन्तस्यत इति तदभिधानं प्रतिज्ञेति वक्तव्यम् । अथ पक्षानपेक्षं स्वतन्त्रमेतल्लक्षणं तथापि यो नैयायिकप्रतिज्ञायां दोष उक्तः स इह प्रसक्तः । (No doubt, Pratijñā is defined in the "Vādavidhi" as "mention of the 'Sādhya.'" But it is open to objection in whatever way it is interpreted. How? If this is said in reference to Pakṣa which has been previously spoken of, then the word, 'Sādhya' becomes superfluous, as the 'pakṣa' could be referred to simply by the word 'tat.' The definition would then be तदभिधानं प्रतिज्ञा. If, on the other hand, the definition has no reference to the 'pakṣa,' then all the defects pointed out by you in the Nyāya definition could equally be attributed to your definition).

It is interesting to compare this with what Dinnāga has said in respect to the same definition. In the beginning of

the third chapter of the "Pramāṇasamuccaya,"<sup>1</sup> Dinnāga first criticises the definition 'pratiñā' of the Nyāya Sūtra, साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञा as being defective, since by Sādhya, only Siddha is excluded, the statements of *Hetu* and *Dṛṣṭānta* which are not सिद्ध will have to be regarded as *pratiñā*. In the next Kārikā<sup>2</sup> he attributes the same defect to the definition साध्याभिधानं प्रतिज्ञा as एवं साध्याभिधानेऽपि । His comment,

<sup>1</sup> PS III 3 :—bsgrub bya bstān pa zhes bya hdir grub pa med la don byas fīd de ltar na yañ dpe dan rtags ma grub byod pa thal bar hgyur.

साध्यनिर्देश इत्यत्र सिद्ध एव निवर्तते ।

एवं चेद्वेतुदृष्टान्ताद्यसिद्धोक्तिः प्रसज्यते ॥

PSV—Rigs pa can rnaurs nare | bsgrub bya bstān pa zhes bya ba yiu no | bsgrub bya smros pal ni grub pa log pa tsan bstān pāhi pbyir bsgrub byāi bye brag fīd ni ma yur par gnas so | dper na sgra rtag stel reg par bya ba ma yur pahi pbyir blo bzhin no zhes bya ba dan | de bzhin du miggi grhuñ bya yin pahi pbyir mi rtag zhes bya ba hdi yañ bsgrub bya bstān pahi pbyir dan bcab bar thal bar hgyur rol

नैयायिका आहुः—साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञेति । साध्यवचनेन सिद्धस्य निवृत्तिरेव प्रदर्शितेति असिद्धयोः हेतुदृष्टन्तयोः प्रसङ्गः । यथा शब्दो नित्यः अस्पर्शत्वात् बुद्धिबत् । च क्षुपत्वादन्त्य इति च । अत्रापि साध्यनिर्देशात् प्रतिज्ञा प्रसज्यते ।

N. B :—These sentences are repeated by Udyotakara on p. 110.

Cf : PVT (Pramāṇavārtikaṭikā) p. 469—

ननु साध्यनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञेति पक्षलक्षणं नैयायिकानाम् । तत्र को दोषः ? ।

also cf. PSV on III-4 and PVT p. 473.

<sup>2</sup> PS. III 5 : de bzhin bsgrub byed brjod pa hlañ phyogs na lhag pbyir nir srid do | rnaur par dpyod pahi hdod pa hdi mi hdod pa las log pa tsam ||

असिद्धहेतुदृष्टान्तस्यापि पक्षत्वप्रसङ्गः ।

एवं साध्याभिधानेऽपि पक्षाधिक्यादसंभवः ।

विचारणायामिष्टोऽयमनिष्टस्य निवर्तकः ॥

de bzhin du rigs pa can rnam la skyon brjod pa de bzhin du rtsod pa bsgrub pa la yañ | rtagl besgrub par bya ba dan | dpe ltar snañ ba brjed par yañ dam bcab par thal bar hgyur ro |

rtsod pa sgrub par ni bsgrub par brjod pa tsam dam bcab bar hgyur pa ma yin gyi | hona kyañ phyogs kyi chos besgrut byaho | phyogs de ci cig rnam par dpyed pāhi hdod pahi don te | de phyogs yio pas bsgrub bya tsam de rtgs ma grub pa la sogs par brjod pa yañ dam bcab par hgyur ro zhes pahi skyon no med do zhe na | skyon ji ltar na med de | de la yañ | de ni mi hdod pa ldig pa la | don byas pa yin na | ji ltār bsgrub byāi khyad par go bar byed | glān tshigs

