



Vyāpti-Pañcakam

(With Māthurī, Dīdhiti, Jāgadīśī)

Translator

Dr. Balirāma Śukla (M.A. Ph.D.)

Vyāpti-Pañcakam

(Five definitions of *Vyāpti*)

With commentaries

Māthurī by Mathurānātha

Dīdhiti by Raghunātha

Vritti on Dīdhiti by

Jāgadīśa

: Translation and Footnotes :

Dr. Balirāma Śukla (M.A. Ph.D.)

Shrutbhavan Research Centre

Book : **Vyāpti-Pañcakam**
Author : **Gaṅgeśa**
Commentary : **Mathurānātha, Raghunātha, Jāgadiśa**
Translator : **Dr. Balirāma H. Śukla (M.A.,Ph.D.)**
Editor : **Muni Vairāgyarati vijaygani**
Publisher : **Shrutbhavan Research Centre, Pune**

~: Distributors :~

Pune : **Shrutbhavan Research Centre**
47/48, Achal Farm,
Nr. Saccāi mātā mandir, Kātraj-Pune-411046
Mo. 7744005728 (9.00 am to 5.00 pm.)
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B-424, Tirthraj Complex, Opp V.S. Hospital,
Madalpur, Ahmedabad-380006, M. 9825128486

Type-setting : **Virati Graphic**
Phone : 08530520629, 7383183665

Publisher's Note

'Shrutbhavan Research Center' as it is newly born in Kātraaj, Pune, works in various field of oriental research-projects. Also, encourages them who have keen interest in them. There are boundless research-works such as 1. Critically editing of rare texts which are not published till now, 2. Making dictionaries of narration of peculiar terms 3. Making dictionary of only terms used in widely existing Jaina literature that may cause to know where a word is used in what sense. 4. Re-editing of published-works with the help of handwritten manuscripts. and 5. Publication of such treaties which endorse our basic oriental research work.

Of them, this present work of English-translation by the late **Dr. Balirām Śukla**, is uncommon and an absolute-concurrence of them who are keenly interested in science of Navya Nyāya. This text namely Vyāpti-pañcakam being taught even in foreign, is really expensive in field of science of logic and language also. Such a more treaties are required to be translated into universal languages. Today's the late **Dr. Balirām Śukla** had truly assisted to us with the English-translation of Vyāpti-pañcakam along with Māthurī, Dīdhiti, Jāgadiśī we are ensured that publishing this work by us, will lead a hand to them who are desirous to know the system of philosophy viz. Navya Nyāya.

This book is published with the contribution of **Juhu Scheme Jain Sangha** Jñānkhāta. Readers are requested to deposite fixed amount in Jñānadravya.

We, always Heartily thankful to Smt. Chandrakalaben Sundarlal Sheth Family, Mangrol (Gujarat), and Bhaishree (International Jain Foundation – Mumbai) for their dedication as well as truly become a pillar for our entire activities of Shrutbhavan Research Centre,Pune.

Bharat Shah
(Hon. President)

Editorial

As, someone Sanskrit poet said - 'There are many of holly texts and various types of vidyās but time is more less than that.' Same like that happens with the late **Dr. Balirām Śukla**, who finished the translation work of 1. Vyāpti-pañcaka-rahasya composed by Mathurānāth Tarkavāgiśa 2. Dīdhiti composed by Raghunāth Śiromaṇi 3. Dīdhiti-vivritti composed by Jagdīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, but could not evaluate them and breathe his last breath. Since, he was my teacher on Navya nyāya, he handed over that to me with the purpose of further finishing.

Even though, not having supreme perfection in morden language i.e. English, the present work is edited as it is with the assistance of **Rajendra C. Jain** [Research Scholar], **Pankaj Jaje** (Ph.D. Fellow, C.A.S.S. Uni, of Pune), and **Shailesh Shinde** (Research Trainee, Shrutbhavan Pune.)

Mistakes, occurred while editing the text, are being believed to get with their appropriate judgement.

Date. 23-3-2011

– Vairāgayarati vijay

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NAVYA-NYĀYA

– Dr. Balirām Śukla

The history of the Buddhist and Jaina logic is considered to be the history of the middle period of logic. The great conflict of the Brāhmaṇa Nyāya and the Śramaṇa Nyāya resulted in the new trend of logic named 'Navya Nyāya.' (नव्य न्याय) The old Brahmaṇa Nyāya as if was completed with Udayanācārya (उदयनाचार्य) and the further development took a new turn resulting in origination of Navya Nyāya. The vigorous flow of logic became speedy with '*Tattvacintāmaṇi*' (तत्त्वचिन्तामणि) written by Gaṅgeśa, (गंगेश) which not only influences all the orthodox systems of the Indian philosophy but left its traces also in all the later disciplines of learning in India.

After the conflict with the Jaina and Bauddha logic which took place around 1000 A.D. the Brāhmaṇic logicians decided to establish 16 categories of the Nyāya system. Among them the development of the category of *pramāṇa* (प्रमाण) is the most essential. Without the solid foundation of *pramāṇa* the establishment of *prameyās* (प्रमेयाः) would not be possible. Hence Gaṅgeśa, the author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, established the Navya Nyāya philosophy as *pramāṇa-pradhāna-śāstra* (प्रमाणप्रधानशास्त्र) instead of concentrating on *prameyās*. From this time onwards Prācīna Nyāya is known to be *prameya-śāstra* (प्रमेयशास्त्र) and Navya Nyāya is known to be *pramāṇa-śāstra* (प्रमाणशास्त्र).

Navya Nyāya as *pramāṇa-sāstra* became pure logic. The main purpose of it was not to show the path of liberation but to establish reliable *pramāṇās*. Navya Naiyāyikās have left the speaking about the path towards liberation or *puruṣārthās* (पुरुषार्थ) etc. They have laid emphasis on the correct apprehension of thing. This in their view will be a good ground for realization of truth. So rather than speaking about the goal they started considering the means of achieving this goal. For the solid base for the discussion of *pramāṇās* Navya Naiyāyikās had neglected the sixteen categories of Prācīna Nyāya and had accepted only the seven categories of Vaiśeṣika (वैशेषिक) such as *Sāmānya*, *Viśeṣa*, *Samavāya*, *Abhāva* (सामान्य, विशेष, समवाय, अभाव) etc. Besides the Navya Nyāya trend concentrated on the expressing of the reality of things by using the specific technical terms which will enable to struck a precise report between the speaker and the listener, and so there will be no misunderstandings while disobeying the real nature of the things.

Not only these technical terms were introduced. Also the new categories like *Pratīyogitā*, *Avacchedakatā* (प्रतियोगिता, अवच्छेदकता) etc. were used. Navya Nyāya puts forward the new qualities and attributes and the nature of the things which is different from the things generally apprehended by us due to these new qualities and attributes. We all know that in category of realities the changes happen according to the circumstances and these changes are always realized by us, but we usually do not express them in words. Navya Nyāya by introducing *pratīyogitā*, *avacchedakatā* etc. tried to express these changes already in the very definition of things. Then the scholars were astonished and glad being provided these new series of words used by Navya Nyāya which were expressing the circumstantial

changes of things. It seems that by that time these scholars belonging to all the schools of thought were already realizing the difficulty of expressing their thoughts in the traditional way of argumentation. Therefore after the introduction of the terminology of Navya Nyāya it was readily accepted by all the systems of the Indian learning instead of the previous patterns used till now. In this way the Navya Nyāya school increased the capability of valid and precise argumentation. Even though there was the discussion in Prācīna Nyāya from the nature of reasoning to *nigrahasthāna* (निग्रहस्थान) which also were the aspects of argumentation, but still the main aim of Prācīna Nyāya was *prameya*, not *pramāṇa*.

The categories mentioned by Gautama (गौतम) were widely used by this later trend of Navya Nyāya. Unfortunately later Navya Nyāya texts became very difficult to understand because this extensive usage of the technical terms like *pratiyogitā*, *avacchedakatā* etc. which were totally incomprehensible for a layman. This might be also the reason why so few persons also nowadays choose to study the Navya Nyāya systems. To become master in this system there is a necessity of intellectual hard work opens the entrance in this field. This also is the reasons why Navya Nyāya was criticized by other schools. The opponents had told that the Naiyāyikās are making simple things difficult by using formula and technical phrases. But their objections are not correct as without the using of the terminology of Navya Nyāya we are unable to differentiate even between the 'absence of only a jar' from the 'absence of a jar and a cloth both.' We do realize the difference between these two types of absences but we cannot express this difference without using the technical terms of Navya Nyāya. Similarly there is the difference between the

instances of knowledge 'there is fire on the mountain' and the 'mountain is fiery' (*parvate agniḥ* and *parvath agniman* (पर्वते अग्निः, पर्वतः अग्निमान्). But this minute difference can not be expressed nor explained without taking the help of the technical terms of Navya Nyāya like *prakāratā*, *viśeṣyatā* (प्रकास्ता, विशेष्यता) etc. The ordinary words of the ordinary language are simply unable to express the subtle difference of these two sentences.

There are many other examples for which we need to take the help of the technical terms of Navya Nyāya and this proves the uniqueness of this system. Not only in the field of philosophical discussions. But without the terms of Navya Nyāya it is difficult to explain the meaning of the first śloka of Amarakośa 'yasya jñānamayasindho.' (यस्य ज्ञानमयासिन्धो) Why the pronoun *yat* (यत्) denotes this particular thing and not another ? The answer to this question can be found only with the help of the Navya Nyāya terminology.

The well-known fourth sutra of Gautama has only fifteen letters. But Gaṅgeśopadhyāya had written the whole his treat *Tattvacintāmaṇi* consisting of 2000 lines only on it. Besides *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, later was so widely commented. It is well-known that the scholars from Mithilā, Bengal, Draviḍa regions and Mahārāshtra had written enumerable commentaries on this treat on which later so many great scholars, have written subcommentaries and sub-sub-commentaries and so the Navya Nyāya writings of many million lines came into existence. In this way Navya Nyāya being a new school has also quite an old and lengthy tradition. And the commentaries and sub-commentaries like *Dīdhiti*, *Jāgadīshī*, *Gādādhārī*, *Māthuri* and *Kroḍapatras* (दीधिति, जागदीशी, गादाधरी, माथुरी, क्रोडपत्र) can not be considered to be just useless gossips. Expressing the weighted of this system a

scholar had written all study Nyāya with enthusiasm and also write also books on this system but only few can understand the secrets of this system.

Here the question arises : What is the difference between the Prācīna and Navya Nyāya ? Regarding this there are so many different views of the scholars. Some say that this is the type of discourse by using in abundance the words *avacchedaka*, *avacchinna* (अवच्छेदक, अवच्छिन्न) etc. what matters most in Navya Nyāya. But this is not correct. In the definition of God in Samadhipāda (समाधिपाद) of Patañjalisūtras (पतंजलि सूत्र) as *sa pūrveṣāmapī guruḥ kālenāvacchedāt*. (स पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनावच्छेदात्) Here also the word *avaccheda* is used. But this text is not even related to Navya Nyāya.

Then some other scholars say that Maharshi Gautama etc. to refute *nairātmyavāda*, *viññānavāda* (नैरात्म्यवाद, विज्ञानवाद) of Cārvāka (चार्वाक), tenets of Bauddha etc. established existence self by inference. The aspects of inference for other's sake which are accepted in Nyāya were described in Sutra, Bhaṣya, Vārtika and Tātparya-ikā (सूत्र, भाष्य, वार्तिक, तात्पर्यटीका) etc. and this should be considered to be Prācīna Nyāya. And the treatises like *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, its commentaries and sub-commentaries which discuss only the components of *pramāṇs* for the valid knowledge of categories should be considered to be Navya Nyāya. But such an approach also is not proper. If only due to the discussion of *pramāṇs* some texts would be considered to be belonging to Navya Nyāya then the treaties of Jain Nyāya and Bauddha Nyāya where *pramāṇs* are discussed also would be considered to be belonging to Navya Nyāya.

Other scholars opinion that the refutation of the doctrines of Carvāka and Bauddha which are found in the ancient treatises prior to Tattvacintāmaṇi should be considered as belonging to Prācina Nyāya and the works after Tattvacintāmaṇi and its commentaries where the refutation of the views of other orthodox systems like Mimāṃsa, Nyāya (मीमांसा, न्याय) etc. is undertaken such works are to be considered as belonging to Navya Nyāya. But this view also is not quite correct as in the more ancient works also there is the criticism of the tenets of the orthodox systems of the Indian Philosophy.

The term “Navya Nyāya” is a technical term. Gaṅgeśa who was an exceptionally great logician after the study of Nyāyabhāṣya and its commentaries and sub-commentaries and also after the study of works by Dignāga (दिग्नाग) etc., wrote “Tattvacintāmaṇi” in the form of the essence of all these treatises. From this work Nyāyaśāstra was named as Navya Nyāya. The treatises prior to “Tattvacintāmaṇi” are known as Prācinanyāya.

Some scholars do divide the Nyāya philosophy into three trends: Prācina, Navya and Navya-Navya. The period from Gautama sutras to Udayana is considered to be Prācina Nyāya. From Udayana to Dīdhitikāra the trend is considered to be Navya Nyāya. From Dīdhitikāra onwards it is Navya-Navya Nyāya. But in fact there is no ground for a such division in ancient new and modern Nyāya. Because almost in all these works we find a novelty of some issues. If the division is made in such a way then even more multiple divisions are possible and it may lead to the regresses and infinitude. Therefore it is better if we stick to the division accepted earlier.

Navya Nyāya.

(1) Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.

Gaṅgeśopādhyāya is considered to be the founder of the Navya Nyāya school. By writing *Tattvacintāmaṇi* he had created the revolution not only in the field of the Nyāya philosophy but in all the branches of the Indian learning. This treatise changed the nature of thought and the method of the discussion of the philosophical doctrines. After the composition of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* mostly all the branches of the Indian philosophy, Rhetoric, Grammar, Literary criticism and even Āyurveda had accepted the new terminology and the method of argumentation of Navya Nyāya inspect of the technical terms like *pratīyogitā*, *avacchedakatā* etc. contained in it. All the writers of the later period made the language of Navya Nyāya the medium of expression of their idea. Since the 13th century in India the language of Navya Nyāya had been utilized in all the branches learning.

The contribution of Gaṅgeśa to the Indian systems of learning is unparallel in the whole history of indology. There was not even a single writer in the medieval age who was not inspired very much by the magnumopus of Gaṅgeśa named *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa is divided into four chapters in which the four *pramāṇas* : perception, inference, analogy and the verbal testimony had been discussed. Gaṅgeśa had made a promise in the beginning of his work by writing the words *pramāṇatattvamatra vivicyate* (प्रमाणतत्त्वमत्र विविच्यते) (here the essence of the means of attaining of the valid knowledge will be discussed). Only because of this reason the Navya Nyāya

philosophy of often called *pramāṇasastra*. When reading *Tattvacintāmaṇi* we can see that Gaṅgeśa was influenced very much by *Prācīna Nyāya* and inspired by the *Prabhākara* (प्रभाकर) school of *Mimāṃsa*. The main conflict for Gaṅgeśa was not with the Buddhists as it was in the case of *Udayanācārya*. The main opponents of Gaṅgeśa were the *Prabhākara Mimāṃsakās*. During the time of Gaṅgeśa there was a very great influence of the *Prabhākara Mimāṃsa* in *Mithilā*. Therefore the most of the arguments of Gaṅgeśa were developed on the opposition to the *Prabhākara Mimāṃsa Philosophy*. This is first of all obvious from the commentary on *Tattvacintāmaṇi* by *Rucidatta* (रुचिदत्त). Gaṅgeśa was also very much impressed by *Nyāyamañjari* (न्यायमंजरी) by *Jayanta Bhatta* (जयन्त भट्ट). This *Kashmir* (काश्मीर) scholar was referred to for the first time in the *Eastern India* exactly by Gaṅgeśa. Gaṅgeśa was also a distinguished poet as it was mentioned by his son *Vardhamāna Upādhyāya*. Gaṅgeśa himself also had mentioned that he was a poet.

Regarding the family of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya the scholars had traced the reference to his family in the *gotrapanthi* (गोत्रपंथी) of *Mithilā*. His village was named *Chidden* (छिदन) and situated in the state of *Mithilā*. Unfortunately the more detailed information about it is still inaccessible. Gaṅgeśa belonged to *Kāśyapa gotra* (काश्यपगोत्र). He was having three sons : *Vardhamāna*, *Supan* and *Hari* (वर्धमान, सुपन, हरि). In the register of *gotra* he had been described as *pramāṇaguru*. *Nyāyakoshakāra Pt. Bhimācārya Zhalakikar* (न्यायकोशकार पं. भीमाचार्य झलकीकर) has mentioned Gaṅgeśa to be a resident of *Bengal state*, but perhaps it is just an obvious mistake. The time of Gaṅgeśa is stated to be the 11th century of *Samvat* (संवत्). Some scholars say that Gaṅgeśopādhyāya was prior to 1030 A.D. They base this conclusion on the fact that the

king Lakṣmaṇasena (लक्ष्मणसेन) was ruling Bengal in 1030 A.D. and there was a Pundit Halāyudh Bhatt (हलायुध भट्ट) in his court. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya is considered to be prior to Halāyudh Bhatt. Prof. Dineśa Chandra Bhattācārya (दिनेशचंद्र भट्टाचार्य) had criticized the view of Dr. Keat, Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Dr. Hari Prasād śāstrī etc. (डॉ. विद्याभूषण, डॉ. हरिप्रसाद शास्त्री) and had proved that the time of Gaṅgeśa was the 13th century A.D. according to historical evidence found in Mithilā. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa had established that Gaṅgeśa was the native of the village Khārian (खारियान) situated in the state of Mithilā. He had pointed out that some scholars point that Gaṅgeśa was a native of Māṅgroni (मांगरोनी) village situated near Madhubani (मधुबनी) in the state of Mithilā. It is known that the earlier name of Maṅgroni was Maṅgalvāni (मंगलवानी).

(2) Pakṣadhara Miśra

After Gaṅgeśa, Pakṣadhara Miśra was the only scholar who established his own independent tradition in the field of Navya Nyāya by writing the commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi name Āloka (आलोक). Āloka was the main treatise for study of Navya Nyāya all over India for so many years. Āloka was written on the three chapters of Tattvacintāmaṇi except Upamāna (उपमान). The commentary Āloka was the only work of Pakṣadhara Miśra known to scholars for very long time. Later after search and investigation two more works by Pakṣadhara Miśra were found : Dravyaviveka and Nyāyalīlāvatīviveka (द्रव्यविवेक, न्यायलीलावतीविवेक). The manuscripts of them were found in the India Office Library together with a commentary of Vardhamān Upādhyāya on Dravyaviveka. This is referred to in Nyāyalīlāvatīviveka. Nyāyalīlāvatīviveka is a more voluminous work but there is no any reference to Pakṣadhara Miśra in it.

Only in the colophon of an available manuscript there had been written. So Nyāyalīlāvātīviveka written by Pakṣadhara Miśra is completed.

The other two works of Pakṣadhara Miśra had been traced in Varāṇasī (वाराणसी). One of them is a commentary in the form of notes on Tattvacintāmaṇi and the other is the commentary on Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa by śaśadhara (न्यायसिद्धांतदीपशशधर). The Nephew of Pakṣadhara Miśra named Vāsudeva (वासुदेव) who was also his student had referred to another work named Pramāṇapallava (प्रमाणपल्लव).

The earlier name of Pakṣadhara Miśra was Jayadeva Miśra (जयदेव मिश्र). There is aligned that once he was called for a debate and there he presented one of his doctrines for complete fortnight (pakṣa). After this he was named as Pakṣadhara. Most of the scholars are of the opinion that Jayadeva who is the author of Candrālōka (चंद्रालोक) was the same person as Pakṣadhara Miśra. There is a famous legend that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (रघुनाथ शिरोमणि) after having completed his study on Navya Nyāya from Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (वासुदेव सार्वभौम) in Bengal was still not fully satisfied with his achievement. Having heard about the renowned scholarship of Pakṣadhara Miśra, Śiromani came to Mithilā for further study from Pakṣadhara Miśra. During that time the gurukul (गुरुकुल) of Pakṣadhara Miśra was very famous. And there were so many scholars there. There was also the restriction for newcomers to see Pakṣadhara Miśra directly. Usually there were five pandits at the external gate and three pandits used to sit at the internal door. New students first met the scholars at the external gate. Only after the logical debate with them the newcomers could proceed towards the internal door. Only after defeating the pandits at the internal gate a

newcomer could meet Pakṣadhara Miśra. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi defeated all the scholars and was introduced to Pakṣadhara Miśra from whom he later got vast and deep knowledge of Navya Nyāya.

There is a dispute among the scholars regarding the excellent scholarship of Pakṣadhara Miśra in the subject of Navya Nyāya. In Pakṣatāprakaraṇa of Anumānakhaṇḍa (पक्षता प्रकरण अनुमानखंड) of Āloka the declines of saṃśayapakṣatā and saṃśaya-yogyatā-pakṣatā (संशयपक्षता, संशययोग्यतापक्षता) had been established. They indicate independent brilliant scholarship of the author. Influence of the thought of Pakṣadhara Miśra on the development of doctrine of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* (सामान्यलक्षणा) and *prāgabdhāva* (प्रागभाव) is found even in the later works on Navya Nyāya.

The time of Pakṣadhara Miśra is believed to be the 13th century A.D. It is said that the statue of Pakṣadhara Miśra was erected in front of Navadvipa university in Bengal. This statue was retched by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, his student and devotee.

(3) Raghunātha Śiromaṇi

Tārkikaśiromaṇi, the jewel of logicians Raghunātha was a native of Bengal. He had lost his father already in his childhood. His mother sent him to the school of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma. Vāsudeva started to teach Raghunātha from the very beginning. Later this child became the greatest logician of India of all the times. During the study years of Raghunātha, Pakṣadhara Miśra was a very renowned scholar of Navya Nyāya in Mithilā. No opponent could come even close to him in debate. There is as saying in praise of Pakṣadhara stating that there was a similarity between Śaṅkara (शंकर) and Vācaspati (वाचस्पति) but there was no

opponent in debate for Pakṣadhara. Hearing about the renowned scholarship of Pakṣadhara Miśra, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi came to Mithilā to study under him. When after the debate with the pandits at the gate Raghunātha reached Pakṣadhara the aged scholar seeing Raghunātha being blind with one eye slightly ridiculed the new student by saying. “Indra (इन्द्र) has thousand eyes, the lord Shiva has three, we all have two eyes, who are you having only one eye ?” Śiromaṇi on the spot gave a very befitting and answer, “It is correct that Indra has thousand eyes and the lord Shiva is having three eyes. As well that it is true that all of you are blind (having no eyes) when I see with the one eye of Nyāya.” Receiving such a reply Pakṣadhara Miśra was very much pleased and accepted Śiromaṇi as his disciple.

By his excellence in the field of Nyāya, Raghunātha had superseded his teacher Pakṣadhara. He had directly refuted several theories of his teacher in his famous commentary of Tattvacintāmaṇi named Dīdhiti. The commentary of Pakṣadhara Miśra on Tattvacintāmaṇi is also a very outstanding work. But Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his treatise had proved that the doctrines which had been thought to be faultless unanimously by the galaxy of the scholars before him were defective and those which were proved by them to be wrong were declared faultless by Raghunātha when he argued in the debate. The same we can find in all of the works by Raghunātha. For example, he differs with Pakṣadhara Miśra on the issue of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. At the time of debate Pakṣadhara Miśra had said to Raghunātha Śiromaṇi :- “single eyed by birth, why are you refuting *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* which is obvious in the case of doubt ?” This was answered by Dīdhitikāra in the chapter on *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*

under the introductory heading *atrīyā vadanti*. (अत्रीया वदन्ति)

The commentary by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi on Tattvacintāmaṇi named Dīdhiti is a very outstanding work in the field of Navya Nyāya. There are so many commentaries written on Tattvacintāmaṇi but the honor given to Dīdhiti by the scholars are not given to any other work. Later Dīdhiti was commented upon by many well-known subcommentators like Jāgadiśa, Gadādhara, Bhavānanda, Mathurānātha etc. (जगदीश, गदाधर, भवानंद, मथुरानाथ) and their works are studied and discussed all over India from Himālaya to Kanyākumārī even nowadays. Apart from this work Raghunātha Śiromaṇi had also written commentary on other works like Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā, Nyāyamañjarī, Ātmatattvaviveka, Kiraṇāvalī (खंडनखंडखाद्य, न्यायमंजरी, आत्मतत्त्वविवेक, किरणावली) etc. Besides these he had written an independent work named Padārthatatva-nirupaṇa (पदार्थतत्त्व- निरूपण) where he had refused the view about separateness being a quality and space and time being categories. In his works Raghunātha Śiromaṇi had criticized the theories established by his predecessors like *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatirekānumāna*, *prāgabhāva* (सामान्यलक्षणा, केवलान्वयि, केवलव्यतिरेकानुमान, प्रागभाव) and the theory that the knowledge of the counterpoisitive is the cause of the knowledge of absence. Raghunātha had also established *arthāpatti* (*presumption*) (अर्थापत्ति) to be a separate means of valid knowledge etc. In this way he had given a revolutionary turn to the development of the Navya Nyāya school of the Indian logic. Therefore without any hesitation we can accept that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi was a true Śiromaṇi, a jewel on the crest of Navya Nyāya.

(4) Yajñapati Upādhyāya (यज्ञपति उपाध्याय)

Yajñapati Upādhyāya was a Maithil Brāhmin resident of Mithilā. He was grandson of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya and son of Vardhamān Upādhyāya. He was born in the beginning of 14th century. He had written an independent commentary on Tattva-chintāmaṇi. Except pervasion his opinion is being quoted in all matters of Nyāya. Later critics have quoted him as ‘Upādhyāyāstu’ or ‘Yajñapatyupādhyāyāstu.’ (उपाध्यायास्तु) (यज्ञपत्युपाध्यायास्तु)

The commentary of Yajñapati Upādhyāya ‘Prabhā’ (प्रभा) on ‘Tattvacintāmaṇi’ is on three parts-Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, and śabda (प्रत्यक्ष अनुमान शब्द). He had left Upamāna. The manuscripts of Prabhā are very few. One copy is found at Government library of Darbhanga, in which its time is quoted 1428 śaksamvat means 1486 A.D.

Prof. Dinesh rejects about his heredity that he was son of Vardhmān Upādhyāya and grandson of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya. He had also rejected the quotation of Śabda Kalpadruma (शब्दकल्पद्रुम), that he was pupil of Vardhamān and Gaṅgeśa. He is of opinion, his father was Śivapati (शिवपति) who had written an independent book on Nyāya on the base of same Yajñapati had written his Prabhā.

(5) Mathurānāth Tarkvāgiśa (मथुरानाथ तर्कवागीश)

Mathurānāth Tarkavāgiśa was a Bengali Brāhmin. His father Śrirām Tarkālankār (श्रीराम तर्कालंकार) was a famous logician. The Primary learning of Mathurānāth was from his father only. Then he went to learn Nyāya at famous logician Raghunāth Śiromaṇi. He was resident of Manihāri (मनिहारी) town of Bengal.

His period is being considered at 16th century. He had written commentaries on Tattvacintāmaṇi and Tattvacintamaṇi Dīdhiti, which are famous by the name Māthuri (माथुरी). It's name is 'Rahasya' (रहस्य). He has his commentaries on 'Kusumāñjali' (कुसुमाञ्जलि) and Āmatattva viveka (आत्मतत्त्वविवेक).

He has also written Māthurī on Pakṣhadhar Miśra's Ālok, but it is still unpublished. He has also an independent volume on Nyāya as 'Nyāya-Rahasya' (न्याय-रहस्य). He was not only scholar but lucky also. His descendants are still at Manihāri town.

(6) Jāgadiśa Tarkālaṅkara (जगदीश तर्कालंकार)

Jāgadiśa Tarkālaṅkara was pupil of Bhavānand Tarkavāgiśa (भवानंद तर्कवागीश). He has written a criticism on Dīdhiti which is famous and now known as 'Jāgdīśi' (जागदीशी). On the Anumān chapter of Dīdhiti, Jāgdīśi and its pervasion is so scholarly written he supersedes Gadādhara (गदाधर) and Mathurānātha. In addition to Dīdhiti he written commentary on Pakṣhadhara Miśra's 'Ālok' also. 'Śabda-Śakti-Prakāśikā' (शब्दशक्तिप्रकाशिका) 'Tarkāmṛta' (तर्कामृत) and 'Nyāyādarśa' (न्यायादर्श) are his independent volumes. 'Śabda-Śakti-Prakāśikā' is the best work in linguistics. Similarly he had tried to fill up the ocean of Nyāya in a jar in 'Tarkāmṛta.' His period is being considered in 16th century.

