*THE VEDĀNTA-PHILOSOPHY
DEscribed by BHAVYA IN HIS MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA*

by

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Poona

Among Indian treatises, reviewing the different systems of contemporary Indian thought, Bhavya’s Madhyamakahrdaya together with the auto-
com mentary, called the Tarkajvala, is probably the earliest and most important as a source-book for the history of Indian philosophy. In this work, consisting of eleven chapters of very uneven length, the author
devotes one chapter each to six different systems of Indian philosophy,
Buddhistic and non-Buddhistic, among which Chap. VIII deals with the
pre-Śaṃkara Vedānta as was known to him in the sixth century A.D.

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I am deeply indebted to my friend, Pandita Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana, for placing at my
disposal most generously a rapid handcopy prepared by him from a Sanskrit ms. of the
Madhyamakahrdayakahārikā, discovered at the Ža.lu monastery in Tibet in the
autumn of 1936 (JBOs, XXIII, pt.i, pp. 15f, 48, 55). In his personal communication he
describes the script of the original ms. as “inornate (analaṅkṛta) Raḥjanā characters
of the 10th century A.D.” and the ms. itself as “consisting of old and shattered palm
leaves with the marginal pagination marks fallen off (galitapārśvatāt patrāṅkā api
vilupṭāḥ)”. For the Tibetan version, I have used my own copy of Vol. XIX (Dsa) of
the Narthang Tenjunr, in which the text of the Madhyamakahrdayakahārikā (= Mhk)
extends from fol. I to 40a6 and the autocommentary, called the Tarkajvala (= T),
thereafter up to fol. 360b1. The Sanskrit Mhk, consisting roughly of 930 ambuḥ
verses, is divided into the following eleven chapters: I. Bodhicitāparātya, II. Min
vrataśamārya, III. Tattvajñānaśaṇa, IV. Śrāvakatattvaniścayavatāra, V. Yogā
āratattvaniścaya, VI. Sāmkhyatattvāvatāra, VII. Vaiśeṣikatattvaniścaya, VIII.
Vedāntatattvaniścaya, IX. Mīmāṁsātattvaniśayavatāra, X. Sarvajñatāśiddhinnirdeśa,
XI. Stutilakṣaṇanirdeśa. Out of 25 folios containing the text, one folio (= no. 18)
covering the latter part of Chap. VI and most part of Chap. VII is found altogether
missing in my copy. What appears on the back of the last leaf (25b) according to the
report in JBOs (ibid.) is obviously the beginning of a commentary on Nāgārjuna’s
Yuktiśaṭṭhikā (cf. Tenjunr, Mdo XXIV, I: 8-ṛtti by Candrakīrti).

From the colophon to Chap. III: Tattvajñānānrśāvatāre Tattvajñānaśi(Sic. ṣa?)
śāparīcchedo nāma triyaḥ samāptah it seems clear, that Tattvajñānānrśāvatāra,
which was suspected to be a different work of Bhavya, and which is alluded to by him
twice under that title in his own “Jewel in the Hand” (See: LVP’s translation in MCB,
Vol. II (1933), and N. Alyawami Sastri’s Karatalaratna (1949) from Chinese) is only
another, probably earlier, name of the Mhk before it attained its present enlarged size.
The concluding verse of our present work: Iti Madhyamakasyedam sankṣepad hṛdayan
kṛtaṃ dīhatāṃ nakṣaṭurāntarabimbadarśanadarpaṇam leaves no doubt about the
authenticity of the present title. At the same time a third designation of this work is
The late Prof. Max Walleser² had utilized the Tibetan version of this VIIIth. chapter, containing Bhavya’s own statement and refutation of the Vedānta doctrine, for drawing stimulating conclusions regarding its earlier characteristics and, in particular, establishing its relationship with the so-called Gaudapāda-kārikā, recognized traditionally as the Āgama-śāstra.³ Upto recent times scholars have continued to draw upon this or that part of Bhavya’s work in its Tibetan version,⁴ but in the absence of the original Sanskrit text, which was taken to have been irrevocably lost, it has by no means been an easy task to interpret Bhavya’s arguments correctly on the basis of such second-hand and not very lucid material. Now, however, an almost complete and fairly readable Sanskrit text of at least the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā has become fortunately available, and it will be possible to work out on its basis more easily the rich and varied contents of the Tibetan Tarkajvālā, whose original still remains undiscovered.

In the following, I propose to give the Sanskrit text of the first sixteen kārikās of Chapter VIII of the Madhyamakahrdaya, entitled Vedāntatattvaviniscaya, and translate it together with its commentary, found in the Tibetan version of the Tarkajvālā. This part of the chapter contains

found in the very last colophon, which runs: Tarkajvālā nāma sūtraṃ samāptam, which would mean, that the Mhk was also called the Tarkajvālāsūtra, while the author’s own commentary on it was called the Tarkajvālā, according to Tibetan sources.

The name of the author is found in various forms, either original or reconstructed, e.g.: Bhavaviveka, Bhavya, Bhavyaka, Bhavyakara, Bhavyaviveka, Bhāvaviveka, Bhāvivikta, Bhāviveka and, probably neither the last nor the least one, Bhagavadviveka, which is found in the opening verse of our Skt. ms., though not in the Tibetan version; it reads: Anyāyamārgānugatamam samikṣya práyena lokaṃ karunāyamānaḥ । kudṛṣṭijā- lāsānti-tyayam etac ca kāṭaṃ śāstram Bhagavadvivekakah. Most of these designations seem to point to Viveka as the essential part of his name, with Bhagavat, Bhavya, Bhā, Bhāva etc. having a more or less titular significance. We call him here by his popular name: Bhavya.