in his Vritti, which is in Tibetan, may be rendered into, 'नैयायिकेषु यथा दोष उक्तः एवं वादविधावपि । हेतुदृष्टान्ताभासामिधानमपि प्रतिज्ञा प्रसज्यते ।' Then the defect attributed to the Nyāya definition is equally attributable to the definition of the "Vādavidhi." It cannot be avoided, says he, by assuming the definition to be पक्षधर्मसाध्याभिधानम्, for पक्ष is defined in the Vādavidhi, as विचारणायामिष्टोऽर्थः or the thing that is desired in an enquiry, and the word, इष्ट which denotes only one thing, cannot both exclude the अनिष्ट and indicate the साध्यविशेष. Evidently then, both Diñnāga and Udyotakara<sup>1</sup> are citing the definition from the same work Vādavidhi. But, while Diñnāga ascribes the work to Vasubandhu, Udyotakara and Vācaspati remain silent.

The definition of Pratyakṣa, 'ततोऽर्थाद्विज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्', is a citation from the "Vādavidhi" according to Diñnāga<sup>2</sup>. Udyotakara quotes and criticises this in his Vārtika,<sup>3</sup> as 'अपरे पुनर्वर्णयन्ति ततोऽर्थाद्विज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमिति । तत्र'. He does not state, from what work it is cited as he has done in respect to the definition of Pratijñā. But Vācaspati in his tīkā<sup>4</sup> ascribes

dañ glān tshigs ma yin par rnam par dpyad par hdod par fīd ni mig gis gzhuñ bya fīd bsgrub par bya ba la yañ brjod par nus pa yin no.

यथा नैयायिकेषु दोष उक्तः एवं वादविधावपि । हेतुसाध्यदृष्टान्ताभासवचनस्यापि प्रतिज्ञात्वप्रसङ्गः । वादविधौ न केवलं साध्याभिधानं प्रतिज्ञा । अपि तु पक्षधर्मसाध्यस्य । कः पक्षः ? विचारणायामिष्टोऽर्थः । तत्र पक्षः साध्य एव । तेन हेतुदृष्टान्तयोरसिद्धयोरपि प्रसङ्गः इति दोषस्तत्र नास्तीति चेत् । कथं साध्यविशेषस्य गमकः ? हेत्वहेतुविचारणायामिष्टत्वे चक्षुषत्वसाध्यस्यापि वक्तुं शक्यते ।

<sup>1</sup> NV. p. 106. पक्षो विचारणायामिष्टोऽर्थ इति चाभिधीयते । अविचारणीयक्षार्थः पक्षेऽन्तर्भवतीति चित्रम् ।

NV. p. 115. एवं विचारणायामिष्टोऽर्थः पक्ष इत्यत्रापि इष्टग्रहणमनर्थकम् ।

<sup>2</sup> PSVI. 15—rtsod pa bsgrub par ni don de las skyes ryam pa s'es pa māon sum yin zhes lya ba.

<sup>3</sup> NV. p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> NVT. p. 99.

it to Vasubandhu “तदेवं प्रत्यक्षलक्षणं समर्थ्य वासुबन्धवं तावत् प्रत्यक्ष-  
लक्षणं विकल्पयितुमुपन्यस्यति-अपरे पुनरिति। लक्षणं व्याचष्टे-ततोऽर्थादिति.”  
The Jaina writer Mallavādin, author of the *Nayacakrāra*,  
too, regards it as the definition of Vasubandhu. “यदिदानीं वसु-  
बन्धोः स्वगुरोस्ततोऽर्थाद्विज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षमिति ब्रुवतो यदुत्तरमभिहितं परगुण-  
मत्सराविष्टचेतसा तत्त्वपरीक्षायां०”<sup>1</sup> It may, thus, be concluded, by  
putting together the evidences from the Tibetan and the  
Sanskrit sources, that *Vāda-vidhi* is a work of Vasubandhu.