(7) Viśvanātha Pañcānana (विश्वनाथ पंचानन)

Vishvanātha Pañcānana was Bengali Brahmin and was resident of Bengal. Śrīniwāsa Bhattācārya (श्रीनिवासभट्टाचार्य) was his father. As a favour on his pupil Rājiv (राजीव) he had written 'Nyāya-Siddhant-Muktāvalī' (न्यायसिद्धांतमुक्तावली) in 1556 Shak.

Eventhough he created 'Kārikavalī' (कारिकावली) was rather difficult for his pupil as such again with kind heart he wrote commentary 'Muktāvalī' on 'Karikāvalī'. Also one criticism is found on Nyāya aphorisms known as Viśvanātha Vritti (विश्वनाथ-वृत्ति). He was resident of Navadvīpa (नवद्वीप) but was stabled at Vrindāvana (वृंदावन). He was trained in tradition of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. The commentary on Nyāya-Siddhānt-Muktāvalī known as 'Dinkarī' (दिनकरी) and its criticism 'Rāmrudrī' (रामरुद्री) are famous all over for its scholarship.

(8) Gadādhara Bhattācārya (गदाधर भट्टाचार्य)

He was son of Jivācārya (जीवाचार्य) and resident of Bengal. He completed his study of whole Nyāya at Navadvīp (नवद्वीप) with Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa (हरिराम तर्कवागीश). His period is considered at middle of 17th century. He had written so many books, some of which are unavailable. Some of them are - (1) The criticism of Nyāya Kusumañjali (न्यायकुसुमांजली), (2) 'Dīdhiti' on 'Ālok' of Tattvacintāmaṇi, (3) Gādādhari (गादाधरी) Ātma-tattva-viveka, Dīdhiti-Prakāśikā (आत्मतत्त्वविवेक, दीधितिप्रकाशिका). (4) Commentary on Muktāvalī (मुक्तावली) (5) The criticism of Durgā-sapta-śatī (दुर्गासप्तशती) (6) Bāhyānirṇaya (बाह्यनिर्णय) and by Vād-granth (वादग्रन्थ) as, out of which most are not reliable. In this Śaktivāda (शक्तिवाद) Vyutpttivāda (व्युत्पत्तिवाद) are main. Some others Avacchedak-vāda (अवच्छेदकवाद) Karaṇatāvāda (करणतावाद) Mukti-vāda (मुक्तिवाद) Ākhyatvāda (आख्यातवाद) Nañyarthvāda (नञर्थवाद) Smritisamskārvāda (स्मृतिसंस्कारवाद) Paryāptivāda (पर्याप्तिवाद) Sādrūśyavāda (सादृश्यवाद) Viśayatāvāda (विषयतावाद) Navyamatavāda (नव्यमतवाद) Kārakvād (कारकवाद) are famous. Other 'Vāda' are not available.

After Gadādhara the flow of Navya Nyāya was

progressive. There were so many famous logicians who had enriched the store of Navya Nyāya.

The nominated logicians after Gadādhara are as under.

- (1) Rāmruḍra Tarkvāgiśa (रामरुद्रतर्कवागीश) (1700 A.D.) The writer of criticism Dīdhiṭi, Vyāptivāda (व्याप्तिवाद) criticism etc.
- (2) Shri Kṛṣṇa Nyāyālaṅkāra (श्रीकृष्णन्यायालंकार) (1650 A.D.) Bhāvadīpikā (भावदीपिका)
- (3) Kṛṣṇakānt - Vidyāvāgiśa (कृष्णकांतविद्यावागीश) (1780 A.D.) Nyāyaratnāvalī etc. (न्यायरत्नावली)
- (4) Mahādeva Puṇatambekara (महादेवपूणतांबेकर) (1790 A.D.) Nyāyakaustubha (न्यायकौस्तुभ) Vyāpti-rahasya-criticism (व्याप्तिरहस्यटीका) etc.

Later on Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika (वैशेषिक) are combined. On the base of which so many volumes are constructed, out of which 'Tark-saṅgraha' (तर्कसंग्रह) is main. It was written by Annambhatta (अन्नभट्ट) who was resident of south (1623 A.D.) There are so many criticism on his Tark-saṅgrah. It has been translated in so many Indian language. It's english translation is also published. This is prescribed in curriculum of so many universities all over. Similarly Nyāya-Siddhānt-Muktāvalī of Viśvanāth Paṇḍita is unparalled work in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣik. There are so many criticism on it. It has also translated in so many Indian languages and English.

Introduction: Vyāpti-Pañcakam

– Dr. Balirāma Śukla

In our tradition of teaching on Navya Nyāya system of logic we start teaching of Navya Nyāya from Vyāpti - pañcak-
rahasya (māthurī) of Mathurānātha. There are different names
have been used for vyāpti by different schools of Indian logic, Viz.
Avinābhāva, Sāhacarya, Niyama, Anaupādhikasambandha,
Samaya, etc. (अविनाभाव, साहचर्य, नियम, अनौपाधिकसंबंधसमय).

In the Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa it is stated as
Avyabhicaritātva, (state of not having deviation) Vyāpti is most
important part of inference. Taking in to account its
importance in the process of inferential knowledge, Ācārya
Annaṃbhata has said “Anumānasya dve Aṅge vyāptiḥ
Pakṣadharmatā ca.” (अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे, व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता च ।) There are
two parts of inference, Vyāpti and Pakṣadharmatā, (existence
of the reason in the subject.)

Though the Tattvacintāmaṇi has been commented by
several authors but Māthurī commentary on this portion, is
taught first to get enter in this system. Because the Māthurī
commentary on this portion is neither long nor short, therefore
it is appreciated to enter in the field on Navya Nyāya system.
Generally in north India naiyāyikās start teaching on Navya
Nyāya by Vyāpti-pañcaka-Māthurī but in South India they start
this teaching by Gadādhari commentary on Dīdhiti on
Tattvacintāmaṇi. Though the nature of vyāpti relation is

expressed in the phrase “where ever the smoke there is fire”, but question arises how can we say ‘where ever the smoke there is fire’ with confidence ? and What is the theory behind this belief ? Someone may doubt ‘let there be smoke without fire’ how can we remove this doubt about deviation ? These are some questions should be answered. To answer these questions we will have to make universality of the relation. Without it we can’t establish any theory, therefore Gaṅgeśa has narrated negative form of vyāpti there would not be universality without negation.

Avyabhicāritattva (absence of deviation) can’t be defined without using negative term. Though naiyāyikās have accepted pure affirmative form of inference but in day to day practice generally negative cum affirmative inference is used, therefore for universality of vyāpti relation, vyāpti should be defined in negative form, and so to say Gaṅgeśa has stated Avyabhicāritattva as vyāpti which means ‘absence of deviation.’ When the absence of deviation is accepted as the nature of vyāpti there is no need of observation of existence of all hetus (reasons) with all sādhyas (that which is to be established.) The deviation (vyabhicāra) can be grasped in one instance of reason also, and the knowledge of deviation causes the knowledge of absense of deviations, this is because the knowledge of counterpositive is the cause of knowledge of absence. When someone looks fire in a hot-iron-ball, where is the absence of smoke, he realizes deviation between smoke and fire, thus he apprehends deviation in the form of Sādhyābhavadvrittiva (साध्याभावद्वृत्तित्व) ‘occurrence of reason in that which has the absence of sādhyā.’ In this way there may be so many forms of deviation viz.

1. Sādhyābhāvadvrittiva (साध्याभावद्वृत्तित्व) 2.

Sādhya-sāmānyādhikaraṇatva (साध्यसामान्याधिकरणत्व) 3. Sādhya-vaiyadhikaraṇyādhikraṇatva. (साध्यवैयधिकरण्याधिकरणत्व) 4. Sādhya-vadanyābhāvādhikraṇatva. (साध्यवदन्याभावाधिकरणत्व) 5. Hetvadhikaraṇavritti abhāvapratiyogikatva. (हेत्वधिकरणवृत्त्य-भावप्रतियोगिकत्व) etc. On the basis of absence of sādhyā many definitions of deviation can be made. When in the end of definitions of deviation the term absence (abhāva) is used that definitions become definitions of vyāpti.

The sādhyābhāva-vadavrittiva (साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्व) is first definition is personated by Gaṅgeśa. For the condition of vyāpti, there is no need to see the coexistence of hetu and sādhyā in all places. Similarly there is no need to perceive all counter-positives of absence to grasp absence, after knowing one instance of smoke one can cognize the absence of smoke in the hot-iron-ball, and when one instance of absence of smoke is found in the locus of reason viz. fire the deviation becomes clear in between smoke and fire and when the perception of smoke does not happen in the locus of the absence of fire the deviation is not cognizer in between fire and smoke, therefore 'vyāpti' in the form of absence of deviation is recognized. Thus the non-apprehension of deviation brings out the vyāpti, in the form of non-deviation.

1. Sadhyābhāva-vadavrittivam. (साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्) 'the mountain has fire because of smoke'-this inference is based on the definition of vyāpti as "Sadhyābhāva-vadavrittivam." Here sādhyā is fire, the absence of fire is sadhyābhāva, the locus of it is water etc. there smoke does not exist. Therefore there is absence of occurrence in the smoke, hence this definition is applied in this inference. But if some one wants to infer smoke on the basis of fire, this definition of vyāpti can't be applied, because in the locus of absence of smoke viz. hot-iron-ball the

fire is located, therefore there is no absence of occurrence in the fire.

According to Mathurānāth the meaning of non-deviation is 'Sādhyābhāvādhikaraṇanirūpitavrittivābhāva' (साध्याभावाधिकरणनिरूपितवृत्तित्वाभाव) the absence of occurrence indicated by the locus of absences of that which is to be established. Though this definition is based on 'Vyadhikraṇa-bahuvrīhi (व्यधिकरणबहुव्रीहि) compound which is not considered correct to apply in every case, but there is no other way to maintain the reason as non-occurent (avritti अवृत्ति) in the locus of the absence of sādhyā without tripada vyadhikraṇa bahuvrīhi (त्रिपदव्यधिकरणबहुव्रीहि) compound.

Raghunāth Śiromaṇi has stated the reason of rejection of this definition pointing out the fault of too narrow application (avyāpti अव्याप्ति) in the inference sādhyā of which has incomplete occurrence (avyāpyavritti अव्याप्यवृत्ति), therefore the second definition in the form of 'sādhyavadbhinna-sādhyābhāvavadavrttitvam' (साध्यवद्भिन्नसाध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्) is introduced. In this inference 'this tree has the conjunction of monkey because of this-tree-ness', the first definition can't be applied because the reason viz. 'this-tree ness' occurred in this tree which has absence of conjunction of monkey in the root of this tree which is the substratum of the absence of sādhyā. A monkey is conjoined with a branch of tree and not the root of tree, hence there is occurrence (vrittitva वृत्तित्व) indicated by the substratum (adhikaraṇa (अधिकरण) of the absence of sādhyā, so there is a fault of too narrow application.

Mathuranāth has tried to remove this fault by modifying this definition. According to him 'the absence of occurrence of the reason indicated by the substratum which is the locus of that substratum-ness which is not delimited (avacchinna-

अवच्छिन्न) by any characteristic and which is indicated by early mentioned sādhyābhāvatva. (साध्याभावत्व) The idea is here the absence of conjunction of monkey always with a part of tree viz. a branch and not root, there is absence of conjunction on monkey therefore the substratum-ness of the absence of monkey is determined by its root it is not 'niravacchinna' (निखच्छिन्न). The absence of monkey in quality etc. is not delimited by any attribute, therefore the locus-ness of the absence of conjunction on monkey non-determined is in quality and not in the tree, hence the quality would be locus of non-determined locus-ness and there tree-ness does not exist, therefore definition of vyāpti is applied, but there would be fault of avyāpti in the inference 'this has the absence of monkey because of existence' here then on determined locus of absence of sādhyā is not established. The conjunction of monkey is delimited by branches etc. Mathurānāth answers that Ācārya Gaṅgeśa has himself refuted this definition by the expression 'Kevalānvayinyabhāvāt' (केवलान्वयिन्यभावात्). Hence this fault should not be considered here.

The effort of Mathurānāth to remove the fault shown by Raghunātha is to make another definition only, without change in definition Mathurānāth also can't remove the fault of avyāpti (अव्याप्ति). Gaṅgeśa also has removed that fault by making second definition 'sādhyavadbhinna' (साध्यवद्भिन्न) etc. Therefore there is similarity in their efforts.

Besides in the opinion of those who present the first definition 'sādhyābhāvavadavrttitva' (साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्व) the absence of conjunction on monkey is different in each locus due to difference in substratum, because two opposite attributes viz. complete occurrence and incomplete occurrence can't exist in one and same place, the absence of conjunction

of monkey, which exists in a tree, and which exists in the quality are different, in this case the undetermined(aniyantrita अनियन्त्रित) locus-ness of the absence of conjunction is unestablished. Therefore it is better to remove mentioned fault of 'avyāpti' by second definition 'sādhyaavadbhinna' etc.

2. Sādhyaavadbhinnasādhyaābhāvavadavrttitvam, (साध्य-वद्भिन्नसाध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्). This definition is mentioned to remove the fault of too narrow application 'avyāpti' in the inference 'this has the conjunction of monkey because of this tree.' Here this tree which has absence of sādhyā is not different from the locus of sādhyā, quality etc. which has the absence of sādhyā is different from the locus of sādhyā because conjunction which is a quality does not exist in quality, hence in the quality which is the locus of absence of sādhyā, this tree-ness (etadvṛkṣatva-एतद्वृक्षत्व) does not exist, there is no fault of 'avyāpti.'

Raghunātha Śiromani has refuted this definition. According to him the absence of conjunction which exists in quality and action is not different from the absence of conjunction which exists in the tree, there is no proof to prove difference in absence due to difference in its substrata.

According to Mathurānātha in the definition Sādhyaavadbhinnasādhyaābhāvavadavrttitvam (साध्यवद्भिन्नसाध्या-भाववदवृत्तित्व) the word 'sādhyaavadbhinna' is useless by the word 'sādhyaavadbhinnavrttitvam' early mentioned fault is avoided, this tree-ness (etadvṛkṣatva-एतद्वृक्षत्व) does not occurred in quality etc. which is different from that which has sādhyā.

3. Sādhyaavatpratiyogikānyonyābhāvasāmānyadhikar-
anyam (साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावसामान्याधिकरण्यम्)

Mathurānāth has explained this definition following way 'absence of occurrence indicated by the substratum of the mutual absence which indicates counter-positive-ness exists in

the locus of sādhyā.' For example in the inference 'the hill has fire because of smoke.' Sādhyā is fire. The mutual absence of sādhyavān (साध्यवान्) is the mutual absence of the locus of fire which exists in water etc. there is occurrence of fish etc. and the absence of that occurrence exists in the smoke. In this way the definition is applied. While in the invalid inference such as 'the hill has smoke because it has fire this definition is not applied. The mutual absence of the locus of smoke exists in the hot-iron-ball where fire exists therefore there is no absence of occurrence in the reason fire. Therefore it is invalid reason.

Ācārya Raghunātha has pointed out the rejection of this definition by showing the fault of too narrow application in all valid reasons because the reason exists in the example which is different from subject (pakṣa पक्ष). Therefore there is no absence of occurrence in the reason, hence the fourth definition was introduced. If to avoid this fault by the expression 'the mutual absence of the locus of sādhyā' the mutual absence counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the locus-ness of sādhyā, means the mutual absence of all locus of sādhyā, there would be repetition of fifth definition.

4. Sakala-sādhyābhāvavanniṣṭhābhāvā-pratiyogitvam
(सकलसाध्याभाववन्निष्ठाभावाप्रतियोगित्वम्)

Absence of counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in all substrata of the absence of sādhyā, is the meaning. In the inference 'the hill has fire because it has smoke' in all substrata of fire, the absence of smoke exists, therefore the counter-positive-ness of that absence exists in smoke, hence the definition is applied. But there is no absence of fire in all substrata of smoke therefore in invalid inference 'this has smoke because it has fire' the definition is not applied. In the substratum of the absence of smoke viz. hot-iron-ball the fire

exists, therefore the absence of fire is not the absence which exists in all substrata of the absence of smoke. We can take there the absence of water etc., the counter-positive-ness of that absence does not exist in fire, hence the definition is not applied.

Here the question arises, in this definition which is qualified by 'All' the absence of *sādhya* or the substratum of absence of *sādhya* ? According to Raghunātha 'All' is qualifier of both 'absence of *sādhya* and the substratum of absence of *sādhya*,' while Mathurānātha says 'All' is qualifier of the substratum of absence of *sādhya*.'

If the expression is not used there would be a fault of over extension, in the inference. 'This has smoke because of fire,' then there is absence of fire in the substratum of the absence of *sādhya* viz. water etc. counter-positive-ness of which exists in fire. When 'All' is used, there would not be fault of over extension. Because of in all substrata of the absence of *sādhya* (smoke) the absence of fire does not exist, in the locus of absence of smoke 'hot-iron-ball,' fire exists.

If 'All' is considered as the qualifier of the absence of *sādhya*, there would be a fault of impossibility, absence of fire which does not occur in that water and the absence of fire which does not exist in this lake etc. also are included in all absences of *sādhya*, one substratum of all these absences of *sādhya* is not established, the absence of non-occupant of that lake exists only in that lake not in all substrata of absence of *sādhya*. Therefore 'All' should be understood as qualifier of substratum of absence of *sādhya*.

According to Raghunātha there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference 'this has that colour because of that test'. Here all substrata of *sādhya* is not established, *sādhya* that

particular colour is one, therefore 'All' can't be qualifier of sādhyā. According to Mathurānātha the word 'All' in this definition, is used in the sense of inclusion (aśeṣa अशेष) not many, therefore there is no early mentioned fault where is only one substratum of absence of sādhyā that also will be included, therefore 'All' is qualifier of the substratum of the absence of sādhyā.

5. sādhyavadanyāvrittītvam (साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वम्)

In the inference 'hill has fire because of smoke' the fire is sādhyā the locus of sādhyā is hill other than that is water where is the absence of smoke so there in smoke, is the absence of occurrence (vṛttitva वृत्तित्व). In this way definition is applied. In the invalid inference 'this has smoke because of fire' this definition is not applied, in the hot-iron-ball which is different from the locus of sādhyā, fire exists there, therefore there is no absence of occurrence in fire.

In this definition the absence of occurrence (vṛttitva) should be known as the absence of occurrence in general, because there is absence of occurrence indicated (nirūpita निरूपित) by water in fire, hence there is a fault of over extension in the invalid inference 'hill has smoke because of fire', in the occurrence in general, includes the occurrence indicated by hot-iron-ball, the absence of that occurrence dose not exist in fire, occurs in the hot-iron-ball.

The substratum of sādhyā should be known by that relation by which sādhyā is desired to be established in the subject (pakṣa पक्ष), otherwise there would be fault of 'avyāpti' in the inference 'hill has fire because of smoke' by the relation inherence (samavāya समवाय) fire exists in the part of fire other than that is hill where smoke occurs, here desired relation is conjunction, (saṃyoga संयोग) by this relation fire exists in the

hill which is not different from that, different from that is lake etc. where fire dose not occur, hence there is no fault of too narrow application, this is the idea.

Similarly by which relation reason (hetu हेतु) is desired in subject the occurrence should be known, otherewise there would be fault of avyāpti in the infernce 'hill has fire because of smoke.' The smoke exists in it's part which is different from the substratum of sādhyā, when the relation which determines the state of being reason is introduced there would not be mentioned fault because by the relation 'saṃyoga' smoke dose not occur in it's part.

There is very minute difference between third and fifth definitions. In third definition the mutual absence counter-positive of which is the locus of sādhyā only is included, while in fifth definition the mutual absence the counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the locusness of sādhyā (sādhyavattva साध्यवत्त्व). There is fault of 'avyāpti' of third definition in the inference 'hill has fire because of smoke' taking mutual absence of fire through 'cālaniya-nyāya.' (चालनीयन्याय)

All these five definitions are based on the original concept of non-deviation, where is no deviation there is 'vyāpti'. All these definitions are made taking in to account the agreement (anvaya अन्वय) and disagreement (vyatireka व्यतिरेक) 'where-ever reason (hetu) there is sādhyā' and 'where-ever absence of sādhyā there is absence of reason (hetu).' All these are not applied in the 'pure affirmative (kevlānvayi केवलान्वयि) inference such as 'it is namable because of knowable' the absence of sādhyā is not established, everything is namable, therefore there is no absence of namability anywhere.

In this way all these five definitions are faulty with regard pure affirmative inference. In first definition absence of sādhyā is not established, and in second, third, and fifth the

mutual absence of locus of sādhyā is not established. All things are namable, hence difference from them is not established. In fourth definition also the absence of sādhyā is not established so this definition is faulty.

According to Gaṅgeśa all these five definitions are not applicable with 'kevalānvayi anumāna' (केवलान्वयि-अनुमान). According to Mathurānātha four definitions beginning from second are faulty with regard the inference 'it has absence of monkey because of existence' because the absence counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the relation which determines the state of sādhyā, is not established, the absence of monkey which has incomplete occurrence exists everywhere in this world. Similarly the difference from the locus of 'vācyatva' (वाच्यत्व) also is not established, whole universe is namable (vācyā वाच्य).

Mathurānātha says that to avoid fault of avyāpti because in the inference 'this tree has conjunction of monkey because of this treeness' the expression 'sādhyavadbhinna' (साध्यवद्भिन्न) is used. That fault is not removed even that is used, because the absence of monkey which exists in quality which is different from that which has 'sādhyā' exists in this tree also. There is no proof to establish difference in absences due to difference in their substrata. Therefore the fault of avyāpti remains intact, if to avoid this fault, the absence of sādhyā is mentioned as qualified by occurrence in that which is different from the locus of sādhyā, the word 'absence of sādhyā' in the definition will be use-less.

Jāgadiśa has followed Raghunātha, the Jagadīśi is the commentary on Dīdhiti of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, he has explained ideas of Raghunātha, his special contribution is found in the interpretation of fifth definition.

Vyāpti-Pañcakam

व्याप्तिपञ्चकम्

व्याप्तिपञ्चकम्

तत्त्वचिन्तामणिः

- (त.१) नन्वनुमितिहेतुव्याप्तिज्ञाने का व्याप्तिः ? न
तावदव्यभिचरितत्त्वम् । तद्धि न साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्,
(त.२) साध्यवद्भिन्नसाध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्,
-

Five Definitions of Vyāpti Tattvacintāmaṇi

(T.1) Here author follows the collection of five tentative definitions of invariable-concomitance (*vyāpti*)

(Now the question is), in the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), which is the cause of inferential knowledge, what is invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) ? Infact, it is not the state of having non-deviation (of the reason from that which is to be established) because invariable-concomitance is neither, the non-existence of the reason in such substratum which possesses the absence of that which is to be established. nor,

(T.2) The non-existence (of the reason) in the substratum which possesses the absence of that which is to be established and which is different form that which has the absence of that which is to be established. nor,

(त.३) साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावासामानाधिकरण्यम्,

(त.४) सकलसाध्याभाववन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वम्,

(त.५) साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वम् वा, केवलान्वयिन्यभावात् ।

(T.3) The not co-existence (of the reason) with such a mutual absence which has the substratum of that which is to be established as its counter-positive. nor,

(T.4) The counter-positive-ness of the absence which resides in all substrata of the absence of that which is to be established. nor,

(T.5) The occurrence (of the reason) in the substratum which is different from that which has that which is to be established. This is because all these definitions are not applicable in the pure affirmative reason.

• • •

श्रीमथुरानाथकृतं व्याप्तिपञ्चकरहस्यम् ।

(१) अनुमानप्रामाण्यं निरूप्य व्याप्तिस्वरूपनिरूपणमारभते-ननु इत्यादिना । अनुमितिहेतु इत्यस्य अनुमाननिष्ठप्रामाण्यानुमितिहेतु इत्यर्थः^१, व्याप्तिज्ञान इत्यत्र च विषयत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः, तथा चानुमाननिष्ठ-प्रामाण्यानुमितिहेतुव्याप्तिज्ञानविषयीभूता व्याप्तिः का इत्यर्थः ।

Rahasya Commentary

(1) Having discussed the validity of inference author starts the discussion about the nature of *vyāpti* by the expression ‘but now the question is etc.’ By the expression “cause of inferential knowledge” here it should be understood that cause of inferential knowledge of the validity of inferential knowledge¹. And in the expression ‘in the knowledge of invariable concomitance’ the meaning of locative case is the ‘state of being object (*viṣayatva* विषयत्व), there fore, the meaning of the Gaṅgeśa’s statement is that What is *vyāpti*, which is the object of the knowledge of *vyāpti*, which (knowledge) is the cause of inferential knowledge of validity in inference ? In the discussion of *vyāpti* after the discussion of validity of inference, the

1. अनुमाननिष्ठप्रामाण्यानुमितिः—The inferential knowledge of validity in the inference. The form of inferential knowledge is “the inference is the means of valid knowledge, because it has the attribute which determines the state of being extraordinary cause of valid knowledge.

अनुमाननिष्ठप्रामाण्यानुमितिहेत्वित्यनेन व्याप्तेरनुमानप्रामाण्योपपादक-
त्वकथनादनुमानप्रामाण्यनिरूपणानन्तरं व्याप्तिनिरूपणे उपोद्घात^२ एव
सङ्गतिः सूचिता । उपपादकत्वञ्च अत्र ज्ञापकत्वम् ।

(२) केचित्तु-अनुमितिपदम् अनुमितिनिष्ठेतरभेदानुमितिपरम्,^३
तथा चानुमितिनिष्ठेतरभेदानुमितौ यो हेतुः^४ प्रागुक्तव्याप्तिप्रकारक-

relevance in the form of introduction² is indicated because of the statement the *vyāpti* brings out of the inference of the validity in inference. Here 'brings out' means 'brings out the knowledge(of validity of inference)

(2) Some of the logicians say the word 'inferential knowledge' denotes the inferential knowledge of the difference from other things, in inferential knowledge³, therefore the meaning of the statment is the inferential knowledge of the difference from other things in the inferential knowledge which is a reason⁴ in the form of 'the state of being produced by the

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2. उपोद्घातः-चिन्तां प्रकृतसिद्ध्यर्थमुपोद्घातं विदुर्बुधाः—Thinking for establishing the thing; the discussion of which is started.
 3. इतरभेदानुमितिः—The inferential knowledge of the difference from others. The form of inferential knowledge is "the inferential knowledge is different from all other things because it is an instance of knowledge, which is different from recollection and which is produced by definite knowledge of concomitant reason existing in the subject."
 4. अनुमितिहेतु—The reason in inferential cognition. The reason is "the state of being produced by the knowledge of the concomitant reason existing in the subject, in this reason the concomitance is inclusive

पक्षधर्मताज्ञानजन्यज्ञानत्वरूपः, तदघटकं यद्व्याप्तिज्ञानं तदंशे विशेषणी-
भूता व्याप्तिः का ? इत्यर्थः, घटकत्वार्थकसप्तम्या तत्पुरुषसमासात् । तथा
च प्रागुक्तानुमितिलक्षणोपोद्घात एव सङ्गतिः अनेन सूचिता इत्याहुः ।

(३) न तावदिति । तावत् वाक्यालङ्कारे, अव्यभिचरित्वं
अव्यभिचरित्वपदप्रतिपाद्यम् । तत्र हेतुमाह तद्धीत्यादि । ‘हि’ यस्मात्,
तत् अव्यभिचरित्वपदप्रतिपाद्यम्, नेति सर्वस्मिन्नेव लक्षणे सम्बध्यते ।
तथा च व्याप्तिर्यतः साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वादिरूपाव्यभिचरित्वशब्दप्रति-
पाद्यरूपा न, अतोऽव्यभिचरित्वशब्दप्रतिपाद्यरूपा न इत्यर्थः

knowledge of the existence in the subject where early mentioned *vyāpti* is a qualifier, the constituent part of which is the knowledge of *vyāpti*, in that what is the qualifier *vyāpti* ? By the seventh case *tatpuruṣa*-compound which means the state of being constituent, Therefore early mentioned introduction relevance, only is indicated by the statement of Gaṇeśa.

(3) *Na tāvat* here ‘*tāvat*’ word is used for the decoration of the sentence. The state of not having deviation means, denoted by the word state of having non deviation there author points out the reason by the expression ‘*tad-dhi.*’ ‘*hi*’ (means) *yasmāt* (from which) Here ‘*tat*’ means that which is denoted by the term ‘not having deviation.’ The word ‘not’ is related with all definitions. Therefore, “because *vyāpti* is not in the form of non existence in that which has the absence of that which is to

part of reason, seventh case shows the inclusion of concomitance in the said reason of inferential knowledge.