² Max Walleser, Der ältere Vedānta, Geschichte, Kritik und Lehre (Heidelberg, 1910). The same author has also investigated parts of Chap. IV of Mhk and T, dealing with the Hinayāna doctrines, for discussing the sects of early Buddhism in his Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus (Heidelberg, 1927), pp. 77 ff.
³ Of this I have used the edition of Pandit Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya (University of Calcutta, 1943) = ĀŚ.
⁴ E.g., S. Yamaguchi, Buddhist Controversies concerning Existence and Non-existence (Japanese), containing an examination of Chap. V, which deals with the Yogācāra standpoint (Kyoto, 1941); H. Nakamura, Early Vedānta Philosophy (Prācinavadāntavādah), Vol. I (Japanese), pp. 236–332 (Tokyo, 1950), offering a translation of Chap. VIII of the Tibetan Tarkajvālā, which deals with the Vedānta. An English summary of the essential points, discussed in this important work in pp. 178–235, appears under the title “Upaniṣadic Tradition and the Early School of Vedānta, as noticed in Buddhist Scripture”, HJAS, Vol. 18, nos. 1 & 2 (June 1955), pp. 74–104.
the pūrwapākṣa, containing a statement of the Vedantic position as understood by Bhavya.

(1) Vedāntavādīnāḥ prāhur ātmavid durlabhā bahīḥ/ kuta ātmadvishāṁ mokṣaḥ śūnyasamskāravādīnāṁ

The Vedāntins state: “Outside of our own School it is difficult to find one, who knows the Soul. To those who dismiss the Soul, maintaining that all productive forces of life (samskāras) are utterly unsubstantial, what is left there, by means of which a deliverance can be obtained?

T: “Vedānta” means the end of all knowledge, which, indeed, implies non-attachment. One who discusses it or maintains it as one’s own theory is a “Vedāntavādin”. They propound as follows: In any other system of knowledge “outside of” the Vedānta doctrine, “one who knows the Soul” is extremely “difficult to find”. By whose support will the Buddhists, who “hate the Soul”, attain their own “deliverance”? Since they maintain that “all things are unsubstantial” (śūnya), unreal (svabhā- varahita), and momentary (kṣaṇavibhoga), how could they be at all delivered from anything?

The character of the eternal Soul, being such, that the knowledge of bondage and deliverance are dependant upon it, it is the Puruṣa, well-known from the Vedas, who is being glorified (in the next stanza):

(2) tamaḥparastat puruṣam mahāntam śūryavarcasam / mṛtyum atyeti matimān matvā 'tmānaṁ maheśvaram

Having perceived on the other side of darkness that transcendent Person, lustrous like the sun, that universal Spirit, which is the great Lord, a man of intelligence can surpass death.

T: “Darkness”, which, having the nature of unhappiness causes unhappiness, originates in the sphere of the threefold Existence (traiḍhātuka), which is the cumulative result of the process of cause and effect. The threefold Existence itself being regarded as darkness, “on the other side of it” means beyond the threefold Existence. This circle of darkness

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6 In accordance with the Skt. text, the order of the four feet of this stanza in T. should have been: a, c, b, d.
7 Cf. AŚ. IV, 96: jhānam asangam; notes on pp. 84 ff. etc.
7 Hand-copy of the Ms. (= Mc.) shows: purastat in a, mṛtyubhyeti in c and satvā in d (for ‘matva’ = having known or perceived; cf. Kaṭha-Upan. (= KU) 2. 12; Śvetās. -Upan. (= ŚU) 1. 6; 1. 12; AŚ. 1, 28 etc.). For the various terms from the Upaniṣadic literature, occurring in this and the following stanzas, refer to Col. G. A. Jacob’s Upaniṣad-devyakosāh, A Concordance of the principal Upaniṣads and Bhaga-vadgīta (Bombay, 1891).
8 Cf. description of the asurya-worlds in Śaṅkara’s comm. on Iṣa-Upan. (= IU) 3.
(tamo-mandala) reaches far beyond the sphere of this earth, and the abode of the "Person" is far beyond the circle of darkness. It has been said: 9

"I have known that great Seer, radiant like the sun and living beyond darkness. Having known Him, one surpasses death. There is no other way leading to the place of non-birth." The Person is called "purusa" 10 because (1) he exists through destruction of the past, or (2) he surpasses slumber, or because (3) he protects, or (4) he fills up. He is "transcendent (mahatam)", because he exceeds everything. 11 He is "lustrous like the sun", because he is of variegated colours. The sun's lustre is variegated and contains the following colours: 12 (1) white, (2) blue, (3) red, (4) steel blue, (5) yellow, (6) pigeon grey, (7) ruby, (8) tawny ('ka.bi.tsa.la' = (Skt.) kapiñjala?). Why is his solar lustre said to possess these colours? It is because it contains the spirits of all the deities, or because such is the innate character of the Great Lord (Maheshvara): (1) The whiteness of the sun represents the essence of the Moon (Soma); (2) the (azure) colour of water is derived from both Fire (Agni) and the Moon; (3) the

9 Quotation from ŚU 3.8: vedāham etam puruṣaṇ mahatam ādityavarṇam tamasah parastat | tam eva viditvā 'timṛtyum eti nānyah panthā vidyate 'yanāya //, which is again found in the comm. to verse 16 below. Tib. translation of ayana here = skye. med. gnas. hgro. ba (ajñatīsthānagarmanā), which seems to suggest the ajñatī-vāda of Gauḍapāda, treated at length in AŚ. III–IV.

10 Four derivations of purusa: (1) pūrva + uṣ, cf. Brhadā.-Upān. (BU) 1.4.1: oṣati ha vai sa tam yo 'smāt pūrva buḥbhaṣati; (2) śāyānti parah; (3) pīparīti (from 'pr pālane') and (4) pṛṇāti (from 'pr pṛṇāne'); cf. Nirukta II. 3: puruṣaḥ purī śadah | purī śayā | pṛṇayat vā | .... tenedam pārpm puruṣaṇa sarvam. Further, Śaṅkara on BU. IV. 3.7: puruṣaḥ ākāśatvat sarvagatatvāt pūrṇa iti puruṣaḥ.