This conclusion is further confirmed by Arcata and  
Durvekamisra in their statements in respect to the definition  
of Inference. In his *Vārtika*<sup>2</sup>, Udyotakara cites and criticises  
the definition, “नान्तरीयकार्थदर्शनं तद्विदोनुमानं.” *Vācaspati*<sup>3</sup>  
prefaces it by “स्वलक्षणं समाधाय परेषामनुमानलक्षणं दूषयितुमुपन्य-  
स्यति.” It means that, having established his definition,  
Udyotakara proceeds to refute the definition of others that  
*anumāna* is the experience of a thing which is inseparably  
connected with another for one who knows the said  
concomitance. His later statements<sup>4</sup> in this context, “न हि  
किञ्चिदस्ति वस्तु यन्नान्तरीयकं सद्भेतुर्भवति। तदनेन दिङ्नागलक्षणं  
दूषयित्वा अन्येषां लक्षणं दूषितम्। संप्रति दिङ्नागस्य स्वकीयलक्षण-  
प्रपञ्चार्थं वाक्यं, “अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये” इत्याद्युपन्यस्य दूषयति।”  
attribute the definition to *Diñnāga*. But it is clear from the  
“*Pramāṇasamuccaya*” and its *Vṛtti* that it is a citation from  
the *Vāda-vidhi*<sup>5</sup>. The phrase, “अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये” to which he  
refers and which has been quoted in full by Udyotakara<sup>6</sup> as

<sup>1</sup> NCA p. 50. <sup>2</sup> NV. p. 54. <sup>3</sup> NVT. p. 126. <sup>4</sup> NVT. p. 126-27.

<sup>5</sup> PSV. II. 27. *rstod pa sgrub pa nas ni med na mi hbyuñ bahi don mthoñ ba de rig pa rjes su dpag paho zhes brjod do.*

<sup>6</sup> NV. p. 55. The definition of *hetu*, “तादृग्विनाभाविधर्मोपदर्शनं हेतुः,” which is cited and criticised by Udyotakara immediately after it is also a fragment of the *Vāda-vidhi*. Cf. PSV. III. 36. *ve zhig rtsed pa bsgrub par ni de lta bahi med na mi hbyuñ bahi chos ñe bar bstān pa ni glān tshigs so zhes bya ba |*

वादविधौ तादृग्विनाभाविधर्मोपदर्शनं हेतुरिति ।

‘अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये सद्भावो नास्तिता सति’ is a half Couplet in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*<sup>1</sup> meant to explain the nature of the ‘त्रैरूप्य’ of the ‘līṅga’ or ‘hētu’ involved in Diñnāga’s definition of the Inference for one’s self as ‘त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थदृक्’<sup>2</sup> stated by him in the first Kārikā of the second chapter of his work. It is, therefore, by confusion that Vācaspati has attributed this definition to Diñnāga.

Arcata, in his “Hētubindutīkā,” as commentary on the “Hētubindu” of Dharmakīrti, cites this definition of स्वार्थानुमान.<sup>3</sup> It is unnecessary, he argues, to know the use of Pakṣa etc. to draw an inference. It is enough, if one knows the nature of the reason (गमकरूप). He cites in support of his contention the view of an Ācārya: “पक्षसपक्षादिसङ्केतापरिज्ञानेऽपि न किञ्चित् पृथ्यते । अत एव आचार्यपादैः नान्तरीयकार्थदर्शनं तद्विदोऽनुमानमिति गमकरूपमात्रमेव पक्षादिसङ्केतानपेक्षमेव प्रतिपादितम् । स्वप्रज्ञापराधात् तत्रापि कैश्चिदसन्त एव दोषाः प्रकीर्त्यन्त इति किमत्र ब्रूमः ।” In commenting on this passage Durvēkamisra in his “Āloka” on the “Hētubindutīkā” attributes this view to Ācārya ‘Vasubandhu : (आचार्यपादैरित्याचार्यवसुबन्धुमभिसन्धाय उक्तम्) and states that it has been expounded by him in his “Vādaavidhi :” “गमकरूपमात्रस्य स्वरूपं दर्शयति वादविधौ वादविधिसंज्ञके प्रकरणे.” He further feels sorry that great thinkers, like Udyotakara, revel in finding

<sup>1</sup>PS. and PSV. II. 5: rjes dpag bya dañ de mtshuñs la yod dañ med la med la med ñid pāo ।

अनुमेयेऽथ तत्तुल्ये सद्भावो नास्तिता सति ।

PSV.—tshal gsum pāhi rtags zhes gañ byod pa de brjod par bya ste ।

त्रिरूपं लिङ्गमिति यदुक्तं तद्व्याच्यम् ।

<sup>2</sup>PS. II. 1. rjes su dpag ryaam gñes rañ donñi tshul gsum rtags las don mthuri pāo ।

अनुमानं द्विधा स्वार्थं त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थदृक् ।

<sup>3</sup>HBT. p. 69 [Hētubindutika with the Āloka of Durvēkamisra—Published by the Oriental Institute, Baroda.]