पर्यवसितः । विशेषाऽभावकूटस्य^५ सामान्याऽभावहेतुता च प्रसिद्धा एवेति, अत एतन्नञ् द्वयोपादानं^६ न निरर्थकम् ।

be established,” denoted by the expression “the state of not having deviation” therefore it is not denoted by the term “the state of not having deviation,” this is a concluding meaning of the text. It is well-known fact that the collection of absence of particular things⁵ causes the absences of things in general, therefore the use of two negatives⁶ is not purposeless (in the definition). Non-occurrence (of the reason) in that which has

5. विशेषाभावकूटस्य—The collection of absences of particular things shows absence of things in general. *Vyāpti* can’t be the meaning of the word “non-deviation” because it is different from occurrence (of the reason) in the thing which has the absence of ‘*sādhya*’ etc. which are denoted by the word “state of having the absence of deviation.” The inheritable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is not meaning of the word, “the state of having the absence of deviation (*avyabhicārita*)” because it is different from collection of ‘non occurrence of reason in that thing which has the absence of that thing which is to be established (*sādhya*) etc.’ which is the meaning of the word, “state of being non-deviation.”
6. नञ्द्वयोपादानं न निरर्थकम्—The use of two negative particles is not purposeless, because the collection of absences of individual thing brings out the absence in general. The negation denotes absence of thing in general. The first negation denotes the difference in general which is the meaning of non-deviation (*avyabhicaritatva*) and the second negation brings out the collection of absences of particular things which is expressed by the words non-occurrence (of reason) in that thing which has absence of *sādhya*.

प्रथमं लक्षणम्

(४) साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वमिति 'वृत्तम्'^{१७} वृत्तिः । भावे

the absence of that which is to be established (this is the definition).

The First definition of vyāpti.

(4) In this definition (*sādhyaābhāvavadavrittītvam*) *vrittām*⁷

7. वृत्तम्—The state of being existent in that which has the absence of *sādhya*. In this definition “vrittām” means ‘vrittītvam’ occurrence. This is because the suffixes “kta” (क्त) “niṣṭha” (निष्ठ) is the word of “bhāva” (भाव) feature. The absence of existence is meant by the word “avrittām” (अवृत्तम्) which means the absence of occurrence. Non-existing of the reason in the thing which has the absence of that which is to be established (*sādhya*). The absence of the occurrence in that thing which has the absence of *sādhya*, this means the absence of occurrence (of reason) indicated by the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, that absence of occurrence where it is found that reason is called valid reason.

On the basis of suffixes “in” which is used in the sense of “matup” (मतुप्) existing in that which has the absence of *sādhya* is substratum. The feature of the reason is the existence in the substratum of the absence of *sādhya*. Therefore according to old *naiyāyikās* the meaning of the definition is “the state of having the absence of occurrence (of reason) in the locus of the absence of that which is to be established (*sādhya*.) This interpretation of old *naiyāyikās* is not admissable, because it goes against the theory of *grameriaans*. According to them after *Karmadhāraya* (कर्मधारय) compound the suffix which denotes “matup” (locus) should not be used while “bahuvrīhi” (बहुव्रीहि) compound

is expressed to derive the meaning of sentence, therefore the word “mahādhana” (महाधन) is not correct, because the “mahādhana” (huge wealth) is a ‘karmadhāraya’ compound and after this compound that suffixes which denotes the locus can’t be used if the compound bahuvrīhi in the form who has money Mahāadhanin (महाधनिन्) as justifies prospect to know the meaning of the sentence. Therefore to convey the said meaning the word, “mahādhana” is used and not ‘mahādhanī’. Though in the sentence “sādhyaḥbhāvavadvritti” (साध्याभाववद्वृत्ति) there is not “karmadhāraya” compound, there is not avyayībhāva (अव्ययीभाव) compound, hence therefore there is no objection for the use suffixes which means locus, but in the expression of the rule in the word karmadhāraya is used in the sense of the compound which is different from bahuvrīhi. Therefore avyayībhāva compound also is included as different from bahuvrīhi. So like karmadhāraya compound, after avyayībhāva compound, also there would not be use of suffixes which denotes locus. This is very well clarified in the text ‘Guṇa-Prakāśa Rahasyam’ (गुणप्रकाशरहस्यम्) and its commentary ‘Dīdhiti-Rahasyam’ (दीधितिरहस्य) While clearing ‘Agūṇavattva’. (अगुणवत्त्व) , here it should be noted on the basis of the interpretation ‘गुणस्याभावोऽगुणं तद् यत्रास्ति स अगुणवान् तस्य भावः अगुणवत्त्वम्’ The absence of quality is non-quality, that where exists, that is the locus of non-quality, the nature of it is state of having non-quality. The state of having non-quality can’t be a common feature of categories beginning from quality, because the absence of quality has incomplete occurrence, it exists in substance also, in the first moment of the origination of substance. Therefore by the word karmadhāraya in the order of grammar the compounds, other than bahuvrīhi should be understood. The word agūṇa which is avyayībhāva compound, therefore with that compound passive-suffixes can’t be used. Therefore early mentioned multiform of bahuvrīhi compound

निष्ठाप्रत्ययात्, वृत्तस्याऽभावः अवृत्तम् वृत्त्यभाव इति यावत्, साध्या-
ऽभाववतोऽवृत्तं साध्याभाववदवृत्तम् साध्याभाववद्वृत्त्यभाव इति यावत् ।
तद्यत्रास्ति स साध्याभाववदवृत्ती मत्वर्थीयेन्द्रप्रत्ययात्, तस्य भावः साध्या-
भाववदवृत्तित्वम् । तथा च साध्याभाववद्वृत्त्यभाववत्त्वमिति फलितमिति

means *vritti* (existence), because here the suffix of the past passive particle, '*hta*' is called in the Sanskrit grammar as '*niṣṭhā*' which is used in the sense of '*bhāva*' mentioned. The absence of '*vritta*' in *avrittitaṁ* '*vṛityabhāva*.' '*sādhyābhāvavataḥ-avrittitaṁ*' means '*sādhyābhāvavadavrittitaṁ*' which means the absence of existence

can't be accepted. Instead of that form of यत्र स गुणवान्, न गुणवान् अगुणवान्, तस्य भावः अगुणवत्त्वम् compound 'where is that which has quality, which has no quality that is the locus of non-quality.' This form of bahuvrīhi compound should be accepted. The mutual absence has no incomplete occurrence, therefore the *aguṇavattva* does not exist in the substance which is produced. All this is mentioned clearly in that work. If this rule is not accepted then other says that with the meaning of word used with avyayībhāva compound the semantic connection of the meaning of the word which is not the part of avyayībhāva compound is disapproved. Therefore *upakumbha* (उपकुम्भ) and *agha-a* (अघट) being in avyayībhāva compound. can't be connected by semantic connection with the word 'bhūta' etc, which is not included as a part in that compound. There fore 'the nearness of a jar which is in the ground' - this meaning should be understood, but according to the rule it can't be the meaning. According to the rule, "the nearness which is in the ground of a jar and the absence which is in the ground of a jar will be the meaning, means the ground will be connected with nearness and absence by symantic connection, which is not desired to be stated"

प्राञ्चः ।

तदसत् 'न कर्मधारयान्मत्वर्थीयो बहुव्रीहिश्चेदर्थप्रतिपत्तिकर' इत्यनुशासनविरोधात् । तत्र कर्मधारयपदस्य बहुव्रीहीतरसमासपरत्वात्, तच्च अगुणवत्त्वमिति साधर्म्यव्याख्यानावसरे गुणप्रकाशरहस्ये तद्दीधितिहरहस्ये च स्फुटम् । अव्ययीभावसमासोत्तरपदार्थेन समं तत्समासानिविष्टपदार्था-न्तरान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात् । यथा भूतलोपकुम्भं भूतलेऽघटमित्यादौ भूतलवृत्तिघटसमीपतदत्यन्ताऽभावयोरप्रतीतेः ।

of reason in that which has the absence of that which is to be established, that absence where exists that is non-existent in that which has the absence of that which is to be established. This is because of suffix in the sense of *matup*, 'the nature of it' is the non-existence (of the reason) in that which has the absence of that which is to be established the state of having the absence of the existent, in that which has the absence of that which is to be established, is the resulted meaning, according to old logicians.

This is not correct because it contradicts the rule, "if bahuvrīhi compound expresses the same meaning then the possessive suffix (*matvarthīya*) is not used after karmadhāraya compound." Here the word karmadhāraya is used in the sense of all compounds other than bahuvrīhi compound. This is clearly mentioned by author in *Guṇaparakāśa-rahasya* and in *Dīdhiti-rahasya* of it on the occasion of explanation of common properties (when) discussing the term the state of not having quality (*aguṇavatva*), because, with the meaning of the word next to *avyayibhāva* compound the connection of the meaning of the word, which is not included (as a part) in that

(५) एतेन वृत्तेरभावोऽवृत्तीत्यव्ययीभावानन्तरं साध्याभाव-
वतोऽवृत्तिः यत्रेति^८ बहुव्रीहित्यपि प्रत्युक्तं, वृत्तौ साध्याभाववतो-
ऽनन्वयापत्तेः । अव्ययीभावसमासस्याऽव्ययतया तेन समं समासान्ता-
रासम्भवाच्च । ननुपाध्यादिरूपाऽव्ययविशेषाणामेव समस्यस्यामानत्वेन

compound, is prohibited. Just as in the case 'bhutal upakum-
bham' 'bhutale gha-am' 'near the pot existing in the ground' and
the 'absolute absence of that,' both of them are not
apprehended.

(5) By this way, *vritterabhāvo avrītti* after this
avyayībhāva compound 'sādhyābhāvavato avrītiḥ yatra' this
bahuvrīhi compound⁸ also is discarded because of the non
applicability of the sementic connection of that which has the
absence of that which is to be established with existing (*vritti*),
and because the *avyayībhāva* compound is an *avyaya* therefore
there would not be connection of other compound, negative
adjuncts which are particular *avyaya* are counted as to be

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8. वृत्तेरभावोऽवृत्तिः इत्यव्ययीभावानन्तरं साध्याभाववतोऽवृत्तिर्यत्र The absence of
occurrence is non-occurrence this 'avyayībhāva' compound, where
non-occurent from that would not be semantic connection of that
which has the absence of sādhyā with occurrent. Another difficulty
also arrises here, that because of the *avyayībhāva* compound is
avyaya and with these, there would not be semantic connection of
other compound. Here *avrītti* is *avyaya*, with this there would not be
use of *tatpuruṣa* (तत्पुरुष) compound of *sādhyābhāva*. (साध्याभाव), with
avyaya only *avyayībhāva* compound only can be used, not with any
other compound. Here 'avrītti' absence of occurrence is an 'avyaya.'

परिगणितत्वात् ।

(६) वस्तुतस्तु साध्याभाववतो न वृत्तिः यत्र इति त्रिपदव्यधिकरणबहुव्रीह्युत्तरं त्वप्रत्ययः, साध्याभाववत इत्यत्र निरूपितत्वं षष्ठ्यर्थः, अन्वयश्चास्य वृत्तौ । तथा च साध्याभावाधिकरणनिरूपितवृत्त्यभाववत्त्वम् अव्यभिचरित्वमिति फलितम् । न च व्यधिकरणबहुव्रीहिः^९ सर्वत्र असाधुरिति वाच्यम्, अयं हेतुः साध्याभाववदवृत्तिरित्यादौ

compounded.

(6) Indeed ‘*sādhyābhavavato na vrittiḥ yatra iti tripadavyadhikaraṇabahuvrīhyuttaram tvapratyayaḥ*’, in ‘*sādhyābhāvavataḥ*’ the state of being described, is the meaning of relational case, it is semantically connected with *vritti* (existence). Therefore the resulted meaning is that the state of having the absence of the existence indicated by the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, is the state of not having deviation. It should not be objected that the usage of bahuvrīhi-compound is not correct in all cases because in the sentences, like ‘*ayam hetuḥ sādhyābhāvadavrittī*’ etc., the usage of vyadhikaraṇa-bahuvrīhi⁹ compound is justified here

9. Vyadhikaraṇabahuvrīhi (व्यधिकरणबहुव्रीहिः)—The bahuvrīhi compound where words which denote qualification and qualifier can’t be expressed with same case. In the sentence *sādhyābhāvadavrittī* (साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम्) there are three words “*sādhyābhāvavataḥ*” (साध्याभाववतः) ‘na’ (न) and ‘*vrittī*’ (वृत्तित्वम्) They are not expressed with same case. The qualification *sādhyābhāvavataḥ* has sixth case ending. The word ‘na’ is avyaya and word ‘*vrittī*’ has first case ending.

व्यधिकरणबहुव्रीहिं विना गत्यन्तराभावेन अत्रापि व्यधिकरणबहुव्रीहेः साधुत्वात् ।

(७) साध्याभावाधिकरणवृत्त्यभावश्च^{१०} तादृशवृत्तित्वसामान्या-

also due to lack of any other way to explain the definition.

(7) The absence of existence (of the reason) in the substratum of the absence that which is to be established¹⁰

10. साध्याभावाधिकरणवृत्त्यभावः—The absence of occurrence described by the locus of the absence of *sādhya* should be known as the absence of occurrence in general. It means the absence which has counter-positive-ness which is not determined by the characteristic which is different from the state of being occurrence (*vrittitiṣṭa*) and determined by the state of being occurrence and that occurrence which is described by the locus of the absence of *sādhya* with the reference to the inference, “the mountain has fire because it has smoke,” the absence of occurrence which is indicated by water etc. which are substratum of the absence of fire, exists in the reason smoke.

If the absence in the general *sāmānyābhāva* (सामान्याभाव) is not understood by the word absence of occurrence, there would be fault of over-extension with regards such as inference “this (mountain) has smoke because it has fire,” by the words absence of occurrence indicated by the locus water which is the locus of the absence of *sādhya* smoke, also understood and the absence of that occurrence which is described by water etc. exists in the fire which is used as a reason. Therefore there is fault of over-extension (*ativyāpti*). Similarly, by the word the absence of occurrence indicated by the

भावो बोध्यः । तेन धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यादौ धूमाभाववज्जलहृदादिवृत्यभावस्य धूमाभाववद्वृत्तित्वजलत्वोभयत्वावच्छिन्नाभावस्य च वद्भौ सत्त्वेऽपि न

should be known as the absence of such existence, in general, therefore there is no fault of too wide application in the inference 'this has smoke because of fire' though the absence of existence of reason in waterlake etc. which have the absence of that which is to be established, and the absence which is determined by the state of being both water-ness and existence indicated by that which has the absence of smoke that which is to be established, abides in the fire. And existent, indicated by that which has the absence of that which is to be established, should be mentioned by the relation which determines the state

locus of the absence of sādhyā we understand the absence as both that occurrence and waterhood, that absence of both also exists in the reason fire. Though the occurrence which is indicated by the locus hot-iron-ball is subsist in fire but waterhood does not subsist in fire. Therefore there is absence of both that occurrence and waterhood, hence there is fault of over-extension, with regards to the inference, 'it has smoke because of fire.' Therefore the absence of occurrence in general is understood by the words the absence of occurrence, so there would not be over-extension with regards to the inherence "it has smoke because of fire,' by the word absence of occurrence in general. The absence of occurrence indicated by hot-iron ball also understood, and that occurrence exists in fire, so there is not the absence of occurrence in the fire, hence there would not be over-extension.

अतिव्याप्तिः ।

साध्याऽभाववद्वृत्तिश्च हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन^{११} विवक्षणीया, तेन वह्न्यभाववति धूमावयवे जलहृदादौ च समवायेन कालिकविशेषण-तादिना च धूमस्य वृत्तावपि न क्षतिः ।

(८) साध्याभावश्च साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नसाध्यता-वच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताको बोध्यः । तेन वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ समवायादिसम्बन्धेन वह्निसामान्याभाववति संयोगसम्बन्धेन, तत्तद्वह्नि-

of being a reason, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in respect of the inference, 'this has fire because of smoke' though smoke exists in water lake etc. and the part of smoke, which have the absence of fire, by the temporal relation and inherence relation¹¹ respectively.

(8) The absence of that which is to be established should be known as having the counter-positive-ness of which is determined by that which determines the state of being that which is to be established, and as well determined by the relation which determines that which is to be established, therefore there is not the fault of too narrow application in the inference, 'this has fire because of smoke', even though smoke exists in that which has the absence of fire in general, by the relation inherence, and in that which has the absence determined by the state of being both water and fire as well by the state of being a particular fire, by the relation conjunction.

11. हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धः—The relation that determines the state of being reason is stated to be the determinant relation of state of being reason.

त्ववह्निजलोभयत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नाभाववति च पर्वतादौ संयोगेन धूमस्य वृत्तावपि न क्षतिः ।

(९) ननु तथापि गुणत्ववान् ज्ञानत्वात्, सत्तावान् जातेरित्यादौ विषयित्वाव्याप्यत्वादिसम्बन्धेन^{१२} तादृशसाध्याऽभाववति ज्ञानादौ

(9) Even though there is a fault of too narrow application in the inferences such as “this has quality-ness because it has the state of being knowledge” and ‘this has existence because of universal,’ because the state of being knowledge, exists in knowledge etc. which is the locus of the absence of quality-ness, and existence exists in the substance by the relations such as subject-ness¹², state of being non pervaded¹³ etc. where ‘jati’ exists.

Nor it should be said that the substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be established is to be mentioned by

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12. *Viṣayitva* (विषयित्व) Because the knowledge has object. That object exists in the knowledge by the relation “*viṣayita*” for example—‘This is a pot’ in this knowledge the pot subsists by the relation “*viṣayita*”.
13. अव्याप्यत्व-स्वाभाववद्भूतित्व : The occurrence in that which has the absence of that particular. The relation in the form of ‘non-pervadness’ by this relation with regard the inference. ‘it has existence because it has generic attribute.’ Here the absence of *sādhya* existence is located in the quality by this relation ‘non-pervadness’ quality is not pervaded by the absence of existence. Therefore the absence of existence subsists in the quality by this relation and in quality generic attribute exists. Therefore there is fault of too narrow application in the valid reason.

ज्ञानत्वजात्यादेर्वर्तमानत्वाद् अव्याप्तिः । न च साध्याभावाधिकरणत्वम्
अभावीयविशेषणताविशेषसम्बन्धेन विवक्षितमिति वाच्यम् । तथा
सति घटत्वात्यन्ताभाववान् घटान्योन्याभाववान् वा पटत्वादि-
त्यादौ साध्याभावस्य घटत्वादेर्विशेषणताविशेषसम्बन्धेनाधिकरणस्य
अप्रसिद्ध्याऽव्याप्तेरिति चेत् न, अत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोरत्यन्ता-
भावस्य सप्तमपदार्थस्वरूपत्वात् ।^{१४} अत्यन्ताभावान्योन्याभावयोरत्यन्ता-

the relation of particular qualifier-ness belonging to the absence. This is because there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the absolute absence of pot-ness or mutual absence of a pot because of cloth-ness.' This is because the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established which is pot-ness is not established by the relation of particular subject-ness.

It is not correct, because the absolute absence of both absolute absence and mutual absence are indicated with qualifierness belonging to the absence is in the form of the seventh category¹⁴ (absence) of entities. But if someone holds the opinion that the absolute absence of absolute absence and

14. सप्तमपदार्थस्वरूपत्वात्—Because it is in the form of seventh category some logicians say “the absence of the absence of a pot is identical with the pot. The negative of negative shows positive.” This is the idea behind this concept. But others say-because the absence has been accepted a separate category by Naiyāyika. Therefore the absence of absence is also a separate category. It is not identical with positive thing.

भावस्य प्रतियोग्यादिस्वरूपत्वनये तु साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-
साध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकसाध्याभाववृत्तिसाध्यसामान्यीय-
प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन साध्याभावाधिकरणत्वं वक्तव्यम् ।

(१०) वृत्त्यन्तं प्रतियोगिताविशेषणं, तादृशसम्बन्धश्च वह्निमान्
धूमादित्यादिभावसाध्यकस्थले विशेषणताविशेष एव, घटत्वाभाववान्
पटत्वादित्याद्यभावसाध्यकस्थले तु समवायादिरेव । समवायविषयि-
त्वादिसम्बन्धेन प्रमेयादिसाध्यके ज्ञानत्वादिहेतौ साध्यतावच्छेदक-

mutual absence is form of its counter-positive etc. The state of being substratum of the absence of that which is to be established should be known as determined by the relation which determines the counter positive-ness in general of that which is to be established, existing in the absence of that which is to be established, in general counter positive-ness of which is determined by the attribute and the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established.

(10) The part of the sentence ending with 'existing' is a qualifier of the counter-positive-ness, such a relation in the case of the inference 'this has fire because of smoke' where that which is to be established is a positive entity is a particular qualifier-ness alone, and in the inference 'this has the absence of pot-ness because of cloth-ness' where that which is to be established is a negative entity, is inherence etc.

The word 'in general', is used to avoid the fault of too narrow application in the inference where knowable etc. is

समवायादिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रमेयाद्यभावस्य कालिकादिसम्बन्धेन योऽभावः सोऽपि प्रमेयतया साध्यान्तर्गतस्तदीयप्रतियोगिताऽवच्छेदक-कालिकादिसम्बन्धेन साध्याऽभावाऽधिकरणे ज्ञानत्वादेर्वृत्तेरव्याप्तिवारणाय सामान्यपदोपादानम् ।

(११) साध्यसामान्यीयत्वञ्च यावत्साध्यनिरूपितत्वं स्वानिरूपक-साध्यकभिन्नत्वमिति यावत् । अस्यैकोक्तिमात्रपरतया गौरवस्यादोषत्वात् ,

(१२) अनुमितिकारणतावच्छेदके च भावसाध्यकस्थले

that which is to be established, by the relation inherence, subject-ness etc. and where knowledge-ness is the reason, because the absence by temporal relation, of the absence of knowable determined by the relation inherence etc. which determines the state of being that which is to be established, that also is in the form of knowable, so it is included in to that which is to be established, by the temporal relation which determines the counter-positive-ness of that, knowledge-ness exists in the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established.

(11) In general means state of being described by all those to be established. The state of being different from that which belongs to that which is to be established, which is not indicator of that (counter-positive-ness). This is the concluded meaning. Due to the excellence of being expressed only by one utterance there is no fault of cumbersome-ness.

(12) And in the inference where that which is to be established, is a positive entity the state of being the substratum

अभावीयविशेषणताविशेषेण साध्याऽभावाधिकरणत्वम् अभावसाध्य-
कस्थले च यथायथं समवायादिसम्बन्धेन साध्याभावाधिकरणत्वमुपादेय ।
साध्यभेदेन कार्यकारणभावभेदात् ।

(१३) न च तथापि घटाऽन्योन्याभाववान् पटत्वादित्य-
त्राऽन्योन्याभावसाध्यकस्थले घटत्वादिरूपे साध्याऽभावे न साध्य-
प्रतियोगित्वं, न वा समवायादिसम्बन्धस्तदवच्छेदकः तादात्म्यस्यैव

of the absence of that which is to be established is by the relation a particular qualifierness, belonging to absence, and in the inference where the negative entity is that which is to be established, there the state of being substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, should be taken by the relation inherence etc. as available, this is because the cause-effect relationship is different due to difference in that which is to be established.

(13) Even it should not be mentioned, that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference “this has the mutual absence of pot because of clothness” where the mutual absence is that which is to be established, where the absence of that which is to be established, is in the form of pot-ness, has no counter-positiveness of that which is to be established, and nor the inherence relation is determinant of that counter-positive-ness because the identity relation alone is determinant of that (counter-positive-ness). This is because the absence of the absolute absence is identical with counter-positive so the mutual absence of a pot is in the form of the absence which has counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being absolute absence of mutual

तदवच्छेदकत्वादित्यव्याप्तिस्तदवस्थेति **वाच्यम्** । अत्यन्ताभावाभावस्य प्रतियोगिरूपत्वेन घटभेदस्य घटभेदात्यन्ताभावत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताका-भावरूपतया घटभेदात्यन्ताभावरूपस्य घटभेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकी-भूतघटत्वस्यापि समवायसम्बन्धेन घटभेदप्रतियोगित्वात् ।

(१४) न चान्यत्रात्यन्ताभावाभावस्य प्रतियोगिरूपत्वेऽपि घटादिभेदात्यन्ताभावत्वावच्छिन्नाभावो न घटादिभेदस्वरूपः, किन्तु तत्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभूतघटत्वात्यन्ताभावस्वरूप एवेति सिद्धान्त इति **वाच्यम्** । यथा हि घटत्वावच्छिन्नघटवत्ताग्रहे घटात्यन्ताऽभावाग्रहात्

absence, hence pot-ness which is determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the mutual absence of pot which is in the form of absolute absence of mutual absence of pot, also is the counter-positive of the mutual absence of a pot by the relation inherence.

(14) It should not be argued that though in other cases the absence of absence is identical with counter-positive but the absence determined by the state of being absolute absence of mutual absence of the pot, is not identical with the mutual absence of the pot, but it is identical with the absolute absence of potness which is the determinant of counter-positive-ness of that, only this is the admitted theory. This is because just as when there is the knowledge of the existence of that which is determined by pot-ness, the knowledge of the absolute absence of pot does not arise and the usage of the absence of the absolute absence takes place. Therefore the absence of the absolute absence of a pot is identical with a pot, similarly when there is the knowledge of the existence of the mutual absence

घटात्यन्ताभावाभावव्यवहाराच्च घटात्यन्ताऽभावाभावो घटस्वरूपः तथा घटभेदवत्ताग्रहे घटभेदात्यन्ताभावाग्रहात् घटभेदात्यन्ताभावाभाव-व्यवहाराच्च, घटभेद एव तदत्यन्ताभावत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभाव इति तत्सिद्धान्तः न युक्तिसहः इति । विनिगमकाभावेनापि घटत्वत्वावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकात्यन्ताभाववद् घटभेदस्यापि घटभेदात्यन्ताभावाभावत्व-सिद्धेरप्रत्यूहत्वाच्च ।

(१५) अत एव तादृशसिद्धान्तो न उपाध्यायसम्मतः ।

अत एव च **अभावविरहात्मत्वं वस्तुनः प्रतियोगिते^{१५}त्याचार्याः ।**

of a pot, the knowledge of the absolute absence of the mutual absence of a pot does not arise and there is such a usage of the absence of absolute absence of the mutual absence of the pot. Therefore the mutual absence of a pot alone is identical with the absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being absolute absence of that, this theory has no proof and due to absence of clinching argument also like the absolute absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by potness-ness the mutual absence of the pot also has the state of being absence of the absolute absence of the mutual absence of pot, because it is not contradicted. Therefore such a theory is not acceptable for Upādhyāya.

(15) Therefore Ācārya says ‘*the state of being absence of absence is identical with counter-positive-ness*’. Otherwise there would be a fault of too narrow application in the mutual

15. अभावविरहात्मत्वं वस्तुनः प्रतियोगिता—The counter-positive-ness is identical with the absence of the absence of a thing.

अन्यथा घटभेदात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिनि घटभेदे तल्लक्षणाव्याप्त्यापत्तेः, अन्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकघटत्वात्यन्ताभावे तल्लक्षणस्याति-व्याप्त्यापत्तेश्च ।

(१६) न चैवं घटत्वत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकघटत्वात्यन्ता-भावस्यापि घटभेदस्वरूपत्वापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तदत्यन्ताभावत्वा-वच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकाभावस्यैव तत्स्वरूपत्वाभ्युपगमात् तद्वत्ताग्रहे तादृश-तदत्यन्ताभावाभावस्यैव व्यवहारात् । उपाध्यायैर्घटत्वत्वावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकघटत्वात्यन्ताभावस्यापि घटभेदस्वरूपत्वाऽभ्युपगमाच्च ।

(१७) न चैवं साध्यसामान्यीयप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेनैव

absence of a pot which is the counter-positive of the absolute absence the mutual absence of the pot and there would be a fault of too wide application in the absolute absence of pot-ness which is the determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the mutual absence.

(16) It should not be argued that-in this way the absence of potness which has counter-positive-ness determined by potness-ness also would be identical with the mutual absence of a pot. This is because the absence which has counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being absolute absence of that alone is accepted identical with that, because when the existence of that thing is known there is the usage of the absence of the absolute absence of such thing, and because Upādhyāya has accepted the absolute absence of potness which has the counter-positive-ness determined by potness-ness, also identical with the mutual absence of the pot.