11 Cf. Śaṅkaraṇānda on ŚU 3.8: mahatam sarvasmat adhikām.

12 Cf. Amarakoṣa 1.5.12–17. On the colour-scale from 'black, grey, blue, red, yellow up to white' in the development of the Soul, according to the epic Śāṅkhya, see O. Strauss, Indische Philosophie (München, 1925), p. 133, also p. 112 (on the Lesya theory in Jainism). For an example of colours attributed to Gods in Mahāyāna Buddhism, cf. the description of Heavraj with eight hands of different colours, represented by different Vedic and other deities, in Alice Getty, The Gods of Northern Buddhism (Oxford, 1928), pp. 142 ff. Further, Atharvasī.-Upān. 5, ŚU. 4.1. In the original the colours may be: (1) śukla, śveta, avadāta etc., (2) nila, (3) lohita (below for 'pale red' = pātala, cf. Amarakośa (AmK) 1.5.15), (4) dhūma (= 'du.ba' below); here Tib. has "ba-bla" (arsenic = haritāla?), whose colour seems to be implied. The name Indra (of whom this is the colour) used to be derived from indha, fuel, cf. BU. IV. 2.2: indho ha vai nāmaṣa yā 'yaṃ daksine 'ksan puruṣas tam và etam indham santam indra ity ācakṣate (also, Śat. Br. 6.1.1.2 etc.), (5) pita, haridra etc., (6) pārāvata ('phug. ron' = pigeon; below: 'rdul. dan. yun' = rajah-pita, dusty yellow), (7) maṇiṣṭhā ('bṣod' = madder, rubia cordifolia; below: 'smug.po' = purple brown, macrotomia; cf. Nāgārjuna's Paramārthastava, 5 (from Lhasa ms.): na rakto haritānjanīṭho varnas tenopalabhyațe / na pitaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ śuklo v a vāropāya namo'stu te), (8) Cf. Mahāyuttattī (= Myy, ed. R. Sakaki, Kyoto, 1916) 4892: kapiñjala, kapiñcal = 'Goś.m.o.reg' (wood-cock); below: 'myur.ba' = swift, speedy etc. is incomprehensible. S. C. Das (Dictionary): 'sna.tshogs.mdog = karbura (p. 766).
red colour is supported by the God of Wealth (Kubera); and the pale red represents the spirit of the Propitious Rudra (‘Ru.tra.bde.byed.dag’ = (Skt.) Rudra-Śaṇkara); (4) the smoky colour comes from Indra; (5) the yellow colour comes from Mitra; (6) the dusty yellow colour represents the spirits of Mitra and the Water-God (Varuṇa); (7) the purple belongs to ‘Dgar.ka.ṇīḍ’ (sic. ‘Tha.skar.gṇīṣ’? = Āśvinai); (8) the presence of the Viśve-devas makes it volatile (‘myur.ba’?). The colour of Purity (brahma-varṇa) is the result of his being the Supreme Lord (Īśvara). The root “at-” indicates constant movement (satata-gamanā); hence the term “ātman” means either that all beings always move in Him, or that He constantly moves among all beings. He it is, who is “great”, because of his omnipresence (sarvavyāpitva), and being “supreme” (iśvara). He transcends all the worlds. The saint (yogin), who perceives the “Person” (Puruṣa) of the above description by his divine eye (divyacakṣus), surpasses all bondage and attains immunity from old age and death.

Now, although the Person possesses various colours, the distinctive mark (lakṣaṇa) recognized by the saint at the time of his own final liberation, is as below:

(3) rukmavañçaḥ yadā paśyan paśyet kartāram īśvaram / 
vihāya pāpam puṇyaṁ ca param sāmyaṁ14 tadā 'pnuyat //

When, on perceiving the gold-coloured one, he recognizes (in him) the Lord, the Maker, he may then, after casting off both sin and merit, attain that supreme equanimity.

T: “Gold” is the fine gold found in the sand. When the Soul, having a similar “colour” is seen and recognized by the concentrated eye of meditation (dhyānacakṣus) as such, one may be sure of being in the presence of the great “Lord” himself. While seeing thus, one becomes “supreme” in cutting off the essence of all sin and merit as well as the bondages characterized by both of them. In particular, one becomes tranquil (sānta). One “attains” the essence of tranquility, which implies a turning away from all action and is beyond discourse (nirvikalpa).15

18 Cf. IU. 6; Bhagavādgitā (= BG) 6.29-30, etc.

14 Mc. reads: sāmyaṁ. From the following T, the Skt. reading would appear to be neither sāmyaṁ nor sāmyaṁ, but sāntaṁ, but it may be noted that ĀŚ uses both sāmya and sānta in the same sense for describing the Absolute; comp. III. 47, IV 45 with IV. 80, 93, 95, 100. Muṇḍaka-Upan. (= MU), 3.1.3 (cf. Maitri-Upan. (= MU) 6. 18) of which the present stanza is a virtual reproduction, also reads sāmyam thus: yadā paśyaḥ paśyate rukmavarnaṁ kartāram īśam puṣpaṁ brahmayonim / tadā vidyāṁ puṇyaśe vidhiṣya nirāśaṁo paramaṁ sāmyaṁ upaṁ / //

18 Cf. ĀŚ. IV. 80; III. 33–34. This description of the Absolute, it may be noted, is not very different from Maitreyanāth’s conception of the Buddhahood; see: Rata-
(Now), if he is beyond the three spheres of Existence, how could he be the “Maker (kartṛ)”? And being so distant, whose Lord is he? The answer is, that inspite of his distant abode, he is all-pervading, as described below:

(4) bhūtam bhavat bhavisyac ca sarvam puruṣa iṣyate /  
sa 'ntar bahiś ca dūre ca so 'ntike sa ca karmakṛt[16] ///

Whatever is past, present or future, it is all regarded as the Person (puruṣa). He is within and without, far and near; and he is the Doer.

T: Whatever, like a man etc., has gone by (ātita), whatever is now in view (pratyutpanna) and whatever is to come hereafter (āgāmi) – ‘all this’ is possessed and sanctified (adhiṣṭhitā) by him, i.e., he pervades all the three spheres of existence. Because, the zenith is his head, the nadir his base,[17] the sky his abdominal cavity,[18] the quarters his hands, the planets and constellations his pores of hair, the mountains his chest, the mountain-range his bone, the streams the network of his arteries, and the forests his hair and nails. His back is the celestial world and his forehead is Brahmā. (Religious) merit and demerit are his two eyebrows. The knitting of his eyebrows is the Lord of Death. The sun and the moon are his two eyes.[19] His breathing out and breathing in are the wind. The hillocks[20] are his teeth. His tongue is the Goddess of Speech. The syllable: om and the exclamation: vaṣaṭ[21] are his two lips. The opening and closing of his eyelids is the Time; his left side the woman and his right side the man.[22] The ‘Lokāloka’-mountain-range (dividing the visible

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16 Cf. Rg-Veda X. 90. 2: puruṣa evedam sarvam yad bhūtam yac ca bhavyam = ŚU. 3. 15 (The v.l.: evaita for evedam, found in Kamalasila’s comm. on Śantaraksita’s Tattvasamgraha, p. 76 (Baroda, 1926) has already been pointed out by H. Nakamura in his article “A note on Pre-Śaṅkara Philosophy”, Proceedings of the Okurryama Or. Res. Institute, Vol. 1, p. 3 (Yokohama, 1954); also v.l. bhavyam for bhavyam (ibid.). Further cf. IU. 1. 5. BG. 13. 15.