<sup>4</sup>HBT. p. 317-19;

defects due to their own ignorance, in a definition which is free from defects and quotes verbatim the entire Vārtika of Udyotakara on this fragment of the "Vādavidhi." No further proof is needed then to regard "Vādavidhi" as a work of Vasubandhu.

तत्रापि आचार्यीये लक्षणे । कैश्चित् उद्योतकरप्रभृतिभिः । कुत असन्त एव दोषास्तैः कीर्त्यन्त इत्याशङ्कायां योज्यं स्वप्रज्ञेति । स्वप्रज्ञाया दोषो तस्मात् । तुरवधारयति । तथा हि उद्योतकरेण किलानुमानसूत्रवार्तिके, 'अपरे तु नान्तरीयकार्यदर्शनं तद्विदोऽनुमानम्' इति पठित्वा तस्यार्थं मात्रया विवृत्यैव 'अत्रार्थग्रहणमतिरिच्यते' इति मात्रयैव दूषणमुक्त्वा पुनर्विपश्चितं नान्तरीयकार्यं इति । समस्तपदमेतत् । तत्र यदि षष्ठीसमासः . . . . . अतस्तद्विद इत्यपि न वक्तव्यम् । (cf N. V. pp. 54-55).

The correct title of the work, from which Diñnāga and Udyotakara quote, is "Vādavidhi." It has been so stated by Durvekamisra in his "Āloka<sup>1</sup>." Manorathanandin, author of the "Pramāṇavārtikatīkā<sup>2</sup>," too, regards "Vādavidhi" as a 'Prakaraṇa.' The Tibetan title of the work "rtsod bsgrub pa" in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, should therefore be rendered into "Vādavidhi." It can no longer be identified either with the "Vādavidhāna" or with the "Vādanyāya." If it were identical with the former is it not strange that Udyotakara should refer to the same work under different titles? The "Vādanyāya<sup>3</sup>" of Dharmakīrti with which it has been identified by Vidyābhūṣana has been published. It is concerned with the exposition of Nigrahasthānas and does not contain any of the definitions cited by Udyotakara. The definition of Pratijñā

<sup>1</sup> HBTA. p. 317.

<sup>2</sup> PVT. p. 207. वादविधिप्रकरणे इन्द्रियज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरे विचार्यमाणे मानसस्य विकल्पस्य इहावसरे कीदृशः प्रस्तावः येन परंपरया तद्धेतुरिन्द्रियमुच्यते ।

<sup>3</sup> Vādanyāya with the Vipāścītārtha of Śāntarakṣita—Ed. Rahula Sankṛt-yāyana 1936.



from which he deduced its identity with the "Vāda-vidhi" is rendered into Tibetan as 'dam bcah ba yañ bsgrub bya bstan paiphyir.' It corresponds to 'pratijñā ca sādhyānirdēśāt' and is quite different from the definition, 'Sādhyābhidhānam pratijñā,' which is rendered into Tibetan as 'bsgrub bya bvjod pa ni dam bcah.' The former definition is of the Nyāyasūtra. It has been distinguished from the definition of the "Vāda-vidhi" by using in the Tibetan rendering, 'bstanpa,' and 'brjod pa.' How can the "Vādanyāya," then, be identified with the "Vāda-vidhi" cited by Udyotakara?

The "Vāda-vidhāna" to which Udyotakara refers and which he regards as a 'śāstra,' should, therefore, be regarded as a different work. It is not improbable that the definition of 'Vāda' cited by Udyotakara<sup>1</sup> and ascribed by Vācaspati to Vasubandhu<sup>2</sup> is a fragment of the "Vāda-vidhāna." According to Chinese sources<sup>3</sup>, we know that Vasubandhu wrote three works, "Lun Shih" or Vāda-vidhi, "Lun sin" or "Vādahr̥ḍa-ya" and "Lun Kuei" or "Vāda-vidhana" and the writers Shen Tai and Kueichi have ascribed the "Vāda-vidhi" and the "Vāda-vidhāna" to Vasubandhu. This ascription to Vasubandhu has further been corroborated by the following statement of S'āntarakṣita at the end of his tīkā on the "Vādanyāya"<sup>4</sup> of Dharmakīrti: ननु चायं वादन्यायमार्गः सकललोकनिबन्धनबन्धुना वादविधानादाचार्यवसुबन्धुना महाराजपथीकृतः । कः पुनरसौ अतिसाहसिको यो महानागैः क्षुण्णं पन्थानं रोद्धुमीहते इत्याह । दुर्विदग्धः । सम्यक् विवेकाहिततया जनोऽयं उद्योतकरप्रीतिचन्द्रमा विविकृतप्रभृतिः । The Vāda-vidhāna must then, be another work of Vasubandhu.