(17) Nor it should be argued that let be said the state of

साध्याभावाधिकरणत्वं विवक्ष्यतां किं साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-
साध्याभाववृत्तित्वस्य प्रतियोगिताविशेषणत्वेनेति वाच्यम् । कालिक-
सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नात्मकत्वप्रकारक^{१६}प्रमाविशेष्यत्वाभावस्य विशेषणता-

being substratum of the absence of that which is to be established by the relation which determines the counter-positive-ness of that which is to be established in general, why the counter-positiveness should be qualified by the existence in the absence of that which is to be established, which (existence) is determined by the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established. This is because, otherwise there would be a fault of too narrow application, in the inference and where the absence of the substrata-ness of the valid knowledge which has soulness as a qualifier, determined by the temporal relation, is that which is to be established by the relation of self some-ness and soul-ness¹⁶ is

16. आत्मत्वप्रकारकेति—When the occurrence in the absence of *sādhya* determined by the relation of determinant of the state of being *sādhya* is applied with the counter-positive-ness. There would not be fault of too narrow application because the *sādhya* which is in the form of the absence of subjectness of the valid knowledge where soulness is qualifier and the counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the temporal relation. The absence of that *sādhya*, counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the selfsome relation, is the absence is *sādhya* counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the relation of the detarminant of the state of being *sādhya*. The counter-positive-ness which exists in that absence is indicated by *sādhya* in the form of the absence of objectness of valid knowledge

विशेषेण साध्यत्वे आत्मत्वादिहेतावव्याप्त्यापत्तेः । कालिकसम्बन्धा-
वच्छिन्नसाध्याभावस्य विशेषणताविशेषसम्बन्धेन योऽभावस्तस्यापि
साध्यस्वरूपतया कालिकसम्बन्धवद्विशेषणताविशेषोऽपि साध्यीयप्रति-
योगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धस्तेन सम्बन्धेनाऽऽत्मत्वप्रकारकप्रमाविशेष्यत्व-
रूपसाध्याभाववति आत्मनि हेतोरात्मत्वस्य वृत्तेः ।

(१८) प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकवत् प्रतियोग्यपि अन्योन्याभावाभावः,

the reason. This is because the absence by self-some-ness, of the
absence of that which is to be established, the counter-positive-
ness of which is determined by the temporal relation, is also
identical with that which is to be established, therefore like the
temporal relation the selfsome-ness relation also is the
determinant relation of the counter-positive-ness belonging to
that which is to be established, by this relation, in the soul
which is substratum of the absence of that which is to be
established, in the form of sustratum-ness of the valid
knowledge which has soulness as a qualifier, soul-ness exists.

(18) The absence of the mutual absence is in the form
of counter-positive also accepted like in the form of the
determinant of conter-positive-ness, therefore there is no non-
establishment of the counter-positive-ness of that which is to be

where soulness is qualifier. The counter-positive-ness is determined
by the temporal relation, by this relation in the locus of the absence
of *sādhya* which is the objectness of valid knowledge, where soulness
is qualifier(the locus) is the produced thing where soulness does not
occur.

तेन तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेन साध्यतायां^{१७} साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धा-
वच्छिन्नसाध्याभाववृत्तिसाध्यसामान्यीयप्रतियोगित्वस्य नाप्रसिद्धिः ।
इत्थञ्च अत्यन्ताभावत्वनिरूपितत्वेनापि साध्यसामान्यीयप्रतियोगिता

established, which exists in the absence of that which is to be established and determined by the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established, when some thing is made as that which is to be established by the relation identity.¹⁷ In this way, the counter-positive-ness of that which is to be established in genral should be made qualified by the state of being described by the state of being absolute absence, otherwise there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the mutual absence of pot because of pot-ness-ness' because the relation identity also is the

17. तादात्म्येन साध्यतायाम्—Where sādhyā is desired by identity relation. The form of inference-‘knowable has difference from jar by identity relation because it has individuality’. Here the counter-positive-ness which exists in the difference from jar which is *sādhyā*, the absence of *sādhyā* which is identical with the difference from the difference from jar, has no the counter-positive-ness which is indicated by *sādhyā* mainly difference from jar. So how can the difference from jar is identical with the absence of difference from difference from jar ? Therefore other says the absence of difference also identical with counter-positive like the determinant of counter-positive-ness. Therefore there is not nonestablishment of counter-positive-ness in general existing in the absence of *sādhyā*, counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the relation which controls the state of being *sādhyā*.

विशेषणीया । अन्यथा घटान्योन्याभाववान् घटत्वत्वादित्यादौ अव्या-
प्त्यापत्तेः । तादात्म्यसम्बन्धस्यापि साध्याऽभाववृत्तिसाध्यीयप्रतियोगिता-
वच्छेदकत्वात्^{१८} ।

determinant of the counter-positive-ness¹⁸ of that which is to be established which exists in the absence of that which is to be established.

18. प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वादिति—Determinant of counter-positive-ness. The absence of difference from jar is the absence of *sādhya* which is identical with jar. The counter-positive-ness which exists in the jar is indicated by the difference from jar which (difference) is the *sādhya* the determinant relation of this counter-positive-ness is identity, by this relation the locus of absence of the difference from jar which is counter-positive-ness is jar itself, there jar-ness which is reason exists, therefore there is fault of too narrow application. When the counter-positive-ness is qualified by the state of being indicated by absolute absence, there would not be fault of too narrow application because the identity is determinant relation of the counter-positive-ness of difference and identity relation is not determinant of counter-positive-ness of the absolute absence. The inherence etc. will be determinant relation of counter-positive-ness which is indicated by absolute absence and by this relation the locus of the absence of *sādhya* which is jar is jar where jar-ness does not exist, therefore there is no occurrence, hence there is no fault of too narrow application. Thus when the absence of mutual absence is accepted as identical with counter-positive, the counter-positive-ness should be qualified with state of being indicated by absolute absence. If it is accepted identical with the determinant of counter-positive-ness, there

(१९) यद्वा साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नसाध्याभाववृत्ति-साध्यसामान्यीयनिरूक्तप्रतियोगित्वतदवच्छेदकत्वान्यतरावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेनैव साध्याभावाधिकरणत्वं विवक्षणीयम् । वृत्त्यन्तमन्यतरविशेषणम् । एवञ्च घटान्योन्याभाववान् पटत्वादित्यादौ साध्याऽभावस्य घटत्वादेः साध्यीय-प्रतियोगित्वविरहेऽपि न क्षतिः, तादृशान्यतरस्य साध्यीयप्रतियोगिता-वच्छेदकत्वस्यैव तत्र सत्त्वात् ।

(19) Or it should be desired to be mentioned that the state of being substratum of the absence of that which is to be established by the relation which determined either said counter-positive-ness of that which is to be established in general, existing in the absence of that which is to be established, determined by the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established, or the state of being determinant of that counter-positive-ness. The sentence ending with 'existing' is the qualifier of 'one of two.'

In this way, there is no harm even though in the inference 'this has the mutual absence of pot because of clothness' The counter-positive-ness of that which is to be established does not exist in pot-ness which is identical the absence of that which is to be established, because one of them the state of being determinant of the counter-positive-ness of

would not be a fault of for narrow application, when the absence of difference from jar is identical with jarness, the counter-positive-ness which is indicated by the absence of the absence of jar, the determinant relation of that counter-positive-ness will be inherence relation and not identity relation.

(२०) न च तथापि कपिसंयोगी^{१९} एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्याद्यव्याप्य-
वृत्तिसाध्यकसद्भेतौ अव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । निरुक्तसाध्याऽभावत्व-
विशिष्टनिरूपिता या निरुक्तसम्बन्धसंसर्गकनिरवच्छिन्नाधिकरणता
तदाश्रयावृत्तित्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । गुणकर्मान्यत्वविशिष्टसत्त्वाऽभाववान्

that which is to be established alone exists there.

(20) Even though it should not be argued that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; ‘this has the conjunction of monkey¹⁹ because of this tree-ness’ where that which is to be established has partial existence, this is because the non-existence in that which has the substratum-ness which is not determined by any characteristic, having determined by mentioned relation and which is described by that which is qualified by the mentioned state of being the absence of that which is to be established, is desired to be said. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference “this has the absence of existence qualified by the difference from quality and action because of quality-ness,” even though the substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be

19. कपिसंयोगी (Kapi-samyogi) Having conjunction of monkey. In that tree which is locus of the absence of conjunction of monkey limited by root, there that tree-ness exists, therefore there is fault of too narrow application. When occurrence in the locus of the substratum-ness which is not determined by any characteristic is maintained, there would not be fault of too narrow application, because in this case the locus of the substratumness which is not determined by anything will be quality etc. where that treeness does not exist.

गुणत्वादित्यादौ सत्त्वात्मकसाध्याभावाधिकरणत्वस्य गुणादिवृत्तित्वेऽपि साध्याभावत्वविशिष्टनिरूपिताधिकरणत्वस्य^{२०} गुणाद्यवृत्तित्वान्नाऽव्याप्तिः ।

(२१) न चैवं कपिसंयोगाभाववान् सत्त्वाद् इत्यादौ निरवच्छिन्न-साध्याऽभावाऽधिकरणत्वाऽप्रसिद्ध्याऽव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम्, केवला-

established which (absence) is in the form of existence, exists in quality because the substratum-ness which is described by that which is qualified by the state of being absence of that which is to be established²⁰, dose not exist in quality etc.

(21) Nor it should be argued that-in this way there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference,

20. साध्याभावत्वविशिष्टनिरूपिताधिकरणत्वस्य—Here *sādhya* is in the form of state of being existence, which is qualified by the difference from quality and action, but qualified is not different from unqualified. Therefore the existence (*sattā*) which is qualified by the difference from quality and action is not different from the existence which is not qualified by difference from quality and action. So the absence *sādhya* here is the absence of absence of unqualified existence which is located in quality etc. where qualitiness exists. Therefore there is fault of too narrow application. But when the locusness is maintained as indicated by that which is qualified by state of being absence of *sādhya*, there would not be fault of too narrow application. This is because in this case of inference, quality has not such substantive-ness which is determined by the state of being absence of *sādhya* which is in the form of the existance is qualified by the difference from quality and action. This is the experience that there is no “existence” which is qualified by the difference from quality and action in quality.

नवयिनि अभावादित्यनेन ग्रन्थकृतैवास्य दोषस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् ।

(२२) न च तथापि कपिसंयोगिभिन्नं^{२१} गुणत्वादित्यादौ निरवच्छिन्नसाध्याभावाधिकरणत्वाऽप्रसिद्ध्याऽव्याप्तिः, अन्योन्याभावस्य व्याप्यवृत्ति^{२२}नियमवादिनये तस्य केवलान्वय्यनन्तर्गतत्वादिति वाच्यम् ।

‘this has the absence of the conjunction of monkey because of existence’. This is because the substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be established, which is not determined by any property is not established, because this fault is desired to be mentioned by author himself by the expression ‘there is absence of it, in pure affirmative inference’

(22) Nor it should be said-yet there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference ‘this is different form that which has the conjunction of monkey²¹ because of quality-ness’ This is because the non-determined substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be established is not established, because in the opinion of those who accept mutual absence always non-partial-existent²² it is not included into pure affirmative. This is because, though in the opinion of those who believe the mutual absence as non-partial existent the absolute absence of another type of mutual absence is identical with the

21. कपिसंयोगिभिन्नम्—Different from that which has the conjunction of monkey. Here the difference from that which has the conjunction of monkey is sādhyā. The absence of sādhyā is in the form of conjunction which is determinant of counter- positive-ness.

22. व्याप्यवृत्तित्वम्—Complete occurrence, means that occurrence which is not determined by any time and place.

अन्योन्याभावस्य व्याप्यवृत्तितानियमवादिनये अन्योन्याभावात्यन्ता-
भावस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकस्वरूपत्वेऽपि अव्याप्यवृत्तिमदन्योन्या-
भावाभावस्य व्याप्यवृत्तिस्वरूपस्याऽतिरिक्तस्याभ्युपगमात्, तच्च अग्रे
स्फुटीभविष्यति ।

(२३) ननु तथापि समवायादिना गगनादिहेतुके इदं वह्निमद्
गगनादित्यादावतिव्याप्तिः वह्न्यभाववति हेतुतावच्छेदकसमवायादि-
सम्बन्धेन गगनादेरवृत्तेः । न च तल्लक्ष्यमेव,^{२३} हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन

determinant of counter-positive-ness the absence of the mutual
absence of that which has that which is partially existent is
accepted different in the form on non-partial existent, this view
will be made clear latter on.

(23) Now here is the objection-yet there is a fault of too
wide application, in the inference; ‘it has fire because of having
ether’ where ether is a reason by the relation inherence. This is
because ether dose not exists in the substratum of the absences
of fire by the relation inherence. It should not be said that-this
is a valid reason²³ because of the absence of the existence in
the subject, there is usage of invalid reason-hood, because there
also inferential knowledge is experienced due to error of
concomitance, otherwise; “this has smoke because of fire” also

23. न च तत् लक्ष्यमेव—Nor the valid inference, having concomitance and
occurrence in subject, both are conditions of to be a valid reason and
not only one of them. Otherwise fire also exists in the mountain
which has smoke, therefore; ‘this has smoke because it has fire,’ this
also would be valid inference.

पक्षधर्मत्वाभावाच्चाऽसद्धेतुत्वव्यवहार इति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि व्याप्ति-
भ्रमेणैवानुमितेरनुभवसिद्धत्वात् । अन्यथा धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यादेरपि
लक्ष्यत्वस्य सुवचत्वात् । एवं द्रव्यं गुणकर्मान्यत्वविशिष्टसत्त्वादि-
त्यादावव्याप्तिः विशिष्टसत्त्वस्य केवलसत्त्वानतिरेकितया द्रव्यत्वा-
भाववत्यपि गुणादौ तस्य वृत्तेः, गुणे गुणकर्मान्यत्वविशिष्टसत्तेति प्रतीतेः
सर्वसिद्धत्वात् । सत्तावान् द्रव्यत्वादित्यादावव्याप्तिश्च, सत्ताभाववति
सामान्यादौ हेतुतावच्छेदकसमवायसम्बन्धेन वृत्तेरप्रसिद्धेरिति चेत् न ।

(२४) हेतुतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नहेत्वधिकरणता-प्रतियोगिक-
हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाऽऽधेयतानिरूपित-विशेषणताविशेष-

would be a valid reason.

In this way there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this is a substance because of the existence qualified by difference from quality and action,' this is because the qualified existence is not different from pure existence, it exists in quality which has the absence of substance-hood because the notion 'there is the qualified existence in quality' is well known by all. And there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has existence because of substance-ness' because the occupancy in universal which has the absence of the existence is not established, by the relation inherence which determined the state of being a reason.

(24) This is not correct, because the general absence of existence in that which has substratum-ness not determined by any attribute and determined by said relation, which described

सम्बन्धेन निरुक्तसाध्याभावत्वविशिष्टनिरूपित-निरुक्तसम्बन्धसंसर्गक-
निरवच्छिन्नाऽधिकरणताऽऽश्रयवृत्तित्वसामान्याभावस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ।^{२४}

by that which qualified by state of being said absence of that which is to be established by the relation one kind of self-someness described by occupancy (*ādheyatā*) determined by the relation which determines the state of being the reason and which (occupancy) is described by the substratumness of the reason determined by that which determines the state of being a reason is desired to be mentioned by the definition of *vyāpti*.²⁴

24. सामान्याभावस्य विवक्षितत्वात्—Because absence in general is desired to say. Here the occurrence which is determined by the relation which determines the state of being reason, and which (occurrence) is indicated by substratumness of reason and which is determined by the determinant feature which determines reasonness and the counter-positive-ness determined by the relation selfsomeness which has that occurrence as its adjunct and which (counter-positive-ness) exists in the occurrence which is indicated by the locus of the locusness which is not determined by any attribute and indicated by indicatoriness which is determined by the relation which is determinant of counter-positive-ness belonging to *sādhya* in general, counter-positive-ness which exists in the absence of *sādhya*, and determined by the relation of that which determines the state of being *sādhya*, and the state of having such a counter-positive-ness is the difference of *vyāpti* just as by relation of conjunction which has jar as its adjunct, the jar exists on the ground, not clothness, therefore by this relation the absence of clothness is “*kevalānvayi*” (everywhere). Similarly the occurrence existing in namebility which (occurrence) is determined by selfsome

(२५) वृत्तित्वञ्च न हेतुतावच्छेदसम्बन्धेन विवक्षणीयम् । अस्ति च सत्तावान् द्रव्यत्वादित्यादौ सत्ताभावाधिकरणताश्रयवृत्तित्वस्य हेतुतावच्छेदकसमवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाधेयतानिरूपितविशेषणताविशेषसम्बन्धेन सामान्याभावो द्रव्यत्वादौ, समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाधेयतानिरूपित-

(25) The occupancy should not be desired to be mentioned by the relation which determines the state of being the reason. And there is general absence of occupancy and indicated by that which has the substratum-ness of the absence of existence by the relation which is a kind of selfsome-ness relation described by the occupancy determined by inherence relation which determines the state of being the reason, in substance-ness. This is because the absence of existence which (absence) has the counter-positive-ness determined by a kind of self-someness relation, described by the occupancy determined by the relation inherence, is the absence which has counter-

relation and which is locus of the absence of existence by the selfsome relation, adjunct of which is occurrence which is in subjectness which is determined by the relation of determinant of state of being reason and which (occurrence) is indicated by the locusness, which is indicated by indicator-ness, existing in substantiveness determined by substantiveness-ness. That occurrence does not exist anywhere by the mentioned relation, therefore the absence of that occurrence exists in the substance also, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application with regard the valid reason, "substantiveness, belongs to the inference, it has generic attribute existence because it has substantiveness."

विशेषणताविशेषसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकसत्ताभावाधिकरणत्वाश्रय-
वृत्तित्वाभावस्य व्यधिकरणसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभावतया
संयोगसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नगुणाभावादेरिव केवलान्वयित्वात् ।

द्रव्यं सत्त्वादित्यादौ च द्रव्यत्वाभावाधिकरणगुणादिवृत्तित्वस्यैव
समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाधेयतानिरूपितविशेषणतासम्बन्धेन सत्तायां
सत्त्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः । द्रव्यं विशिष्टसत्त्वादित्यादावव्याप्तिवारणाय प्रतियोगि-
कान्तमाधेयताविशेषणम्^{२५} ।

positive-ness determined by non-co-existent relation, is pure
affirmative status is just as the absence of quality determined
by conjunction.

And in the inference ‘this has substance-ness because of
existence’, the occupancy described by the quality which is the
substratum of the absence of substance-ness, exists in existence
by the relation qualifier-ness described by occupancy
(*ādheyatā*) determined by the relation inherence. Therefore
there is no fault of too wide application. To avoid the fault of
too narrow application in the inference; ‘this has substance-
ness because of qualified existence’ ending with ‘having
counterpositive’ is the qualifier of the occupancy. (*ādheyatā*)²⁵

25. प्रतियोगिकान्तमाधेयताविशेषणम्—If the qualification having locusness of
reason which is determined by the determinant of the reason- hood,
is not used, then there would be fault of too wide application with
the invalid reason belonging to; “this has substanceness because it
has qualified generic attribute existence.” The locusness of the
absence of substanceness by the relation selfsomeness, adjunct of

(२५) वस्तुतस्तु एतल्लक्षणकर्तृमते विशिष्टसत्त्वं विशिष्टनिरूपिता-
धारतासम्बन्धेनैव द्रव्यत्वव्याप्यं, न तु समवायसम्बन्धेन,^{२६} तथा च

(25) In fact, in the opinion of the maker of this definition, the qualified existence is pervaded by substance-ness by the relation the state of being substratum described by qualified thing only and not by inherence relation.²⁶ Therefore

which is the occurrence in existence, exists in quality etc. The occurrence which existing in the existence, indicated by quality etc. that occurrence exists in qualified existence also, because qualified thing is not different from unqualified thing. When the expression “having locusness of the reason determined by the determinant of reason-ness adjunct of which is that selfsome relation” is used, there would not be fault of too narrow application in the inference; “it has substantiveness because it has qualified existence.” This is because the locusness which exists in substance which is indicated by indicator-ness which exists in the reason qualified existence indicates occurrence, which is determined by the relation of inherence and which (occurrence) exists in qualified existence by the relation selfsomeness adjunct of which is that(occurrence), the locusness of the absence of substantiveness which exists in quality etc. the substratum of that locusness is quality etc. indicated by it, is the occurrence in the existence. That does not exist any where, therefore absence of that occurrence exists in the qualified existence. This is the idea.

26. न तु समवायादिसम्बन्धेन—Not by the relation inherence etc. here the determinant relation of *hetutā*(reason-hood) is the locus-ness indicated by qualified existence. The occurrence by this relation occurrence which exists in qualified existence by its relation the

प्रतियोगकान्तमाधेयताविशेषणमनुपादेयमेव । तदुपादाने हेतुतावच्छेदक-
भेदेन कार्यकारणभावभेदापत्तेः । हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन सम्बन्धित्वे
सति^{२७} इत्यनेनापि विशेषणाद् वह्निमान् गगनादित्यादौ नातिव्याप्तिः ।

(२६) ननु तथापि उभयत्वमुभयत्रैव पर्याप्तं न तु एकत्रेति
सिद्धान्तादरे घटत्ववान् घटत्वतदभाववदुभयत्वादित्यादौ पर्याप्त्याख्य-

the qualifier of occupancy (*ādheyatā*) ending with 'having counter-positive' should not be used indeed. If it is used there would be different cause-effect relationships due to different determinants of the state of being reason. The qualification 'state of being relatum by the relation which determines the state of being reason'²⁷ also should be used, therefore there is no fault of too wide application in the inference; 'this has fire because of ether'.

(26) Even though here the objection is-if this doctrine that 'both-ness occupies both things simultaneously and not one thing' is accepted, there is the fault of too wide application in the inference; 'this has pot-ness because of both-ness of those which have pot-ness and the absence of it' when the reason is taken by the relation *pariāpti*, because the reason dose not

locus of the absence of substance-ness is quality etc. and which is determined by the inherence relation does not exists any where therefore the absence of occurrence exists in qualified existence also. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

27. सम्बन्धित्वे सतीत्यनेन—Being relative the reason ether, is not related with anything by the relation of inherence which is determinant relation of state of being reason.

सम्बन्धेन हेतुत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिः, घटत्वाभाववति हेतुतावच्छेदकपर्याप्त्याख्य-
सम्बन्धेन हेतोरवृत्तेः, घटो न घटपटोभयमितिवद् घटत्वाभाववान् न
घटत्वतदभाववदुभयमित्यपि प्रतीतेरिति चेत् न,

तादृशसिद्धान्तादरे हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन साध्यसमानाधि-
करणत्वे सतीत्यनेनैव विशेषणीयत्वादिति । अत एव उक्तं 'निविशतां वा
वृत्तिमत्त्वं साध्यसमानाधिकरणत्वं वेति' केवलान्वयिग्रन्थे दीधितिकृतः ।
तद्विशेषणात् वह्निमद् गगनाद् इत्यादौ न अतिव्याप्तिः ।

(२७) केचित्तु^{२८} निरुक्तसाध्याभावत्वविशिष्टनिरूपिता या

exist in that which has the absence of pot-ness by the relation
paryāpti which determines the state of being reason. This is
because there is the notion also that 'which has the absence of
pot-ness is not both which have pot-ness and its absence' just
as 'pot is not both pot and cloth'.

This is not correct because if this doctrine is accepted
'having state of being co-existent with that which is to be
established' should be added as qualifier. Therefore the author
of *Dīdhiti* says 'let include state of having existence in the
reason or state of being co-existent with that which is to be
established' in the '*kevalānvayi grantha*.' When this qualification
is used there is no fault of too wide application in the inference
such as; 'this has fire because of ether.'

(27) Some logicians²⁸ say, the definition of *vyāpti* is

28. केचित्तु—This definition is made according to the opinion of those who
accept absence of mutual absence or absolute absence is different
from counter-positive, or determinant of counter-positive-ness.

विशेषणताविशेषसम्बन्धेन यथोक्तसम्बन्धेन वा निरवच्छिन्नाधिकरणता तदाश्रयव्यक्त्यवर्तमानं हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नद्धर्मावच्छिन्नाधिकरणत्वसामान्यं तद्धर्मवत्त्वं विवक्षितम् । धूमवान् वह्नेरित्यादौ पर्वतादिनिष्ठवहन्यधिकरणताव्यक्तेर्धूमाभावाधिकरणावृत्तित्वेऽपि अयोगोलकनिष्ठवहन्यधिकरणताव्यक्तेरतथात्वान्नातिव्याप्तिरित्याहुः ।

(२८) अन्ये तु हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्ने हेतुतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नस्वाधिकरणताश्रयवृत्तिं यन्निरवच्छिन्नाधिकरणत्वं तदवृत्तिनिरुक्त-

desired to be mentioned the state of having the attribute which is substratum-hood in general determined by a particular attribute and determined by the relation which determines the state of being a reason, which (substratum-hood) exists in that individual thing which has the substratum-hood not determined by any feature, described by that which is qualified by early mentioned. The state of being absence of that which is to be established by the relation attributive-ness or relation as the mentioned.

There is no fault of too wide application in the inference; 'it has smoke because of fire' etc. because though the substratum-ness of fire abiding in the mountain, does not exist in the substratum of absence of smoke; the substratum-ness of fire abiding in the hot ironball is not like that (exists in the substratum of absence of smoke) this is said.

(28) Others say that the state of being substratum-hood determined by early mentioned relation and described by that which is qualified by early mentioned state of being absence of

साध्याभावत्वविशिष्टनिरूपितयथोक्तसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाधिकरणतात्मकत्व-
मिति विशेषणविशेष्यभावव्यत्यासे तात्पर्यम्^{२९}, स्वपदं हेतुपरम् । इत्थञ्च

that which is to be established and which does not exist in that substratum-hood of that which is not determined by any attribute, and which exists in the locus of substratum-hood of itself which is determined by that which determines the state of being reason and determined by the relation which determines the state of being reason. This is intention²⁹ by the change of qualifier and qualified relationship. The term 'self' denotes reason. In this way there is no fault of too narrow application even in the inferences; 'this has the absence of the conjunction with monkey because of existence', 'this is different from that

29. तात्पर्यम्—Intention. "The locusness of reason which is determined by determinant of reason-hood, and which is determined by the relation of determinant of reasonhood, existing in the locus of such locusness of the reason, the locus-ness which is not determined by any attribute, non-existing in that locus-ness which exists in the locus which is indicated by the state of being indication, and which is determined by the relation which determines the counter-positive-ness of the sādhyā in general, and which counter-positive-ness exists in the absence of sādhyā and which (counter-positiveness) is determined by the state of being absence of sādhyā, counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the determinant of state of being of sādhyā and which is determined by the relation which determines the state of being sādhyā, to be belonging of reason of that locusnessness" is the definition of vyāpti according to some authors.

कपिसंयोगाभाववान् सत्त्वात्, कपिसंयोगिभिन्नं गुणत्वादित्यादावपि
नाव्याप्तिरित्याहुरिति सङ्क्षेपः ।



which has conjunction with monkey' because of state of
quality. etc. This is the brief discussion.



द्वितीयं लक्षणम्

(२९) लक्षणान्तरमाह-

साध्यवद्भिन्नेति । साध्यवद्भिन्नो यः साध्याभाववान् तदवृत्तित्व-
मित्यर्थः । कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्याद्यव्याप्यवृत्तिसाध्यकाव्याप्ति-
वारणाय साध्यवद्भिन्नेति साध्याभाववतो विशेषणमिति प्राञ्चः, तदसत्,
'साध्याभाववद्' इत्यस्य व्यर्थतापत्तेः, साध्यवद्भिन्नावृत्तित्वम् इत्यस्यैव
सम्यक्त्वात् ।

The second definition of *Vyāpti*

(29) The author states the second definition of *vyāpti* by the expression "that which is different from that which has that which is to be established". The meaning is the non-existence of reason in that which possesses the absence of that which is to be established and which is different from that which has that which is to be established. According to old logicians the expression 'that which is different from that which has that which is to be established' is the qualifier of the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established is used to avoid the too narrow application, in the inference; 'this has the conjunction of a monkey of this treeness because this is the inference' in which that which is to be established has partial existence. This is the opinion of old logicians. It is not correct because in this case the expression 'the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established' will be useless, because the non-existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established only would be the correct definition.

(३०) नव्यास्तु साध्यवद्भिन्ने साध्याभावः साध्यवद्भिन्न-साध्याभावः तद्वद्वृत्तित्वमिति सप्तमीतत्पुरुषोत्तरं मतुप्प्रत्ययः । तथा च साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तिर्यः साध्याभावस्तद्वद्वृत्तित्वमित्यर्थः । एवञ्च साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तीत्यनुक्तौ संयोगी द्रव्यत्वादित्यादावव्याप्तिः । संयोगाभाववति द्रव्ये द्रव्यत्वस्य वृत्तेः, तदुपादाने च संयोगवद्भिन्नवृत्तिः संयोगाभावो गुणादिवृत्तिः संयोगाभाव एव, अधिकरणभेदेन अभावभेदात् तद्वद्वृत्तित्वान्नाव्याप्तिः ।

(30) New logicians say-the absence of that which is to be established in that which is different from that which has that which to be established is meant by the absence of that which is to be established, is in that which is other than that which has sādhyā and non existence in that. This is suffix *mātuṣ* after the compound seventh case *tatpuruṣa*. Therefore 'the non-existence in that which has the absence of that which is to be established which (absence) exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established' is the meaning. In this way if the 'existent in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established', is not said there will be the fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has conjunction because this has substantiveness.' This is because substance-ness exists in the substance which has the absence of that which is to be established that is conjunction when that is said the absence of the conjunction which exists in quality is the absence of conjunction which exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, because absence is different due to difference in the substratum and because it does not exists in that, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

(३१) न च तथापि साध्यवद्भिन्नावृत्तित्वमित्येवास्तु लक्षणं किं साध्याभाववदित्यनेन इति वाच्यम् । यथोक्तलक्षणे तस्य अप्रवेशेन वैयर्थ्याभावात् तस्यापि लक्षणान्तरत्वात् ।

न च तथापि साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तिर्यस्तद्वदवृत्तित्वमेवास्तु किं साध्याभावपदेन इति वाच्यम् । तादृशद्रव्यत्वादिमद्वृत्तित्वात् असम्भवापत्तेः । साध्याभावेत्यत्र साध्यपदमप्यत एव, द्रव्यत्वादेशि द्रव्यत्वाभावाभावत्वात् भावरूपाभावस्य च अधिकरणभेदेन भेदाभावात् ।

(31) Nor it can be said-let there be the non- existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established as the definition, what is the need of the expression 'that which has the absence of that which is to be established' ? This is because even there is no useless-ness of that expression due to non-inclusion of it in the said definition because that is also a different definition.