17 Cf. MahāU. 5. 156: īrādhvam śiraḥ pinḍamayam adhaḥ pādamayaḥ tathā | pārśvayor hastasamsthānām madhye codaradharmīṇam.

18 T. lto. ba = udara; v.l. stho is inexplicable.

19 Cf. MuU. 2. 1. 4: cakṣuṣṇi candraśrīyav.

20 T.: ri.bran (Sic. ri.phran or ri.brag?)

21 T.: ba.sta.tha.shes.bya.bahi. yi.ge.ni.chu.giiso, where I take “chu” to be a mistake for “mchu” (lip). (This has now been confirmed by Sde. dge edition.)

22 Cf. BU. 4. 2. 2–3 etc.
world from the regions of darkness)^22 form the intervening space between his nipples. His fingers represent the interspaces between mountains; his pair of knees the two golden leaves^24 (?). His two shanks are the pair of Aśvinikumāras; the part below his loins the day and night; his male organ the Indra; the nature of his enjoyment the Prajāpati, and his pair of feet the Viśnu. (Finally), the colours are his blood. Being both ‘within and without’, as well as ‘far and near’, he moves in and moves out everywhere, and even enters the process of maturation etc.

(Now), if he is all alone, how is he able to enter upon a variety of activities and (yet) remain unimpaired? This is established (in the following) by means of an example:

(5) viśve bhāvās tato jātā ārṇābhād īvāmśavaḥ /^25

From him are born all things in the universe, like threads coming out of a spider.

T: Just as a silk-worm (kṛmi) produces abundant threads and yet without undergoing any change remains unspent, even so does the Person, in spite of his producing the three spheres of existence, remain unchanged and unspent. Although as the cause of all existence he is inexhaustible, it is said here, that he still brings about the dissolution of the existence:

tasmin pralīnā vidvāmso nā ’pnuvanti punarbhavam^25 ///

Wise men, who have merged themselves in him, do not get a second birth.

T: When a ‘wise man’, practising profound meditation (dhyāna-yogin) perceives him by his eye of intelligence (prajñā-netra), not only does he get himself merged in him, but being bereft of all sins does not have to share in the miseries, arising in this world of ‘rebirth’.

(Now,) why does the Yogin not attain immortality (amṛtatva) without having perceived the Person? The reason for this is stated below:

(6) amṛtatvam na martyasya vahneṣṭ śaityam ivesyate /

tasmād amṛtātā ’yuktā ’prabodhāt puṇṛṣe ’mṛte^26 ///

^22 Cf. Kirfel, Kosmographie der Inder (Bonn, 1920), pp. 121–122, 126; Raghuvanśa, I. 68.

^24 T.: gser.hdab.gthas.so.

^25 For the simile of a spider cf. BU. 2. 1. 20; ŚU. 6. 10; MuU. 1. 7 etc. T has “dar.gyi. sрин.bu” (= kośakāraññita, silkworm) and “sрин.bal.byed.pahi.sрин.bu” (hair-making insect) in the stanza and the commentary respectively. For the second half of the stanza cf. ŚU. 1. 7: līna brahmaṇi tatparā yonimuktāh.

^26 Mc. reads: tamabhyaśa for na martyasya and does not write any of the avagrahas in the second line of the stanza. Numerous passages are found in the Upaniṣadic literature expressing this thought, continued from the preceding stanza. See: ŚU. 3. 7; 5. 6; 6. 17; KnU (= Kena-Upa.). 2. 4; KU. 6. 8; cf. BU. 4. 4. 7 = KU. 6. 14–15; ĀŚ. III. 21, IV. 7, etc.
The mortal cannot be regarded as having immortality, just as fire (cannot be regarded) as having coldness. Hence, it does not stand to reason that immortality could be attained without there being an awakening into (the state of) that Person.

T: ‘The mortal’ (martya) is what deserves to die (martyum arhati), or what suffers death (marta-bhūta), (which means) the whole world (sarvaloka). Being by nature something that always suffers death, it could not be considered as having immortality, because it has not that character, just as heat, and not coldness is the character of fire. Hence, for those mortals, who have not visualized the Person, residing beyond the kingdom of death, the attainment of immortality is unthinkable. The following serves the purpose of eulogising his great prowess (mahānubhāva):

\[
(7) \text{yataḥ param pariṣṭiḥ yato jyāyān na vidyate} / \\
\quad \text{anīyān nā'pi tenedam viśvam ekena saṃtattam}^{27} ///
\]

As there is nothing else higher than him, or superior to him or even subtler than him, he alone is the sole cause, that holds together the diversity (of this universe).

T: Other than him there is nothing that excels (paratva), or is superior (jyāyastra) and preeminent (jyaisthya), or is more subtle (anīyastra). The character of a saint (yogin), endowed with eight such attributes (guna), has been laid down as follows:²⁷ “He is endowed with the (1) power to attenuate himself (anima), (2) power to extend himself (mahima), (3) power to levitate himself (laghima), (4) supremacy (over the elements etc., isita), (5) power of control (vasita), (6) power to reach (rab.phye) (?)