<sup>1</sup> NV. p. 150.

<sup>2</sup> NVT. p. 218. तदेवं स्वाभिमतं वादलक्षणं व्याख्याय वासुबन्धवं लक्षणं दूष-  
यितुमुपन्यस्यति ।

<sup>3</sup> See "Vāda-vidhi" by Tucci IHQ. IV. 630-636.

<sup>4</sup> Vādanyāyatīkā, p. 142.

Very little is known about the “Vāḍavidhānatīkā.” It can be inferred from its title that it is the commentary of the ‘mūla’ or the original text, “Vāḍavidhāna.” Udyotakara makes a casual reference to it when he refutes the definitions of Pakṣa<sup>1</sup> according to Diñnāga and Vasubandhu. The definition of Pakṣa is not essential to Diñnāga, since according to him, the statement of Pakṣa *i.e.*, ‘pratijñā’ does not form an integral part of his syllogism. Yet, following others, he defines it in his “Nyāyamukha” and “Pramāṇasamuccaya.” It is defined in the “Nyāyamukha<sup>2</sup>” as “साध्यत्वेनेप्सितः पक्षः विरुद्धार्थानिराकृतः” to which Udyotakara refers and which is considered as a definition of Bhadanta or Diñnāga by Vācaspati. In the “Pramāṇasamuccaya<sup>3</sup>” it is defined as “साध्यत्वेनैव स्वयमिष्टः प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमार्थानिराकृतः.” Vasubandhu, too, seems to have defined it in one of his works, as “विचारणायामिष्टोऽर्थः” and in another as “पक्षो यः साधयितुमिष्टः.” The main contention is whether the qualifying word “स्वयं” should form an integral part of the definition. We know from Diñnāga that the former definition of Vasubandhu belongs to the “Vāḍavidhi.” The latter definition is ascribed to Vasubandhu

<sup>1</sup> NV. p. 117.

<sup>2</sup> NV. p. 116. Cf. PVT. p. 443. न्यायमुखे साध्यत्वेन ईप्सितः पक्षः विरुद्धार्थानिराकृतः इति पक्षलक्षणे ।

Cf. NP (Nyāyapraveśa). तत्र पक्षः प्रसिद्धो धर्मी प्रसिद्धधर्मविशेषणविशिष्टतया स्वयं साध्यत्वेनेप्सितः । प्रत्यक्षानिराकृत इति वाक्यशेषः ।

<sup>3</sup> PS.—ran gi ño bo kho ha bstān bdag hdod rañ gi chos lan la mñon sum don dan rjesdpag dan yid ches grays pas ma bsal pah l.

स्वरूपेणैव निर्देश्यः स्वयमिष्टः सधर्मिणि । प्रत्यक्षार्थानुमानेन चासवाचाऽनिराकृतः ॥

Cf. PVT.—p. 424.

by Vācaspati<sup>1</sup>. It may, in all probability, be a fragment of the "Vādauidhāna." It is appropriate, therefore, that this definition should be discussed in its tīkā.

Thus a re-examination of the whole problem, in the light of the new evidences from Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese sources, has resulted in suggesting the "Vādauidhi" and the "Vādauidhāna" as two different works of Vasubandhu and the "Vādauidhānatīkā" as a commentary of the "Vādauidhāna."

<sup>1</sup> NVT. p. 186. तथा पक्षो यः साधयितुमिष्ट इत्यत्रापि वसुबन्धुलक्षणे विरुद्धार्थानिराकृतप्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । एतदुक्तं भवति । न केवलमस्माकं एतद्विरुद्धार्थानिराकृतपदमनर्थकं प्रतिभाति । समानतीर्थानामपि तथा विभाति यतस्तेर्नोपात्तमिति । अत एव वक्तव्यं पक्षो यः साधयितुमिष्ट इति ।