Nor it should be said-let be the non-existence in that which has that which exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, what is the need of the expression 'absence of that which is to be established' ?

Because there will be a fault of impossibility, because it exists in that which has such substance-ness. In the expression 'the absence of sādhyā that which is to be established', the word that which is to be established, is for the same reason only sādhyā the substance-ness, also is the absence of the absence of substance-ness because the absence which has the positive form is not different due to the difference in the substratum.

(३२) ननु तथापि घटाकाशसंयोगघटत्वान्यतराभाववान् गगन-
त्वादित्यादौ घटानधिकरणदेशावच्छेदेन घटाकाशसंयोगाभावस्य गगने
सत्त्वात् सद्धेतुतया अव्याप्तिः, साध्यवद्भिन्ने घटे वर्तमानस्य साध्याभावस्य
घटाकाशसंयोगरूपस्य गगनेऽपि सत्त्वात्, तत्र च हेतोर्वृत्तेः । न च
साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तित्वविशिष्टसाध्याभाववत्त्वं विवक्षितमिति^{३०} वाच्यम् ।
साध्याभावपदवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः । साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तित्वविशिष्टवदवृत्तित्वस्यैव

(32) This is the objection that—in the inference; “this thing has the absence of one of them the conjunction of a jar with ether and jar-ness because this has ether-hood” which is a valid reason, there is fault of too narrow application, because the absence of the conjunction of jar and ether exists in ether, by the place where there is no a jar, in the jar which is different from that which has that which is to be established, and which has absence of that which is to be established, in the form of the conjunction of jar and ether, exists in ether also and there reason exists.

Nor it should be said ³⁰the state of having the absence of that which is to be established qualified by the existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, because the word the absences of that which is to

30. विवक्षितम्—Desired to be said—just as the locus-ness indicated by the state of being indicator determined by qualified existence-ness, exists only in substance not in quality etc., similarly the absence of sādhyā in the form of the conjunction of ether with jar also exists only in jar and not in ether, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

सम्यक्त्वादिति चेत्, न । अभावाभावस्यातिरिक्तत्वमतेनैतल्लक्षणकरणात् । तथा च अधिकरणभेदेन अभावभेदात् साध्यवद्भिन्ने घटे वर्तमानस्य साध्याभावस्य प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणस्य प्रतियोगिमति गगनेऽसत्त्वाद-
व्याप्तेरभावात् ।

(३३) न चैवं साध्याभावेत्यत्र साध्यपदवैयर्थ्यम् अभावाभाव-
स्यातिरिक्तत्वेन द्रव्यत्वादेरभावत्वाभावात् साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तिघटाभावादेस्तु

be established would be useless. If it is said that the absence existence in that which has that qualified by existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established would be correct. This is not admitted because this definition is made by the opinion that the absence of absence is different from positive entity. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application because the absence of that which is to be established exists, in the jar which is different from that which has that which is to be established and which (absence) does not exist in that where counter-positive of it exists and that absence abides in ether which has counter-positive, due to difference in absence by substratum.

(33) It should not be argued that-in this way the word 'that which is to be established', will be useless in the expression 'the absence of that which is to be established' because the absence of absence is different from positive entity hence the substance-ness is not an absence, the absence of a jar which exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established does not exist in the substratum of the

हेतुमति असत्त्वात्^{३१} अधिकरणभेदेन अभावभेदादिति वाच्यम् । यत्र प्रतियोगिसमानाधिकरणत्वप्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणत्वलक्षणविरुद्धधर्माध्यासः^{३२} तत्रैव अधिकरणभेदेन अभावभेदाभ्युपगमो न तु सर्वत्र, तथा च साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तिघटाभावादेहेतुमत्यपि सत्त्वाद् असम्भववारणाय^{३३}

reason³¹ because of the difference in the absence due to difference in the locus of it. This is because where the oppositive attributes as “the state of being co-existent with its counter-positive and state of being non-co-existent with its counter-positive³², abide there only absences are accepted different due the differene in the is substratum, not in all cases. Therefore to avoid the fault of impossibility³³ because of the absence of a jar

31. हेतुमत्यसत्त्वादिति—Because it does not exist in the locus of the reason. The absence of absences which exists in water, the locus of that absence is the water etc. and not mountain etc. If absence is not different from other absence on basis of the difference of locus then the locus of the absence of fireness which exists in lake etc., like it the mountain also will be its locus, because the absence of fireness exists in the mountain. The smoke exists in the mountain. Therefore there would be fault of too narrow application. When the absence is accepted different from other absence due to difference in there locuses then the absence of jarness existing in lake etc., the substratum of it is the absence of smoke. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.
32. विरुद्धधर्माध्यास—Knowledge of opposite attributes. The absence of the conjunction of monkey which has incomplete occurrence is accepted different on the basis of the different locus of absences.
33. असम्भववारणाय—To avoid the fault of impossibility, if leaving the word

साध्यपदोपादानात् ।

(३४) यद्वा घटाकाशसंयोग-घटत्वान्यतराभावाभावोऽतिरिक्त एव, घटाकाशसंयोगादीनामननुगततया तथात्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । घटत्वद्रव्यत्वाद्यभावाभावस्तु नातिरिक्तः, घटत्वद्रव्यत्वादीनामप्यनु-

etc. which exist in that which is different from that which has 'that which is to be established abides in the substratum of the reason, the term 'that which is to be established' is included.

(34) Or the absence of an absence of one of the jar-ness and the conjunction of ether and jar is different from positive entity because the conjunction of jar and ether etc. has no consecutive attributives as positive entity. Therefore this can not be said, the absence of absence of jar-ness and substantiveness etc. are consecutive attributives. Therefore to

'sādhya' only the word absence is used, there would be the fault of too narrow application, because the absence which exists in lake etc., which is locus of the absence of sādhya fire is the absence of absence of substance-ness which has identity with substantiveness, the locus of this absence is mountain where smoke exists, therefore there is not the absence is of that occurrence, there is the fault of too narrow application, when the word 'sādhya' is being used in the definition, there would not be the possibility of the fault of impossibility. The absence of sādhya which exists in water, is the absence of fire, the locus of it is water etc., the occurrence which indicated by water does not exists in smoke therefore there is no chance of fault of impossibility.

गतत्वात् । तथा च द्रव्यत्वादिकमादायासम्भववारणायैव साध्यपदमिति प्राहुर्गित्यास्तां विस्तरः ।



avoid fault of impossibility by taking substance-ness etc. the expression ‘that which is to be established’ is used it is said by some logicians. Let finish details.



तृतीयं लक्षणम्

(३५) साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावेति । हेतौ साध्य-
वत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावाधिकरणवृत्तित्वाभाव इत्यर्थः । अन्योन्याभावश्च
प्रतियोग्यवृत्तित्वेन विशेषणीयः, तेन साध्यवतो व्यासज्यवृत्ति-
धर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकान्योन्याभाववति हेतोर्वृत्तावपि न असम्भवः ।

(३६) ननु एवमपि नानाधिकरणकसाध्यके वह्निमान् धूमादि-
त्यादौ साध्याधिकरणीभूततत्तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकान्योन्या-

The Third definition of Vyāpti

(35) Non-coexistence of the mutual absence which has its counter-positive that which has that which is to be established in the reason. The absence of existence described by the substratum of the mutual absence of that which has that which is to be established, is its counter-positive, this is the meaning. The mutual absence should be qualified by non-existing in the counter-positive. Therefore, there is no fault of impossibility even though the reason exists in the substratum of mutual absence of that which has that which is to be established determined by the characteristic which exists simultaneously more than one thing.

(36) There is an objection in this way also. There is a fault of too narrow application in the inference, 'this has fire because this has smoke' where that which is to be established belongs to many substrata. This is because in the substratum of the mutual absence which has counter-positive-ness

भाववति हेतोर्वृत्तेरव्याप्तिर्दुर्वारा इति । प्रतियोग्यवृत्तित्वमपहाय साध्यवत्त्वाच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकान्योन्याभावविवक्षणे तु पञ्चमेन सह पौनरुक्त्यमिति चेत्, न, वक्ष्यमाणकेवलान्वय्यव्याप्तिवदस्य अपि अत्र दोषत्वात् ।

(३७) न च तथापि साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावमात्रस्यैव एतल्लक्षणघटकत्वे वक्ष्यमाणकेवलान्वय्यव्याप्तिः अत्रासङ्गता, केवलान्वयिसाध्यकेऽपि साध्याधिकरणीभूततत्तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता-

determined by the state of being particular individual which is a substratum of that which is to be established, there the reason exists. If to avoid that fault instead of non-existence in the counter-positive, the mutual absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established is used, there will be repetition in the respect of fifth definition. This is not correct, because like too narrow application in the pure positive inference which will be said later on, here this fault also happens.

(37) Nor yet it can be argued that-if the mutual absence which has that a which has that which is to be established, this is only a part of the definition, the fault of too narrow application in the pure positive inference which is to be shown later on would be in-consistent in this case, because the mutual absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being particular individual substratum of that which is to be established, is established, in the inference where that which is to be established is pure affirmative. This is because

कान्योन्याभावस्य प्रसिद्धत्वादिति वाच्यम् । तत्रापि तादृशान्योन्याभावस्य प्रसिद्धत्वेऽपि तद्वति हेतोर्वृत्तेरेव अव्याप्तेर्दुर्वात्त्वात् ।

(३८) यद्वा साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावपदेन साध्यवत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकान्योन्याभाव एव विवक्षितः । न चैवं पञ्चमाभेदः, तत्र साध्यवत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभाववत्त्वेन प्रवेशः, अत्र तु तादृशान्योन्याभावाधिकरणत्वेन इत्यधिकरणत्वप्रवेशाप्रवेशाभ्यामेव भेदात् । अखण्डाभावघटकतया^{३४} च नाधिकरणत्वांशस्य वैयर्थ्यमिति न

there also, even though such mutual absence is established, there the fault of too narrow application is not avoidable, because the reason exists in the substratum of that.

(38) Or that by the expression ‘mutual absence which has the counter-positive-ness which abides in that which has that which is to be established,’ the mutual absence that which has the counter- positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established, is to be said. In this way there is no identity with fifth (definition) since a mutual absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established is not included there, here (it is included) as a being a substratum of a such mutual absence. In this way there is difference from fifth definition, due to inclusion and non inclusion of state of being substratum, there is no uselessness of the part of substratum-ness, because it is a constituent part of one individual (akhand) absence³⁴, therefore there is no fault.

34. अखण्डाभाव—There are so many definitions of *vyāpti*, one of them is

कोऽपि दोष इति दिक् ।



This is a direction.



inclusive of locusness. This is the idea, here in the definition non-occurrence in that which is different from that which is the locus of the absence of sādhyā, the state of being determinant existing in the mutual absence, is indicated by the state of being determinant existing in the locus. But in this third definition that state of being determinant existing in mutual absence, is indicated by the state of being determinant, existing in occurrence. This is difference between them.

चतुर्थ लक्षणम्

(३९) सकलेति । साकल्यं साध्याभाववतो विशेषणं, तथा च यावन्ति साध्याभावाधिकरणानि तन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वं हेतोः व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः । धूमाद्यभाववज्जलहृदादिनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वाद्बह्व्यादावतिव्याप्तिरिति यावदिति साध्याभाववतो विशेषणम्, साध्याभावविशेषणत्वे तत्तद्बह्व्यादवृत्तित्वादिरूपेण यो बह्व्याद्यभावस्तस्यापि सकलसाध्याभावत्वेन प्रवेशात् तावदधिकरणाप्रसिद्ध्या असम्भवापत्तेः ।

The fourth definition of *Vyāpti*:

(39) All, (the expression all), is a qualification of the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established, the counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in that which are substrata of the absence of that which is to be established, in the reason is the *vyāpti*. This is the meaning. Because there is fault of too narrow application in the fire which is a counter-positive of the absence which abides in waterlake etc. which is the substratum of the absence of smoke etc. all is stated to be a qualification of that which has that which is to be established. If it would be a qualification of the absence of that which is to be established there will be a fault of impossibility. This is because the absence of fire qualifies by non-existence in lake etc. that (absence) also is included in all absences of that which is to be established, therefore one substratum of them are not established.

(४०) न च द्रव्यं सत्त्वादित्यादौ द्रव्यत्वाभाववति गुणादौ सत्त्वादेर्विशिष्टाभावादिसत्त्वादतिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तादृशाभावप्रति-योगितावच्छेदकहेतुतावच्छेदकवत्त्वस्येह विवक्षितत्वात् ।

(४१) प्रतियोगिता च हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना ग्राह्या, तेन द्रव्यत्वाभाववति गुणादौ सत्तादेः संयोगादिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाभावसत्त्वेऽपि

(40) Nor it should be argued that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference 'it is a substance because it has existence, because of there is absence of qualified existence³⁵ in the quality etc. which has the absence of substance-ness, because here, 'state of having the determinant of the state of being reason the determinant of the counter-positive-ness of such an absence, is to be said.

(41) The counter-positive-ness should be taken as determined by the relation of the determinant of the state of

35. सत्त्वादेर्विशिष्टाभावात्—The quality which is locus of absence of the substanceness is the locus of existence, being non-substratum of qualified existence. If the counter-positive-ness of the absence of qualified existence exists in that counter-positive-ness exists in existence also, therefore there is fault of too narrow application when to avoide this fault state of having determinant of state of being reason is maintioned as determinant of counter-positive-ness of such absence. The state of being qualified existence though it is determinant of the counter-positive-ness of that absence the state of being unqualified existence which is determinant of state of being reason is not determinant of the counter-positive-ness of such absence, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

नातिव्याप्तिः ।

(४२) साध्याभावश्च साध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न-साध्यतावच्छेदक-सम्बन्धावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताको ग्राह्यः, अन्यथा पर्वतादावपि वह्न्यादेर्विशिष्टाभावादिसत्त्वेन समवायादिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नवह्न्यादिसामान्याभाव-सत्त्वेन च यावदन्तर्गततया तन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वाभावात् धूमस्य असम्भवः स्यात् ।

(४३) न च कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वात् इत्यादौ एतद्वृक्षस्यापि तादृशसाध्याभाववत्त्वेन यावदन्तर्गततया तन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वाभावादेत-

being the reason. Therefore there is no the fault of too wide application, even the absence of existence, which has a counter-positive-ness determined by the relation conjunction, exists in quality etc. where the absence of substance-ness exists.

(42) And the absence of that which is to be established, should be understood as having a counter-positive-ness determined by the relation of the determinant of the state of that which is to be established, and determined by the determinant of the state of being that which is to be established, otherwise there would be a fault of impossibility, because smoke has not the counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in the mountain etc., which is included in all where the absence of a qualified fire and the absence of fire in general determined by the relation of inherence exist.

(43) Nor, it should be said that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the conjunction of monkey because of 'this tree-ness' this tree-ness also exists in

दृक्षत्वस्याव्याप्तिरिति **वाच्यम्** । किञ्चिदनवच्छिन्नायाः साध्याभावाधि-
करणताया इह विवक्षितत्वात् । इत्थञ्च किञ्चिदनवच्छिन्नायाः कपि-
संयोगाभावाधिकरणताया गुणादावेव^{३६} सत्त्वात्तत्र च हेतोरप्यभाव-

that which has such absence of that which is to be established, which (tree) is included in all, because the absence of counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in that, because the substratum-hood of the absence of that which is to be established, is desired to be said, as not determined by any thing. In this way the substratumhood of the absence of the conjunction of monkey which is not determined by any thing, exists in quality³⁶ etc., and where is the absence of the reason

36. गुणादावेव—In quality etc. only. Those who do not accept difference between absences due to differences in substratum, in the opinion of them, the absence of conjunction of monkey which exists in the tree and the absences of conjunction of monkey which exists in quality, both are same. If the absence of the conjunction of monkey in the tree is determined by root, the absence of monkey in quality also would be determined by something. If it is not determined by anything in quality, it is not determined by anything in the tree also, because both are same. Here complete occurrence and non-complete occurrence both should be accepted as non-complete occurrence and which has non-complete occurrence can't be co-existent. Just as the conjunction and absence of conjunction both are co-existent in the tree in different parts, similarly the absence of conjunction which exists in quality has complete occurrence when the absence of conjunction in the tree has incomplete occurrence. Therefore in the opinion of those who accept identity in absences, the locusness of the

सत्त्वान्नाव्याप्तिः ।

(४४) न च कपिसंयोगाभाववान् सत्त्वादित्यादौ साध्याभावस्य कपिसंयोगादेर्निरवच्छिन्नाधिकरणत्वाप्रसिद्ध्या अव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । केवलान्वयिनि अभावादित्यनेन ग्रन्थकृतैव एतद्दोषस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् ।

(४५) न च पृथिवी कपिसंयोगादित्यादौ पृथिवीत्वाभाववति जलादौ यावत्येव कपिसंयोगाभावसत्त्वादितिव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तन्निष्ठपदेन तत्र निरवच्छिन्नवृत्तिमत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । इत्थञ्च

also. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

(44) It should not be said that-there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; “this has the absence of the conjunction of monkey because this has existence” due to non establishment of the state of being a substratum of the conjunction of monkey as not determined by anything. This is because this fault would be mentioned by author himself by the expression, “Absence in the pure affirmative inference.”

(45) Nor it should be said that-there is a fault of too wide application in the inference; “it is earth because it has the conjunction of monkey.” This is because the absence of the conjunction of monkey exists in all water etc., which are substrata of the absence of earth-hood, because of by the expression “existing in that” the existence which is not determined by any thing is to be said. In this way, the absence of the conjunction of monkey is not the absence which has existence not determined by anything in the

absence of the conjunction which exists in quality has incomplete occurrence.

पृथिवीत्वाभावाधिकरणे जलादौ यावदन्तर्गते निरवच्छिन्नवृत्तिमानभावो न कपिसंयोगाभावः किन्तु घटत्वाद्यभाव एव तत्प्रतियोगित्वस्य हेताव-
सत्त्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः ।^{३७}

(४६) न चैवमन्योन्याभावस्य व्याप्यवृत्तितानियमनये द्रव्यत्वा-
भाववान् संयोगवद्भिन्नत्वादित्यादेरपि सद्हेतुततया तत्राव्याप्तिः संयोग-
वद्भिन्नत्वाभावस्य संयोगरूपस्य निरवच्छिन्नवृत्तेरप्रसिद्धेरिति वाच्यम् ।
अन्योन्याभावस्य व्याप्यवृत्तितानियमनयेऽन्योन्याभावस्य अभावो न
प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकस्वरूपः, किन्त्वतिरिक्तो व्याप्यवृत्तिः । अन्यथा^{३८}

water etc., which is included in all, the substratum of the absence of earth-ness, but the absence of jar etc. only is as such, and the counter-positive-ness of that absence does not abide in the reason.³⁷ Therefore there is no fault of too wide application.

(46) It also should not be said that-in this way there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference, “this has the absence of substance-ness because this is different from that which has the conjunction”. This is also a valid reason according to them who believe that mutual absence is non-partial existent, because the absence of the difference from that which has the conjunction which (absence) is identical with conjunction has no non-determined existence. This is because in the opinion of the scholars who accept mutual absence has non partial existence, the absence of mutual absence is not identical with the determinant of counter-positive-ness but it is a different category, and non-partial existent. Other wise³⁸ there would

37. हेतावसत्त्वात्—Because it does not exists in the reason.

38. (अन्यथा) Otherwise—The absence of mutual absence. Logicians who

मूलावच्छेदेन कपिसंयोगिभेदाभावभानानुपपत्तेरिति संयोगवद्भिन्नत्वा-
भावस्य निरवच्छिन्नवृत्तिमत्त्वात् ।

(४७) वस्तुतस्तु सकलपदमत्राशेषपरं,^{३९} न तु अनेकपरम्,

not be the knowledge of the absence of the difference of that which has the conjunction of monkey by determination by the root, because the absence of the difference of that which has conjunction has non-determined existence.

(47) Indeed the word “All” means ‘not-remaining else’³⁹ and not ‘many,’ otherwise there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference where one individual is a counter-

accept mutual absence as having complete occurrence, accept the absence of mutual absence as different from the determinant of counter-positive-ness of the absence. For example, the difference from that which has the conjunction of monkey, has complete occurrence, the absence of that also is different from the determinant of counter-positive-ness, when that absence is admitted as different from the determinant of counter-positive-ness of absence. Just as the notion, “there is no difference from that which has conjunction of monkey in the branch of tree” is valid. The notion “in the root of tree” there is nondifference from that which has conjunction of monkey also is valid. If the absence of difference from that which has conjunction of monkey is accepted identical with the conjunction of the monkey, then because it is not determined by root therefore the notion. “There is no difference from that which has conjunction of monkey” would be invalid.

39. अशेषपरम्—Pervaderness is the meaning of word ‘all’.

एतद्घटत्वाभाववान् पटत्वादित्याद्येकव्यक्तिविपक्षके^{४०} साध्याभावाधिकरणस्य यावत्त्वाप्रसिद्ध्या अव्याप्त्यापत्तेः । तथा च किञ्चिदनवच्छिन्नाया निरुक्तसाध्याभावाधिकरणताया व्यापकीभूतो योऽभावः हेतुतावच्छेदक-सम्बन्धावच्छिन्नः तत्प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकहेतुतावच्छेदकवत्त्वं लक्षणार्थः ।

(४८) न च सत्त्वादिसामान्याभावस्यापि प्रमेयत्वादिना निरुक्त-

subject⁴⁰ as in the case; ‘this has the absence of this jar-ness because this is a cloth’. This is because the many-ness of the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established is not established. Therefore the meaning of the definition is that ‘the state of having the determinant of the state of being a reason which (determinant) is the determinant of that counter-positive-ness determined by the relation, determinant of the state of being a reason, of the absence which is the pervasive of the state of being a substratum of the absence of that which is to be established which is mentioned as not determined by any thing.

(48) Nor it should be said that there is a fault of too wide application in the inference; “it is a substance because it has existence.” This is because the absence of existence also is the pervasive of the state of being substratum of the absence of

40. एकव्यक्तिविपक्षके—Where one individual is contradictory example. In this inference the absence of sādhyā is the absence of absence of the fire-ness which is identical with that particular fireness, the locus of this form of absence of sādhyā, is one individual fire alone. Therefore many locuses of that absence are not established.

साध्याभावाधिकरणताया व्यापकत्वाद्^{४१} द्रव्यं सत्त्वादित्यादावति-
व्याप्तिः । तद्वन्निष्ठान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वं व्यापकत्व-
मित्युक्तौ तु निर्धूमत्ववान् निर्वह्नितादित्यादावव्याप्तिः निर्वह्निताभावानां

that which is to be established.⁴¹ By the state as-the state of being pervader a non-determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the mutual absence which exists in that which has that, there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the absence of smoke because of the absence of fire.' This is because all absences of absence of fire in the form of fire, are determinant of the mutual counter-positive-ness of the absence existing in that which is the substratum of substratum-ness or the absence of the absence of smoke by the way of a

41. निरुक्तसाध्याभावाधिकरणताया व्यापकत्वात्—The absence of existence is pervader of the locusness of the absence of sādhyā. This is because the absence which exists in the substratum of substantiveness quality etc., is not the absence of knowable but the absence of jar etc., the determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the absence is not knowability. That knowability exists in the absence of existence, hence the absence of existence is the pervader of locusness of the absence of sādhyā. The counter-positive-ness of which is indicated by such and absence which is determined by the relation of inherence exists in the generic attribute existence. The determinant of the counter-positive-ness is the state of being existence which is the determinant of the state of being valid reason. That determinant exists in the existence, therefore there is a fault of over-extension, this is the meaning.

वह्निव्यक्तीनां सर्वासामेव चालनीयन्यायेन^{४२} निर्धूमत्वाभावाधि-
करणतावन्निष्ठान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वादिति वाच्यम् ।
तादृशाधिकरणताया व्यापकतावच्छेदकं हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धा-
वच्छिन्नयद्धर्मावच्छिन्नाभावत्वं तद्धर्मवत्त्वस्य विवक्षितत्वात्^{४३} ।

filter action⁴² because the state of having that attribute which is the state of being absence which is determined by a particular attribute and determined by the relation which is a determinant of the state of being a reason, and which is a determinant of the state of being a pervasive, of such a substratum-ness, is to be mentioned.⁴³

42. चालनीयन्यायेन—The mutual absence which exists in the mountain which is the substratum of smoke, is the mutual absence of that which has the absence of fire of kitchen, the counter-positive-ness of the absence exists in the hill the determinant of that counter-positive-ness is fire of kitchen. The pervader is not the absence of the absence of fire. Therefore there is fault of too narrow application.
43. विवक्षितत्वात्—The determinant of pervaderness of the locus-ness of smoke which exists in the mountain, is the state of being absence determined by which particular attribute is the state of being absence of the absence of fire, counter-positive-ness of which exists in the absence of fire and which is determined by the selfsome relation, that attribute exists in the absence of fire which is reason. The absence of which, exists in the mountain is the absence of jar and not the absence of the absence of fire. The determinant of that counter-positive-ness is fire-ness non-determinant is the state of being absence of the absence of fire that is determinant of pervaderness.

(४९) व्यापकताच्छेदकत्वन्तु तद्वन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वम् । न तु तद्वन्निष्ठप्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वम्, तद्वति निरवच्छिन्नवृत्तिमान् योऽभावस्तत्प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वं वा, प्रकृते व्यापकतायां प्रतियोगिवैयधिकरण्यस्य निरवच्छिन्नवृत्तित्वस्य वा प्रवेशे प्रयोजनविरहात् । तेन^{४४} पृथिवी कपिसंयोगादित्यादौ नातिव्याप्तिः कपिसंयोगाभावत्वस्य निरुक्तव्यापक-

(49) The state of being a determinant, of pervasive-ness, is the state of being non-determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the absolute absence even not non-determinant of counter-positiveness of absence which is non-existent with its counter-positive which exists in that which exists which has that thing or not the state of non-determinant of counter-positive-ness of that absence which has existence, not determined by any thing in the substratum of that. In the present definition there is no need of the inclusion of the expression of “not being present with counter-positive of it, or existence of not determined by any attribute, in the definition of pervasive-ness.” Therefore⁴⁴ there is no fault of too wide application in the inference; ‘this is earth because this has the conjunction of monkey’. This is because the state of absence of the conjunction of monkey has not the state of being the determinant of above

44. तेनेति—Therefore. When the determinant of pervaderness in accepted in the early mentioned form.

तावच्छेदकत्वविरहादित्येव^{४५} परमार्थः ।



said pervasive-ness,⁴⁵ this is only the real meaning.



45. निरुक्तव्यापकतावच्छेदकत्वविरहात्—Because of it is not the determinant of pervader-ness which is stated early. The absolute absence which exists in the water which is substratum of absence of that which has the conjunction of monkey which exists in the part of tree, therefore the determinant of the counter-positive-ness of the absence is the state of being absence of the conjunction of monkey. In this way the state of being absence of the conjunction of monkey is not determinant of pervaderness of the locusness of the absence of sādhyā.

पञ्चमं लक्षणम्

(५०) साध्यवदन्येति । अत्रापि प्रथमलक्षणोक्तरीत्या हेतौ साध्यवदन्यवृत्तित्वाभाव इत्यर्थः । तादृशवृत्तित्वाभावश्च तादृशवृत्तित्व-सामान्याभावो बोध्यः । तेन धूमवान्वहेरित्यादौ धूमवदन्यजलहृदादि-वृत्तित्वाभावस्य धूमवदन्यवृत्तित्वजलत्वोभयाभावस्य च हेतौ सत्त्वेऽपि नातिव्याप्तिः ।

(५१) साध्यवदन्यत्वञ्च-अन्योन्याभावत्वनिरूपित-साध्यवत्त्वा-वच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभाववत्त्वं, तेन वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ तत्तद्वह्निम-

The fifth definition of Vyāpti.