²⁷ See: ŚU. 3. 9: yasmāt paraṁ nāparam asti kincid yasmān nāniyo na jvāyo ‘sti kaścit .... tenedam pariṣṭam puruṣeṇa sarvam. See note 43 below. The Tibetan version of Mbk (fol. 28a) includes the following stanza in T as a part of the original kārikā-text, although it is not found among the Sanskrit kārikās. It reads: de.ni.phra.dan rags.dan.lidan /// yan.lidan.gtso.bo.dbang.sgyur.ba /// rab.phye (sic.phyi?). ḡdod.pahi.mihar. thug.gan /// rnal.hbyor.ji.ltar.ḥdod.par.hgro. This enumerates the eight siddhis of a Yogan, as explained, e.g., by Keśāsvāmin (12th cent. A.D.), commenting on Amapara-as 36 (aśvāryam aśmaādikam) (ed. by Harā Datta Sārma, Poona Or. Ser. – No. 43, p. 12). The last Siddhi, viz., yathākor yatra)-kāmāvasāyita, is sometimes replaced by garima, as e.g. in Maheśvara’s commentary on the Amaparās (Bombay, 1907), but the Yogasūtras of Patañjali, III. 44 (together with the Bhāsya of Vedavyasa and the commentary of Vaiśesatmigra) agree with the present text. Cf. anima laghima prāptih prākāmyam mahīmā tathā / iśitaṃ ca vaśitaṃ ca tathā kāmāvasāyita // (Vaiṣesatyma under anima, Calcutta 1873); laghimā vaśitēytaṃ prākāmyam mahīmānīmā / yatrakāmāvasāyitam prāptihārasvāyam aṣṭadhā // (Abhīdhānacāntāmani of Hemacandra, p. 36, Calcutta, samvat 1934). For a comprehensive study of these Yogic powers, see Sigurd Lindquist, Siddhi und Abhīnā (Uppsala, 1935). It may be noted that through this reference Bhavya is seen to assume the closest affinity between Vedānta and the Patañjala-darsana.
(7) irresistibility of will (prākāmya) and (8) power to proceed at will (yathākāmāvasāyitā)."

Hence, although he is alone, he is the soul of the diverse aggregate of the three spheres of existence:

(8) tasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni bhavaty ātmaiva paśyataḥ\(^{28}\) / For the discerner, all the beings in Him are also included in the Soul.

T: All that moves or does not move (carācarabhūta) is comprehended within the soul. And besides, one who sees the soul realizes,

bālapaṇḍitacāṇḍalaviprādīnāṁ ca tulyatā\(^{29}\) // and the ignorant and the learned, the outcast and the Brahmin, and so forth, are all equal.

T: The equality (implied here) is in reference to the non-distinction in (respect of their) demerit or merit (pāpapūnya).

Now, if someone were to raise the question: "This Person (purusā), who is (said to be) ubiquitous (sarvavyāpin), and from whom, although he is alone, the bodies of all kinds of living beings (gati), like gods and men, are (said to be) born, – how is it that he, like any (other) bodied being, is neither evanescent (anitya), nor non-pervasive (a-sarvatraga)?", – the following is said as a rejoinder:

(9) ghaṭottpattau vināše vā nā 'kāsasya tadātmatā / tadātmatā 'piśā na dehaḥvyadayavyayē\(^{30}\) //

When a pot is being produced or destroyed, the ether does not become

\(^{28}\) Cf. TÚ 7: yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaiva bhūd vijñānataḥ (Saṃkarānanda's Dīpikā).

\(^{29}\) Nakamura (op. cit., note 4 above) refers to Brahmastūra-Sāṅkarabhāṣya, II. 3. 43: tadāh kahē ṣākhīnā dāsahavāvīdābhāvam brahmaṇa āmananty ātavān Bṛhma-ṣūte "brahma dāsa brahma dāsa brahmaiveṃte kitaṃvā" ityādānā | dāsa ya ete kavartyā prasiddhāh | ye cāmī dāsah svāmisvā atmānam upakṣapayanti | ye cāmē kitaṃvā dyāyat\(\)tāḥ te sarve brahmaṁveti hinaṃtādāharaṇeṇa sarveśām eva nāmarupakṣākārya-karṣāsaṃghātāpravīṣṭānām jivānām brahmataṃ aha. Further, BG. V. 18: vidyā-vinayasyaṃpanne brahmāṇe ... / ... śvāpāke ca paṃdātāḥ samādihānaḥ. I have noted at least two other references to outcasts in the present work: – Mhk. I. 26 reads: na kroṣṭā māttamātāṅgakumbāḥsphālanaṃ / na māṭāṅgah samudrāntamahimani-ḍalapālāne (which includes a play on the word māṭāṅga). The other reference to the outcasts is found in T on III. 26 of Mhk. which, while establishing the non-substantiality of material elements, like the Earth (urvi) etc., states the objector's view as: de,dag,gi.sra.ba,daṅ,ģer.ba,daṅ,tsha.ba,daṅ,go.yo.ba,la.sogs.pahi.no.bo.hid.gān.yin,pa.dag,ni,ri,khrod,pa,daṅ,gdl,pa,yan,chod,la,yan,grags.te (i.e. even the Śabaras and Māṭāṅgas know their nature). In pointing out these references to the outcasts by Bhavya, it may not be impertinent to observe, that Candrakīrti shows a less highbrowed attitude towards them, when in a parallel instance he substitutes a shepherdess for an outcast, cf. gopālāṅganājana, p. 260, 418 of Madhyamakavṛti (ed. by L. V. Poussin, Bibli. Budhica, IV, 1913).
identical with it (in shape etc.). Similarly, when bodies etc. are born or die, they cannot be considered to be identical with the Soul.

$T$: As in the case of a pot, a jar etc., which is being produced or destroyed, the ether does not assume the characteristics of the pot (etc.), so also the Puruṣa does not assume the nature of the embodied being ($lus.can = \text{sārīrin, dehin}$), even while in its various shapes it is being born or suffers death.

(Now,) to establish (further) this example of the ether with a view to meet a serious objection (from the adversary), it is pointed out:

(10) ghaṭākāśavad ekasya nānātvam ced abhedataḥ /
ghaṭabhedena caikatvam sāmye sarvasya janmavat\textsuperscript{31} //

If (an objection is raised, viz. that) the unity (of the Soul) is (here turned into) a diversity, which is evident in the multiplicity of bodies, illustrated by the ether in the pot, (we answer, that) when the pot is broken, there exists an unbroken unity (of the ether). (Hence,) it is as if everything is born in a state of sameness.

$T$: It may be said: “Although your ether may be a unity, it is being divided into the separate, large and small pots. (Hence,) the Soul also must be like that.” But, this does not stand to reason: because no distinction can exist within the ether which is occupying all the pots. The ether within a pot, which is being broken and that in another pot, which is already broken, is not different from each other. This applies to the ether in all pots alike. In a similar way, the Soul (= ātman) does not exist separately in all the embodied beings, and in spite of the multiplicity of bodies, the Soul is the same in all of them. Thus, the example of the ether in the pot has not been disproved.

\textsuperscript{30} Mc. reads: dehādyudayāvayayam in (d), where dehādi corresponds to Tib. lus.can (= dehin) both in Mhk and $T$, Cf. ĀŚ. III. 3 and 4 (corresponding respectively to udaya and vyaya of the jīva) with further references on pp. 301–2; Brahmabindu-U. 13–14. It is made clear by Bhavya that the adversary here and in the following argument is the Buddhist (see stanza 1 above and $T$ on 12 below). However, cf. also the Sāṃkhya-kārikā 10, which describes the characteristics of the vyakta and the avyakta, which are found mixed up here in the description of the Puruṣa, i.e., his being ‘active’ (cf. kartṛ in st. 3; karmakṛt in st. 4 etc.) and at the same time ‘one’ (eka in st. 7), ‘eternal and omnipresent’ (nitya, sarvatraṅga in st. 16 & $T$) etc. This apparent incongruity which is sought to be removed by the Vedāntin by giving this example of ‘the ether in the pot’ (ghaṭākāśa) should therefore be equally objectionable to the Sāṃkhya.

\textsuperscript{31} Mc. reads: dehi- for ceda- in (b) and caikasya for caikatvam in (c.) Mc. being the single source for the Sanskrit text, which sometimes makes no sense, I have ventured to emend it here rather heavily. The (d) of this stanza also seems doubtful. On the basis of $T$ I might suggest: sāmyam sarvasya siddhavat (= (Hence) the state of sameness of everything is as good as proved).
Now, to prove the unity of the Soul (= ātmaikya) by a different approach (= naya), (we say the following:)

(11) yathā ghaṭādibhede 'pi mṛḍbdheda nā 'sti kaś cana /
     (tathaiva dehabhede 'pi nāʾtmabheda 'sti kaś cana)\(^{33}\) //

Although there may be a difference between (the various kinds of) pots etc., the clay (of which they are made) is in no way different. Similarly, although the bodies may differ, the Soul is in no way different.

\(T\): Although the products, like a pot, a cup etc. are different, there is no difference in their material cause. So also, there is no difference whatever in the Soul, although the bodies of deities\(^{33}\) etc. may differ from each other.

(12) ghaṭākāše yathaikasmin rajodhūmādibhir vṛte /
     tadvattā na hi sarveṣāṃ sukhāder na tathāʾtmānanah\(^{34}\) //

When the ether in one pot becomes covered by dust, smoke and so forth, it is not that the ether in all the other pots also becomes similarly affected. So also with happiness etc., which are not of the Soul.

\(T\): The Buddhist having first found fault with the Soul-theorists (= ātmavādin) by saying: "As (your) Soul is omnipresent, if one (person) is happy, everybody else should also be happy", the following is said for refuting the same. Although ether is all-pervading, when the ether occupying the interior of one pot is covered by dust, smoke etc., the ether inside all the other pots also does not on that account become so covered; nor does the absence of any such covering in the case of one pot cause the absence of the same in the case of all other pots. Likewise, when one person here becomes happy, all the rest also do not on that account become so; nor does the misery of one entail the misery of all the rest.

(Now,) if it is asked: "How does happiness or misery arise at all in each of these individuals (= samāna)?", the answer is:

(13) aprābodhād anātmajñāḥ svapne bhogābhimānavaḥ\(^{35}\) /
     cinoti karma bhūṅkte ca tatphalam yac chubbhāsubham //

\(^{33}\) The second line of this stanza is missing in Mc. and has therefore been reconstructed from the Tibetan. For a different reconstruction, see \(\text{AŚ.}\) Pp. 52–53. The loss of this line may be due to the homoeographic "sti kaś cana" (either in the original ms. or in the copy). Cf. \(\text{AŚ.}\) III. 6, which is also found quoted in the Tibetan version of Śantarākṣita's Madhyamakālaṁkāra (see Walleser, Der ältere Vedānta, p. 20).

\(^{34}\) For the reference to deities, see \(T\) on stanzas 2, 4 above.

\(^{35}\) In (d), sukhādir would seem better than sukhāder of Mc. The first line is almost identical w/n \(\text{AŚ.}\) III. 5 (yathaikasmin ghaṭākāše rajodhūmādibhir yute); the editor suggests the ōṁ reconstruction of the second line from the Tibetan: na bhavanti tathā sarve n sukhaṁ tathāṁ at (p. 52).

\(^{35}\) Cf. numerous passages dealing with the dream-consciousness in the Upaniṣads.
(As long as) one has not recognized the Soul on account of one’s own ignorance, one goes on priding oneself over unreal enjoyments in a state of dream as it were; one keeps collecting (various kinds of) karma and enjoys their fruits, whether good or bad.

T: So long as one does not perceive the Soul and remains ignorant about it, one takes pride in the enjoyment of unreal things etc. in the state of dream as it were. Being in total ignorance of the Soul, he still goes on heaping up karma, whether good or bad, and tasting its good or bad fruits.\(^{36}\)

(Now,) as the Person (= Purusa) is the Doer and the Enjoyer, it may be objected, that inasmuch as He collects together sins as well as merits, and enjoys them, He is (open to the charge of being) himself a sinner and so on; but we would say:

\[(14) \text{ dehasamsththo 'py asamgatvåd bhuñjåno nopalipyate } \]
\[\text{ råjavat kåmacåri}^{37} \text{ ca påpenå 'naparådry asau } // \]

Although He pervades the body, He, while enjoying (the objects), remains uncontaminated (by them) and like a king, behaving according to his pleasure, He remains innocent of all sin.