(50) “That which is different from that which has that which is to be established”. Here also, like the first definition in the reason, the absence of existence described by that which is different from that which has that which is to be established. This is the meaning. The absence of such existence should be understood as absence in general of such existence. Therefore there is no fault of too wide application in the inference; ‘this has smoke because of fire,’ eventhough the absence of existence described by the water lake etc. which is different from that which has smoke and the absence of both water ness and existence in that which is different from that which has smoke, exist in the reason.

(51) The state of being different from that which has that which is to be established means the state of having that absence which is described by counter-positive-ness of which is determined by the state of having that which is to be established

दन्यस्मिन् धूमादेर्वृत्तावपि नाव्याप्तिः^{४६}, न वा वह्निमत्त्वावच्छिन्न-
प्रतियोगिताकात्यन्ताभावस्य स्वावच्छिन्नभिन्नभेदरूपस्य^{४७} अधिकरणे

and which counter- positive-ness which is described by state of mutual absence. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application⁴⁶ in the inference; ‘this has fire because of smoke’, even though smoke exists in that thing which is different from that which has that which is to be established (that particular fire), not even there is fault of too narrow application, though in the mountain nor even though in the mountain etc. smoke exists which is the substratum of the absence which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having fire which (absence) is in the form of difference from that which is different from that which is determined by that itself,⁴⁷ there is

46. नाव्याप्तिः—No fault of too narrow application. All locuses of fire are included into them which have sādhyā. State of having the absence of counter-positive-ness which is determined by the state of having sādhyā and which (counter-positive-ness) is determined by the relation of identity, does not exist there, therefore there is no fault of too narrow application.

47. स्वावच्छिन्नभिन्नभेदरूपस्य—The difference from that which has difference from that which is determined by that just as the difference from that which has difference from that which has jar is not difference from jar. Similarly the difference from that which has difference from that which has the absolute absence of that which has fire is not different from the absolute absence of that which has fire. Thus that absence also has the counter-positive-ness which is determined by the state of having sādhyā. Hence the locus of that absence is mountain etc.,

पर्वतादौ धूमस्य वृत्तावप्यव्याप्तिः । तस्य साध्यवत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताया
अत्यन्ताभावत्वनिरूपितत्वेन अन्योन्याभावत्वनिरूपितत्वविरहात् ।
अन्योन्याभावत्वनिरूपितत्वञ्च तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्वमेव ।

(५२) साध्यवत्त्वञ्च साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन बोध्यम्, तेन
वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादौ वह्निमत्त्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकस्य समवायेन
वह्निमतोऽन्योन्याभावस्य अधिकरणे पर्वतादौ धूमादेर्वृत्तावपि नाव्याप्तिः ।

fault of too narrow application because the counter-positive-
ness of that (absence) which is determined by state of having
that which is to be established is described by the state of being
absolute absence and not by the state of being mutual absence.
The state of being described by the state of being mutual
absence means to be determined by the relation identity alone.

(52) And the state of having that which is to be
established, should be known by the relation which delimits the
state of that which is to be established, therefore there is no
fault of too narrow application in the inference, 'this has fire
because of smoke' eventhough the smoke exists on a mountain
which is the substratum of the mutual absence of that which
has fire by the relation inherence and which (absence) has the

occurrence which indicated by that exists in smoke. Therefore there
is fault of too narrow application. When the counter-positive-ness is
stated to be indicated by state of being mutual absence there is no
fault of too narrow application because there is absence of being
determined by the relation of identity in the counter-positive-ness of
the absolute absence. There that absence can't be taken as the
absence of that which has sādhyā, this is the idea.

सर्वमन्यत् प्रथमलक्षणोक्तदिशा अवसेयम् । यथा चास्य न तृतीय-
लक्षणाभेदस्तथोक्तं तत्रैवेति^{४८} समासः ।

सर्वाण्येव लक्षणानि केवलान्वय्यव्याप्त्या दूषयति- **केवला-
न्वयिनि अभावादिति** । पञ्चानामेव लक्षणानाम् इदं वाच्यं ज्ञेयत्वादि-
त्यादिव्याप्यवृत्तिकेवलान्वयिसाध्यके, द्वितीयादिलक्षणचतुष्टयस्य तु
कपिसंयोगाभाववान् सत्त्वादित्याद्यव्याप्यवृत्तिकेवलान्वयिसाध्यकेऽपि
चाभावादित्यर्थः ।

(५३) साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नसाध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्न

counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having fire. All
other things should be known according to the description in
the first definition. How there is no non-difference with third
definition that is already discussed in that place only.⁴⁸

Author rejects all five definition by too narrow application
in the pure affirmative inference by the expression 'absence in
pure affirmative inference.' There is absence of all five definitions
in the inference; 'it is namable because it is knowable' in which
that which is to be established is a pure affirmative and non partial
eristent all four definitions beginning from the second one have
fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the
absence of the conjunction of monkey because of existence' where
that which is to be established is pure affirmative and partial
existent, this is the meaning.

(53) This is because the mutual absence, which has

48. तत्रैवोक्तम्—Maintioned there only by in locus of locussness, there is
difference between them. These two definitions third and fifth.

प्रतियोगिताकसाध्याभावस्य साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन साध्यवत्त्वा-
वच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाऽन्योऽन्याभावस्य चाप्रसिद्धत्वात्, कपिसंयोगा-
भाववान् सत्त्वादित्यादौ निरवच्छिन्नसाध्याभावाधिकरणत्वस्य अप्रसिद्ध-
त्वाच्च इति भावः । तृतीयलक्षणस्य केवलान्वयिसाध्यकासत्त्वञ्च
तद्व्याख्यानावसरे एव प्रपञ्चितम् ।

(५४) एतच्चोपलक्षणं द्वितीये कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्या-
दावप्यव्याप्तिः, अधिकरणभेदेन अभावभेदे मानाभावेन कपिसंयोग-
वद्भिन्नवृत्तिकपिसंयोगाभाववति वृक्षे एतद्वृक्षत्वस्य वृत्तित्वात् ।

counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established and determined by the relation which determines the state of being that which is to be established and the absence of that which is to be established which has the counter-positive-ness is determined by the determinant of the state of that which is to be established and determined by the relation which determines the state of that which is to be established, are not established, and the inference; ‘this has the absence of the conjunction of monkey because of existence’, the substratum-ness of the absence of that which is to be established, non-determined by anything is not established, this is the idea. The third definition is not applicable in pure affirmative inference is stated when this definition was discussed.

(54) This is indicative. There is a fault of too narrow application of second definition in the inference; “this has the conjunction of monkey because of this treeness.” This is

(५५) न च साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तित्वविशिष्टसाध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वं वक्तव्यम्, एवञ्च वृक्षस्य विशिष्टाधिकरणत्वाभावात् न अव्याप्तिरिति

because this tree-ness exists in the tree which has the absence of the conjunction of monkey which absence exists in that which is different from that which has the conjunction of monkey because there is absence of proof for the theory that absence is different due to difference in substratum.

(55) It should not be said that-there is not fault of too narrow application when it is stated-‘The absence of existence in that which has the absence of that which is to be established qualified by the existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established’ because in this way the tree is not a qualified substratum. This is because in that case the expression the absence of that which is to be established will be purpose-less. Hence, existence in that which is qualified by the existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established is the correct form of definition, because there is no fault of impossibility in a valid reason due to the absence of the qualified substratum-hood in the locus of the reason. And there is a fault of too narrow application by taking mutual absence through the method of the filter action in the inference; ‘this mountain has fire because of smoke’ where that which is to be established has many substrata while the all mutual absences which have the counter-positive-ness which exists in that which has that which is to be established are included in the third definition, this also should be noted.

वाच्यम् । साध्याभावपदवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः । साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तित्वविशिष्ट-
वदवृत्तित्वस्यैव सम्यक्त्वात् । सद्भेदतौ हेत्वधिकरणे विशिष्टाधिकरण-
त्वाभावादेव असम्भवाभावात् । तृतीये साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिताकान्योन्या-
भावमात्रस्य घटकत्वे चालनीयन्यायेन अन्योन्याभावमादाय नानाधि-
करणकसाध्यके वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादावव्याप्तिश्च इत्यपि बोध्यम् ।

इति श्रीमथुरानाथतर्कवागीशकृतं व्याप्तिपञ्चकरहस्यं समाप्तम् ।



Thus the chapter on VYĀPTI-PAÑCAKAM in VYĀPTI-
VĀDA RAHASYA by Śrī Mathurānātha Tarkavāghīśa ends.



प्रथमं लक्षणम्

(त.१) ननु अनुमितिहेतुव्याप्तिज्ञाने का व्याप्तिः ? न तावदव्यभिचरितत्वम् । तद्धि न साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम् ।

(दी.१) समारब्धानुमानप्रामाण्यपरीक्षाकारणीभूतव्याप्तिग्रहो-
पायप्रतिपादननिदानं व्याप्तिस्वरूपनिरूपणम् आरभते-ननु
इत्यादिना ।

(जा.१) समारब्धेति । समारब्धं यदनुमानप्रामाण्यपरीक्षणं

The First definition of *vyāpti*.

(T.1) Here author follows the collection of five tentative definitions of invariable-concomitance (*vyāpti*) Now the question is, in the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), which is the cause of inferential knowledge, what is invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) ? Infact, it is not the state of having non-deviation (of the reason from that which is to be established) because invariable-concomitance is neither. The non-existence of the reason in such substratum which possesses the absence of that which is to be established.

(D.1) By the expression 'Nanu' author Gaṅgeśa starts the discussion of the nature of *vyāpti* which is the cause of the discussion of the method of the grasping *vyāpti*, which is the reason of examination of validity of inference which is started by author in previous chapter.

(J.1) 'Started'. Started the examination of the validity of inherence, which is the cause of establishing of validity of

प्रामाण्यसाधनं तत्कारणीभूतं यद्व्याप्राप्तिग्रहोपायप्रतिपादनं तन्निदानं व्याप्तिस्वरूपनिरूपणमित्यर्थः । व्याप्तिज्ञानं विना 'अयं व्याप्तिग्रहोपाय' इति ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वाद्, व्याप्तेस्तत्र विशेषणत्वादिति^{४९} भावः ।

pervasion. The cause of which is the discussion of the method of grasping vyāpti, which is dependent upon discussion of the nature of vyāpti. Without the knowledge of vyāpti there would not be the knowledge of the method of grasping vyāpti. This is because vyāpti is qualifirer⁴⁹ there (in the method of grasping vyāpti)

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49. विशेषणत्वात्—Because of qualifiereness. In the method of knowledge of unveriable concomitance the knowledge of concomitance is qualifier in vyāpti (concomitance) without is qualifier of the knowledge of vyāpti. Therefore without the knowledge of vyāpti there would not be the knowledge of the method of the knowledge of vyāpti, because the knowledge of qualifier is the cause of the knowledge of qualified thing.

द्वितीयं लक्षणम्

(त.२) साध्यवद्भिन्नसाध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम् ।

(दी.२) साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वस्याव्याप्यवृत्तिसाध्यक-
सद्भेतावव्याप्तिमाशङ्क्याह—साध्यवद्भिन्नेति । साध्यवद्भिन्ने यः
साध्याभावस्तद्वदवृत्तित्वमर्थः ।

(जा.२) अव्याप्यवृत्तीति । कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वात् इत्यादा-
वित्यर्थः । इदञ्च येन रूपेण येन सम्बन्धेन च साध्यत्वं तदवच्छिन्नस्य

The Second definition of vyāpti.

(T.2) (Nor,) The non-existence (of the reason) in the substratum which possesses the absence of that which is to be established and which is different from that which has that which is to be established.

(D.2) Non-occurrence (of the reason) in that which has the absence of *sādhya*, which is different from that which has *sādhya* of the definition. There is fault of too narrow application in the valid reason, *sādhya* of which has incomplete occurrence. So author says “Different from that which has *sādhya*” non-occurrence (of the reason) in that which has the absence of *sādhya*. [Non co-existence (of reason) with the mutual absence counter positive of which is that which has *sādhya*.. This is the meaning :]

(J.2) ‘Non-partial existence’ means ‘in the inference; “this has the conjunction of monkey because of this tree-ness” etc.’ This is due to inclusion of the absence of that which is to be established delimited by the state of being that which is to be

साध्याभावस्य प्रवेशमादृत्य, अन्यथा तु व्याप्यवृत्तिसाध्यकेऽपि^{५०} विशिष्टभावादिकमादाय^{५१} दोषो बोध्यः । अव्याप्यवृत्तिसाध्यकेऽपि आकाशादिहेतावव्याप्यभावादाह^{५२} सद्धेताविति । वृत्तिमद्धेताविति तदर्थः । अव्याप्यवृत्तिसाध्यं यत्र तत्र सन् वर्तमानो यो हेतुस्तत्रेत्यर्थः, तेन

established by which from attribute and by which relation. Otherwise even in the inference, where the that which is to be established, is non-partially existent⁵⁰, there is a fault taking in to account the absence of a qualified thing⁵¹ this should be known here. Author says “in the valid reason.” This is because there is no fault of too narrow application⁵² even in the inference where that which is to be established is a partialy existent and where ether etc. are reasons. In that reason, which abides something, this is the meaning of that expression. The partial existent that which is to be established is where, which reason exists there, in that reason, this is the meaning. Therefore even though there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; “this has the absence of conjunction because this

50. व्याप्यवृत्तिसाध्यके—In the inference where sādhyā has complete occurrence such as “this has substance-ness because of earthness.”
51. विशिष्टभाव—Qualified absence etc. absence of substance-ness qualified by water-ness, absence of absence of substance-ness and absence of substance-ness by temporal relation.
52. अव्याप्यभावात्—Because of the fault of too narrow application. There is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; “this has the conjunction of monkey because of ether” because ether does not exist anywhere, which is locus of the absence of the conjunction of monkey which is the absence of sādhyā.

संयोगाभाववान् गुणत्वादित्यादावव्याप्त्यभावेऽपि न क्षतिरित्यपि वदन्ति ।

(जा.३) ननु साध्यवद्भिन्नो यः साध्याभाववान् इत्यर्थे साध्याभाववत्पदवैयर्थ्यं साध्यवद्भिन्नावृत्तित्वस्यैव सम्यक्त्वात्, न चावृत्तित्वेन समं साध्यवद्भिन्नस्यान्वयाविवक्षणात्, साध्याभाववता सममेव तादात्म्येनैवान्वयविवक्षणान्न वैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम् । तथा सति साध्यवद्भिन्नात्मको यो मतुबर्थः सम्बन्धी तदवृत्तित्वस्य सम्यक्त्वे साध्याभावपदवैयर्थ्यध्रौव्यात् । अतः सप्तमीसमाससामर्थ्यं व्याचष्टे- साध्यवद्भिन्ने इति ।

is a quality,” there is no harm, this is said by author.

(J.3) This is the objection if the meaning is that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, possesses the absence of that which is to be established, the expression “that which has the absence of that which is to be established,” will be purposeless because, then the non-existence in that which has that which is to be established only will be correct definition. Nor it should be said that-there is not useless-ness because the cementic relation of that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, is not with non-existence, but it is stated to be desired with that which has the absence of that which is to be established by the relation identity, eventhough non existence in that relatum which is the meaning of *matup* in the form of that which is different from that which has that which is to be established is correct. Then the expression ‘absence of that which is to be established’ is indeed useless. Therefore author supporting seventh compound says “in that which is different from that

तथा च साध्यवद्भिन्नस्य वृत्तावनन्वयात् यथा सन्निवेशे न वैयर्थ्यम् । साध्याभावे^{५३} साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तित्वविशेषणं तु अव्याप्यवृत्ति-साध्यकसङ्ग्रहार्थम् एव इत्याशयः ।

(जा.४) साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वादिमति पर्वतादौ धूमादेः

which has that which is to be established. Therefore there is no fault of useless-ness when it is included as it is, because that which is different from that which has that which is to be established is not semantically related with existence, The existence in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established is the qualifier of the absence of that which is to be established.⁵³ This qualification for the inclusion of the inference where that which is to be established is partially existent, this is the idea.

(J.4) There would be a fault of too narrow application or the fault of impossibility, because smoke exists in mountain etc., which is the substratum of substanceness, which exists in

53. साध्याभावे—Absence of occurrence (of reason) which is indicated by the locus of the absence of sādhyā and which (locus) is different from that which has sādhyā. This is second definition. When this definition is accepted, there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the conjunction of monkey because of this tree-ness.' Though this tree is locus of absence of the conjunction of monkey in the root but this is not different from that which is locus of sādhyā, because the conjunction of monkey also exists there such a locus of absence of sādhyā is quality also where this tree-ness does not occurs. This is the idea.

सत्त्वादव्याप्तिरसम्भवो वा स्याद्, अतः-साध्याभावेति । न च कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्यादेः सङ्ग्रहार्थम् अधिकरणभेदेन अभाव-भेदमादृत्य एव लक्षणमिदं कार्यं, तथा च साध्यवद्भिन्ने योऽभावस्तद्वद-वृत्तित्वस्यैव सम्यक्त्वे साध्यपदवैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम् । प्रतियोगिता-संसर्गेण साध्यीयत्वेनैव साध्याभावस्य प्रवेशो, न तु अभावत्वेनापीति तद्वैयर्थ्यशङ्कानवकाशात्^{५४} ।

that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, therefore the expression “absence of that which is to be established” is used. It should not be stated that-for the inclusion of the inference, “this has the conjunction of monkey because of this tree-ness” taking in to account the theory the absence is different due to difference in substratum only, this definition should be made, therefore the non-existence in that which has the absence which exists in that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, is only correct definition. Hence the term ‘the absence of that which is to be established’ is useless. This is because there is inclusion of the absence of that which is to be established, as being connected with that which is to be established by the relation counter- positive-ness and not by the state of being absence, therefore there is no chance of the doubt of useless-ness.⁵⁴

54. तद्वैयर्थ्यशङ्कानवकाशात्—There is no possibility of doubt of perposeless-ness of word “absence of sādhyā’ absence of occurrence indicated by the locus of that which is qualified by sādhyā by the relation of counter-positive-ness and which exists in that which is different from that which has sādhyā, this is the meaning. Therefore here in form of

(जा.५) वस्तुतः स्वप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन साध्यवद्भिन्ने वर्तते यः, साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन साध्योऽभावः तद्वदवृत्तित्वमर्थः । तथा च साध्यतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन साध्यीयत्वार्थकस्य साध्यपदस्य अनुक्तौ स्वप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभूतसमवायादिसम्बन्धेन वहन्यादि-मतोऽन्यस्मिन् पर्वतादौ यः समवायाद्यवच्छिन्नवहन्याद्यभावस्तद्वति धूमादेः सत्त्वादव्याप्तिः स्यात्, अतः तदुपात्तमिति नव्याः ।

(J.5) Infact the meaning is that, the non-existence in that which has that absence, of that which is connected with that which is to be established, by the relation which is determinant of the state of being that which is to be established, that (absence) which exists in that which has that which is different from that which has that which is to be established, by the relation which is determinant of the counter-positive-ness of absence of that which is to be established. Therefore when the expression ‘that which is to be established’, which means the state of being connected with that which is to be established by the relation which is determinant of the state of being that which is to be established, is not used there will be a fault of too narrow application, because of the smoke exists in that which has the absence of fire determined by relation inherence mountain etc., which (absence) exists which is different from that which has fire by the relation inherence which is determinant of the counter-positive-ness of that itself, therefore that expression is used. This is stated by new logicians.

absence, the absence of sādhyā is not included but it is included as a qualified by sādhyā by relation of counter-positive-ness, therefore the word ‘sādhyā’ is not meaningless.

(जा.६) केचित्तु व्याप्यवृत्तित्वाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वादिविरुद्धधर्माध्यासात्^{५५} संयोगाद्यभावस्यैव द्रव्यगुणाद्यधिकरणभेदेन भेदः, न तु गगनाद्यभावस्य, मानाभावात् । तथा च साध्यवद्भिन्नवृत्तिगगनाद्यभाववति पर्वतादौ धूमादेः सत्त्वादव्याप्तिः, अतः साध्यपदमित्याहुः, तन्मन्दं, गुणे गगनाद्यभावे गुणत्वादिसामानाधिकरण्यं, न तु द्रव्ये गगनाद्यभावे तथात्वम् इत्यादि प्रतीत्या गगनाद्यभावस्यापि गुणत्वादिसामानाधि-

(J.6) Some logicians say that the absence of conjunction etc. only is different due to difference in substrat substance and quality etc., because of the imposition of two opposite attributes such as the state of being partial existence and state of being non-partial existence⁵⁵, and not the absence of ether etc. because there is no proof. Therefore there is a fault of too narrow application. That's because smoke etc. occurs in mountain etc. which has the absence of ether etc. which (absence) exists in that which is different form that which has that which is to be established. Therefore the word “that which is to be established” is used, this is not correct, because there is a possibility of two opposite attributes such as the co-existence with quality-ness etc., and its absence, in the absence of ether etc., on the basis of the notion the absence of ether etc. “in

55. व्याप्यवृत्तित्वाव्याप्यवृत्तित्वविरुद्धधर्माध्यासात्—Because of the apprehension of opposite attributes, complete occurrence and incomplete occurrence, = non-occurrence in that which is locus of it counter-positive is complete occurrence, in that which is locus of it's ocunter-positive is incomplete occurrence. Therefore absence of conjunction is different in the locuses as substance and quality, the absence of eather is not different in quality and substance because it has complete occurrence.

करण्यतदभावयोः विरुद्धयोः धर्मयोः सम्भवादिति दिक् ।

(जा.७) न च घटत्वघटाकाशसंयोगान्यतरत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नाभाववान् गगनत्वादित्यत्राव्याप्तिः, साध्यवद्भिन्ने घटे वर्तमानस्य गगनघट-संयोगात्मकसाध्याभावस्यापि अधिकरणे गगनादौ गगनत्वादिहेतोः सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम् । अभावाभावस्यातिरिक्तामते एवैतल्लक्षण-करणादिति भावः ।

quality co-existence with quality-ness, in the absence of ether and not in substance co-existence with quality-ness in the absence of ether. This is the direction.

(J.7) Nor it should be stated, that there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the absence of that which is determined by the state of being one of them jar-ness and the conjunction of ether-ness because the reason' in the etherness etc. exists ether which also is the substratum of the absence of that which is to be established in the form of conjunction with ether and jar which absence exists in the jar which is different from that which has that which is to be established. This is because this definition is made taking in to account only the opinion of those who accept the absence of absence as separate category. This is the idea.

तृतीयं लक्षणम्

(त.३) साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावासामानाधिकरण्यम् ।

(दी.३) कर्मादौ संयोगाद्यभावस्य भिन्नत्वे मानाभावादाह-साध्यवदिति ।

(जा.८) भिन्नत्वे इति । द्रव्यनिष्ठसंयोगाभावतो भिन्नत्वे इत्यर्थः । मानाभावादिति । तथा चात्राव्याप्यवृत्ति^{५६}साध्यकसङ्घेतावव्याप्तिरिति भावः ।

The Third definition of vyāpti.

(T.3) (Nor,) The not co-existence (of the reason) with such a mutual absence which has the substratum of that which is to be established as its counter-positive.

(D.3) There is no proof to accept the absence of *sādhya* which exists in movement is different, therefore author says - “*Sādhyaavaditi*.”

(J.8) “In the state of being different,” In the state of being different from that which has the absence of the conjunction existing in the substance is the meaning.

‘Because of the absence of proof. Therefore there is a fault of too narrow application in the inference where that which is to be established is partially existent.’⁵⁶ This is the idea.

56. अव्याप्यवृत्ति—Fault of too narrow application in the inference; “this has conjunction of monkey because of this tree-ness.” Here the absence of conjunction which exists in quality which is different from that

चतुर्थ लक्षणम्

(त.४) सकलसाध्याभाववन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वम् ।

(दी.५) हेतोः साध्यवत्पक्षभिन्नदृष्टान्तवृत्तित्वेन अव्याप्तेराह
सकलेति ।

(जा.९) हेतोरिति । न च साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावस्य
केवलान्वयित्वादसम्भव^{५७} एव वक्तुमुचितो नाव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् ।

The Fourth definition of vyāpti.

(T.4) (Nor,) The counter-positive-ness of the absence which besides in all substrata of the absence of that which is to be established.

(D.4) Because the reason exists in example which is different from subject which has *sādhya*, hence there is fault of too narrow application therefore author says-*sakal* (all).

(J.9) 'Of the reason.' It should not be said that-there is a fault of impossibility only and not too narrow application. Because the mutual absence of that which has that which is to be established is pure affirmative.⁵⁷ This is because in the

which has the absence of *sādhya*, is different from that absence of *sādhya* which exists in this tree, therefore the locus-ness of the absence of conjunction of monkey exists in this tree, also, there this tree-ness which is reason exists, so there is a fault of too narrow application.

57. केवलान्वयित्वात्—Because of omni-present. In the inference such as 'this has fire because of smoke' here also the mutual absence of both pot and fire, which also has that which has *sādhya* as counter-positive, exists everywhere, therefore there is a fault of impossibility.

वह्निमान् गगनादित्यत्रावृत्तिगगनादौ लक्षणसम्भवेन तस्यापि सङ्घेतुतायाः स्वयं वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति भावः । साध्यपदस्य सिद्धिकर्मतत्तद्व्यक्ति-परतया^{५८} तत्तद्व्यक्त्यवच्छिन्नान्योन्याभावासामानाधिकरण्यरूपस्य पर्यवसितार्थस्य द्रव्यं पृथिवीत्वादित्यादावेव सम्भवाद् गन्धवती पृथिवीत्वादित्यादावव्याप्तिकथनमित्यपि वदन्ति ।

(दी.६) साकल्यं साध्याभाववति साध्ये च बोध्यम्, साध्याभावो वा साध्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताको ग्राह्यस्तेन

inference; 'this has fire because of ether,' there in ether which is non-existent, there is a possibility of application of the definition this is also a valid reason which will be mentioned later on. This is the idea.

The term 'sādhya' means the particular individual object of the certain knowledge of that which is to be established'⁵⁸ therefore the concluding meaning in the form non-'co-existence of the mutual absence of that which is determined by the state of that particular individual, is applicable only in the inference like; 'this is a substance because of earth-ness', therefore the fault of too narrow application is mentioned in the inference; 'it has smell because of eather-ness' author says this also.

(D.5) All-ness should be known as the qualification of that which has absence of sādhya and sādhya or the absence of sādhya should be known as having counter-positive-ness which is determined by that which is determinant of the state of being

58. सिद्धिकर्मतद्व्यक्ति—Siddhi-the certainty of sādhya. Karm-the object of certainty of sādhya.

विपक्षैकदेशनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगिनि व्यभिचारिणि नातिव्याप्तिः, न वा नानाव्यक्तिसाध्यकसङ्घेतावव्याप्तिः ।

(जा.१०) ननु सकलस्य साध्यप्रतियोगिकाभावस्याधिकरणा-
प्रसिद्ध्या व्यभिचारिणि अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय यदि साध्याभावस्य विशेषणं
साकल्यं तदा वह्निमान् धूमादित्यादिसङ्घेतावव्याप्तिः, तत्रापि तत्तत्सपक्षा-
वृत्तित्वावच्छिन्नाभावरूपस्य^{५९} तत्तद्विपक्षावृत्तित्वावच्छिन्नाभावरूपस्य च

sādhya. Therefore there is not a fault of too wide application in invalid reason which is counter-positive of the absence which exists in the part of contradictory subject. Nor there is fault of too narrow application in the reason which has many individuals as *sādhya*.

(J.10) Here is the objection if 'all' is admitted qualifier of the absence of that which is to be established, to avoid the fault of too wide application in a devious reason due to non-establishment of the substratum of all absences of that which is to be established, there would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has fire because of smoke,' there also is a fault of non-established (sabstratum) the collection of the absence of that which is to be established in the form of the absence of that which is determined by non-existence in that individual counter-subject and in the form of the absences of that which is determined by non-existence in the particular individual definite subject.⁵⁹

60. तत्तद्विपक्षावृत्तित्वावच्छिन्नत्वाभावः—The absence of that which is determined by occurrence of reason in that particular subject as water etc.

तत्तत्सपक्षावृत्तित्वावच्छिन्नत्वाभाव The absence of that which is determined by occurrence in that particular subject as mountain etc.

साध्यप्रतियोगिकाभावस्तोमस्य अधिकरणाप्रसिद्धेरत आह-साध्याभाव-वतीति । तथा च साकल्यं न साध्याभावविशेषणम्, अतो नाप्रसिद्धि-रिति^{६०} भावः ।

(जा.११) केचित्तु ननु धूमवान् वह्नेः इत्यादि व्यभिचारिणि अतिव्याप्तिः, साध्याभाववद्यत्किञ्चिन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वादित्यत आह-साकल्यं साध्याभाववतीति । ननु एवमपि साध्याभाववन्निखिलान्तर्गते महानसादौ वर्तमानस्य अभावस्य प्रतियोगित्वं धूमादौ नास्तीति

Therefore author says ‘in that which has the absence of that which is to be established’, hence ‘all’ is not the qualifier of the absence of that which is to be established, therefore there is no fault of non-established⁶⁰ (substratum).