T: Although He pervades the whole body. He still remains unaffected (ma.chags.pa = asakta), and even while enjoying the objects He is not contaminated by them. Just like a king, He behaves according to His sweet will, and yet does not commit any injury (to anyone) (phyr.gnod. pa.byed.pa.med.pa). Because of His being the Lord of all, although He may commit sin, He does not deserve to share the results of that sin.

Thus, to follow up the above line of argument:

\[(15) \text{ ekåm sarvagatam nityam param brahmå 'cyutam padam } \]
\[\text{ yogi yuñjåna (äve)tti}^{38} \text{ na tadaiti punarbhavam } // \]

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\(^{36}\) The entire text of T. is divided into fairly equal 27 sections (bam.po) of which the 22nd bam.po ends here. E. Frauwallner (in “Zu den buddhistischen Texten in der Zeit Khri.sron.lde.btsan’s”, Wiener Zeitschr. für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, Bd. I, 1957) reckons 300 ślokas to be the extent of one bam.po, covering about 12 folios of the Sde.dge edition. In the Narthang edition used here, it covers about 14 folios.

\(^{37}\) This acceptance of the Divine Right of kings, extended into the sphere of religious thought, is also consistent with the description of the Purusa found in T on stanza 2 and 3 above, as compared with Manu. V. 96; VII. 4–7. Further, for Purusa as a sinner, cf. Sarvasiddhåntasanggraha, IV. 4. 33–34 (cited by Nakamura).

\(^{38}\) Mc. shows here a lacuna of two letters, which I have tried to restore after T: kun.tu.rtogs.pa.yin.te, as in the stanza itself no translation of the missing term is given. With a slight emendation the original reading might as well be: yuñjan yadda vetti.
The saint (yogin) perceives by practice (of meditation) that unique, omnipotent, eternal, pure, supreme and immortal refuge,\(^9\) and then he is not born again.

\(T:\) Because of its supremacy over the whole body it is ‘unique’; because of its pervading the entire world it is ‘omnipresent’; because of its indestructibility it is ‘eternal’, because of its having the nature of the Nirvāṇa\(^{10}\) it is ‘pure’; because of its high eminence it is ‘supreme’; because of its being without beginning or end it is immortal; because of its being a place of resort it is the ‘refuge’. The yogin objectifies it by means of his deep meditation (bsam.gtan.gyi.sbyor.bas = dhyānayogena); by such intense practice, the pure one (= brahman) described above is thoroughly apprehended (by him), and then he turns away from rebirth.

(Now,) the characteristic of that Soul which remains aloof from all enjoyment of the good and the not-good is extolled in the following:

\[(16)\] nityaṃ tad avikalpañ ca yatra vācām agocarāḥ / giras tatra prayujyante bhedāpahṛtabuddhibhiḥ //

It is everlasting, inconceivable and beyond the realm of speech. (Yet) various terms are used to describe it by those whose minds are led away by pluralistic considerations.

\(T:\) That Brahman is ‘everlasting’, because it is capable of being objectified by the Yogi at all times; it is ‘inconceivable’, because it is something different from the senses and the consciousness. What comes within the reach of the mind can (alone) become the object of speech, hence, whatever is beyond its reach is also ‘beyond the realm of speech’. Further, ‘a mind, led away by pluralistic considerations’ means a mind, which is inclined to accept pluralism; one who has such a mind is meant here by the expression: ‘whose mind is led away by pluralistic considerations’. By him the term: Brahman is ‘used to describe it’, as well as other terms like: Soul (ātman), Person (puruṣa), Almighty (īśvara), the Omnipresence (sarvatraga), the Eternal (nitya) and so forth. The reason (for such usage) is the practicality (of these terms). The meaning of other such terms is to be understood according to the context. Its nature being inexpressible the Vedas have called it: “self-born, actionless, immeasurable”, “the Person beyond darkness” (and further) “I have known that great Seer, radiant like the sun and living beyond darkness. Having known Him,\(^{9}\) Ratnapratyabhīṣga IV. 53 ff. (p. 107) makes an insinuating comparison between the Tathāgata and Brahmā and speaks of brāhmyam padam; cf. brāhmanyam padam, ĀS. IV. 85.\(^{10}\) For Brahma-nirvāṇa, BG. 2. 72; 5. 24–26.
one surpasses death. There is no other way leading to the place of non-
birth.” 41 Similarly: “The One, who dwells in each and every subtle
source of creation, and in whom all this folds and unfolds itself, – having
recognized Him with certitude, who is the superior, excellent and adorable
God, I am led towards absolute quiescence”; 42 “To whom there is nothing
superior, nor inferior; than whom there is nothing more subtle, nor
gross; unimpeded and uncovered (like a tree?), that God stands all alone,
being also the Person, who gradually pervades everything”; 43 “Being
subtler than the subtle and greater than the great, He stands pervading
all the living beings by his own virtue. Free from sorrow and without
offering any sacrifice, one perceives with clarity of all senses the greatness
of His sovereignty.” 44 Further, “On knowing the great and powerful
Soul, which is bodiless among the embodied ones, and which endures
among the undurable, the wise man does not grieve.” 45 Again, “It
moves and it moves not, it is far away and yet nearby, it is both inside
as well as outside of everything.” 46 And similarly, “He is the source of
whatever is incarnate, just as a spider is that of threads, or the moon-
stone that of the liquid (oozing from it), of the fig-tree that of its des-
cending shoots.” 47 and so forth. Thus the truth is that the Person (Puruṣa)
is to be seen by means of direct perception according to the Vedic lore,

41 See stanza 2, note 9 above.
42 Quotation from ŚU. 4. 11: yo yonim yonim adhibhṛtya eko yaszmim idam sam ca vi-caiti sarvam | tam iṣaṇaṁ varadaṁ devam iṣyam nicāyyeyam īśantim aṭyaṇtam eti. The Tibetan of the last pāda: bdag.hes.bzuṅ.nas.sīn.tu.shi.bar.hgro.bar.hgyur points to a variant: emi for eti.
43 Quotation from ŚU. 3. 9: yasmāt param nāparam asti kiṃ cīt yaszmān nāṇyo na jñāyo ‘sti kaś cīt | vrṣa iva stābdho dīvi tiṣṭhyay ekas tenedam pūraṇam puruṣeṇa sarvam already cited in note 27 to stanza 7 above. The (c) in Tib. differs from Skt. Cf. BU. 3. 9. 28, where the Puruṣa is compared to a tree.
44 This corresponds to ŚU. 3. 20: aṣṭa niṣṭān mahato mahīyān ātma guhāyām niḥito ‘sya jantaḥ | tam akṛatam paśyati vītāsoko dhātuḥ prasādāṁ mahīmānām iṣam. Again we have here some differences in the original of Tibetan: guṇa? for guhā in (b) and dhātu- for dhātuḥ in (d), which is noted and explained by Śaṅkara in his comm.: athavendriyāṁ dhātavāḥ śarīrasya dhāraṇāt teṣaṁ prasādād vīṣayadhyādārāsanabālā-
dyapanayanāt. KU. 2. 20 has the variant ātmanāḥ for iṣam in (d).
45 This is the same as KU. 2. 22: aṣṭa niṣṭāṁ śarīreṇa anavasthēṣeṇa aṣṭaḥṣeṇām mahāntam vibhūṁ ātmanām ratvā dhīro na śocat.
46 See: ĪU. 1. 5: tadejati tan naijati tad dure tad v antike | tad antarasya sarvasyā tad u sarvasyā ‘sya bhāyataḥ.
47 This is found quoted by Kamalaśīla on Tattvasaṃgraha, 154 (GOS): ā僰nañhāva īvamāṇāṁ candrakānta īvāmbhināṁ | prarohāṇāṁ iva plakṣaḥ sa hetuḥ sarvajanminām; Prameyakamalāntaṇa (NSP, 1912, p. 17b). This is quoted again by Bhavya in his Prajñāpradīpa (Tib. version, Bibl. Indica, p. 19), where instead of nṛga,groo (nyagrodha) fig tree, the reading is: biag.ṭol(plakṣa). Cf. Nakamura in Proceedings etc. (cited in note 6 above) pp. 2–3.
and that it is irrefutable. This is how the Vedāntist establishes his *prima facie* argument.

As this deserves to be given an answer, the author of this treatise proceeds to make the following statement.

Such are the contents of one of the earliest sources of information on the pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta, which must have come to be accepted by the Buddhists not long since as a full-fledged system of Indian philosophy. That a close affinity had already existed between the views of the Mādhyamikas on the one hand and the Vedāntists or the Upaniṣadists on the other has been placed beyond doubt on the pre-Bhāvya testimony of Gauḍapāda’s *Āgamaśāstra* as well as the post-Bhāvya testimony of Śaṅkarācāra’s *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Bhāvya’s own detailed estimate of the Vedāntic position (which comes after the above *purvapakṣa*) confirms the recognition of some common ground between the two idealistic trends of Indian philosophic thought. Bhāvya is generous enough to acknowledge, that whatever is good in the Vedānta may be considered as taught by the Buddha himself. Before we close this presentation of his data, therefore, we may make a special note of the following stanzas appearing during the course of his controversy with the Hinayānists in Chapter IV of the *Mhk*: *Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra*:

IV (7): na buddhoktir mahāyānaṁ sūtrāntādāv asaṃgrahāt / mārgāntaropadesād vā yathā Vedāntadarśanam //

(The Hinayānist, affirming his *purvapakṣa* says:) The Mahāyāna cannot represent the teaching of the Buddha, either because it is not included among the *Sūtrāntos* etc. (including the *Abhidharma* and the *Vinaya*), or because it teaches the heretic paths of salvation, thus being similar to the Vedānta system. (*T* fol. 155a explains, that the Vedānta, which is known to be the concluding part of the *Vedas*, teaches bathing on the rivers, fasting and incantations as the methods of getting freedom from sin; and the Mahāyānists also follow the same methods for destroying sins and increasing merits.)

And now Bhāvya’s reply to this argument is found to be the following:

IV (56): Vedānte ca hi yat sūktaṁ tat sarvam buddhabhāṣitam / dṛṣṭāntanyūnatā tasmāt saṃdīgdhām vā parīkṣyatām //

48 See: Nakamura, “Upanisadic tradition etc.”, *HJAS*, Vol 18 (cited above in note 4), p. 104. The nearest approach to this description of the Vedānta seems to have been made by Kālidāsa in the opening stanza of his *Vikramorvaśiyam: Vedānteṣu yam ōhur ekapurūṣam ....* etc. Cf. the opening stanza of *Abhijñāna-sākuntalam* with the description of the eight Siddhis in *T* on 7.

49 See: stanza 330: *teṣām alpāparādhan tu....* etc.
Whatever is well said in the Vedānta is all taught by the Buddha. Hence, (in your above argument) the example given is faulty. The doubtfulness (in your thesis) will have to be examined. (T explains that there is a fallacy in giving an example, which is already covered by what is to be proved, i.e., the fact that some of the Vedāntic and the Mahāyānīst methods of salvation are identical is not enough to prove, that Mahāyāna is not taught by the Buddha. Hereupon the Hinayānīst points out, that there are points of dissimilarity as well, e.g., the bad words like killing, robbing etc., discussed in various parts of the Vedas, that are absent in the Mahāyāna), which can also be given as examples. The Mahāyānīst replies, that if it is admitted that such bad utterances are not found in the Mahāyāna, then there is no mistake (with us); because the Mahāyāna would in that case be neither against the Tripitaka, nor against the doctrinal teachings, as we have been seeking to establish all along. Thus, whatever is well spoken in the Vedas and in accordance with the words of the Buddha would be acceptable, and yet (some of) their teachings would be unacceptable (according to your reasoning). After properly examining this doubtful position, what is reasonable should be accepted, and what is unreasonable rejected.)

(P.S.: As no other text of the Tibetan Tarkajvalā was available to me except the one in the Narthang edition of the Tenjur, I thought of requesting my friend, Prof. Hajime Nakamura (Tokyo University), who had already translated this portion into Japanese (see note 4) without the aid of the Skt. original of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās, to edit the Tibetan text for being published along with the present article. He lost no time in preparing the following most useful appendix, based upon the Derge, the Peking and the Narthang editions of the Tenjur, as soon as I had submitted my own translation to him. I am greatly obliged to him and his colleagues for this excellent cooperation. I am also thankful to him for a few valuable references and comments, he was kind enough to send me.)