(J.11) Some of logicians say, that there is a fault of too wide application in the devious reason as; “it has smoke because of fire.” This is because it (fire) is the counter-positive of the absence which exists in something which has the absence of that which is to be established. Therefore ‘all’ is connected with that which has the absence of that which is to be established. Here is an objection-in this way also there the fault of too narrow application will remain intact, because the counter-positive-ness of the absence which exists in kitchen etc., which is included in

61. नाप्रसिद्धिः—No fault of non-establishment. If the “all” is a qualification of the absence of sādhyā then only is the fault of non-establishment of locus of all absences of sādhyā, if “all” would be qualifier of locus of the absence of sādhyā, then there would not be fault of non-establishment this the idea.

अव्याप्तितादवस्थ्यमत उक्तं-साध्ये चेति । तथा च सपक्षो महानसादिर्न सकलसाध्याभाववान् इति अदोषः ।

(जा.१२) प्राञ्चस्तु व्यभिचारिणि अतिव्याप्तिवारणार्थं साध्या-
भाववति यावत्त्वविशेषणे दत्त एव साध्ये यावत्त्वविशेषणमव्याप्ति-
वारकतया सार्थकं भवति, अतः साध्याभाववत्येव साकल्यं प्राक्
प्रयोजयति साकल्यमित्यादिना इत्येवमवधारयन्ति, तन्मन्दं, साध्या-
भाववति साकल्यानुक्तावतिव्याप्तिवारकतया एव साध्ये साकल्य-
विशेषणस्य प्रथमतः सार्थकत्वसम्भवात् । अन्यथा गगनावृत्तिधर्मवान्

that which has the absence of that which is to be established, does not exist the reason smoke etc. therefore it is said “that which is to be established,” thus the definite subject kitchen etc. is not that which has the absence of all that which is to be established, therefore there is no fault.

(J.12) Old logicians hold that-when to avoid the fault of too wide application in devious reason the qualifier ‘all’ is connected with that which has the absence of that which is to be established, only then the qualifier ‘all’ in that which is to be established is fruitfull as a remover of the fault of too narrow application. Therefore ‘all’ is connected with that which has the absence of that which is to be established in first by the expression ‘all.’ This is not correct, because there is a possibility of fruitfullness of the qualifier ‘all’ with that which is to be established, in first, by removing the fault of too wide application. Otherwise there will be fault of too wide application in the inference; ‘this has the thing which dose not abide in ether, because of substance-

द्रव्यत्वादित्यादौ पटत्वादिलक्षणतत्तत्साध्यव्यक्त्यभाववद् गुणादि-
निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगिनि द्रव्यत्वादौ अतिप्रसङ्गादिति^{६१} ध्येयम् ।★

(जा.१३) ननु साध्यवति अपि द्वित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकस्य
सकलसाध्यप्रतियोगिकाभावस्य सत्त्वादसम्भवः,^{६२} किञ्च सकल-

ness' because of the over extention⁶¹ in substance-ness' which is
the counter-positive of the absence which exists in quality etc.
which has the absence of individual particular that which is to be
established, in the form of cloth-ness etc.

(J.13) There is fault of impossibility⁶² because the

61. अतिप्रसङ्गात्—Because of fault to over-extension. Even “all”, is not used as
qualifier of that which has the absence of sādhyā, if it is not accepted
as qualifier of sādhyā in the inference; ‘it has the quality which does
not occur in the ether because it has substance-ness’, etc. also, that
attribute which does not exist in ether therefore absence of sādhyā
would be the absence of potness also which exists in one locus as such
quality etc., there the absence of substance-ness exists counter-positive
of the absence is substance-ness. Therefore there is fault of over-extension
of fourth definition. In this way when ‘all’ is accepted as qualifier of
sādhyā, there would not be over-extension because qualitiness also is
included in to sādhyā. The absence of qualitiness does not exists in
quality. The absence of qualitiness exists in eather etc. where reason
substance-ness occures. Therefore there is not fault too wide application.

★ Editor’s Note ‘इत्थञ्च प्रथमतः साध्ये साकल्यविशेषणोपादाने गुणत्वादेरपि सङ्ग्रहात्
तदभावान्न गुणादिः किन्तु गगनमात्रं तत्र हेतोर्वृत्तित्वान्नातिव्याप्ति This text is available
in Printed book of व्याप्तिपञ्चक which is explained by Vāmācārāṇ-
bhattacārya, but not translated by translator.

62. असम्भवः—Fault of impossibility. In the inference such as “this has fire
because of smoke.” The absence of both fire and pot also, is such

पदोत्तरनाम्ना सकलसाध्यप्रतियोगिताकाभाववतोऽनुपस्थापनात् तेन समं सकलपदस्य कर्मधारयोऽपि अनुपपन्न इत्यत आह-साध्याभाव इति । तथा च साध्याभाववत्येव साकल्यं देयं न तु साध्येऽपीति भावः ।

(जा.१४) साध्याभाववति साकल्यदानस्य प्रयोजनमाह-तेनेति । विपक्षैकदेशः कश्चिद्विपक्षः साध्यनिष्ठसाकल्यस्य साध्यसामान्याभावस्य

absence of all those which are to be established having the counter-positive-ness determined by two-ness, exists in that, also which has that which is to be established. More over by the name followed by the word 'All', that which has the absence of all those which are to be established, 'is not denoted therefore *'karmadhāraya'* compound of the word 'all' with it, is not applicable. Hence author says 'absence of that which is to be established.' Therefore word 'all' should be connected with that only which has the absence of that which is to be established and not with that which is to be established also. This is the idea.

(J.14) Author says the reason of the use of 'all' connected with that which has that which is to be established by the word 'therefore.' The part of counter-subject (means) someone of counter-subjects. Author says the purpose of the inclusion of 'allness' in that which is to be established, or inclusion of absence of that which is to be established in general by the expression 'or

absence, counter-positive of which is sādhyā in the locus as such absence naturally mountain etc., there is no absence of smoke but the absence of pot etc., the counter-positive-ness as this absence does not exist in smoke. Therefore there is fault of impossibility. Absence of both things can be taken as the absence of sādhyā in all valid inferences. Therefore there is fault of impossibility and not a fault of too narrow application.

वा निवेशस्य फलमाह-न वेति । एकव्यक्तिसाधके सकलसाध्योक्तौ अपि अव्याप्तिः अग्रे स्थास्यतीत्याशयेन नाना इत्युक्तम् ।★

(जा.१५) अव्याप्यवृत्तीति । कपिसंयोगी एतत्त्वादित्यादौ इत्यर्थः । यद्यप्यग्रे हेत्वभावस्यापि प्रतियोगिवैयधिकरण्यावच्छिन्नस्यैव निवेशः करणीयः इति अव्याप्यवृत्तिहेतावव्याप्तिः सम्भवति तथापि यथाश्रुतमूलस्य न तत्र अव्याप्तिरित्यावेदयितुं व्याप्यवृत्तिहेतूक्तिः ।

(दी.७) अव्याप्यवृत्तिसाध्यकव्याप्यवृत्तिसद्धेतावव्याप्ते-
र्यभिचारिणि चाव्याप्यवृत्तावतिव्याप्तेर्वारणाय अभावद्वये प्रतियोगि-

not'. There would be a fault of too narrow application in the inference where that which is to be established is only one individual when all that which is to be established is mentioned taking in to account this 'many' is stated by author.

(J.15) 'Partial existent' means in the inference; 'this has the conjunction of monkey, because of this tree-ness.' Though in later 'the absence of reason' also, is to be included as delimited by non-existence with its counter-positive. Therefore the fault of too narrow application in the partial existent reason also possible, yet to inform that there is no fault of too narrow application according to original text 'non partial existent reason' is stated.

(D.7) Both absences should be known as non-existent with counter-positive, to avoid over-extantion in invalid reason,

★ Editor's Note : न चैकव्यक्तिसाध्यकस्थलेऽपि द्वित्वाद्यवच्छिन्नाभावमादायाऽसम्भवः, न त्वव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् । व्यासज्यवृत्तिद्यर्मानवच्छिन्नत्वविशेषणेनैव तद्वारणसम्भवात् । This text is available in printed book of 'व्याप्तिपञ्चक' with Jāgdiśi which is explained by Vāmācārāṇbhatacārya, but not translated by translater.

व्यधिकरणत्वं बोध्यम् ।

(जा.१६) व्यभिचारिणीति । एतद्वृक्षत्ववान् कपिसंयोगाद् इत्यादावित्यर्थः । अभावद्वये इति । साध्याभावे हेत्वभावे चेत्यर्थः । अत्र च साध्याभावे प्रतियोगिवैयधिकरणं साध्यताघटकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोगिनो यदधिकरणं तदवृत्तित्वं, तेन धूमाद्यभाववतोऽपि अयःपिण्डादेः कालिक-सम्बन्धेन धूमादिमत्त्वेऽपि नातिव्याप्तिः^{६३} । हेत्वभावे प्रतियोगि-

which has incomplete occurrence, and fault of too narrow application in the valid reason which has complete occurrence but *sādhya* of which has incomplete occurrence.

(J.16) In the devious reason means-in the inference; ‘this has tree-ness because of conjunction of monkey’. In both absences means in the absence of that which is to be established, and in the absence of reason. Here the non-existence with counter-positive of it means non-existence in that which is to be the substratum of counter-positive by the relation which is determined by the state of being that which is to be established, therefore there is no fault of too wide application⁶³ even though smoke exists in the hot-iron-ball by

63. नातिव्याप्तिः—No fault of too wide application. In the expression “occurrence in that which is not locus of counter-positive” the locusness of counter-positive if it is taken by only relation in general, there would be fault of over-extendion in the inference such as “it has smoke because of fire.” When the locusness of counter-positive is mentioned by the relation of the determinant of ‘*sādhya*tā’ there would not be fault of too wide application, counter-positive of the absence of smoke does not exist in hot-iron-ball by the relation

वैयधिकरणं तु प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोग्यनधिकरणत्वघटितं बोध्यम् । तेन अयमात्मा ज्ञानादित्यादौ साध्याभाववतो घटादेर्विषयतया हेत्वाभावप्रतियोगिमत्त्वेऽपि नाव्याप्तिः^{६४} ।

(दी.८)हेत्वभावोऽपि प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रति-
योगिव्यधिकरणः । तत्प्रतियोगित्वञ्च हेतुतावच्छेदकरूपेण बोध्यं,

the temporal relation. Non existence with its counter-positive in the absence of the reason should be known by the relation, which determined the counter-positive-ness, therefore ⁶⁴there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; ‘this is soul because of knowledge’, though jarness etc. which are substrata of the absence of that which is to be established, has the counter-positive-ness of the absence of reason by relation subject-ness.

(D.8) The absence of reason also should be known as non-co-existing with counter-positive, determined by the determinant of counter-positive-ness and that counter-positive-ness also determined by the determinant of the state of being reason. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; where substernece-ness etc. is *sādhya* and

conjunction, there is not absence of fire, therefore there is no fault of too wide application.

64. नाव्याप्तिः—No fault of too narrow application, when the locusness of counter-positive of the absence of reason is mentioned by relation in general. There would be fault of too narrow application in the inference; “it is soul because of knowledge.”

तेन द्रव्यत्वादौ साध्ये विशिष्टसत्तादौ नाऽव्याप्तिः, न वा विशिष्ट-
सत्तात्वादिना तादृशाभावप्रतियोगिनि सत्तादौ अतिप्रसङ्गः^{६५} ।

(जा.१७) हेत्वभावोऽपि इति । अपिना साध्याभावसङ्ग्रहः ।
तेन विशिष्टसत्तावान् जातेरित्यादौ नातिव्याप्तिः^{६६} । यद्यपि साध्या-

qualified existence etc. is reason. Nor there is fault of over-
extension⁶⁵ in counter-positive of such absence determined by
state of being qualified existence.

(J.17) The absence of reason also here by the expression
'also' the absence of that which is to be established is included,
therefore there is no fault of too wide application⁶⁶ in the

65. अतिप्रसङ्गः—Fault of over-extension. When the counter-positive-ness of
the absence of reason is stated to be determined by the determinant of
the state of being reason, there would not be a fault of over- extension
in the inference; “this is substance because of existence” which is not
co-existent of its counter-positive and which exists in quality etc.
which is the locus of the absence of substenceness and which is non-
locus of qualified existence determined by qualified existence-ness.
The counter-positive-ness of the absence of qualified, exists in the
existence. Therefore there is the fault of over-extension when the
counter-positive-ness of the absence as the reason is mentioned as
determined by the determinant feature there would not be over-
extension because the counter-positive-ness of the absence of qualified
existence is not determined by the state of being existence which is the
determinant of the state of being reason. This is the idea.

66. नातिव्याप्तिः—No fault of over-extension when the counter-positive-ness
of the absence of reason is not mentioned as determined by the

भावोऽपीत्येवं क्रमेण वक्तुमुचितम् अपिशब्दादेव हेत्वभावस्य लाभ-
सम्भवात् **तथापि** तत्प्रतियोगित्वञ्च इत्यग्रिमत्पदेनानिर्दिष्टहेत्वभावस्य
परामर्शसम्भवात् हेत्वभावप्रतियोगित्वञ्च इत्यभिधाने च ग्रन्थगौरवादि-
त्यमभिधानम् ।

(जा.१८) **प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगीति** । प्रति-

inference; 'this has qualified existence because of generic attribute.' Though it should be mentioned by such order that the absence of that which is to be established also mentioned, because by the word 'also' 'the absence of reason can be understood yet by the expression 'that counter-positive-ness' the absence of reason which was not early mentioned, that could not be taken. And if the counter-positive-ness of the absence of reason is to be stated there is cumbersome-ness of the text.

(J.18) In the expression 'counter-positive determined by that which determines the counterpositive-ness', the term

relation which determines the state of being the reason, there would be a fault of over-entension in the inference; "this is different from soul because of substance-ness." The absence of substance-ness also exists in the substratum of the absence of sādhyā by the temporal relation, the counter-positive-ness of the absence occurs in substance, therefore there is a fault of over-entension. When the counter-positive-ness is taken by the relation of the determinant of state of being reason there would not be fault of over-entension, because the counter-positive-ness which is determined by temporal relation is not determined by the relation inherence which determined state of being reason.

योगिपदं प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकताघटकसम्बन्धेनावच्छेदकस्य वैशिष्ट्य-
लाभाय, तेन हृदादौ कालिकादिसम्बन्धेन धूमात्वाद्यवच्छिन्नस्य काष्ठादेः
संयोगसम्बन्धेन सत्त्वेऽपि नाव्याप्तिः । तत्प्रतियोगित्वं हेत्वभावप्रति-
योगित्वं । हेतुतावच्छेदकरूपेणेति । हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन इत्यपि
बोध्यम्, तेनात्मभिन्नं द्रव्यत्वादित्यादौ साध्याभाववति आत्मनि
वर्तमानस्य प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणस्य
कालिकादिसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोगित्वेऽपि द्रव्यत्वस्य नातिव्याप्तिः ।

‘counter-positive’ is used to get qualified-ness of determinant by the relation which determines the state of being determinant of counter-positive-ness. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference; ‘it has fire because of smoke’ even though the wood etc. which has smoke etc., by the temporal relation, exists in lake etc. by the relation conjunction. That counter-positive-ness means the counter-positive-ness of the absence of the reason. Determined by the determinant of the state of being reason. By the relation which determines the state of being a reason also should be known. Therefore there is no fault of too wide application in the inference; ‘this is different from soul because of substance-ness’ though substance-ness is the counter-positive of the absence of substance-ness by temporal relation which absence does not exist with its counter-positive by the relation which determines the counter-positive-ness that absence exists in soul, which is the substratum of absence of that which is to be established.

(जा.१९) न च हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोगिवैयधिकरण्योक्तौ एव अतिव्याप्तिवारणसम्भवात्, हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धेन प्रतियोगित्वविवक्षा व्यर्थेति वाच्यं, तथा सति निर्धूमत्वव्याप्यवान् निर्वह्नितादित्यादौ निर्वह्नित्वभेदमादायैव लक्षणसम्भवे निर्धूमत्वव्याप्येत्याद्युत्तरग्रन्थवक्ष्यमाणाव्याप्त्यलग्नतापत्तेरिति ध्येयम् ।

वस्तुतः निर्वह्नित्वस्य व्याप्यवृत्तितया तद्धेतुस्थले हेत्वभावे प्रतियोगिव्यधिकरणत्वं न देयं व्यर्थत्वात्, परन्तु हेतुतावच्छेदकसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नत्वं वाच्यम्, अतः नाग्रिमग्रन्थासङ्गतिरिति ध्येयम् ।

(J.19) It should not be said that-there is a possibility of removal of the fault of too wide application only if it is mentioned different substratum-ness of counter-positive non-existence by the relation which determines the state of being a reason. Therefore desire to say counter-positive-ness as delimited by the relation which determines the state of being reason is use-less. This is because in that case there is possibility of the application of definition by taking in to account the mutual absence of the difference from fire in the inference; “this has that which is pervaded by the absence of smoke because of absence of fire”. So the too narrow application which is to be mentioned in the later text would be irrelevant, this should be noted.

Indeed, the absence of fire is a non-partial existent, hence where this is a reason there non-existence with its counter-positive should not be mentioned with regard to the absence of reason, cause it will be useless, but the state of being determined by the relation which determines the state of

(जा.२०) हेत्वभावे प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नवैयधिकरण्य-विवक्षायाः फलमाह-तेन द्रव्यत्वादाविति । अन्यथा साध्याभाववति गुणादौ विशिष्टसत्ताभावस्य सत्तारूपप्रतियोगिसमानाधिकरणत्वाद-व्याप्तिरेव स्यादिति भावः ।

(जा.२१) अत्र तु द्रव्यत्वसाध्यतायां साकल्याप्रसिद्ध्या अव्याप्तेरुक्तविवक्षयापि अप्रतीकारात्-आदिपदम् । तेन गुणवत्त्वादि-साध्यस्योपग्रहः द्रव्येतरासमवेतमात्रं वा प्रकृते द्रव्यत्वमिति ध्येयम् ।

being a reason should be added, therefore there is no irrelevance of later text, This should be understood.

(J.20) Author says the fruit of desire to be mentioning non-existence with that which is determined by the determinant of counter-positive-ness in the respect of the absence of reason by the expression 'there-fore in substance-ness' etc. Otherwise there would be a fault of too narrow application because of the absence of qualified existence is co-existent with its counter-positive in quality etc. in the form of existence and so on, which have the absence of that which is to be established. This is the idea.

(J.21) Here where substance-ness is that which is to be established 'all' is not established, there is a fault of too narrow application which is not avoided, eventhough there is desire to apply that qualifier. Therefore the word and etc. is used, by this the state of having quality etc. as that which is to be established, is included or only non-inherence in that which is different from substance is the meaning of substance-ness, in present case this should be noted. Author says the result of desire to

हेतुतावच्छेदकरूपावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वविवक्षाया फलमाह-न वेति ।
सत्त्वादाविति । द्रव्यत्वादौ साध्ये इति अनुषज्यते ।

पञ्चमं लक्षणम्

(त.५) साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वं वा,
केवलान्वयिनि अभावात् ।

(दी.९) यत्र एकव्यक्तिकं साध्यं विपक्षो वा तत्र निर्धूम-
त्वादिव्याप्ये तत्त्वेन साध्ये निर्वहित्वादौ चाव्याप्तिस्तत्र हेत्वभावस्य
वहन्यादेः प्रत्येकं यावद्विपक्षावृत्तित्वादत आह-साध्यवदिति ।

(जा.२२) यत्र एकव्यक्तिकमिति । तथा च द्रव्यं पृथिवीत्वाद्

mention the counter-positive-ness determined by the attribute which determines the state of being reason by the expression 'or not.' 'In the existence etc.' should be followed by when substance-ness is that which is to be established.

The Fifth definition of vyāpti.

(T.5) (Nor,) The non-occurrence (of the reason) in the substratum which is different from that which has that which is to be established, this is because all these definitions are not applicable in the pure affirmative reason.

(D.9) Where *sādhya* is one individual thing, or contradictory subject, there which is pervaded by the absence of smoke as its own capacity is *sādhya* and the absence of fire is reason, there is a fault of too narrow application, because the absence of reason fire etc. everyone does not exists is all contradictory subjects therefore author says *sādhyaavaditi*.

(J.22) 'Where one individual is that which is to be

इत्यादावव्याप्तिः सकलसाध्याप्रसिद्धेरित्यर्थः । ननु इतोऽप्यस्वरसात् साध्यसामान्याभावस्यैव निविष्टत्वात् साध्ये साकल्यं न देयमेव इत्यत आह-विपक्षो वेति । विपक्षः साध्याभाववान्, ★तद्धटावृत्तिधर्मवान् तद्धटान्यत्वादित्यादावव्याप्तिः साध्यभाववत्तद्धटस्य साकल्याप्रसिद्धेरिति भावः ।

(जा.२३) साध्याभावन्निष्ठान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकी-भूताभावप्रतियोगित्वं वक्तव्यमतः दोषान्तरमाह-निर्धूमेति कश्चित् ।

established.' Therefore there is fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this is substance because of earth-ness'. Because all those which are to be established, are not established, this is the meaning. 'All', should not be connected with that which is to be established because even more due to incongruity, only the absence of that which is to be established in general is included, therefore author says 'or counter-subject.' Countersubject means that which has the absence of that which is to be established. There is fault of too narrow application in the inference; 'this has the attribute which dose not abide in that pot because it is different from that pot etc.," because 'all-ness' of that pot which is abode by the absence of that which is to be established is not established. This is the idea.

(23) The counter-positive-ness of the absence which is not determinant of the conuter-positive-ness of the mutual absence, which exists in that, which has the absence of that

★ Editor's Note : 'एकव्यावर्तक इत्यनुषज्यते । तथा च यत्रैकव्याक्तिरेव साध्याभाववती तत्र' This text is available in printed book of 'व्याप्तिपञ्चक' with Jāgdiśī which is explained by Vāmācārāṇbhattachārya but not translated by translator.

(जा.२४) ननु साध्यादिभेदेन व्याप्तेर्भेदात् यत्रैकव्यक्तिरेव विपक्षस्तत्र लक्षणे साध्याभाववति साकल्यविशेषणं न देयमिति दोषान्तरमाह-निर्धूमत्वव्याप्य इति ।

निर्धूमत्वस्य साध्यत्वे यत्रैकव्यक्तिकमित्यनेनैव गतार्थता स्यादतो व्याप्यपर्यन्तं, निर्धूमत्वव्याप्यस्यापि स्नेहादेः स्नेहत्वादिना साध्यत्वे

which is to be established should be stated. Therefore author points out another fault by the expression 'absence of smoke'. This is stated by some one.

(J.24) Where only one individual is the counter-subject there in the definition 'all' should not be applied with that which has the absence of that which is to be established. This is because *vyāpti* is different due to difference in that which is to be established. Therefore author says another fault by the expression 'that which is pervaded by the absence of smoke.'

When the absence of smoke is that which is to be established, then by the expression only 'where one individual,' the purpose may be achieved, therefore author goes till that which is pervaded, oily-ness which is pervaded by the absence of smoke also is that which is to be established by the state of being oily-ness there is no fault of non-inclusion because of deviation of the absence of fire. Therefore author said 'when that which is to be established by the state of being that. When that which is to be established is in the form of that which is pervaded by the absence of smoke, this is the meaning.

Every individual, there is fault of two narrow application, because Absence of reason in the form of the fire in the kitchen, etc. is non-existent in mountain which is included in all those

वहन्यभावस्य व्यभिचारित्वादसङ्ग्रहो न दोष इत्यत उक्तं-तत्त्वेन साध्ये इति । निर्धूमत्वव्याप्यत्वेन साध्ये इत्यर्थः ।

प्रत्येकमिति । हेत्वभावस्य महानसीयादिवहेः साध्याभाववत् सकलान्तर्गतपर्वताद्यवृत्तित्वादव्याप्तिरिति^{६७} भावः । निरुक्तप्रतियोगि-वैयधिकरण्यावच्छिन्नसाध्याभावव्यापकतावच्छेदकं निरुक्तप्रतियोगि-वैयधिकरण्यावच्छिन्नयद्रूपावच्छिन्नाभाववत्त्वं तद्रूपवत्त्वं व्याप्तिरित्युक्तौ तु न दोष इति ध्येयम् ।

(दी.१०) अत्र अन्योन्याभावस्य साध्यवत्तावच्छिन्नप्रति-

which has the absence of that which is to be established, this is the idea. Therefore there is a fault of too narrow application⁶⁷. The state of having that attribute which is the state of being absence determined by that particular attribute and which is determined by said non-existence with its counter-positive and which is determinant of the state of being pervaded and of the absence of that which is to be and established, which is determined by said non co-existent with its counter-positive is *vyāpti*, when it is stated there is no any fault, it should be understood.

(D.10) Here state of having counter-positive-ness of mutual absence is determined by state of having *sādhya* is

68. अव्याप्तिरिति—There is a fault of too narrow application. The kitchen fire which is absence of fire can't be accepted in the mountain which has similies absence of that which is to be established in that kitchen the similar fire of mountain does not exist, so by the word the similar absence which occurs in the locus of similar absence of that which is to be established, the absence of reason that is absence of absence of fire can't be accepted therefore there is fault of too narrow application

योगिताकत्वं व्युत्पत्तिबललभ्यम् । न हि भवति नीलो घटो
घटादन्य^{६८} इति ।

इति व्याप्तिपञ्चकस्य रघुनाथशिरोमणिकृता
दीधितिव्याख्या समाप्ता ॥

(जा.२५) ननु साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्यत्वस्य धूमादिमति
सत्त्वादव्याप्तिरत आह-अत्रेति । तथा च साध्यवत्पदेन निरूढलक्षणया
उपस्थापितस्य साध्यतावच्छेदकविशिष्टसाध्यवत्तावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता-
कस्य अन्यपदार्थैकदेशे अन्यत्वे तादात्म्येन अन्वयात् साध्यवति च
साध्यवत्तावच्छिन्नभेदासत्त्वात् न अव्याप्तिः^{६९} । गुरुधर्मस्य अवच्छेदक-

apprehended through denotative function, because bluepot is not
different from a pot.⁶⁸

Thus the commentary on *Vyāpti-Pañcaka* by
Raghunātha Śīromaṇi is over.

(J.25) The difference from that which has that which is
to be established, exists in that which has smoke. Therefore
there is a fault of too narrow application, hence author says
'here.' In this way, there is no fault of too narrow application⁶⁹
because in that which has that which is to be established, the

68. न हीति—"Not just" This is different from the jar. Here jar is connected
with the meaning of difference by relation state of being counter-
positive-ness determined by potness different from that which has
sādhya which is here also the thing that which has sādhya is
connected with difference by the relation of state of being counter-
positive-ness determined by state of being sādhya.

69. नाव्याप्तिरिति—No fault of too narrow application. Because of meaning of

त्वोपगमाच्च द्रव्यं पृथिवीत्वादित्यादौ द्रव्यत्वत्वविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वव-
त्वावच्छिन्नभेदाप्रसिद्ध्या नाव्याप्तिरिति भावः^{७०} ।

mutual absence determined by the state of having that which is to be established, does not exist because of that, which has the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of having that which is to be established qualified by determinant of the state of that which is to be established which is presented by word 'that which is to be established', is related, by identity relation with 'difference' which is the part of the meaning of different, when the cumbersome attribute is accepted as determinant, there is no fault of too narrow application⁷⁰ in the inference;

fifth definition is the absence of occurrence (of reason) in the locus of mutual absence, counter-positive-ness of which is indicated by state of being determinant which is determined by the determinant of the state of being sādhyā. Therefore the mutual absence of that which has fire and jar and the mutual absence of kitchen which has fire, cannot be taken and the mutual absence of that which has fire only can be taken according to early mentioned mutual absence of locus, that absence exists in water etc., where smoke does not exist. Therefore there is no fault of too narrow application in the inference, "this has fire because of smoke." This is the idea.

70. नाव्याप्तिरिति भावः—No fault of too narrow application. Just counter-positive-ness does not happen determined by heavy property is not proved and the attribute which is qualified by heavy property cumbersome also is not proved. Therefore, taking in to account the mutual absence of that which has substanceness qualified by substance-ness the fault of too narrow application in the inference "this is substance because of earthness." This is the idea.

(जा.२६) यद्धर्माविशिष्टबोधकपदसमभिव्याहतेन अन्यादिपदेन उपस्थापिते अन्यत्वादौ तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वप्रकारेणैव तादात्म्येन अन्वयो, न तु तद्धर्माश्रयप्रतियोगिताकत्वेन इत्यत्र व्युत्पत्तौ प्राचां संवादमाह न हीति । तथा च तादृशव्युत्पत्त्यस्वीकारे नीलघटे घटप्रतियोगिकभेदसत्त्वात् नीलघटो घटान्य इत्यपि व्यवहारः स्यादिति भावः ।

(जा.२७) अत्र च द्रव्यं घटान्यदित्याद्यप्रयोगात् यद्विशिष्टप्रति-

‘this is substance because of earth-ness’ due to non-establishment of the mutual absence of that which is determined by the state of having substance-ness qualified by substance-ness-ness. This is the idea.

(J.26) The difference which is expressed by the word ‘different’ which is semantically connected with the word which conveys that qualified by which particular attribute, is related by identity as having as qualifier the state of having counter-positive-ness determined by that particular attribute, and not having as qualifier the state of having the counter-positive-ness which exists in that which is the substratum of that particular attribute. In this theory author points out agreement of old logicians by the expression ‘not because.’ Therefore if such theory is not accepted there would be such a usage that ‘the blue-pot is different from a pot.’ This is because there is mutual absence which has a pot as its counter-positive. This is the idea.

(J.27) And here the mutual absence as having counter-positive-ness qualified by which particular attribute should be known by the term difference etc. because there is no usage as

योगिकत्वेन भेदः अन्यादिशब्देन बोध्यः, तदवृत्तिधर्मस्यैव अनुयोगिता-
वच्छेदकत्वात् तत्र घटो घटान्य इत्यस्य वारणासम्भवात् नीलघटत्वस्य
धर्मितावच्छेदकत्वानुधावनमिति मन्तव्यम् ।

(जा.२८) नीलो घटो घटान्य इत्येव सम्यक् पाठः तथैव
प्रकृतोपयोगित्वसङ्गतेर्घटादन्य इति पाठस्तु साध्यवदन्य इत्यत्र पञ्चमी-
समासे लुप्तविभक्तिस्मारितप्रतियोगित्वे प्रकृत्यर्थावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्वस्य
संसर्गमर्यादया भानमादृत्य कथञ्चित् सङ्गमनीयः ।

(जा.२९) घटः पटो न इत्यादौ पटपदं मुख्यार्थपरमेव, न तु प्रकृत

substance is different from a pot, because the attribute which is not there is determination of substanceness. There is possibility of avoiding the usage 'the pot is different from pot', therefore author had to mention the blue-jar-ness, as the determinant of the state of being substratum, this should be noted.

(J.28) 'The blue pot is different from a pot' this is a correct version, by this only there is consistency with present use, the text 'different from a pot' should be supported any how taking in to account the apprehension through the limitation of relation, of state of being determined by the determinant of the state of being present meaning, in the counter-positive-ness which is reminded by hidden case in the fifth compound in the expression 'different from that which is different from that which has that which is to be established.'

(J.29) In the expression 'the pot is not a cloth' the word 'cloth' reveals main meaning and not that which has the counter-positive-ness determined by pot-ness just as in present

इव पटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकपरं निपातातिरिक्तस्थल एव नामार्थयो-
 र्भेदान्वयस्य अव्युत्पन्नतया नञ्पदोपस्थाप्यभेदे पटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रति-
 योगिताकत्वसंसर्गेणैव पटस्यान्वयसम्भवात् । पटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिता-
 कत्वन्तु पटत्वमवच्छिन्नत्वं प्रतियोगित्वञ्चेति त्रितयमेव, विशेष्य-
 विशेषणभावापन्नसंसर्गः, न तु वस्तुगत्या पटत्वावच्छिन्नं यत् प्रतियोगित्वं
 तन्मात्रं, पटो न इत्यत्र प्रतियोगितायां पटत्वावच्छिन्नत्वमानस्य अनुभव-
 सिद्धत्वात्, अन्यथा प्रतियोगिताव्यक्तिभिरेव तत्तद्विशिष्टबुद्ध्युपपत्तौ
 पटत्वादेस्तदवच्छेदकत्वमेव न स्यात्, मानाभावात् । अत एव

case. This is because the difference relation of two meanings of two names is not apprehended in the case, other than *nipāt* only. Therefore there is possibility of the connection of cloth with difference which is presented by negative term by the relation state of having counter-positive-ness determined by cloth-ness. (And the state of having counter-positive-ness determined by cloth-ness,) Here cloth-ness, the state of being determined by cloth-ness and counter-positive-ness all the three are relations, which are apprehended by qualifier and qualified relation-ship and not indeed the counter-positive-ness determined by cloth-ness alone, because in the expression ‘this is not a cloth’ it is proved by experience. Otherwise there would be the knowledge of thing qualified by that particular attribute, through individual counter-positive-ness only, cloth-ness would not be determinant of that because there is no proof. Therefore in *kevalānvayi*-chapter author him-self has said, that in the notion ‘there is absence of fire’ fire-ness, state of being

केवलान्वयिग्रन्थे वह्निर्नास्तीत्यत्र वह्नित्वमवच्छिन्नत्वं प्रतियोगित्वञ्च संसर्गमर्यादया भासते इति स्वयमप्युक्तम् ।

(जा.३०) इत्थमेव च प्रमेयं नास्ति कम्बुग्रीवादिमान् नास्तीत्यादिशाब्दबोधानां संसर्गकोटावेव प्रतियोगितायां प्रमेयत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नत्वावगाहितया भ्रमत्वं, संसर्गप्रकारसाधारणविशेष्यविशेषणभावस्यैव भ्रमत्वघटकत्वात्, अन्यथा स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन प्रमेयत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वस्य अलीकतया अखण्डतादृशसम्बन्धेन प्रमेयस्य अभावधर्मिणि अन्वयासम्भवेन भ्रमत्वानुपपत्तेः, सदुपरागेणाप्यसतः संसर्गमर्यादया भानस्य

determined, and counter-positive-ness all these three are apprehended through the limitation of relation (*saṃsarga-maryādā*).

(J.30) In this way, verbal apprehensions such as ‘there is the absence of object of valid knowledge, there is absence of that which has conch like neck,’ are error like in the side of relation, when in the counter-positive-ness is determined by state of being knowable (*prameyatva*) etc. because the qualifier-qualified relationship which is common to relation and qualifier is only included in the state of being error, otherwise the counter-positive-ness determined by the state of being knowable (*prameyatva*) by the relation self-some-ness (*svarūpa*) is non-existent, therefore there is no possibility of relation of knowable with locus of absence by part-less such a relation, hence that would not be an error. This is because the apprehension on non-existent by imposition of existent through the limitation of relation is not accepted by the author of ‘*maṇi*’

मणिकृता अनङ्गीकारात् । क्लृप्तेन पटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन च अभावे प्रमेयस्य सत्त्वेन तादृशसम्बन्धेन भ्रमत्वस्य वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् , पटत्वादेरन्वयितानवच्छेदकतया तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन प्रमेयत्वादिविशिष्टस्यान्वये निराकाङ्क्षत्वाच्च, अन्यथा घटवति अपि घटो नास्तीत्यादेः प्रमात्वापत्तेः, तत्तद्घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन घटविशिष्टस्य घटविशेषाभावस्य तत्र सत्त्वात् ।

(जा.३१) एतेन सत्तासमवायिनि अपि गुणादौ विशिष्टसत्तात्वा-वच्छिन्नस्य समवायेन असत्त्ववत् घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन घटत्वावच्छिन्नवतोऽपि घटाद्यभावस्य न तादृशसम्बन्धेन प्रमेयत्वाद्य-

and by known relation in the form of counter-positive-ness determined by cloth-ness the knowable exists in absence, therefore by this relation, it cannot be treated as error and because clothness is not determinant of state of having relation by the relation of counter-positive-ness determined by that, clothness there is no expectancy for the connection of that which is qualified by state of being knowable. Otherwise the notion that there would be no pot valid in the locus of a pot because there is absence of a particular pot which (absence) is qualified by the pot by the relation of counter-positive-ness determined by pot-ness.

(J.31) By this way, in quality etc. which is inherent of existence also, there that which is determined by the state of being qualified-existence dose not exist. In the same way the absence of a pot has that which is determined by pot-ness by the relation of counter-positive-ness determined by pot-ness, it

वच्छिन्नत्वम् । अतः प्रमेयं नास्तीत्यादौ घटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगात्वसम्बन्धेनैव प्रमेयत्वावच्छिन्नत्वस्यैव अभावांशे भ्रमत्वमित्यपि प्रत्युक्तं, घटत्वादेरन्वयितानवच्छेदकतया तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वसम्बन्धेन प्रमेयत्वविशिष्टस्य अन्वये निराकाङ्क्षतया तथा शाब्दस्य असम्भवाद् इति ध्येयम् ।

(जा.३२) नीलो घटो नास्तीत्यादौ नीलघटत्वस्य अन्वयितावच्छेदकत्वे तादृशधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वमेव संसर्गो, न तु नीलत्वादिप्रत्येकधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वम्, नीलपटस्य पीतघटस्य च अधिकरणे तादृशप्रयोगापलापपत्तेः नीलत्वोपलक्षितस्य घटत्वमात्रस्य

has no the state of being substratum of that which is determined by the state of being knowable, by that relation. Therefore in the notion that 'there is no knowable there is the state of being error of the state of being determined by state of being knowable, in the absence by the relation of counter-positive-ness determined by potness. This also is refuted, because there is no expectancy for the connection of that which is qualified by state of being knowable, by the relation of counter-positive-ness by that (pot-ness) because pot-ness is not the determinant of the state of being related, therefore there is no possibility of verbal cognition, this should be understood.

(J.32) "There is not blue pot," here when the state of being blue pot is a determinant of state of being related, the counter-positive-ness determined by that attribute alone is a relation and not the counter-positive-ness determined by every individual like blue potness etc. this is because there would be the fault of refuting of the usage of that in the substratum of blue and yellow pot. Where only potness indicated by blue-ness by the relation

अन्वयितावच्छेदकत्वस्थले तु नोपलक्षितघटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वमेव, तथा नीलो संयोगेन घटो नास्तीत्यादौ तृतीयाविभक्तेर्नावच्छिन्नत्वमर्थः संसर्गीभूतप्रतियोगितायां तदन्वयासम्भवात्,★ किन्तु अवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वं प्रतियोगितामात्रं वा अवच्छिन्नत्वसंसर्गेण संयोगादेस्तत्रान्वयादेव विशिष्टलाभात् ।

(जा.३३) न च एवं संयोगेन घटाभावस्यैव समवायेन घटविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वाभावतया समवायेन कपाले घटो नास्तीति व्यवहारापत्तिः, तृतीयान्तसमभिव्याहारस्थले तदुपस्थाप्यप्रतियोगित्वस्यैव संसर्गतया

conjunction there counter-positive-ness determined by indicated pot-ness, is a relation. In the notion, ‘there is not a pot by the relation of conjunction’ semantic the meaning of third case is not the state of being determined, because in that case there would not be the connection of that with the counter-positive-ness, which is a form of relation, but state of having a counter-positive-ness determined by (something) or only counter-positive-ness is the relation, due to the connection of conjunction with it by the relation of state of being determined by (something), there is apprehension of a qualified thing.

(J.33) And it should not be stated that-in this way, there should be usage that ‘there is not a pot in the half of the pot by the relation of inherence,’ this is because the absence of pot by

★ Editor’s Note : ‘पदार्थापदार्थयोरन्वयस्य निराकाङ्क्षत्वात्, पदार्थः पदार्थेनान्वीयते इति नियमाच्च’ This text is available in printed book of ‘व्याप्तिपञ्चक’ with Jāgdiśi which is explained by Vāmācaraṇbhattachārya but not translated by translator.

भानस्य व्युत्पन्नत्वात् समवायावच्छिन्नघटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताका-
भावस्य च कपाले विरहात् ।

(जा.३४) अस्तु वा घटत्वावच्छिन्नत्वस्यैव संयोगादिसम्बन्धा-
वच्छिन्नत्वस्यापि प्रतियोगित्वांशे संसर्गमर्यादयैव भानं तृतीयान्तसमभि-
व्याहारस्य नियामकत्वाच्च नातिप्रसङ्गः । ‘घटानधिकरणं; भूतलम्’
इत्यादौ तु लक्षणया अधिकरणपदमेव घटाधिकरणार्थकं घटपदं तु
तात्पर्यग्राहकम्, अन्यथा अनधिकरणपदेन अधिकरणसामान्यभिन्नत्वोक्तौ
च भूतले तस्य बाधः स्यात् । न च घटान्वितस्यैव अधिकरणस्य भेदस्तत्र
नञा बोधनीयः समासान्तर्गतनञ उत्तरपदार्थमात्रान्वयित्वव्युत्पत्तेः ।

relation conjunction is identical with the absence of
substanteness qualified by pot by the relation inherence,
because when there is proximity of word ending with third
case, the counter-positive-ness which is expressed by that, is
apprehended as a relation and the absence having the counter-
positive-ness determined by pot-ness and the relation of
inherence, does not exist in the part of the pot.

(J.34) Or let it be a cognition of the state of being
determined by the relation of conjunction limitation in the
counter-positive-ness by the expectancy (*saṃsargamaryādā*)
just like the state of being determined by pot-ness and because
of the proximity of word ending with third case is a limiter.
Therefore there is not fault of too wide application. In the
notion ‘the ground is non substratum of pot’ the word
substratum denotes the substratum of pot by implication and
the word pot is conveyer of the intention of speaker, otherwise

अन्यथा नीला नीलघटो घटो घट इत्यादौ नीलघटान्यस्य घटत्वं नीलाप्रमेयः पट इत्यादौ च नीलप्रमेयान्यस्य पटत्वं प्रतीयते । वस्तुतः सम्बन्धिकपदस्थले व्युत्पत्तिवैचित्र्यात् प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकं घटानधिकरणमित्यादौ घटाद्यन्वितस्यैवाधिकरणादेर्भेदो भासते★ इति परमार्थः ।

(जा.३५) पीतः शङ्खो नास्तीत्यादि शाब्दबोधस्तु शङ्खत्वा-वच्छिन्नतया न प्रतियोगित्वमवगाहते तन्मात्रस्यान्वयितानवच्छेदकत्वात्, शङ्खवत्तया निश्चिते धर्मिण्यपि तादृशप्रयोगात्, परन्तु पीतशङ्खत्वा-

if by the word; “non-substratum” the difference from all substrata is stated, there would be contradiction, in the ground, and the mutual absence of substratum related with a pot should not be conveyed by negation, because ‘the negation in the compound should be connected with only the meaning of next word’ this is the rule other-wise in the usage ‘blue-non-pot is a pot,’ pot-ness of other than blue pot’ and in ‘blue non-knowable would be a cloth’ cloth-ness is of other than blue knowable, is cognized. Infact in the case the word which denotes relative due to difference in notions in the case of the usage ‘non-determinant of the counter-positive-ness,’ that ‘non substratum of pot’, etc. the difference of substratum etc. related with pot is apprehended, this is the reality.

(J.35) ‘There is not yellow conch,’ in this verblal

★ Editor’s Note : अन्यत्र त्रिपदतत्पुरुषानुपगमेऽपि घटस्य नाधिकरणं, प्रतियोगिताया नावच्छेदकम् - इत्यादिरीत्या त्रिपदतत्पुरुषेण विशिष्टलाभसम्भवादिति । This text is available in printed book of ‘व्याप्तिपञ्चक’ with Jāgdiśi which is explained by Vāmācāraṇbhattachārya, but not translated by translator.

वच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितात्वेन संसर्गमर्यादया प्रतियोगित्वमवगाहते । नञादि-
पदानां यद्धर्मविशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहित्वोपस्थाप्याभावधर्मिकान्वयबोध-
जनकत्वं तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वेन प्रतियोगितासंसर्गधीजनकत्व-
व्युत्पत्तेः । इयान् तु विशेषः-यत् घटो नास्ति इत्यादिशाब्दबोधे
सांसर्गिकप्रतियोगित्वावगाहितप्रसिद्धन घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितात्वेनैव
निरूपिता, पीतः शङ्खो नास्तीत्यादौ तु पीतशङ्खत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितात्वेन

cognition the counter-positive-ness is not apprehended as being determined by conch-ness because that only is not determinant of the state of being related (*anvayitā*), because which is definite locus of conch there also is found such usage, but the counter-positive-ness is cognized as having the state of being counter-positive-ness determined by yellow-conch-ness through the limitation of relation (*saṃsarga-maryādā*). 'Negative words bring out verbal apprehension which has the absence as substratum presented by that (knowledge) which has the relation of that which is qualified by which particular attribute, as being determinant by that particular attribute, it brings out the knowledge of counter-positive-ness relation,' this is the rule.

This is the peculiarity here. In verbal cognition as 'there is absence of a pot' there, objectiveness of the counter-positive-ness as being a relation is not established there the counter-positive-ness is mentioned as being counter-positive-ness determined by pot-ness only is mentioned and in the verbal apprehension 'there is absence of yellow conch' the counter-positive-ness determined by yellow conch-ness is not

अप्रसिद्धेनैव इत्यादिकं बहुतरम् ऊहनीयम् ।

इति जगदीशतर्कालङ्कारकृता
विवृत्तिनाम्नी दीधितिव्याख्या समाप्ता

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established and so on. Many things are should be thinkable here.

Thus the Vivritti commentary on Dīdhiti by Jāgadiśa Tarkālaṅkāra ends.

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Appendix-1 A

Terminology (San.-Eng.)

अतिव्याप्ति	Fault of too wide application, fault of over extension
अत्यन्त	Absolute, constant
अत्यन्तभाव	Absolute-absence, constant absence
अधिकरण	Substratum
अधिकरण, आधार, आश्रय	Substratum, locus
अधिकरणत्व	State of being substratum, state of being locus, locusness
अनवस्था	Regress, infinitude
अनुमान	Inference
अनुमती	Inferential knowledge
अनुयोगी	Relatum
अन्योन्याभावः भेदः	Mutual basence, difference
अन्वय	Semantic relation, connection, grammatical connection, agreement
अप्रसिद्ध	Non-established
अबाधित	Unsublated
अभाव	Absence
अभावत्व	Absenceness
अभिधेयत्व	Name-ability
अभिहितान्वयवाद	Theory of meaning
अभेद, तादात्म्य	Identity, non-difference
अभ्युदय	Exaltation
अलक्ष्य	Indefinable
अवच्छिन्न	Determined
अवच्छिन्नत्व	State of being determined
अवच्छेदक	Determinant, limiter

अवच्छेदकता	State of being determinate, limitary, controller
अवृत्ति	Non-occurrent
अव्यभिचरित्वम्, व्याप्तिः,	
अविनाभाव	Absence of deviation
अव्याप्ति	Fault of too narrow application, too narrow definition, under-extenuation
अव्याप्यवृत्ति	Incomplete occurrent, partial occurrent, partial existent
अव्याप्यवृत्तित्व	Incomplete occurrent, partial existences, partial occurrence
अशेषत्वम्	Perviderness
असम्भव	Fault of impossibility
अस्वरसः	Incongruity
आकाश, गगन	Ether
आधार, आश्रय, अधिकरण	Substratum, locus
आधेय	Superstratum
आधेयता	Occurrence
आश्रय, अधिकरण, आधार	Locus, substratum
उपमिती	Analogy
उपराग	Imposition
उपाधि	Adjunct
उपाय	Method
कालिक सम्बन्ध / कालिक	
विशेषणता	Temporal relation
केवलान्वयि	Pure-affirmative
गगन, आकाश	Ether
ग्रह	Grasping
चालनीय न्याय	Filter-action
जातिः	Generic attribute

ज्ञान	Apprehension
तात्पर्य	Intention of speaker
तादात्म्य, अभेद	Innity, non-difference
दृष्टान्त	Example
धर्म	Attribute
ध्वंस, प्रध्वंसाभाव	Posterior(absence), destruction
पक्ष	Subject
पृथक्त्व	Separateness
प्रतियोगिन्	Counter positive
प्रतीति	Notion
प्रमाण	Testimony
प्रमेय	Object of Valid Knowledge
प्रसिद्ध	Established
प्रागभाव	Prior (absence)
प्रामाण्य	Validity
बोध	Cognition
भेद, अन्योन्याभाव	Mutual absence, difference
मूर्त	Material, Substance
लक्षणा	Implication, secondary meaning
लक्ष्य	Definable
विपक्ष	Contradictory subject, counter subject
विभाग	Disjunction
विशिष्टभाव	Qualified absence
विषयता	Subjectness
वृत्तित्वम्	Occurrence, Existence, State of being existent
व्यतिरेक	Disagreement
व्यभिचारी	Deviation
व्यभिचारी हेतु	Devious reason
व्यापक	Pervasive

व्यापकत्वम्	Pervasiveness
व्याप्तिः, अविनाभाव	Conductance, invariable relation, operation
व्याप्ति	Invariable concomitance
व्याप्ति, अव्यभिचरित्वम्, अविनाभाव	Invariable relation, conductance, operation, pervasion, invariable, concomitance
व्याप्य	Pervaded
व्याप्यवृत्ति	Non-partial existent
व्याप्यवृत्तित्व	Non-partial existence
व्युत्पत्ति	Denotative function
शब्दबोध	Verbal Cogition
संयोग	Conjunction, connection, contact
सङ्ख्या	Number
सत्त्व	Existence (one of generic attributes)
सपक्ष	Definite subject
समभिव्याहार	Proximity
समवाय	Inherence
समवायिकारण	Inherence-cause
साध्य	Probandum, that which is to be established
सामर्थ्याभाव	Absence of capacity
स्वरूपसम्बन्ध	Self-linking connectors, relation self-someness
हेतु	Reason (which brings out the knowledge to hidden thing.)

• • •

Appendix-1 B

Terminology (Eng.-San.)

Absence	अभाव
Absence of capacity	सामर्थ्यभाव
Absence of deviation	अव्यभिचरित्वम्, व्याप्तिः अविनाभाव
Absenceness	अभावत्व
Absolute, constant	अत्यन्त
Absolute-absence, constant absence	अत्यन्ताभाव
Adjunct	उपाधि
Anology	उपमिती
Apprehension	ज्ञान
Attribute	धर्म
Congition	बोध
Conductance, invariable relation, operation	व्याप्तिः, अविनाभाव
Conjunction, connection, contact	संयोग
Constant absence, absolute-absence	अत्यन्ताभाव
Constant, absolute	अत्यन्त
Contradictory subject, counter subject	विपक्ष
Counter positive	प्रतियोगिन्
Definable	लक्ष्य
Definite subject	सपक्ष
Denotative function	व्युत्पत्ति
Determinant, limitor	अवच्छेदक
Determined	अवच्छिन्न
Deviation	व्यभिचारी
Devious reason	व्यभिचारी हेतु
Disagreement	व्यतिरेक
Disjunction	विभाग
Established	प्रसिद्ध
Ether	आकाश, गगन
Exalitation	अभ्युदय

Example	दृष्टान्त
Existence (one of generic attributes)	सत्त्व
Fault of impossibility	असम्भव
Fault of too narrow application, too narrow definition, under-extension	अव्याप्ति
Fault of too wide application, fault of over extension	अतिव्याप्ति
Filter-action	चालनीय न्याय
Generic attribute	जातिः
Grammatical connection	अन्वय
Grasping	ग्रह
Identity, non-difference	अभेद, तादात्म्य
Implication, secondary meaning	लक्षणा
Imposition	उपराग
Incomplete occurrence, partial existence, partial occurrence	अव्याप्यवृत्तित्व
Incomplete occurrence, partial occurrence, partial existent	अव्याप्यवृत्ति
Incongruity	अस्वरसः
Indefenable	अलक्ष्य
Inference	अनुमान
Inferential knowledge	अनुमिती
Infinity, regress	अनवस्था
Inherence	समवाय
Inherence-cause	समवायिकारण
Intention of speaker	तात्पर्य
Invariable relation, conductance, operation, pervasion, invariable, concomitance	व्याप्ति, अव्यभिचरितत्त्वम्, अविनाभाव
Invariable concomitance	व्याप्ति
Locus, substratum	आश्रय, अधिकरण, आधार
Locusness, substratumness	अधिकरणत्व

Material, substance	मूर्त
Method	उपाय
Mutual absence, difference	अन्योन्याभावः भेदः
Name-ability	अभिधेयत्व
Non- difference, identity	तादात्म्य, अभेद
Non-established	अप्रसिद्ध
Non-occurrent	अवृत्ति
Non-partial existence	व्याप्यवृत्ति
Non-partial existent	व्याप्यवृत्तित्व
Notion	प्रतीति
Number	सङ्ख्या
Object of Valid Knowledge	प्रमेय
Occurrence	आधेयता
Occurrence, existence, state of being existent	वृत्तित्वम्
Operation, invariable relation, conductance, pervasion	व्याप्तिः, अविनाभाव, अव्यभिचरित्वम्
Pervaded	व्याप्य
Pervasion, invariable-concomitance, conductance, operation	व्याप्तिः, अविनाभाव
Pervasive	व्यापक
Pervasiveness	व्यापकत्वम्
Pervertedness	अशेषत्वम्
Posterior(absence), destruction	ध्वंस, प्रध्वंसाभाव
Prior (absence)	प्रागभाव
Probondum, that which is to be established	साध्य
Proximity	समभिव्याहार
Pure-affirmative	केवलान्वयि
Qualified absence	विशिष्टाभाव
Reason (which brings out the knowledge to hidden thing.)	हेतु

Regress, infinitude	अनवस्था
Relation self-some-ness	स्वरूपसम्बन्ध
Relatum	अनुयोगी
Self-linking connectors, relation self-some-ness	स्वरूपसम्बन्ध
Semantic relation, connection, grammatical connection, agreement	अन्वय
Separateness	पृथक्त्व
State of being determinate, limitor, controler	अवच्छेदकता
State of being determined	अवच्छिन्नत्व
State of being substratum, state of being locus, locusness	अधिकरणत्व
Subject	पक्ष
Subjectness	विषयता
Substance, material	मूर्त
Substratum	अधिकरण
Substratum, locus	अधिकरण, आधार, आश्रय
Superstratum	आधेय
Temporal relation	कालिक सम्बन्ध/कालिक विशेषणता
Testimony	प्रमाण
Theory of meaning	अभिहितान्वयवाद
Unsublated	अबाधित
Validity	प्रामाण्य
Verbal Cognition	शाब्दबोध

Appendix-2 A

Figures (Eng.)

Fig.-1




Fig.-1A




Fig.-2




Fig.-2 A




Fig.-3




Fig.-3 A




Fig.-4

That Which is to be




Fig.-4 A




Fig.-5





Fig.-5 A



Appendix-2-B

व्याप्तिपञ्चकम् ।

१. साध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम् ।

Fig.-1





Fig.-1A



२. साध्यवद्भिन्नसाध्याभाववदवृत्तित्वम् ।

Fig.-2





Fig.-2 A



३. साध्यवत्प्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावासामानाधिकरण्यम् ।





Fig.-3/A



४. सकलसाध्याभाववन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वम् ।

Fig.-4





Fig.-4/A



५. साध्यवदन्यावृत्तित्वम् ।

Fig.-5





Fig.-5/A



Appendix-3

Brief Introduction of

Prof. Dr. Baliram Shukla

(Elder son of Pandit Hariram Shastri Shukla (Famous नैयायिक))

Education —

Honoured as Acharya in First class at Sanskrit University, Varanasi.

Completed M.A. in Philosophy at Kashi Hindu University, Varanasi.

Ph.D. from Delhi University, Delhi.

Important Works —

Anumān Pramāṇa (अनुमान प्रमाण) (Published)

Nyāyasidhāntamañjarī-commentary (न्यायसिद्धान्तमञ्जरी-व्याख्या) (Published)

A basic Course of Indian Logic. (Published)

Āatmatva Jātivicār (आत्मत्व जातिविचार) (Edited) (Published)

Āatmadarśanam (आत्मदर्शनम्) (Edited) (Published)

Navyanyāya ke Paribhāṣik Padārth (नव्यन्याय के पारिभाषिक पदार्थ) (1st part)

Other Works —

Nearly 50 Research papers published in different Magazines.

Presented Research papers and successfully Participated in Seminars.

Rewards —

Honoured as 'Nyāyabhūṣaṇa' (न्यायभूषण) by the Chief of Shri Rāghavendra Swami Ma-h Mantrālaya, Andhrapradesh.

Rewarded by Shri Moraya Goswami Temple Chinchawad, Pune for the great contribution in Philosophy and Sanskrit.

Honoured by Various Ācaryas and Institutes.

Delivered Lectures at —

Shri Rāmānuj Darśan college, Varanasi.

Shri Lāl Bahādur Shāstri Central Sanskrit University, New Delhi.

Worked as Head of the Philosophy Department at University of Pune.

Helped with the Guidelines to Research scholars for Ph.D.

Written and published Articles in Hindi-Marathi-Sanskrit and English.

Invited for Delivering lectures by the various Universities.

Invited for Assembly regarding the Debate by different Sanskrit Institutes.

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Appendix-4

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